OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF 

THE EUROPEAN WAR 






Copyright, 1916, 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotyped. Published Se 




StP 28 1916 



Nortoooli Jlrcas 

J. 8. Cushing Co. - Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norw I. Mass., U.S.A. 



►CI ■'. 1378G2 



INTRODUCTION 

In constitutionally governed countries it is customary for the 
Executive at important times to lay before the Representatives of 
the people "collected documents" containing the information on 
which the Government has shaped its foreign policy. 

In Great Britain these documents are often printed on large sheets 
of white paper, loosely bound, called "White Papers." If the docu- 
ments are very important, they are later reprinted in pamphlet form, 
and are then called by the color of their cover, " Blue Books." 

At the outbreak of the World War in 1914 several Governments 
besides that of Great Britain issued pamphlets of collected docu- 
ments, and these have become known, by the color of their respective 
bindings, as the German "White Book," the French "Yellow Book," 
the Russian "Orange Book," and so on. 

Following the previous customs of their respective countries the 
several Governments issued more or less exhaustive collections, and 
in each case were primarily guided by the desire to justify themselves 
before their own people. 

In America the British Blue Book won the greatest favor, not 
only because it became known first but also because of its inherent 
worth. Its despatches are well written, and sufficiently numerous 
to tell a consecutive story. The book is well printed, provided with 
indexes and cross references, and represents the most scholarly work 
done by any of the European Governments. 

The German White Book, on the other hand, contains few de- 
spatches, and these only as illustrations of points made in an exhaust- 
ive argument. Such a presentation can be convincing only if one has 
confidence in the honesty of the author. There can be no doubt that 
as a source book for study the British Parliamentary Papers are 
superior to the German Papers, but even the British Papers are not, 
as many people have wished to believe, complete and do not, there- 
fore, offer the final authority on which scholars can rely. This has 
been conceded and actually emphasized by so staunch a friend of 
the Allies as the late Charles Francis Adams. Writing in the Pro- 
ceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January, 1915, 
Mr. Adams said : — 

"We hear a great deal from those interested in original research of public 
archives and access thereto, and of dates arbitrarily fixed by the various Foreign 
Offices at which those archives have been, or are to be, laid open to the investi- 
gator. It is, however, a bit confounding in this connection to learn, as we now 






vi Introduction 

are learning, that, so far at least as the Foreign Office of Great Britain is concerned, 
the papers there to be found are at times of somewhat secondary importance. 
A knowledge of the true inwardness of any given situation of a certain sort must 
be looked for elsewhere. More even than that, the papers on file in the Foreign 
Office are not unseldom even illusory. The statement is unquestionably star- 
tling;, and how, it will be asked, did such a condition of affairs come about ? The 
explanation is curious — English ! For at least two centuries now — indeed 
ever since the British Foreign Office took its present form — a usage as to cor- 
respondence has prevailed in connection with it which has now to be reckoned 
with, a usage in no wise generally understood. As Parliament, far back in the 
eighteenth century — during in fact the Walpole epoch — gradually assumed 
the large state functions it has since developed, it became more and more a prac- 
tice to call on those constituting the Ministry for papers relating to events 
connected with foreign affairs, especially correspondence. The modern Blue 
Book was thus gradually evolved. As the practice grew, its inconveniences 
made themselves felt. Both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and those with 
whom he was in correspondence wrote under an ever increasing sense of restraint. 
A- the British diplomatic service was constituted this, not unnaturally, resulted 
in two forms of correspondence ami sets of records — first the usual official 
exchanges, including instructions and despatches subject to parliamentary call 
through the Blue Book. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a private interchange 
of letters, frequently familiar in tone as between old friends, or perhaps relatives, 
would be going on between the representatives at certain of the foreign courts 
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. . . . It was, moreover, in times of exigency 
that recourse was naturally had to this form of communication. . . . Theformal 
despatches, constituting the great mass of the Foreign Office correspondence — 
95 per cent of it, perhaps — were regularly filed in the official archives ; and there 
they now are. The private communications, however, coming from the important 
embassies and relating generally to more or less critical situations, were consid- 
ered as belonging to the First Secretary for the time being. . . . Such were the 
British usage and understanding. Such are they now." 

This quotation establishes the presumption that also in the present 
British Blue Book only a part of the Correspondence that was ex- 
changed between the British Foreign Office and the British Ambas- 
sadors and Ministers abroad litis been published. For none of the 
other books litis completeness bem claimed. 

The question, therefore, arises whether the study of any one of 
these books or of all of them together can enable the student to arrive 
at the truth. The editor believes that this question should be 
answered in the affirmative. 

If six or more interested spectators describe one event, no two 
descriptions may agree. By a judicious comparison of all, however, 
an impartial observer may come very near to understanding the 
truth. By noting, moreover, not only what each man says but 
also what he refrains from saying, it is easy to understand the atti- 
tude of each toward the event described, and thus to check his 
credibility. 

A successful study from this point of view necessitates an intimate 
familiarity with the documents published by all the European Gov- 
ernments, and to attain it the documents must be studied in their 
relation to one another. This is, however, very difficult unless the 
system of cross references contained in the British Blue Book is 
extended to cover all the books. The Maemillan edition is the 



Introduction vii 

first to do this, and to enable the student to turn at once from one_ 
book to another and to check the probable accuracy of a Russian 
presentation, for instance, by comparing it with the British or Ger- 
man version of the same incident. 

The several versions are often so different that it becomes neces- 
sary to adduce proof for the statement that they have reference to 
the same event. Such proofs are given in the footnotes. 

A great amount of additional information which the editor had 
gathered in the course of his studies and which he thought might be 
helpful to other students is also given in the footnotes. It is, of 
course, not intended to be exhaustive. 

There is one other point in which the Macmillan edition differs 
from the official British publication of The Collected Diplomatic 
Documents. The latter prints one book after another, complete, 
beginning with the British Blue Book. This edition, on the other 
hand, prints the despatches according to dates, and within the dates 
according to the alphabetical order of the countries which sent or 
received them. This enables the student to see at a glance the state 
of the diplomatic activities in the various European capitals on any 
one day. There are several reasons why this is desirable, but the 
bare mention of one suffices. 

The Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary was given on the evening 
of July 25th. It did not become known in the European Chancel- 
leries until the afternoon of July 26th, as is stated both in the French 
Yellow Book and in the Russian Orange Book. Whether the delay 
was due to Serbian negligence or to Austro-Hungarian interference 
is not known. As a matter of fact, however, practically all the 
messages of July 26th, in which the reply is discussed, were based 
on hearsay and not on a knowledge of the wording of the reply. In 
the British arrangement of the despatches this and similar facts 
disappear. In the present arrangement they become immediately 
apparent. 

The English translations of the foreign books in the official British 
version are excellent, and have been followed in this edition through- 
out. Good translations cannot always be literal translations, and 
while the editor believes that occasional errors have crept into the 
Official English version there is no need of a general revision. 
Serious students, moreover, will prefer to check the accuracy of 
any given passage of importance themselves by consulting the 
original. Nor will they be satisfied with reprints in which the 
possibility of errors cannot be avoided. For this reason photo- 
graphic reproductions of official copies of the books have been added 
as an appendix to this edition. 1 

This appendix has relieved the editor of a double responsibility, 
first of vouching for the accuracy of the translation, and secondly of 
discussing every inaccuracy he discovered however slight it might 
have been. He has, therefore, drawn attention to mistranslations 

1 The Editor was unable to obtain an official Serbian Blue Book, and has substituted 
an excellent French edition. 



viii Introduction 

only when they appeared to him to have a possible bearing on dis- 
puted points. One instance will illustrate his meaning. In No. 39 
of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book Count Berchtold instructs the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London to explain to Sir Edward 
Grey in detail the dossier "which has been sent to you by mail" 
("ilas Ihnen auf dem Postwege vbermittelte Dossier"). This is ren- 
dered in the official English version "which is being sent to you by 
mail." Since the question has arisen whether Sir Edward Grey 
received the dossier before Great Britain declared war on Germany, 
the change of the past tense in this despatch to the present tense may 
be important. 

There are many more points in which this edition differs from 
others. To students they will be self-explanatory, because they are 
the result, in every case, of the editor's wish to prepare a serviceable 
source book, not for partisans but for scholars and intelligent readers. 
The editor has been content with doing the hard and slow work of 
collating the despatches and bringing order out of chaos. He has 
tried to dispel the confusion due to redundance and at times perhaps 
to wilful misrepresentation. He has cracked the nut, as it were, 
that the kernel of truth might lie revealed. 

What this truth is, or what it seems to him to be, he may discuss 
at some future time. All he wished to do in this book was to make 
the initial studies for others less arduous and thus to stimulate them 
to search for the truth themselves. His greatest reward, therefore, 
will be, if scholars agree that he has succeeded in keeping prejudice 
out of the book, being fair to all, and preparing that most necessary 
of all helps to a scholar, a reliable source book. 

In many doubtful cases the Editor has fortunately had the in- 
valuable advice of Professor C. A. Beard of Columbia University, 
whose impartial fairness and keen scent for the truth are well 
known among scholars and to whom he wishes to express his sincere 
thanks. 

EDMUND VON MACH. 

Cambridge, Mass. 
June, 191G. 



LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE 
CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL 
POSITIONS 



1. GREAT BRITAIN. 

Lord High Chancellor . . 
Secretary of State for Foreign 

• Affairs 

Permanent Under-Secretary of 

State for Foreign Affairs 
French Ambassador . . . 

Russian Ambassador . . . 

German Ambassador 
. I ustro- Hungarian Ambassador 
Belgian Minister .... 
Serbian Minister .... 



Viscount Haldane. 

Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir A. Nicolson. 

M. Paul Cambon. 

M. de Fleuriau (Charge d'Affaires). 

Count Benckendorff. 

M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy). 

Prince Lichnowsky. 

Count Mensdorff. 

Count de Lalaing. 

M. Boschkovitch. 



2. FRANCE. 



President of the Republic . 
President, of the Council ■ 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs 



Political Director 
British Ambassador . 
Russian Ambassador 



German Ambassador . . 
A ustro-H u ngaria n A mbassador 
Belgian Minister .... 
Serbian Minister .... 



M. Poincare. 
M. Rene Viviani. 

1. M. .lunnart. 

2. M. Stephen Pichon. 

3. M. Rene Viviani. 

4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting). 

5. M. Doumergue. 

6. M. Delcasse. 
M. Berthelot. 

Sir Francis Bertie. 

M. Isvolsky. 

M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Affaires). 

Baron von Schoen. 

Count Szecsen. 

Baron Guillaume. 

M. Vesnitch. 



3. RUSSIA. 



Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Minister for War . . . 
British Ambassador . . 
French Ambassador . . 
German Ambassador . . 
Austro-H ungarian Ambassador 

Serbian Minister .... 



M. Sazonof. 

M. Suchomlinof. 

Sir George Buchanan. 

M. Paleologue. 

Count Pourtales. 

Count Szapary. 

Count Czernin (Charge d'Affaires). 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch. 



List of Principal Persons 



4. GERMANY. 

Imperial Chancellor .... Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. 

Secretary of State Herr von Jagow. 

Under-Secretary of State . . . Herr von Zimmermann. 

British Ambassador .... Sir Edward Goschen. 

Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of 
Embassy I. 

French Ambassador .... M. Jules Cambon. 

M. cic Manneville (ChargS d'Affaires). 

Russian Ambassador .... M. Swerbeiev. 

M. Broniewsky (Charge' d'Affaires). 

American Ambassador . Mr. Gerard. 

Austro - Hungarian Ambassador Count Szogyeny. 

Belgian Minister Baron Beyens. 

Serbian Charge d' Affaires . . Dr. M. Yovanovitch. 

French Minister at Munich . M. Allize. 
French < 'onsul-General at Frank- 
fort M. Ronssin. 

5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Secretary <>f State for Foreign 

Affairs Count Berchtold. 

Under-Secretaries of State for 

Foreign Affairs .... Baron Macchio. 
< 'oiint Forgaeh. 

President of the Ministry of 

Hungary Count Tisza. 

British Ambassador .... Sir Maurice de Bunsen. 

French Ambassador . . . . M. Dumaine. 

Russian Ambassador .... M. Schebeko. 

Prince Koudacheff (Charge d'Affaires). 

American Ambassador . . . Mr. Penfield. 

Herman Ambassador .... Herr von Tschirscky. 

Italian Ambassador .... Duke d'Avarna. 

Belgian Minister Count Errembault de Dudzeele. 

Sicilian Minister M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch. 

French Consid-General at Buda- 
pest M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin. 

Russian Cimsiil-tti nerul at Finnic M. Salviati. 

Acting Russian Consid at Prague M. Kazansky. 



6. TURKEY. 



British Chargt d'Affaires 
French Ambassador 
Serbian Charge d' Affaires 
Austrian Consul-General 



Mr. Beaumont. 
M. Bompard. 
M. M. ( reorgevitch. 
Herr Jehlitschka. 



BELGIUM. 
Minister for Fi 



iijn . [ffairs . 



Colonial Minister . . . 
British Minister . . . 
French Minister .... 

American Minister . . . 
German Minister . . . 
Austro- Hungarian Minister 
Dutch Minister .... 



M. Davignon. 

Baron van der Elst (Seoretarv-General). 

H. Renkin. 

Sir Francis Yilliers. 

"SI. Klobukowski. 

Mr. Brand Whitlock. 

Herr von Below Saleske. 

( 'mint < larv. 

M. de Weede. 



List of Principal Persons 



8. SERBIA. 

Prime Minister M. Pashitch. 

Acting Prime Minister and Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs . Dr. Laza Patchou. 

British Minister Mr. des Graz. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary). 

French Minister M. Boppe. 

Russian Charge a" Affaires . . M. Strandtman. 

German Secretary of Legation . Herr von Storck. 

Austro- Hungarian Minister. . Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. 

Belgian Minister M. de Welle. 

Austro- Hungarian Consular 

'. at Nish Herr Hoflehner. 



9. ITALY. 



Minister for Foreign Affairs 
British Ambassador . . 
French Ambassador . . 
German Ambassador 
Serbian Minister . . 



Marquis di San Giuliano. 

Sir Rennell Rodd. 

M. Barrere. 

Herr von Flotow. 

M. Ljub Michailovitch. 



10. SPAIN. 

Belgian Minister Baron Grenier. 

11. DENMARK. 

French Minister M. Bapst. 

12. HOLLAND. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Loudon. 

French Minister M. Pellet. 

Belgian Minister Baron Fallon. 

13. LUXEMBURG. 

Minister of State and President 

of the Government .... Dr. Eyschen. 

French Minister M. Mollard. 

German Minister Herr von Buch. 

14. NORWAY. 

French Minister M. Chevalley. 

16. SWEDEN. 

French Minister M. Thiebaut. 

16. SWITZERLAND. 

French Consul-General at Basle M. Farges. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction v 

List of principal persons mentioned in the correspondence, 

showing their official positions . . . . . . ix 

Calendar of despatches sent and received xv 

Part One. Despatches sent and received at the various 
Foreign Offices; arranged by names and places; with 
diaries, summaries of despatches, and footnotes ... 1 

Part Two. The parts of the several official publications of 

diplomatic documents not printed under Part One . . 525 
I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book : Introduction . 525 
II. The French Yellow Book : Chapter I, Warnings 

(1913) 531 

III. The German White Book 551 

IV. The British Blue Book : Introductory Narrative 

of Events 561 

Part Three. Documents frequently quoted but not contained 
in the official publications of collected diplomatic docu- 
MENTS 571 

I. The Chancellor's speech, August 4th, 1914 . . 573 

II. The " Brussels " documents 577 

III. The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 581 

IV. Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir 

Edward Grey 586 

V. Documents found in the possession of Mr. Grant- 
Watson, Secretary of the British Legation . 588 
VI. The telegrams and letters exchanged between the 
Royal and Imperial courts of London, Berlin, 

AND PeTROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KlXG GEORGE AND 

President Poincare 500 

Index 599 

Appendix. The several official publications of collected 

diplomatic documents in photographic reproduction . . 609 
xiii 



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CALENDAR 

Despatches dated later than August 6, 1914 



Foreign 
Office of 










Vienna 


Paris G2 k 
Paris 61 
Paris 63 
London 64 
London 65 


August 9 
August 8 
August 10 
August 11 
August 12 


Brussels 67 
To Jap. Amb. 66 
Tokio 69 
Berlin 6S 


Augusl 22 

August 20 
August 23 
August 23 


Brussels 


The Hague 56 
Paris and London 
57, 58 
Paris 59 
The Hague 60 
Paris 61 

The Hague 63, 64 
To Entente 65, 06 
The Hague 62 
Wlitl M-k67 
Brit Min. 68 


August 7 
August 7 

August S 
Augusl 'i 
August 9 
August in 
August 10 
August 10 
August 11 
August 11 


French Min. 69 
The Hague 71 
The Hague 70 
From Sazonof 72 
The Hague 73 
Paris 74 
London 75 
From colonies 76 
FromA.-H. Min. 77 
The Hague 78 
To all 79 


August 11 
August 12 
August 12 
August 12 
August 13 
August 16 
August 17 
August 26 
August 28 
August 29 
August 29 


Paris 


Declaration 160 


Sept. 4 






Berlin 










London 


Sir E. Goschen 160 


August 8 


Sir M. de Bunsen 
161 


Sept. 1 


Petrograd 










Belgrade 


Report from Serbian 
Min. to Austria 52 


August 16 







PART ONE 

DESPATCHES SENT AND RECEIVED AT THE VARIOUS 
FOREIGN OFFICES; ARRANGED BY NAMES AND 
PLACES; WITH DIARIES, SUMMARIES OF DE- 
SPATCHES, AND FOOTNOTES 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING 
THE WAR 



Sunday, June 28, 1914 

On this day Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohen- 
berg, were murdered in Serajevo. 

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreion Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 








Belgium 








France 





Vienna 


Germany 








Great Britain 








Russia 








Serbia 








France : 


From Vienna 





French Yellow Book No. 7 1 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, June 28, 1914. 

News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke 
of Austria and his wife have been to-day assasinated at Serajevo 
by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the 
attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion 
of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite. 

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed 
by telegraph. 



Dumaine. 



Monday, June 29, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 



Sent Despatches to 



Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

1 For earlier numbers of French Yellow Book, see p. 531 

B 1 



Belgrade 



Vienna 



2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 1 

Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. 

Belgrade, June 29, 191 4- 

Under the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it is diffi- 
cult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama 
of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I 
must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself 
to putting on record certain facts. 

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel- 
feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were 
celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Milos Obilic, who, 
in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious 
Murad. 

Among all Servians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In 
place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary 
enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under 
the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for 
many years been carried on in the press. 

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, 
to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of 
Serajevo, Prineip, Cabrinovic and the third person still unknown, who 
also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and 
may therefore think that they have surpassed their model. 

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in 
Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder. 

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock ; the Servian Government 
at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. 
They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it 
was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into 
one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: 
"It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," 
or "This is revenge for the annexation." 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 1 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. A*. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, 1914. 

The Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already 
shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade ; further, 
that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Bel- 



June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 2 3 

grade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that 
the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles 
about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles 
of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong 
influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quan- 
tities into Bosnia. 

Tuesday, June 30, 1814 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary Belgrade 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Vienna, Berlin, 

Constantinople 

Austria-Hungary enquires what measures the Serbian Government had taken 
"to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in 
Serbia." 

Serbia remarks on the attempt of Austria-Hungary to "represent in the eyes 
of Europe" the Serajevo murder as "the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia." 
The murder " has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian police." 

Austria- Hungary : 

From Belgrade 

AuSTRO-HtJNGABIAN RED BOOK No. 2 

Ritter Von StorcJc, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 80, 1914- 

To-day I sent an enquiry to Herre Gruic, General Secretary of 
the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the 
Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up 
the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in 
Servia. 

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention 
of the Servian police. 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 2 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitrh, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914- 

The tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the 
outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as 



4 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and 
more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against 
us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone 
adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 5 

M. Yov. M. Yovanoviteh, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, June 17/30, 1914- 

As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, 
I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign 
Ail'airs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our 
conversation I adopted the following line of argument: — 

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically 
the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally 
do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their terri- 
tory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated 
to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. 
I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit 
to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being 
proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Govern- 
ment, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their 
way by Austro-IIungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent 
Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for 
revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, 
etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for 
our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction 
something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to con- 
tinue to work for this object, convinced that, it is practicable and 
ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and 
cannot stultify this work." 

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to com- 
municate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him. 

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Am- 
bassadors the substance of this conversation. 

I have, etc. 

From. Berlin 

Serbian Huk Book No. 3 

Dr. M. Yovanoviteh, Charge if Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1014. 

The Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from 
Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected 
with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion. 



June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 6 5 

Serbian Blue Book No. 4 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' 'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914. 

The hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, 
and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Buda- 
pest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contra- 
dictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies. 

From Constantinople 

Serbian Blue Book No. 6 

M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister a?id Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Constantinople, June 17/30, 191 4- 

I had to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the 
hope that this regrettable event — whatever is said about it in certain 
diplomatic circles — would not unfavourably influence the relations 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown con- 
siderable improvement. 

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not 
to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro- 
Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that 
the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed 
me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he 
understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted 
by tlie Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely 
desired friendly relations with Serbia. 

I have, etc. 

Wednesday, July i, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary Uskub, Serbia 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia All Legations abroad London, Vienna 

Austria-Hungary is informed by her consul in Llskub, Serbia, of "the inhuman 
joy with which the murder of Serajevo was received in Serbia." 

English newspapers discuss the crime as emanating from Serbian revolu- 
tionists. 



6 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Uskub, Serbia 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 3 

M. JeMitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold. 

Uskub, July 1, 191 4. 

On the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi Day), 
which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the 
battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially cele- 
brated as the " Festival of the Liberation " of the Servian nation. 

For four months a special committee had worked at making this 
celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of 
Servian nationality. 

The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended 
to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary ; those 
who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways ; 
food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., 
were promised. 

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite 
end in view. 

The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special 
trains. 

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which 
were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under 
different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia 
and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube 
and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia. 

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible 
crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling 
which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous 
expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have 
absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman. 

In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed 
at I'skub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the 
moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representa- 
tive gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably. 

Serbia : 

To All Serbian Legations Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 8 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad. 

Belgrade, June 18/ July 1, 1914. 

The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and 
more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to 



July 1, Serbian Blue Book No. 7 7 

destroy that high moral reputation x which Serbia now enjoys in 
Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia 
of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, 
the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles 
of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately 
recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to 
our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our 
co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. 
At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to im- 
prove her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd 
to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts 
of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to 
Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately 
this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian 
subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic 
elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and 
in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take 
the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do every- 
thing in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order 
to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. 
But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian 
press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy respon- 
sibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door 
of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm 
from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever. 

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available 
channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian 
campaign in the European press. 



From London 
Serbian Blue Book No. 7 

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 

Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) London, June 18/ July 1, 1914- 

Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian 
sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo 
outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries. 

1 For the reputation of Serbia see the Report on the Balkan Wars by an Inter- 
national Commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
and published by the Endowment, Washington, D. C, in the spring of 1914. The 
murderers of the late king and queen have not yet been brought to justice. 



8 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 9 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June IS/ July 1, 1914. 

There were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. 
I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and 
peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information 
that the Serbian flag has been burned, 1 I will lodge a complaint in the 
proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against 
Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially 
by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. 
Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place 
in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as 
possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. 
It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted 
towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral. 

Thursday, July 2, 1014 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreion Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France Vienna 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Paris 

France is informed of great excitement in Vienna, and is quoted as counselling 
composure in Serbia. 

France : 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 8 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 2, 1914. 

The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in 
Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content 
to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she 
has acquired. 

1 See July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11. 



July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11 9 

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired 
to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intoler- 
able to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of 
complaint which would admit of resort to military measures. 

Dumaine. 

Serbia : 

From Paris 

Serbian Blue Book No. 10 

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, June 19/ July 2, 1914. 

The French Government advise ' us to maintain an attitude of 
the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as 
in public opinion. 



Friday, July 3, 1014 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Vienna 

Austria-Hungary complains officially of the tenor of the Serbian press, while 
Serbia complains of the Austro-Hungarian press and of a "flag" incident in 
Vienna which is not clearly described in the despatch. 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 11 

M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, dune 20/ July 3, 1.914- 

Yesterday being the day on which the remains of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to 
Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence 
should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning. 

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24. 



10 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the 
concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord 
himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved 
of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. 
The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order 
to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accord- 
ingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the 
Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing 
happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an 
insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more 
particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the 
heading " Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the 
whole incident is falsely described. 

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time 
up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon 
as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People 
from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the 
Municipality i and the State Council to demand the removal of our 
flag. 

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director In chief of the 
Catholic Reichspost, Ilermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all 
of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the 
Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians. 

I have, etc. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 12 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914- 

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under- 
Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, 
Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone 
of its articles. 1 He argued that the Belgrade press was under no 
control and created die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchic. I told him 
that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result 
private people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there 
were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by 
going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay 
with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past 
two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking 
Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The 
anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a 
few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with 

1 For quotations from the Serbian Press see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, 
under date of July 25, 1914. See also French Yellow Book No. 14, under date of 
July 20, 1914. 



July S, Serbian Blue Book No. 12 11 

which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian 
army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The 
press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the 
present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams 
were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire 
Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable 
Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that 
strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent ? Even if the crimi- 
nal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of 
Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a 
manner. 

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia 
nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those 
who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation 
of its object." 

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality 
of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve 
Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been 
organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew 
that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as die 
Bosniaken, bosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien, while now 
it was being said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was 
a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . . 

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, " that we do not accuse the 
Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agi- 
tators. ..." 

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna 
press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this 
critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to 
a severe test. 

I have, etc. 



Saturday, July 4, 191 5 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary Paris 

Belgium 

France Berlin 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Paris, Petrograd 

M. Poincare, President of France, expresses his sympathy with Austria-Hungary 
and his belief that Serbia would show great willingness in the "judicial investiga- 
tion and the prosecution of the accomplices" of the Serajevo criminals. In this 
view he is seconded by Germany, who for this reason is quoted as expecting no fur- 
ther complications. 



12 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Paris 

AUSTRO-HUN'GARIAN RED BOOK No. 4 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914. 

To-day I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of the Imperial 
and Royal Government for their sympathy. 

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Servia among 
us, lie mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Ital- 
ians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the 
part of the people. 

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection 
with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it 
must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in 
Servia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate 
and illegitimate. 

In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that the Ser- 
vian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the 
judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No 
State could divest itself of this duty. 



France : 

From. Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 9 

M. tie Manneville, French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 4, 1.914. 

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yes- 
terday, and lias to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that 
he hoped Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might 
have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prose- 
cution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that 
he was confident that this would be the case because Servia, if she 
acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised 
world against her. 

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety 
which is shown by a part of the German press as To possible tension 
in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, 
or at least they do not wish to seem to do so. 

De Manneville. 



July 4> Serbian Blue Book No. 14 13 

Serbia : 

From Paris 

Serbian Blue Book No. 13 

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, June 21 /July 4, 1914. 

I had a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of 
the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who was somewhat concerned ' at what had occurred. I 
made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes 
which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the 
first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the 
annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as 
well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything ortho- 
dox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the 
hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order 
to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna. 

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has 
quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself 
considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the ex- 
pressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the 
subject in the Senate. 

I have, etc. 

From Petrogratl 

Serbian Blue Book No. 14 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21 /July 4, 191 4. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages com- 
mitted upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe 
for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in 
Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opin- 
ion in Serbia to remain calm. 



Sunday, July 5, 1914 
There are no published despatches. 

1 The British Premier, Mr. Asquith, in speaking of the murder of Serajevo in the 
House of Commons, had said that it made him "shudder for the fate of humanity." 
[London Times, July 1, 1914.] 



14 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Monday, July 6, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches fr 


Austria-Hungary 





Nish 


Belgium 








France 





Petrograd 


Germany 








Great Britain 








Russia 








Serbia 





Vienna 



Austria-Hungary is once more informed of the "joy" which the news of the 
Serajevo murder had created in Serbia. 

Serbian officials acknowledge the unfortunate tone of the Serbian press, while 
the Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonof, is troubled by the "attacks of the Aus- 
trian press against Serbia." 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Nish, Serbia 

AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 5 

llcrr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Bcrclifold. 

Nish, July 6, 1914- 

The news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only 
too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. 
There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the 
predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this 
was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression 
in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading 
circles — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occu- 
pied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial 
circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude. 

All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher 
personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime 
and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony 
on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, 
of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated 
Servian people. 

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee 
garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of 
what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his 
first information as to the very definite rumour which was being 
circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear 
what a feeling of real delight seized the numerous visitors who were 
present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, 
and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one who 



July 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 16 15 

has long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism 
which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he ob- 
served. 

France : 

From Petrograd 

French Yellow Book No. 10 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 6, 1914. 

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the 
Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in 
a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the 
Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his 
country. 

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government woidd perhaps be compelled to search for 
the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. 
Sazonof interrupted him : "No country," he said, "has had to suffer 
more than Russia, from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have 
we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure 
with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such 
a course." 

May this warning not be in vain. 

Paleologue. 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 15 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914- 

The excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia 
is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently 
exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 16 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister arid Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914. 

The principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of 
the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as fol- 
lows : — 



16 Official Diplomatic Documents 

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 25/28 last, when the 
Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage 
upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the 
perpetrators were Serbians ; moreover, this was done in such a 
manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia 
proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there 
was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances 
were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade 
as the place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (1) the visit to Belgrade of 
both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the 
third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers 
began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. 
It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenz- 
bureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the Az Eszt 
were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This 
evidence mainly tends to show : (1) that it has been established that 
the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji 
Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of 
the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch. 

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz. : to 
hold the "Narodna Odbrana" 1 responsible for this outrage. Fur- 
ther, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian 
Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated : — 

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that 
this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetra- 
tors, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young 
men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been em- 
ployed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the 
outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and re- 
volvers." 

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenz- 
bureau sent the following request to the newspapers : — 

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the 
Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin." 

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the 
following official statement : — 

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating 
to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. 2 All the details, 
therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted 
with reserve." 

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish 

1 The "Narodna Odbrana" is a political society of Serbia. For its aims and con- 
stitution see below, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 under date of .Inly 25, 1914. 

2 The Austro-Hungarian Government did not know where the threads uncovered 
by the investigation would lead. Its wish to have them kept secret until it had de- 
cided on its course corresponds to its action a few months earlier, which is thus de- 
scribed in the American Review of Reviews, May. 1914, p. 545: "Then one day in 
March a bomb was exploded in the office of the Greek Catholic Magyar bishop that 
killed the vicar and two others. Evidence discovered later proved that the plot was 
of Russian origin, the purpose being — as those implicated admitted — to create 
trouble between Roumania and Austria-Hungary which in its turn would embarrass 
the Triple Alliance. To prevent more serious complications, the Hungarian Govern- 
ment decided not to probe too deeply in the affair." 



July 7, Serbian Blue Book No. 17 17 

alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest 
newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, 
the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna 
Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the 
accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the 
chief instigator of the outrage. 

I have, etc. 

Tuesday, July 7, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Vienna 

Austria-Hungary is reported by the Serbian Minister in Vienna to be much 
excited. 



Serbia : 



From Vienna 
Serbian Blue Book No. 17 



M. Yov. M. Yovanovilch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, June 24/ 'July 7 , 1914- 

In influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. 
Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers 
of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance, 
Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible 
to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. 
For them one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the 
outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner 
or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation 
within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this 
and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been 
decided ; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and mili- 
tary circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has 
been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought 
to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the 
enquiry. 

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following 
courses : either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national mis- 
fortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with 
the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation in the work 



18 Official Diplomatic Documents 

will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping 
the extreme penalty ; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan- 
Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifes- 
tation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There 
are many indications that influential circles are being urged to 
adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for 
defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should 
do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect. 

I have, etc. 



Wednesday, July 8, 1914 
There are no published despatches. 

Thursday, July 9, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia All Serbian Legations 

Serbia : 

To All Serbian Legations Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 18 

M. X. Pashitch, Prime Minister ami Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 2(1/ July 9, 1914. 

The Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from 
Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of 
conversation with your colleagues and journalists. 



Friday, July 10, 1914 
There are no published despatches. 



July 11, French Yellow Book No. 11 19 

Saturday, July n, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches prom 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France Budapest 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

France is informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government and the press are 
for peace, but that "the general public here (Budapest) believes in war and fears 
it." 

France : 

From Budapest 

French Yellow Book No. 11 

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Budapest, July 11, 1.914. 

Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian 
question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was 
necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which 
he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And 
the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed 
himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of 
Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the 
project of a demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both 
hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented 
without hesitation. 

With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been 
given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the Hungarians lias, 
as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, 
which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might 
be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that 
for the word "demarche," with its appearance of a threat, there should 
be substituted the expression "pourparlers," which appears to them 
more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment 
all is for peace. 

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes 
in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every rea- 
son to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every 
day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities 



20 Official Diplomatic Documents 

towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been 
brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with 
one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which 
people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is 
sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is ■preparing a coup, is now 
doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone 
of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, 
then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. 
But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (a plaisir). 
Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness 
of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof 
of this ; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably 
low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at 
79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued. 

D'Apchier Le Matjgin. 



Sunday, July 12, 1914 
There are no published despatches. 

Monday, July 13, 1014 

There are no published despatches. 

Tuesday, July 14, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia All Serbian Legations Berlin, Vienna 

The tone of the Serbian press and in turn that of the Austro-Hungarian press 
continue threatening. 

Serbia : 

From Berlin 

Serbian Blue Book No. 19 

Dr. M. Yovanwitch, Charge a" Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 1/14, 1.914- 

The Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand 
the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made 



July 14, Serbian Blue Book No. 20 21 

by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not 
tolerate such proceedings. 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 22 

M. Yov. M. Yovanoviteh, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 1/14, 1914. 

Once more public opinion has been excited against us by the 
Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
With the exception of the Zeit and the Arbeitcr Zeitung, all the 
Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the 
material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo 
outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone 
this is. 

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are espe- 
cially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence 
upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the 
Neue Freie Presse. 

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian a Voutrance. The Neue 
Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends in high 
financial circles, and which — if so desired — writes in accordance 
with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises 
the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by 
war ; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it 
must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter 
through now." 

The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in 
prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 
kronen. 

To All Serbian Legations 

Serbian Blue Book No. 20 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914. 

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked 
tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets 
neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. 
It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies 
to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, 
and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public. 

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from 
articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of 
any party or corporation. 



22 Official Diplomatic Documents 

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary pro- 
hibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other 
newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite 
public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenz- 
bureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news 
which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance 
exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary 
of the Odyck, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was pro- 
hibited ; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria- 
Hungary. 

(4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be 
confiscated only for lese-majeste or for revolutionary propaganda; 
in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of 
newspapers. 

In these circumstances, you should point out for their informa- 
tion, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal 
means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, 
when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria- 
Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate 
the controversy, while ours merely reply. 

Please also emphasize the fact that public opinion in Serbia is 
relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke 
and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what 
our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not 
publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm 
as possible to Serbia. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 21 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
tn all the Serbian Ligations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, l- r, 14- 

Durin<; the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have 
been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demon- 
strations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that 
some Hungarian journalists were killed ; that Austro-Hungarian 
subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; 
that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made 
a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All 
these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm 
prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind 
this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only 
do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the 
town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian 
subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as 
is reported by the Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made 
upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their 
windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had 



July 15, French Yellow Book No. 12 23 

the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are 
being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian 
public opinion against Serbia. 

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were pres- 
ent to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig; there was not the 
slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole 
ceremony exemplary order was maintained ; so much so that for- 
eigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which 
was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their 
own countries. 

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government 
to which you are accredited and to the press. 



Wednesday, July 15, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France Vienna 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Vienna 

France is informed of some bellicose articles in German and Austro-Hungarian 
papers. 

The Austro-Hungarian intentions toward Serbia are quoted by the Serbian 
Minister as shrouded in mystery. 

France : 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 12 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Yiejina, July 15, 1.914- 

Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organi- 
sation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as 
incapable of holding their own in European affairs ; this would ensure 
to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities 
for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased 
to impose. The Militarische Rundschau frankly admits it. "The 
moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that 
war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three 
years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this 
moment the initiative rests with us : Russia is not ready, moral fac- 



24 Official Diplomatic Documents 

tors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have 
to accept the contest some day, 1 let us provoke it at once. Our 
prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; 
and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned 
— to be or not to be — which is in truth the great matter to-day." 

Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches Count 
Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, 
"Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." 
These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security 
can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is 
in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the 
cursed Servian race. Dumaine. 

Serbia : 

From. Vienna 

Serbian' Blue Book No. 23 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister ami Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, Jul;/ 1/15, 1914. 

The most important question for us is, what, if any, are the inten- 
tions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo 
outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my 
other colleagues arc in a similar position. The word has now been 
passed round here not to tell anybody anything. 

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held 
a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the 
object and the result of this meeting. The communique issued on 
the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences 
of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing 
was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval 
Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this 
meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Em- 
peror, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there 
to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza 
has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the 
Serajevo incident ; you are acquainted with his statements. His 
speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. 
Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the de- 
velopment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for 

1 The reasons underlying this statement are thus set forth in the American Review 
0/ Reviews, July, 1914, p. 30: "It is believed tint Russia i- intending to provoke a 
Near Eastern Crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret Naval Convention lias been 
concluded l»-t ween England and Russia with the object of enforcing the demands of 
the Triple Entente against Germany." And these demands of the Triple Entente, so 
far as Russia is concerned, are set forth in the same copy of American Review of 
Reviews in an interview with the Russian statesman. Professor Mitronov. as follows: 
"As far as Russia is concerned extension into the Balkans is a political necessity and 
nothing short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the in- 
tolerable bituaiion." 



July 15, Serbian Blue Book No. 25 25 

(I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there 
was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry 
were announced. Some time has now elapsed ; the matter has been 
spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted ; then came the 
death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with 
this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the 
Hungarian Parliament ; you have read his reply. Many hold the 
opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than 
the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Em- 
peror. (The Bourse has now recovered ; both the War Minister and 
the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an 
opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the 
possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of 
Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being com- 
plied with. 

One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps 
at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is com- 
pleted and the matter submitted to the Court. 

I have, etc. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 24 

M. Yov. M. Yoranovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1914- 

It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations 
have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official 
accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be 
accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary ele- 
ments. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of 
procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the atti- 
tude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. 
There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in 
accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with 
the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all 
admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press. 

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office 
does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German 
Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy. 

I have, etc. 

Serbian Blue Book No. 25 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. X. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1.914. 

What steps will be taken ? In what form ? What demands will 
Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not believe that to-day even 



26 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the Ballplatz 1 itself could answer these questions clearly and pre- 
cisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that 
again Count Forgach is the moving spirit. 

In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to 
choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage 
a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish 
the culprits ; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, 
and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration 
all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria- 
Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this 
in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should 
she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the 
Friedjung and Agram trials '! Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in 
this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe 
the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates under- 
taking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda 
and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, 2 Austria- 
Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise 
her prestige internally as well as externally. . . . 3 

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memoran- 
dum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set 
forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 
1909, until to-day ; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly 
lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the 
( aliincts of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con- 
tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, 
and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfill all the obliga- 
tions of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will 
also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be re- 
quested to accept unconditionally. 4 

I have, etc. 



Thursday, July 16, 1914 
SIM MARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia Berlin 

1 The Austrian Foreign Office is situated on the Ballplatz. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 38, despatch from Rome, under date of July 23. 
1914. 

3 The omissions indicated by the dots are those of the official British translation. 
* This was the exact course taken by Austria a few days later. 



July 17, Serbian Blue Book No. 27 27 

Serbia : 

From Berlin 

Serbian Blue Book No. 26 

Dr. M. Yomnovitch, Charge d' Affaires <ii Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 8/16, 1914. 

The Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the 
German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Ser- 
bian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the 
Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary. 

Friday, July 17, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to 



Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia London, Rome 

Italy is said to have warned Austria-Hungary, and the English Press is reported 
in Serbia as being unfavorably influenced by cuttings from the Serbian Press sup- 
plied to it by Austria-Hungary. 

Serbia : 

From London 

Serbian Blue Book No. 27 

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

(Telegraphic.) London, July 4/17, 1914- 

The Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over 
the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that 
Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is sub- 
mitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof 
of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become 
more acute during the next few weeks. Xo reliance should be placed 
in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official 
circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon 
Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that 
as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will 
change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia. 



28 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Rome 

Serbian Blue Book No. 28 

M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Home, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 4/17, 191 4. 

I have obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis 
di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that 
any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take 
into account international considerations would meet with the dis- 
approval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government 
desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained. 

Saturday, July 18, 19 14 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serliia Petrograd 

Serbia : 

From Petrograd 

Serbian Blue Book No. 20 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister anil Minister for Foreign Affairs 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914- 

I have spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 
subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and 
the Vienna press. 

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the 
Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile 
agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened 
nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself. 



July 19, French Yellow Book No. 14 29 

Sunday, July 19, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received 

Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France Vienna 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia All representatives 

France is placed in possession, through secret sources, of the terms of the forth- 
coming Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and learns the reason why it will con- 
tain a time limit. 

Serbia endeavors to justify herself at the various foreign offices of Europe. 

France : 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 13 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs 

Vienna, July 1.9, 101 4. 

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly 
report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have 
been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has 
added a section containing political information emanating from a 
trustworthy source. 

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has ob- 
tained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note 
to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently 
announcing. 

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account 
of the accurate information which it contains. 

Dumaine. 

French Yellow Book No. 14 

Memorandum 

(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situa- 
tion in Austria) 

Vienna, July 20, WI4} 

From information furnished by a person specially well informed 
as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be 

1 This memorandum is dated July 20, 1914. Since it is enclosed in a letter of 
July 19, 1914, it cannot possibly be later than the letter. From the letter itself it would 



30 Official Diplomatic Documents 

wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will 
be demanded of Servia ; she will be required to dissolve several 
propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, 
to guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep 
strict control oxer anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is 
a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in 
this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the 
subterfuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a 
clear and direct reply ; that is why a short interval will perhaps ' be 
fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of 
the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Bel- 
grade will refuse. Then military operations will begin. 

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the 
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a con- 
flagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary 
to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her 
army and railways, and before France has brought her military 
organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity 
in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the 
most localised operations against Servia. But everything must be 
regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the 
official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign 
press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the 
most important organs; it omits all ((notation from and all mention 
of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten 
days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian 
press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a promi- 
nent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant 
papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language 
freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of 
the official agency lias obviously for its aim the excitement of public 
feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is 
significant. 

seem that the report would have to ho dated not later than on the date previous to its 
submiasion to the ambassador, and that is July Is. 1914. 

Whether the student accepts this date, or July 19, 1914, the noteworthy fact is 
established that France had accurate information — and the ambassador knew it 
to be so (cf. last line of his letter) — of the intended action of Austria-Hungary, and 
knew that there would !«■ a time limit attached to Austria's demands. 

'The word "perhaps" does not occur in the Times edition of the French Yellow 
Book, luit has been added to the text in the Collected Diploma tie Documents Relating 

to i lie Outbreak of the Eur jan War printed under the authority of His Majesty's 

Stationery Office. There is no explanation in the Official Hritish Version why the 
word "perhaps" has been added. The text of the French Yellow Hook supplied 
to I he editor by the French Embassy in Washington in October, 1915, contains the 
word "peut-etre." 



July 19, Serbian Blue Book No. 30 31 

Serbia : 

To All Serbian Missions Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 30 

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all 
Serbian Missions abroad 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914. 

Immediately after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian 
press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the 
opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. 
The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and 
propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana," 
" Kolo Srpskich Sestara," etc., which were tolerated by the Serbian 
Government. 

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as 
the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence, 1 and at the 
same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime 
that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to 
take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled. 

Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued 
to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the 
Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connection with it various 
false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the 
Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hos- 
tility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation 
of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was 
intentionally luring the Belgrade press into an awkward and delicate 
controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in 
Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself 
to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading re- 
ports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the 
case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view 
of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad 
with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but 
also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Govern- 
ment were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and 
the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the 
constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press 
and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers. 
These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna 
and Budapesth journals selected passages from such of the Serbian 
newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, 
strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated 
them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention 
of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of repre- 
senting .Serbia as being guilty. 

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know 

1 These messages are not given in the published documents. Cf. also British Blue 
Book No. 121, July 24 and note 1. 



32 Official Diplomatic Documents 

that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining 
their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed 
to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince 
foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more 
serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the 
intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in 
its own country and abroad. 

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand 
over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have 
played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government 
further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the 
misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already 
been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the 
Skupshtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the 
Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to 
observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was 
bound by her position as a European State. 

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration 
of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the 
matter. 1 They did not demand that any of the accomplices should 
be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to 
trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for 
information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been 
expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over 
to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this 
point was supplied. 

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued 
in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in 
Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that 
the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary 
began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, 
to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from 
the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some 
action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the 
measures which are to be taken — more especially military measures 
— will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the 
Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in 
the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a cate- 
gorically satisfactory reply. 

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at 
the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the news- 
papers became still more acute ; nevertheless this sad event did not 
lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On 
the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by 
certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal them- 
selves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, 

1 This statement seems to be at variance with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 2, 
under date of June 30, 1914. 



July 19, Serbian Blue Book No. 30 33 

and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of the King's 
birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed 
by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-Consul, M. Pomgraz, 
that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the 
Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. 
He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro- 
Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time 
that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied 
that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any 
preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case 
at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same 
time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day 
showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, 
for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. 
Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage 
of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia 
and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and 
tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, 
since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such 
rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public 
opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises. 

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken 
into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step 
is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect 
upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is 
still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evi- 
dent that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the 
perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most 
probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea. 

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian 
Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain 
excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance 
of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have 
given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthen- 
ing of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which 
had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the 
questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Ser- 
bian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental 
Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia 
of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and 
Athens. 

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require 
that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and last- 
ingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited 
state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro- 
Hungarian Government to make a demarche which may humiliate 
the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which 
could not be accepted. 

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the 



34 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain 
friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every at- 
tempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbour- 
ing Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to 
trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who 
are in Serbia — should such, of course, exist. 

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed 
against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any 
country which respects and maintains its independence. 

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be 
firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments 
to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense 
should occasion or necessity arise. 



Monday, July 20, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 



Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great Britain Berlin 

Russia 

Serbia Vienna 

Greed Britain enters the diplomatic exchange of views on this day, according to 
the British Blue Book. From the Introductory Narrative to the British Blue 
Book, Edition of September 28, it appears that Sir Edward Grey had kept in 
touch from the first with the events arising out of the Serajevo murder. (For 
the Introductory Narrative see pp. 561 to 570.) 

Great Britain : 

Sent fa Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 1 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at 
Berlin 

Sir, Foreign Office, Juki 20, 1014. 

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of 
what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. 

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take 
some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. 

I said that I had not heard anything recently, 1 except that Count 

1 This seems to be at variance witli Chapter Two of Sir Edward Grey's Introductory 
Narrative to the British Blue Book Edition, of Sept. 28, 1914. Seep. 562. Consider- 
ing, moreover, the close relations existing between the French and the British Foreign 
( )ffices it seems likely that Sir Edward ( irey may have had cognisance of the information 
contained in the Yellow Book. Nos. 13 and L4, under date of July 19, and of the infor- 
mation contained in the despatches published by other Foreign Offices under dates of 



July 20, Serbian Blue Book No. 31 35 

Berchtold, 1 in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had 
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said 
that it should be cleared up. 

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable 
thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. 

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not 
do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case 
against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered 
at the trial. 

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would 
act upon some case that would be known. 

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, 
to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could 
keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justi- 
fication she could produce for making any demand, the more chance 
there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war 
between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be 
dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. 

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 31 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 

Sir, Vienna, July 7/20, '1.914. 

It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here any- 
thing positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The 
word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about 
everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our news- 
papers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pend- 
ing with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. 
There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a 
serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly prob- 
able, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general 
conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of 
suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of 
the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two 
opportunities previously missed — the annexation of Bosnia 2 and 
the Balkan war 3 — have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hun- 
gary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, 
after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against 

June 28, to July 19,1914. Whether Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19, had been deliv- 
ered to Sir E. Grey when he wrote the above despatch is not sure. 

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

2 1908. a 1913. 



36 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be con- 
cluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war 
could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene. 

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by 
the military preparations which are being made, especially in the 
vicinity of the Serbian frontier. 

I have, etc. 



Tuesday, July 21, 1814 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to 

Austria-Hungary Belgrade 

Belgium 

France London, etc : Berlin 

Germany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Serbia declares her readiness in Berlin to accept the forthcoming Austro- 
Hungarian demands, provided that Austria-Hungary asks "only for judicial 
cooperation." 

Germany declares that she is in complete ignorance of the "contents" of the 
forthcoming note. 

. 1 ustria-Hungary receives another report of the hostile attitude of the Serbian 
people, who are represented as rejoicing over the Serajevo murder. 

Austria : 

From Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BciOK No. 6 

Freiherr von Giesl to Conn/ Berchtold 

Belgrade , July 21, 1914. 

After the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back 
at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as 
to the tone which prevails here. 

Alter the annexation crisis 1 the relations between the Monarchy 
and Servia were poisoned on the Servian side by national chauvinism, 
animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Servian aspirations 
carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Servian popu- 
lation; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Servia has 
increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in 
some cases bears the mark of insanity. 

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this; they 
can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles 
as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known 
axiom that the policy of Servia is built up on the separation of the 
territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on 

1 The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 190S. 



July 21, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 6 37 

the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power ; this is its only 
object. 

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political 
circles here for a week can be blind to this truth. 

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as 
a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here ; 
among them I count the crime of Serajevo, the death of Hartwig 
and the electoral campaign. 

The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Servians an expec- 
tation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg States will fall to 
pieces ; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before ; 
there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those terri- 
tories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a 
revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the 
Slav regiments — this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought 
system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness. 

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Servians as 
powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with ; contempt 
is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall 
without trouble into the lap of the Great-Servian Empire, which is 
to be realized in the immediate future. 

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerless- 
ness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles, 
and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand. 
They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even 
the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary 
as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear 
of being called to account. For decades the people of Servia has been 
educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent 
on the party press ; the Great-Servian propaganda and its monstrous 
offspring, the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education. 

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to the death 
of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised 
by "The Times" as "ravings"; l I do not mention the lying cam- 
paign in the press which, however, might strengthen Servians in the 
conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria- 
Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, 
cursed Austrian, etc., are suitable stock epithets for us. 

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this 
loss 2 to the Servian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of 
the deceased ; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for 
the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another 
in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill 
in time to come. 

1 "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Servian newspapers) is that M. 
de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other 
day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the dis- 
gust of cultivated people, whatever their political sympathies may be." — The Times, 
July 16. 1913. 

2 Hartwig was the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and was known as an ardent 
Pan-Slavist, and reckless hater of Austria-Hungary. 



38 Official Diplomatic Documents 

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a 
platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties 
which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of 
weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is 
conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary. 

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be 
powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed 
that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among 
us are only " bluff." 

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War 
and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the 
weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious. 

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your 
Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could 
tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up 
to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with 
Servia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even 
for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided. 

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Servia, we shall share 
the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation 
in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried 
through. 

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro- 
Hungarian interests in Servia, the question takes the form that we 
cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige. 

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching 
requirements joined to effective control — for this alone could clear 
the Augean stable of Great-Servian intrigues — then all possible eon- 
sequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a 
strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end. 

Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long dis- 
cussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the 
hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's 
reputation in Servia and her position in Europe. 

France : 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 15 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to .1/. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, .July 21, W14- 
It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at 
Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Govern- 
ment was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of 
the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only ' for judicial 
cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, 

1 A r . Y. Times translation reads "did not demand." 



July 21, French Yellow Book No. 16 39 

but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it 
would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower 
the prestige of Servia. 

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian 
Charge d' Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this 
subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German 
Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, 
and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro- 
Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State pro- 
tested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, 
and expressed himself in the same way to me. 1 I could not help 
showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with 
what circumstances lead one to expect. 

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary 
notices for mobilisation, 2 the object of which is to place Germany in 
a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent 
out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circum- 
stances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as 
they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting 
the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily 
followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none 

the less significant. T r , 

Jules Cambon. 

To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome 
French Yellow Book No. 16 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister fur Foreign Affairs, to London, 
St. Petcrsburgh, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, .July 21, 101 4. 
I specially draw your attention to information of which I am in 
receipt from Berlin 3 ; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme 
weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the 
anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question. 

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when 
Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she judges necessary 
in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her 
with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

1 The reader must decide for himself whether or not to give credence to this state- 
ment by Mr. von Jagow, the German Secretary of State. If true, it proves that 
Austria-Hungary was preparing her case against Servia without consultation with 
Germany. In that case it is natural that the Entente Powers should have had more 
accurate preliminary information of the Austrian note, through their Secret Service, 
which, for instance, must have supplied the information, French Yellow Book Nos. 
13 and 14. July 19, 1914. A friendly power is less apt to maintain a spy service at 
the capital of an allied Government. See however, also French Yellow Book No. 19, 
July 22 and footnote. 

2 This information is proved to be wholly false by French Yellow Book No. 101, 
July 30, 1914, where Viviani implies that Germany had not even then proceeded to 
partial mobilization. 

3 The only two despatches published as previously received from Berlin are Nos. 9, 
July 4, and 15, July 15, 1914. Neither of them contains the information here given. 



40 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Wednesday, July 22, 191 5 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

( lermany 

Great Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 



Sent Despa 

Belgrade, London, etc. 
London, etc. 



Vienna, London 
Berlin 



Austria-Hungary sends the text of her Serbian note to her minister in Belgrade 
for presentation on the next day, and instructs her Representatives at the other 
capitals in Europe to inform the several foreign offices of her step. 

France counsels moderation in Vienna. 

Germany and Great Britain are quoted as having done the same. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To Belgrade. 

ArsTRo-HuxcARiAN Red Book No. 7 

Count Berchtold to Frcihcrr von Giesl in Belgrade. 

Vienna, July 22, 1,914. 

Your Honor will please transmit the following note on Thursday, 
July 23, in the afternoon, to the Royal Government. 

(Translation) 



Le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal s'est vu oblige d'a- 
dresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, 
par l'entremise <lu Ministre. 
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, 
la note suivante an Gouverne- 
ment Royal de Serbie : 

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le 
Ministre <le Serbie a Vienne 
a fait, d'ordre de son Gouverne- 
ment, an Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal la declaration sui- 
vante : — 

"'La Serbie reconnait 
qu'elle n'a pas cte atteinte dans 
ses droits par le fait accompli 
eree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et 
qu'elle se conformera par conse- 
quent a telle decision que les 



The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment felt compelled to ad- 
dress the following note to the 
Servian Government on the 23rd 
July, through the medium of the 
Austro-IIungarian Minister at 
Belgrade : — 

"On the 31st_ March, 1909, 
the Servian Minister in Vienna, 
on the instructions of the Ser- 
vian Government, made the 
following declaration to the 
Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment : — 

'"Servia recognises that the 
fait accompli regarding Bosnia 
lias imt affected her rights, and 
consequently she will conform 
to the decisions that the Powers 
may take in conformity with 



July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 



\\ 



Puissances prendront par rap- 
port a l'article 25 du Traite de 
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils 
des Grandes Puissances, la Ser- 
bie s'engage des a present a 
abandonner 1'attitude de protes- 
tation et d'opposition qu'elle a 
observee a 1'egard de l'annexion 
depuis l'automne dernier, et elle 
s'engage, en outre, a changer le 
cours de sa politique actuelle 
envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour 
vivre desormais avec cette der- 
niere sur le pied d'un bon voi- 
sinage.' 

"Or, l'histoire des dernieres 
annexes, et notamment les evene- 
ments douloureux du 28 juin, ont 
demontre L'existence en Serbie 
d'un mouvement subversif dont 
le but est de detacher de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise cer- 
taines parties de ses territoires. 
Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour 
sous les yeux du Gouvernement 
serbe, est arrive a se manifested 
au dela du territoire du royaume 
par des actes de terrorisme, par 
une serie d 'attentats et par des 
meurtres. 

" Le Gouvernement Royal 
serbe, loin de satisfaire aux en- 
gagements formels contcnus dans 
la declaration du 31 mars, 1909, 
n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce 
mouvement : il a tolere l'acti- 
vite criminelle des differentes 
societes et affiliations dirigees 
contre la Monarchic, le langage 
effrene de la presse, la glorifica- 
tion des auteurs d 'attentats, la 
participation d'officierset de fonc- 
tionnaires dans les agissements 
subversifs, une propagande mal- 
saine dans l'instruction publique, 
tolere enfin toutes les manifes- 
tations qui pouvaient induire la 
population serbe a la haine de la 



article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. 
In deference to the advice of the 
Great Powers, Servia undertakes 
to renounce from now onwards 
the attitude of protest and oppo- 
sition which she has adopted with 
regard to the annexation since 
last autumn. She undertakes, 
moreover, to modify the direc- 
tion of her policy with regard to 
Austria-Hungary and to live in 
future on good neighbourly terms 
with the latter.' 



"The history of recent years, 
and in particular the painful 
events of the 28th June last, 
have shown the existence of a 
subversive movement with the 
object of detaching a part of the 
territories of Austria-Hungary 
from the Monarchy. The move- 
ment, which had its birth under 
the eye of the Servian Gov- 
ernment, lias gone so far as to 
make itself manifest on both 
sides of the Servian frontier in 
the shape of acts of terrorism 
and a series of outrages and 
murders. 

"Far from carrying out the 
formal undertakings contained 
in the declaration of the 31st 
March, 1909, the Royal Servian 
Government has done nothing to 
repress these movements. It lias 
permitted the criminal mach- 
inations of various societies and 
associations directed against 
the Monarchy, and has tolerated 
unrestrained language on the 
part of the press, the glorifica- 
tion of the perpetrators of out- 
rages, and the participation of 
officers and functionaries in sub- 
versive agitation. It has per- 
mitted an unwholesome propa- 
ganda in public instruction ; in 



42 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Monarchic et au rnepris de ses 
institutions. 



"Cette tolerance coupable du 
Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 
n'avait pas cesse au moment ou 
les evenements du 28 juin der- 
nier en out demontre au monde 
entier les consequences funestes. 

"II resulte des depositions et 
aveux des auteurs criminels de 
1'attcntat du 28 juin que Ie 
meurtre de Sarajevo a ete tranie 
a Belgrade, que les amies et ex- 
ploit's dont les meurtriers se 
trouvaient etre munis leur out 
ete donnes pur des officiers et 
fonctionnaires serbes faisant par- 
tie <le la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et 
enfin que le passage en Bosnie 
des criminels et de leurs amies a 
ete organise et effectue par des 
chefs du service-frontiere serbe. 



"Les resultats mentionnes de 
l'instruction ne permettent pas 
au Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal de poursuivre plus long- 
temps l'attitude de longanimite 
expectative qu'il avait observee 
pendant des annees vis-a-vis des 
agissements concentres a Bel- 
grade et propages de la stir les 
territoires de la Monarchic; ces 
resultats lui imposent au con- 
traire le devoir de mettre fin a 
des nicnees qui torment une 
menace perpetuelle pour la tran- 
quillite de la Monarchic 

"C'est pour atteindre ce but 
que le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal se voit oblige tie de- 
mander au Gouvernement serbe 
l'enonciation omcielle qu'il eon- 
damne la propagande dirig6e 



short, it has permitted all mani- 
festations of a nature to incite the 
Servian population to hatred of 
the Monarchy and contempt of 
its institutions. 

"This culpable tolerance of the 
Royal Servian Government had 
not ceased at the moment when 
the events of the 28th June last 
proved its fatal consequences to 
the whole world. 

" It results from the depositions 
and confessions of the criminal 
perpetrators of the outrage of the 
28th June that the Serajevo as- 
sassinations were planned in Bel- 
grade; that the arms and explo- 
sives with which the murderers 
were provided had been given 
to them by Servian officers and 
functionaries belonging to the 
' Narodna Odbrana ' ; and finally, 
that the passage into Bosnia of 
the criminals and their arms was 
organised and effected by the 
chiefs of the Servian frontier 
service. 

"The above-mentioned results 
of the magisterial investigation 
do not permit the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government to pursue 
any longer the attitude of ex- 
pectant forbearance which they 
have maintained for years in face 
of the machinations hatched in 
Belgrade, and thence propagated 
in the territories of the Mon- 
archy. The results, on the con- 
trary, impose on them the duty 
of putting an end to the intrigues 
which form a perpetual menace 
to the tranquillity of the Mon- 
archy. 

"To achieve this end the Im- 
perial and Royal Government see 
themselves compelled to demand 
from the Royal Servian Govern- 
ment a formal assurance that they 
condemn this dangerous propa- 



July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 



43 



contre la Monarchie austro-hon- 
groise, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble des 
tendances qui aspirent en dernier 
lieu a detacher de la Monarchie 
des territoires qui en font partie, 
et qu'il s'engage a, supprimer, par 
tous les moyens, cette propa- 
gande criminelle et terroriste. 

"Afin de donner un earactere 
solennel a cet engagement, le 
Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 
fera publier a la premiere page 
du 'Journal officiel' en date du 
13/26 juillet l'enonciation sui- 
vante : — 

"'Le Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie condamne la propagande 
dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hon- 
grie, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble des 
tendances qui aspirent en dernier 
lieu a detacher de la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise des territoires 
qui en font partie, et il deplore 
sincerement les consequences fu- 
nestes de ces agissements cri- 
minels. 

"'Le Gouvernement Royal re- 
grette que des officiers et fonc- 
tionnaires serbes aient participe 
a, la propagande susmentionnee 
et compromis par la les relations 
de bon voisinage auquel le Gou- 
vernement Royal s'etait solen- 
nellement engage par sa declara- 
tion du 31 mars, 1909. 

"'Le Gouvernement Royal, 
qui desapprouve et repudie toute 
idee ou tentative d'immixtion 
dans les destinees des habitants 
de quelque partie de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie que ce soit, considere de 
son devoir d'avertir formellement 
les officiers, les fonctionnaires et 
toute la population du royaume 
que dorenavant il proeedera avec 
la derniere rigueur contre les per- 
sonnes qui se rendraient cou- 
pables de pareils agissements qu'il 



ganda against the Monarchy ; in 
other words, the whole series of 
tendencies, the ultimate aim of 
which is to detach from the 
Monarchy territories belonging 
to it, and that they undertake to 
suppress by every means this 
criminal and terrorist propa- 
ganda. 

"In order to give a formal 
character to this undertaking the 
Royal Servian Government shall 
publish on the front page of their 
'Official Journal' of the 13/26 
July the following declaration : — 

"'The Royal Government of 
Servia condemn the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary — i.e., the general tendency 
of which the final aim is to 
detach from the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy territories be- 
longing to it, and they sincerely 
deplore the fatal consequences 
of these criminal proceedings. 

"'The Royal Government re- 
gret that Servian officers and 
functionaries participated in the 
above-mentioned propaganda 
and thus compromised the good 
neighbourly relations to which 
the Royal Government were 
solemnly pledged by their decla- 
ration of the 31st March, 1909. 

"'The Royal Government, 
who disapprove and repudiate all 
idea of interfering or attempting 
to interfere with the destinies 
of the inhabitants of any part 
whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
consider it their duty formally to 
warn officers and functionaries, 
and the whole population of the 
kingdom, that henceforward they 
will proceed with the utmost 
rigour against persons who may 
be guilty of such machinations, 



44 



icial Diplomatic Documents 



mettra tons ses efforts a prevenir 
et a reprimer.' 

"< lette enunciation sera portee 
simultanement a la connaissance 
de l'Arniee Royale par un ordre 
(In jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et 
sera publiee dans le 'Bulletin 
officiel ' <le l'armee. 

"Le Gouvernement Royal 
serbe s'engage en outre : 

" 1 a supprimer toute publica- 
tion qui excite a la haine et an 
mepris de la Monarchic et dont 
la tendance generale est dirigee 
contre son integrite territoriale ; 

"l' : ' a dissoudre immediate- 
ment la societe dite 'Narodna 
Odbrana,' a eonfisquer tons ses 
ni' incus de propagande, et a pro- 
ceder de la menie maniere contre 
les autres societes et affiliations 
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la 
propagande contre la Monarchic 
austro-hongroise ; le Gouverne- 
ment Royal prendra les mesures 
necessaires pour que les societes 
dissoutes ne puissent pas con- 
tinucr leur activity sous un autre 
lKnii et sous line autre forme; 

"3° a eliminer sans delai de 
l'instruction publique en Serbie, 
tant en ce qui concerne le corps 
enseignant que les moyens d'in- 
struction, tout ce qui sert ou 
pourrait servir a fomenter la 
propagande contre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie ; 

"4° a eloigner du service mili- 
taire et de I'administration en 
general tons les officiers et fonc- 
tionnaires coupables de la pro- 
pagande contre la Monarchic 
austro-hongroise et dont le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal se 
reserve de communiquer les noins 
et les faits an Gouvernement 
Royal; 



which they will use all their 
efforts to anticipate and sup- 
press.' 

"This declaration shall simul- 
taneously be communicated to 
the Royal army as an order of the 
day by His Majesty the King and 
shall lie published in the 'Official 
Bulletin' of the Army. 

"The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment further undertake : 

"1. To suppress any publica- 
tion which incites to hatred and 
contempt of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy and the general 
tendency of which is directed 
against its territorial integrity ; 

"-. To dissolve immediately 
the society styled 'Narodna Od- 
brana,' to confiscate all its means 
of propaganda, and to proceed 
in the same manner against other 
societies and their branches in 
Servia which engage in propa- 
ganda, against the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. The Royal 
Government shall take the neces- 
sary measures to prevent the 
societies dissolved from continu- 
ing their activity under another 
name and form ; 

" 3. To eliminate without delay 
from public instruction in Servia, 
both as regards the teaching body 
and also as regards the methods 
of instruction, everything that 
serves, or might serve, to foment 
the propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary ; 

"4. To remove from the mili- 
tary service, and from the ad- 
ministration in general, all officers 
and functionaries guilty of propa- 
ganda against the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy whose names 
and deeds the Austro-Hungarian 
Government reserve to them- 
selves the right of communicat- 
ing to the Royal Government ; 



July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 



45 



" 5° a accepter la collaboration 
en Serbie des organes du Gou- 
vernernent Imperial et Royal 
dans la suppression du mouve- 
ment subversif dirige contre l'in- 
tegrite territoriale de la Mo- 
narchic; 

"6° a ouvrir une enquete judi- 
ciaire contre les partisans du 
complot du 28 juin se trouvant 
sur territoire serbe ; 

"des organes, delegues par le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, 
prendront part aux recherches y 
relatives ; 

"7° a proceder d'urgence a 
l'arrestation du Commandant 
Voija Tankosic et du nomme 
Milan Ciganovie, employe de 
l'Etat serbe, compromis par les 
resultats de l'instruction de 
Sarajevo ; 

"8° a empecher, par des me- 
sures efficaces, le concours des 
autorites serbes dans le trafic illi- 
cite d'armes et d'explosifs a tra- 
vers la frontiere ; 

" a licencier et punir severe- 
ment les fonctionnaires du ser- 
vice-frontiere de Schabatz et de 
Loznica coupables d 'avoir aide 
les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo 
en leur facilitant le passage de la 
frontiere ; 

"9° a donner au Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal des expli- 
cations sur les propos injusti- 
fiables de hauls fonctionnaires 
serbes tant en Serbie qu'a l'e- 
tranger, qui, malgre leur position 



"5. To accept the collabora- 
tion ' in Servia of representatives 
of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment for the suppression of the 
subversive movement directed 
against the territorial integrity 
of the Monarchy ; 

"6. To take judicial proceed- 
ings against accessories to the 
plot of the 8th June who are on 
Servian territory ; delegates of 
the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment will take part in the inves- 
tigation : relating thereto ; 

"7. To proceed without delay 
to the arrest of Major Voija Tan- 
kositch anil of the individual 
named Milan Ciganovitch, a Ser- 
vian State employe, who have 
been compromised by the results 
of the magisterial enquiry at 
Serajevo ; 

"8. To prevent by effective 
measures the cooperation of the 
Servian authorities in the illicit 
traffic in arms and explosives 
across the frontier, to dismiss and 
punish severely the officials of 
the frontier service at Schabatz 
and Loznica guilty of having 
assisted the perpetrators of the 
Serajevo crime by facilitating 
their passage across the frontier ; 

"9. To furnish the Imperial 
and Royal Government with ex- 
planations regarding the unjus- 
tifiable utterances of high Ser- 
vian officials, both in Servia and 
abroad, who, notwithstanding 



| The meaning of Clauses 5 and 6 was, according to Austria-Hungary, "wilfully 
misinterpreted" by Serbia and her champions. See British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 
1914, where Austria-Hungary is quoted as stating "that cooperation of Austrian 
agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative 
measures." Similar cooperation in investigation had, upon request, been granted 
to Serbia twice at least in the past (see Austin-Hungary and the War by Ernest Ludwig), 
and had also been asked by, and granted to, the United States of America in the in- 
vestigation of the sinking of the Maine. See also the Austrian Explanation, Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 27, July 25, where Austria-Hungary explains that what she 
has in mind is an arrangement in Serbia similar to the "Bureau de Stjrete" maintained 
in Paris by Russia. See also Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 



46 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres 
l'attentat ilu 28 juin de s'expri- 
mer dans des interviews d'une 
maniere hostile envers la Mo- 
narchic austro-hongroise ; enfin 

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
de l'execution des mesures com- 
prises dans les points precedents. 

"Le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal attend la reponse du 
Gouvernement Royal au plus 
tard jusqu'au samedi, 2."> de ce 
mois, a (I heures du soir. 

" l'n niemoire concernant les 
resultats de l'instruction de Sara- 
jevo a l'egard des fonctionnaires 
mentionn6s aux points 7 et 8 est 
annexe a cette note." 

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre 
Excellence de vouloir porter le 
contenu de cette note a la con- 
naissance du Gouvernement au- 
pres duquel vous etes accredit^, 
en accompagnant cette communi- 
cation du commentaire que voici : 

Le 31 mars, L 909, le Gouverne- 
ment Royal serbe a adress6 a 
l'Autriche-Hongrie la declaration 
dont le texte est reproduit ci- 
dessus. 

Le lendemain meme de cette 
declaration la Serbie s'est engagee 
dans line politique tendant a 
inspirer des idees subversives 
aux ressortissants serbes de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise et a 
preparer ainsi la separation des 
territoires austro-hongrois, limi- 
trophes a la Serbie. 

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une 
agitation criminelle. 

Des societes et affiliations ne 
tarderent pax a se former qui, 
soit ouvertement, soit clandes- 
tinement, etaient destinees a 



their official position, have not 
hesitated since the crime of the 
28th June to express themselves 
in interviews in terms of hostility 
to the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment ; and, finally, 

" 10. To notify the Imperial 
and Royal Government without 
delay of the execution of the 
measures comprised under the 
preceding heads. 

"The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment expect the reply of the 
Royal Government at the latest 
by 6 o'clock on Saturday even- 
ing, the 25th July. 

"A memorandum dealing with 
the results of the magisterial 
enquiry at Serajevo with regard 
to the officials mentioned under 
heads (7) and (8) is attached to 
this note." 

I have the honour to request 
your Excellency to bring the con- 
tents of this note to the knowl- 
edge of the Government to which 
you arc accredited., accompany- 
ing your communication with 
the following observations : — 

On the 31st March, 1909, the 
Royal Servian Government ad- 
dressed to Austria-Hungary the 
declaration of which the text is 
reproduced above. 

On the very day after this 
declaration Servia embarked on a 
policy of instilling revolutionary 
ideas into the Serb subjects of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and so preparing for the sep- 
aration of the Austro-Hungarian 
territory on the Servian frontier. 

Servia became the centre of a 
criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the forma- 
tion of societies and groups, 
whose object, either avowed or 
secret, was the creation of dis- 



July 23, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 



47 



creer des desordres sur le terri- 
toire austro-hongrois. Ces socie- 
tes et affiliations comptent parmi 
leurs membres des generaux et 
des diplomates, des fonction- 
naires d'Etat et des juges, bref 
Ies sommites du monde officiel et 
inofficiel du royaume. 

Le journalisme serbe est pres- 
que entierement au service de 
cette propagande, dirigee eontre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour 
ne passe sans que les organes de 
la presse serbe n'excitent leurs 
lecteurs a la haine et au mepris 
de la Monarchic voisine ou a des 
attentats diriges plus ou moins 
ouvertement eontre sa surete et 
son integrite. 

Un grand nombre d' agents est 
appele a soutenir par tous les 
moyens l'agitation eontre l'Au- 
triehe-Hongrie et a corrompre 
dans les provinces limitrophes la 
jeunesse de ces pays. 

L'esprit conspirateur des poli- 
ticiens serbes, esprit dont les 
annales du royaume portent les 
sanglantes empreintes, a subi une 
recrudescence depuis la derniere 
crise balkanique ; des individus 
ayant fait partie des bandes jus- 
que-la occupees en Macedoine 
sont venus se mettre a la disposi- 
tion de la propagande terroriste 
eontre l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En presence de ces agissements, 
auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est 
exposee depuis des annees, le 
Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a 
pas cru devoir prendre la moindre 
mesure. ("est ainsi que le Gou- 
vernement serbe a manque au 
devoir que lui imposait la decla- 
ration solennelle du 31 mars, 
1909, et e'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis 
en contradiction avec la volonte 
de l'Europe et avec l'engagement 



orders on Austro-Hungarian ter- 
ritory. These societies and 
groups count among their mem- 
bers generals and diplomatists, 
Government officials and judges 
— in short, men at the top of 
official and unofficial society in 
the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost 
entirely at the service of this 
propaganda, which is directed 
against Austria-Hungary, and 
not a day passes without the 
organs of the Servian press stir- 
ring up their readers to hatred or 
contempt for the neighbouring 
Monarchy, or to outrages 
directed more or less openly 
against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are 
employed in carrying on by every 
means the agitation against Aus- 
tria-Hungary and corrupting the 
youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis 
there has been a recrudescence 
of the spirit of conspiracy in- 
herent in Servian politicians, 
which has left such sanguinary 
imprints on the history of the 
kingdom; individuals belonging 
formerly to bands employed in 
Macedonia have come to place 
themselves at the disposal of the 
terrorist propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary. 

In the presence of these doings, 
to which Austria-Hungary has 
been exposed for years, the Ser- 
vian Government have not 
thought it incumbent on them 
to take the slightest step. The 
Servian Government have thus 
failed in the duty imposed on 
them by the solemn declara- 
tion of the 31st March, 1909, 
and ' acted in opposition to the 
will of Europe and the under- 



is 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de l'Au- 
triche-Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouverne- 
lneiit Imperial et Royal a I'egard 
de 1'attitude provocatrice de la 
Serbie eta it inspiree du desin- 
teressement territorial de la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise et de 
l'espoir que le Gouvernement 
serbe finirait tout de meme par 
apprecier a sa juste valeur l'ami- 
tie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En 
observant une attitude bien- 
veillante pour les interets poli- 
tiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal esperait 
que le royaume se deciderait 
rinalement a suivre de son cote 
une ligne de conduite analogue. 
L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait 
surtout a une pareille evolution 
dans les idees politiques en Ser- 
bie, Iorsque, apres les evenements 
de l'annee 1912, le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal rendit 
possible, par une attitude desin- 
teressee et sans rancune, l'agran- 
dissement si considerable de la 
Serbie. 

Cette bienveillance manifested 
par l'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard 
de I'Etat voisin n'a eependant 
aucunement modifie les procddes 
du royaume, qui a continue a 
tolerer sur son territoire une 
propagande, dont les funestes 
consequences se sont manifestoes 
au monde entier le 28 juin der- 
nier, jour oil l'heritier presomptif 
de la Monarchie et son illustre 
epouse devinrent les victimes 
d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cet etat de 
choses le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal a du se decider a entre- 
prendre de nouvelles et pressantes 
demarches a, Belgrade afin 
d'amener le Gouvernement serbe 
a arreter le mouvement incen- 



taking given to Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The patience of the Imperial 
and Royal Government in the 
face of the provocative attitude 
of Servia was inspired by the 
territorial disinterestedness of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the hope that the Servian 
Government would end in spite 
of everything by appreciating 
Austria-Hungary's friendship at 
its true value. By observing a 
benevolent attitude towards the 
political interests of Servia, the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
hoped that the kingdom woidd 
finally decide to follow an analo- 
gous line of conduct on its own 
side. In particular, Austria- 
Hungary expected a development 
of this kind in the political ideas 
of Servia, when, after the events 
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal 
Government, by its disinterested 
and ungrudging attitude, made 
such a considerable aggrandise- 
ment of Servia possible. 

The benevolence which Aus- 
tria-Hungary showed towards the 
neighbouring State had no re- 
straining effect on the proceed- 
ings of the kingdom, which con- 
tinued to tolerate on its territory 
a propaganda of which the fatal 
consequences were demonstrated 
to the whole world on the 28th 
June last, when the Heir Pre- 
sumptive to the Monarchy and 
his illustrious consort fell victims 
to a plot hatched at Belgrade. 

In the presence of this state of 
things the Imperial and Royal 
Government have felt compelled 
to take new and urgent steps at 
Belgrade with a view to inducing 
the Servian Government to stop 
the incendiary movement that is 



July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 



49 



diaire menaeant la surete et l'in- 
tegrite de la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal est persuade qu'en entre- 
prenant cette demarche il se 
trouve en plein accord avec les 
sentiments de toutes les nations 
civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- 
mettre que le regicide devint une 
arme dont on puisse se servir 
impunement dans la lutte poli- 
tique, et que la paix europeenne 
Mt continuellement troublee par 
les agissements partant de Bel- 
grade. 

C'est a l'appui de ce qui pre- 
cede que le Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal tient a, la dis- 
position du Gouvernement Royal 
de Grand e-Bretagne un dossier 
elucidant les menees serbes et les 
rapports existant entre ces menees 
et le meurtre du 28 juin. 

Une communication identique 
est adressee aux representants 
Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des 
autres Puissances signatiares. 

Vous etes autorise de laisser 
une copie de cette depeche entre 
les mains de M. le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914- 



threatening the security and 
integrity of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment are convinced that in 
taking this step they will find 
themselves in full agreement with 
the sentiments of all civilised 
nations, who cannot permit regi- 
cide to become a weapon that 
can be employed with impunity 
in political strife, and the peace 
of Europe to be continually dis- 
turbed by movements emanating 
from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
hold at the disposal of the 
British Government a dossier 
elucidating the Servian intrigues 
and the connection between these 
intrigues and the murder of the 
28th June. 

An identical communication 
has been addressed to the Im- 
perial and Royal representatives 
accredited to the other signatory 
Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a 
copy of this despatch in the hands 
of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, July 24, 191 4. 



Annexe 

L'instruction criminelle ou- 
verte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo 
contre Gavrilo Princip et con- 
sorts du chef d'assassinat et de 
complicite y relative — crime 
commis par eux le 28 juin der- 
nier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux 
constations suivantes : 

1°. Le complot ayant pour but 
d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a 



Annex 

The criminal enquiry opened 
by the Court of Serajevo against 
Gavrilo Princip and his acces- 
sories in and before the act of 
assassination committed by them 
on the 28th June last has up to 
the present led to the following 
conclusions : — 

1. The plot, having as its ob- 
ject the assassination of the Arch- 



50 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Sarajevo, de I'Archiduc Fran- 
cois-Ferdinand fut forme a Bel- 
grade par Gavrilo Princip, 
Nedelkjo Cabrinovic, le nomme 
Milan Ciganovic et Trifko 
Grabez, avec le concours du 
commandant Voija Tankosic. 

2°. Lea six bombes et les qua- 
tre pistt ilets Browning avec muni- 
tion, moyennant lesquels les mal- 
faiteurs ont commis l'attentat, 
furent livres a Belgrade a Prin- 
cip, Cabrinovic ej: Grabez par le 
nomme Milan Ciganovic et le 
commandant Voija Tankosic. 

3°. Les bombes sont des gre- 
nades a la main provenant du 
depot d'armes de L'armee serbe a 
Kragujevac. 

4°. Pour assurer la reussite 
de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna 
a Princip, Cabrinovic et ( rrabez la 
maniere de se servir des grenades 
et donna, dans un foret pres <lu 
champ de tir a Topschider, des 
lecons de tir avec pistolets Brown- 
ing a Princip et Grabez. 

5°. Pour rendre possible a. 
Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de 
passer la frontiere de Bosnie- 
Herzegovine et d'y introduire 
clandestinement leur contrebande 
d'armes, un sy'steme de transport 
secret fut organise par Ciganovic. 

D'apr&s cette organisation l'in- 
troduction en Bosnie-Herzego- 
vine des malfaiteurs et de leurs 
armes fut operee par les capi- 
taines-frontieres de Chabac 
(Rade Popovic) et de Loznica 
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj 
Grbic de Loznica avec le con- 
cours de divers particuliers. 



duke Francis Ferdinand at the 
time of his visit to Serajevo, was 
formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo 
Princip, Xedeljko Cabrinovic, one 
Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko 
Grabez, with the assistance of 
Commander Voija Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and the four 
Browning pistols and ammuni- 
tion with which the guilty par- 
t ies committed the act were 
delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, 
and Grabez by the man Milan 
Ciganovic and Commander Voija 
Tankosic at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-gre- 
nades coming from the arms 
depot of the Servian army at Kra- 
gujevac. 

4. In order to ensure the suc- 
cess of the act, Ciganovic taught 
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez 
how to use the bombs, and gave 
lessons in firing Browning pistols 
to Princip and Grabez in a forest 
near the shooting ground at Top- 
schider. 

5. To enable Princip, Cabrino- 
vic, and Grabez to cross the fron- 
tier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
smuggle in their contraband of 
arms secretly, a secret systemjaf 
transport was organised by Ci- 
ganovic. 

By this arrangement the intro- 
duction into Bosnia-Herzegovina 
of criminals and their anus was 
effected by the officials controlling 
the frontiers at Chabec (Rade 
Popovic) and Loznica, as well as 
by the customs officer Rudivoj 
Grbic, of Loznica, with the as- 
sistance of various individuals. 



On the occasion of transmitting the above note, your Honor will 
verbally add that you are instructed — in case an unconditional 
affirmative answer of the Royal Government shall not in the meantime 
have been delivered to you — to leave Belgrade together with the 
personnel of the Imperial and Royal Embassy at the expiration of the 



July 22, Austro-IIungarian Red Book No. 8 51 

period of grace of forty-eight hours after your communication con- 
templated in the note has been made. 

To Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Pelrograd, and Constantinople 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 8 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg!} and Constantinople 

Vienna, .July 22, 1 1914. 
(Translated from the French.) 

The Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address 
the following note to the Royal Servian Government on Thursday, 
the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal 
Minister at Belgrade (see instructions to the Imperial and Royal 
Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 1914). 

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed 
to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced 
above. 

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy 
of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro- 
IIungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the 
Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. 

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose 
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on 
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among 
their members generals and diplomatists. Government officials and 
judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in 
the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this prop- 
aganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day 
passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their 
readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to 
outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every 
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the 
youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of 
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has 
left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom ; indi- 
viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have 
come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary. 

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has 
been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought 

1 This note was to be presented on July 24. See Austro-Hunsarian Red Book No. 9, 
July 23, 1914. 



52 Official Diplomatic Documents 

it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Gov- 
ernment have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn 
declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the 
will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face 
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial 
disinterestedness of the Austro-IIungarian Monarchy and the hope 
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by 
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By 
observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of 
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom 
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its 
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development 
of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events 
of 1911', the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested 
and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement 
of Servia possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the 
neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of 
th.e kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda 
of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole 
world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Mon- 
archy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at 
Belgrade. 

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal 
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at 
Belgrade with a. view to inducing the Servian Government to stop 
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and in- 
tegrity of the Austro-IIungarian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in tak- 
ing this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the 
sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to 
become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political 
strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by move- 
ments emanating from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government 
hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating 
the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and 
the murder of the 28th June. 

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial 
and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



July 22, French Yellow Book No. IS 53 

France : 

To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 17 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 22, 1914. 

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the 
tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he 
knew nothing of the text ; our Ambassador expressed his great as- 
tonishment at this. 1 He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin 
Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current. 

M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the Marquis di 
San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance 
that he is working 2 at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked 
for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution 
of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the 
crime of Serajevo. 

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one 
can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away 
by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maxi- 
mum from Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and in- 
directly, and looks to Germany for support in this. 

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his in- 
fluence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly 
conversation, how much Europe woidd appreciate moderation on 
the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would 
be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Vienna 
French Yellow Book No. 18 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador ut Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

Art i in/ Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 22? 1914. 

Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, 
who is prolonging his stay at IschI, is trying to obtain from the Em- 
peror. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest 
severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Po- 
land," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said 
to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very dis- 

1 French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21. 1914. 

2 The despatch from Rome containing this information has not been published in 
the French Yellow Book or elsewhere. 

3 The date of this despatch seems strange, since Count Berchtold had returned to 
Vienna and despatched the "Serbian Note " to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bel- 
grade on that date. 



54 Official Diplomatic Documents 

turbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened 
actively in order to exercise a moderating influence. 

In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made at Bel- 
grade this week. The requirements of the .Austro-IIungarian Gov- 
ernment with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guaran- 
tees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the 
dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be ac- 
cepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, hut says that 
lie is ready for a full resistance. lie has confidence in the strength 
of the Servian army ; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs 
in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country. 

Unless people arc absolutely blinded, it must he recognised here 
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro- 
IIungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed 
by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised. 

Ilerr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing him- 
self a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is 
willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would 
not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian 
Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of 
reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any 
objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and 
the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, 
but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian 
national feeling. Dumaine. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 19 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bicnrenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

Loudon, Jnli/ 22, 1914. 

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the 
impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin 
with regard to the demarche which the Austro-IIungarian Minister 
is proposing to make at Belgrade. 

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which 
I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, 
who stated to him ' that at Berlin a demarche of the Austro-IIungarian 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No, 2, July 22, 1914. The interview here spoken of is not 
gi en in this British Blue Book unless it is the interview of July 20, British Blue Book 
No. 1, July 20. Sir E. ( ire} 's remarks quoted here are so much like these made by him 
on July 20 that it seems unlikely that the interviews given in French Yellow Book No. 
lit and British Blue Book No. 1 are not the same. In that ease, however, the remarks 
of the German Ambassador are wrongly given either here or in the Blue Book. In 
British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, the I lerman Secretary of Foreign Affairs is quoted as 
considering it "inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be ap- 
proached by the ( lerman < Sovernment." It seems incredible that the accuracy of this 
statement should not have been challenged in the British Blue Book if the German 



July 22, French Yellow Book No. 19 55 

Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince 
Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were en- 
deavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, 1 but 
that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and 
that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche of this 
kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would 
like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the cir- 
cumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and 
the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured 
themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it 
and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the conse- 
quences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government 
were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention 
of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against 
them the opinion of Europe. 

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward 
Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. 
The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who 
also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations. 

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares 
the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may 
make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and 
above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to 
accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet 
which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors 
accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this 
official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were 
most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feel- 
ings take a public form (demarche) which lacks the moderation that 
is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public 
opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which 
the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, 
and which has been made less patient by the memory of two vic- 
torious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices 
which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 
400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is 
not inclined to put up with any humiliation. 

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador, 2 asked him to recommend his Government not to de- 
part from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new 
complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which 
she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be 
carried away too far. 

Paul Cambon. 

Ambassador had told Sir E. Grey on July 20 (or 21) that the " German Government 
were endeavouring to hold bark and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna etc." 

1 This important statement is not given in the British Blue Book. See previous note. 

2 Such an interview is published in the British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, while this 
despatch is dated July 22, 1914. 



56 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Great Britain : 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 2 

Sir 11. Rumbold, British Chargi d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 22) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. 

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the 
forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his 
Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was 
evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been 
made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settle- 
ment between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no 
interference from outside in the discussions between those two coun- 
tries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Gov- 
ernment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in 
conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme 
importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper 
footing. 

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past 
the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, 
been one of great forbearance. 1 

1 Cf. the previous despatch, French Yellow Book No. 19. 



July 23, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9 57 

Thursday, July 23, 1914 

The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum is Presented to Serbia 

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from 

Austria-Hungary London 
Belgium 

France London, etc. Munich 

Germany London, etc. 

Great Britain Vienna Rome, Austr.-Hung. 

Ambassador 

Russia Belgrade 

Servia London, etc. Aust.-Hung. Minister 

Austria-Hungary presents her note to Serbia at 6 p.m. ; and believing that 
"Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment," sends 
special instructions to her Ambassador in London. 

Germain/ sends instructions to her Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Petro- 
grad, dating these instructions July 23 for presentation on July 24. In the in- 
structions she defines her position. 

Great Britain is informally informed of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, 
and discusses the possibility of a European war. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To London 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 23, 1914. 

As among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily 
led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day 
taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation which 
you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in 
our circular note l at the Foreign Office, to point out among other 
matters that it would have been within the power of Servia to render 
less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spon- 
taneously doing what is necessary in order to start an inquiry on 
Servian soil against the Servian accomplices in the crime of 28th 
June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved, 
lead from Belgrade to Servia. 

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications 
point to Belgrade, the Servian Government have not taken any 
steps in this direction ; on the contrary, they have attempted to 
wipe out the existing traces. 

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade, 2 
it is to be gathered that the Servian civil servant Ciganovic, who is 
compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22. 

2 This Despatch has not been published in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. 



58 Official Diplomatic Documents 

criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three 
days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had 
already left the town. As is^well known also, the director of the 
Servian press declared that Ciganovic is completely unknown in 
Belgrade. 

With regard to the short time-limit attached to our demand, 
this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of 
Servia. 1 

The requirements which we demand that Servia should fulfil, and 
which indeed contains nothing which is not a matter of course in the 
intercourse between States which arc to live in peace and friendship, 
cannot lie made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, 
having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a 
method of political action by which it would be open to Servia at 
pleasure to prolong the crisis which lias arisen. 

France : 

To London, Berlin, Petrograd ami Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 2Q 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hi London, 
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, ami Home. 

Paris, July 28, 1914. 

According to information collected by the French Ambassador 
at Vienna, 2 the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
bad been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while 
keeping eight army corps ready to start operations. 

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer 
to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call 
the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety 
aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated" to our Ambassador that the 
tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formu- 
lated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the 
customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what 
confidence ought to be placed in these assurances. 

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short 
space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes 
to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which 
relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for 
control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything 
which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country. 

In diplomatic circle- at Vienna the German Ambassador is in 
favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that 

'Exactly the same explanation for the forthcoming time limit was advanced in 
French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 1 1. as early as July 19, 1914. Austria could, of 
course, not know that the substance of her note and her reasons for it had been familiar 
to the Entente Powers since the previous Sunday. 

2 French Yellow Book No. Is, July 22, 191.',. 

3 The interview here referred to is not mentioned in the only published Despatch, 
French Yellow Book No. Is, July 22, 191.",, on which tin- present message can be based. 



July 23, German White Bool; Exhibit I 59 

the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with 
him on this point ; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances 
which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure 
confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any ob- 
jection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the rev- 
olutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements 
which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Munich 

French Yellow Book No. 21 

.1/. Attize, French Minister at Munich, to M. liieniruu-Martiu , Acting 
Minister for Foreign . [ffairs, Paris. 

Munich, Jul;/ 23, 1914. 

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of 
the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable ; 
on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming 
with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism. 

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that 
the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (dont il 
avait connaissance ! ) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could 
be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation 
appeared to him to be very serious. 

Germany : 

To Paris, London, and Petrograd 

German White Book Exhibit 1 2 

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and 
St. Petersburg, mi July ..'3rd, 1914- 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con- 
cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the 
Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose 
clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the 

1 The French phrase does not imply accurate knowledge. It may mean that he 
had a general idea of the contents, possibly similar to that shared by the Entente 
Powers since July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yeljow Book, Nos. 13 and 14. 

Bavaria is one of the federated States comprising the German Empire. Owing to 
its size and importance it enjoys special prerogatives, one of which is its independent 
representation in some foreign capitals and at the Vatican. Diplomatic negotiations 
of importance and those concerning the Empire are conducted by the German Foreign 
Office and the German Ambassadors and .Ministers. If the President of the Bavarian 
Council had more accurate information of the Austrian note than the phrase definitely 
says he had, he may have received it through the Bavarian Minister who being a 
Catholic may be assumed to have been in intimate personal relations with the leading 
Catholics of Austria-Hungary. 

2 The German Foreign Office is not in the habit of issuing collected diplomatic 
papers on given subjects as the British Foreign Office is. As regards the outbreak of 
the European War the German Foreign Office contented itself with issuing a narra- 
tive to which a number of despatches were added as exhibits. There are therefore 
comparatively few German despatches published. For the narrative see pp. 551 to 
560. 



60 Official Diplomatic Documents 

means which it utilises for their realization. Through the pub- 
lished facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action 
of the efforts for the separation of the South Slavic provinces from 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian 
Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity 
with the connivance of members of the Government and of the 
Army. 

The Serl> intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. 
In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed 
itself during the Bosnian crisis. 1 Only to the far-reaching self-re- 
straint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the 
energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provo- 
cations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the 
part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future 
well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it 
has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance 
of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased 
in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the 
threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is 
compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation 
of the Austro-Hungarian '.Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings 
across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the 
Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, 
the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment can lie viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude 
assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia 
docs not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline 
to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away 
into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would 
remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced 
definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with 
tlie Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal 
to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be 
left with it. 

I have the honour to request you to express yourself 2 in the sense 
indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir 
Edward Grey) (M. Sasonof) and therewith give special emphai is 
to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which 
should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the 
limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers 
to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because 

i ( if 1908-1909. 

"• Austria had sent her note to her representative in Belgrade on July 22. and notified 
her other representatives on the same day, Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and s. 
Tin" formal presentation of the note in Serbia was to take place in the afternoon of 
July 23, while the Power- were to be informed "I it officially, receiving a copy of the 
note on July 24, 101 1 ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9. Informally the Powers 
were informed on July 23 : ci British Blue Book No "•. July '-'::. 1014. 

On July 21, French Yellow Hook \ T o. 15, the < icrman Secretary of Foreign Affairs had 

said he did not know the contents of the forthc ing note. Between then and .1 nlv l':;. 

< lermany had Keen informed of the note, and as the above despatch proves, given her 

. I 1 1 1 1 1 v i I . 



July 23, British Blue Book No. 3 61 

every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty- 
alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences. 

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about 
the course of your interview. 

Great Britain : 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 38 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- 
ceived July 27.) ' 
Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914. 

I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant 
of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. 
Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign 
Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the con- 
viction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely 
necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn 
of events' in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. 

I have, etc. 

Rennell Rodd. 

To Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 3 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 1014- 

Count Mensdorff 2 told me to-day that he would be able to- 
morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that lie 
understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then 
explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. A he 
told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would 
give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered 
that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian 
officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a 
long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. 

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would 
make any comment until I received an official communication, and 
it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to 
make any comment at first sight. 

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would 

1 This is a letter, delayed in transmission to July 27, and therefore printed by Sir 
E. Grey among the July 27 despatches. Important diplomatic messages are sent in 
duplicate by telegram and by letter. This is one of the few instances where Sir E. 
Grey did not print the telegram, which undoubtedly was properly received. The 
British Blue Book contains no explanation. 

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



G2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin 
to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted 1 this very much. To begin 
with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make 
it difficult, it' not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few 
days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect 
of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from 
Servia. I admitted that, it' there was no time-limit, the proceedings 
might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could al- 
ways he introduced afterwards ; that, if the demands were made with- 
out a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might 
be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the 
Austrian case was very strong it might lie apparent that the Russian 
Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour 
of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a 
thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been 
tried and failed. 

< 'ount Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed 
since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an en- 
quiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 
l ( .t()!), Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms 
of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her 
promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to dis- 
integrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to pro- 
tect herself. 

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count 
Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling 
upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great 
apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon 
and Count Benckendorff, 2 hut also by others, as to what might 
happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very de- 
sirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it 
on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount 
of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how 
reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justifica- 
tion that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. 
The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as 
many as four Great Powers of Fairope — let us say, Austria, France, 
Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it 
must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an 
interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed 
by a complete collapse of European 3 credit and industry. In these 
days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things 
worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the 
war, many things might he completely swept away. 

1 France, and therefore probably the Entente Powers had known of the time limit 
since .Inly 19, 1914 ; ef. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14. 

2 Accounts of previous interviews to this effect, with the Russian and French Am- 
bassadors are not printed in the British Blue Book. 

3 This suggests what Sir E. Grey ^ai<l in his speech of August 3, that England 
would suffer almost as much if sin- stayed rait as if she entered the war. Such a view 
contemplates only England's trade, and disregards the loss of lives. 



July 23, Russian Orange Book No. 2 63 

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible 
consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would de- 
pend upon Russia. 

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was 
just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to 
say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very 
much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would 
be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each 
other. 

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but 
he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh 
had not been very favourable recently. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

Russia : 

From Belgrade. 

Russian Orange Book No. 1 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 {23), 191 4. 

The Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an 
ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, 
in the absence of Pasliitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands 
contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally 
that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty- 
eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the 
staff at the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are 
away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Bel- 
grade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. Patchou, who communicated 
to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Iiussia and de- 
clares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of 
Austria. 



Russian Orange Book No. 2 

Russian Charge, d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914. 

Text of the note presented to the Servian Government by the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day. 

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 7, July 22, 1914. 1 



64 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Serbia : 

From Austro-Hungarian Minister 

Serbian Blue Book N>>. 32 

Huron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, 
to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the 
enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed 
to the Royal Serbian Government. 

I have, etc. 

Handed personally at 6 P.M. 
[For the text of the note see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 7, July 22, 1014.] 

To All the Serbian Ligations Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 33 

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 191 4. 

The Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 
6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from 
the Serbian Government within two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m. 
He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade 
unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated 
time. 

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian 
Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a 
position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian 
Government could accept them in their entirety. 



July 24, Austro-H ungarian Red Book No. 17 



65 



Friday, July 24, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to 

Austria-Hungary London, Petrograd 

Belgium London, etc. 

France Viviani, London, etc. 



Germany 

Great Britain 



Russia 



Serbia 



Vienna, Paris, Berlin, 

Belgrade 
Vienna, London etc. 



Petrograd, London 
Crown Prince to Czar 



Received Despatches from 

London, Paris, Petrograd 

Vienna 

Viviani, Berlin, London, Petrograd, 
Aust.-Hung. Ambassador 
Vienna, Petrograd 

Petrograd. Vienna, Belgrade, Ger- 
man Ambassador 

Berlin, Paris, Belgrade Aust.-Hung. 
Ambassador, Crown Prince of 
Servia 

Petrograd 



The Governments of the several European Powers are officially notified of the 
Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. 

Austria-Hungary and Germany insist that the dispute remain localized between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 

Great Britain proposes a Conference of four Powers, Great Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy to mediate between Austria and Russia. At the request of 
the French Ambassador she apparently alters her plan to mean mediation between 
Austria and Serbia. From the published despatches of this day, which arecon- 
tradictory, it dors not appear which plan Great Britain is urging. She refuses 
however, to exert pressure on Russia while asking Germany to exert pressure in 
Vienna. 

Great Britain refuses Russia's request to promise her unconditional support of 
Russia and France, but instructs her representative in Belgrade to express no 
views except in agreement with the representatives of the other two Entente 
Poweis, whose alliance with each other she recognizes to be as binding as that of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. 

Serbia is sure that war on her means a European War. 

Russia is hostile in her dealings with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and 
discusses her determination to support Serbia even to the extent of going to war, 
but does so only with the Entente Powers. 

France promises to support Russia in war, if need be, but gives active diplo- 
matic support to Great Britain's proposal of a Conference of Four Powers. Italy 
does the same. 

Great Britain mobilizes her fleet, according to French Yellow Book No. (ill, 
July 27, 1914, but does not mention this fact in any of her published despatches. 

Belgium foresees a European war. 



Austria-Hungary : 



To London 



Austro-Huxgarian Red Book No. 17 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914- 

In answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday : 
I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our demarche 
of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, 



66 Official Diplomatic Documents 

but that it is merely ;i demarche with a time-limit, which, as Your 
Excellency will he good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in 
strict confidence will — if the time-limit expires without result — for 
the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, 
and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we 
are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands. 

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Servia, after the ex- 
piration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of 
our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she 
should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well 
known, we have already had twice (190S and 1912) to mobilise because 
of Servia. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red Book No. 10 

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) London, .lull/ :34, 1914- 

Have just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who 
read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; 
to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent 
to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co- 
operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty 
of the State. 

He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived 
of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bring- 
ing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. 
It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satis- 
factory. 

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence 
against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the 
territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, 
complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto 
often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set 
on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, 
etc.) 

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time- 
limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime 
of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified. 

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only 
concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very 
"apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a 
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, lie observed that 
the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the 
same effect as those of the Triple Alliance. 

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with 
emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for our- 



July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 67 

selves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never 
been kept. I understand that in the first place he considered the 
question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, how- 
ever, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situa- 
tion. 

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, 
said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was 
to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all 
exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary 
and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in 
Servia. 

From Paris 
Axtstro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July % 1.914- 

I have just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister 
of Justice, 1 who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the con- 
tents of our demarche at Belgrade through this morning's papers, 
seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. With- 
out entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily 
agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government 
made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible. 

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special 
impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice. 

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, 
would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on 
him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue 
directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests 
of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by 
Sen ian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situa- 
tion. 

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first 
rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia com- 
pletely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands. 

The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed ener- 
getically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a 
duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the 
sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations 
which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that 
the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner 
corresponding to our wishes. 

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in 
any way the attitude of Servia. 

1 Ci. French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914. 



68 Official Diplomatic Documents 

AlSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 12 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914- 

Baron Schoen will, in accordance with instructions, 1 make a com- 
munication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin 
( aliinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only 
Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case 
third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations 
of her alliance, would be on our side. 

Austro-Hungariax Red Book No. 13 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

Baron Schoen has just made the demarche as he was instructed. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself 
definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French 
Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia 
concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that 
the question would find a direct and peaceful solution. 

The Servian Minister here had already been advised 2 that his 
Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, 
with the limitation, however, " so far as their sovereign rights were not 
affected." 

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus 
of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with. 

To Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 18 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I received the Russian Charge d'Affaires on the morning of the 
24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing 
to his knowedge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Bel- 
grade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them. 

Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not 
hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Servia, and 
he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Peters- 
burgh that our demarche might take the form of a humiliation of 
Servia, which must have an echo in Russia. 

I took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Charge d'Aft'aires 

1 German White Book, Exhibit 1. July 23. 1914. 

2 Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 10. July 2. For different advice given Serbia by 
France, see French Yellow Book No. 26, July 24, 1914. 



July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 14 G9 

as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Servia 
as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Govern- 
ment of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies 
directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress 
them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it 
possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly 
carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to 
the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and 
the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope 
to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and, not 
least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took 
root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon 
could be continued with impunity. 

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase 
of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point 
of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Govern- 
ment. 

Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view 
of his own Government, and also did not know what position Servia 
would take towards individual demands. 

At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d'Affaires expressly 
said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government 
the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, 
especially to the effect that no humiliation of Servia was intended 
by us. 

From Petrograd 

AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 14 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg}}, July 24, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew 
what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he 
could not take up any definite attitude towards my demarche. I be- 
gan by reading out my instructions. 1 The Minister interrupted me 
for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my 
explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had orig- 
inated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang 
from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said 
that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to make war on Servia, 
and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during 
recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required 
pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required 
did not elicit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to 
maintain that Pasic had already expressed himself to this effect. This 
I corrected. "77 dim cela 25 fois si vovs vovlez," said he. I said to 
him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or the 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8, July 22, 1914. 



70 Official Diplomatic Documents 

dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the 
dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Servia would never under- 
take. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the sup- 
pression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on 
the part of the Minister. Servia then will no longer lie master in 
her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene again, and 
what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Servia shows 
goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto. 

The commentary added to the communication of the note was 
listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at the passage that 
our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed 
that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I 
pointed out how regrettable it would lie if we could not come to an 
understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything 
which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister 
might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister 
attempted to minimise the Monarchial side of the question. 

With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the 
Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given our- 
selves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This 
was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examina- 
tion of the matter. 1 said to him that the results which had been 
attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our pro- 
cedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and 
Servia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further infor- 
mation if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret. 

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he 
was not in the least curious. Tie represented the matter as if we only 
., mted to make war with Servia whatever happened. I answered 
that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what 
we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary 
intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs. 

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the 
observation that we certainly had created a serious situation. 

In spite of his relati vecalm, t lie attitude of the Minister was through- 
out unaccommodating and hostile. 

AXJSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 15 

Communique of the Russian official Gazette. 

St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1014. 

The St. Petersburgh telegraphic agency announces: — 

The official journal publishes the following communique — 

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia 
by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government 
the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following 
the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which 
Russia cannot remain indifferent. 



July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 16 71 

AuSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 16 

( 'mint Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. 

After a Council of Ministers 1 which lasted for five hours, M. 
Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a 
long conversation with him. 

The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be con- 
sidered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro- 
Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, 
but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 
by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the 
whole of Europe. 

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagree- 
ably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered 
a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been 
presented. Russia would require an international investigation of 
the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German col- 
league at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary 
would not accept interference in her difference with Servia, and that 
Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would 
be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power. 

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained 
that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the 
eventual intention of Austria-Hungary " de d&vorer hi Serbie." Count 
Pourtales answered that he did not accept any such intention on 
the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most 
special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria- 
Hungary was " d'iiifligcr a hi Serbie le chMimentjustemeni merite." M. 
Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would 
allow herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this 
point had been made. 

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Ger- 
many should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace.' 2 The 
German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany 
certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally 
fully represented the interests of her ally. 

1 This is undoubtedly the Council of Ministers at which Mr. Sazonof said, British 
Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, he %vould have to consult his colleagues concerning the 
reply which Serbia would make to Austria. 

2 The condition on which Russia would insist is stated in British Blue Book No. 17, 
July 25, 1914, where Sazonof, as a result of the Council of Ministers held in the after- 
noon of July 24, states: "Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become 
the predominant Power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, 
she will face all the risks of war." 

Students will note that while the determination of the Entente Powers to go to 
war unless Austria-Hungary recedes from her position is occasionally expressed even in 
I In- published despatches (e.g. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, French Yellow Book 
No. 38, July 25, and No. 37, which should be compared with British Blue Book No. 25. 
same day. See also the Editor's "Germany's Point of View," page 230), this is never 
mentioned to any of the Triple Alliance Powers. 



72 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Belgium : 

From Vienna 

Belgian Gray Book No. 1 

< 'mi nt Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro- 
Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. 

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Red Book No. 7, 
July 22, 1!U4.] 

To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd 

Beu.i w Grai Book No. 2 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers nt Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. 

Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914. 

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration 
whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to 
address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu- 
trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to 
fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in 
the event nt' a war breaking out on her frontiers. 

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a comminu- 
tion would be premature at present, hut that events might move 
rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions 
at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad. 

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my col- 
leagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you nowexact 
instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a 
Franco-German war became more threatening. 

I enclose herewith a note, signed, hut not dated, which you should 
read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give 
him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary. 

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instruc- 
tion^. 

This telegram will he despatched when the order is given for the 
mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and 
to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information 
leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution. 



Enclosure in Xo. 2. 
Sir, 

Tuk international situation is serious, and the possihility of a war 
between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government. 



July 24, Belgian Gray Book No. 2 73 

Belgium has most scrupulously observed l the duties of a neutral 
State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those 
duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum- 
stances may be. 

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often 
reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will 
remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her 
frontiers. 

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have 
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army 
has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have 
been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of 
its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put 
in a state of defence. 

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. 
They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international 
obligations ; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can 
have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed 
struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any 
of those Powers. 

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communi- 
cate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian 
Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take 
note of it. 

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers 
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. 2 

1 The truth of this .statement, has been challenged by Germany. For the < official 
Publications on this subject see European Politics During the Decade before the Win- 
as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, German Foreign Office, 1915. See also Fuehr, 
Alexander, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk & W agnails Co., 1915. 

2 These notes were presented to the several Powers on August 1, 1914, in accordance 
with a telegram (see Belgian Gray Book No. 16) of that day ; i.e. a week and a day 
after the note had been drawn. 

One of the reasons why Belgium drew this note thus early, on July 24, may be 
found in the events touched upon in an account of the experiences of a member of the 
British Military Intelligence Department, given by himself before the Boston Press 
Club on Sunday, January 14, 1915. This British officer is Mr. Forbes Sutherland, 
who said according to an affidavit by two witnesses in the editor's possession : 

That for several years he had been a member of the British Military Intelligence 
Department. 

That he landed in New York toward the end of June, 1914, and he there found a 
cablegram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to re- 
port immediately. 

That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to inquire what it was 
all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service. 

That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declara- 
tion of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence depart- 
ment to concert measures with the head of the Belgian secret service. 



74 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From M. Viviani, flic French Premier, who hod been absent together 
with the President on a visit to Russia. 

French Yellow Book No. .22 

M. Rene Viviani, President of tin 1 Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

I should be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine 
the following information and instructions. 

Herat, July 24, 1914, t a.m. 

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which 
might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to 
Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke 
lias been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that 
we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an ex- 
planation or sonic raise en demeure which would be equivalent to in- 
tervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia 
might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. 

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might by 
means of a friendly conversation with Count Berehtold, give him 
counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand 
how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would 
appear to be a threat on the part of the < Cabinet at Vienna. 

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, 
expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate 
itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten 
general peace, and lie has telegraphed to his Government to this effect. 

M . Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. 
While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at 
Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask 
you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, 
and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which 
each of you can make Count Berehtold understand without delay 
the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require. 

Further, it would he desirable to ask IN I . Paul ( 'ambon to bring tin' 
advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and 
to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia 
will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Bencken- 
dorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation. 

Rene Viviani. 



July 24, French Yellow Book No. 25 75 

French Yellow Book No. 23 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France." 

Paris, .July 24, 1914. 

1 have sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but l from in- 
formation contained in this morning's papers it appears that the 
Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday 
evening. 

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to 
us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; 
it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs 
who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require 
the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propa- 
ganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 
6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission. 

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I recpiested him to 
come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues 2 as to 
his action. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

France : 

From the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 

French Yellow Book No. 24 

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Austrian Red 
Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] 

To Viviani, and London, Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Rome and Belgrade. 

French Yellow Book No. 2.5 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, on hoard the "France," and to 
London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Belgrade. 

Paris, July .",, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which 
was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szecsen in- 

1 M. Martin's reply. No. 23, indicates that he understood M. Viviani's message, 
No. 22, to suggest means by which Austria-Hungary might be prevented from pre- 
senting her note to Servia. If this was the meaning of the message, it can only have 
been written with a view to future publication and not in the hope of accomplishing 
anything. The note is dated July 24, 1 A.M. By that time both Russia and Great 
Britain had been informed of the contents of the note (British Blue Book No. 3) and the 
fact that the note had been presented (Russian Orange Book No. 2). In view of the 
decision of the Entente Powers to have their representatives act in unison — cf. last 
sentence of Yellow Book No. 23 with British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914 — it is 
certain that neither Great Britain nor Russia would have kept so important an event 
as the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note from the French Premier. 

2 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty as a unit from the first. Cf. 
British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same da; 
Serbian Blue Book No. 5, June 30, 1914. 



76 Official Diplomatic Dor 'intents 

forms me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian 
Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th 
for their answer. 1 

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 
31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated 
an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the 
press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security 
and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown 
by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established 
during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade. 

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put 
an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their 
tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official 
pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, 
by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the 
terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and 
threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian 
army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the 
army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake 
to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those 
officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to 
them by the Austrian Government, to accept the cooperation of 
Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to winch their 
attention lias been directed, as well as for the investigation into the 
crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a 
Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it. 

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up 
the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, 
and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were 
provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian 
army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian 
officers and officials. 

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making 
this communication, Count Szecsen without any observations in- 
formed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on 
my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused 
by the information available this morning as to the contents of the 
Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be 
aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical 

1 The French Yellow Book prints here the following note : " The Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
the following correction : 

" ' In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency 
this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet 
at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. 
As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until I! o'clock in the 
evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 
o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. 

"'I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the 
termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.' " 



July 24, French Yellow Book No. 26 77 

a demarche with so short a time limit ; that is to say, a time when the 
President of the Republic and the President of the Council and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburgh 
and were at sea, 1 and consequently were not able to exert, in agree- 
ment with those Powers which were not directly interested, that 
soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in 
the interest of general peace. 2 

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to 
the intentions of his Government. 

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock 

this afternoon. , r 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

To Stockholm — for M. Viviani — Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, 
Borne, Petrograd 

French Yellow Book No. 26 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. 
Thiebaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the 
Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Borne, St. 
Petersburgh. 

Paris, July 24, 1914- 

M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from 
his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not 
know the contents of the Austrian note. 3 

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, 
M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, 
that Servia must try to gain time, 4 as the limit of forty-eight hours 
perhaps formed rather a "raise en demeure" than an ultimatum in 
the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an 
opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were 
not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; he was 
advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the 
Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Servia, 
while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices 
of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full in- 
formation as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all 
speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria 
by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe. 

I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and in- 
tentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on 

1 This thought is stated as coming from the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, 
in Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6. 

2 The Austrian Ambassador reporting to his home office (Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 11, July 24) , does not mention this interview with the Acting Political Director. 

On the other hand M. Bienvenu-Martin does not state here what the Ambassador 
quotes him there as having said. 

3 The contents of the Austrian note had been published in the French morning 
papers of July 24, 1914, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24; and had 
been disclosed to Sir Edward Grey. British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914. 

4 The advice given Serbia by France is differently stated in Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 13, July 24, 1914. 



78 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not 
communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been 
consulted nor even informed ' of it. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

French Yellow Book No. 27 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- 
holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, 
St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Borne. 

Paris, July 24, 191.',. 

The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me 2 that opinion has 
been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian 
demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be 
that Servia may give way. 

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will 1 
show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punish- 
ment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given 
as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they 
could not accept a general order t<> the army dictated to the King, 
nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the 
interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers 
that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dis- 
pute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers. 

Our Ambassador at Berlin 3 gives an account of the excitement 
aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian 
Charge d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Ger- 
many would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and 
appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our 
Ambassador is to see Ilerr von Jagow this evening. 

M. Barrere informs us that Italy 4 is exercising moderating influence 
at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

French Yellow Book No. 28 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- 
holm (for tin President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, 
St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Govern- 
ment, of which he would not leave me a copy, 5 but at my request he 
read it twice over to me. 

' Tin ■ seems to be at variance with British Blue Book No. 38, July 23, 1914. 

2 The despatch from the French Ambassador in Vienna here referred to has not 
been published. 

»Cf. below French Yellow Book No. 29, .July 24, 1914. 

J The despatch from the French Ambassador in Rome here referred to has not been 
published. 

6 There is no reason why lie should not leave' a copy witli M. Martin. The tier- 
man Ambassador in London apparent];.' left s copy with Sir E. < oe\ ; British Blue Bo >k 



July 24, French Yellow Book No. 28 79 

The Note was almost word for word as follows : — 

"The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning 
the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir 
presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably 
the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the 
means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also 
do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tend- 
encies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern 
Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their in- 
corporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and 
is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the 
Government and the army. 

"The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In 
an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested 
itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation 
and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian 
provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did no1 
lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which 
was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. 
Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, 
the Pan-Servian propaganda, has, since that time, continuously in- 
creased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the 
recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become 
clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity 
or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to 
remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the 
frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are 
constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro- 
cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only 
be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public 
opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted 
does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government 
might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow 
themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards 
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do 
not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, 
would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their de- 
mands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if 
necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having 
to be left to them." 

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the 
last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point 
that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ; 
it is as follows : — " The German Government consider that in the 
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively 

No. 9, July 24, 1914. M. Martin must have had a copy of it when he wrote this mes- 
sage. However excellent his memory is, he could not have quoted a lengthy note as 
accurately as he did, from memory. 



SO Official Diplomatic Documents 

between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers 
ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately 
concerned. 

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the 
dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing 
to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable conse- 
quences." 

1 called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while 
it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those 
who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand 
it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, 
having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian 
Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being 
carried away by a revolution. 

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into 
account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of 
a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis 
(which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also 
be taken into consideration; that of Servia 's acceptance and of her 
agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the ac- 
complices and lull guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian 
propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and 
dignity. 

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by 
Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be 
examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be 
thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation. 

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who 
could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in 
Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of 
Germany to localise the dispute. 

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and 
vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if 
we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple mise en 
demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered 
that personally he had no views. Bienyentj-Martin. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 20 

.1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienrcnu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24, 1914. 

The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep im- 
pression. 

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could 
not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as 
in the press, the same view is expressed. 



July 24, French Yelloto Book No. 30 81 

Most of the Charges d' Affaires present in Berlin came to see me 
this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The 
Russian Charge d Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has pre- 
sented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic 
and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh. 1 He is in- 
clined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany 
desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria 
will not doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which 
the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the 
monarchic principle (par un sentiment de solidarity monarchique) and 
by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude. 

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon. 

Jules Cambon. 

French Yellow Book No. 30 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-. 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24, 101 4. 

I asked the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I 
had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, 
that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute 
with Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it. 

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the 
note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government 
having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. More- 
over, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and 
he hopes that it will be localised. 

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, 
the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. 
Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely 
ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to 
Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my sur- 
prise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit 
and scope he was ignorant. 

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only because we 
are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me." 

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic 
trouble will probably break out in Servia ; that will open the door to 
fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna ? " 
I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the 
language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, 
the question, but betoken an active support. Finally, I remarked 
that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission 
would make an unpleasant impression in Europe. 

Here von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement 

1 The identical thought was expressed on the same day in Paris by the Acting 
Political Director, French Yellow Book No. 25. See also same day, British Blue Book 
No. 6. 



82 Official Diplomatic Documents 

(mi pen d'emotion) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was 
counting on tlmr giving her wise advice. 

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would en- 
deavour t<> persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable 
concessions ; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the 
other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Bel- 
grade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna 
from another quarter?" 

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on 
circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that 
the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the 
situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is 
happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all 
means of retreat have been cut off." 

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's 
attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro- 
Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the con- 
fidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag 
along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the 
Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with 
ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be 
strong ; the conviction is that they were violent. 

An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening shows 
also that at the German ( 'ham-cry there exists a state of mind to which 
we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I 
mean the feeling that the monarchies must stand together {sentiment 
de la solidarite monarchique). I am convinced that great weight must 
be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude 
of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have 
been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been 
a few days previously. 

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Ilerr von 
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every 
one that they were ' ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria 
to Servia. Jules Cambon. 

From Petrograd 

French Yellow Book No. 31 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at S. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1014. 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. 
Sazonof a threatening note to Servia. 

1 This sentence reads "know nothing of the note" in The New York Times Trans- 
lation. Ii contradicts, therefore, the firsi part .if the despatch where the contents of 

the note are discussed. The official English vei ion rive iplanation of the altered 

wording. The edition of the French Yellow Bool ip ied to the editor by the French 
Ambassador in Washington, October, 1915, contains the past tense 



July 24, French Yellow Book No. 32 83 

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could 
not be more pacific, 1 a fact of which the President of the Republic 
and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy them- 
selves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian 
Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces 
a new and disquieting element into the situation. 

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence 
to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum 
renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers 
of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna. 

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire 
to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. 
Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente 
can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative 

attitude - Paleologtte. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 32 

M. Paul Camion, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister jar Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 24, 191 4. 

Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no 
stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the 
British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the ini- 
tiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the media- 
tion, between Austria and Servia, 2 of the four Powers which are not 
directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this 
is the essential point. 

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lich- 
nowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter 
to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, 
and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ulti- 
matum without previous agreement with Berlin. 

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he 
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held 
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg!] 
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter 
capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great 
Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening 
of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this 

'This differs from British Blue Book No. 6, July 24 ; and No. 17. July 25. 1914. 
There was a conference between Sazonof and the French and British Ambassadors in 
Petrograd on July 24, in the morning, as described in British Blue Book No. 6. So far 
as the French published despatches go, the above is the only report. Cf. also below, 
German White Book, Exhibit 4, July 24, 1914. 

2 M. Bienvenu-Martin in quoting this suggestion in Yellow Book No. 34, same day, 
alters it to include mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. That this was not the 
Cambon-Grey intention appears from British Blue Book No. 10. July 24, where Sir 
E. Grey begins with his idea of action "simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh," 
while M. Paul Canibon prefers "mediation between Austria and Servia." 



S4 Official Diplomatic Documents 

that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in 
Germany. 

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, 
by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from 
Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she 
could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum. 

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way 
of arresting the course of events. 

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the 
demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey. 

Paul Cambon. 

French Yellow Hook No. 33' 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Loudon, to M. Bicnrcnit- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, Julij 24, 1914. 

The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a tele- 
gram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him 
their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to- 
morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of 
the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in 
to-day's " Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government t< 
accept it. 

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely 
difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been ask- 
ing ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict. 

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I pro- 
pose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention 
of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack. 

Paul Cambon. 

To Stockholm for M. Viviani, lie/grade, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, 
Home 

French Yellow Book No. 34 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- 
holm [for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg]!, 
Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Govern- 
ment's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such 

1 This despatch has I n doctored for insertion hen-. It is an impossible message 

in its present form. It is dated July 24, and states that the "Servian Minister received 
to-night. " etc., notification of the Austro-Hungarian note. This notification, however, 
was sent to the Servian Minister on the previous day. July 'S.i. Cf. Serbian Blue Book 
No. 33. The casual reader would receive the impression from this despatch that the 
time limit granted to Serbia was 24 hours, from "to-night," July 24, to "to-morrow, 
Saturday evening." 

The last paragraph of this despatch, No. 33. refers to a summons to a conference, 
v hirli has been described in No. :;_'. 



July 24, German White Book Exhibit 3 85 

formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government 
to another ; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility 
assumed by Austria. 

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before 
him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the cooperation of the 
German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers 
who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, 
England, Erance, Italy and Germany ; this mediation to be exercised 
simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh. 1 

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing 
to cooperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that 
Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against 
a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satis- 
faction which is considered compatible with her independence and 
her sovereignty. Bienvenu-Martin. 



Germany : 

From Vienna 

German White Book Exhibit 3 2 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on 
July Uih, 1914. 

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge 
d'affaires 3 in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria- 
Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the 
historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that 
the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. 
Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted 
merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the 
Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary 
must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. 
It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance 
of powers in the Balkan. The Charge d'affaires, who had received no 
instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary 
"ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to 
Sasonof. 

1 Mediation both in Vienna and Petrograd was Sir E. Grey's first idea, see British 
Blue Book No. 10. Julv 24, but he was dissuaded from it bv the French Ambassador 
in London. M. Paul Cambon. Cf. British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, 1914. This 
statement here is, moreover, at variance with M. Cambon's report, Yellow Book No. 
32, same day. M. Cambon's desire not to bring any pressure to bear on Russia was 
eventually shared bv Sir E. Grey. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No. 
80, Julv 28, and British Blue Book Nos. 11 and 16. 

2 For Exhibit No. 2 see July 28, 1914. The Exhibits of the German White Book are 
not numbered chronologically. 

3 See above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. IS, July 24, 1914. 



86 Official Diplomatic Documents 

German- White Book Exhibit 4 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- 
cellor on July 24th, 1914. 

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged inter- 
view with Sasonof. The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured 
accusations 1 toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. 
He declared most positively that Russia could not permit'- under any 
circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone 
between the parties concerned. 



Great Britain : 



From the Austrian Ambassador. 
British Blue Book No. 4 



Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, t<i Count 
Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated 
by Count Mensdorff. July 24, 1914.) 

[Here follows the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia; cf. Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] 

British Blue 1!<»ik No. 5 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914- 

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the 
reasons leading up to it, lias been communicated to me by Count 
Mensdorff. 3 

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that 
it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, 1 and such 
a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the pro- 
ceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circum- 
stances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with 
Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before 
seen one State address to another independent State a document of so 
formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent 
with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were 
to mean,*' as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be 
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority 
within the frontiers of Servia. \ 

i If. above French Yellow Book No. 31, sain, day, "The intentions of the Emperor 
anil his ministers could not he more pacific." 

"■Cf. British Blue Book No. 17. July 25, 1915. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 

'That there would be a time limit had been known to France and, therefore, 
probably to the Entente Powers, since July 19, 191 1 ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 
and 11. 

6 The meaning of this clause is best explained in British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 
1914, whore it is said that the Austro-Hungarian Government had stated "that co- 
operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial 
or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this." 
Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, I'll 1. 



July 23, British Blue Book No. 6 87 

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern 
myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of 
the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and 
Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such 
comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss 
those merits. 

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange 
of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to 
what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. 

Count Mensdorff ' replied that the present situation might never 
have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the 
Archduke ; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help," 
though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time 
limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination 
on Servia's part. 

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit 
could have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms 
of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been 
content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of 
forty-eight hours from its presentation. 

From Petrograd 

British Blue Book No. 6 

Sir G. Buchanan, British . I mbassador at St. Petcrsburgh, to Sir Edward, 
Grey. — (Received July 24-) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1.914- 

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof 2 to the 
effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. 

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was 
demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the Erench 3 Embassy to 
discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both 
provocative and immoral ; she would never have taken such action 
unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were 
quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's 
Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia 
and France. 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would 
fulfil all the obligations 4 entailed by her alliance with Russia, if 
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic 
negotiations. 

1 Austro-Hunsarian Ambassador in London. 

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

3 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty together from the first. Cf. 
British Blue Book No. 12. same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day. See 
also British Blue Book No. 10, note 2. 

4 This must mean "going to war," diplomatic support being spoken of in the next 
line. 



88 Official Diploviatic Documents 

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their 
Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the 
name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason 
to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Govern- 
ment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to 
support Russia and France by force of arms. I )irect British interests 
in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never 
be sanctioned by British public opinion. 1 To this M. Sazonof replied 
that we must not forget that the general European question 2 was 
involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and 
that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems 
now at issue. 

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what 
he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should 
join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active 
intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be 
tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark 
on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, 
was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare 
war on Austria? 

M. Sazonof 11 said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisa- 
tion would at any rate have to be carried out; 4 but a council of Min- 
isters was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. 
A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the 
Emperor would preside, when a decision 6 would be come to. 

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce 
Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to 
bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French 
Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her 
mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, 
our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united 
attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my sugges- 
tion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should 
know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands 
formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must 
first consult his colleagues 6 on this point, but that doubtless some of 
tin' Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. 

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me 

1 This sentence is contrary to the claim that Great Britain is fighting for the rights 
of the little nations, including Serbia. Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 10 and 11, same day. 

2 This refers to tin- fetich of all the Powers for the past century, often called "the 
balance of power." See Russian Orange Hook No. 17, July 25 : "We count upon it 
that England will at once side definitely witli France and Russia in order to maintain 
the European balance of power for which she has constantly intervened in the past." 
Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26, July 24, 1914. 

3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

4 This raises the question, when it was begun. 

6 For a French account of the decision arrived at in this meeting, see French Yellow 
Book No. 50, July 26, 1914. 

6 This almost makes it appear as if Russia wrote Serbia's reply for her. Cf. Re- 
port of the Balkan Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1014, 
p. 41 : "The Balkan alliance in its later phase was but a tool employed by local policy 
encouraged by Russia, and directed, under the inspiration of Russian diplomacy, 
against Germanic pretensions." 



July 24, British Blue Book No. 7 89 

for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government 
with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it 
seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make 
strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, 
urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would 
endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your 
way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would 
probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and 
Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out 
if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we 
would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we 
should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset 
make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, 
he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation 
of action taken by Austria. 

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot 
reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and 
it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present 
their ultimatum. 1 

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, 
that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are deter- 
mined to make a strong stand. 2 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 7 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received did// 2',.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, duly 24, 1914- 

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian 
Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia 
could not leave Russia indifferent. 3 

Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, and said 4 to him, as his own personal view, that 
Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of 
acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory 
in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian 
Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian 
demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. 5 to-morrow. His 
Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence 

1 This same idea is expressed by the other two Entente Powers. Cf . French Yellow 
Book Nos. 25 and 29, same day. 

2 Cf. next day, British Blue Book No. 17, " If she [Russia] feels secure of the support 
of France, she will face all the risks of war." 

3 For a stronger phrasing see July 25, British Blue Book No. 17. 

* This interview is spoken of in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. IS, July 24, and 
German White Book, Exhibit 3, same day. According to both despatches the Russian 
Charge d'Affaires was without instructions, and consequently refrained from expressing 
an opinion. 

6 The hour was at first placed at 5 p.m., later at 6 p.m. See French Yellow Book 
No. 25, July 24. 



90 Official Diplomatic Documents 

was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction 
throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what 
had been done could be raised by any Power. 

From Belgrade 

British Blue Book No. S 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir 
Edward Grey. — (Recti ml July &£.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July U, 1914- 

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by 
Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate 
them. 

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who 
returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, 
and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. 

From the German Ambassador 
British Blue Book No. 9 
Note l communicated by German Ambassador, July 2Jf, Wl^. 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con- 
cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the 
Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose 
unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set 
itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now 
made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre 
of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the 
detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom 
is 1o he found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the 
connivance of members of Government and army. 

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an 
especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested 
itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching 
self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the 
Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed 
did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future 
which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not 
been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of 
official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously 
increased in extension and intensity: to its account must be set the 
recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become 

1 German White Book Exhibit No. 1, July 2.3. 1914, cf. French Yellow Book No. 28, 

same day 



July 24, British Blue Book No. 10 91 

clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity 
or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still 
longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side 
of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her terri- 
tories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the 
course of procedure anil demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of 
that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in 
Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension 
that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those 
demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a 
provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hun- 
garian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's 
position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain 
the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by 
strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the 
choice of the means having to be left to them. 

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that 
in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled 
exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great 
Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two 
immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently 
the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another 
Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed 
by incalculable consequences. 

To Paris 
British Blue Book No. 10 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1.914. 

After telling M. Cambon 1 to-day of the Austrian communication 
to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I 
had made to Count Mensdorfr 2 upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon 
that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some 
days ago 3 had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in 
St. Petersburgh. I would say 4 to the Ambassador that, of course, if 
the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble 
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it, 5 
but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it 
seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I 
should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to 

1 French Ambassador in London. 

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 
3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 1, July 20, 1914. 

4 Sir Edward's remarks to the German Ambassador are the result of his interview 
with the French Ambassador. For the determination of the Entente Powers to act 
together in this matter see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 1. 

5 Cf. Nos. 6 and 11, same day. 



92 Official Diplomatic Documents 

exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the 
only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised 
was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct 
interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simul- 
taneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 1 

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the 
four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to 
join in it ; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in 
St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some 
action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into 
Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian 
demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take 
action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the 
Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. 

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. 
Petersburgh ' until after it was clear that there must be trouble 
between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move 
into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the 
four Powers to urge Austria, to stop her advance, and Russia also 
to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any 
chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate 
in it. 

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once 
moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by 
mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would 
be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers. 

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and 
Servia. 

He replied that it was so. 

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon 
on the subject. 

I am, etc. 
E. Grey. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 11 

Sir Edward drey to Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1.914. 

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the 
German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I under- 
stand the German Government is making the same communication 
to the Powers. 

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to 
trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; 2 I had 
heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive 

i CL French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24, and note 1. 
2Cf. British Blue Book No. 0, July 24, and uote 3. 



July 24, British Blue Book No. 12 93 

of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the 
German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal 
hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating 
influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the 
extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of 
the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, 
I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not 
believe any Power could exercise influence alone. 

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence 
being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, 
and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and 
St. Petersburgh 1 in favour of moderation in the event of the relations 
between Austria and Russia becoming threatening. 

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might 
march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia 
should march to help Servia ; it would be very desirable to get 
Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. 
But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Ger- 
many would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You 
should inform Secretary of State. 

Prince Lichnowsky 2 said that Austria might be expected to move 
when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional 
acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his 
Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be re- 
turned by Servia ; a reply favourable on some points must be sent 
at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded 
to Austria. 

To Belgrade 
British Blue Book No. 12 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d 'Affaires at 

Belgrade. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, 
however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of 
the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. 
She certainly ought to express concern and regret. 3 For the rest, 
Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider 
best in Servian interests. 

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when 
time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional 
acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding 

1 Cf. previous note, where Sir E. Grey apparently dropped his idea of bringing 
simultaneous pressure to bear on Vienna and Petrograd in favor of Paul Cambon's 
idea of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 

2 German Ambassador in London. 

3 This would imply that Austria-Hungary's claim was correct that Serbia had 
neglected to do this, although four weeks had elapsed since the murder. Cf. also note 
1 to Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19. 



94 Official Diplomatic Document* 

an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the 
time limit allows. 

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government 
will express their views, but 1 cannot undertake responsibility of 
saying' more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even 
that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and 
Russian Governments. 1 You should therefore consult your French 
and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as ex- 
pressed above, to Servian Government. 2 

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not 
precipitate military action. 

Russia : 

From. Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 

Russian Orange Book No. 3 

Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affair*, 
at 10 a.m. on July 11 {24), 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address 
the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the 
10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Belgrade. 

[Here follows the text of the note; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 
22, 1914.] 

Russian Orange Book No. 4 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge a" Affaires 
at Vienna. Communicated also to London, Rome, Pans, and 
Belgrade. 3 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 11 (2JA, 1!>U- 4 

Please convey the follmoing message to the Austro-Hungarian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs: — 

"La communication du Gou- "The communication made by 

vernement austro-hongrois aux Austria-Hungary to the Powers 

Puissances le lendemain de la the day after the presentation of 

presentation de 1'ultimatum a the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves 

Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances a period to the Powers which is 

qu'un delai tout a fait insuffisant quite insufficient to enable them 

pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit to take any steps which might 

1 Of. French Yellow Book No. 23, July 24, and British Blue Book No. 6, same day. 
and note 1 . 

- This advice was never given to Servia ; cf. British Blue Book no. 22. July 2.5. 1914. 

s According to French Yellow Book No. 39 this note was amunicated to Bucharest 

instead of to Belgrade and also to Berlin. 

4 This note, although dated July 24, was presented in London (British Blue Bock 
No. 13) and Taris (Yellow Book No. 39) on July 25, the very day on which the time 
limit was to expire. Russia was informed of the presentation of the note on July 2.J. 
(Russian Orange Book No. 2.) 



July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 4 



95 



d 'utile pour I'aplanissement des 
complications surgies. 

"Pour prevenir les conse- 
quences incalculables et egale- 
ment nefastes pour toutes les 
Puissances qui peuvent suivre le 
mode d'action du Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois, il nous parait in- 
dispensable qu'avant tout led61ai 
donne a la Serine pour repondre 
so it prolonged L'Autriche-Hon- 
grie, se declarant disposee a in- 
former les Puissances des donnees 
de l'enquete sur Iesquelles le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
base ses accusations, devrait leur 
donner %alement le temps de s'en 
rendre compte. 

" En ce cas, si les Puissances se 
convainquaient du bien-fonde de 
certaines des exigences autri- 
chiennes, elles se trouveraient en 
mesure de faire parvenir au 
Gouvernement serbe des conseils 
en consequence. 

"Un refus de prolonger le 
terme de I'ultimatum priverait 
de toute portee la demarche du 
Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
aupres des Puissances et se trou- 
verait en contradiction aver les 
bases ineine des relations inter- 
nationales. 

"Le Prince Koudachef est 
charge de communiquer ce qui 
precede au Cabinet de Vienne." 

M. Sazonof espere que le 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, paragraph before last, where Aus- 
tria-Hungary offers to the Powers a "dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the 
connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 2Sth June." So far as 
Austria was concerned, this was an act of courtesy. The Powers had been unwilling 
or unable to protect her from these intrigues culminating in the murder of the Arch- 
duke. It was, therefore, she claimed, her right and her duty to punish them in her 
own way. 

Sazonof interprets the offer of Austria-Hungary not as an act of courtesy but as 
an accusation lodged before the tribunal of the Powers, who, therefore, should be the 
judges of how far Austria-Hungary might be permitted to go. According to European 
traditions, followed for over a century by all the nations, such a course would have 
affected the dignity of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers. Cf. Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, i914. 

2 This line varied, of course, according to the Government to which the note was pre- 
sented. 



help to smooth away the diffi- 
culties that have arisen. 

"In order to prevent the con- 
sequences, equally incalculable 
and fatal to all the Powers, which 
may result from the course of 
action followed by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, it seems 
to ns to he above all essential 
that the period allowed for the 
Servian reply should be extended. 
Austria-Hungary, having de- 
clared her readiness 1 to inform 
the Powers of the results of the 
enquiry upon which the Imperial 
and Royal Government base their 
accusations, should equally allow 
them sufficient time to study 
them. 

" In this case, if the Powers 
were convinced that certain of 
the Austrian demands were well 
founded, they would be in a 
position to offer advice to the 
Servian Government. 

"A refusal to prolong the term 
of the ultimatum would render 
nugatory the proposals made by 
the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to the Powers, and would 
be in contradiction to the very 
bases of international relations. 

"Prince Kudachef is instructed 
to communicate the above to the 
Cabinet at Vienna." 

M. Sazonof hopes that His Bri- 
tannic Majesty's Government 2 



96 Official Diplomatic Documents 

britannique adherera au point de will adhere to the point of view 

vue expose, et il exprime l'espoir set forth above, and lie trusts 

que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien that Sir E. Gray will see his way 

niunir 1'Ambassadeur d'Angle- to furnish similar instruetions to 

terre a Vienne d 'instructions con- the British Ambassador at 

formes. Vienna. 

To London, Berlin, Rome and Paris 
lii ssian Orange Book No. ■"> 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at 

London, Berlin, Rome, anil Ran'.'!. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914. 

With reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudaehef ' we trust 
that the Government to which you are accredited will share the 
Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative 
at Vienna to hold similar language. 

( 'oiiununicated to Belgrade. 

From the Serbian Croirn Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia 

Russian * >k inge Hook No. 6 

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prince Regent 
of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

Belgrade, .Inly 11 (24), 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented 
to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Sera- 
jevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, 
ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, 
and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity 
of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by 
the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the 
Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating 
for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent 
State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a 
declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for 
au order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check 
the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for 
criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are 
further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to 
take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carry- 
ing out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are re- 
quired to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight 
hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave 
Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hun- 

1 Russian Charge d'Affaires in Vienna. 



July 24, Russian Orange Book No. S 97 

garian conditions which are compatible with the position of an 
independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may 
advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the 
crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of 
the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legis- 
lation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a 
time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit 
by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our 
frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty 
to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good- 
will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us 
with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav 
heart will not pass unheeded. 

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people 
in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate 
of the Kingdom of Servia. 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Book No. 7 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914. 

All the morning papers, even those few which recognise the 
impossibility of Servia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly 
welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official 
" Lokal-Anzeiger " is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless 
any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburgh, Paris, 
Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German 
people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the 
Balkan 1 peninsula is to be cleared up at last. 

From Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 8 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 11 (24), 1914. 

A copy of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been com- 
municated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador. 2 
The German Ambassador later visited 3 the Minister and read to 

1 The Balkans had been spoken of for years as the Powder Magazine of Europe, 
where at any moment a spark might start a European conflagration. Nobody in 
Berlin or Vienna believed any nation would come to the support of Serbia in view of 
the intrigues which had led to the murder of Serajevo, and which Berlin and Vienna be- 
lieved were rightlv charged against Serbia. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 25. July 24, 1914. 

3 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, 1914. 



9S Official Diplomatic Documents 

him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and 
indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Servia, Austria, 
would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to mili- 
tary measures. The communication ended with the observation 
that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled 
between Austria and Servia direct, and that it was to the interest of 
the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. 
The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at 
the interview, asked ' the Ambassador whether the Austrian action 
should be considered as an ultimatum — in other words, whether, 
in the event of Servia not submitting entirely to the Austrian de- 
mands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a 
direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions. 



From Belgrade 
Russian Orange Book No. 9 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister.for Foreign 

Affairs. ' 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 11 {24), 1914. 

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer 
to Austria within the prescribed time limit — that is to say, to- 
morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m. — showing the points which are accept- 
able or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the 
Powers 2 to defend the independence of Servia. Then, added Pashitch, 
if war is inevitable, we will make war. 

Serbia : 

To Pcirograd 

Serbian Blue Book No. 34 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister far Foreign Affairs, to 
Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, Jut// 11/24, 1914. 

I INFORMED the Russian Charge d'Affaires that I would hand in 
the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at (i p.m. 
I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal 3 to the Govern- 
ments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. 
If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on. 

1 In the French account of this interview, Yellow Book No. 2S, .Inly 24, M. Martin 
and not the Acting Head of the Political Department is said to have asked this ques- 
tion. 

2 The only published appeal is that of the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, Russian 
Orange Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. 

3 No such appeal had been published, except one from the Serbian Crown Prince 
to the ( Izar, July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 6. 



July 24, Serbian Blue Book No. 37 99 

To London 

Serbian Blue Book No. 35 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. M. Boschkovitch , Minister in London. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, L'>1 4. 

I informed the British Charge d'Affaires to-day that the Austro- 
Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent 
country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the- hope 
that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce 
the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not 
conceal my anxiety as to future developments. 

From Petrograd 

Serbian Blue Book No. 36 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914- 

As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the con- 
tents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Am- 
bassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.' During the con- 
versation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian demarche 
I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the 
situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Am- 
bassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter 
in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and 
did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that 
he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long 
that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, 
but a European question. 

To the Czar from the Serbian Crown Prince 

Serbian Blue Book No. :!7 

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial 
Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. 

[See No. 6 of Russian Orange Book, July 24, 1914.] 

1 This sentence may have been retained to give the reader an insight into the 
character of Count Pourtales. It should, therefore, be compared with similar pic- 
tures, e.g. British Blue Book No. 78, Julv 29, and contrasted with British Blue Book 
No. 72, July 29, and No. 97, July 30. 



LOO 



Official Diplomatic Docuvienis 



Saturday, July 25, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 



Austria-Hungary 



London, Petrograd 
Under Secretary of State, 

Rome etc. 
London etc., Vienna 



Belgrade 



( rermany 
Great Britain 



Russia 



London 

Paris, Petrograd, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome, Bel- 
grade 

London 

All Representatives 



Belgium Rome etc. Belgrad 

France London etc., Vienna Berlin, London, Petro- 

grad, Rome, Vienna, 
Belgrade 
Petrograd 

Paris, Petrograd. Ber- 
lin, Rome, Vienna, 
Belgrade, Russian 
Ambassador 
Vienna, Belgrade, Ber- 
lin, Paris, London, 
German Ambassa- 
dor 
Russia and Great Britain endeavor to secure from Austria-Hungary an exten- 
sion of the time limit set in the Serbian note to expire on this day at 6 p.m. The 
French support of this request, while promised, does not materialize. Germany 
gives her support, hut doubts Austria's willingness to grant the request. 

Austria-Hungary denies the request, hut announces that she will not immedi- 
ately proceed to war, and that a period of military preparation will intervene. 
This appears to satisfy Great Britain as a concession of practical value. 

Serbia delivers Iter reply which docs not satisfy Austria-Hungary, whose lega- 
tion leaves Belgrade at 6.30 P.M. 

Great Britain continues her efforts to bring aboul a ( lonference of four powers, 
hut apparently has yielded to the view of the French Ambassador that no pres- 
sure should be exerted on Russia, for in one note Sir E. Grey even substitutes 
Russia for Italy in the proposed group of the mediating powers. 

Germany repeats that she had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in the 
preparation of her note to Scrvia, hut finding her demands just would support her. 
She dec lines to mediate between Aus1 ria and Serbia, but announces her willingness 
to take part in mediation between Austria and Russia. 

Russia and France arc endeavoring to secure the unconditional support of Great 
Britain, not in the interest of Serbia, but to maintain the European balance of 
power. 

Austria-Hungary disclaims any intention of disturbing this balance of power, 
and explains anew her reasons for proceeding against Serbia. She also explains 
the meaning of those clauses of her note- which she says had been misunderstood ; 
and states that Russia was acting under a misapprehension. She also issues a 
dossier containing the- proofs of her indictment of Serbia. 

France refuses to issue an official correction of erroneous accounts in the French 
;>n-ss concerning the- attitude of Germany. 

Belgium continues to contemplate the probability of a European War. 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 101 

Austria-Hungary : 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal . 1 mbassadors at Berlin, Rome, 
Paris, London, St. Petersburgh and Constantinople. 

Vienna, .July 25, 191/).. 

Your Excellency will find herewith the dossier mentioned in 
the circular note 1 to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian 
propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder. 

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice 
of the Government to which you are accredited. 

(See Note 2 to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.) 

Enclosure 
"The Dossier" 2 

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from 
the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite 
them with the Servian States, dates from far back. 

This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate 
object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its 
culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing 
off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly 
and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian 
Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power. 

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against 
the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, 
apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed 
to prepare for this war. 

The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these 
associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary 
committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact 
it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials 
wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its 
founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers 
Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, 1914. 

2 This "dossier," being too long to be telegraphed, was sent by mail (see Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). It was presented (the Powers were advised of 
it on July 25, see French Yellow Book No. 38 and note 1) in Paris on July 27, and was 
published, in part, under No. 75 of the French Yellow Book of that date. It was prob- 
ably presented in London to Sir Edward Grey on the same day. Sir E. Grey, however, 
published only a scant summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, omitting the rest 
and not stating that he had received it. In the introductory narrative to the edition 
of the Blue Book of Sept. 28. 1914. Sir E. Grey says : "That his Majesty's Government 
did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ulti- 
matum till the 7th August." Neither the British Blue Book nor the Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book contains a despatch of this day, which renders it impossible to ascertain 
to which "evidence" Sir E. Grey referred in this sentence. It may have been a 
complete transcript of the evidence presented at the trial of the Serajevo murderers. 

The "dossier," however, contained the "evidence on which Austria had founded 
her ultimatum," and this Sir E. Grey kept from Parliament, from the country and 
possibly from his colleagues. The first partial knowledge of the "dossier" that the 
world had came from the French Yellow Book which was published several months 
after the outbreak of the war. 



102 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), and 
Majors (then Captains) Vbja Tankosic and Milan Pribicevic. This 
association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies 
for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy. (See Appendix 2.) 

A convinction description of the activity at that time of the 
Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of 
Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of 
his evidence before the district court at Serajevo; he was then at 
Belgrade, and had been accepted l>y the Narodna Odbrana, with 
other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of 
L909, Krstanovic had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a 
school established for the formation of new hands at Cuprija (in the 
district of Jagodina), managed by < 'aptains Voja Tankosic and 1 hisan 
Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers. 
General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the 
three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals. 

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb 
throwing, mine laying, Mowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, 
and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions 
of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired. 

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged 
by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared 
for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way sub- 
jects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, 
and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice under- 
hand attacks against the means of defence of their country. 

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration 
made by the Servian Government on the Mist March, 1909, in which 
the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to 
accept the new situation created in municipal and international law 
by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly promised 
to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source 
of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an 
end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Servia and the 
Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement 
of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in 
accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile tothe 
Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would 
have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the 
ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav 
districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the 
realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual 
friendship ami parallel interests. 

These hopes, however, have not been realised. 

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 103 

the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to sup- 
press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has 
only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy 
has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The 
Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the 
new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were sum- 
moned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. 
Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the 
Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have 
been incited to treason against their country. 

Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly 
in this spirit. 

Up to the present time no' fewer than eighty-one newspapers 
appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through 
the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the 
penal law. 

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred 
person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, 
or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian 
papers. 

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass 
of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in 
Appendix I. 

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of 
Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the 
formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after 
the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which repara- 
tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modu- 
lation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced 
views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Sarrum- 
jjrava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of 
Belgrade. (See Appendix I (//).) 

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the 
attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic 
against the Feldzeugmeister von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was turned to account by the prcs^. 

As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed, 
and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these 
circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives 
of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found 
on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. 
Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime 
was of an anarchist type. 

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating 
the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed. 
Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that 
Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero 
whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief." 



104 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The Politika considers the 18th August ' of the same year as a 
suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic, 
"whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the 
outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).) 

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do witli the territorial 
aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance 
of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed 
in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation 
of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This 
approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle 
against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the 
attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. 
(See Appendix I (c).) 

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Servia but 
also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by 
well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this 
mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for 
the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy. 

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation car- 
ried on by the associations. The same persons w r ho were at its head 
at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they 
still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organ- 
isers, the most violent opponents of the Monarchy; General Bozo 
Jankovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing estab- 
lishment), and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organ- 
ised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict 
hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna 
Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very 
active agitation. 

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with 
the "shooting federation" (Schiitzenbund) , (702 societies), the 
great Sokol 2 Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian 
Club, the association of horsemen (Reitervereiri) , "Prince Michael," 
the society of sportsmen {J dgcrbund) , and the league of development 
(Kulturliga), as well as numerous other associations all of which, 
subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the 
Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more 
and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com- 
plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but 
members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana. 

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Servia a close 
network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those 
who were receptive of its ideas. 

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate 
sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it. 

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society" 

1 Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty. 

-[Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav 
countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.) 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 105 

(Kulturrercin) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical 
improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the 
Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) 
the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its 
"re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the 
sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pre- 
tence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and 
language and even to destroy her"; that it is an essential necessity 
to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," 
"a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every 
means" to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate 
the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are 
suffering in bondage." 

All the efforts "at an educational programme" (Kulturbestrebungen) 
of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea 
simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people 
for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy. 

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work 
in the same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as 
an example (see Appendix 3). 

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and 
civil servants are at its head. 

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the 
annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical 
training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, 
and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the 
"dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the 
north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and 
rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." 

In the administrative reports of this association the technical 
work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines 
for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the adminis- 
tration," namely, the preparation of national development and the 
strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling 
it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," 
and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out 
in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across 
the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified." 

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send 
forth the appeal that " falcons must be reared " capable " of bringing 
freedom to the brothers still in bondage." 

As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna 
Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object 
but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried 
on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words. 

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death 
struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to 
the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the 
eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the 



106 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories." (See 
Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are 
further also expected to take part in this "national work." This 
"healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond 
the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for 
this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them 
Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an 
example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation. 

But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the 
work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch 
with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi- 
cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, 
no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" 
which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged." 

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by 
the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Od- 
brana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections 
for " foreign affairs." 

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated 
branches is extremely varied. 

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially 
controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished 
members of the Narodna Odbrana in the southeastern parts of 
the Monarchy where they spe;ik before various societies on national 
or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired 
opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of 
explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less 
veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated. 

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic 
(Director of the Government printing establishment), already several 
times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an 
"appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary 
the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war 
against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic under- 
took tours of this nature in the southeastern districts of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 
1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly 
of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he 
designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language. 

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy 
formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna 
Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ; 
for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or 
in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Ser- 
vians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy. 

Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso- 
ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna 
Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian, adherents to 
his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representa- 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 107 

tive of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the "brothers 
in Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings 
of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful" — a thought which in 
confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different 
expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this 
society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to 
the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia, 
the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information 
founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this 
matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this 
connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia 
in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military 
reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, 
and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of 
the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : "This event marks 
the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished 
in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the 
people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not 
been destroyed." 

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have 
succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to estab- 
lish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the 
character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this 
point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa- 
tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis- 
covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian 
Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups 
of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy. 

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of 
a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that 
of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana 
and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. 
It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown. 

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the 
poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as tho e 
of irresponsible youth. 

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved B.B., 
D.K., Y.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie 
V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevic, left the service of the army of 
the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to 
Servia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams 
unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning 
to the Fatherland they have betrayed. 

The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of 
Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ; 
what is less known is that people who have been expelled from 
Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, 
are received in Servia with open arms, and often even protected by the 



108 Officio! Diplomatic Documents 

State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools 
with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors 
and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly 
establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. 
A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, 
several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dis- 
missed on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of 
them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others 
were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been 
thus dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, 
declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during 
the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province 
was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that 
during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal 
Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training 
college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports 
in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he 
must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, 
the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being 
noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and 
arrested. 

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre- 
sentation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a 
lung time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana 
had made military preparations tor the war which it desired to make 
against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria- 
Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the 
usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equip- 
ment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.) 

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at 
Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage 
(Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time 
of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in 
the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be 
further added a complete system of espionage. 

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, 
described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme 
which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against 
the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of 
the "ancient red Hag of the Narodna Odbrana." 

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred 
against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and 
from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility; 
in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible 
in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any 
sense of shame common acts of murder. 

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj, 
the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 109 

(Banalrat) von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was 
mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was 
pursuing him, and wounded two others. 

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic 
was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna 
Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been 
devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only 
matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade together with 
the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy cele- 
brations in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations 
with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, 
with whom he had had political discussions. A few days after- 
wards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian 
major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which 
he carried out his crime. 

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made 
in an arsenal for military purposes. 

Jukic" s attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of 
August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America, 
made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron 
Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action 
organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, 
and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the 
Narodna Odbrana and its confederates. 

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago, 
and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled 
attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its 
appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their im- 
pending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Servia, 
demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked 
in America from Servia, and that carried on from Servia in the terri- 
tory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines. 

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new 
outrage, this time unsuccessful. 

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the 
Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an 
attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. 
The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired 
by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his 
five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia. 

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, 
Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where, together with his 
accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and 
members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when 
immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with 
political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here 
also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma 
learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hun- 
gary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. 



110 Official Diplomatic Documents 

He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with 
whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by 
of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and 
leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining 
this end. 

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at 
Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his 
plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the 
throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka 
Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proeeed- 
ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told them that in 
the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna 
Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, 
for purposes of agitation, but especially to cam" out an attempt on 
the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Xarodna Odbrana 
and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed 
against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts 
the conclusion may he drawn that the Xarodna Odbrana, as well 
as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were 
grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans- 
late theory into practice. 

It is noteworthy, however, that the Xarodna limits itself in this 
way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil 
to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its 
plan . but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this prop- 
aganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has ex- 
cited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this 
miserable "heroism." 

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history 
and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June 
(see Appendix 8). 

Princip and Grabez are characteristic examples of young men 
who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of 
the Xarodna Odbrana. 

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued 
with these ideas, Princip Imsied himself with criminal plans against 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the 
Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on 
the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories. 

He was joined by < Jabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and 
whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, 
as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading 
of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility 
to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action. 

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez 
succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered. 

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however 



July 25, Austro-Hiingarian Red Book No. 19 111 

determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, 
it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as 
in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com- 
mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly 
admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to 
purchase them. 

It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure 
their arms. Milan Pribicevie and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal 
men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of 
as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already 
become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they 
could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of 
the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these 
two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless 
balked this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a 
loss in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji, 
and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active 
member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as 
a pupil at the school {Bandcnschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). 
Princip and Cabrinovic were not deceived in their expectations, as 
they at once received the necessary help from Ciganovic. 

The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosir, 
of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna 
Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, 
in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija 
(see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers 
in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter 
of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti- 
Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but 
a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resi Jved 
to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks 
to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give 
every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni- 
tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Servian 
army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition 
and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of 
the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting, 
a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since 
been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to 
ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar- 
gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of 
potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, 
a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, 
as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they 
were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their 
corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the 
Narodna Odbrana, as was already known. 

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was 
necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into 



112 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ; 
he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and 
assured them of the collusion of the Servian Customs officials for 
getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described 
by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave 
no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, 
and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna 
Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only 
result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent 
their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans- 
port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were 
summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when 
wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the 
object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Ser- 
vian authorities set this smootli machinery into motion at a word 
from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. How- 
ever, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions 
they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission''' of the 
Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal 
of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile 
good-naturedly ami approvingly — sufficient proof of how accus- 
tomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature. 

The Royal Servian Government have taken a grave responsibility 
on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place. 

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria- 
Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against 
the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their 
own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, 
of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against 
the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revo- 
lution ; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, 
who share in the direction of its military and civil administration, 
from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low 
murder appears as the best weapon. 

APPENDIX 1 

Opinions of the Servian Press 

(a) The Politika, on the 18th August, 191(1, on the occasion of 
the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, 
published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months 
earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, 
Freiherr von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the fol- 
lowing observations were made: — "Two months ago, on the 2nd 
of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made 
an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at 



July 25, Austro-IIungarian Red Book No. 19 113 

this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood 
of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing 
to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon 
the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through 
his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very 
well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings 
which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted 
thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against 
foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up 
the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their cus- 
tom — to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised 
the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, 
it was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished, 
that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this 
fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his 
name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his 
name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on 
the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever. 

"To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry 'Honour to 
Zerajic.' " 

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : — 

"Bosnia lives and is not dead yet, 
In vain have you buried her corpse ; 
Still the chained victim spits fire, 
Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge. 
With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her 
Rut the living dead will not descend into the vault ; 
Emperor, dost thou hear? 

In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about thy throne. 
These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom 
Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed. 
\\ hy does this horrible Golgotha shudder? 
Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence, 
His hand fell, but out of the blood 
A thousand brave hands will rise ; 
That shot was only the first herald 
Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments." 

(b) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary 
of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and 
the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border, 
published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks 
against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the 
Servian people still think always of the " revanche." The day of the 
"revanche" must come; for this the feverish exertions of Servia to 
organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people 
and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee. 

On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October, 
1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; 
quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal." 

(c) On the 18th April, 1911, the Politika said: "Except for a 
few cynics, no one in Servia would be glad to see King Peter pro- 



114 Official Diplomatic Documents 

ceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Servia and Austria- 
Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Servian feels that." 

(d) The Beogradske Novine wrote on the 18th April, 1911: — 
" Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter 
to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig- 
nation which has seized the whole of the Servian race on account of 
the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible." 

(e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit 
of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult 
to all Serbs. By this visit, Servia would forfeit the right to play the 
part of Piedmont. The interests of Servia can never coincide with 
the interests of Austria." 

(/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the 
Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the ]'ezernjc Nooosti, com- 
mented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : 
" Between Servia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The 
projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Servia a ' shame- 
ful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Servia,' 'a solemn sanctioning 
of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed 
against Servia and the Servian people.'" 

{g) On the 18th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an 
article headed, "The decay of Austria": — 

" In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now 
happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, 
Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, 
a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a devel- 
opment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction." 

(/() The Balkan, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," 
in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect: "If 
Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro 
and Servia will do it, saying to Austria, 'Halt ! no further!' A war 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dis- 
membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We 
have finished one war, we are now facing a second." 

(/) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the 
Servian travelling public and to Servian traders to boycott the 
Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellsehaft (The Danube Steam Navigation 
Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of 
this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with 
lines by a committee. The moneys would flow to the funds of the 
Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming 
war with Austria." 

(/.■) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the 
seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes: "The criminal black and 
yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief 
who, when he cannot steal a. whole sack of gold, contents himself with 
one dinar." 

(/) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of 



July 25, Austw-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 115 

the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary 
in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Servian newspapers pub- 
lished memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It 
must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not 
acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the 
hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We 
are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear 
the last cannon shot of freedom." 

(m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading 
place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of 
existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive 
campaign contemplated by Servia. 

(n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the annex- 
ation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sov- 
ereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that 
day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people 
groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining 
freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which 
had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for 
freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian 
territories, when the Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of 
Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their 
task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears 
of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. 
The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those 
Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the 'sec- 
ond Turkey' even as with God's help they had marched against the 
Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of 
revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian 
God will grant that the 'second Turkey' will vanish too." 

(o) The Mali Journal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : "Every 
effort towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent 
to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the 
facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary 
her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obliga- 
tion of every Servian Government to fight this enemy." 

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said: "Our new 
year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under 
a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure ; after Kossovo came 
Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended." 

(g) The Novosti of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture 
of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text: 
" Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians pre- 
serve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of 
freedom dawns." 

(r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the 
Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution." 



116 Official Diplomatic Documents 

(s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : "Servia can 
never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattling in the Skutari affair." 

(t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes: "The Austrian 
statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, 
not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the 
ruin of their State." 

((/) The Pragda of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now 
lost her right to exist." 

(v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers 
expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under 
the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection. 

(w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that: 
"The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the ' patriotism 
of Europe' This programme can only be realised, however, when 
Austria is partitioned." 

(.r) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What 
are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History 
knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria." 



APPENDIX 2 

Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by 
the Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society. 
(Narodna odbrana izdanje stredi.snog odbora narodne- 

ODBRANE. BeOGKAD, 1911. "NOVA STAMPARIJA" DaVIDOVIC, 

Decaxska ulica br. 14, L.jvb. Davtdovica.) 

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet 
"does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of 
the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per- 
missible nor possible to do this." 

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists 
of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the 
second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the 
third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies 
abroad. 

In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna 
Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse- 
quence of the popular movement arising in Servia on the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : — 

(1) liaising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation- 
ality. 

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers. 

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed 
action. 

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and 
other things necessary for the realisation of its task. 

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary 
band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action. 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 117 

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people 
in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing 
to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had 
been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining 
its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise 
its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence 
of a similar occasion, "the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana 
would again be unfurled." 

At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna 
Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, 
experience had shown that Servia was not ready for the struggle 
which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which 
Servia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it 
was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which 
the enemies of Servia have aimed at this land, many blows have 
preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are 
necessary so that a new attack may not find Servia equally unpre- 
pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of 
every class is stated to be " the preparation of the people for war in 
all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the 
present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are 
" strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase 
of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, etc. . . . so 
far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in 
these spheres." 

The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a 
hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in 
Servia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small 
fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of 
the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, 
consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second 
task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper util- 
isation of these activities learned in the field of sport. 

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value 
of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum- 
stances of Servia, where the military training only lasts six months. 
These observations conclude with the sentence : 

"A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new 
Servia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifle- 
man." 

• The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna 
Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political 
excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States de- 
pend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is 
said : 

"The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part 
of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the 
North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisa- 
tion and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come 



118 Official Diplomatic Documents 

against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from 
us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle 
which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by 
the question ' to be or not to be ?'" 

"What is the object of the Lectures?" is the title of the seventh 
chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following 
sentences : 

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely 
propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel- 
oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the 
old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will 
never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special 
branches more and more ami concern themselves with all questions 
of our social and national life." 

In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna 
Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, 
"Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the 
Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, 
the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the 
Narodna Odbrana. 

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter ("New Obilice and 
Singjelice" 1 ) runs as follows : — 

" It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find 
ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the 
gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of 
the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the 
Germans, Austrians and 'Schwabas,' with their onward pressure 
against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the 
reference to the heroic deeds of Obilice and Singjelice, the necessity of 
sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared 
that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in 
Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the 
authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, 
also, against gloom and ignorance there is no need of such heroes. 
Tht 1 Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and 
cannon against the 'Schwabas' and the other enemies with whom we 
stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. 
However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it 
regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and 
demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying 
on in Servia and beyond the frontier." 

The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and 
friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following 
sentences : — 

1 Milos Obilice (or Kobilic') crept — according to Serbian tradition — into the 
Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan 
Murad (von Kallay, Geschichte der Serben, Vol. I). Stephan Singjelic, Prince of 
Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Sing- 
jelic defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown 
himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. 
(Von Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbisehen An/statutes.) 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 119 

"The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across 
the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief 
tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the 
Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia. 
It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers out- 
side Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private 
initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a 
powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all 
Servian territories." 

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," 
proceeds as follows : — 

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the 
pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana 
proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." 
This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people" as 
their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the fol- 
lowing expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, 
as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows : — 

"Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria 
attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches 
the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our 
national position." 

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda 
is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, 
the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account 
hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, 
which conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against 
Austria." 

After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the 
remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is 
mere talk. The people must be told that : — 

"For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental 
essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian 
territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen, 
tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will 
tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must 
be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out 
of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade 
and the connection with the sea. 

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought 
together in the following concluding sentence : — 

" In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger 
threatening it from Austria, the' Narodna Odbrana has the important 
duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving 
to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty 
conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and 
union." 

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the 



120 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways 
for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed." 

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitu- 
lated in the following sentences : — 

"While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times 
according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connec- 
tions made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the 
same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is 
Odbrana (defence); to-day, too, Narodna (of the people); to-day, 
too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered 
them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, 
now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary 
chilis, (Komitees), weapons and bombs were asked for; to-day steady, 
fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks 
and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present, 
preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come." 



The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following infor- 
mation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : — 

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the 
Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana 
are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four 
sections : — for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, 
and for foreign affairs. 

1 fistrict Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices 
of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the 
corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself 
into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local 
branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President 
being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and 
Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Com- 
mittees have also a section for Foreign Affairs. 

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities 
conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions. 

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns 
and villages. 

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the 
country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary. 

Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation 
of (lie Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every 
respect are the following : — 

The Riflemen's Association with 7<i2 societies, the Sokol Association 
" Dusan the Strong" with 2500 members, the Olympic Club, the 
Horsemen's Society, "Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association 
and the Culture League. 

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the 
Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, 
libraries, etc. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen 
of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana. 



July 25, AuMro-lIungarian Red Book Xo. 19 121 

APPENDIX 3 

Extract from the "Report on the Activities of the Sokol 
Society Dusan the Strong in Kragujevac in the years 
1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office " Buducnost" Tih. 
Lekic 1914.) 

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the 
President, Major Kovacevic of the Servian Army, greeted the annual 
meeting in January, 1914. 

"It is known to you," the President began, "that Sokolism, which 
arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic insti- 
tution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic 
brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle 
against the enemy of Slavism. 

"We Servians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have 
taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our 
own and our brothers' welfare and happiness. 

"We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, 
for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the 
weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained. 
We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part 
of our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We 
have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and 
given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and 
brotherhood." 

After giving a few words of praise to this "noble work" which 
" realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevic proceeded : 

"Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more 
dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisa- 
tion and his economic position. 

"This enemy is insatiable in his lusts; he holds millions of our 
brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them 
and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call 
and beg for still quicker help. 

"We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy 
enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our 
duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many 
brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur? 

" Brothers and sisters ! 

"The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever 
be on our guard. 

" Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. 
Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true 
and enduring. 

"Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol 
idea. 

"Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, 
and let us always remember that truth which the Servian Sokols 



122 Official Diplomatic Documents 

wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised 
people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, 
and to conquer." 

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech 
of the President. After a description of the successes in the last 
wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, 
it is stated that "the day arrived when we returned to our work, 
because our programme was nut yet fulfilled, because our task was 
not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of 
the crucified Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the 
Drina ; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inherit- 
ance of St. Sava ; 1 we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of 
Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin; we must cross the mountains 
of Romanaija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must 
end at last : 'Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou 
nowhere people of thy race. . . .'" 

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis 
is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother 
societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid 
on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in 
Serajevo. On this the report remarks : " By sending representatives 
to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them — 
we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are 
still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram 
students to Servia - and of the dedication of the flag of "the Young 
People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive con- 
cludes with the following sentences: — 

"These manifestations — the coining of the brother Croats to 
Sumadija and the meeting of the 'temperate youth' from all Servian 
regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not 
exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and 
the germ of a great (]a'<\ to lie done in the near future. 

"They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening 
of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed 
nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this 
genu will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, 
there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which 
it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this 
power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national 
development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was 
always the aim of the actions of our leaders." 

The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who have 
supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the 

1 St. Sava (ob. 123G) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina is the name 
of Ducatus Sanli Save. The "inheritance of St. Sava" i-, therefore, equivalent in 
meaning to " Herzegovina." 

2 This visit of the Agram students (April. 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, etc., 
was used in Serbia as tin' pretext lor a -real demonstration of hostility to the Mon- 
archy. The excursionists were are. .pled military honours, and lunches and balls 
took place in the Military Academy and the ( )fficers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military 
parade was held in honour of the visitors. 



Jvly 25, Austra-Hvmgarian Red Book No. 19 123 

Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and 
thanked : — 

The District Committee of the " Narodna Odbrana" at Kragujevac, 
particularly its "Hitter" section, which often assisted the Sokol 
Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium 
at Kragujevac, who "always showed his fatherly care" to the Sokols ; 
the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially 
supported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragu- 
jevac ; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragu- 
jevac. 

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen 
in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : — 

"After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those 
who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will 
devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to 
the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's 
eyrie, who at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, 
and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all 
our brothers who are not yet free." 

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic, President, 
by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzakovic, as secretary, and 
by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two 
professors (Emil Lukie and Milan Jankovic), as well as a further 
officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic). 

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed 
by Major M. J. Kovacevic and Brzakovic, Secretary of the Law 
Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the "Srpski 
Soko" in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Servia 
stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy 
to an extent not hitherto known. 



APPENDIX 4 

The Servian Official Gazette in the service of the Narodna 
Odbuax a 

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement 
to the Servian Official Gazette, Srpski Novine, of 28th June, 1914 
(new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper. 

The following passages occur in this appeal : — 

"Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day 
of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the 
territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Servian, 
Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to 
Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day 
and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this terri- 
tory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank; so much work is yet 
to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could 



124 Official Diplomatic Documents 

formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have 
already gone so far in the new history of the people; when behind 
us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater 
and more glorious events await us; to-day when we stand in the 
midst of the creation of a great national State ; to-day St. Vitus' 
Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that 
which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of 
that which will come. Men and women of Servia ! Millions of our 
brothers, Slovenes, ( 'roats, and Servians beyond our frontiers, look 
to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their 
breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the 
national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of 
our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St. 
Vitus' Day, 1914." 



APPENDIX 5 

Deposition of Trifko Krstanovic, concerning the Narodna 
Odbrana 

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanovic, of Zavadonici, was 
arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 
L914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the mur- 
derous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack 
was to be expected and because this remark brought him under sus- 
picion of having had knowledge of the plot. 

lie was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at 
Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark 
did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, 
founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the 
Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on 
account of the agitation developing in Servia against the Austro- 
Ilungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence 
of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against 
Krstanovic were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his 
knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an 
important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness. 

An extract from his depositions taken on the 10th July, 1914, 
which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows: — 

"In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Servia 
on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to 
Bagina Basta in the district of Uzice, and as I found no work there, 
I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the 
annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, 
and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial 
and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 125 

told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent 
home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme 
seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the 
impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (Karaula). 
Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go 
home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should 
I now want to go out of Servia which now needed more people because 
a war with Austria would come? When I said to him that I had 
nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance 
if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and 
a gendarme took me to the inn 'Zelenom Vijencu' ('The Green 
Wreath'), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosic, the leader 
of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the 
'Green Wreath' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, 
other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosic told me 
that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, 
the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a 
war between Servia and Austria could easily arise. On this a man 
took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to 
the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in 
the office I met [Milan Pribicevic, who enrolled me in the Komitee. 
At this enrolment, Milan Pribicevic asked me whether Voja Tankosic 
had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. 
To this I answered 'Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be 
efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. " There were then about 70 of 
us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks 
our leader Tankosic informed us that the Great Powers had pro- 
hibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide 
ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited by for- 
eigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here 
we were drilled by the officers, Voja Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko 
Gvosdic and Mitar Djinovic, who was involved in the Montenegrin 
bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no 
one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our 
numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders. 
We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and 
the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every 
fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevic, General Bozo Jankovie, 
the pharmacist Skaric, the deputy Zivko Rafajlovic, and a certain 
Glisic Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid 
for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when 
war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volun- 
teers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at 
Cuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a 
day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until 
March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that 
we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the 
Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the 



126 Official Diplomatic Documents 

dissolution of the Komitee General Bozo Jankovic told me to enter 
the service of Bozo Milanovic at Sabac, where I should receive wages 
of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service 
would he. I accepted because, as a member of the Komitee, I re- 
garded myself as bound to obey General Jankovic, and also because 
1 had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this 
way I came to Sabac in March, 1909, and reported myself to Bozo 
Milanovic, a tradesman of Sabac. General Jankovic had told me that 
Bozo Milanovic was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac, and 
that I should assist him in connection with this Xarodna Odbrana. 
When I had given Bozo Milanovic the General's letter and he had read 
it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his 
orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever 
they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a 
letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next 
day, Bozo Milanovic gave me a closed letter which I was to take to 
Cedo Lukic, Superintendent of Excise at Serbisch-Raca. On the road 
to Raca, at the village of Bogatic, the District Captain stopped me, 
took the letter from me opened it and read it. In the letter it said 
that Lukic should immediately buy three boats so that they should 
lie ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. 
On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given 
strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders, 
so that international diplomatic intervention should not lie provoked. 
I returned to Sabac and told Bozo Milanovic what had happened to 
me. Bozo Milanovic applied to the District Prefect, who gave 
orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatic had taken 
from me, should lie returned. He also gave orders that the Captain 
should send the letter to Cedo Lukic to whom it was addressed. I 
carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910, 
and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch-Raca, 55 to Loznica, 
5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Kovil- 
jaca. I noticed how often 1 was in each place because these places 
are a very long way from Sabac. 1 took the letters to the chiefs of 
the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received 
letters in reply and took them to Bozo Milanovic. I recollect that 
on a few occasions I took letters to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in 
letter carrying was one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebrenica. Every 
week I took letters from Bozo Milanovic to Belgrade, and delivered 
them to Milan Pribicevic and Bozo Jankovic. I knew nothing of 
I lie contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them. 
So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Bozo Milanovic were 
not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses 
were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when 
Bozo Milanovic opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher 
letters to Bozo Milanovic, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent 
me witli the letter to Mika Atanasijevic, Professor at Sabac, to de- 
cipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he forgot to 
close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it 



July 25, Austro-Hurtgarian Red Book No. 19 127 

was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped 
with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication 
that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about 
eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovic, Bozo gave me his 
visiting card with a death's head drawn upon it; on it was written 
that I was designated an initiate (povjerenik) of the Narodna Odbrana. 
On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying. . . . 

"On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dusan Opterkic, 
member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 
23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know 
what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. 
From time to time, Milan Pribicevic gave me a revolver, or money 
for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers 
on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor 
any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that 
Milan Pribicevic gave them these things as an honour, just because 
they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms. 

"On one occasion, during my service with Bozo Milanovic, I was 
ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina, 
who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, 
so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaricic, a Servian officer of Reserve, 
who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna 
Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanaricic was dangerous to the 
Servian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death. 

"That man and I received instructions from Bozo Milanovic to 
go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaricic, 
who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the 
district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, 
but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking 
round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that 
peasant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife, 
I sent that man to Sabac to tell Bozo Milanovic that it was not pos- 
sible to kill Startaricic in the manner he desired, namely, with the 
knife. On this, I received orders from Bozo Milanovic that we should 
kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. 
According to Bozo's instructions, the man who was with me was 
to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions 
were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme 
brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabac that we 
were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we 
returned to Sabac. 

"In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Bozo 
Milanovic, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Sabac I went 
to Belgrade, where I met General Jankovic, and he had me arrested 
for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for 
about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and 
they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities 
decided to send me to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my 
life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where 



128 Official Diplomatic Documents 

they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came 
to Bosnia in December, 1910. 

"I know nothing of any 'Black Hand,' with the exception of 
what I have read of it in Servian newspapers. I can't remember now 
what was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor 
do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there 
prevailed in Servia universal anger and hatred against the person 
of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn 
enemy of the Servians." 

Beyond this, Krstanovic referred to his earlier statements, of which 
only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing 
testimony. 

The Komitee into which Milan Pribieevic introduced Krstanovic 
was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Cuprija there 
were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Ciganovic was also one of 
the pupils. 

In the school at Cuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must 
be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna 
Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders. 



APPENDIX 6 

Extract from the Proceedings of the District Court of 
Serajevo in the Prosecutiox of Jovo Jaglicic and others 
for Espionage. 

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jaglicic and several 
accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of 
Servia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded 
inter alia opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of 
the (Jreat-Servian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna 
Odbrana. 

Jovo Jaglicic made a statement that in the month of August or 
September, 1012, he for the first time met Petar Klaric, known as 
Pesut, formerly a rattle inspector in Foca, who had fled to Monte- 
negro in 1012 and then became a Komitadji. 

At their first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade 
Milosevic of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milosevic was 
lying very ill in hospital : " It would be a pity if he were to die ; we 
have spoken of great matters ; has he never said anything to you about 
them?" On receiving a negative answer Klaric went on: "I had 
something important to tell you ; we are Servians, and must do some- 
thing important for Servia. < !ome to my office." There the follow- 
ing conversation ensued between them : — 

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I don't know you yet and 
whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have 
the heart, betray me !" 



July .25, Au.stw-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 129 

On Jaglicic asking him what it was all about, Klaric answered, 
"Brother, in Servia there is a society called the 'Narodna Odbrana.' 
Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among 
them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if 
they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help 
a bit." 

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klaric an- 
swered : — 

"The Society has this object: for instance, you are in Kalinovik ; 
you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many 
guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, 
and so on. We have a secret writing, 'cipher,' and use it for corre- 
spondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too." 

Jaglicic was frightened that Klaric was merely sounding him for 
the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him 
the names of some of the members, on which Klaric reflected for some 
time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence. 

Hereon Klaric said to him: "Shall I give you the 'cipher'?" 
Jaglicic agreed. Klaric, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out 
on a slip and gave it to Jaglicic. 

On another occasion Klaric gave an account of his stay at Banja- 
Koviljaca (near Loznica) where he was instructed by the Servian 
captain Todorovic 1 in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused 
why he learnt this he answered : " If anything such as I have spoken of 
to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to handle 
bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so 
that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown 
up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Servia." 

Klaric then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that 
he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph 
and telephone wires. 

At these meetings Jaglicic learnt from Klaric that it also apper- 
tained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis), 
to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klaric 
also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bos- 
nian and Servian members would not be entrusted to the post, but 
despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers. 

Klaric further told Jaglicic that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta 
celebration (in September, 1912) a Servian major had stayed in the 
Hotel "Europe" with the Servian deputation which was sent to it, 2 
that Klaric had taken members of the Xarodna Odbrana to him, and 
that he had sworn them in. 

From a spy Jadlicic learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, 
or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of 

1 Captain Kosta Todorovic was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director 
of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Raca to Ljuboija. 

2 The Serbian major, Mika Jankovie, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta cele- 
bration. 



130 Official Diplomatic Documents 

soap, 1 and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that 
he would fetch them. 



APPENDIX 7 
From Confidential Reports on the Narodna Orbrana 

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representa- 
tives of all parties so as to win over both the progressives and those 
who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is 
Pribicevic, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by 
an officer on leave. 

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective prop- 
aganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions 
of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, 
interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initia- 
tion of panics, revolts, etc. 

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries 
in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propa- 
ganda. Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably 
railway officials — in the neighbour! 1 of important bridges, junc- 
tions, etc., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out 
the directions they have received, or to get them carried out. 

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, 
so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each 
other. 

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as 
members. 



APPENDIX 8 

Extract from the Records of the District Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at Serajevo, touching the proceedings 
there instituted against Gavrilo Princip and confederates 

ON ACCOUNT OF the CRIME OF ASSASSINATION perpetrated on 

the 28th June, 1914, ox His Imperial and Royal Highness 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este and 
Her Highxess the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. 

I. The deed ami the perpetrators 

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko GrabeS, Yaso Cubri- 
lovic and Cetres Popovic confess that in common with the fugitive 
Mehemed Mehmedbasic they contrived a plot for the murder of the 

'The bombs used in the Serajevo attack mi the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as 
well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913. which came from the 
Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap 



July 25, Austro-IIungarian Red Book No. 19 131 

Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case 
of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the 
28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of 
carrying out the planned attack. 

Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses that he was the first of the con- 
spirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which 
missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants 
of the carriage following the Archducal motor car. 

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning 
pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received 
fatal wounds. 

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to 
murder. 

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the inves- 
tigations which have taken place, and it is established that the 
deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess 
Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at 
them by Gavrilo Princip. 

II. Origin of the plot 

The accused have made the following declarations, which are 
essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate : — 

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he 
associated with a number of Servian students in the cafes of the town, 
conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of 
the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this in- 
tention to his acquaintance Cabrinovic, who also was in Belgrade 
at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was 
ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an 
attempt on the Archduke's life was a^ frequent topic of conversation 
in the circle in which Princip and Cabrinovic moved, because the 
Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Servian 
people. 

Princip and Cabrinovic desired at first to procure the bombs and 
weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Servian 
Major Milan Pribicevic or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they them- 
selves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however, 
Major Pribicevic and the authoritative member of the said association, 
Zivojin Dacic, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided 
to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganovic, 
who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the 
employment of the State railways. 

^ Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of 
Ciganovic, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon 
Ciganovic called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with 
him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would 
like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for 



132 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the attempt. Cabrinovic also talked with Ciganovic on the subject 
of the weapons. 

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabez, who also was in Belgrade, 
into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession 
to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt. 

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with 
Ciganovic about the execution of the attempt. 

Meanwhile Ciganovic had reached an understanding on the subject 
of the planned attack with the Servian Major Voja Tankosic, who was 
a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object 
the Browning pistols. 

Grabez confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip 
and Cabrinovic that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganovic, 
visited Major Tankosic at the latter's request at his rooms. He says 
that after he had been introduced Tankosic said to him: "Are you 
the man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez answered: 
" I am." Tankosic next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a 
revolver?" and when Grabez answered in the negative Tankosic 
said to Ciganovic: "I will give you a revolver; go and teach them 
how to shoot/' 

Hereupon Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military 
rifle range at Toprider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the 
range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved 
himself the better shot of the two. Ciganovic also familiarized 
Princip, Grabez and Cabrinovic with the use of the bombs which 
were later given to them. 

On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganovic handed over to Princip, Cabri- 
novic and Grabez, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, 
four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition, as 
well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison 
themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the 
secret might be kept. Moreover Ciganovic gave them some money. 

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilic, at Easter, of his plan 
of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo 
to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of 
the attempt.^ Hereupon Ilic according to his confession enlisted Jaso 
Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic in the plot. 

III. Origin of the bombs 

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the 
attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession 
of the police at Serajevo. 

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs arc Servian 
hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military 
purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in 
the Save at Brcko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their 
original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from 
the Servian arsenal of Kragujevac. 



July 2.5, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 133 

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt 
against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores 
of the Army Depot at Kragujevac. 

Grabez quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed 
over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs." 

IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Serbia 
to Bosnia 

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : — 

Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to 
make their way via Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and there to betake 
themselves to Misko Jovanovic who would take over the weapons. 
Next they were to go to Sabac and report themselves to the frontier 
captain Major Rade Popovic, to whom he gave them a note, of which 
Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left 
Belgrade with the weapons. v At Sabac Princip handed over the note 
which he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who there- 
upon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass 
in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the 
other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this 
alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time 
Major Popovic handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at 
Loznica, whose name was Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic. 

Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez passed the night at Sabac and went 
by train the next morning to Loznica, with a half-price ticket, it may 
be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popovic had 
drawn up for them. They reached Loznica at noon and delivered to 
the frontier captain at that place Major Popovic's letter, in which were 
the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them < in 
their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would 
summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the 
charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made 
an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next 
morning in his office. 

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrinovic should 
take Grabez's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that 
Princip and Grabez should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was 
discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an excise 
man from Ljesnica called Grbic was to take Princip and Grabez with 
him to his tower (karanla) and bring them over the frontier. Cabri- 
novic accordingly walked to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of 
Zvornik. Princip and Grabez drove with the exciseman Grbic to 
Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room 
in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbic caught sight 
of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious. 

Grabez's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was 
supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbic laughed when he 
saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of 



134 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly 
thought that Grabez and Princip were travelling on a mission. 

Grbic and a second exciseman 1 in night Princip and Grabez in a boat 
to an island in the Drina. There Grbic instructed them to wait for a 
peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on 
the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbic had directed them ; next 
day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through 
a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj, 
where he handed them over to the local teacher Cubrilovic, who 
seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further 
on their way. 

He took them on to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. 

Cabrinovic's statement about the events of the journey up to the 
point at which he parted with Princip and Grabez conformed in 
essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supple- 
ment that Major Popovic told them that he did not reach Sabac from 
Belgrade till the day before their arrival. 

In Loznica, Cabrinovic, Princip and Grabez decided to separate, 
as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier 
captain at Loznica, whom they informed of this, applauded their 
plan and gave Cabrinovic a letter for M. Jaklojevic, the teacher at 
Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Cabrinovic handed over the bombs, Brown- 
ing pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip 
and Grabez, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had 
been told oft' to accompany him. 

There he found the teacher Jaklojevic, to whom he handed the 
letter from the frontier captain of Loznica. Hereupon the former 
notified the Servian frontier guard. When Cabrinovic, with the 
teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there 
for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik 
in Bosnia. 

Cabrinovic then proceeded to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. 

Supplement 

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were 
published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears 
that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last 
desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at 
Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the 
execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented 
from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, 
who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter 
the Imperial and Royal < 'onsulate. The conclusion to be drawn from 
the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem 
to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned 
attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from 
laving the information. 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 135 

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can 
be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the 
investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details 
of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present. 



APPENDIX 9 
The Serbian Press on the Assassination 

(a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan writes on the 29th June, 
with regard to the two perpetrators : — 

" Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a compositor by profession, was full of 
anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty 
days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and 
was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he 
announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work 
in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade 
until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a 
volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. 
He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended 
the^gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time 
as Cabrinovic, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, 
nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow 
students who came, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well 
as latterly with Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, 
although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive 
Party. Princip, like Cabrinovic, was brought up at Serajevo ; the 
two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their 
childhood." 

(b) The Piemont of the 1st July, points out that Princip's pro- 
test was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajic. The 
explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found 
in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that 
Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of 
St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made 
the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more 
natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account 
of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after 
by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.) 

(c) The Young Radical Odjek, of the 3rd July, says : — " The 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of 
enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of vio- 
lence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal 
feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge." 

(d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, Srpska Zastava, of the 
3rd July, says in an article entitled "Suspicions and Threats": — 
" The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out- 



136 Official Diplomatic Documents 

come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other 
hand, the savage persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world." 

(e) The Progressive newspaper, Pravda, of the 3rd July, writes : — 
"The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of 
the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Servian 
people." 

(J) The Agcnce des Balkans, of the 3rd July, says : — "The crimes 
which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the 
Servians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct 
instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities." 

(g) The Pragda, of the 4th July, says: — "All the murders and 
assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time 
in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed 
peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method 
of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of 
a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of 
assassinations should have firmly established itself." 

(/)) The Balkan, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary 
"must be placed under international control, because of its persecu- 
tion of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than 
Turkey. 

(i) The Mali Journal, of the 7th July, writes: — "A sprig of the 
Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few 
days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslave- 
ment of his immediate Fatherland (engeres Vaterland) amounted to a 
paroxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had 
brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official 
Austria-Hungary to this? It has ai^wered with general massacres, 
plunderings and destruction of Servian life and property. Only the 
worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are 
always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen 
to them. Only compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes, 
and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civil- 
isation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary." 

(j) The Tribuna, of the 7th July, says : — "We are of the opinion 
that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination 
of the Servians at one blow." 

(/,•) The Piemont, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka 
that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the 
Christians. 

(/) The Balkan, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under 
the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a 
general boycott against all the Austrians living in Servia. 

(m) The Mali .Journal, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott 
the Danube Steamship Company. 

(/0 Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the 
Tribuna, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing 
from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 1.9 137 

Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary. 
It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the 
direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not 
mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the 
citizens. 

(o) The Stampa, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are 
exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture 
in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended 
to base complaints against the Servian people. 

(p) The Agence dcs Balkans, of the 9th, reports from Belgrade : 
— " Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general 
massacre of Servians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina." 

(q) The Balkan, of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's 
statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Arch- 
duke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of 
humanity, 1 publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 
years, from which it deduces that the Servian people during this 
period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hun- 
gary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons 
of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the 
principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken 
by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria- 
Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, 
peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these 
truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind 
have accompanied the news of the murder with the word, " I am 
no longer anxious for the fate of humanity." 

(r) The Politika, of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading 
article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows: — "The 
manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being 
carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in 
those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to 
which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, 
other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on 
certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the 
murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were 
objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment 
because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state, 
and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread 
to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and 
thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort." 

(•?) The Stampa, of the 9th, says that not everything which has 
happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and 
attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the 
truth will sooner or later come to the surface ; blood-thirsty Austria 

1 ["We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost 
make us despair of the progress of mankind." 

Mr. Asquith's Speech, Times. July 1, 1914.] 



138 Official Diplomatic Documents 

will drink, nay, is drinking, Servian blood, till she can drink no more. 
It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and 
dead in Bosnia. 

(t) The Politika, of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against 
the members of the Imperial House. 

(u) The Commercial Journal, Trgoeinski Glasnik, of the 10th 
July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro- 
Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonour- 
able. It is a warning to the Servian people in Austria-Hungary that 
they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and 
property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready 
to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the 
Government. After the latest occurrences, the Servian people ought 
mi longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the 
slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance. 

(r) Iii the Stampa, of the 10th July, we find: — "Nothing lasts 
for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The time is not far oh" when the Servians who broke 
the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle 
round the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic." 

(/r) The Pravda, of the K>th July, under the title " Boycott against 
Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in 
Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty 
of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out. 

(.r) The Zvono, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son 
of < ountess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should 
avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, Arch- 
duke Franz Ferdinand. 

(;/) The Mali Journal, of the 19th July, publishes a report which 
says : — "Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro- 
Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro- 
Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found." 

(-) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July, 
writes: — "Austria-Hungary oilers a hundred proofs that it will 
inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not 
a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have 
been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more 
proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands 
than Austria-Hungary." 



APPENDIX 10 

The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on 
the subject of the crime aliainst the archduke franz 
Ferdinand. 

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial 
and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 139 

will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local 
Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting 
at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic, director 
of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : "Servia 
was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the 
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Arch- 
duke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a 
prominent and deadly danger for Servia, and possibly for wider 
Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon 
challenged Servia to war or attacked it, in which case Servia, which 
was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed 
her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now 
Servia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dan- 
gers which threatened Servia in the person of the victim had been 
swept out of the way. Servia would now have rest for several years, 
as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking 
in the steps of his predecessor." 

" Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand woidd be a heavy blow and a great 
grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture 
of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would 
not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely 
fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had. 
Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that 
the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to 
overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately, how- 
ever, these friends, and through them we too, had been disappointed. 
If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers 
and bombs would at last have to play their real role. Whatever the 
God of Servia has in store, things cannot go on as at present." 

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval 
by his hearers. 



APPENDIX 11 

Supplements after going to Press 

1. — To Append i J- 8 

The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip 
and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which 
the following important facts emerge : — 

In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition 
to Sabac, was initiated by Bozo Foviz, a member of the managing 
committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that asso- 
ciation, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna 
Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic 



140 Official Diplomatic Documents 

was later nominated representative of the Xarodna Odbrana for 
Tuzla. 

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the 
Xarodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip 
and Grabez to Cubrilovie, with the information that he was bringing 
two Servian students with weapons to him. When lie learned this, 
he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip 
and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, 
with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand. 



2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the 
Monarchy 

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception 
hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representa- 
tions of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation 
of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia. 

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South 
Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the 
foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names 
of all the "provinces still awaiting liberation" : Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc. 



To the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BoOK No. 20 

Count Berchtold to the I. nder Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Lambach, July 25, 1914- 

Russian Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received 
urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation 
of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excel- 
lency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a pro- 
longation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even 
after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly 
solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we 
should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by 
Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military 
measures. 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 22 141 

To Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 21 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Bad held, July 25, 1914. 

For Your Excellency's information and guidance : — 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires called this morning l on the Under 
Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the 
wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be pro- 
longed. 

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been 
taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government 
would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabi- 
nets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were 
given to the former to examine the data on which our communica- 
tion to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier. 

The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d'Affaires that he 
would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but 
that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a pro- 
longation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the 
grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in sup- 
port of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a 
mistaken hypothesis. 2 Our note to the Powers was in no way in- 
tended to invite them to make known their .own views on the subject, 
but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the 
communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by inter- 
national courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter 
concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the 
patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had 
been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much 
against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests. 

From Belgrade 

AlTSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 22 

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

Cabinet Council met yesterday evening and early this morning; 
form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is 
to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I hear that 
Royal train is being made up ; gold belonging to the National Bank 

1 This time of day is important, because the French Ambassador says, French 
Yellow Book No. 48, that it "seems useless to support" the Russian request, "when 
there is no longer any time for it." since his instructions reached him "exactly at the 
moment when the time limit given to Servia expires." The time limit expired at 6 
p.m. No reason is advanced in the French Yellow Book why the instructions should 
have reached the French Ambassador so late. There is telegraphic and telephonic 
communication between Paris and Vienna. See French Yellow Book No. 39, No. 41 
(" this morning "), No. 44, No. 45, No. 47 and No. 48 ; British Blue Book No. 26, and 
Russian Orange Book No. 15. all of the same day. 

2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914, and note 3. 



142 Official Diplomatic Documents 

and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being 
taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are 
of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up 
is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular. 

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the 
fortress were evacuated. Railway station thronged with soldiers. 
The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the 
south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while 
I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by 
the 0.30 train. 

From Semlin, Serbia 
Austuo-Hungaiuan Red Book No. 23 
Freiherr von Oic.il to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraph c.) Semlin, July 25, 191 4. 

Orders for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 p.m. 

AlTSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 24 

Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. 

As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory 
answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that 
diplomatic relations are broken off with Servia, and have left Belgrade 
with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at 
two minutes to six P.M. 

From Serbia 

AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 25 

Note ' of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914- 
(Translation). 

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication 
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, 2 and arc 
convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which 
may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. 

( 'onseious of the fact that the protests which were made both from 
the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and 
actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests 

1 See Austrian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1014 where the Serbian Note is printed in 
full together with the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed it unsatisfactory. 

2 Old style. 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian. Red Book No. 25 143 

which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Govern- 
ment on the 18th 1 March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any 
occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no 
attempt lias been made since that time, either by the successive Royal 
Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal 
state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Govern- 
ment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial 
and Royal Government have made no representation except one con- 
cerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and 
Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. 
Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the 
sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace 
that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot 
be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such 
as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifes- 
tations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course 
of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The 
Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that 
at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between 
Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to 
oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions 
to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and 
surprised at the statements, according to which members of the 
Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the prepara- 
tions for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government 
expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that 
concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire 
correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons 
concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, 
therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, 
they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without 
regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of 
Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake 
to cause to be published on the first page of the Journal officiel, 
on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : — 

" The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which 
may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tend- 
ency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the 
fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Govern- 
ment regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial 
and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries 
participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compro- 
mised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian 
Government was solemnlv pledged by the declaration of the 31st 
March, 1909. 1 

1 New style. 



144 Official Diplomatic Documents 

"The Government, etc. . . ." (identical with the text as de- 
manded). 

The Royal Government further undertake : — 

1 . To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina 
a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish- 
ment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general 
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of 
Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re- 
vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced 
into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publi- 
cation may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under 
the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution. 

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- 
perial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Na- 
rodna Obdrana and other similar societies have committed up to the 
present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of 
any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will 
accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will 
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which 
may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without 
delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might 
serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever 
the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and 
proofs of this propaganda. 

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military 
service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to 
be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and 
Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names 
and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the 
proceedings which are to be taken against them. 

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly 
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial 
and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col- 
laboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such 
collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with 
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider 
it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or 
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th * June, and who 
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the 
participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- 
ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as 
it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 145 

procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the 
results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro- 
Hungarian agents. 

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the v note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As 
regards Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the 15th l June was employed (on probation) 
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest 
him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good 
as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump- 
tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which 
have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for 
the purposes of the later enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures 
which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and 
explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will 
immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier 
officials on the Schabatz-Locnitza line who have failed in their duty 
and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the re- 
marks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in inter- 
views after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial 
and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon 
as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them 
the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have 
shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, al- 
though the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect 
evidence and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal 
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the 
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present 
note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this 
reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com- 
mon interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, 
as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this 
question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, 
or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the decla- 
ration made by the Servian Government on the ISth (31st) March, 
1909. 

To Petrograd 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg!). 

Vienna, July 25, 1914- 
We were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious 
measures against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute 



146 Official Diplomatic Documents 

might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, 
allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position 
we took up towards Servia, because fundamental considerations of 
national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting 
an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it 
possible for Servia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without 
punishment and without the possibility of punishment. 

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the 
great settlement with the central European Powers to have already 
arrived, 1 and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, 
the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed super- 
fluous. 

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the 
refusal of our demands by Servia, and in face of the resulting necessity 
for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even 
be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose 
elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations 
have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof 
and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner 
which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, 
presents itself. 

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circum- 
stances, has established a close understanding with your German 
colleague,- who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government 
to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria- 
Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand 
alone. 

I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof 
understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become 
inevitable. 

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the 
Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circum- 
stance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the 
principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in 
the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order 
to reach a settlement of her differences with Servia. 

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire 
for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Servia is forced upon us, 
it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, hut merely a means 
of self-defence and self-preservation. 

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently 
eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to 
the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points 
of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th. 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 2.3, 1914. 

8 Germany and Austria, it seems, were determined to stand together diplomati- 
cally as closely as France, England and Russia ; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 
note 1. Italy appears to have been as close to the Entente Powers as to her own 
allies if "iic may judge by the despatches from Rome contained in the British Blue 
Book and the French Yellow Book. See also French Yellow Book No. 35, July 25, and 
No. 51, July -'(). 



July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 147 

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular 
attention to this dossier : and impress upon him that it is an unique 
event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the 
seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and 
with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with 
those of Servia. 

We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of 
the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — notwithstand- 
ing that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian 
promises — suffered Servia to increase her territory after the annexa- 
tion crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent. 

Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered 
in Servia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive propor- 
tions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our 
Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities 
of Servia. 

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic 
measures on our part against this menace to all public order will 
appear intelligible and' indeed necessary. 

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation 
with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your expla- 
nation of our motives and intentions the hint that we — as your 
Excellency will have already been in a position to explain — aim at 
no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty 
of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to ex- 
treme measures for the enforcement of our demands. 

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the 
peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of 
nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 vc-irs, 
and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for him- 
self the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace." 

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of 
the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the 
strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and 
national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations 
with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism 
between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, 
in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the 
dominant political interests of Russia. 

Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our 
existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also 
threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, con- 
vinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will 
clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of 
such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. 
Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative 

1 See note 1 to Enclosure of Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. 1914, 
where it is stated that Sir E. Grey did not publish this "dossier." Russia also omitted 
it in her published documents in the Russian Orange Book. 



148 Official Diplomatic Documents 

from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our 
position in Europe. 

Al-STHO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 27 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg]!. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representa- 
tives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the 
subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on 
the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confi- 
dence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated 
merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended 
tn infringe on the sovereignty of Servia. 

By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establish- 
ment of a private "Bureau de Surete" at Belgrade, which would 
operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in 
Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration. 

Belgium : 

To Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Belgian Gray Bhhk No. 3 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914. 

I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is 
enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers 
guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium. 

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany be- 
come imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the 
Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them 
of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations 
that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1S39. 

The communications in question would only be made upon tele- 
graphic instructions from me. 

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall re- 
quest you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you 
are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to 
them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and 
without any request that they should take note thereof. 

My telegram will ' inform you of the date to be given to the cir- 
cular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which 
you hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclo- 
sure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of 
fresh instructions from me. 

1 Notice the absence of any uncertainty whether or not such a telegram will be sent. 



July 25, French Yellow Book No. 35 149 

Enclosure in No. 3 
(See Enclosure in No. 2.) 

From Belgrade 

Belgian Gray Book No. 4 

M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Belgrade, July 25, IOI4. 1 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply 
returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian 
note of the 10 (23) July. 



Enclosure in No. 4 



[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, 
July 25 and No. 34,' July 27, 1914.] 

France : 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 35 

M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of 
events. 

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take 
advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances 
at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be 
threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the 
army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the 
pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of 
Austria's demarche. 

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the 
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly 
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the 
Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation. 

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted 

his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, 

to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by 

her two allies. 2 T ^ 

Jules Cambon. 

1 This despatch could not have reached Rrussels on July 25. It was probably sent 
by mail. In Belgian Gray Book No. 6, July 27, the actual Serbian reply does not seem 
to be known. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where it is stated that the 
reply became known after a delay of 20 hours. Cf. also Russian Orange Book No. 36, 
July 27. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, same day, where according to the German Am- 
bassador Austria-Hungary had acted without consulting either Germany or Italy. 



150 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Viviani and London, Berlin, Petrograd, and Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 36 

M, Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- 
holm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, 
St. Petersburgh, Vienna. 

Paris, July 25, 1014. 

The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against 
an article 1 in the Echo de Paris which applied the term "German 
threat" (menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr 
von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state 
at the Direction Politique, that there has been no "concert" between 
Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that 
the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was 
communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, 
though they had approved it subsequently. 

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; 
the German Government had merely indicated that they thought 
it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other 
Powers ran the risk of aggravating it. 

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's 
demarche. Having asked 2 him to repeat the actual terms of the 
last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms 
showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between 
the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private 
information had been given to any journalist, the information in the 
Echo de Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that 
the German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than 
at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The 
German Ambassador did not take up the allusion. 

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also 
came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian 
note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply 
with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are 
not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian minister will 
leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin 
military "preparations" but not military "operations." 

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburgh, 
has advised Belgrade to express regret 3 for any complicity which 
might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the 
most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that 
in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the inter- 
ests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at 

1 f'f. Russian Orange Book No. 19, of same day commenting on the inaccuracies 
and additions of this article. 

■ This refers to the interview of the previous day, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 
28. There, however, Mr. Martin himself does the asking. 

3 Belgrade had obviously not done so before, for if it had this advice would have 
been superfluous. One of the chief grounds of complaint that Austria-Hungary had 
against Serbia was that the latter had neither officially expressed her regret, nor con- 
trolled the exultation permeating the Serbian press. 



July 25, French Yellow Book No. 37 151 

Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if 
these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise ' the 
Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which 
they shall decide that they are able to do so. 

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, 2 
has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen 
at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between 
Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to 
concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the 
stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring 
about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance 
that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation 
of France, Germany, Italy 3 and England, Germany alone being able 
to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction. 

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this 
suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is 
a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend 
herself to any demarche at Vienna. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



From London 

French Yellow Book No. 37 

M . de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 25, 191 4- 

The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that 
his Government would refuse 4 to interfere in the dispute between 
Austria and Servia. 

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany 
at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Peters- 
burgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would 
certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. 
Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, 
and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy? 

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would 

1 As a matter of fact, while svich instructions were sent by Sir E. Grey the British 
representative failed to offer this advice to Serbia. See British Blue Book No. 22, July 
25, 1914. He gave as his reason that his French and Russian colleagues "have not 
yet received instructions from their Governments." So far as the French Minister is 
concerned, this explanation is at variance with the above despatch. 

2 This is wrong ; see British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, 1914. 

3 This was the British formula of July 24, 1915. On the day of this despatch, 
however, July 25, Sir E. Grey had changed this formula to read Germany, France, 
Russia and Great Britain ; see British Blue Book No. 25. 

4 This is not so stated in any despatch of this date in the British Blue Book. Cf. 
British Blue Book No. 25, where the German Ambassador is quoted by Sir E. Grey : 
"if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might 
be able with dignity to accept it." This means that Sir E. Grey's original idea of 
mediation between Austria and Russia might be acceptable, while its modification, 
under the pressure of the French Ambassador, of mediation between Austria and 
Serbia was not acceptable. 



152 Official Diplomatic Documents 

no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of 
a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually 
broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached 
attitude l (pourrait s'en desinteresser). 

De Fleuriau. 

From Petrngrad 

French Yellow Book No. 38 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1.914. 

The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from 
the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit 
fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to 
form an opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which 
is offered to them. 2 

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his 
Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from mak- 
ing any allusion to the measures 3 which Russia would no doubt be led 
to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity 
of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recrimina- 
tions of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on M. 
Sazonof. 

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor 
presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 4 "We must 
avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. 
I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government 
come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations." 

Paleologue. 

To Vienna 
Fhench Yellow Book No. 39 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. 
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. 

Paris, July 25,1914. 

The Russian Government has instructed its representative at 
Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time 

1 The New York Times translation roads "would be able to remain aloof from it." 
A comparison of Fleuriau's report of Sir E. Grey's words with the latter's own report 
nf what he told the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 25. reveals that 
Fleuriau gave his Government (he impression that Sir F. Grey had far more definitely 
hinted to the German Ambassador that England would fight by the side of France 
and Russia than Sir E. < Irey himself stated he had done. 

'•"['his suggests that Sir E. Grey knew of the preparation of the dossier. Ci. notes to 
British Blue Book No. -Is. .Inly 27, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25 
(enclosure). 

3 This means Russia's intention to go to war ; cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 
1914. 

1 For his determination, however, see British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 



July 25, French Yellow Book No. 41 153 

limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion 
on the dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and 
with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone. 

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all 
meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers by communi- 
cating her note to them, and would place her in a position of con- 
flict with international ethics. 

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corre- 
sponding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to 
support the request of your colleague. 1 The Russian Government 
have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 40 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 25, 1914. 

Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the 
instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask 
for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note 
of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian 
demarche should be supported by the British Embassy. 

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same 
action 2 as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communi- 
cation which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, 
according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with 
the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, 
in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations. 

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left 
for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis. 

De Fleuriau. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 41 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 191 4. 

This morning the British Charge d'Affaires, acting under instruc- 
tions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were 
willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of 

1 The French Minister did not do so ; cf. French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. 
For a discussion of his reasons see above. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 
1914. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 where Sir E. Grey writes : "You may 
support 171 general terms, etc." 



154 Official Diplomatic Documents 

intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, 
in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time 
limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum. 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly 
after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of 
the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this 
very morning to the German ] Ambassador at Vienna to the effect 
that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfor- 
tunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. 2 In any case Herr von Jagow 
does not think that this request would be granted. 

The British Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as 
I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the 
Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a 
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further ; 
but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank 
cheque given by Germany to Austria. 

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a 
domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially 
an international one. 

Jules Cambon. 



French Yellow Book No. 42 



M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin. July 25, 1914. 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the 
German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet 
at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit 
of the ultimatum. 

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until 
late in the afternoon, 3 that is to say, till the very moment when the 
ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to 
the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of 
Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this com- 
munication illusory, inasmuch ;is it docs not give the Powers time to 
consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of 
the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending 
the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis. 

•Tiles ( !ambon. 

1 In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed. 

'-('omit Berchtold left for Ischl on the 25th in the morning; ef. Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 21, same day. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been made 
known to Russia in the evening of July L'.'i ; and bad been known to France and. there- 
fore, probably to the Entente Powers, in general terms, inclusive of the fact that 
there would be a time limit, on July 19, mil ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 11. 

1 Of. the previous despatch No. 11, where Mr. von Jagow is spoken of as having 
received the British Charge d'Affaires in (he same matter, and having already re- 
quested an extension of the time limit. 



July 25, French Yellow Book No. U 155 

French Yellow Book No. 43 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
martin, Acting Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1.914. 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has, in accordance with his in- 
structions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing 
an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow 
replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion 
of this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too 
late. 

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, 
action ' at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert 
themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note 
was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into 
war. 

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but 
of an "execution" - in a local matter. 

The Charge d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German 
Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hos- 
tilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe ; to 
this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such con- 
sequences. 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour 
that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation 
of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received 
complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this 
word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Ger- 
many's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic. 

Jules Cambon. 

From Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 44 

M. Barrerc, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienveuu-Martiii, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 25, 1914- 

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the 
demarcJie which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia 
at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest 3 to undertake, the object of 
which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar 
to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of 
the time limit imposed on Servia. 

1 Austria-Hungary had already promised that actual military operations would be 
delayed ; cf. British Blue Book No. 26. July 25. 1914. 

2 There is no reason why the official English translation should have retained this 
French word, instead of translating the. whole phrase which means "no question of 
war, but of action in a local matter." 

3 The occasional appearance of Bucharest in these despatches is noteworthy. 



156 Official Diplomatic Documents 

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and 
M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communi- 
cation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could 
not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take 
any step at Vienna. 

Barrere. 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 45 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914- 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires received instructions from his 
Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to 
Servia at the very moment 1 that Count Berchtold was leaving for 
Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining 
there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis. 

Prince KoudachefT informed him nevertheless of the demarche which 
he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one addressed 
to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not 
expect any result. 

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instruc- 
tions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was 
represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with 
documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, 
was nut consonant with international courtesy. 2 Baron Macchio 
replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being 
courteous. 

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on 
Servia : it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow 
had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia. 

Dumaine. 

From Belgrade 

French Yellow Book No. 46 

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 25, 1914- 

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be 
sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. 

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the Journal 
Officiel the declaration which has been required of them ; they will 

1 This was in the morning ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. 

2 Austria-Hungary was of a different opinion ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 21, July 25, and note 2. 



July 25, French Yellow Book No. Jfl 157 

communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day ; 
they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other asso- 
ciations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they under- 
take to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, 
in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government 
offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the 
propaganda ; they only request that the names of these officials may 
be communicated to them. 

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the 
Government ask that an explanation 1 of the manner in which this 
will be exercised may be given to them. They c6uld accept no parti- 
cipation which conflicted with international law or with good and 
neighbourly relations. 

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare 
that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, 
they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or to the 
decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the 
declaration of March 31, 1909. 

Boppe. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 47 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1.914. 

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour 
that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This even- 
ing the newspapers published extra editions which announce a 
rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister. 

The correspondent of the Agence Hams at the Wilhelmstrasse has 
just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting 
of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper 
offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed 
through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, 
and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the 
Siegessdule, the Austrian and then the Italian 2 Embassy. It is a 
significant outburst of chauvinism. 

A German 3 whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had 
been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note, 



1 For an explanation of the Austro-Hungarian meaning see the Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 27, of the same day. 

1 As early as in 1912 Paul Rohrbach had pointed out, in Der deutsche Gedanke in 
der Welt (translated. German World Policies. The Macmillan Co.) that in a European 
conflagration Germany could not count on the support of Italy. 

3 For a clear understanding of the ante-war days it is unfortunate that the French 
Ambassador in Berlin not infrequently quotes anonymous Germans whose standing 
and importance remain obscure. 



158 Official Diplomatic Documents 

reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect 
should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts 
of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture. 

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every 
eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of 
the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria. 

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might 
be listened to at Berlin. 

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not suc- 
ceed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and 
absolutely united front. 1 

Jules Cambon. 



From Vienna 
French Yellow Book No. 48 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914- 

Your telegram 2 reaches me exactly at the moment when the time 
limit given to Servia expires. On the other hand I have just informed 
you under what conditions the Russian Charge d'Affaires has had 
to carry out his demarche It seems useless to support him when 
there is no longer any time for it. 3 

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded 
to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers 
against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are 
assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly ; 
he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the 
conditions imposed by his Government inadequate. 

Dumaine. 



French Yellow Book No. 49 

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. 

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.) 4 
[For the text see Austro-Hupgarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, 
or ib. No. 25, July 25, 1914.] 

'This was Russia's great aim, to secure England's unconditional support; cf. 
British Blue Book No. 6, June 24, 1914. and no. 17, June 25. 

- French Yellow Book No. 39, same dav. 

• Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day : "This morning." The time 
limit was to expire at <i p.m. See also Russian ( (range Book No. 15, same day. There 
would not seem to lie any reason why the French Ambassador should have received 
his instructions too late to act. S lso British Blue Book No. 13, July 25, 1914. 

J Notice the day, July 27, when the Serbian reply was officially presented. A sum- 
mary reached France on July 26, but with a delay of 20 hours. See French Yellow 
Book No. 56, July 26. 



• July 25, German White Book Exhibit 6 159 

Germany : 

To London 

German White Book Exhibit 13 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on 
July 25th, 1914. 

The distinction 1 made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro- 
Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do 
not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as 
heretofore we take the position that this question must be localised 
by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore 
our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her re- 
sponsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, 
in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our 
known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria 
jointly with the other powers. 

From Petrograd 

German White Book Exhibit 6 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the 
Chancellor on July 25th, 191 4. 

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary 
aide de camp to the Czar). 

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly 
interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. 
The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were 
raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At head- 
quarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. 
I have the impression 2 that complete preparations for mobilisation 
against Austria are being made. 

1 Sir Edward Grey knew from British Blue Book Nos. 6 and 17 of Russia's determina- 
tion to intervene in favor of Serbia. Germany believed that Russia would not inter- 
vene because, without England, she might be forced by France to refrain from aggressive 
action, and in view of Asquith's invectives against Serbia in Parliament after the Serajevo 
murder [The Times, July 1. 1914 quotes him as saying, "We are once more confronted 
with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of 
mankind"] did not believe that England would go to war for Serbia. 

Sir Edward Grey's first proposal was that four powers should intervene simul- 
taneously in Petrograd and in Vienna. This plan was modified under French pressure 
(sec dispatches of July 24 and 25, 1914) to amount to a request that Germany induce 
Austria-Hungary to submit her case against Serbia to a conference of four powers, 
one of whom should be Russia herself (British Blue Book No. 25, July 25, 1914). 

The German position is made perfectly clear in the above despatch. 

* The correctness of this impression is proved by the telegram from the Czar to 
the German Emperor of July 30 (German White Book. Exhibit 23a), in which the Czar 
says: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago." 
Ci. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24. and note 5. And for the general subject o f 
Russian mobilization see the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 544: "The 
French papers are now admitting that Russia's recent mobilization of a million men 
on her German and Austrian frontiers was chiefly intended as a demonstration to 
France that her ally could help her in time of need." See also Musical Courier. Sept. 
30, 1915, p. 8, where an American traveller relates his experiences with mobilized Rus- 
sian troops in Batum and in Sebastopol on May 24, 1914. 



160 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Great Britain: 

From the Russian Ambassador 

British Blue Book No. 13 ' 

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. 

(Translation.) 
M. Sazonof telegraphie au M. Sazonof telegraphs to the 
Charge d 'Affaires de Russie a Russian Charge d 'Affaires at 
Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, Vienna on the 11th (21th) July, 
1914: 1914: 

[For the text see Russian Orange Book Xo. 4, July 24, 1914.] 

To Paris and Petrograd 

British Blue Book No. 14 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to 
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that 
the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche 
with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not com- 
plied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government 
would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, 
not operations. 2 

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same 
information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister 
lor Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situa- 
tion rather less acute. 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 15 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphie.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Govern- 
ment have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Gov- 

1 This is the first despatch listed in the British Blue Book under date of July 25. 
It was sent on the 24th from Petrograd and delivered in London early the next day. 
It was undoubtedly received at the same time in Paris, if not late on July 24. Since 
it is not listed in the French Yellow Book the exact time when it was received cannot 
be given. It may, however, be surmised that in the absence of published information to 
the contrary, it reached Paris in ample time to instruct the French Ambassador to sup- 
port his Russian colleague in Vienna. The French Ambassador, however, claimed that 
his instructions reached him too late ; cf. French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. 

2 This concession of Austria-Hungary was a half-way acceptance of Russia's 
request (British Blue Book No. 13, Russian Orange Book No. 4) for an extension of 
the time limit. 



July 25, British Blue Book No. 17 161 

eminent contained in your telegram of to-day. 1 They have, how- 
ever, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to 
Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday. 2 



British Blue Book No. 16 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914- 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make 
except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as 
Belgrade. 3 He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the 
Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme 
measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, how- 
ever, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept 
the Austrian demands in their entirety. 

From Petrograd 

British Blue Book No. 17 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914- 

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communi- 
cated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to 
Paris, 4 and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication 
which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the 
Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to 
Belgrade. 5 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the 
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond 
with the information which had reached him from German quarters. 6 
As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador 
agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time 
limit expires this evening. 

1 See No. 14. 

2 The advice spoken of is contained in British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914, a 
despatch to the British Minister in Belgrade, who in No. 22, July 25, informs Sir E. 
Grey that he had not offered the advice because his French and Russian colleagues 
had received no instructions. Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 

3 Cf. German White Book. Exhibit 13, July 25th, and note ; also British Blue Book 
No. 10, July 24, and note, and French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24. France wishes 
mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 

' See No. 14. 

6 See No. 12. There is no hint in Sir E. Grey's despatch to Belgrade that it was 
suggested by the French Ambassador. Cf. British Blue Book No. 15, and note. 

6 The published despatches contain no hint as to this information, and as a matter 
of fact Austria did as she had told England she would do. Sazonof, moreover, had 
received the correct Austro-Hungarian offer through the Russian Ambassador in 
London, Russian Orange Book No. 16, same day. 



162 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready 
to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, 
but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political 
demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian 
Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking 
Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and with- 
draw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same 
time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in 
favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question 
placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia 
in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were 
given not to Austria, but to the Powers. 

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready 
to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, 
Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia 
might propose to submit the question to arbitration. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipi- 
tate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence 
in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no ag- 
gressive intentions, 1 and she would take no action until it was forced 
upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. 
She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and 
establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Ger- 
many really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If 
we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no 
war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would 
in the end be dragged into war. 

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and 
Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation 
were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if 
she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said 
that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count 
upon our neutrality. 

I said all I could to impress prudence oh the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would 
not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry 
out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency 
replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and be- 
come the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure 
of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He as- 
sured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, 
but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the 
situation as desperate. 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and last paragraph of this note. 



July 25, British Blue Book No. 18 163 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 18 

Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge a" Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1.914. 

Your telegram of the 24th July 1 acted on. 

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this 
morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately in- 
structed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time 
limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it 
appeared from pressithat Count Berchtold 2 is at Ischl, and Secretary 
of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay 
and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State 
said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the 
spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to 
take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government 
could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. 

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that 
Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and 
had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian 
territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming in- 
fluence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared 
that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dan- 
gerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. 
He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that 
telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very 
reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to 
Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to under- 
stand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he 
would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations 
between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready 
to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour 
of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note 
left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very 
earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the 
contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. 

'See No. 11, July 24. 1914. 

5 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



164 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 19 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 25, 1914- 

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he 
knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany and ourselves 
should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, 
if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing. 

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional 
acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable 
information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 20 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914- 

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the 
surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is 
officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave 
Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of 
note at 6 p.m. to-day. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day ' to communicate 
personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 

From Belgrade 

British Blue Book No. 21 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the 
Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the 
Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible. 

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : — 
The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declara- 
tion in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reserva- 
tions. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to 
a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the 

1 C'f. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21. and French Yellow Book No. 45 and note, 
July 25, 1915. 



July 25, British Blue Book No. 24 165 

commission can be shown to be in accordance with international 
usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can 
be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the 
officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to sup- 
press the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Govern- 
ment want war at any cost, they cannot but be content ' with the full 
satisfaction offered in the Servian reply. 

British Blue Book No. 22 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires, at Belgrade, to Sir 
Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) / Belgrade, July 25, 1914- 

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from 
Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of 
your views. 

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, 
and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the 
Servian reply, I have up to now abstained 2 from offering advice to 
the Servian Government. 

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have 
already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. 

British Blue Book No. 23 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914- 

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. 

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina 3 will 
meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the 
vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives. 

To Petrograd 

British Blue Book No. 24 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- 

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the 
attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you 

1 For reasons why Austria-Hungary was not content, see Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24. 

3 The Serbian Parliament. 



1GG Official Diplomatic Documents 

said as reported in your telegram of yesterday, 1 and I cannot promise 
more on behalf of the Government. 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanc- 
tion our going to war over a Servian quarrel. 2 If, however, war does 
take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and 
I am therefore anxious to prevent it. 

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian 
demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both 
Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this 
event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four 
Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not 
to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at 
Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany 
will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should 
act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. 

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by 
either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included 
the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would 
therefore, be essential. 3 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 25 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that 
the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would 
be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military prepara- 
tions, but not military operations. In informing the German Am- 
bassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation 
before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday 
should be delayed. 

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisa- 
tion of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did 
happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, 1 and ourselves to keep 

1 Sec N T o. 0, July 24. 1916. 

2 This disposes of the claim popularly made that one of the reasons why Great 
Britain went to war was in part to protect the independence of a little state — Serbia. 

3 Germany accepted Sir Edward Grey's view and promised her cooperation in media- 
tion between Russia and Austria on this same day, July 25, cf. German White Book, 
Exhibit K>. Cf., however, French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Germany 
is quoted as refusing to interfere between Austria and Serbia. 

The Petrograd-Vienna mediation may be called the Sir E. Grey plan, and this 
Germany accepted on July 25. The Vienna-Belgrade mediation may be called the 
Paul Cambon modification, and this Germany rejected. 

1 All the editions of the British Blue Book including the important one of Sept. 2S, 
1914, print here " Russia." In the Collected Diplomatic Documents Sir Edward Grey 
inserts a footnote to Russia "Should be Italy." A similar footnote had appeared 
in the New York Tun,:: edition of August, 1914. The fact that "Russia" continued 
to be printed without, a footnote, even in the official edition of Sept. 2S, which con- 
tained a number of corrections, raises the presumption that "Russia" bad not only 
been written, but also meant. It. is true that in British Blue Book No. 17 of the same 
date, Russia said that she "would be quite ready to stand aside." but this may also 
imply that mention had been made of her as a member of the "Conference." Cer- 
tainty on this point is, however, impossible. 



July 25, British Blue Book No. 20 107 

together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the 
frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. 

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German 
Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known before- 
hand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff 
terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that 
note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky ' said, how- 
ever, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria 
and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. 2 lie ex- 
pressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. 

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title 
to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question 
became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was 
affected, in which we must all take a hand. 3 

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and 
Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany woidd be essen- 
tial to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. 
The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had 
had no time to consult them, 4 and could not therefore be sure of their 
views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my 
suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right 
thing to act upon it. 

To Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 26 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- 

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following 
telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador 
at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 

" The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers 
are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which 
are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian 
Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have de- 
clared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they 
have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope 
that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may 
examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian re- 
quests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the 
Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government 
were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be 

1 German Ambassador in London. 

2 German White Book, Exhibit 13. same day. 

3 This phrase is very much stronger in French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, 
where Paul Cambon reports what he claims Sir E. Grey told him he had said to the 
German Ambassador. 

4 See, however, the British-French and French-British despatches of July 24, and 
July 25, 1914. 



168 Official Diplomatic Documents 

acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their 
communication to the Powers of any practical meaning." 

You may support in general terms : the step taken by your Russian 
colleague. 

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, 
it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Govern- 
ment were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of 
relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, 
therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too 
late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in 
the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any 
irretrievable steps. 

To Paris, Berlin, and Petrograd 

British Blue Book No. 27 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir 
H. Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. 
Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1.914- 

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the 
Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day. - 
I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corre- 
sponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able 
to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it. 

To? or From? 

No. 28 

[Nil.] 

Sir Edward Grey has never explained this deleted No. 28. The British Blue 
Book was not prepared and distributed, as was the German White Book, in a 
hurry to supply the necessary background to the speeches delivered in Parliament 
on the strength of which the nation went to war. The Britisli Blue Book was dis- 
tributed in Parliament several days after England had declared war on Germany. 
A careless numbering of the despatches seems out of the question. No. 28 very 
likely was a despatch which Sir E. Grey at the last moment decided not to 
publish. 

To Rome 
British Blue Book No. 29 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Rodd, British A mbassador at Rome. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- 

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in gen- 
eral terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. 3 

1 On this day Sir E. Grey was not yet willing to be known either in Vienna or in 
Berlin as making common cause with the other Entente Powers. 

2 See No. 21, same day. 

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 27, same day. 



July 25, British Blue Book No. 30 169 

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made 
no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

To Belgrade 
British Blue Book No. 30 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' 'Affaires at 

Belgrade. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 191^. 

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd 1 instant and spoke to Sir 
A. Nicolson 2 on the present strained relations between Servia and 
Austria-Hungary. 

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. 
They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- 
Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain 
juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry 
conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that 
there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian 
territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the 
necessary steps to give satisfaction ; but if Austria transported the 
question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, 
being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that 
Servia must abandon certain political ideals, 3 no independent State 
would, or could, submit to such dictation. 

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were 
Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; 4 that one of them had been in Servia, 
and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dan- 
gerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian 
authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he 
was an innocent and harmless individual. 

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch 5 his opinion 
on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to 
base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government 
woidd endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and 
moderate spirit. j am et 

E. Grey. 

1 It seems strange that this interview of the 23d should not have been mentioned 
to the British representative in Belgrade until two days later, the twenty-fifth, es- 
pecially since the instructions given to the representative in Belgrade in No. 12, July 24, 
seem to be based on the information given in the interview of the 23d. The inter- 
view, moreover, appears to have taken place before the presentation of the Austro- 
Hungarian note. While in a continuous story of events this note does not belong 
here, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing why it has nevertheless been introduced 
in this place. 

2 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 

3 These certain political ideals were those of a Greater Serbia which could not be 
realized except at the cost of a dismembered Austria-Hungary. 

4 Bosniaks is the term by which Austria-Hungary called the Serbians in Bosnia 
before the murder of Serajevo, while Serbia called them Serbians. After the murder, 
the Serbians used the term Bosniaks to indicate that Serbia was innocent, and Austria- 
Hungary used the term Serbians to show that Serbia was guilty. 

s Serbian Minister in London. 



170 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Russia : 

Announcement by the Russian Government 

Russian Orange Book No. 10 

St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. 
Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by 
Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest 
anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the 
dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain 
indifferent. 

From Vienna 

Russian Orange Book No. 11 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs-. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25) 1914. 

Count Berchtold is at Ischl. 1 In view of the impossibility of 
arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to ex- 
tend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this 
proposal verbally to Baron Macehio. The latter promised to com- 
municate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added 
that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal. 

Russian Orange Book No. 12 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914- 

In continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard 2 from 
Macehio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal 
to extend the time limit of the note. 

From Belgrade 

Russian Orange Book No. 13 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade to Russia Minister for Foreign 

A ff airs - Belgrade, July 12 (.25), 1914. 

(Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914). 
(Telegram.) 

Following is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet 
to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before 
the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum. 

[Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1014.] 

1 He went there during the forenoon of Julv 25. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 21, and British Blue Book No. 20, July 25, 1914, and French Yellow Book No. 45, 
same day. 

- Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 20, and for reasons for the refusal No. 21, 
July 25, 1914. 



July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 16 171 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Book No. 14 

Russian Charge (V Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 12 (25), 1.914. 

I have received your telegrams of the 11th (24th) 1 July and have 
communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He 
tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to 
advise 2 Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has 
informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same 
as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berch- 
told, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his tele- 
grams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wis- 
dom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to 
think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of 
Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way 
without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar 
argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite 
promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be 
taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be 
avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the 
negative. 

From Paris 

Russian Orange Hook No. 15 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1014. 

I have received your telegram of the 11th (24th) 3 July respecting 
the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have 
made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The 
French Representative 4 at Vienna has been furnished with similar 
instructions. 

From London 
Russian Orange Book No. 16 
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1914. 

I have received your telegram of the 11th July. 5 Grey has in- 
structed 6 the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action 

1 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, Julv 24. 1914. 

! British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 ; ef. also French Yellow Book Nos. 41, 
42, 43, July 25, 1914. 

3 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, Julv 24, 1914. 

4 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 39 and 48, July 25, 1914. 

6 Russian Calendar, which is July 24 of our calendar ; Russian Orange Book Nos. 

6 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914. 



172 Official Diplomatic Documents 

for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same 
time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come 
to see him, 1 and had explained that the Austrian note should not be 
regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, 
in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply 
within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic 
relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate 
opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explana- 
tion he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be 
too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ulti- 
matum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve 
as a basis for discussion. 2 

To London 

Russian Orange Book No. 17 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
London. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. 

In the event of any change for the worse in the situation which 
might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that 
England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order 
to maintain the European balance of power, 3 for which she has con- 
stantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be com- 
promised in the event of the triumph of Austria. 

From the German Ambassador 

Russian Orange Book No. IS 4 

Note verbalc handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the 
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1014- 

(Translation.) 

Il nous revient de source We learn from an authorita- 

autoritative que la nouvelle tive source that the news spread 

repandue par quelques journaux by certain newspapers, to the 

d'apres laquelle la demarche du effect that the action of the 

Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hon- Austro-Hungarian Government 

grie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a at Belgrade was instigated by 

l'instigation de l'Allemagne est Germany, is absolutely false. 

1 British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, 1014. 

2 ( '(intrust the information here directly transmitted to the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs with the latter's reply to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, British 
Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. and note 4. 

1 This is only a supplementary declaration to German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, 
which is the important German declaration, presented in Paris, London and Petrograd. 
It is printed in British Blue Book No. 9, French Yellow Book No. 2S, July 24, but is 
omitted in the Russian Orange Book. 



July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 19 



173 



absolument fausse. Le Gouverne- 
meni allemand n'a pas eu con- 
naissance du texte de la note 
autrichienne avant qu'elle ait 
ete remise, et n'a exeree aucune 
influence sur son contenu. C'est 
a tort qu'on attribue a, l'AHe- 
magne une attitude commina- 
toire. 

L'Allemagne appuie naturelle- 
ment comme allie de l'Autriche 
les revendications a son avis 
legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne 
contre la Serbie. 

Avant tout elle desire, comme 
elle l'a deja declare des le com- 
mencement du differend austro- 
serbe, que ce conflit reste loca- 
lise. 



The German Government had 
no knowledge of the text of the 
Austrian note before it was pre- 
sented, and exercised no influence 
upon its contents. A threaten- 
ing attitude is wrongly attributed 
to Germany. 



Germany, as the ally of 
Austria, naturally supports the 
claims made by the Vienna 
Cabinet against Servia, which 
she considers justified. 

Above all Germany wishes, as 
she has already declared from 
the very beginning of the Austro- 
Servian dispute, that this conflict 
should lie localised. 



From Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 19 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russia it Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. 

Please refer to my telegram 1 of the 11th (24th) July. 

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct 
form, 2 the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, 
and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances 
as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is 
much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of 
the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in 
no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He 
stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any 
definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless 
approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly " the 
bolt once fired" (these were his own words), Germany could only 
be guided bv her duties as an ally. 



Russian Orange Book No. 8, July 24, 1914. 
' Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914. 



174 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From London 

Russian Orange Book No. 20 

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
. Iffairs. 

(Telegram.) Loudon, July 12 {25), W14- 

Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him 
that the German Government were not informed of the text of the 
Austrian note, hut that they entirely supported Austria's action. 1 
The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see 
her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. 
Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long- 
as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British 
interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to 
the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisa- 
tion, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the 
interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great 
Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action. 2 

From Belgrade 

Russian Orange Book No. 21 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 12 {25), 1914. 

In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply 
to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the 
Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 P.M. this evening, 
that, not having received a satisfactory 3 answer within the time 
limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the lega- 
tion. The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. 
The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this 
evening for that town. 

From London 

Russian Orange Book No. 22 

Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1014- 

Grey has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian 
mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a 

'See German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, July 23, British Blue Book No. 9, 
July 24, omitted in the Orange Book. See note to Russian Orange Book No. Is, 
July IT,. 191 1. 

' Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, French Yellow Book No. 37. July 25, 1914. 

3 For the reasons of Austria-Hungary why the Serbian note did not satisfy her, see 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 



July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 39 175 

general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of 
reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian 
and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great 
Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at 
once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential 
of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to 
mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this 
point at Berlin. 1 

Serbia : 

To All Serbian Legations Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 38 

.1/. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. 

A brief summary of the reply of the Royal Government was com- 
municated to the representatives of the allied Governments 2 at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. 3 They were informed that the 
reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian 
Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far 
as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all 
costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in 
the Serbian reply. 



The Serbian Reply to Austria-Hungary 

Serbian Blue Book No. :>0 

Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. — Belt/mile, 
July 12/25, 1914. 

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, 
July 27, 1!»14.] 

1 No detailed references to the mobilization of Germany. France, Italy and Great 
Britain are contained in any despatches published in the British Blue Book. 

2 This expression is noteworthy, referring no doubt to France, Russia and Eng- 
land, who are here spoken of either as allied to each other or even allied to Serbia. 
See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4. where Count Mensdorf quotes 
Sir E. Grey as referring to Great Britain as the ally of France. Cf. also French Yellow 
Book No. 158, August 4. Since no mention is made of a summary being given to the 
representatives of the other Powers, " the representatives of the allied Governments " 
were possibly invited as representing a unit to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
This is, however, not mentioned in French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, 1914, where the 
French Minister simply reports "M. Pashitch has just acquainted me, etc." 

3 For the delay with which even this summary reached the Powers see French Yellow 
Book No. 56, July 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. 



176 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Front the Austro-Hungarian Minister 

Serbian Blue Book No. 40 ' 

Baron Giesl run Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, 
to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Sir, Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. 

As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my 
Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, 
the day before yesterday, at 6 P.M., has now expired, and as I have 
received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your 
Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff 
of the Imperial and Royal Legation. 

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with 
all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of 
the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted 
to the Imperial German Legation. 

Finally,- I desire to state formally that from the moment this 
letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a 
fait accompli. 

I have, etc. 



To All Serbian Legation* Abroad 

Serbian Blue Book No. 41 2 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1014. 

I communicated the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day 
at 5.45 p.m. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. 
From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When 
I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he 
would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then 
give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I 
was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he 
was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the 
same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of 
the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian 
interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He 
stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between 
Serbia and Austria-Hungarv must be considered as definitely broken 
off. 

1 This note should more properly follow No. 41. 

2 Parts of this note, from a chronological point of view, should have been printed 
before No. 40. 



July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 1$ 177 

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina 
to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their 
staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in 
the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, 
while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which 
it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service 
should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to 
their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their 
ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked. 



From the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Serbian Blue Book No. 12 

Count Leopold, Berchtohl, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna. 

Sir, Vienna, July 12/25, 1914. 

As no satisfactory reply 1 has been given to the note which the Im- 
perial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed 
to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled 
to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust 
the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic 
Majesty to the German Legation. 

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain 
with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of 
this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for 
your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal 
Legation. 

I have, etc. 

1 For Austria-Hungary's reasons why the reply was not satisfactory see Austro- 
Hungariau Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 



178 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Sunday, July 26, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office 


OF 


Sent Despatches to 


Austria-Hungi 


try 


London, Berlin, Rome, 
London, Paris, Petrograd 


Belgium 







France 

( rermany 
! Jreat Britain 




London, London, etc. 
Note for Minister 
London, Paris, Petrograd 
Paris, Berlin, Rome, 
Paris 


Russia 
Serbia 




Koine, Vienna, Berlin 



Petrograd 

Austro-Hungarian 

Minister 
Rome, Petrograd, Vienna, 

Christ iania, Luxemburg 
Petrograd 
Vienna, Berlin, Rome 

Prague, Paris, Berlin 



The full Serbian reply and the reasons why it had not satisfied Austria-Hungary 
remained unknown to the Powers throughout the whole of Sunday, July 2(i. A 
summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris and also Petrograd with a delay of 
twenty hours, and there is no indication in the published despatches that it reached 
the other Foreign Offices sooner. 

In the absence of accurate information two versions gained currency. First 
that Serbia's seeming concessions were a sham, anil that she knew them to be so 
or she would noi have ordered the mobilization of her troops three hours before 
she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. Secondly, that she had yielded in every- 
thing except a few minor points. 

Austria-Hungary continues her endeavors to prove to the Powers that she had 
been forced to act harshly with Serbia, but that she did not contemplate any 
territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Serbia. She orders the mobilization 
of some of her troops. 

Germany is greatly concerned about the military preparations going on espe- 
cially in Russia and warns the Powers of the danger that lies in mobilisation. She 
endeavors to gain the confidence of France, and France's willingness to intercede 
in Russia. 

tinut Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four Powers; 
at first, as on the previous days, with a view to mediation between Petrograd and 
Vienna; afterwards — anil probably owing to French opposition to her original 
plan — with the view of discovering "an issue which would prevent complica- 
tions." 

Russia holds a "long and friendly conversation," as Sazonof describes it. with 
Austria-Hungary, and suggests the settlement of the Serbian difficulty by means 
of direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna. Another suggestion that 
Serbia should appeal for British intervention is not pressed. 

Russian mobilization continues. 

France reverts to her plan that Germany should exert pressure on Austria- 
Hungary amounting to mediation between her and Serbia. She claims to be 
convinced of Russia's moderation and pacific intentions, but does not publish the 
accounts of Russian mobilisation which must have reached her as well as Ger- 
many. Germany's request that she let it be known that France and Germany are 
jointly working for peace, she rejects as emphatically as Germany's other request 
that she should urge moderation in Petrograd. 

Italy is urged by the Entente Powers to dissociate her interests from those of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and is informed by Russia of the latter's definite 
determination to come to the assistance of Serbia. 

Serbia is silent on this day, and Belgium practically so. 



July 26, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28 179 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Petrograd 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg!/, July 26, 1.914- 

As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of 
Russian troops, Count Pourtales has called the Russian Minister's 
attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays 
measures of mobilisation ' would be a highly dangerous form of diplo- 
matic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration 
of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that 
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out 
of control. 

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour 
that the reports on the subject were incorrect ; that up to that time 
not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and 
that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures 
of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps 
Kasan and Moscow. 

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attache 
received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof, 
the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtales had spoken 
with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, 
and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military 
details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed 
information. In the following telegram 2 from Count Pourtales to 
Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communi- 
cations from Major von Eggeling are collected : 

"The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversation with 
the Russian Minister of War : M. Sazonof had asked him to make 
the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his 
word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had 
been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be 
taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If 
Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, 
Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. 
In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German 
front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburgh. Peace with Germany is 
earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisa- 
tion against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a 

1 For the aggressive meaning of mobilisation according to International Law see 
Elihu Root. President of the American Society of International Law, in the Am, ricart 
Journal of International Law, July, 1914 : " It is well understood that the exercise of 
the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the 
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example 
probably would be the mobilisation of an army by another Power immediately across 
the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory, yet 
the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war." 

2 Not published in German White Book. 



180 Official Diplomatic Documents 

reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under- 
stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but 
that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in 
itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly 
and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for 
peace." 

To London 

AuSTRO-HlTNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 29 

Count Berchtokl to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

IIerr von Tschirschky informed me to-day in pursuance of his 
instructions that, according to a telegram : from Prince Lichnowsky 
which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., 
Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from 
Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that 
he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor 
of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna. 

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach 
the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the 
fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this 
letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at '■'> P.M. yesterday, Servia had 
already ordered the general mobilisation - of her army, which proves 
that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It 
was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that 
the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to 
London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our 
demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Bel- 
grade. 

To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd 

AlJSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BoOK No. 30 

Count Berchtokl to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, 
Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgk. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

We have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia after she had 
refused 3 the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excel- 
lency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, 
and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect : — 

The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the de- 
mands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure 

1 Not published in German White Book. 

2 See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 32, same 
day. 

3 For the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed the Serbian note unsatisfactory 
see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 



July 26, French Yellow Book No. 50 181 

permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them, 
anil have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon 
their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of 
our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy. 
Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find 
ourselves obliged to compel Servia by the sharpest measures to make 
a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now 
pursued. 

See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914, which describes an 
interview between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, 1914. 

Belgium : 

From Austro-Hungarian Legation 

Belgian Gray Book No. 5 

Communications made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian 
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

M. Pasiiitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the 
Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not 
having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been 
broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have 
left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 
3 o'clock. 1 

France : 

To Viviani, London, etc. 

French Yellow Book No. 50 

M. Bienvenn-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- 
dent of the Council (on board the ''La France,") and to the French 
Ambassadors at London, St. Peter sburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 26, 1914. 

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows : — refusal 
of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by 
Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after 
receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient 
although it reached the limit of any possible concession 2 — order for 
mobilisation given in Servia whose Government retired to Kragou- 
jewatz, 3 where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. 

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been 
communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even 

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, also British Blue Book No. 32, same 
day. 

2 Cf . French Yellow Book No. 49. printed under July 25. 1914. stating that Serbia 
did not present her reply to France till the next day. July 27. Cf. also French Yellow 
Book No. 56, July 26, which states that even the summary was 20 hours late in 
reaching the Foreign Office. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, July 26, 
1914. and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. See also, Serbian Blue Book No. 3S, 
July 25. Note 2. 

3 Nish, according to Russian Orange Book No. 21, July 25, 1914. 



182 Official Diplomatic Documents 

advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, 
who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion 
of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an ex- 
tension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by 
the Italian Ambassador to M. Paleologue that at Vienna people still 
soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." 
It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engage- 
ments of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand. 

From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia 
to ask for British mediation. 1 At the Council of Ministers 2 on the 
25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation 
of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria 
was considered ; this mobilisation, however, would only be made 
effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia, 
and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being 
left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be 
occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically 
and morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed. 

In London the German demarche* was made on the 25th in the 
same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward 
Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break 
out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did 
not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language 
to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening ' 
of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey 
more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily 
involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still 
willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene. 

At Berlin 5 the language used by the Secretary of State to the 
Russian Charge dAffaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory ; when the 
latter asked him to associate himself with a demarche at Vienna for 
an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken 
action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an 
extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he 
replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a 
war hut with local operations. Ilerr von Jagow pretends not to 
believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences. 

A real explosion of chauvinism 6 has taken place at Berlin. The 

1 This is a new suggestion. Cf. French Yellow Hook No. 46, July 25, where an 
appeal to the European Powers is contemplated. It reached Paris, moreover, not on 
the 25th, as this despatch implies, but on the 20th; see below No. 53. French Yellow 
Book. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. 

3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914, and note. 

4 Cf. British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, and its place among the despatches of 
that date, which makes it more likely that the communication was made early in the 
morning. It was, moreover, the subject of much diplomatic correspondence throughout 
the day. 

5 For the events described in this paragraph see British Blue Book No. IS, and 
French Yellow Book No. 37, of July 25, 1914. 

6 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 47, July 25, 1914. The rest of the information con- 
tained in this paragraph is not written in M. Jules Cambon's published despatch. 



July 2G, French Yellow Book No. 51 183 

German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks 
that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would 
immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before 
attacking us. 

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time ' to join in 
the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of 
the time limit fixed for Servia ; lie does not regret it, this demarche 
having been categorically rejected, and England not having had 
time to give instructions to her representative about it. 

A note from the British Embassy 2 has been delivered to me : it 
gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburgh and M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir 
Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly in- 
terested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies 
should not cross the frontier, and that, they should give time to Eng- 
land, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. 
If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think 
that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of 
England and France ; the adherence of Germany is essential, for 
neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except 
that of impartial friends or allies. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 51 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 26, 1.914. 

A telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Con- 
sulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and 
Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military 
measures. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to 
Rome till the day after to-morrow. 

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of 
the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. 
From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the im- 
pression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of 
war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation. 3 

M. Salandra said to me on this subject : " We shall make the 
greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is some- 
what analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do some- 
thing in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra 

: For the error of this statement see the despatches dealing with this subject on 
July 25, 1914. and the notes. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 24, July 25, 1914. 

3 It was obviously in the interest of the Entente Powers, in case of a European 
war, to secure the separation of Italy from Austria-Hungary and Germany. 



184 Official Diplomatic Documents 

stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communi- 
cated to Rome at the last moment. 



Barrere. 



French Yellow Book Nc 



.1/. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Home, July 26, 1914. 
M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a 
conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead 
Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could 
not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed. 

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile 

to Austria in this serious business. „ 

Barrere. 

To London 
French Yellow Book No. 53 

.1/. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. dc 
Fleuriau, Charge d 'Affaires at London. 

Paris. Juli/ 26, 1914. 

M. Paleologtje sends me the following telegram : — 

" M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the media- 
tion of the British Government." 2 

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, 3 I think that the French 
Government can only say that they hope to see the British Govern- 
ment accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them. 

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Petrograd 

French Yellow Book No. 54 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy per- 
severance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up 

1 This despatch refers to the interview, described in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 
1914, between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British and French 
Ambassadors. The direct report of this interview by the French Ambassador has 
not been printed in the French Yellow Book. No valid reason appears why such a 
roundabout mention of this interview in Petrograd should receive preference in the 
official publication of the despatches. 

• See French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26. and note 3 ; contrast British Blue Book 
No. 44, July 27. 

3 No despatch from Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to this 
effect has been published in the French Yellow Book. 



July 26, French Yellow Book No. 55 185 

to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready 
to negotiate." ' 

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come 
to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his 
presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, 
making clear the insulting character "~ of the principal clauses. "The 
intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if 
you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory 
against the intrigues of Servian anarchists ; but the procedure to 
which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded : 
" Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee 
you the result." 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this 
language ; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the 
opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof 
has decided to propose 3 this evening to Count Berchtold the opening 
of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh on the 
changes to be introduced into the ultimatum. 

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between 
Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I there- 
fore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to 

* ucceed - Paleologue. 

From Vienna 

. French Yellow Book No. 55 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienrenu-Martin , 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia ; he 
had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from 
Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly 
acceptable. 4 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in 
the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the 
note. This procedure, which is quite usual 5 in the diplomacy of the 

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and contrast with British Blue Book No. 
17, same day. 

2 In the Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day this interview is called "long and 
friendly." Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, same day, and note ; also British 
Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 

3 There is no published despatch showing that he did this. On the contrary in 
French Yellow Book No. 53, July 26, Sazonof makes an entirely different suggestion. 
He did, however, revert to the plan proposed here later (see British Blue Book No. 78, 
July 29) and thereby blocked the plan of a Conference of Ministers in Belgrade. 

4 The reader must decide for himself whether Count Berchtold was honest in his 
belief or.not. From French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, New York Times translation, 
it seems that Serbia was willing to accept the demands of Austria-Hungary, if they 
did not include judicial participation. This demand was dropped in favor of participa- 
tion in the investigation. See also British Blue Book No. 57, July 27, printed under 
date of July 28. 

5 A subjective judgment of this kind while indicative of the existing suspicion on 
the part of the French Government cannot, of course, claim to be in the nature of 
proving the case. 



186 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards 
me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian 
Government. 

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay 
which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal 
for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allow- 
ing ns to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany. 

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company 
with Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 the latter received instructions 2 from the 
Foreign Office with reference to the demarche to be attempted by the 
representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am 
expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with 
the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse 
his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the 
principle of localising the conflict. 3 

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although 
surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have 
been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military- 
action. T-. 

Dumaine. 



To Viv&ani, London, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 56 

M. Bienvcuii-Murtin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- 
dent of the Council (on hoard the " La France,") and to the French 
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg!), Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July J!, 101 4. 

The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only 
reached us after twenty hours delay. 1 Although the Servian Gov- 
ernment had given way on all points, with the exception of two small 
reservations, 5 the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off rela- 
tions, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to pro- 
ceed to execution on Servia. 

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Am- 
bassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to 
Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene 
between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be local- 
ised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his 
best to maintain peace. 6 

1 The close union of the three Entente Powers is apparent throughout. Cf. British 
Blue Book No. 40, July 26, HIM, mid Britisli Blue Book No. 6, note 1, Julv 24. 

- See British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 36, July 26, 1914. 

3 Contrast, this paragraph with British Blue Book No. 40, same clay, where the same 
interview is described. 

1 I.e. on Sunday, July 26, at 2 p.m. 

6 For the entirely different view of the Austro-Hungarian Government see their 
Red Book No. 34, July 27. 1914. 

6 Germany did more and accepted Sir E. Grey's plan ; German White Book, 
Exhil.it 13, July 25, 1914. 



July 26, French Yellow Book No. 57 187 

In the course of an interview between M. Barrere and the General 
Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indi- 
cated that probably the Italian Government would not have ap- 
proved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them 
beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact re- 
lieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria. 1 

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a com- 
munication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia 
in a pacific sense. " Austria," he said to me, " has declared to Russia 
that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any 
attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia ; her only intention 
is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The 
prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia ; Germany feels 
herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be 
maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence 
in this sense at St. Petersburgh." 

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she 
had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her modera- 
tion, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful 
solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany 
on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly 
be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to 
the occupation of Servia. 2 

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be 
reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the ques- 
tion concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the media- 
tion at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other 
Powers less interested in the question. 

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instruc- 
tions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not 
feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburgh alone. 

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am- 
bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared 
to be on this point identified with France. 3 „ ,„■ 

BiENYEXT'-MaRTIN. 



French Yellow Book No. 57 

Note for the Minister 

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914- 

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the 
afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the 

1 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, same day. 

2 The attitude of France, consistently carried out through the next days, is here 
foreshadowed. Her view is that Austria-Hungary's position was unreasonable, while 
Russia's was reasonable and moderate. Germany, therefore, should exert pressure on 
Austria, while she herself refused to exert like pressure on Russia. 

3 Germany was trying to work together with France for the maintenance of peace. 
France refused to appear to act. in accord with Germany for fear of offending Russia, 
see French Yellow Book No. 62. July 27. 



188 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Direction Politique, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in 
the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, 
such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before, 1 and in order 
to define exactly the sense of the demarches of the German Govern- 
ment, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the 
interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, sug- 
gested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took 
down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambas- 
sador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in 
the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an 
identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarite paci- 
fique), they examined the means which might be employed to main- 
tain general peace." " 

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your 
opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that 
Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with 
the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared 
surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was ex- 
plained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's nega- 
tive attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were 
exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion 
by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were 
only too evident. 

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the 
optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political 
Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner 
quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely anil without 
regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him 
to do so. 

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's atti- 
tude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective 
analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German rela- 
tions led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated 
statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Aus- 
trian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that 
point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed her- 
self on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ? 
Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin 
allow one to admit that Austria, could have taken up a position with- 
out any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the 
consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising 
appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating 3 influence 
at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian 
note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming 

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, and Russian Orange Book No. 19, July 25, 1914. 

2 Cf. preceding despatch and note 0. 

3 France was still clinging to the Paul Cambon modification — mediation between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia — of the Sir E. Grey plan — mediation between Russia 
and Austria-Hungary. 



July 26, French Yellow Book No. 57 189 

and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in inter- 
posing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called 
the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice 
given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which 
weighed on Europe ! 

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats 
of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking ' make 
peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the 
day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would 
be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige 2 the St. Peters- 
burgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war 
which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid. 

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that 
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, 3 and 
had only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that 
Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to 
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situa- 
tion which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He 
declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, 
and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, 
if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, 
represented it to be. 

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his 
impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, 
for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According 
to him Austria was not uncompromising ; what she rejects is the 
idea of a formal mediation, the " spectre" of a conference : a peaceful 
word coming from St. Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory 
tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of 
being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that 
Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna. 

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he 
would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communi- 
cate to the press a short note in a moderate tone. 

1 There is here no reference to Serbia's mobilisation ordered three hours before she 
sent her reply to Austria-Hungary ; cf. Belgian .Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914. 

2 France throughout deemed Russia's interest in protecting Serbia more vital 
than Austria-Hungary's interests in protecting herself from Serbian intrigues. 

3 Here the official British publication "Collected Diplomatic Documents" prints 
the following note, not contained in the French Yellow Book, and does so without any 
explanation : 

" Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian 
President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia. 

"Cf. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page ¥4, in which Sir 
M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states: — 

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German 
Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched 
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador 
himself that he endorses every line of it." 

The first paragraph in its English translation, is a perversion of the truth. The French 
text merely says that he "had cognisance," and for this see note to French Yellow Book 
No. 21, July 23. As to the rest the reader must decide for himself whether the anonymous 
informant of the British Ambassador deserves more credence than the German Chan- 
cellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs who repeatedly said that they had not known 
the contents of the Austro-Hungarian note until it was officially presented to the 
Powers. Cf. especially French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, No. 17, July 22, and 
No. 30, July 24. 



190 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Christiania 
French Yellow Book No. 58 

.1/. Chevalley, French Minister tit Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. 

Christiania, July 26, 1914. 

The whole German fleet ' in Norway has received orders to put 
to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make 
straight for Germany. 

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were 
to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger. 

( HEVALLEY. 



From Luxemburg 

French Yellow Book Nil 59 

,1/. d'Annoville, French Charge a" Affaires at Luxemburg, to A/. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister jar Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914. 

According to information which I have just received from Thion- 
ville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold 
themselves at the disposition of the Commandatur at any moment. 

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden 
to go away from their place of residence. 

Germany : 

From Petrograd 

German White Book Exhibit 5 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. 
Telegram of Jul,/ 26th, 1914- 

The Austro-IIungarian Ambassador had an extended interview 2 
with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory im- 
pression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassa- 
dor that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to 
obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. 

i Orders to stop the demobilization of the British fleet had been issued, two days 
earlier. ..u July -'I, 1914, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914. See 
also not.- 2, British Blue Hook No. -1, , July 'J7. 

2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day. "Ions; and friendly" interview; but 
contrast impression of this interview on French Ambassador, French Yellow Hook 
\o 54, same day. where Sazonof is reported as having "made elear the insulting char- 
acter of the principal clauses." No mention of thi- interview is made in the Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book. The Russian despatch, No. 25, is sent to Vienna. There can 
be no doubt that Sazonof gave the impression to both Austria-Hungary and Germany 
that a ,ti;'i>n>rh,ii},nt between Russia and Austria-Hungary was possible. 



July 26, German White Book Exhibit 10a 191 

German White Book Exhibit 7 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the 
Chancellor on July 26th, 191 4- 

The military attache requests the following message to be sent to 
the general staff : 

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and 
Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable 
elsewhere. 

To London 

German White Book Exhibit 10 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. 
Urgent. July 26th, 191J.. 

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and 
solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it 
will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to 
establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, 
Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us) 
If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures 
very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the con- 
flict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We 
ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.- 

To Paris 
German White Book Exhibit 10a 3 

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
Paris. July 26th, 1914- 
After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no 
intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the 
Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests 
solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We 
depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the 
preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence 
at St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 

1 The words in italics are substituted here from the New York Timrx translation for 
those of the Collected Diplomatic Documents, which is the official British version 
and follows the official German translation, and reads "the call for several classes of 
the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation." It will be 
noticed that two thoughts are inadvertently omitted here: first that it is Russia who 
is mobilizing; secondly that she is mobilising "also against us." The editor of the 
Collected Diplomatic Documents who states, on p. 403, that "a few footnotes have 
been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the Ger- 
man original," disregards the omission of Russia in his footnote to these words, st:i t iim 
merely "The German text adds here auch gegen uns (also against us)." 

- Tin's entire message delivered to Sir E. Grey by the ( lerman Ambassador has been 
omitted in the British Blue Book. 

3 From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, 1914, it appears that this me: 

was delivered in Paris. It is, however, not printed in the French Yellow Book. 

In the English Translations published by The Imperial German Foreign Office these 
"Exhibits" are renumbered and printed as numbers: 10a becomes 11; 106 12. etc. 



192 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Petrograd 

German White Book Exhibit 106 l 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg on July 26th, 1914- 

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterested- 
ness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of 
Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We 
trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten 
seriously the peace of Europe. 

For an additional message to Russia see oelow after No. 29 of the Russian 
Orange Book, July 26, 1914. 

Great Britain : 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 31* 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914- 

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered 
satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. 
War is thought to be imminent. 

British Blue Book No. '-V2 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 20.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will 
keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is 
resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian terri- 
tory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question 
whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public 
opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that 
everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a 
few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agita- 
tion in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency 
thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably 
result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such 

1 Like the preceding two messages which have been omitted from the British Blue 
Book and the French Yellow Book respectively, this message has been omitted from 
the Russian Orange Book. 

- The information contained in this despatch had reached England from Belgrade 
on the previous day ; British Blue Book No. 23. 



July 20, British Blue Book No. 33 193 

as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being 
brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a con- 
dition for facing a war. 

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult 
for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's 
ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the 
requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing 
them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, ac- 
cording to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other 
way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she re- 
quired ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way 
to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume 
a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. 
As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing 
up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter * addressed by you 
yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you ex- 
pressed the hope that the Servian concessions Would be regarded as 
satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence 
of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian 
Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point 
Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Ser- 
vian concessions were all a sham. 2 Servia proved that she well knew 
that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of 
Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had 
ordered mobilisation 3 and retirement of Government from Belgrade. 



From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 33 

Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914- 

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State 
says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His 
Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden 
return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of 
State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh 
had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian ter- 
ritory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of 
State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not 
annex territory. 

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, same day. 

2 For the reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 5, same day. 



194 Official Diplomatic Documents 

British Blue Hook No. 34 

Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Ore;/. — {Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that 
German Ambassador at Vienna lias been instructed to pass on to 
Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a 
favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast con- 
tained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July. 1 

Under-Secretary of .State considers very fact of their making this 
communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they 
associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German 
Government do not see their way to going beyond this. 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 35 2 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, in Sir Edward Orey. — 
(Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 26, Wl.' t . 

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a con- 
ference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly. 

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this even- 
ing that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did 
not imply declaration of war. 

To Paris, Berlin, Rome 

British But-: Book No. 36 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir 
II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir B. Rodd, 
British Ambassador at Borne. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1.914- 

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Am- 
bassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Ger- 
many, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the 
purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? 3 
You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do 
this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the 
Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Bel- 
grade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request 

1 See No. 21, July 25, 1014. 

- This seems t<> be a reply to No. 36. 

:t This is no longer the Conference of Sir E. Grey's original plan — mediation be- 
tween Russia ami Austria-Hungary — nor of the Paul Canibon modification of this 
plan — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See note to No. 37. 



July 2G, British Blue Book No. 39 195 

that all active military operations should be suspended pending 
results of conference. 

To Paris 

British Blue Book No. 37 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. 

Berlin telegram of 25th July. 1 

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action 
by the four Powers if necessary. 

From Borne 

British Blue Book No. 38 

[Here Sir E. Grey prints a despatch from Rome dated July 23, but delayed in 
transmission. For the text see above under date of July 23, and explanatory note.] 

British Blue Book No. 39 

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — (Commu- 
nicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.) 

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, 
July 27, 1914. The British Blue Book fails to print the Austro-Hungarian 
comment.] 

According to the published despatches none of the Entente Powers had received 
copies of the Serbian reply on July 26, and even a summary of the reply had 
reached Paris with a delay of twenty hours, i.e. at 2 P.M. Sunday, July 2li, 1914 
(French Yellow Book No. 56, same day also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27 ) . 
As to the reply, however, two versions were current on July 26 : first, that dis- 
seminated by Russia, Serbia and France, to the effect that Serbia had yielded 
completely except on one or two minor points ; secondly, that given out by Austria- 
Hungary and Germany, to the effect that Serbia's concessions were a sham and 
that the entire reply was unsatisfactory. 

The only foreign offices cognisant of the reply were, of course, those of Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary, unless one wishes to understand a passage of British Blue 
Book No. 6, July 24, (see note 7) to mean that the Russian Cabinet wrote the note 
for Serbia. 

Eventually Austria-Hungary sent her commentary on this note to the Powers 
by mail July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). These com- 
ments, however, were not printed either in the British Blue Book or the French 
Yellow Book in any of the editions receiving currency in America or in the 
Collected Diplomatic Documents officially issued by England. Neither does it 
appear in any of the other books except the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. 

1 The official British version contains here a footnote "See No. 18." The Conference 
there spoken of has in view "working in favour of mediation in Vienna and at St. 
Petersburgh." It is in short Sir E. Grey's original plan. Despatches Nos. 36 and37, 
therefore, contain different proposals. France's objections to working in favour of 
moderation in Petrograd were discussed above in note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 
56, July 26. Very probably, therefore, British Blue Book No. 37 should precede No. 36. 
When Sir E. Grey met determined opposition in Paris to his plan (No. 37) he may 
have modified it. as expressed in No. 36. No. 36 reached the British Ambassador while 
he was at a conference with the Russian and French Ambassadors in Vienna in the 
evening (French Yellow Book No. 55) and his reply, British Blue Book No. 40, while 
dated July 26, was received in London the next day. All this makes it unlikely that 
after sending No. 36, Sir E. Grey should have reverted to his original plan in No. 37. 
From No. 35 it does not appear which plan of a conference was accepted by Italy. 



196 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 40 ' 

Sir M. dc Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— {Receiccd July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1014- 

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro- 
Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is im- 
possible tor Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to 
press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant 2 
(last paragraph). 

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris 3 
arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me.' 
They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I commu- 
nicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of 
Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settle- 
ment of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either 
the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. 

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support 
the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be 
postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to 
be taken. 

Russia : 

To Rome 

Russian Orange Book No. 23 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome. 
(Telegram.) St. PetersburgJi, July 13 {26), 1914. 

Italy might play a part of the first importance in favour of pre- 
serving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon 
Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards 
the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should 
express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming 
to the help of Servia. 5 

1 No 40 should precede No. 39. for while both despatches are said to have been 
re II, iu mi July 27, No. 40 was sent on July 26. 
2 See No. 26, July 25. 
See \.>. 36, July 26, 1914. 

* ( 'f. the French account of this interview, French Yellow Book No. 55, same day. 

■ I 'I. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, July 20, and for Russia's determination 

to force :i war unless Austria-Hungary yielded. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, 

" if she (i.e. Russia) feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks 

of war." 



July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25 197 

From Prague 

Russian Orange Book No. 24 

Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Prague, July IS (26), 1014. 

Mobilisation x has been ordered. 

To Vienna; also Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome 
Russian Orange Book No. 2."> 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairsto Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {20), Wl.' t . 

I had a long and friendly 2 conversation to-day with the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed 
to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the 
clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite 
impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept 
them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out 
without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and 
to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. 
As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous 
consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed 
against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could 
not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it 
seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be 
difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations con- 
tained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof. 

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to 
the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all 
the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment 
as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most 
desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised 
to enter into a private exchange of views 3 in order to redraft certain 
articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation 
with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to 
find a formula which w r ould prove acceptable to Servia, while giving 
satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please 
convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner. 

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, 
Great Britain, and Italy. 

1 The despatches probably received in Petrograd announcing the Serbian mobi- 
lisation on July 25, three hours before Serbia sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. 
are not published in the Russian Orange Book. See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 
1914. 

2 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, and contrast French Yellow Book No. 54, 
both of July 26, 1914. For the Austrian Version see Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914. 

3 This is Sazonof's counter proposition to Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference of four 
Powers. 



198 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Berlin 
Russian Orange Book No. 26 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, .July 13 (26), 1914. 

Please communicate the contents of my telegram 1 to Vienna of 
to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to 
him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to 
meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit. 

From Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 27 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
. Iff airs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 

The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon 
his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 2 of the contents of 
the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal 
his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the 
Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory 3 attitude 
should produce the best impression in Europe. 

Russian Orange Book No. 28 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914- 

The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations : 4 — 

(Translation.) 

"L'Autriche a declare a la "Austria has declared to 

Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas Russia that she does not desire 

des acquisitions territoriales et territorial acquisitions, and that 

qu'elle ne menace pas l'integrite she harbours no designs against 

de la Serbie. Son but unique the integrity of Servia. Her sole 

est d'assurer sa propre tranquil- object is to secure her own peace 

1 Russian Orange Book No. 25, and sec nolo 'A to that despatch. 

- The summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris in I he afternoon of July 26, 1914 ; 
see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where an interview with the German 
Ambassador is described. The interview here referred to wdth the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador is not mentioned in the French Yellow Book. 

3 For a contrary interpretation of the Serbian attitude see British Blue Book 
No. 32, same day, and note '2. 

4 This is the official message, German White Book, Exhibit 10a, sent by the Chan- 
cellor to the German Ambassador in Paris. It is not printed in the French Yellow 
Book and is here printed as if it were a personal opinion of the German Ambassador. 



July 26, Russian Orange Book No. SO 199 

lite. Par consequent il depend and quiet, and consequently it 

de la Russie d'eviter la guerre, rests with Russia to prevent war. 

L'Allemagne se sent solidaire Germany is at one with France 

avec la France dans le desir in her ardent desire to preserve 

ardent de conserver la paix et peace, and she sincerely hopes 

espere fermement que la France that France will exercise a 

usera de son influence a Peters- moderating influence at St. 

bourg dans un sens moderateur." Petersburg." 

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well 
act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory 
spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a 
course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in 
the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the 
four Powers — Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France — could 
not make representations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, for that the 
matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. 
The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the 
Minister refused to agree to the German proposal. 

Russian Orange Book No. 29 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July IS (26), 1.914. 

The Director of the Political Department has expressed the per- 
sonal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at 
Paris aim at intimidating l France and at securing her intervention at 
St. Petersburgh. 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Book No. 30 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914. 

On the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had 
mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers 

1 Russia also received, on this day, July 26, 1914, the following message from 
Berlin, which is not printed in the Russian Orange Book. It is here quoted from 
the German White Book (authorized translation), p. 7 : 

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which 
must consist in mobilising the army. 

" But mobilisation means war. 

" As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be 
directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires 
to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the exist- 
ence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume 
an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect 
the integrity of Servia, as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. 
It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an under- 
standing." 



200 Official Diplomatic Documents 

report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series 
of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the even- 
ing the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian 
Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any 
police were present and no precautions were taken. 

Serbia : 

Serbia has not published any despatches of July 26, 1914. 



July 27, 1914. 



201 



Monday, July 27, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 


Petrograd, Berlin, Rome 
London, Paris, Petrograd 


Petrograd, Berlin 


Belgium 





Berlin 


France 


London, London etc. 


Basle, London, Petro- 
grad, Constantino- 
ple, Berlin, Rome 

Serbian reply and 
Austro-Hungarian 
Memorandum. 


Germany 


London 


Kovno, Berne, Petro- 



Great Britain 



Russia 



Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, 
Rome 



Paris and London, 
Berlin, London etc. 

Czar to Serbian Crown 
Prince 



Serbia 



Vienna, Paris, Berlin, 

Petrograd, Rome 
Serbian reply and 

Austro-Hungarian 

Memorandum 
London, Paris, Berlin, 

Vienna 



Czar to Serbian Crown 
Prince. 



Austria-Hungary sends out for presentation to the Powers the dossier with her 
proofs of Serbian guilt and issues her comments to the Serbian reply, explaining in 
detail why she could not accept it as satisfactory, and repeats her declaration 
that she "does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort." 

France continues to hold Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary's firmness 
in dealing with Serbia, and refuses Germany's request to intercede in Petrograd. 
She is troubled by the confidence expressed by the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassadors in London that "England would preserve neutrality" and, like 
Russia, is endeavoring to secure the promise of English support in case of war. 
Sazonof is represented by the French officials as very moderate and desirous of 
peace. Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference to "examine means of finding a 
solution" is supported but altered to include Belgrade instead of only Vienna 
and Petrograd, while Jules Cambon in Berlin renews his request that Berlin alone 
intervene in Vienna. 

Germany accepts in principle Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference and "at 
once starts the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward 
Grey." She expects, however, most good from direct conversations between 
Vienna and Petrograd as suggested by Sazonof. She continues to point out the 
danger of Russian mobilisation. 

Great Britain announces the action of keeping her fleet mobilised as of this day 
while it actually occurred on July 24. It was meant to dissipate the impression 
that in any event England "would stand aside," which impression Sazonof 
"deplored." Serbia's reply continues to be represented as satisfactory by Sir E. 
Grey, who omits from the Blue Book both the dossier and the Austro-Hungarian 
comments on the Serbian reply. Great Britain repeats her conference proposals 
to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna or, according to the French Yellow 
Book, also Belgrade. Sir E. Grey is, however, not unfavourable to Sazonof 's plan 
of direct conversations. 

Russia, while not refusing categorically Sir E. Grey's plan, urges her own of 
direct conversations. She continues her mobilisation, although some of her high 
officials deny this. 



202 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Serbia officially appeals to Russia for help. 

Belgium discusses the Serbian reply on information supplied by the British 
Charge d 'Affaires at Belgrade. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 31 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914- 

Just had a long conversation with M. Sazonof. 1 Told the Minis- 
ter I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in 
Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited 
with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a 
march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went 
so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a pre- 
ventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and 
that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action 
was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by 
word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It 
would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian in- 
terests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were 
absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, 
and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. 
As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, 
I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to 
be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they 
might be. 

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to 
him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path 
which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. 
He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy 2 in its 
form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would 
like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was 
at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the 
note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks 
were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note 
in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible 
without very great difficulty ; only the two points 3 dealing with the 
collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the 
point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be 
designated by us, 4 seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present 

> While dated July 27, this interview took place on July 26; cf. Russian Orange 
Book No. 25, July 26, and note 1. The last paragraph of this note, moreover, refers 
to the Serbian mobilisation, which took place on the 25th, as of "the previous day." 

- trench Yellow Book No. 54, July 26, quotes Sazonof as having said "insulting.' 

3 They are points 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914, 
and the explanation, Red Book No. 27, July 25, 1914. 

4 This is point 1 of the note to Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, 
July 22, 1914. 



July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 203 

form. With, regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give 
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram 
of the 25th instant ; J with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion 
that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been 
set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day 2 and 
I did not know what had happened since then. 

To Petrograd 

Au.STRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 32 

Count Berchtold to Count Szapary at St. Petcrsburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I empower your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so 
long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains local- 
ised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions 
of any sort. 

From Berlin 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 27, 1914. 

M. Sazonof explained to the German Ambassador that he could 
"guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had 
been begun ; though it was true that certain necessary military pre- 
cautions were being taken." 

The German military attache at St. Petersburgh reports 3 that 
"the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that 
not a man or a horse has been mobilised ; however, naturally, certain 
military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the 
German military attache adds, apparently spontaneously, to his 
report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching." 

To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. 

Vienna. July 27, 191 4. 

Annexed you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of 
the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June 
transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade. 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 21, 26, and 27, July 25, 1914. 

2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5. Julv 25, 1914. 

»Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 11, also S and 9, July 27, 1914. 



204 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Enclosure 1 

Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal 
Government of the 12/25 July, WI4. 



(Translation.) 

The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment have received the commu- 
nication of the Imperial and 
Royal Government of the 10th 
instant, 2 and are convinced that 
their reply will remove any mis- 
understanding which may 
threaten to impair the good 
neighbourly relations between 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the Kingdom of Servia. 

Conscious of the fact that the 
protests which were made both 
from the tribune of the national 
Skupschtina 3 and in the declara- 
tions and actions of the respon- 
sible representatives of the State 
— protests which were cut short 
by the declarations made by the 
Servian Government on the lNtli 1 
March, 1909 — have not been 
renewed on any occasion as re- 
gards the great neighbouring 
Monarchy, and that no attempt 
has been made since that time, 
either by the successive Royal 
Governments or by their agents, 
to change the political and legal 
state of affairs created in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov- 
ernment draw attention to the 
fact that in this connection the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
have made no representation 
except one concerning a school 
book, and that on that occasion 
the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment received an entirely satis- 
factory explanation. Servia has 
several times given proofs of her 
pacific and moderate policy dur- 

1 For a brief summary see French Yellow Book No. 75 (2), July 28, and footnote. 

2 Old style 

1 The Serbian Parliament. 



(Remarks.) 

The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment confine themselves to as- 
serting that, since the declara- 
tions on the 18th March, 1909, 
no attempt has been made by the 
Servian Government and their 
agents to change the position of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Thereby they deliberately and 
arbitrarily shift the ground on 
which our demarche was based, 
as we did not maintain that they 
and their agents have taken any 
official action in this direction. 

Our charge, on the contrary, 
is to the effect that the Servian 
Government, notwithstanding the 
obligations undertaken in the 
above-quoted note, have neg- 
lected to suppress the move- 
ment directed against the terri- 
torial integrity of the Monarchy. 

Their obligation, that is to say, 
was that they should change the 
whole direction of their policy 
and adopt a friendly and neigh- 
bourly attitude towards the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
and not merely that they should 
refrain from officially attacking 
the incorporation of Bosnia in 
the Monarchy. 



July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 



205 



ing the Balkan crisis, and it is 
thanks to Servia and to the sacri- 
fice that she has made in the 
exclusive interest of European 
peace that that peace has been 
preserved. The Royal Govern- 
ment cannot be held responsible 
for manifestations of a private 
character, such as articles in the 
press and the peaceable work of 
societies — manifestations which 
take place in nearly all countries 
in the ordinary course of events, 
and which, as a general rule, 
escape official control. The 
Royal Government are all the 
less responsible, in view of the 
fact that at the time of the solu- 
tion of a series of questions which 
arose between Servia and Aus- 
tria-Hungary they gave proof of 
a great readiness to oblige, and 
thus succeeded in settling the 
majority of these questions to the 
advantage of the two neighbour- 
ing countries. 



For these reasons the Royal 
Government have been pained 
and surprised at the statements, 
according to which members of 
the Kingdom of Servia are sup- 
posed to have participated in the 
preparations for the crime com- 
mitted at Serajevo; the Royal 
Government expected to be in- 
vited to collaborate in an investi- 
gation of all that concerns this 
crime, and they were ready, in 
order to prove the entire correct- 
ness of their attitude, to take 
measures against any persons 
concerning whom representations 
were made to them. Falling in, 
therefore, with the desire of the 
Imperial and Royal Government, 
they are prepared to hand over 
for trial any Servian subject, 



The proposition of the Royal 
Servian Government that utter- 
ances in the press and the activi- 
ties of societies are of a private 
character and are not subject to 
official control is absolutely an- 
tagonistic to the institutions of 
modern States, even those which 
have the most liberal law with 
regard to press and associations ; 
this law has a public character 
and subjects the press, as well 
as associations, to State control. 
Moreover, Servian institutions 
themselves contemplate some 
such control. The complaint 
against the Servian Government 
is in fact that they have entirely 
omitted to control their press 
and their associations, of whose 
activities in a sense hostile to 
the Monarchy they were well 
aware. 

This proposition is incorrect ; 
the Servian Government were 
accurately informed of the suspi- 
cions which were entertained 
against quite definite persons and 
were not only in a position but 
also bound by their internal laws 
to initiate spontaneous enquiries. 
They have done nothing in this 
direction. 



206 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



without regard to his situation or 
rank, of whose complicity in the 
crime of Serajevo proofs are forth- 
coming, and more especially they 
undertake to cause to be pub- 
lished on the first page of the 
Journal officiel, on the date of 
the 13th (26th) July, the follow- 
ing declaration : — 

"The Royal Government of 
Servia condemn all propaganda 
which may be directed against 
Austria-Hungary — i.e., the 

general tendency of which the 
final aim is to detach from the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ter- 
ritories belonging to it, and they 
sincerely deplore the fatal con- 
sequences of these criminal 
proceedings. 



The Royal Government regret 
that, according to the communi- 
cation from the Imperial and 
Royal Government, certain Ser- 
vian officers and functionaries 
participated in the above-men- 
tioned propaganda, and thus 
compromised the good neigh- 
bourly relations to which the 
Royal Servian Government was 
solemnly pledged by the declara- 
tion of the 31st March, 1909. 1 

"The Government, etc. . . ." 
(identical with the text as de- 
manded). 



The Royal Government further 
undertake : — 



Our demand ran : — 

"The Royal Government of 
Servia condemn the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary. . . ." 

The alteration made by the 
Royal Servian Government in 
the declaration demanded by us 
implies that no such propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary exists, or that they are cog- 
nisant of no such propaganda. 
This formula is insincere and dis- 
ingenuous, as by it the Servian 
Government reserve for them- 
selves for later use the evasion 
that they had not by this decla- 
ration disavowed the then exist- 
ing propaganda, and had not 
admitted that it was hostile to 
the Monarchy, from which they 
could further deduce that they 
had not bound themselves to 
suppress propaganda similar to 
that now being carried on. 

The wording demanded by US 
ran : — 

"The Royal Government re- 
gret that Servian officers and 
functionaries . . . partici- 
pated. . . ." 

By the adoption of this word- 
ing with the addition "according 
to the communication from the 
Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment" the Servian Government 
are pursuing the object that has 
already been referred to above, 
namely, that of preserving a free 
hand for the future. 

We had demanded of them : — 

1. "To suppress any publica- 
tion which incites to hatred and 
contempt of the Austro-Hun- 



July 27, Austro-H ungarian Red Book No. 34 



207 



1. To introduce at the first 
regular convocation of the Skup- 
schtina * a provision into the press 
law providing for the most severe 
punishment of incitement to 
hatred and contempt of the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
for taking action against any 
publication the general tendency 
of which is directed against the 
territorial integrity of Austria- 
Hungary. The Government 
engage at the approaching re- 
vision of the Constitution to 
cause an amendment to be intro- 
duced into article 22 of the Con- 
stitution of such a nature that 
such publication may be confis- 
cated, a proceeding at present 
impossible under the categorical 
terms of article 22 of the Con- 
stitution. 



garian Monarchy and the general 
tendency of which is directed 
against the territorial integrity 
of the Monarchy." 

We wished therefore to ensure 
that Servia should be obliged 
to see to it that press attacks of 
that nature should be discon- 
tinued in future; we wished 
therefore to know that a definite 
result in this connection was 
assured. 

Instead of this Servia offers us 
the enactment of certain laws 
which would be calculated to 
serve as means towards this 
result, viz. : — 

(«) A law under which the 
press publications in question 
which are hostile to the Mon- 
archy are to be punished on their 
merits (subjeetiv) a matter which 
is of complete indifference to us, 
all the more as it is well known 
that the prosecution of press 
offences on their merits (subjec- 
tiv) is only very rarely possible, 
and, if any law of the sort is laxly 
administered, even in the few 
cases of this nature a conviction 
would not be obtained ; this, 
therefore, is a proposal which in 
no way meets our demand as it 
does not offer us the slightest 
guarantee for the result which 
we wish to obtain. 

(b) A law supplementary to 
Article 22 of the constitution 
which would permit confiscation 
— a proposal which is equally 
unsatisfactory to us, as the exist- 
ence of such a law in Servia is of 
no use to us, but only the obliga- 
tion of the Government to apply 
it ; this, however, is not promised 
us. 

These proposals are therefore 
entirely unsatisfactory — all the 



1 The Serbian Parliament. 



20S 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



more so as they are evasive in 
that we are not told within what 
period of time these laws would 
be enacted, and that in the event 
of the rejection of the Bills by the 
Skupschtina — apart from the 
possible resignation of the Gov- 
ernment — everything would be 
as it was before. 



2. The Government possess no 
proof, nor does the note of the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
furnish them with any, that the 
Narodna Odbrana and other 
similar societies have committed 
up to the present any criminal 
act of this nature through the 
proceedings of any of their mem- 
bers. Nevertheless, the Royal 
Government will accept the de- 
mand of the Imperial and Royal 
Government, and will dissolve 
the Narodna Odbrana Society 
and every other society which 
may be directing its efforts 
against Austria-Hungary. 



3. The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment undertake to eliminate with- 
out delay from public instruction 
in Servia everything that serves 
or might serve to foment the 
propaganda against Austria- 



The whole of the public life of 
Servia teems with the propa- 
ganda against the Monarchy, of 
the Narodna Odbrana and of so- 
cieties affiliated to it ; it is there- 
fore quite impossible to admit 
the reservation made by the 
Servian Government when they 
say that they know nothing 
about them. 

Quite apart from this the de- 
mand we have made is not en- 
tirely complied with, as we 
further required : — 

That the means of propaganda 
possessed by these associations 
should be confiscated. 

That the re-establishment of 
the dissolved associations under 
another name and in another 
form should be prevented. 

The Belgrade Cabinet main- 
tains complete silence in both 
these directions, so that the half 
consent which has been given us 
offers no guarantee that it is 
contemplated to put a definite 
end to the activities of the asso- 
ciations hostile to the Monarchy, 
especially of the Narodna Od- 
brana, by their dissolution. 

In this ease also the Servian 
Government first ask for proofs 
that propaganda against the 
Monarchy is fomented in public 
educational establishments in 
Servia. when they must know 



July 27, Austro -Hungarian Red Book No. 34 



209 



Hungary, whenever the Imperial 
and Royal Government furnish 
them with facts and proofs of 
this propaganda. 



4. The Royal Government also 
agree to remove from the mili- 
tary service all such persons as 
the Judicial enquiry may have 
proved to be guilty of acts 
directed against the integrity of 
the territory of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy, and they ex- 
pect the Imperial and Royal 
Government to communicate to 
them at a later date the names 
and the acts of these officers and 
functionaries for the purposes of 
the proceedings which are to be 
taken against them. 



5. The Royal Government 
must confess that they do not 
clearly grasp the meaning or the 
scope of the demand made by the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
that Servia shall undertake to 
accept the collaboration of the 



that the school books which have 
been introduced into the Servian 
schools contain matter of an 
objectionable nature in this re- 
spect, and that a large propor- 
tion of the Servian teachers are 
enrolled in the ranks of the 
Narodna Odbrana and the socie- 
ties affiliated with it. 

Moreover, here too the Ser- 
vian Government have not 
complied with a portion of our de- 
mand as fully as we required, in- 
asmuch as in their text they have 
omitted the addition which we 
desired "both as regards the 
teaching body and also as re- 
gards the methods of instruc- 
tion" — an addition which cpiite 
clearly shows in what directions 
the propaganda against the Mon- 
archy in the Servian schools is 
to be looked for. 

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian 
Government attach to their con- 
sent to the removal of the officers 
and functionaries in question 
from military and civil service 
the condition that these persons 
should have been convicted by 
Judicial enquiry, their consent is 
confined to those cases in which 
these persons are charged with a 
crime punishable by law. As we, 
however, demand the removal of 
those officers and functionaries 
who foment propaganda against 
the Monarchy, a proceeding 
which is not generally punish- 
able by law in Servia, it appears 
that our demand under this 
head also is not complied with. 

International Law has just as 
little to do with this question as 
has criminal procedure. This is 
purely a matter of State police, 
which must be settled by way of 
a separate agreement. Servia 's 
reservation is therefore unintel- 



210 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



representatives of the Imperial 
and Royal Government upon 
their territory, but they declare 
that they will admit such collab- 
oration as agrees with the prin- 
ciple of international law, with 
criminal procedure, and with 
g< Kid neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that 
the Royal Government consider 
it their duty to open an enquiry 
against all such persons as are, 
or eventually may be, implicated 
in the plot of the 15th ' June, 
and who happen to be within 
the territory of the kingdom. 
As regards the participation in 
this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian 
agents or authorities appointed 
for this purpose by the Imperial 
and Royal Government, the 
Royal Government cannot ac- 
cept such an arrangement, as 
it would be a violation of the 
Constitution and of the law of 
criminal procedure; neverthe- 
less, in concrete cases communi- 
cations as to the results of the 
investigation in question might 
be given to the Austro-Him- 
garian agents. 



ligible, and would be calculated, 
owing to the vague general form 
in which it is couched, to lead to 
unsurmoimtable difficulties when 
the time comes for concluding 
the prospective agreement. 



Our demand was quite clear 
and did not admit of misinter- 
pretation. We desired : — 

(1) The opening of a judicial 
enquiry (enquete judidaire) 
against accessories to the plot. 

(2) The collaboration of repre- 
sentatives of the Imperial and 
Royal Government in the inves- 
tigations relating thereto ("re- 
cherches" as opposed to " enqvMe 
judiciaire"). 

It never occurred to us that 
representatives of the Imperial 
and Royal Government should 
take part in the Servian judicial 
proceedings ; it was intended 
that they should collaborate only 
in the preliminary police inves- 
tigations, directed to the collec- 
tion and verification of the 
material for the enquiry. 

If the Servian Government 
misunderstand us on this point 
they must do so deliberately, for 
the distinction between "enquete 
judiciaire" and simple "recher- 
che*" must be familiar to them. 

In desiring to be exempted 
from all control in the proceed- 
ings which are to be initiated, 
which if properly carried through 
would have results of a very un- 
desirable kind for themselves, 
and in view of the fact that they 
have no handle for a plausible 
refusal of the collaboration of 
our representatives in the pre- 
liminary police investigations 
(numberless precedents exist for 

Style. 



July 27, Austro-Hwngarian Red Book No. 



211 



7. The Royal Government pro- 
ceeded, on the very evening of 
the delivery of the note, to arrest 
Commandant Voja Tankosic. 
As regards Milan Ziganovic, 
who is a subject of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and who 
up to the 15th x June was em- 
ployed (on probation) by the 
directorate of railways, it has not 
yet been possible to arrest him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment are requested to be so 
good as to supply as soon as pos- 
sible, in the customary form, the 
presumptive evidence of guilt, 
is well as the eventual proofs of 
guilt which have been collected 
up to the present, at the enquiry 
at Serajevo for the purposes of 
the later enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government 
will reinforce and extend the 
measures which have been taken 
for preventing the illicit traffic 
in arms and explosives across the 
frontier. It goes without saying 
that they will immediately order 
an enquiry and will severely 
punish the frontier officials on 
the Schabatz-Loznitza line who 
have failed in their duty and 
allowed the authors of the crime 
of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will 
gladly give explanations of the 
remarks made by their officials 
whether in Servia or abroad, in 
interviews after the crime which, 
according to the statement of 
the Imperial and Royal Govern- 

'Old 



such police intervention) they 
have adopted a standpoint which 
is intended to invest their refusal 
with an appearance of justifica- 
tion and to impress on our de- 
mand the stamp of impractica- 
bility. 

This answer is disingenuous. 

The enquiries set on foot by us 
show that three days after the 
crime, when it became known 
that Ciganovic was implicated 
in the plot, he went on leave and 
travelled to Ribari on a commis- 
sion from the Prefecture of 
Police at Belgrade. It is, there- 
fore, in the first place incorrect 
to say that Ciganovic had left 
the Servian State Service on the 
25th/28th June. To this must 
be added the fact that the Pre- 
fect of Police at Belgrade, who 
had himself contrived the depar- 
ture of Ciganovic and who knew 
where he was stopping, declared 
in an interview that no man of 
the name of Milan Ciganovic 
existed in Belgrade. 



The interviews in question 
must be quite well known to the 
Royal Servian Government. By 
requesting the Imperial and 
Royal Government to communi- 
cate to them all kinds of details 
about these interviews, and keep- 
Style. 



212 



Official Diplomatic Document* 



incut, were hostile towards the 
Monarchy, as soon as the Im- 
perial and Royal Government 
have communicated to them the 
passages in question in these re- 
marks, and as soon as they have 
shown that the remarks were 
actually made by the said offi- 
cials, although the Royal Govern- 
ment will themselves take steps 
to collect evidence and proofs. 

ID. The Royal Government 
will inform the Imperial and 
Royal Government of the execu- 
tion of the measures comprised 
under the above heads, in so far 
as this has not already been done 
by the present note, as soon as 
each measure has been ordered 
ami carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal 
Government are not satisfied 
with this reply, the Servian 
Government, considering that it 
is not to the common interest to 
precipitate the solution of this 
question, are ready, as always, 
to accept a pacific understand- 
ing, either by referring this ques- 
tion to the decision of the Inter- 
national Tribunal of The Hague, 
or to the Great Powers which took 
part in the drawing up of the 
declaration made by the Servian 
Government on the 18th (31st) 
March, 1909. 



ing in reserve the holding of a 
formal enquiry into them, they 
show that they are not willing 
to comply seriously with this 
demand either. 



Belgium : 

From Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 6 

Huron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 87, 1014- 

According to a telegram from the British Charge d'Affaires at 
Belgrade, 1 the Servian Government have given way on all the points 

1 Belgium had her own representative in Belgrade. No valid reason appears why 
the information here published should have come in the roundabout way through the 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 61 21.3 

of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian 
officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of inter- 
national law. The British Charge d' Affaires considers that this reply 
should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a 
more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly 
because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British 
Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, 
and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis 
for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision 
rests with the Emperor. 

France : 

From Basle 

French Yellow Book No. 60 

M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Basle, July 27, 1914. 

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district re- 
ceived orders to break off their leave and return to Germany. 

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been 
given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to 
prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two 
days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has 
been directed under penalty of a fine. 1 

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are 
restricted. 

Farges. 

To London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 61 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules 
Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" 
(for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors 
at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem 
characteristic : — On Friday he reads a note 2 in which the German 

British official in Belgrade and the Belgian Minister in Berlin. Since the exhaustive 
Austro-Hungarian comment on the Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, same day, was 
presented to all the great Powers it is significant that no reference to it is here made, 
and that the British official presents exclusively the Serbian, and one may say, Russian 
view of the Serbian reply. 

1 The accuracy of this statement can neither be proved nor disproved at this writ- 
ing. German writers have denied it. If the information was true, one should expect 
to have it reported directly by the French consuls in the Grand Duchy of Baden. On 
the other hand, precautionary measures would, of course, have been taken near the 
French frontier earlier than elsewhere. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24. 



214 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Government categorically place themselves between Austria ami the 
Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding 
that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain 
localised, since any intervention of another party must through the 
play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences ; " — the second 
day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers hav- 
ing, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and 
the risks of general war, advised Servia to yield, 1 Herr von Schoen 
returns to minimise this step, 2 pretending to be astonished at the 
impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to 
Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was 
neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" — the third day, 
Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded, 
as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German 
Ambassador appears on two occasions 3 to insist on Germany's peace- 
ful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the mainte- 
nance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which 
closes the first phase of the crisis. 

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on 
account of the incomprehensible 4 refusal of Austria to accept Ser- 
via's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats 
to invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by 
the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to 
accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow 
the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the media- 
tion of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army 
crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, 
Russia not appearing to lie able to tolerate '° the occupation of Servia 
after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving 
every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of 
the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively 
and be listened to at Vienna ; if she does not do this she justifies all 
suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war. 

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by 
their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield, 1 they have thus ful- 
filled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a 
rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained 
satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a 
general war. 

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet 
of London is put forward ; M. Sazonof having said to the British 
Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the 
Powers, 6 Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has 
formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin 

1 Sec. note to British Blue Book No. 39, July 26, and British Blue Book No. 22, 
where it appears that the advice was never given. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25. 

3 French Yellow Book Nos. 56 and 57, July 26. 

4 For Austria's reasons »■,■ \u.-tro-Himgarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 
'C'f. Note 2, French Yellow Book No. 57, July 26. 

e This appeal was never made ; ef. also French Yellow Book No. 68, July 27, 1914. 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 62 215 

and Rome : the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at Lon- 
don would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of 
resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during 
this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all 
active military operations. 1 Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this sug- 
gestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable 
to it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, 
according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to 
speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other 
means than words. 

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British 
colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Govern- 
ment in whatever form appears to you opportune. 2 

Biexvenu-Martin. 



To London, St. Petersburg!!, Berlin, Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 62 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- 
dent of the Council {on board the " La France") and to the French 
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg!), Berlin, Vienna. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

After his demarche of yesterday 3 tending to an intervention by 
France at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambas- 
sador returned, as I have informed you, to the Direction Politique 
on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press 
a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the con- 
versation ; he even suggested the following terms : — " During the 
afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most 
amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-opera- 
tion, they examined the means which might be employed to main- 
tain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms ap- 
peared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions 
on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indi- 
cated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which 
the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might 
be issued if I approved it. 

The note communicated was as follows: — "The German Am- 
bassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh inter- 
view, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers 
for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colour- 
less, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might 
have been misinterpreted. 

1 Note that no engagement is taken to refrain from mobilisation. 

2 This last paragraph can refer only to the French Ambassador in Berlin, although 
the despatch is notjlisted as having been sent also to Berlin. 

5 French Yellow Book No. 56 and 57, July 26. 



216 Official Diplomatic Documents 

This morning 1 Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the 
Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the 
Minister, and has added: "Note well the phrase in an identical 
spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the 
sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the 
letter was drawn up as follows: — "The Cabinet of Vienna has, 
formally and officially, caused it to lie declared to that of St. Peters- 
burgh, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and 
that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity 
of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tran- 
quillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war 
must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Govern- 
ment have firm confidence that the French Government, with which 
they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European 
peace should he able to he maintained, will use their whole influence 
with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit." 

I have let you know the reply - which has been given (a French 
demarche at St. Petersburgh would be misunderstood, 3 and must 
have as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, failing that, 
mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals). 

Ilerr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; 
the most probable is that it has for its object, like his demarche itself, 
an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, 
to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on 
France 4 ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened 
to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to com- 
plete the success of Austria. 

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for 
any useful purpose you can put it to. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Loudon 

French Yellow Book No. 63 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914- 

The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would 
preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Xicol- 

1 From Russian Orange Hook No. 28, July 26, it appears that this declaration was 
made on July 26. .See German White Book 10a. July 26, giving an official German 
message to France, which is not printed in its entirety in the Yellow Book. 

2 For a similar refusal of Great Britain to exert her conciliatory influence in Petro- 
grad, see French Yellow Book No. SO. July 28. 

3 The Times translation says "would have been difficult to explain." This is the 
more accurate translation. 

4 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 29, July 26. It seems that the entire French de- 
spatch refers to events that took place on the previous day. This then is a " rewritten " 
despatch for the purpose of making the Yellow Book appear to be more complete 
than it is. 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 65 217 

son has told me, 1 however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the 
conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt 
as to the freedom which the British Government intended to pre- 
serve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient. 

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with 
this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid 
a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought 
to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the 

side of France. 2 t>. -r, 

De t leuriau. 



From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 64 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. 

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues. 

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is 
applying itself successfully to restraining the press ; in particular 
great moderation towards Germany has been recommended. 3 

J\I. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from 

Berlin since vesterday. n 

Paleologue. 

From Constantinople 

French Yellow Book No. 65 

M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Therapia, July 27, 1914- 

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman 
Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of 
Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict 
will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia 
will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would 
extend the armed conflict. 

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, 

with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she 

will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the 

Triple Alliance. 4 r, 

r Bompard. 

1 This is not given in the British Blue Book. 

2 For the culmination of this wish, see French Yellow Book No. 138, August 2, 1914. 

3 But even M. Paleologue does not claim that it was observed. See the Russian 
press of these days. 

4 This is a very important statement ; especially since no one had ever claimed 
that Bulgaria had been forced into "the orbit of the Triple Alliance" by unfair or 
militaristic means. 



218 Official Diplomatic Document* 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 66 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge (V Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 191J+. 

Sir Edward Grey l told the German Ambassador this morning 
that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she 
would make it elear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement 
of the questions mentioned in her note of July 'l'.\, hut that she wished 
to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question 
would arise, and war would follow in which, other Powers would he 
led to take a part." 

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement 
of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty 
took this measure quietly on Friday - on his own initiative ; to-night, 
Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. 
This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia. 

De Fleuriau. 

From. Berlin 

French Yellow Hook No. 67 

M. .lutes Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienrenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914- 

To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on 
the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of 
London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Peters- 
burgh and Vienna. 

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the 
way to a peaceful issue. Ilerr von .Tagow replied that he was dis- 
posed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, 
Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should he 
forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be 
almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as 
bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Aus- 
trian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to 
communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest 
importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which 
were friendly with and allied to her. 

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany 
would he obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention 

i Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, Julv 27, 1914. 

2 Friday was Julv 24 ; of. Sir E. Grev's " to-day," British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. 
1914; see also Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 1914. 

For the effect of this admiralty order on Russia and on bringing on the war, see 
Editorial, Daily News (London), August 1, 1914. 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 69 219 

proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna x could, in his 
opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. 
In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed 
my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led 
Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I 
expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect. 

Jules Cambon. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 68 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914- 

Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, 
M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that 
Servia was disposed to appeal 2 to the Powers, and that in that case 
his Government would be prepared to stand aside. 

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate 
to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which 
Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers 
would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian 
Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. 
Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties. 

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little con- 
ference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active 
military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion 
to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it. 

De Fleuriau. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 69 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Gov- 
ernment to ask for the mediation 3 of England ; it is, however, pos- 
sible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on 
the way. 

1 This is Sir E. Grey's first plan. The French wish was to have mediation between 
Vienna and Belgrade. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27, and British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 
1914. 

3 The proposal of English mediation was one of the many made but never pressed, 
probably for the reason suggested in French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. The 
nearest account of something in the nature of such a demand is given in Serbian Blue 
Book No. 35, July 24 [note the date]. 



220 Official Diplomatic Documents 

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers 

intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought 

I think to be supported in the first place. ^ T1 

v De Fleuriau. 

To London 

French Yellow Book No. 70 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de 
Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's 
proposal 1 for common action by England, Germany, France and 
Italy at Vienna, Belgrade 2 and St. Petersburgh, to stop active mili- 
tary operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors 
at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a 
solution for the present complications. 

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over 
with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his demarche 
in whatever form he should judge suitable. 

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. 
Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. 
Petersburgh and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the 
British Government. 

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. 
Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would 
be disposed to take at Vienna ; a demarche from this side, promoted 
with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would 
appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first 
exercised. 

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that 
the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible 
when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were 
used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "con- 
versations." „ ,, r 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 71 

M. ile Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at Loudon, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Loudon, July 27, 1914. 

I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his 
proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at 

1 British Blue Book No. 11, July 24 and No. 24, July 25. 

2 Belgrade is not contained in the British proposal. British Blue Book No. 11, 
July 24. It was, however, France's persistent wish to have mediation between Vienna 
and Belgrade. 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 72 221 

London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the neces- 
sary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as 
soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised 
to make the same demarche. 

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four 
Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; they are con- 
sulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference 
and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian 
Government. The German Government have not yet replied. 

De Fleuriau. 

From Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 72 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 27, 1914. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, 
and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the 
contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had 
not had any previous knowledge of it. 1 

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and for- 
cible character ; but he had not suspected that it could take such a 
form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as 
certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an 
assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Aus- 
tria. "In no way:" the Minister replied : " we were not consulted ; 
we were told nothing ; it was not for us then to make any such com- 
munication to Vienna." 

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted 
more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety ; to-day he 
still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced 
that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain 
them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration ; he 
doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure 
on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment 
attaches great importance to her relations with London, 2 and he 
believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful 
action, it is England. 

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of 
peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without 
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of 
the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested 
in the Austro-Servian dispute. Barrere 

1 It is noteworthy that the Entente diplomats in none of the published despatches 
doubted the honesty of Italy's denial of having had previous accurate knowledge of 
the Austrian note. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 51, July 26. 

2 The opponents of Germany have desired to minimize Germany's wish to be on 
good terms with England. 



222 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 73 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Mariin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secre- 
tary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. 
In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, 
but added that he could not consent to anything which would re- 
semble a conference of the Powers ; that would be to set up a kind 
of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if 
it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg]]. 1 Herr von Jagow's 
language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency. 

In fact, a demarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Peters- 
burgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assum- 
ing the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifica- 
tions ; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. 
Petersburgh the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict 
should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties 

can only be found by gaining time. T ^ 

J ' 6 s Jules Cambon. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 74 

.1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 191 4. 

I had a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave 
support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made. 

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassa- 
dor, that he could not accept 2 the proposal that the Italian, French 
and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find 
with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, 
because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the 
affairs of Austria and Russia. 3 

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that 
the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any 
question of form ; that what was important was the co-operation 
of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of 
peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common 
d-marches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna, 4 that he had often ex- 

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 70 and 73. same day. 

3 See, however, British Blue Book No. 40, same day, where Germany accepts "in 
principle." 

4 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 73, same day. 



July 27, French Yellow Book No. 74 223 

pressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always op- 
posed to one another in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity 
of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers 
belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent 
a conflict. 

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had 
engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of 
Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with 
Russia, 1 and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two 
groups of allies in opposition. 

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing 
to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could 
not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the con- 
sequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing 
the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to inter- 
vention by Russia." 

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged 
to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was 
bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he 
had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian 
Charge d Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not 
yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except 
on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then 
that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support 
has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or 
to examine with Servia the terms of her reply." 

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether 
Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that 
he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. 
"You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the 
Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the 
terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the 
responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be pre- 
pared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready 
to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was neces- 
sary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and 
that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point. 

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress. 2 
I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful." 

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the im- 
pression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now saw clearly 
that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken ; that 

1 This has been denied by those who have claimed that the Teutonic alliance was 
practically for aggressive purposes, while the French-Russian alliance was entirely 
defensive. 

2 Sazonof had proposed this conversation ; cf. Russian Orange Rook No. 25, July 20, 
and No. 3S, July 27, also French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26 ; also British Blue Book 
Nos. 55 and 69, July 28. From French Yellow Book No. 54, it appears that Russia had 
for the time being abandoned the Grey Conference idea, and that the French Ambas- 
sador to Russia believed Russia's new plan " to be preferable to any other procedure." 



224 Official Diplomatic Documents 

he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps 
rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such 
action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it 
was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in 
Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before 
them. 

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must 
have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his pro- 
posal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another 
form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to asso- 
ciate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities 
that belong to her in the eyes of England. 

Jules Cambon. 

To London, St. Petersburg}!, Berlin, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 75 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, 
Rome. 

Paris, July 27, 1911 

The Austro-IIungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a 
memorandum ' which amounted to an indictment of Servia ; he was 
instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not 
given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Gov- 
ernment, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures 
to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are re- 
quired of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps 
to that effect. 

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures con- 
templated by Austria, and Count Scezsen replied that they might 
be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of 
the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point. 

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia 
had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and 
that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish 
with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who 
wished for peace ; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her 
resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their 
co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave respon- 
sibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which 
it was impossible to foresee. 

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count 
Scezsen handed to me. 

B 1 envenu-Marti n . 

1 The so-called dossier, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19. July 25. It was 
published only in part in the New York Times translation of the French Yellow Book. 
Sir E. Grey apparently received the dossier on the same day but gave only a very brief 
summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. The dossier itself is not printed 
in the British Blue Book. 



July 27, German White Book Exhibit 11 225 

Enclosure 

Memorandum of the A ustro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count 
Scezsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 191 4- 

(See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.) 

From Serbia 

The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note was 
communicated to France on this day, July 27, 1914. See French Yellow Book 
No. 49, July 25, and for text Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, 
except that France did not publish the Austro-Hungarian comment. 

Germany : 

From Kovno 

German White Book Exhibit 8 

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on 
July 27th, 1914- 

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. 

From, Berne 

German White Book Exhibit 9 

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on 
July 27th, 1914. 

Have learned reliably that French XlVth corps has discontinued 
manoeuvres. 

From St. Petersburgh 

German White Book Exhibit 11 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- 
cellor on July 27th, WI4: 

Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War. 

Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. 
The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order 
to mobilise has as yet been issued. 1 Though general preparations 
are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If 
Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are 
directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to 
be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, 
Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very 
much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against 

1 The Czar telegraphed to the Emperor on July 30 that mobilisation had been 
decided upon five days ago, i.e. July 25. Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 23a, July 30. 
Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 5. 



226 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I 
told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but 
considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing. 

To London 

German White Book Exhibit 12 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London 
on Juh/ 27th, 1914. 

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to 
hold a quadruple conference in London. 1 It is impossible for us to 
place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. 
Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian 
conflict. 

To London 

German White Book Exhibit 15 

Telegram of the Chancellor hi the Imperial Ambassador in London 
'on July 27th, 191 4. 

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the 
sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated be- 
sides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley 
with Vienna. 2 

Great Britain : 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 41 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the 
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro- 
Ilungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with 
Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at 
stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia 
it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This 
country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, 
and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great 
disappointment. 

1 Apparently antedates British Blue Book No. 43, and French Yellow Book No. 67, 
July 27. 

2 Apparently sent in reply to conversation between Mr. von Jagow and the British 
Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 43, same day. Cf. also British Blue Book 
No. 46, same day. 



July 27, British Blue Book No. 43 227 

1 propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, 
to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His 
Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and 
to ask his Excellency whether he can not suggest a way out even now. 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 42 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, — 
(Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914- 

Your proposal, 1 as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday, 
is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in 
London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed ac- 
cordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador 
at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability 
of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary 
instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at 
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the 
Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the 
opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, 
Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 43 

Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received, July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

Your telegram of 26th July. 2 

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practi- 
cally amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, 
be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. lie 
could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he 
was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that 
your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that repre- 
sentatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss 
and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He main- 
tained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not 
practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. 
Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de 
Sazonof 3 to exchange views with Count Berchtold. 4 He thought 

•The official version prints here as a footnote "Nos. 36 and 37." These two 
despatches contained different proposals as explained above in note 1 to British Blue 
Book No. 37, July 26. 

2 British Blue Book No. 36, July 26 according to footnote in Official Blue Book. 
Cf., however, British Blue Book No. 46, where Germany accepts the offer of No. 37. 
See notes on Nos. 36 and 37, July 26, 1914. 

3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

4 Austro-Hunsarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 
25, July 26, 1914. 



228 Official Diplomatic Document* 

that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, 
and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await out- 
come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian 
( rovernments. 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that 
as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mo- 
bilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked 
him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." lie said that 
if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but 
if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and 
Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be 
difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore 
have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg]! 
had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. 1 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 44 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. 

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had 
yesterday- with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away 
objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out 
that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultima- 
tum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a 
whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were 
reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly 
be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision 
of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with 
Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for 
Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she 
was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to 
put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and 
Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. 3 The Austrian 

1 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit No. 5, July 26. 

2 July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. French Yellow Book No. 54. 
July 26. 

3 This is a new proposal added to the others that had been offered : (a) Sir Edward 
Grey's various conference plans. (/>) Sazonof's plan to substitute for the Conference 
direct conversation with Vienna. Tins last proposal, according to Sir G. Buchanan, 
was made by Sazonof to (lie Austrian Ambassador. This was, however, not the case. 
Sir Sazonof's report of the interview, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. and the 
French Ambassador's report. French Yellow Book No. 54, same day. and tin- Austrian 
Ambassador's report, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. From French 
Yellow Book No. 52, July 26, it appears that this proposal may have been made to 
the Italian Ambassador. It was directly made to Rome by Sazonof in Russian Orange 
Book No. 23, July 26, From tins despatch, where Italy is urged to adopt a definitely 
unfavourable attitude, it is clear that the proposal was not liima fide, which may be 
the reason why Sir E. Grey did nut accept it. The prominent fact of the entire in- 
vestigation is that Sir G. Buchanan's despatch is inaccurate. 



July 27, British Blue Book No. 46 229 

Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to 
his Government. 

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that 
I had correctly denned the attitude of His Majesty's Government in 
my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 
24th instant. 1 I added that you could not promise to do anything 
more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the 
cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Govern- 
ment that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia 
and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. 2 Their atti- 
tude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only 
induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching 
her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His 
Excellency must not, if our efforts 3 were to be successful, do anything 
to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that 
the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long 
as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier 
even when it was issued. 

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue 
of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could 
be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by 
delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred 
too long. 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 45 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received J uly 27 '.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg]), July 27, 1914- 

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as 
reported in my telegram of to-day, 4 I understand that his Excellency 
has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian 
demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh. 

To Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 46 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914- 

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government 
accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the 

1 See No. 6. July 24. 1914. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 

3 What these efforts were, to preserve peace with dignity for all, or to force Austria- 
Hungary to submit, is not stated. 

« See No. 44. 



230 Official Diplomatic Documents 

four Powers, 1 reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria 
if attacked. lie has also been instructed 2 to request me to use 
influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the 
peace of Europe. 

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have 
been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of 
State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian 
note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. 3 I assumed 
that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia 
had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at 
Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria 
put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into 
Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, 
being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian 
reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. 
I said German Government should urge this at Vienna. 4 

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity 
of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if 
Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, with- 
out any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not 
afford to sec Austria crushed. 6 -Fust so other issues might be raised 
that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and 
would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever 
known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I 
would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply 
it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. 

To St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 47 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914- 

See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen. 6 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and 
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand 
aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression 
must produce. 7 

1 Cf. German White Bonk Exhibit 15, July 27, in reply to British Blue Book No. 43, 
July 27. 191 t. 

2 This further instruction is not printed in the ( lerman White Book. 

3 Confirmation of such a remark by Mr. von Jagow would be valuable. 

4 Germany complied with this request; cf. British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 

6 This is a elear reference to one danger threatening Austria-Hungary. The other 
danger of losing her prestige as a big Power if she failed to punish Serbian intrigues is 
often mentioned in the despatches. 

6 The official British version prints this footnote: "See No. 46." In first edition 
the reference was given as No. 37. 

T Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24. where Sazonof hopes that England "would not 
fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France." Germany and Austria con- 
tinued to believe until July 29 that England would not do so ; cf. British Blue Book No. 
1)16, Julv 30, where the British Ambassador in Rome states that "Germany was now 



July 27, British Blue Book No. 4$ 231 

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the 
orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it 
happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But 
I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must 
not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was 
promised. 1 

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe 
Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take 
Servian territory. 2 I pointed this out, and added that it would be 
absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians 3 in our 
dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. 

Ta Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 48 
Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1014- 

Count Mensdorff 4 told me by instruction 5 to-day that the 
Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the 
Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to 
secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed 
that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending to- 
wards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their 
final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and 
against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take 
more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude 
of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government 
knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to 
find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had 
been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of 
Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what 

disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria as she seemed convinced that we 
should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." 
Cf. also British Blue Book No. 80. July 29, and French Yellow Book No. 96, July 2!). 

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, where it is stated that the fleet was kept 
mobilised on July 24. See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher, New York Evening Sun 
and Milwaukee Free Press, April 19, 1915, "Mobilisation of the fleet before the war 
on the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the king." 

= Cf. British Blue Book No. 33, July 26. 

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, where Sazonof says he could not be "more 
Servian than Servia." 

4 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 

6 What follows is a very brief summary in general terms of the dossier, Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. This was received in Paris on July 27 ; see 
French Yellow Book No. 75. of that date. 

In Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 2S, it is stated that the dossier had 
been sent by post, "das Ihnen auf dem Postwege ubermittelte Dossier." And from 
French Yellow Book No. 75. July 27, it appears that it had been sent early enough to 
be presented in Paris on July 27. Such documents are generally sent to be presented 
simultaneously at the various Foreign offices. It is, therefore, practically certain that 
the dossier was presented also in London on July 27. The official English translation 
"which is being sent to you by post" conveys the wrong impression that the document 
could not have been in London on July 27. It is noteworthy that Sir E. Grey did not 
print the whole dossier anywhere in the British Blue Book, while he even stated in the 
Preface to the Blue Book edition of Sept. 28, 1914. that he "did not receive any state- 
ment of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August." 
See also note 1 to the dossier, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, and the 
Instructions to the several .Ambassadors. 



2'.\2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced 
and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would 
understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the 
moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, 
guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and 
for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of 
Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the 
Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not 
taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no 
sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than 
as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve 
a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an 
element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. 
The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British states- 
men could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended 
by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a 
country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures 
so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. 
Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable re- 
lations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a 
fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the 
fight, if necessary. 

< 'mint MensdorfT added on his own account that, as long as Servia 
was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures 
because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the 
Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and popu- 
lation without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian 
subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on 
Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking 
Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory. 1 

I said that I could not understand the construction 2 put by the 
Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mens- 
dorfT the substance of the conversation that I had had with the Ger- 
man Ambassador this morning about that reply. 

( ount MensdorfT admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might 
seem to be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing 
— the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would lie 
real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their 
subversive campaign against Austria. 

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed 
that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia 
anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they 
could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well 
and good 3 ; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I 
pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of 
the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be 

1 Of. note No. 3 to the previous despatch. 

,J I f. note to British Blue Book No. 39 under date of July 26. 

3 Sir E. Grey here expresses an idea contrary to that often mentioned, viz. that. 
England was the protector of the little nations. 



July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 31 233 

expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish 
the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased 
tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already 
the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our 
fleet was to have dispersed to-day, 1 but we had felt unable to let it dis- 
perse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, 
and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet ; but, 
owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was im- 
possible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as 
an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the 
Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia 
that I had ever seen a country undergo, 2 and it was very disappointing 
to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if 
it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 
To Rome 

British Blue Book No. 49 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson 3 to-day that the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal 
for a conference of four to be held in London. 

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and 
Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the con- 
ference, the Marquis di San Giuliano 4 would recommend the sugges- 
tion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what 
procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 
British Blue Book No. 39 

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian note (communicated bv 
the Serbian Minister, July 27). See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 

Russia : 

From London 

Russian Orange Book No. 31 

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 

Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1.914. 

I have received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July. 5 Please 
inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct dis- 

1 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 

2 With this "humiliation" of Serbia compare the fate in recent years of Persia, 
Morocco, Corea, and other small nations. 

3 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 

4 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

6 Not printed in Russian Orange Book. 



234 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



cussions 1 with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme 
for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the 
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared 
to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official 
proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and 
Rome. 2 

To Paris and London 

Russian Orange Book No. 32 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris 
and London. 

(Translation.) 

St. Petersburg!!, 
(Telegraphic.) 

July 27, 1914. 

The British Ambassador came 
to ascertain whether we think it 
desirable that Great Britain 
should take the initiative in con- 
voking a conference in London 
of the representatives of Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy to examine the possibility 
of a way out of the present situa- 
tion. 

I replied to the Ambassador 
that I have begun conversations 
with the Austro-Hungarian Am- 
bassador under conditions which, 
I hope, may be favourable. I 
have not, however, received as 
yet any reply to the proposal 
made by me for revising the note 
between the two Cabinets. 

If direct explanations with the 
Vienna Cabinet were to prove 
impossible, I am ready to accept 
the British proposal, or any other 
proposal of a kind that would 
bring about a favourable solu- 
tion of the conflict. 

I wish, however, to put an end 
from this day forth to a mis- 
understanding which might arise 



Saint-Petersbourg, 
(Telegraphique.) 

le 14 (27)juillet, 1914. 
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre 
est venu s'informer si nous 
jugeons utile que l'Angleterre 
prenne ['initiative de convoquer 
a Londres une conference des 
representants de l'Angleterre, la 
France, l'Allemagne et l'ltalie, 
pour etudier une issue a la 
situation actuelle. 

J'ai repondu a l'Ambassadeur 
que j'ai entame des pourparlers 
avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- 
Hongrie, en conditions que j'es- 
pere favorables. Pourtant je 
n'ai pas encore recti de reponse a 
la proposition que j'ai faite d'une 
revision de la note entre les deux 
Cabinets. 

Si des explications directs avec 
le Cabinet de Vienne se trou- 
vaient irrealisables, je suis pret a, 
accepter la proposition anglaise, 
ou toute autre de nature a 
resoudre favorablement le conflit. 

Je voudrais pourtant ecarter 
des aujourd'hui un malentendu 
qui pourrait surgir de la reponse 



1 See Orange Book No 
64, July 27. Sazonof hac 
note to Serbia on July 27, 
view of this whole subject 

2 British Blue Book No 



July 



No. 38, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 
roposals of direct discussions of the Austrian 
S had not yet heard from Vienna. For a re- 
, British Blue Book No. 07, July 28. 
26, also Nos. 43 and 57, July 27. 



July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 35 235 

donnee par le Ministre de la from the answer given by the 

Justice francais a l'Ambassadeur French Minister of Justice to the 

d'Allemagne, concernant des con- German Ambassador, regarding 

seils de moderation a, donner an counsels of moderation to be 

Cabinet Imperial. given to the Imperial Cabinet. 

To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome 

Russian Orange Book N<>. 33 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, 
London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July U (27), 1914. 

I have taken note of the reply ! returned by the Servian Govern- 
ment to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its modera- 
tion, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. 
We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless 
the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia 

From Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 34 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July U (.37), 101 4. 

The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day 
at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The 
Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any media- 
tion or conference. 2 

From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 35 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 

I discussed the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. 
They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken 
by the German Ambassador, 3 which Sevastopoulo has already tele- 
graphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his 
declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e. : 

1 . That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial 
acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity 
of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet. 

1 See note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of Julv 26. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 01, Julv 27. 

3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 01, July 27. 



236 Official Diplomatic Documents 

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. 

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire 
to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon 
Russia. 

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of soli- 
darity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced 
that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident 
object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French 
Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus 
compromising our ally in our eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of 
throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly mak- 
ing every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France. 



From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 36 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914- 

It is clear from your telegrams ' of the 13th (26) July that you were 
not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The tele- 
gram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours 2 
to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at 
the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our 
representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There 
is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the 
Austrian telegraph office. 

From Paris 
Russian Okange Book No. 37 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, Jul}/ 14 (.37), 1914. 

On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has 
informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer 
has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, 
Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the 
object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The 
Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambas- 
sador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it 
might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultima- 
tum, or even a declaration of war. 

1 Not printed in either the French Yellow Book or the Russian Orange Book. 

2 It also reached the French Government with a delay of twentv hours. C'f. French 
Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. 



July 27, Russian Orange Book No. Ifi 237 

From Berlin 

Russian Ouange Book No. 38 

Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1,914. 

I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal 
in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of 
a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hun- 
garian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow 
answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with 
I'ourtales that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might 
as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German 
Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater 
insistence to adopt this conciliatory line ; Jagow answered that he 
could not advise Austria to give way. 

From Berlin 
Russian Orange Book No. 39 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign. 

Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914. 

Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his 
Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured 
to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of 
peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburgh and 
at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon 
suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the 
following terms : "To abstain from all action which might aggravate 
the existing situation." (S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver 
la situation de I'heure actuelle.) By adopting this vague formula, all 
mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might 
be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion ' in 
spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good 
feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks 
to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a 
matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — was avoided. 

To Serbia 
HrssiAN Orange Book No. 40 

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His 
Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914- 
When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial 
stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for 
you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people. 

1 For von Jagow's reasons see French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, also Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 35, July 28. 



238 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and 
my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away 
the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the 
Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting 
no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the 
horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia. 

From Vienna 

Russian Orange Book No. 41 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 14 {27), 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conver- 
sation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a 
perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in 
Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it 
was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to 
accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the 
most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound 
surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose 
that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German 
Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, 
has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, 
and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon 
that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that 
Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such con- 
duct has caused a great sensation here. 

From London 

Russian Ouange Book No. 42 

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 14 {27), 1914. 

Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came 
to epiestion him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Peters- 
burg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that 
the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also 
pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded 
anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its 
spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to 
the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a 
moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form 
the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question. 



July 27, Serbian Blue Book No. 43 239 

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin 
hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of 
crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give 
rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers 
would be involved 

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely 
anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preser- 
vation of peace was in question ; but, in the contrary event, Great 
Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action. 

Serbia : 

From St. Petersburg 

Serbian Blue Book No. 43 

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the 
Crown Prince of Serbia. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914- 

[See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.] 



240 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Tuesday, July 28, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 
France 

Germany 

Great Britain 



Russia 
Serbia 



&ENT DESPATCHES TO 

Belgrade, Berlin, London, 
St. Petersburgh 

London, Berlin, St. Peters- 
burgh, Vienna, Rome, 
Viviani 

German Governments, St. 
Petersburgh 

Emperor to Czar 

Berlin, St. Petersburgh 



London 

All Serbian legations 

St. Petersburgh 



Despatch es from 

Berlin, Tokio 

Vienna 

Vienna, London, Ber- 
lin, St. Petersburgh, 
Viviani 

Vienna 



Paris, St. Petersburgh, 
Vienna, Rome, Ber- 
lin, Nish, French and 
Russian Embassies 

Fiume, Vienna, Berlin 

Vienna 



. 1 ustria-Hungary declares war cm Serbia and endeavours to explain her point of 
view to England most especially, but also to Russia. Russia's extensive mobilisa- 
tion results in Austria-Hungary calling on Germany for assistance and urging her 
to use toward Russia "unambiguous language." Sir E. Grey's proposal trans- 
mitted by Germany is declared to have come too late. 

France is resolved to support English and Russian proposals but persists in 
claiming that mediation should not be between Vienna and Petrograd alone, 
but include Belgrade. She views with suspicion every act and statement of 
Germany, and refuses to announce thai she and Germany had agreed to work for 
peace. She also refuses to use a moderating influence on Russia. 

Germany : The Chancellor informs the Federal Governments of the serious state 
of affairs, expressing the hope to be able to maintain peace but announcing it as the 
duty of Germany to support Austria-Hungary, if "through the interference of 
Russia the fire " should be spread. At the same time she urges Austria-Hungary 
to come to an understanding with Russia. 

The Emperor personally appeals to the Czar in the interest of peace. 

Great Britain declares that she would find it embarrassing to give Russia 
"pacific advice." She also does not follow up the advice sent by the British 
Ambassador in Rome to the effect that "Serbia may be induced to accept note in 
its entirety on the advice of the four Powers." Her own conference proposal 
she "would suspend" in favor of Russia's proposal of direct conversations with 
Vienna. Sir E. Grey even made an alternate proposal, which Germany trans- 
mitted to Vienna, but which is not mentioned either in the British Blue Book 
or the French Yellow Book. (See German White Book, Exhibit 1(5.) 

Russia announces the failure of direct conversations with Vienna at the very 
moment when Sir E. Grey suspends his proposal, and disregarding Sir E. Grey's 
conference plan calls for English mediation, apparently between Vienna and 
Belgrade, which was France's suggestion. 

Serbia, according to the uncontradicted statement of Vienna (British Blue 
Book No. 56, under date of July 28) opens hostilities, and asks Russia for help, 
assuring the latter of her loyalty. 



July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 241 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Berlin 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35 
Count Szdgyeny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, 
Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at 
London, is declined l so far as Germany is concerned on the ground 
that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European 
Court in her settlement with Servia. 

From. Tokio 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 36 

Freiherr Jon M idler to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914- 

To-day's semi-official Japan Times contains a leading article which 
concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with 
the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Genua ny 
and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case 
of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, main- 
tain the strictest neutrality. 

To Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 37 

Con ut Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade. ( Tra ns- 

lated from the French.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 191 4. 

The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satis- 
factory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government 
are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights 
and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. 

Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a 
state of war 2 with Servia. 

To Berlin 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyeny in Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- 

For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the 
Secretary of State : — 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 43. July 27. For a later agreement see British Blue 
Book No. 46, July 27. and German White Book, Exhibits 12 and 15, July 27. 

2 For the Austro-Hungarian note announcing to the Powers that war had been 
declared, see British Blue Book No. 50. July 2s. 



242 Official Diplomatic Documents 

1 have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, 
dated the 27th inst. : — 

"I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir 
Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self- 
defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of 
making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independ- 
ence. 1 What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction 
for what has passed, and guarantees for the future. 

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your 
Excellency's communications to Count Szapary. 

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we 
were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal. 

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which 
the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution. 

This was his idea when he proposed a conference. 

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hun- 
gary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation 
during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue. 

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day 
amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refrain- 
ing from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared 
that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State ex- 
pressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to 
go to war with Servia, anil if we assumed that Russia would remain 
quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to 
remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. 2 If we 
could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable. 

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British 
Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the 
manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day, 3 would for the 
present remain there. "We had not called up any Reserves, but as 
they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home 
again." 

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a 
collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation 
of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes 
action, the conference necessarily breaks down. 

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency 
that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our 
conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has 
arisen, to have been outstripped by events. 

' British Blue Book No. 4.S. July 27. 

2 This is a refutation of the popular claim that Great Britain went to war in part on 
Serbia's account, to vindicate the rights of the little nations. 

3 This refers to the interview of July 27. See British Blue Book No. 48. 



July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. Jfi 243 

To London 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1.914- 

We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey 
should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia 
in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, 
and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of ex- 
plaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being ' 
sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient 
passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir 
E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of 
the note without observations has been sent to Your Excellency by 
post yesterday), 2 and you should make clear to him that the offer of 
Servia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended 
to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future. 

As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional ac- 
ceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can 
easily be seen through: Servia accepted a number of our demands, 
with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion 
in Europe, trusting that she would not be recpjired to fulfil her 
promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay 
special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisa- 
tion of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th 
July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just 
before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes 
before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had no military preparations, but 
by the Servian mobilisation we were compelled to do so. 

To St. Petersburgh 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 40 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- 

For your Excellency's information and guidance : 
The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to 
inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same 
time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter 
had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion 
with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th in- 
stant), 3 in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness 

1 This is a wrong translation ; it should read, "which has been despatched to you." 
and is so translated in the English translation issued by the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment. 

2 Neither the dossier nor the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian note were 
printed in the British Blue Book, although the Serbian reply was printed in No. 39 
before No. 40 which is a telegram of July 26. For the reason why this Serbian reply 
is printed in this edition among the July 27 despatches, see note to British Blue Book 
No. 39, under date of July 20. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. 



244 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the 
opinion that Servia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some 
of tin' demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which 
he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him 
under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be 
regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain 
which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. 
Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas 
with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency 
should receive instructions with this end in view. 

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. 
No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve 
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which 
we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more im- 
possible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling 
of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. 
Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Servia. 

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated 
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted 
hostile opinion in Servia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary 
we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present 
relations towards Servia which made it necessary, quite against our 
will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our rest- 
less neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not 
to permit any longer a movement -which was allowed to exist by 
the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the 
Monarchy. The attitude of Servia after the receipt of our note had 
further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, 
because Servia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory 
reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already 
committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had 
waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us 
on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Servia. By this act we 
were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience 
which we had shown towards Servia. The establishment of a funda- 
mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Servia had 
now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian 
provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was 
consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. 

To London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 41 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 101 /,. 

The British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day 
has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of 
Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Servia as follows : — 



July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 41 245 

The British Government have followed the previous course of 
events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach im- 
portance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for 
us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely 
understand the grievances which we have against Servia. 

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in 
itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question can- 
not escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this con- 
flict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe. 

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only 
on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to 
the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested 
in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in com- 
mon with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the 
possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be 
most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London con- 
ference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various 
States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view 
of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual con- 
tact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already 
received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Govern- 
ments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put 
forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, 
if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of 
hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not 
possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision in- 
volving bloodshed ; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing with- 
out accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Servia 
appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an 
understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter 
to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes. 

1 thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, 
and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary 
of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from 
mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between 
us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed 
concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had 
for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of prevent- 
ing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since 
our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian 
frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I 
had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian 
answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ulti- 
matum. Servia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub- 
terfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well. 

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here, Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, 
and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate repre- 
sentation of the facts. 



246 Official Diplomatic Documents 

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of 
European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from 
us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not 
be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Servia, and 
directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment. 

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agree- 
ment, Servia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the 
path she lias formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, 
again imperil the cause of peace. 

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully 
understood our point of view, but, on the other hand, he regretted 
that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government 
to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being 
realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me 
as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European 
conflagration, to be of special value. 

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, 
and thereupon our conversation came to an end. 

To Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 42 

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyiny at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) July 28, 191 4. 

I request your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the 
Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my 
name : — 

"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. 
Petersburgh, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making 
extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an 
assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister 
of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the 
latter has, however, told the German Military Attache that the mili- 
tary districts which border on Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, 
Moscow and Kasan — will be mobilised, should our troops cross the 
Servian frontier. 1 

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the ( "abinet at 
Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the 
attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to 
the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a 
threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these 
measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most exten- 
sive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by 
our Ally, the German Empire." 

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears 
to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken 

1 Genuau White Book, Exhibit 11, July 27. 



July 28, French Yellow Book No. 75 (2) 247 

by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in 
conjunction with Germany. 

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to 
be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all 
that is involved in a threatening attitude. 1 

To Berlin 
Austro-Htjngahian Red Book No. 43 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyiny <\1 Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) July 28, 101 4. 

Information has been received from the Imperial German Ambas- 
sador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use 
their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order 
to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as 
satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the 
* 'ahinets. 2 

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British pro- 
posal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration. 

Belgium : 

From Vienna 

Belgian Gray Book No. 7 

Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, W14- 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration 3 
of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia. 

France : 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 75 (2) 

Official Communiqui of the Press Bureau.' 1 

Vienna, July 28, Wlf t . 

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and 
presented the text of the Servian reply. 5 

1 This despatch would seem to dispose of the claim sometimes made that Germany's 
demand on Russia to demobilise brought on the war much against the wishes of Austria- 
Hungary, who had been dragged in. 

2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and No. 67, July 28. 

3 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 50, 
same day. 

4 This is a brief summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply, 
see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 

b The Austrian Minister left Belgrade on the evening of July 25 (see Serbian Blue 
Book No. 41, July 25), after receiving the Serbian reply. This despatch is dated July 



248 Official Diplomatic Documents 

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply ; it makes 
it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of 
putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the 
anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restric- 
tions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the 
Austro-Hungarian demarche, but also with regard to the claims ad- 
vanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made arc without 
importance. 

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept 
the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution 
of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory. 

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that 
the hostile intrigues of the press should lie suppressed, amounts to a 
refusal. 

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent 
associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity 
under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even 
been considered. 

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as 
necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south- 
east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to lie insufficient. 

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the 
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitra- 
tion, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was 
due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobili- 
sation. 

From on board "La France" 

French Yellow Book No. 76 

.1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienrenu-Martin. 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

On board the "La France," July 28, 1914. 

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising 
the events of Saturday ; ' the telegram describing the last visit of the 
German Ambassador,' 2 that 3 relating to the mediation which Russia 

28. Its number is 75 (2), which is unusual. Beginning with the second paragraph this 
communique is a summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. 
In short it is the reply to the Serbian reply. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, 
July 27. which was presented also in Paris. It is not printed in its entirety in the 
French Yellow Book. The editor of the French Yellow Book, however, M. Jules 
( million, former French Ambassador in Berlin, doubtless felt the unfairness of making 
no reference to it at all. He therefore, added this communique as an afterthought, 
which accounts for the strange number 75 (_'). 

1 Saturday was July 25. the telegram referred to was sent on July 26. Cf. French 
Yellow Book No. 50, also No. 56. 

- ( If. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 

3 This is a mistranslation substituted in the official British Blue Book of Sept. 28 
and in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" for the correct translation in the N. Y. 
Time* version which reads, "also the telegram with regard to," etc. This third tele- 
gram, however, has been omitted in the French Yellow Book. It would be interesting 
to know what it contained and wdiat the "British demarches at Berlin" refer to, 
Cf. end of French Yellow Book No. SO, same day; but see also French Yellow Book 
No. 74, July 27, which may describe the demarche mentioned here. 



July 28, French Yellow Book No. 77 249 

advises Servia 1 to ask for and to the British demarches at Berlin, as 
well 2 as vour telegram received this morning directly through the 
Eiffel Tower. 

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; 
the proposition which you maintained is self-evident ; in the search 
for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with 
Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not 
taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion ; 
but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse 
to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action 
has provoked the crisis. 

We must now continue to use the same language to the German 
Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two 
British proposals mentioned in your telegram. 3 I entirely approve 
the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting 
M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should 
be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given 
to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view 
to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of 
the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, 
be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. In proposing 3 to 
exert it also at Belgrade, which means in fact between Vienna and 
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not 
excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany, 
a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche by 
which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris 
and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely 
Austro-Servian and without any general character. 

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives 
with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade. 

Rene Viviani. 

To Viviani 

French Yellow Book No. 77 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France." 

Paris, July 28, 1914. 

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the 
German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in 

1 For another proposal by Russia see British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 

s The New York Times translation reads : " I have also received this morning your 
despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower." The only despatch printed under July 28 as 
sent to Viviani is French Yellow Book No. 77. This latter despatch, therefore, should 
have been printed before No. 76. It is, of course, possible that the fourth telegram 
mentioned in No. 76 has not been published as was the case with the third telegram. 

3 There were two proposals mentioned in the telegrams to which Viviani seems to 
reply here ; if. French Yellow Book No. 50. July 26, and No. 77, July 28. The first one 
contemplates pressure in Petrograd and Vienna. The second includes Belgrade, un- 
doubtedly as the result of the urging of France, who had always contended that it 
was a case of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade rather than Vienna and Petro- 



250 Official Diplomatic Documents 

efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken 
by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which consists 
in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of 
military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh, and in a 
meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors 
under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solu- 
tion of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin 
of such a nature as must lead to failure. 

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his 
Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel 
Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they 
demand from that Power; Count Szecsen has given no explanation 
as to those measures; according to our Military Attache at Vienna, 
mobilisation, dating from July 28, appears to be certain. 

Bienyent-Martin. 

To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 7s 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, 
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Home. 

Paris, July 28, 1914- 

I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morn- 
ing ; lie told me that he had no communication or official proposal to 
make to me, hut that he came, as on the evening before, to talk 
over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action 
which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's in- 
tentions, he declared that hi' did not know them, and was ignorant of 
the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing. 

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may 
act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing 
to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we 
had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy 
and Germany,had been put forward byGreat Britain, the Ambassador 
said that the German Government really only asked to associate 
themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action 
did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been 
rejected by Austria. 

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle 
to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other 
means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria 
to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation. 

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, 
and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on 
Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French 
papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken 
up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves 
Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note ; 



July 28, French Yellow Book No. 80 251 

she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must 
have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 79 

M. Bienvenu-Martin , Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. 
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. 

Paris, July 28, 191 4. 

Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have for- 
warded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by 
the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our ad- 
herence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy 
and of the reservations of Berlin. 

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British 
colleague, who had received the necessary instructions to acquaint 
the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as 
soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same 
demarche; you will adapt your attitude to his. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 80 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 28, 1914. 

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and 
German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian 
reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of 
Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating 
action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg!!. Sir Edward Grey re- 
plied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning 
of the crisis, especially in her advice 1 to the Servian Government, and 
that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific 2 advice. 
He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that 
Germany's help was indispensable. 

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has 
telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian 
Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This in- 
formation has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, 

1 The published despatches nowhere give clear evidence that Russia gave Serbia 
any advice that had a moderating influence, although the British Ambassador said 
that Sazonof would do so, British Blue Book No. 55. under date of July 28. 

1 Germany has always claimed that Russia could have been restrained by pacific 
advice from England. The same view was expressed in the London Daily News of 
August 1, 1914. France had also refused to exert her conciliatory influence on Russia. 
Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 



252 Official Diplomatic Documents 

who has sent the information that the first interview between the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had produced 
a good effect at the Ballplatz. 

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agree- 
ment could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Peters- 
burgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they 
raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt. 

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual 
meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situa- 
tion, the latter replied " that he had begun pourparlers with the Austrian 
Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable ; that, 
however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the 
revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explana- 
tions with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, 1 M. Sazonof de- 
clares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of 
such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute. 

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious 
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations 
should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's 
action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of 
the friendly intervention of the four Powers. 

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined 
effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's sugges- 
tion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best 
to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between 
St. Petersburgh and Vienna. 2 Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, 
directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his demarche for the moment. 3 
In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war 
against Servia, opens a new phase of the question. 

Paul Cambon. 

From Berlin 
French Yellow Book No. 81 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 

Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 28, 1914- 

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary 4 was brought to 
the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Charge d'Affaires. 

1 This implies that Sazonof had not accepted the British proposals whole-heartedly 
on the previous day, but had rather pushed his own proposal of direct conversations 

2 Cf . British Blue Book Nos. 43 and 46, July 27, and Nos. 67, 68 and 69, July 28, and 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, July 27. In British Blue Book Nos. 68, 69, Sir E. Grey 
seems to prefer Sazonof's proposal of direct conversations to his own of a conference. 

» It is nowhere stated what this d-marche was, the despatch explaining it having 
been omitted from the Yellow Book; see note 3 to No. 76, same day. A possible 
explanation is found in the text of the German White Book, which is illustrated by 
Exhibit 16, July 28. See the note there. 

4 The only published conversation to which this can refer is the one of July 26, 
two days previous to this despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. 



July 28, French Yellow Book No. 81 253 

The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks 
of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Govern- 
ment did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian 
Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for 
hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with 
M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the 
present difficulties. The Russian Charge d' Affaires takes a favour- 
able view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's 
desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburgh enter into direct relations 
and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking 
whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations. 

To-day I gave my support to the demarche made by my British 
colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he 
did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept 
the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors 
of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another 
form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress 
upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him 
if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversa- 
tions between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were in progress, and that 
from now on he expected a favourable result. 

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning 
together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had 
with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's 
proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language 
to them as to me ; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a 
demarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea 
of a conference. 

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, 
and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government 
that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might 
take the character of a diplomatic demarche at Vienna and St. Peters- 
burgh. 

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any 
demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by 
asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the 
Powers to avoid war could be brought about. 

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace 
compatible with our engagements towards our ally ; but to place the 
reponsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany 
to state precisely what she wishes. 

Jules Cambon. 



254 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 82 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affair.'!. 

St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the pro- 
posal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct 
conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. 

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Am- 
bassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this 
double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria 
is unwilling to converse." 

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two 
colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism. 

Paleologue. 

From Vienna 
French Yellow Book No. S3 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 28, 101 4. 

Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any 
intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between 
Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, 
and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially de- 
clared at mid-day. 

The attitude of my Russian colleague lias never varied up to the 
present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, 
but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very 
difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers, as well as 
the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and 
Count Szapary. 

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain 
the adherence of Germany — "Mediation between Austria and 
Russia " — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between 
those two Empires which does not exist up to the present. 

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution 
of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed 
her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself 
to enter into war with Russia and France, 1 in circumstances which 
she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under 
conditions which have been thoroughly considered. 

Dumaine. 

1 If this is written with sincerity it reveals the serious suspicion of Germany enter- 
tained by France. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42. same day, where it ap- 
pears that it was not Germany who pushed on Austria-Hungary. 



July 28, German White Book Exhibit 2 255 

Germany : 

To the Governments of Germany 

German White Book Exhibit 2 

The Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential. 
Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

You will make the following report to the Government to which 
you are accredited : 

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published 
in its note ! to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear 
that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the 
throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least 
with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and 
army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of 
years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe. 

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the 
Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and modera- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic inter- 
cession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to 
which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a 
conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian 
Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, 
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb prop- 
aganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. 
It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right 
to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted 
to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through 
which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently 
threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the de- 
mands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as 
justifiable. 

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the 
Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its 
representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in 
Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. 
There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government 
than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless 
it renounces for good its position as a great Power. 

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course 
and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European 
conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the 
"Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany re- 
sponsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 

1 This is probably an inaccurate reference, for the Chancellor undoubtedly had in 
mind the dossier (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25) which was to be 
presented, and, judging by this despatch, was presented to the foreign offices in Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd. and Constantinople. For the Austro-Hungarian note 
to Serbia see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22. . 



256 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not 
Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, 
but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb 
aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which 
eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajewo. If 
Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this 
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise 
that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions 
of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears 
the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Scrvian affair, which all 
other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. 
This reponsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more 
heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that 
Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to 
touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace 
against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence. 

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly 
indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria- 
Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance 
with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. 
Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. 
The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, 
points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at 
the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies 
which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the in- 
terest of the preservation of the peace of Europe. 

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of 
Russia the fire he spread, we should have to support, faithful to our 
duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our com- 
mand. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the 
clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war 
will bring upon the peoples of Europe. 

Germany : 

To St. Petersburg 

German White Book Exhibit 14 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
'on July :2Sth, 1914. 

We continue ' in our endeavour to induce Vienna to elucidate in 
St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in 
a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declara- 
tion of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. 

1 See note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also German White Book, 
Exhibit 15. July 27. 



July 28, German White Booh Exhibit 20 257 

From Vienna 

German White Book Exhibit 16 ' 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on 
July 28th, 1914. 

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his 
thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He 
states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the 
subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated. 

To St. Petersburg 

German White Book Exhibit 20 

I. His Majesty to the Czar. 

July 28th, IO.45 p.m. 

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is 
caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscru- 
pulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led 
to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become 
a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own 
King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You 
will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other 
sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are 
responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved 
punishment. 

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encoun- 
tered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. 
In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long 
time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria- 
Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with 
Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts 
to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. 

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, 

(Signed) Wilhelm. 

Great Britain : 

For British Blue Book No. 50 see below under date of July 31, 1914. 

1 The paragraph in the Narrative of the German White Book which these Exhibits 
are to illustrate reads: "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the 
Conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in 
which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was 
sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian 
Government remarked with full appreciation of ovir action it had come too late, the 
hostilities having already been opened." This second proposal of Sir E. Grey is not 
mentioned in the British Blue Book. It was probably discussed in the third tele- 
gram referred to but not printed in the French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, see also 
French Yellow Book No. 80, same day. 



258 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From, Paris 

British Blue Book No. 51 

Sir /•'. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July AS, 101 4-) 

Sir, Paris, duly 27, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memo- 
randum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps 
to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria- 
Hungary and Servia. I have, etc. 

Francis Bertie. 



Enclosure in No. 51 
Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. 



Par une note en date du 25 
de ce inois, son Excellence l'Ain- 
bassadeur d'Angleterre a fait 
connaitre au Gouvernement de 
la Republique que, d'apres Sir 
Edward Grey, la seule maniere 
d 'assurer, si e'etait possible, le 
maintien de la paix dans le cas 
on les rapports entre la Russie et 
l'Autriche deviendraient plus 
tendus serait une demarche com- 
mune a Vienne et a Saint- 
Petersbourg des representants de 
l'Angleterre, de la France, de 
rAllemagne et de 1'Italie en 
Autriche et en Russie; et il a 
exprime le desir de savoir si le 
Gouvernement de la Republique 
etait dispose a accueillir favo- 
rablement cette suggestion. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres par interim a l'honneur de 
faire connaitre a son Excellence 
Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invite 
M. Jules Cambon ' a se concerter 
avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre 
en Allemagne et a appuyer la 



(Translation.) 
In a note of the 25th of this 
month, his Excellency the British 
Ambassador 2 informed the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic that, in 
Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only 
possible way of assuring the 
maintenance of peace in case of 
the relations between Russia and 
Austria becoming more strained 
would be if the representatives 
of Great Britain, France, Ger- 
many, and Italy in Austria and 
Russia were to take joint action 
at Vienna and at St. Petersburg ; 
and he expressed the wish to 
know if the Government of the 
Republic were disposed to wel- 
come such a suggestion. 



The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs ad interim has the honour 
to inform his Excellency Sir F. 
Bertie that he has requested 
M. Jules Cambon ' to concert 
with the British Ambassador in 
Germany and to support any rep- 



1 French Ambassador in Berlin. 

2 Acting on instructions contained in British Blue Book No. 10. July 24. For the 
entire subject see the summary of events of July 24 based on the despatches of that 
day, where it appears that Sir E. Grey altered his original proposal at the suggestion 
of France. 



July 28, British Blur Book No. 51 



259 



demarche qu'ils jugeront oppor- 
tune de faire aupres du Cabinet 
de Berlin. 

Le Gouvernement de la Re- 
publique a, d autre part, con- 
formement an desir exprime par 
le Gouvernement britannique et 
que son Excellence Sir Francis 
Bertie lui a trarismis par une note 
en i late du 2b de ce mois, autorise 
M. Paul Cambon ' a prendre part 
a la reunion proposee par Sir 
Edward Grey pour rechercher 
avec lui et les Ambassadeurs 
d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a Lon- 
dres, les moyens de resoudre les 
difficultes actuelles. 

Le Gouvernement de la Re- 
publique est pret egalement a 
donner aux agents francais a 
Petersbourg, a Vienne et a Bel- 
grade des instructions pour qu'ils 
obtiennent des Gouvernements 
russe, autrichien et serbe de 
s'abstenir de toute operation 
militaire active en attendant les 
resultats de cette conference. II 
estime toutefois que les chances 
de succes de la proposition de Sir 
Edward Grey reposent essen- 
tiellement sur l'aetion que Ber- 
lin serait disposee a Vienna [sic]. 
Une demarche aupres du Gou- 
vernement austro-hongrois pour 
amener la suspension des opera- 
tions militaires pa rait vouee a 
l'echec si l'influence de l'Alle- 
magne ne s'est pas exercee au 
prealable sur le Cabinet de 
Vienne. 

Le Garde des Seaux, Presi- 
dent du Conseil et Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres par interim, 
saisit cette occasion de renou- 
veler, etc. 

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914. 



resentation which they may con- 
sider it advisable to make to the 
Berlin Cabinet. 

In accordance with the desire 
expressed by the British Govern- 
ment and conveyed to them by 
Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 
26th of this month, the Govern- 
ment of .the Republic have also 
authorised M. Paul Cambon ' to 
take part in the conference which 
Sir E. Grey has proposed with a 
view to discovering in consulta- 
tion with himself and the German 
and Italian Ambassadors in Lon- 
don a means of settling the pres- 
ent difficulties. 

The Government of the Re- 
public is likewise ready to in- 
struct the French representa- 
tives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, 
and Belgrade 2 to induce the 
Russian, Austrian, and Servian 
Governments to abstain from all 
active military operations pend- 
ing the results of this conference. 
He considers, however, that the 
chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal 
being successful depends essen- 
tially on the action which the 
Berlin Government would be will- 
ing to take at Vienna. Repre- 
sentations made to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government for the 
purpose of bringing about a sus- 
pension of military operations 
would seem bound to fail unless 
the German Government do not 
beforehand exercise their in- 
fluence on the Vienna Cabinet. 

The President of the Council 
ad interim takes the opportunity, 
etc. 



Paris, July 27, 1914. 



1 French Ambassador in London. 

2 The frequency with which France introduces Belgrade, when Sir E. Grey's pro- 
posal contemplates only Vienna and Petrograd, is noteworthy. 



260 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Paris 
British Blue Book No. 52 
Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914- 



Le Gouvernement de la Re- 
publique accepte la proposition 
de Sir Edward Grey relative a 
une intervention de la Grande- 
Bretagne, de la France, de l'Alle- 
magne et de l'ltalie en vue 
d'eviter les operations militaires 
actives sur les frontieres autri- 
chiennes, russes et serbes ; il a 
autorise M. P. Cambon ' a pren- 
dre part aux deliberations de la 
reunion a quatre, qui doit se 
tenir a Londres. 

L'Ambassadeur de France a 
Berlin a recu pour instructions, 
apres s'etre concerte avec l'Am- 
bassadeur d'Angleterre a Ber- 
lin, d'appuyer la demarche de ce 
dernier dans la forme et la me- 
sure qui seraient jugees oppor- 
tunes. 

M. Viviani 2 est pret a envoyer 
aux representants francais a 
Vienne, Saint-Petersbourget Bel- 
grade des instructions dans le 
sens suggere par le Gouverne- 
ment britannique. 

Ambossade ilc France, Londres, 
le 27 juillet, 1914. 



(Translation.) 

The Government of the Re- 
public accept Sir Edward Grey's 
proposal in regard to interven- 
tion by Great Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy with a view 
to avoiding active military opera- 
tions on the frontiers of Austria, 
Russia, and Servia ; and they 
have authorised M. P. Cambon l 
to take part in the deliberations 
of the four representatives at the 
meeting which is to be held in 
London. 

The French Ambassador in 
Berlin has received instructions 
to consult first the British Am- 
bassador in Berlin, and then to 
support the action taken by the 
latter in such manner and degree 
as may be considered appropriate. 

M. Viviani 2 is ready to send 
to the representatives of France 
in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and 
Belgrade instructions in the sense 
suggested by the Biritsh Gov- 
ernment. 

French Embassy, July 27, 1914- 



From St. Petersburg 

British Blue Book No. 53 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Bcnchen- 
dorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — {Communicated by 
Count Benckendorff, July 28.) 

(See Russian Orange Book No. 32, July 27.) 



French Ambassador in London. 
: French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



July 28, British Blue Book No. 55 



261 



From St. Petersburg 
British Blue Book No. 54 



M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for 
dorff, Russian Ambassador 
Count Benckendorff, July 28, 

Saint-Petersbourg, 
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne confirmerrt 
mon impression que I'Allemagne 
est plutot favorable a l'intransi- 
geance de l'Autriche. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui 
aurait pu arreter tout le develop- 
pement de la crise, parait n'exer- 
cer aucune action snr son alliee. 

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffi- 
sante la reponse de la Serbie. 

Cette attitude allemande est 
tout particulierement alarmante. 

II me semble que mieux que 
toute autre Puissance l'Angle- 
terre serait en mesure de tenter 
encore d'agir a Berlin pour en- 
gager le Gouvernement alle- 
mand a Taction necessaire. 
C'est a, Berlin qu'indubitable- 
ment se trouve la clef de la 
situation. 



Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken- 
in London. — (Communicated by 
1.914.) 

(Translation.) 

St. Petersburgh, 
July 15 {28), 1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

My interviews 1 with the Ger- 
man Ambassador confirm my 
impression that Germany is, if 
anything, in favour of the un- 
compromising attitude adopted 
by Austria. 

The Berlin Cabinet, who could 
have prevented 2 the whole of this 
crisis developing, appear to be ex- 
erting no 3 influence on their ally. 

The Ambassador considers that 
the Servian reply is insufficient. 

This attitude of the German 
Government is most alarming. 4 

It seems to me that Great 
Britain is in a better position 
than any other Power to make 
another attempt at Berlin to 
induce the German Government 
to take the necessary action. 5 
There is no doubt that the key 
of the situation is to be found at 
Berlin. 



From St. Petersburgh 
British Blue Book No. 55 

Sir (1. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Crey. — (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. 

With reference to my telegram of yesterday, 6 I saw the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory 
and more optimistic. 

1 No accounts of interviews between Sazonof and the German Ambassador are men- 
tioned in the Russian Orange Book in telegrams of July 26, 27, or 28. For Germany's 
attitude, see note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 2S,'and German White Book, p. 554. 

2 This is an assertion for which no proof has been advanced in the pul ilished despatches. 

3 See, however. German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. 

4 Contrast with this footnote to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 

6 That this action was taken appears from notes to British Blue Book No. 67, July 
28, and German White Book. Exhibit 16, same date. 
6 British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 



21)2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

He would, he said, use all his influence l at Belgrade to induce the 
Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to 
Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her 
rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become 
Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept 
friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, 
lie wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers through- 
out the conversations that would ensue. 

lie again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by 
Servia in 190S, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to 
the Powers. 

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference 
of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him 
confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether 
instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of 
views, which he had proposed.- The German Ambassador, to whom 
I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct 
exchange of views would he more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. 

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the 
Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that 
you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event 
of its taking place. 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 56 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914- 

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversa- 
tion with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Peters- 
burg]], he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Govern- 
ment and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure 
him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible 
to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she 
had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation 
crisis of 1909. lb' earnestly hoped that something would be done 
before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this 
would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the 
Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. 3 The Rus- 
sian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the 
Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, 
and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the 

' Of. French Yellow Book N... 4(1. .Inly 27. 

- Cf. British Blue Book No. 53. same date. 

3 If this should prove to have been the case, it would be very important, because 
a less yielding attitude could be expected of Austria-Hungary if hostilities had actually 
been befiun, not by Austria-Hungary, but by Serbia. The diplomatic documents con- 
tain no denial of this assertion. 



July 28, British Blue Book No. 57 263 

Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to 
fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice 
to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satis- 
factory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had yesterday 1 with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg]!. 
The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to 
Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically 
reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might 
reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good 
behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers 
to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly 
asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised 
to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 57 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany 
will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending 
the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practi- 
cally deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at 
present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any 
point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia 
will even now accept it 2 Austria will be satisfied, and if she had rea- 
son to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may 
defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety 
on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this 
would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to 
Austria-Hungary alone. 3 

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is 
favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government 
have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. 
He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the 
note. He assured me both before and after communication of the 

1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; and Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 31, July 27. 

2 This passage taken together with the previous telegram would seem to imply 
that on this date the Powers had not yet decided to condemn the Austrian demands 
as altogether unacceptable. Serbia took the same view, cf. British Blue Book No. 64, 
same day. 

3 If this suggestion had been pressed events might have been different. When 
Sir R. Rodd sent this telegram on July 27. he may not yet have known of Sir E. Grey's 
announcement on that date that the British fleet had been kept mobilised. It was 
this announcement which according to the London Daily News of August 1, 1914, 
stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and made war inevitable. 



26-4 Official Diplomatic Documents 

note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him 
assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia. 1 



From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 58 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 
(Received July ~S.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 191 1 

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this 
afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambas- 
sador, recorded in your telegram 2 to Berlin of the 27th July. 

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that 
it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident 
that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good 
effect in the interest of peace. 



Fro m Paris 

British Blue Book No. 59 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward drey. — 
(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of 
your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your 
telegram of yesterday 3 to St. Petersburgh. 

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the 
impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves 
"solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, 
which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He 
also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna 
more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources 
to the Russian Government. 

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the 
integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also 
would be respected, he gave no assurance. 4 

1 By this assurance it was hoped t" satisfy all legitimate demands of Russia, as 
Austria-Hungary saw them. From British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, it appears 
that, even Sazoiiof did not categorically reject the proposals made in this telegram. 

2 See No. 46, July 27. 

1 British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 

' It is difficult to sec how the I ierman Ambassador in Paris could have given assur- 
ances for Austria-Hungary. 



July 2S, British Blue Book No. 62 265 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 60 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914- 

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that 
reported in my telegram of yesterday l to my French and Italian 
colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two 2 col- 
leagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the 
proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he 
desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We 
therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be 
objecting to the form 3 of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could 
be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work 
with us. 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 61 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— {Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay war- 
like proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any sugges- 
tion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply. 4 

Prestige 5 of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now 
prevent conflict. 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 62 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- 

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of 
your telegram of 27th July 6 to Berlin. I avoided the word "media- 

1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. 

2 The text would appear to mean the French and Italian Ambassadors, but when 
only two are mentioned by one of the Entente Ambassadors the reference is generally 
to the ambassadors of the other two Entente Powers. 

3 That this was the case appears from British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 
<See note to German White Book, Exhibit Id, July 28. 

5 Austria-Hungary believed that her prestige, i.e. her existence as a great power, 
was at stake, and that her action against Serbia, therefore, was in self-defence. 

6 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 



266 Official Diplomatic Documents 

tion," but said that, as mentioned in your speech, 1 which he had just 
read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the 
four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which 
Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as 
rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had re- 
garded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of 
Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of 
discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abey- 
ance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this 
sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no 
discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war 
would be declared to-day and that well-known pacific character of 
Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own. might be accepted as a 
guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter 
that must lie settled directly between the two parties immediately 
concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities 
could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to com- 
plications threatening the peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, 1 begged him to believe that, 
if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should some- 
times differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy 
with the many just complaints 2 which Austria-Hungary had against 
Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first 
her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for 
peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would 
appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in 
mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like 
those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement 
and which could no longer be postponed. 3 



From Rome 

British Hi.ce Book No. 63 

Sir 1!. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, U>14- 

Your telegram of 25th July to Taris. 4 

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and 
Vienna. 

i "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. 

■ These just complaints which are here acknowledged to have existed, were a few 
days later iitin-lv lost si^ht of. 

' 1 ( !f. British Blue Book No. 61, July 28. 

< A footnote in the British Blue Book gives as reference No. 27. This can hardly 
!„• ilir despatch referred to here. The proper despatch is either not printed, or con- 
tained in No. 30 or 37. Their dates, however, are July 26. 



July 28, British Blue Book No. 65 267 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 64 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. 

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the 
following to you : — 

In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires 
had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding 
mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under 
article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian 
note. 1 

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such 
explanations to Servia, they might be given - to Powers engaged in 
discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without con- 
ditions. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published 
a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was 
considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many 
points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sen- 
tence regarding renunciation of propaganda — quite childish, but 
there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a 
course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d Affaires. 
It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to 
be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. 
Servia was said to have wilfully 3 misinterpreted this. He thought, 
therefore, that ground might be cleared here. 

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of 
Austrian declaration. 

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the imme- 
diate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at 
once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement 
with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador. 

From Nish 

British Blue Book No. 65 

Mr. CracJeantkorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. — (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation 4 
pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. 

1 As late as July 28. therefore, Serbia was almost ready to accept the Austro-Hun- 
garian note. For a discussion of articles 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
Nos. 31 and 34, July 27, and Nos. 21, 26 and 27, July 25. 

2 They were so given to Russia, see references given in preceding note. 

3 See Austro-Hungarian comment to Serbian replv, Red Book No. 34, July 27. 
4 Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24. note 3 and No. 22. July 25. The advice 

for moderation was not given until after the reply had been sent. 



268 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian 
merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at 
Orsova. 

From Nish 

British Blue Book No. 66 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. — (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 67 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July .28, 1914. 

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July ' of what 
was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not 
be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain 
what suggestion could be made Tor a settlement. No suggestion 
would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to 
be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating 
Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies. 

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views 
between Austria and Russia, I would suspend - every other sugges- 

1 British Blue Book No. 4:S. July 27. 

1 < 1. British Blue Book No. 77. .Inly 29. (See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 
47, .July 29. ) In view of the claim that Sir E. Grey consistently pressed his "eon- 
ference" idea, this passage is of importance. The entire subject has been discussed 
finin the German point of view l>v ( 'hancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech 
before the Reichstag, Aug. 1!), 1915, as follows: 

Tie statement that the whole war might have been avoided if I had agreed to accept 
the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey and take part in a conference for the regulation 
of the Russian-Austrian question at issue has again of late been repeatedly made in 
England. Here an- the real farts. The English proposals for a conference were de- 
livered here by the English Ambassador on tie- 27th of .lulv. The English Blue Book 
also shows that tie- Secretary of State at the Foreign Office m the convi rsation in 
question with Sir Edward Goschen —a conversation in which the Sea, tary designated 
tie- means proposed as unsuitable — had communicated to the English Ambassador 
that, according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonof was inclined to consider 
a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold. He was of the opinion that a 
direct conversation between Petrograd and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. 
For that reason it was best to await the results of this conversation. Sir Edward 

Goschen nmunieated this to London and received a telegraphic answer in which Sir 

Edward ' Irey used these words: 

" As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and 
Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as 1 entirely agree that it is the most 
preferable method of all." 

Thus Sir Edward Grey accepted tin- German point of view at that time, and ex- 
pressly withdrew his proposal of a conference for the time being. 

However, unlike Sir Edward < irey, I did not permit matters to rest with the platonic 
wish that a direct conversation might ensue between Vienna and Petrograd, but did 
everything within my power to persuade the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian 
governments to discuss their differences by an exchange ,,f opinions between their 
respective cabinets. I have once before declared in this very place that our endeavors 



July 28, British Blue Book No. 67 269 

tion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of 
all. 

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, 
and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and 
make the situation less critical. 

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador 
here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in 
the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday 
to you. 1 

at mediation, especially in Vienna, had been carried on in a manner, which, as I stated 
at the time, " went to the extreme limits of all that was compatible with our relations 
as an ally." Since this activity of mine as a mediator in the interests of preserving 
the peace has been repeatedly called in question in England, I shall prove by the 
evidence of facts that all these accusations are without foundation. 

On the evening of July 29 the following communication of the Imperial Ambassador 
at Petrograd reached Berlin : 

" M. Sazonof, who has just requested me to see him, communicates to me that 
the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to consider the desire he had 
expressed to enter into direct conversations. There was therefore nothing left to do 
save to return to the proposal of a conversation of four, as made by Sir Edward Grey." 

Since the Vienna government had in the meantime declared itself prepared for a 
direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that there must be some mis- 
understanding. I telegraphed to Vienna and made use of the opportunity once more 
to make a clear announcement of my own conception of the situation as a whole. My 
instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were as follows: 

" The communication of Count Pourtales is not in accordance with the represen- 
tations which Your Excellency has made of the attitude of the Austrian-Hungarian 
government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I beg you to explain. 
We cannot expect of Austria-Hungary a willingness to negotiate with Serbia, with 
whom she is already in a state of war.i But the refusal of all interchange of opinion 
with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty 
as an ally, but should Austria-Hungary ignore our advice, we must nevertheless decline 
to be drawn into a world conflagration, through Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice. 
Your Excellency will therefore at once and with all emphasis and earnestness express 
yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold." 

Herr von Tschirschky in answer to this communicated on July 30: 

" Count von Berchtold states that, as Your Excellency assumes, there has indeed 
been some misunderstanding in question, and that on the part of Russia. Having 
already received word of this misunderstanding also through Count Szapary, the 
Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador in Petrograd, and having at the same time followed 
our urgent suggestion that he enter into communication with Russia, he had at once 
given the necessary instructions to Count Szapary." 

Gentlemen, I made all this known to the British press, when excitement in England 
increased shortly before the outbreak of the war, and serious doubts as to our en- 
deavors to preserve peace became audible. And now after the event, that press 
makes the insinuation that this occurrence had never taken place at all and that the 
instructions to Herr von Tschirschky had been invented in order to mislead public 
opinion in England. You will agree with me that this accusation is unworthy of an 
answer. I would also allude at the same time to the Austrian Red Book which merely 
confirms my presentation of the case and shows how after the aforesaid misunder- 
standing had been cleared up, the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna had 
begun to take their course, until the general mobilization of the Russian army brought 
them to an untimely end. I repeat, gentlemen, that we have supported the direct 
discussion between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost emphasis and success. 

The assertion that we, by refusing to accept the English suggestion of a conference, 
must accept the blame for this war, belongs to the category of those calumnies under 
cover of which our enemies endeavor to hide their own guilt. The war became un- 
avoidable onlv through the Russian mobilisation. 

i Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibit 15. same 
date. The effect of Germany's continued pressure on Austria-Hungary appears from 
French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, 
July 29. 



270 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 6S 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1014- 

German Government, having accepted principle of mediation 
Ik 'tween Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am 
ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest 
the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, 
keep the idea in reserve ! until we see how the conversations between 
Austria and Russia progress. 

To St. Pctcrxburgh 

British Blue Book No. 69 

Sir Edward drey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Offi<r, July 28, 1014- 

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange 

of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported 

in your telegram of the 27th July. 2 

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would 

facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister 

for Foreign Affairs proposes 3 the Ministers at Belgrade should do. 

Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his 

willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take 

more concrete shape. 

Russia : 

To London 

Russian Orange Book No. 43 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
Lou/Inn. 
[See Xci. ">4 of British Correspondence, July 28, 1014.] 

From Finnic 

Russian Orange Book No. 44 

Russian Consul General at Fiumc to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914. 

State of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and 
at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up. 

1 Again Sir E. Grev defers to Sazonof's direct conversation idea. 

2 British Blue Book No. 55, July 27. 

3 The proposal referring to the Ministers at Belgrade has been omitted from the 
despatch No. 55, to which the Official Blue Book refers here. 



July 28, Russian Orange Book No. Ifi 



271 



From Vienna 
Russian Okange Book No. 45 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
Affairs. 

Vienne, 

le 15 {28) juillet, 1914. 

(Telegraphique.) 

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le 
Comte Berchtold ' dans le sens 
des instructions de votre Ex- 
cellence. Je lui fis observer, en 
termes les plus amicaux, combien 
il etait desirable de trouver une 
solution qui, en consolidant les 
bons rapports entre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait 
a la Monarehie austro-hongroise 
des garanties serieuses pour ses 
rapports futurs avec la Serbie. 

J'attirais 1 'attention du Comte 
Berchtold x sur tous les dangers 
pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'en- 
trainerait un conflit arme entre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. 

Le Comte Berchtold 1 me re- 
pondit qu'il se rendait parfaite- 
ment compte du serieux de la 
situation et des avantages d'une 
franche explication avec le Cabi- 
net de Saint-Pet ersbourg. II me 
dit que d'un autre cote le Gou- 
vernement austro-hongrois, qui 
ne s'etait decide que tres mal 
volontiers aux mesures ener- 
giques qu'il avait prises contre la 
Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, 
ni entrer en discussion aucune 
des termes de la note austro- 
hongroise. 

Le Comte Berchtold ' ajouta 
que la crise etait devenue si aigue, 
et que l'excitation de l'opinion 
publique avait atteint tel degre, 



to Russian Minister for Foreign 
(Translation.) 

Vienna, July 15 {28), IOI4. 
(Telegraphic.) 

I spoke to Count Berchtold ' 
to-day in the sense of your 
Excellency's instructions. 2 I 
brought to his notice, in the 
most friendly manner, how desir- 
able it was to find a solution 
which, while consolidating good 
relations between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Russia, would give to 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
genuine guarantees for its future 
relations with Servia. 

I drew Count Berchtold 's ' 
attention to all the dangers to 
the peace of Europe which would 
be involved by an armed conflict 
between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. 

Count Berchtold ' replied that 
he was well aware of the gravity 
of the situation and of the ad- 
vantages of a frank explanation 
with the St. Petersburgh Cabi- 
net. He told me that, on the 
other hand, the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government, who had 
only decided much against their 
will on the energetic measures 
which they had taken against 
Servia, could no longer recede, 
nor enter into any discussion 
about the terms of the Austro- 
Hungarian note. 

Count Berchtold ' added that 
the crisis had become so acute, 
and that public opinion had risen 
to such a pitch of excitement, 



1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

2 No despatch containing these instructions is printed in the Russian Orange Book. 



272 Official Diplomatic Documents 

que le Gouvernement, le voulait- that the Government, even if 

il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, they wished it, could no longer 

d'autant moins, me dit-il, que consent to such a course. This 

la n'ponse meme de la Serbie was all the more impossible, he 

donne la preuve du manque de said, inasmuch as the Servian 

sincerite de ses promesses pour reply itself furnished proof of 

l'avenir. the insincerity of Servia's 

promises for the future. 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Book No. 46 

Russian Charge (V Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 15 {28), int.',. 

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian 
reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present 
this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local papers, which, 
tn all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being 
well aware of the calming * effect which it would have on German 
readers. 

From Vienna 

Russian Orange Book No. 47 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914. 

The order for general mobilisation has been signed. 2 

To London 

Russian Orange Book No. 48 

Hussion Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
London. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 15 {28), 1014. 

In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, 
it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory 
action," and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against 

1 Germany undoubtedly waited until she received the Austro-Hungarian com- 
ments, which were sent by mail from Vienna on July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 39, July 28). German newspapers are always antedated, the paper dated 
July 28 being issued on the evening of July 27. 

- If "signed" means issued, this information is probably inaccurate. For a com- 
plete discussion of this subject see M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War. 
('has. Scribner's Sons, p. 69, who says "This confirms the supposition that Austria 
had not mobilised more than eight army corps before August 1st." 

3 Sazonof apparently had now given up his plan of direct conversation with Austria, 
which he had sought since July '-Mi, and also Sir E. Grey's plan of- a conference, and 



July 28, Serbian Blue Book No. 47 273 

Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation 
will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will 
meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely 
and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans. 
Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

Serbia : 

From Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 45 ' 

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914. 

The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satis- 
factory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal 
Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding 
of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse 
to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself 
henceforward in state of war with Serbia. 2 

To All Serbian Legations 

Serbian Blue Book No. 46 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at 
noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government. 

To Petrograd 

Serbian Blue Book No. 47 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Your Excellency, Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914- 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received 
from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from 
Nish at 2.10 p.m. 

urged the other plan of British direct mediation which probably had been outlined in 
the third despatch referred to in French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, but not printed 
in full in the Yellow Book or in the Blue Book. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 44, 
July 'J7. 

1 For Serbian Blue Book No, 44 see July 30, 1914. 

2 This was notified to the Powers in a despatch printed British Blue Book No. 50, 
July 28. 



274 Official Diplomatic Documents 

"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia 
to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government." 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable 
act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small 
Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic 
but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity 
for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the 
peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the 
whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector 
of Serbia. 1 

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from 
the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty. 

I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty 2 
and respect. 

I have, etc. 

1 Of. also the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince, Russian Orange Book No. 6, 
July 24, and the Czar's reply, Russian Orange Book No. 41), July 27. 

'According to one's interpretation of the Serbian relations to Russia, the word 
"loyalty" is either significant or merely a polite phrase. 



July 29, 1914 



275 



Wednesday, July 29, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 


London, Petrograd, 


Paris, Berlin, Petro- 




Paris, and Rome 


grad 




Berlin 




Belgium 


London etc. 





France 


London etc., London 


Rome, Petrograd, Brus- 
sels, Frankfort, Mu- 
nich, Vienna, Berlin, 
London, Belgrade 


Germany 


Paris 

Emperor to Czar 


Czar to Emperor 


Great Britain 


Rome, Berlin, Paris, 


Berlin, Petrograd, Vi- 




Vienna 


enna, Rome, < nn- 
stantinople, Nish, 
from Russian Am- 
bassador 


Russia 


Berlin, London and 


Berlin, Nish, Paris, 




Paris, 


London 




Paris 


Serbian Crownprince 
to Czar. 



Serbia 

Austria-Hungary makes renewed efforts to convince the Powers of the justice 
of her case, and unequivocally accepts Sir E. Grey's first proposal of mediation 
between Petrograd and Vienna. At the same time, while refusing to discuss the 
"wording of the note," she is ready to have direct conversations with Petrograd 
on ' ' a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that she had no desire to injure 
any Russian interests" nor to annex territory or to touch the "sovereignty of 
Serbia." She is much disturbed by French and especially Russian mobilisation 
and announces that the latter may force her to proceed to general mobilisation 
on her part. 

Belgium announces that she has "decided to place her army upon a strengthened 
peace footing." 

France continues to be suspicious of Germany, whom she holds responsible for 
Austria-Hungary's determination to put a stop to Serbian intrigues. While 
publishing many notices to the effect that Germany and Austria-Hungary were 
mobilising, she makes no mention of the Russian mobilisation except as measures 
of defence forced upon Russia. Several of the French despatches published on this 
day are by their contents proved to have been written earlier. 

Germany is greatly troubled by the mobilisation going on in France and Russia 
and declares that if it continues she will have to declare Kriegsgefa.hr. The 
Emperor exchanges telegrams with the Czar begging him to intercede for peace. 
Germany continues her pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with 
Russia, and wishes to work together with Great Britain, whose neutrality she 
wishes to secure in case of war. 

Great Britain believes direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd "the 
best possible solution." Sir E. Grey is erroneously informed that Austria- 
Hungary has refused them, and reverting to his conference or mediation plan 
declares his willingness to accept "any method that Germany thought possible in 
the interests of peace." In case of war, Sir E. Grey declares, England would "have 
to decide what British interests required." The suggestion of a possible invasion 
of Belgium first broached on this day is not denounced as wrong. Sir E. Grey also 



276 Official Diplomatic Documents 

suggests that Austria should halt after taking Belgrade to give the Powers the 
chance of adjusting the difficulties. 

Russia claims that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests. She 
also claims that Austria-Hungary had "categorically refused to continue an 
exchange of ideas," and mobilises the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and 
Kasan. Receiving France's promise of unconditional support she "hastens" her 
"military preparations." 

Serbia dors not publish any documents of this day. 

Italy suggests that Austria-Hungary "convert into a binding engagement to 
Europe" her declaration that she wished neither "to destroy the independence of 
Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory." Unfortunately this suggestion was not 
pressed, for Italy believed that thus "Russia might be induced to remain quiet." 

Austria-Hungary : 

To St. Petershurgh, London, Paris, and Rome 

AUSTUO-HUNGARIAN Red Book No. 44 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal A mbassadors at St. Peters- 
burgh, London, Paris, and Rome. 

(Telegraphic. ) Vienna, July 29, 1911,.. 

For your Excellency's information. 

I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the 
following memorandum in answer to a demarche made here by him : ' 

Memorandum 

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep 
gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial Ger- 
man Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst. 1 with regard to the 
request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Govern- 
ment should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they r 
might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a 
basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British 
Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal 
Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact 
that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of till our 
demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, 2 
but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which 
materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. 
The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which 
contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view. 

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their aston- 
ishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was 
directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for 
this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the 
Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin. 3 The basis 

1 This serins to refer to German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, 
July 28. See also British Blue Book No. 84, July 29. 
- British Bin.- Book Nos. 46 and 48, July 27. 
3 The logic of this inference is from the Austro-Hungarian point of view irrefutable. 



•July 29, Austro-ll ungarian Red Book No. 1±5 277 

of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has 
no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Mon- 
archy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against 
Servia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, 
are entirely friendly. 

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that 
to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an 
attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British sug- 
gestion, since at the time of the demarche made by Germany a state of 
war between the Monarchy and Servia had already arisen, and the 
Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events. 

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of 
observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they 
communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation 
of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse 
without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view con- 
tained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on 
our side. 

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Rus- 
sian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between 
the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which 
has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the 
Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this. 1 

From Paris 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 45 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Park, July 29, 1914. 

France is unmistakably making certain military preparations 
as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exag- 
geration. 

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is commissioned 
to discuss these preparations 2 with M. Viviani to-day, and to point 
out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take 
similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and 
which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they be- 
came known. In this way the two countries, although they are only 
striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, 
which would be dangerous. 

Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will 
declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us 
and Servia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies 
on the support of France. 

1 This is an unequivocal acceptance of Sir K. Grey's origirial proposal of mediation 
between Petrosrrad and Vienna. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, referring to "yesterday afternoon," i .e. 
July 29. 



278 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGAHIAN RED BOOK No. 46 

Count Szogyeny to Count Bcrchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Peters- 
burgh that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German 
mobilisation. 1 

Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced 
in my telegram of the 27th inst. 2 Following this a telegram has 
to-day been sent to St. Petersburgh, stating that owing to the fur- 
ther progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany 
might be brought to mobilise. 3 

From St. Petersburgh 

ArsTKn-IIi ingarian Red Book No. 47 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 

As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof 
is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged 
disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over 
the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much 
more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against 
Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder- 
standings which seemed to me to exist. 

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary 
categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed 
in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your 
Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to dis- 
cuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian- 
Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a 
position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion 4 in declaring 
that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no 
intention, naturally on the assumption that 'the conflict between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian 
territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of 
Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready 
to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh with regard to Austro-Hun- 
garian and Russian interests. 

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of 
this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of 

1 Cf. German White Book Exhibits 10 and 10b, July 26. 

• Sri- Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33. July 27. 

3 Not given in the I lerman White Book or the Russian Orange Book. Cf. Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 42, July 28. 

>CI. Chancellor's Speei-h, note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. 



July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47 279 

the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that 
to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a 
vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the 
Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He 
returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of 
Sir E. Grey, etc., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia 
recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satis- 
faction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be 
acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Rus- 
sian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that 
Russian interests x were in this case Servian interests, so that I was 
obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new 
topic. 

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety 
in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against 
Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing 
about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this 
anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unpreju- 
diced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could 
not constitute a menace for Russia. 

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial 
Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was 
urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy 
end should be put to the military competition (lizitieren) which now 
threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very 
characteristically expressed the view that he could communicate this 
to the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day. 

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed 
to-day, which woidd give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat 
extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most 
official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They 
would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans 
should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for 
the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the 
Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any 
case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also al- 
ready so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's atten- 
tion to the impression which such a measure would make in our 
country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note 
would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister 
again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness( ! ) of 
this measure. 

1 A possible explanation of the remark that "Russian interests were in this case 
Serbian interests" may be found in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, where Sazonof 
cannot allow "Austria to become the predominant Power in the Balkans." 



280 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 48 

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914- 

I have just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian 
Ambassador has told him that he lias been notified by his Government 
that the military districts of Kicfi', Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are 
being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as 
a Great Power, 1 and was obliged to take corresponding measures. 
The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our 
Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial 
and Royal Military Attache, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had 
to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied. 2 

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the 
knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to 
emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not 
stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on 
military grounds, to follow at once. 

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it 
desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany 
at St. Petersburg]], and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be 
instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are ac- 
credited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian 
mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences. 3 

Your Excellency will add that, as can lie understood, in our military 
operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted 
from our path. 

The Imperial anil Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and 
Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declara- 
tion as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions. 

To St. Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 49 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July -if), 1914- 

In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July. 
I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your 
Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to 

1 The reason win- "Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power" is nut 
piven. The interesting part of this passage is that Austria-Hungary was not the 
only country which believed that her honor as a Great Power demanded a certain 
course of action of her. 

- See German White Book. Narrative, pp. 351 to 360. 

3 This was evidently an attempt on Austria's part to keep the peace among the 
nations. 



July 29, French Yellow Book No. S4 281 

Servia which however has already been outstripped by recent events. 
I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the sug- 
gestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this 
occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which 
affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be 
hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have 
arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our 
relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object. 1 

Belgium : 

To Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, Si. Petersburg}!, Rome, The Hague, 
and Luxemburg 

Belgian Gray Book No. 8 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, Loudon, Vienna, St. Petersburg, 
Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Sir, Brussels, July 29, 1,914. 

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a 
strengthened peace footing. 

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. 

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in 
some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace 
footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened 
peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions 
and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength 
as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones 
of the neighbouring Powers. 

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which 
may be addressed to you. 

France : 

From Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 84 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 29, 1914. 

The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war 
by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts 
for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation 
should be interrupted. Barrere. 

1 This is another evidence that Germany's influence upon Vienna was having 
effect or that Austria-Hungary of her own accord was willing to try and avert a general 
war by making explanations to Russia. 



2S2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople. 
French Yellow Book No. S5 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. 

Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, 

Belgrade. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 
The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, un- 
easy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity 1 
of tin- crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, 
and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events 
are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian 
Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany 
intervenes 2 between her ally and the other Powers and declares that 
the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political 
crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that 
the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German 
Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official 
and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does 
not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the in- 
tegrity of Servia ; in these circumstances the danger of war can only 
come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is 
well defined. In these circumstances any action for the mainten- 
ance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburgh alone. 

This sophism, 3 which would relieve Germany from intervening at 
Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von 
Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco- 
German action at St. Petersburgh ; it has been also expounded in 
London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given 
that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet have, from the beginning, given 
the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating 
themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the re- 
quirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any 
way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it 
is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they 
refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia 
to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation 
of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be 
arranged between Austria and Servia ; and, finally, that they do not 
hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original 
Austro-Hungarian note. 

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the 
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe- 

1 The U. S. diplomatic agent. Mr. F. II. Mallett, reported to the Department of 
State in Washington at the time that the Serajevo murder was undoubtedly instigated 
by Serbia, and that a world war might ensue. See X, w York Herald. July 30, 1914. 

2 For Germany's explanation of her action, see German White Book, Exhibit 1, 
and British Blue Book No. (37, July 28, witli not,'. 

3 Granting that this term is used in all sincerity, it shows how widely apart France 
and Germany were in viewing the events leading up to the war, since the expression 
of Germany's honest belief appeared as a "sophism" to France. 



July 29, French Yellow Book No. 87 283 

guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the 
idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being 
suggested, 1 and while they refuse to take any positive action at 
Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Peters- 
burgh in play with the illusion of an entente which might result 
from direct conversations, while they are taking action against 
Servia. 

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh 
Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, 
should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal. 2 
This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide 
Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping 
Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic ad- 
vantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government 
would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to im- 
pose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," condi- 
tions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandise- 
ment was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern 
Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general 
peace either at once or in the near future. 

BiENVENU-jNIaRTIN. 

From. St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 86 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienverm- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 
I am now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian 
Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great 
Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British col- 
league is telegraphing to London to the same effect. 3 

Paleologue. 

From Brussels 

French Yellow Book No. S7 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, July 29, 1914. 
I report the following impressions of my interview with M. 
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in- 

1 This is an error, see Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 07, July 
2S. 

2 This shows that Russia had not accepted the conference idea on July 29. France 
and Russia, therefore, seem to be working somewhat at variance with each other — 
see, however, next number. 

3 British Blue Book No. 7S, July 29, which gives as the reason for Sazonof's willing- 
ness to have a conference that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined 
direct conversation." See, however, Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book 
No. 67, July 28. 



284 Official Diplomatic Documents 

formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies 
every apprehension ; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, ac- 
cording to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without 
previous arrangement with the Emperor William. 1 

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to 
take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but 
there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention 
against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and 
British colleagues share this feeling. 

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with 
the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that every- 
thing will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the 
country. 

Klobukowski. 

From Frankfort 

French Yellow Book No. 88 

M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Frankfort, July 29, 1914. 

I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and 
to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived 
lure, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Tassel, and Mayence, 
which arc full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded 
under the pretext 2 of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres. 

Ronssin. 

From Munich 

French Yellow Book No. S9 3 

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Act- 
ing Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Munich, .July 29, 1914. 

I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have 
been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all 
their output for the army. 

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport 
of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles. 

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non- 
commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at 

1 This seems to have been France's firm conviction. For a discussion of Germany's 
influence or lack of influence on Austria-Hungary see John W. Burgess, The European 
War. A. C. McClurg& Co., Chicago. 

J The annual manoeuvres in Germany begin in July. For the subject of German 
mobilisation see M. G. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Seribner's 
Sons, and E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. 

3 See note to No. ss. 



July 29, Fretwh Yellow Book No. 91 285 

Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders 
yesterday to return immediately. 

Allize. 



From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 90 ' 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 29, 191 4- 

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 
8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the 
Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in 
Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from 
Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian 
frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district. 

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in 
order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order 
to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a general mobilisa- 
tion of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, 
it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow. 

Dumaine. 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 91 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg}:, to M. Bienven it- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had 
invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has 
been refused by the latter. 2 

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied them- 
selves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against 
Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on 
the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be de- 
spatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to 
operate eventually against Austria. 

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts 3 the 
idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he dues 
not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discus- 
sions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace. 

Paleologue. 

1 See note to No. 88. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and for the error in this statement 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

3 This contains the information given above as a separate telegram, No. 86. 



286 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 92 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bieiirnnt- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 29, 191.'+. 

I asked the Secretary of State to-day ' how the question of direct 
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed 
to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a detente, stood. He 
answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed towards 
them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was 
awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the sug- 
gestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would 
view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria 
and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Im- 
perial Government are not failing to do. 

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian 
reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw 
in it a basis for possible negotiation. 2 I added that it was just on 
that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had 
received such a document, inexplicable. 

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations 
one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished 
to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a 
supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary 
of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Ilerr von Jagow that 
Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject 
the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission 
would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more 
than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One 
could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Pro- 
visional International Commission, charged with the duty of control- 
ling the police inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this 
instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations 
and did not justify a rupture. 

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conver- 
sations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh to which Sir E. Grey 
had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could 
be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. 
He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the 
London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their in- 
fluence in support of direct conversations. 

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the 

1 The contents of this telegram seem to refer to events of the previous day. 

2 This cannot possibly have l>een said on July 29. since Austria-Hungary had de- 
elared war on Serbia, and the latter had begun the hostilities on July 27, cf. British 
Blue Book No. 56 under date of July 28. 



July 29, French Yellow Book No. 93 287 

British Ambassador to come and see him. 1 He spoke to him of the 
proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference ; he told him 
that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to im- 
pose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my col- 
league of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was mak- 
ing to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able 
to maintain peace or let loose war. 

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war 
broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmis- 
sible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter. 

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was 
trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria 
and Russia ; he knew that England looked on such conversations 
with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be 
rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had 
mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked 
my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said. 

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect. 2 

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the 
last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite 
the last days they flattered themselves here that England would 
remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the Ger- 
man Government and on the financiers and business men by her 
attitude is profound. 

Jules Cambon. 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 93 3 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bicnrcrin-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees 
with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak 
of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid 
the collision have failed. 

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Peters- 
burgh by MM. Sazonof and Szapary should be continued and made 
more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but 
Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that 
Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would 
prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia. 

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the im- 
minence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhab- 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, received and listed under July 29. This 
interview took place on July 28, and proves that this French despatch is wrongly 
dated. 

2 British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, but received and therefore listed under July 29. 

3 This despatch, like the previous one, while dated July 29, must have been written 
before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which was on July 28. 



288 Official Diplomatic Documents 

itants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings 
to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, 
but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict. 

Dumaine. 

To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, 
Belgrade 

French Yellow Book No. 94 

M. Birnrrnn-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, 
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Borne, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade, 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

The following communication was semi-officially made to me this 
morning by the German Ambassador: — 

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to 
obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly con- 
versation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating 
exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The 
Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind 
to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the 
declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication 
will lie made at St. Petersburgh. 

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning 
with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German 
Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. 
When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a 
basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to 
intervention easier. 

When I observed that the military operations which had been 
begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that 
the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to 
delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exer- 
cise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not 
be pushed forward very actively. 

Bienyent-Martin. 

To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople. Rome, 
lie/grade 

French Yellow Book No. 95 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Lo>idon, 
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to commu- 
nicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. 1 It appears 

1 This telegram is not published either in the Russian Orange Book or the German 
White Book. It mav be the telegram British Blue Book No. 70 published under 
date of July 29. 



July 29, French Yellow Book No. 90 289 

from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war 
by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already 
taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, 
and finally the refusal ' of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations 
between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise 
in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While in- 
forming the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambas- 
sador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions 
were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not 
imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore 
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. 

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two tele- 
grams 2 addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after point- 
ing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the con- 
versations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, 
asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with 
a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian 
military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to 
crush Servia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second com- 
municated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conver- 
sations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's 
uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. 
The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very 
disquieting, 3 and considers that England is in a better position than 
the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising 
pressure on Vienna. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 96 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

Rome, July 29, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by 
the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of 
the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of 
mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, 
had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, 
Moscow and Kazan. 4 He added that this step had no aggressive 
character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna had not been recalled. 

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano 
told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Ger- 
many had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not 

1 For the error of this statement see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

2 British Blue Book Nos. 93, 2 and 3, July 30. 

3 This statement is not contained in the despatch presented in London. 

4 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 48, July 29. 



290 Official Diplomatic Documents 

move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati 
reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von 
Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did 
not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact 
that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to 
treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at 
Berlin also told his British colleague that lie did not believe in a general 
war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make 
war. 1 

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He 
thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and 
with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material 
advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find 
some means of coining to an agreement with her. But if Austria 
wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent 
State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to inter- 
vene by military measures. 

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of 
an agreement. lie thinks that England can still exercise a great 
deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yester- 
day, he told me, a long conversation with the Britisli Ambassador, 
Sir R. Rodd, 2 in order to show him to what extent British interven- 
tion might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your 
Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make 
representations to this effect in London." 3 r, 

B.VRRERE. 

To London 

French Yellow Book No. 97 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, 

Paris, Jul;/ ,.>.<>, 1914. 

I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good 
enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he 
may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of media- 
tion by the four Bowers, which had in principle 4 obtained the ad- 
herence of the German Government. 

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the 
same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of 
war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Rus- 
sian frontier, •' the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician 

1 This statement, if true, seems to disprove the assertion popularly made that 
( iermany and Austria-Hungary wished to bring about a general war. 

2 Of. British Blue Book No. ."iT, written July 27, but received and published under 
date of July -'s. Barrere says "yesterday," which shows that also this telegram was 
u i u ten, at least in part, on July 28. 

' For this interview see British Blue Book No. SO, July 29. 

' British Blue Book No. 40, July 27. 

'•' There is no proof given for this assertion. 



July 29, French Yellow Book No. 98 291 

frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian con- 
versations. 

The explanations which the German Government are going to 
ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von 
Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention 
of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise 
effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburgh for the main- 
tenance of peace. 

I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State 
how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Gov- 
ernment the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in 
co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace. 

Rene Viviani. 



From London 

French Yellow Book No. 98 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 29, 1914. 

In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey 
observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations 
between Russia and Austria not having been accepted 1 at Vienna, 
it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention 
by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This sugges- 
tion has been accepted in principle 2 by the German Government, 
but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lich- 
nowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose 
a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance 
of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy. 

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's 
request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this 
conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that 
Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia con- 
cerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier 
would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. 
My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions 
of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present. 

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation 
very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution. 

Paul Cambon. 

1 This error makes the round in the Entente despatches. Cf. Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 47, July 29, where Austria-Hungary, while unwilling to discuss "(lie 
wording of the note," makes it "clear that I [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] was in a 
position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion." 

* British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 



29- Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Belgrade 
French Yellow Book No. 99 

.1/. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Biemoemu-Martin, 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 29, 1014. 

The Crown Prince, as sunn as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
was received, telegraphed ' to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian 
colleague tells me that lie has just communicated to M. Pashitch 
His Majesty's reply. 

The Tsar thanks - the Prince for having turned to him at so critical 
a juncture ; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a 
peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince 
that, if this object cannot he attained, Russia will never cease to 
interest herself in the fate of Servia. 

Boppe. 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 100 

.1/. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bieu- 
renu-Martin. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 

The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia 
doe-, not stop her military preparations the German army will re- 
ceive the order to mobilise. 

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been 
caused. 3 on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising atti- 
tude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro- 
Hungarian army corps are already mobilised. 

The tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication 
has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the 
mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against 
Austria. 

P.VLEOLOGUE. 

Germany : 

To Paris 

German White Book Exhibit 17 

f the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on 
July 29th, 1914. 
News received here regarding French preparations of war multi- 
plies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the 

1 Russian < (range Book No. 6, July 24. - Russian Orange Book Xo. 40, July 27. 

1 i.ccoi ling to this despatch part of the Russian mobilization had t ikon place pre- 
viously, while part was to be ordered on the evening of July 29. Asreg 
mobilization orders cf. the word of honor given by the Russian ( Ihief of Staff, 1 
White Book. p. 556, that up to :i p.m., July 29, " nowhere there had been a mobilisa- 
tion, viz. calling in of a single man or h 



July 20, German. White Book Exhibit 22 293 

French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would 
call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to pro- 
claim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while 
this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the 
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preser- 
vation of peace. 

From the Czar 

German White Book Exhibit 21 

//. The Czar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 P.M. 

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment 
I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been 
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation 
which 1 fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be 
unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall 
be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent su<-h a 
calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of 
our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally 
from going too far. 

(Signed) Nicolas. 

To St. Petersburgh 

German White Book Exhibit 22 

III. His Majesty to the Czar. 

July 29th, 6.30 P.M. 

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the 
conservation of peace. However : I cannot — as I told You in my 
first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an " igno- 
minious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the 
promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely 
unreliable. 

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be 
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises 
of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am 
strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Aus- 
tria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. 
I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to 
remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing 
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a 
direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Govern- 
ment and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already 
telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all pos- 
sible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might 
be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a 
calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine 



294 Official Diplomatic Documents 

my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friend- 
ship and aid — I willingly accepted. 

(Signed) Wilhelm. 

Great Britain : 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 70 

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador 
in London, July 29, 1914. 

(1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, 
dated July 28, 191 ',. 

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Ser- 
via, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the 
mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Mos- 
cow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming 
the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from 
his post. 

(2.) Telegram to Cmml Benckendorff} 

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end 2 to the idea 
of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by 
London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to 
suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now 
most urgent. 

Inlcss military operations are stopped, mediation would only 
allow matters to drag tin and give Austria time to crush Servia. 3 



From Berlin 

British Blce Book No. 71 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
i Received Jul// 29. ) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency 
this evening. 4 lie said that he wished me to tell you that he was 
most anxious that Germany should work together with England for 
maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the 

1 Russian Ambassador in London. 

•This seems to indicate that Sazonof considered the direct conversations closed. 
Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, and footnote 1 to French Yellow 
Book No. 'is, July L>!>. 

' i I French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, where two telegrams from Sazonof to 
Count Benckendorff are mentioned. The second one is not given here. It was of a 
kind li> arouse suspicion of ( iennany. There is. however, nothing either in the British 
Blue Hook or I he Russian Orange Book that would have borne it out. 

4 ( 'f. French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 72 295 

last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal 
for a conference l of representatives of the Great Powers, because he 
did not think that it would be effective, and because such a con- 
ference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" 
consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon 
the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed 
conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong 
desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was 
doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the 
two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other 
and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions 
would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news 
were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had 
mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation 
was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, 
as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue 
to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as 
yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar meas- 
ures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. 2 
I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian 
note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded 
by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, 
surely a certain portion of responsibility would, rest with her. His 
Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but 
that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel 
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had 
nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England 
and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A 
war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last 
words. 

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most 
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. 
I think that that opinion is shared by many people here. 3 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 72 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir FjI- 
ward Grey. — (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1911,. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the 
language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in 

1 From British Blue Book No. 46. July 27, it appears that Germany had accepted 
"in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers." 

2 This claim made on July 29 is important because later France wished to make it 
appear that Germany was not sincere and advanced this argument too late to deserve 
any credence. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1. 

3 If true this would seem to disprove the charge that either Germany or Austria- 
Hungary was plotting to bring about a world war. 



296 Official Diplomatic Documents 

your telegram : to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his 
Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having 
received the same disquieting 2 news from Vienna as had reached His 
Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should 
know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him 
whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian 
Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of 
Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any 
arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by 
His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if 
Servia were attacked Russia would not he satisfied with any engage- 
ment which Austria might take on these two points, and that order 
for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that 
Austria crossed Servian frontier. 

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give 
moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from 
the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Am- 
bassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining in- 
fluence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being 
thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not he averted if Servia 
were attacked by Austria. 

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had 
received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and 
Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions. 



From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 7:i 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 
23rd July 3 in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government 
is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have 
recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has ad- 
dressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of con- 
vention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and 
considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria- 
Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of 
Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of 
London of 26th February, 1909. ' 

1 See No. 46, July 27. 

' Ci . however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

3 See No. -I. July 2 4. 

J In view of later events this declaration of Austria-Hungary is very important. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 75 2<J7 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 74 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
— (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian 
Government's suggestion 1 has been declined by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means 
of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly 
between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly. 

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London 
of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now 
the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that 
the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. 
So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all 
hope need not be abandoned. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 75 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told 
me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had 
answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was there- 
fore too late 2 to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply 
might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiv- 
ing their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he ex- 
plained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been 
shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he under- 
stood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would 
carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past 
experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which 
were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the 
exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Aus- 
trian Government had already assured the Russian Government that 
they had no territorial tlesigns. 

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view 
be correct, to speak openly in this sense. 3 The holding of such 

1 I.e. direct conversations. That this was an error appears from Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

2 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29. 

3 Austria-Hungary did so, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 



298 Official Diplomatic Documents 

language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstand- 
ings. 

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. 

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving 
advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that 
he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of Euro- 
pean complications. 

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a 
proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his 
anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support 
your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely 
appreciated. 

British Blue Book No. 76 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Echeard Grey. — 

{Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1.91 4. 

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. lie reminded 
me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful 
in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed 
would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a 
fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, 1 and he was not 
sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply 
offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. 
He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of 
certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in 
France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French 
colleague, who informed him that French Government had done 
nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, re- 
called officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government 
had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. 2 My French col- 
league said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, 
that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so 
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable 
for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come for- 
ward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. 3 Under- 
Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as 
he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed 
by you. 

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial 
Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. 

1 Germany forwarded Sir E. Grey's proposal to Vienna on July 2S, and on the same 
day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. From this despatch it would seem that 
the German Secretary of State feared lest it was his urging mediation too strongly 
thai had induced Vienna t" declare war. 

- Whether Sir E. Goschen was mistaken in this statement or not, it is impossible to 
state it this writing. From M. P. Price, Tin Diplomatic History of the War. < lias. 
Scribner's Sons, chapters on Mobilisation, it would appear that the above statement 
was erroneous. See also E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. pp. 22-1 ff. 

3 This seems to imply France's acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's war on Serbia 
provided she did not press it too far. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 78 299 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 77 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914- 

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in 
your telegram of to-day. 1 His Excellency may rely upon it that 
this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to 
secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce 
Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come 
into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his 
Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe. 2 

From St. Petersburg!! 

British Blue Book No. 7S 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. — (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29,1914. 

Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day. 

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th in- 
stant 3 to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance 
with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks 
as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made 
to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his 
Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, 
would only be directed against Austria. 

Austrian Government had now definitely declined 4 direct conver- 
sation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for For- 
eign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on 
advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing 
German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return 
should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassa- 
dors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three 
Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian 
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved 
by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not 
care what form such conversations took. Xo time was to be lost, 
and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, 
by mean of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or 
individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to 

• See No. 75. 

2 This was written after Germany had found herself unable to accept Sir E. 
Grey's first plan of a conference, accepting it, however, in principle. Since the out- 
break of the war Germany has been held responsible for the war because she rejected 
the conference plan. On July 29 Sir E. Grey apparently did not hold the view that 
Germany's refusal of accepting his conference plan either indicated Germany's deter- 
mination to have war, or shut the door to all pacific efforts. See also note 2 to British 
Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 

3 See No. 67, July 28. 

* This is the same error previously made in the Entente telegrams. See Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 



300 Official Diplomatic Documents 

accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank 
and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. 
If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be 
realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian 
Government. 

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion 
made in Rome telegram of the 27th July, 1 which I mentioned to him, 
were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree 
to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable 
to Servia ; he could nut, he said, be more Servian than Servia. 2 
Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have 
to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your 
telegram of the 28th instant :i was one of secondary importance. 
Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight 
to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excel- 
lency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at 
Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambas- 
sador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own 
Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused 
the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by 
their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been 
recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. 
I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned 
all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, 
that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared 
war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she 
knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humilia- 
tion for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown 
that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's 
desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any 
lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand 
that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier imme- 
diately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobili- 
sation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous 
situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work 
together. 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 7!) 

Sir M. (Ic Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 

(iritl. —{Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop 
war with Servia, to which Austro-IIungarian Government are now 
fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has 

1 See No. 57, received July 28. 

2 For a similar phrase see British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 
1 See Xo. 69, July 2S. 



July 20, British Blue Book No. SO 301 

been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French 
and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro- 
Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement 
to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh 
to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of 
Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador 
thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. 1 This, how- 
ever, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government 
would refuse to do. 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. SO 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 2.9, 1014- 

In your telegram of the 27th instant - to Berlin, German Am- 
bassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a 
conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th 
instant 3 from Berlin. 4 

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin 
shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's 
telegram of the 27th July, ' but what creates difficulty is rather the 
"conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than 
the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending 
to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in 
London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might 
propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for For- 
eign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the 
door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Peters- 
burgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of 
views might be concomitant with such direct communication. 

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian 
Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless 
they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging 
that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this. 

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany 
believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was 
really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that 
Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would 
have a great effect. 6 

1 If the Italian Ambassador was right, it is unfortunate that no attempt wis 
made, — at least none appear in the despatches, — to invite Austria-Hungary to take 
this "binding riiLML'ernent." 

2 See No. 46, Julv 27. 
' See No. 43, July 27. 

4 Cf . German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, where Germany has taken action 
"in the sense as desired bv Sir Edward Grev." 
See No. 43, July 27. 

6 It is interesting to have Italy use the same argument that Russia had advanced 
as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. G. 



302 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, 
he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing 
one group, should continue to exchange views. 1 

To Rome 
British Blue Book No. 81 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

With reference to your telegram of yesterday. 2 

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors 
here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that 
Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and 
the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Aus- 
tria v, ill not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between 
Austria and Servia. 3 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must 
therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable 
reception is given to any suggestions he can make there. 

From. Constantinople 

British Blue Hook No. 82 

Mr. Beaumont, British Charge" d 'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir 
Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 191 4- 

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend consider- 
ably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian terri- 
tory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Am- 
bassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of 
Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which 
the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population dis- 
contented with Servian rule. 4 

From Nish 

British Blue B s No. S3 

Mr. Crachanthorpe, British Charge" d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. — (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914. 

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expres- 
sion of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 
27th instant in the House of Commons. 

1 For this entire interview cf. French Yellow Book No. 90. July 29. 
- See No. 64, July 2*. 

3 Mediation between Austria and Serbia was the French wish rejected by Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. Germany was in favor of mediation between Vienna and 
Petroiirad. See German White Book, Exhibit 13. July 25. 

4 This despatch stands alone and unsupported by any other. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 85 303 

i 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. S4 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1.914- 

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German 
Chancellor x to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between 
Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and he hopes with good success. Aus- 
tria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring 
to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh 
the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told 
the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between 
Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. 2 I would 
press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my in- 
formation this morning 3 was that the Austrian Government have 
declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Aus- 
trian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss 
directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of 
settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at 
St. Petersburgh had been told that Russian Government would 
mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favour- 
able in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. 
They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consul- 
tation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London too 
formal a method. I urged that the German Government should 
suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could 
be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France 
agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating 
influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that 
Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact media- 
tion was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany 
thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the 
interests of peace. 4 

From Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 85 6 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1911 

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency 
had just returned from Potsdam. 

1 German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27. 

1 Si. long, therefore, as Germany was trying (see German White Book, Exhibit 14. 
July 28) to bring it about, she cannot be blamed for not having accepted the first con- 
ference plan. 

3 British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, but see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, 
July 29. 

4 Cf. British Blue Book No. 76, July 29, and note 1. 

5 In his Introductory Narrative, p. ix, Sir E. Grey calls this despatch a "strange 
response" to his appeal of mediation, No. S4. The juxtaposition of these despatches 



304 Official Diplomatic Documents 

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European 
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's 
obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to main- 
tain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid 
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as lie was 
able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, 
that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be 
crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the 
object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great 
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British 
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial 
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious 
in any war that might ensue. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he 
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. 
As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as 
Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the 
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government 
an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the 
action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter 
upon in Belgium, 1 but when the war was over, Belgian integrity 
would be respected if she had not sided against Germain'. 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chan- 
cellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring 
about an understanding with England ; he trusted that these as- 
surances might form the basis of that understanding which he so 
much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement 
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the 
present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of 
British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly 
produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. 

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request 
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at 
this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course 
of aetioii and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain 
full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I 
communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day 2 to his Ex- 
cellency, who expressed his best thanks to you. 

Iii lps I-. <\irrv out this suggestion. Nor would it have 1 n possible to prove tin- error 

..f I Ins presentation it it hail not been for the last paragraph, which refers to No. 77 
instead of No. 84. 

The German enquiry about English neutrality was doubtless the result oi disquiet- 
ing information not only from Russia but also from Italy about the attempt made to 
have Great Britain declare her solidarity with France and Russia trf. British Blue Book 
No. mi. note 5, .Inly 29). Sir E. Grey, moreover, had two serious interviews and a 
private talk with the German Ambassador in the morning and on the afternoon of 
July -"a. see British Blue Book Xos. ss and Ml. This despatch, No. 85, arrived "about 
midnight ," Brit ish Blue Book. p. ix. la fairness, therefore, it should haye been printed 
aftei \o so lather than after No, 84. See also note 3 to X,,. (HI, .July 29. 

1 This is the firs! mention of Belgium. It is noteworthy that a possible invasion 
of Belgium does not call forth the statement from Sir E. Goschen, or within the next 
days, from Sir E. Grey, that it would be contrary to existing treaties. 

- See No. 77, same day. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 87 305 

From Rome 

British Blue Book No. 86 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edieard Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914- 

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any 
further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communica- 
tion made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. 
The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence 
at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia. 

To Paris 
British Blue Book No. S7 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

After telling M. Cambon ' to-day how grave the situation seemed 
to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day 
that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations 
into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the 
efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common 
with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon 1 that I 
thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here ap- 
proached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view 
from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. 
In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was 
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an 
attempt to crush France, 2 was fastening a quarrel on France on a 
question that was the subject of a special agreement between France 
and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia 
was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. 3 Even if the 
question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel 
called upon to take a hand in it. It would then lie a question of the 
supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Bal- 
kans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a 
war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and 
France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we 
should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France 
would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but 
in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her 
to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have 
to decide what British interests required us to do. 4 I thought it 

1 French Ambassador in London. 

2 For France's own point of view of the Morocco crisis see French Yellow Book 
No. 1, Annex 1. "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco." 

3 This is contrary to the popluar claim that Great Britain went into the war for the 
little nations. 

' A very important statement. * 



306 Official Diplomatic Documents 

necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all pre- 
cautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince 
Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not 
be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that 
this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I 
still hoped might not arise. 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. 
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for 
supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feci called to 
intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France 
become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony 
of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. 
He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no 
criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a. 
demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany 
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give ; 
she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked. 1 

I am, etc., 

E. Grey. 
To Berlin 

British Blue Book No. S8 
Sir Edward drey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information 
that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting 
her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication 2 made by 
( !ount Benckendorff, 3 that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly 
rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. 
I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the 
German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day 
the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in 
Vienna and St. Petersburgh. If lie succeeded, well and good. If 
not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up 
what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, 4 and 
propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to 
work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, 
that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded 
it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should 

1 If this despatch printed after No. S5 and referring to the neutrality of England 
was written after the receipt of Xo. 85, it is noteworthy that it contains no mention of 
Belgium. For the probably proper order of the despatches, however, see note 1, 
British Blue Book No. 85. 

» British Blue Book No. 70, July 20. 

3 Russian Ambassador in London. 

'Probably British Blue Book No. 84, July 29, although the telegram was sent to 
Berlin not in the morning but "about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th," according 
to the Introductory Narrative of the British Blue Book. To call I o'clock the 
"evening" is strange, but is explained by the endeavor to make No. 85 appear to be 
an answer to Xo. 84. See note 1 to British Blue Book Xo. 85, same day. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 89 307 

be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, 
and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late 
for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short 
time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in 
occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be 
possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while 
saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had com- 
plete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance 
further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and 
Russia. 1 

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to 
Berlin what I had said to him this morning. 

I am, etc., 

E. Grey. 
To Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 89 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon a Ik nit 
the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite 
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The 
situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at 
present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. 
But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue 
might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and 
I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversa- 
tion — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should 
stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I 
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that 
was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if 
things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no ques- 
tion of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France 
was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did be- 
come such that we thought British interests 2 required us to inter- 
vene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be 
very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped 
that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at 
present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with 
the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in 
our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it in- 

1 This is again Sir E. Grey's original proposal, which was agreeable to Germany in 
principle. It was accepted by Austria-Hungary even to include negotiations between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, and 
for the fact that the Austro-Hungarian acceptance, which was subject to the continu- 
ation of the war. but with a " promise not to advance further, "was acceptable to Sir E. 
Grey, see British Blue Book No. 103, July 30. 

2 This idea occurs several times in the despatches of July 29. 



308 Official Diplomatic Documents 

volved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be 
open to any reproach for him that the friendly tone of all our con- 
versations had misled him or his Government into supposing that 
we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not 
been so misled, the course of things might have been different. 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; 
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given 
in Berlin as his view of the situation. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 
To Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 90 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, Jul;/ 20, 1014- 

In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this 
morning, 1 as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July - to your Excel- 
lency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's f telegram 
of the 28th July 4 and of my reply to it. 5 I said I had begun to doubt 
whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by 
Servia would now satisfy Austria. 6 But there appeared, from what 
the Marquis di San Giuliano 7 had said, to lie a method by which, if 
the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might 
bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would 
give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for 
the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give 
what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German 
Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria 
would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with 
Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could 
not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while 
Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That 
would not lie mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon 
Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said 
the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by 
force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great 
Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliat- 
ing Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the 
humiliation of others. There must, of course, lie some humiliation 
of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the 
humiliation of Russia. 8 

1 The official reference to this interview is No. 84, but see also No. 88. 
- See X". 84. 

3 British Ambassador in li 

< See No. 64. 
'■ See No. 81. 

6 The question whether it would satisfy Austria-Hungary does not seem to have 
been asked. 

7 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

'The tenor of this summary of the interview with the German Ambassador is 
different from that given in Nos. 84 and 88. See also No. 89. 



July 29, British Blue Book No. 91 309 

The German Ambassador sa-id that Austria would not take Ser- 
vian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory 
while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn 
Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole 
position of Russia in the Balkans. 

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it 
was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the 
Netherlands ' apparently were taking precautions. 

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must 
be found of preserving the peace of Europe. 

I am, etc. 

To Vienna K Gbey - 

British Blue Book No. 91 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1.914. 

The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long 
memorandum, 2 which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an 
account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation 
of how necessary the Austrian action was. 

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question 
between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad 
for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in 
getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were 
given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake. 

Count Mensdorff 3 said that the war with Servia must proceed. 
Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising 
again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She 
had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to 
make sure that her interests were safeguarded. 

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering 
with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, 
to turn her into a sort of vassal State. 

Count Mensdorff 3 deprecated this. 

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the 

Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, 

he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded 

as being in the Austrian sphere of influence. 4 T 

° r 1 am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

1 The reference to the Netherlands is omitted in the accounts of the interviews, 
Nos. S4, 88, 89. Since the Netherlands, however, were mentioned, other things maj 
have been mentioned, and it is not unlikely that No. 85, containing Germany's first 
bid for English neutrality, was the result of the despatches received in Berlin from the 
German Ambassador in London. Unfortunately these are not printed in the German 
White Book, See also note 1 to No. 85. 

2 This may refer to the famous dosxi'r, pre-ciited in Paris on July 27, and printed 
in the Yellow Book on that date. Parts, if not the whole, were surely presented also 
in London on that day, as appears from British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. See notes 
to British Blue Book No. 48 and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 

4 The proper appraisal of this remark is only possible on the background of an ex- 
tensive knowledge of the history of the Balkans since 1878. 



310 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



To Rome 
British Blue Book No. 92 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July :J9, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication 
from the Marquis di San Giuliano 1 suggesting that the German 
objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was 
strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the 
form of procedure. 

1 said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German 
Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea 
of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the 
German Government in principle, could be applied. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 



Russia : 



To Berlin 
Russian Orange Book No. 49 



Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge d' Affaires 

at Berlin. 2 

(Translation.) 

<S7. Petersburgh, 
July Id (J!)), 1!)14. 
(Telegraphic.) 

The German Ambassador in- 
forms me, in the name of the 
Chancellor, that Germany has 
not ceased to exercise a moder- 
ating influence at Vienna, and 
that she will continue to do so 
even after the declaration of war. 
Up to this morning there had 
been no news that the Austrian 
army has crossed the Servian 
frontier. I have begged the 
Ambassador to express my thanks 
to the Chancellor for the friendly 
tenour of this communication. 
I have informed him of the mili- 
tary measures taken by Russia, 
none of which, I told him, were 
directed against Germany; I 
added that neither should they 



Saint-Petersbourg, 
le 16 {29) juillet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'Ambassadetjb d'Allemagne 
in'informe, an nom du Chance- 
lier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas 
cesse d'exercer a Vienne une 
influence moderatrice et qu'elle 
continuera cette action meme 
apres la declaration de guerre. 
Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait 
aucune nouvelle que les armees 
autrichiennes aient franchi la 
frontiere serbe. J'ai prie l'Am- 
bassadeur de transmettre au 
Chancelier mes remerciements 
pour la teneur amicale de cette 
communication. Je I'ai informe 
des mesures militaires prises par 
la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, 
n'etait dirigee contre l'Alle- 
magne ; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne 



Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

In the British Blue Book this despatch is listed as having been sent to London. 



July 29, Russian Orange Book No. Ifi 



311 



prejugeaient pas non plus des 
niesures agressives contre l'Au- 
triche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'ex- 
pliquant par la mobilisation de 
la plus grande partie de l'armee 
austro-hongroise. 

L'Ainbassadeur se prononcant 
en faveur d'explications directes 
avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous 
je repondis que j'y etais tout 
dispose, pour peu que les con- 
seils du Cabinet de Berlin dont 
il parlait trouvent echo a, Vienne. 



En meme temps je signalais 
que nous etions tout disposes a 
accepter le projet d'une con- 
ference des quatre Puissances, 
un projet auquel, paraissait-il, 
l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas 
entierement. 

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, 
le meilleur moyen pour mettre a, 
profit tous les moyens propres a, 
produire une solution pacifique, 
consisterait en une action paral- 
lele des pourparlers d'une con- 
ference a quatre de l'Allemagne, 
de la France, de l'Angleterre et de 
l'ltalie et d'un contact direct 
entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la 
Russie, a l'instar a peu pres de ce 
qui avait eu lieu aux moments les 
plus critiques de la crise de Fan 
dernier. 

Je dis a l'Ambassadeur qu'- 
apres les concessions faites par la 
Serbie, un terrain de compromis 
pour les questions restees ou- 
vertes ne serait pas tres difficile a 
trouver, a condition toutefois de 
quelque bonne volonte de la part 
de l'Autriche et a, condition que 
toutes les Puissances usent de 
toute leur influence dans un sens 
de conciliation. 



be taken as aggressive measures 
against Austria-Hungary, their 
explanation being the mobilisa- 
tion of the greater part of the 
Austro-Hungarian army. 1 

The Ambassador said that he 
was in favour of direct explana- 
tions between the Austrian Gov- 
ernment and ourselves, and I 
replied that I, too, was quite 
willing, provided that the advice 
of the German Government, to 
which he had referred, found an 
echo at Vienna. 

I said at the same time that 
we were quite ready to accept 
the proposal for a conference of 
the four Powers, a proposal with 
which, apparently, Germany was 
not in entire sympathy. 

I told him that, in my opinion, 
the best manner of turning to 
account the most suitable 
methods of finding a peaceful 
solution would be by arranging 
for parallel discussions to be 
carried on by a conference of the 
four Powers — Germany, France, 
Great Britain, and Italy — and 
by a direct exchange of views 
between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia on much the same lines 
as occurred during the most criti- 
cal moments of last year's crisis. 

I told the Ambassador that, 
after the concessions which had 
been made by Servia, it should 
not be very difficult to find a 
compromise to settle the other 
questions which remained out- 
standing, provided that Austria 
showed some good-will and that 
all the Powers used their entire 
influence in the direction of con- 
ciliation. 



1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2, where it is stated by Sazonof that 
Russia mobilised while Austria-Hungary was "proceeding to a general mobilisation." 



312 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To London and Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 50 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
London and Paris. 

St. Petersburg!!, July 16 (.JO), 1914. 

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt 
with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's 

tele-ram 1 of the 15th (28th) July. 

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna 
Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial 
Government. 

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely 
on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which 
they may consider advisable. 

From Berlin 

Russian' Orange Book No. 51 

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 10 (29), 1914. 

Ox my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply 
respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, 
the Secretary of State answered in the negative. 2 

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect 
at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cam- 
bon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would 
hasten to face Germany with a. fait accompli. 

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day 
from Pourtales, stating that you seemed more inclined than you 
previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I 
replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise 
from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only 
to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that 
Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that lie 
feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to conic to 
an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising 
against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our fron- 
tier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, 
Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that con- 

1 If this refers to Orange Boole No. 45, July 2s, compare it with Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book No. 47, July 29: "it does not constitute a refusal." If it refers to another 
despatch, such a despatch has not been printed. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 51, where Sazonof i^ the one to break off the negotiations. 

2 For the reply from Vienna in reference to the conference plan see Austro-Hun- 
garian Red Book No. 44, and for the Russian direct conversation plan see Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 47, both of July 29. 



July 29, Russian Orange Book No. 53 313 

sequently we had to take similar steps. 1 I added that whatever 
measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no 
wise directed against Germany. 

From Nish 

Russian Orange Book No. 52 

Russian Charge d' Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 (2.9), 1.914. 

The Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the 
name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral. 

From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 53 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 16 (29), 1914. 

For the information of the President of the French Republic 
on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had pre- 
pared a short summary 2 of the present political situation, approxi- 
mately in the following terms : Austria, fearing internal disintegra- 
tion, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for 
an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an 
occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Ger- 
many is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends 
upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" 
between Austria and Servia ; that question is the punishment of 
Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for 
the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influ- 
ence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been 
refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen 
vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Ger- 
many towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same 
attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was 
given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's 
inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, 
and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general 
war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating 
pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the 
greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to 
accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently 
Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only 

■The important question is, "Who mobilised first?" In the Documents very 
contrary statements occur. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 85, July 29. 



314 Official Diplomatic Documents 

and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at 
Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeav- 
ouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the 
conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. 1 
Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are mani- 
festly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking 
active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase 
proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all 
her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir 
E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guaran- 
tees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern 
Europe. 

From London 

Russian Orange Book No. 54 

Russian Ambassador at Loudon to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, .July 16 {29), 101 4. 

I have communicated the contents of your telegrams 2 of the 
15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador 
to-day 3 that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had 
been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from 
St. Petersburgh that Russia was mobilising against Austria in conse- 
quence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the 
German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, 
but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it 
should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should 
indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four 
Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy, 
and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into 
play if Germany consented to range -herself on the side of peace. 

From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 55 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July HI {29), 1914- 

Viviani has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm 
determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination 

1 This is an error, for Germany not onlv urged the British "mediation" plan (see 
German White Book, Exhibits 15 and 10, July 28) but also the Russian direct con- 
versations plan (see British Blue Book No. 67, note 2, July 28). 

2 This is a confirmation of French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, which states that 
two telegrams were sent. In the Russian Orange and British Blue Books only one is 
given. Cf. British Blue Book No. 70, 2, July 29. 

'Compare this summary with Sir E. Grev's own summary. British Blue Book 
Nos. S4, SS, 89, July 29. 



July 29, Russian Orange Book No. 56 315 

is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, includ- 
ing the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the 
Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic 
sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has 
telegraphed an urgent message 1 to London that, direct discussions 
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna having ended, the London Cabi- 
net should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the 
Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before see- 
ing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter 
again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani 
having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should 
hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, 
Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitra- 
tion " alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question 
of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for 
mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary 
for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what 
Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that 
the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, 
but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis 
of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but 
that she was determined at the same time to act in complete har- 
mony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, 
might have convinced himself that this determination met with the 
warmest approval of the country. 



From Nish 

Russian Orange Book No. 56 2 

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia 1o 
His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

Deeply touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased 
to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. 
Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which 
your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, 
and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure 
now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These 
painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment 
which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, atid the sentiments of ever- 
lasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded 
to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all 
the Serbs. 

1 French Yellow Book No. 97, July 20. 

2 Without a date but published in the Russian Orange Book among the telegrams 
of July 29. _ In the Serbian Red Book it was published as No. 44 of July 30. This 
may be a mistake, or it may contain a hint in the direction of the charge sometimes 
made that Russia wrote the Serbian State Papers. 



316 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Nish 

Russian Orange Book No. 57 

Russian Charge a" Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 {29), 191 L 

I have communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic 
reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. 
On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed: "The Czar 
is great and merciful !" He then embraced me and was overcome 
with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night. 

To Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 58 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July Id {29), 1914. 

The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision 
of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military 
preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these prep- 
arations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken 
by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any 
means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia. 

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no 
alternative but to hasten 1 on our own military preparations and 
to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the 
French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful 
to them for the declaration 2 which the French Ambassador made 
to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon 
the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, 
that declaration is especially valuable to us. 

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany. 

1 This elicited Viviani's request, French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, not to "take 
any step which may offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her 
forces." proving that on July 30, Viviani believed that Germany had uot even partially 
mobilised. 

- ( If. Russian Orange Book No. 55, same day. 



Thursday, July SO, 1914 



317 



Thursday, July 30, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 


Petrograd 





Belgium 




Petrograd [Letter from 
Belgian Minister] 


France 


London and Petrograd 


Petrograd, Vienna 




London 


Berlin, London 


Germany 


Czar 


Petrograd, Czar 


Great Britain 


Berlin, Paris, Petrograd 


Vienna, Petrograd, 

Berlin 
Paris, Rome, Russian 

Ambassador 


Russia 


London, etc. 


Nish, Berlin, London 


Serbia 


Czar 


Petrograd 



. I ustria-Hungary, while unable to have her ambassador in Petrograd discuss her 
Serbian note with Sazonof, was willing to discuss her relations with Russia on a 
much broader basis, and had already done so with the Russian Ambassador in 
Vienna. She regrets Russia's mobilisation against her, which is forcing her to 
counter measures. 

Belgium is silent on this day, and does not publish the despatch from her 
Minister in Petrograd, dated July 30. 

France renews her promise of support to Russia, but warns her in her mobilisa- 
tion against "any step which may offer to Germany any pretext for a total or 
partial mobilisation of her forces." She therefore believes that Germany has not 
even partically mobilised, but nevertheless sends an alarming message concerning 
German military measures to Sir E. Grey, who agrees that the moment has "come 
to consider and discuss together every hypothesis." 

Germany continues her pressure on Vienna, and by exchanges of royal tele- 
grams between Berlin and London and Berlin and Petrograd endeavours to avoid 
war. The General Staff urges immediate mobilisation but is unsuccessful. 

Great Britain refuses to bind herself to remain neutral in case of war, on the 
conditions proposed by Germany on the previous day. Sir E. Grey is even seri- 
ously considering the necessity of joining France, and tightens the bond between 
the two countries by making known to the British Ambassador in Paris the letters 
exchanged in 1912 between himself and the French Ambassador. Great Britain 
continues to mobilise, but does not publish the conversation with the German 
Ambassador in which this subject was discussed. One of the most important 
papers of this day (No. 105) suffers from notable inaccuracies. 

Russia continues her mobilisation, but offers to "stop all military preparations " 
if Austria will declare herself "ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which 
violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia." Although Sazonof feels very hopeful 
of the success of his new offer, he alters it on the next day "as requested by the 
British Ambassador." Several Russian despatches printed under this date are 
misleading. 

Serbia does not announce anything of importance. 



318 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

To St. Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 50 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914- 

For Your Excellency's information and guidance : — 

1 have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed 
that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as 
to a discussion 1 with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt 
that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. 
Schebeko. 

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your 
Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired 
witli regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped 
by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of 
subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in 
any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised 
your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our 
special relations towards Russia. 

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had 
taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a mis- 
understanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical 
questions two days before, a fact which the Ambassador confirmed 
with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this 
conversation. 

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia was 
regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburgh. He said that we 
were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Servian 
State, and it was not known at St. Petersburgh what our intentions 
in the matter were ; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, 
whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush 
it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future 
fate of Servia, winch was linked to Russia by historical and other 
bonds. At St. Petersburgh they had taken the trouble to use all 
their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our condi- 
tions, though tins was indeed at a time when the conditions after- 
wards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with refer- 
ence to these demands they would do everything they could in order 
to accomplish at any rate all that was possible. 

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasised 
the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in 
Servia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only 
desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a 
guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a some- 
what lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also 

1 I.e. of the wording of the Serbian note and Austro-Hungarian Serbian conflict in 
general. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 



July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50 319 

gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Rus- 
sian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though 
this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible author- 
ities. 

In the further course of our discussion I referred ^to the Russian 
mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was 
limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan 
it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not 
know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute 
between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively 
against Servia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be 
observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps 
had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia 
was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our 
mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that 
this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards 
Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure 
against the Russian mobilisation. 

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, and this 
he promised to do. 

Belgium : 

From Petrograd 

(This letter was sent via Germany, where it was captured after war had been 
declared, and published in the North German (official) Gazette. As appears from 
the letter itself a telegraphic copy of it was sent by the Nordisk cable. The 
authenticity of this letter has never been officially denied by the Belgian Govern- 
ment.) 

The Belgian Legation, St. Petersburg}!, 795-4.02. The Political Con- 
dition. July 30, 1914- 

Yesterday and the day before passed in anticipation of the events 
which must follow the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on 
Servia. The most contradictory news is being spread and it has 
been impossible to separate truth from fiction concerning the inten- 
tions of the Imperial (Russian) Government. Only one fact is in- 
contestable ; namely, that Germany has endeavoured here, as well as 
in Vienna, to find a means by which to avoid a general conflict, but 
that she has met on the one hand the determination of the Vienna 
cabinet not to yield one iota and on the other the suspicion of the 
Petersburgh cabinet as regards the assurances of Vienna that it is 
contemplating only the punishment, and not the acquisition of Servia. 

Mr. Sazonof has declared that it was impossible for Russia not to 
keep herself in readiness nor to mobilise, but that these measures 
were not taken against Germany. This morning an official com- 
munique to the papers announced that the "reservists in a certain 
number of governments had been called to the colors." He who 
knows the reticence of the official Russian communiques may well 
assert that the mobilisation is general. 



320 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The German Ambassador declared this morning that he had 
readied the ends of his endeavours as mediator, pursued incessantly 
since Saturday, and that he had practically no hope left. I have 
just been told that the British Ambassador bad expressed himself 
to the same effect. Latterly England proposed arbitration, but Mr. 
Sazonof replied, "We ourselves proposed this to Austria, who de- 
clined." The suggestion of a conference was met by Germany with 
the suggestion of an agreement between the cabinets. One is 
tempted to ask if the whole world is not wanting war, trying only 
to postpone the declarations of war in order to gain time. 

At first England let it be known that she did not wish to be drawn 
into the conflict. Sir George Buchanan openly said this. To-day, 
however, St. Petersburg is convinced — nay, more, they have the 
assurance that England will support France. (Aujourd'hui on est 
fermement convaincua St. Petersburgh, on en a meme ['assurance que 
I'Angleterre soutiendra la France.) This assurance carries great 
weight, and has done not a little to give the upper hand to the war 
party. 

The Russian Government has given free rein to all pro-Servian 
and anti-Austrian manifestations these past days. In the cabinet 
meeting early yesterday morning differences of opinion still existed, 
and the announcement of the mobilisation was postponed. Since 
then a change has taken place; the war party has gained the upper 
hand, and to-day at four o'clock in the morning the mobilisation was 
publicly announced. 

The army believes itself strong and is full of enthusiasm. It 
bases its hopes on the remarkable progress it has made since the 
Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the realisation of its 
programme of reconstruction and reorganisation that it really cannot 
be said to count. This was the reason which gave England's assur- 
ances of support so much weight. 

As I had the honour of telegraphing (T. 10) you to-day, every hope 
of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished. This is the view of 
the diplomatic corps. For my telegram I chose the way via Stock- 
holm by the Xordisk cable as safer than the other. This despatch 
I am entrusting to a private courier, who will mail it in Germany. 

With the assurance of deepest respect, Mr. Secretary, I am, 

(Signed) B. de L'Escaille. 

France : 

To St. Petersburgh and London 

French Yellow Book No. 101 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and London. 

Paris, July SO, 1014- 

M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me that the German Am- 
bassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Govern- 



July 30, French Yellow Book No. 102 321 

ment to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military 
preparations. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that 
these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobi- 
lised eight army corps 1 and had refused to arrange peacefully her 
differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circum- 
stances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as 
imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that 
she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and 
France without loss of time. 

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance. 2 

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of 
the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversa- 
tion entered into between the Powers which are less directly in- 
terested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved ; I 
therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary 
measures of defence, which Russia thinks must go on, she should 
not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pre- 
text for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces. 3 

Yesterday in the late afternoon 4 the German Ambassador came 
and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of 
the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this 
way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret, and that 
French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them. 

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step 

which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and 

that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose 

of maintaining peace could not be doubted. 

Rene Viviani. 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 102 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July SO, 1914. 

M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every 
military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general 
mobilisation 5 should be avoided, answered that in the course of last 
night the General Staff has suspended all measures of military pre- 

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30, and that these eight army corps 
had been mobilised against Serbia. See also Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2. 

2 France had given this declaration as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. 6, 
July 24. 

3 This is an important statement because it shows that Viviani believed on July 30 
that Germany had not even partially mobilised, all earlier despatches notwithstanding. 
It also shows that Viviani knew the danger as soon as Germany should feel obliged to 
mobilise. This warning was doubtless given in reply to Russian Orange Book No. 58, 
July 29. Sir E. Grey knew of this message, as appears from British Blue Book No. 104, 
July 30. 

' That is on July 29, and France did not then deny having taken military measures. 
6 The wording was "total or partial mobilisation," see previous despatch. 



322 Official Diplomatic Documents 

caution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday 
the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attache 
of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the 
mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against 
Austria. 1 

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with 
Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that 
Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word 
which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received 
the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just 
had personally with the Emperor William. 

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received 
disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German 
army and navy. 2 

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Rus- 
sian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards 
conciliation. 3 He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate 

until the last moment." 4 t, 

Raleologue. 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 103 s 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July SO, 1914- 
The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on 
M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease 
her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not 
infringe the territorial integrity of Servia : — 

" It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must 
safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and 
her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of 
Austria." 

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to 
tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburgh 
while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking 
to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian king- 
dom before Russia can come to its aid. Hut the Emperor Nicholas 

1 For a different version of the interview see German White Book, Exhibit IS, 
Julj 30 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book Xo. 101, July 3d, note 3. 

' 1 It is not clear from the Entente telegrams what would have " conciliated " Russia 
short of stopping the punishment of Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary was determined 
to mete out this punishment, a deadlock ensued. Austria-Hungary's concessions 
wen- her promise not to annex any Serbian territory and not to touch the sovereignty 
of Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Rook No. 17, July 29. It nowhere appears 
that Russia offered any concessions. The different courses pursued by the respective 
countries were due to the different attitudes assumed by their allies. Germany exerted 
a constant pressure in Vienna, while England and France refused to take any steps in 
Petrograd. See French Yellow Book No. 02, July 27, and No. SI, July 2S. Contrast 
with British Blue Book No. 11)4, July 30. 

4 Cf. note to British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 

s Ibid. 



July 30, French Yellow Book No. 105 323 

is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal 1 
to you in his name : 

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed 
the character of a question of European interest, declares herself 
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging 
to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military 
preparations." 

Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his Gov- 
ernment. 

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by 
Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discus- 
sion by the Powers in London. 

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they 
are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict. 

Paleologue. 

From Vienna 
French Yellow Book No. 104 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July SO, 1914. 
In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian 
Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German 
Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his coun- 
try, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This 
enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great 
importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who exam- 
ined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness 
to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions. 2 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 105 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July SO, 1914. 
Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news 
of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was 
false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial 
Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which 
announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps 
diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany. 3 

1 This proposal was altered later at the request of the British Ambassador to one 
much less acceptable to Austria-Hungary. C'f. French Yellow Book No. 113, and see 
for the discussion of these changes E. von Mach, Gtrmniiy'n I'auit of View, pp. 142 ff. 

2 This was probably due to German pressure. See Chancellor's Speech in note 2 to 
British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 

3 Germany was apparently ready to mobilise at any moment. It has been popu- 
larly stated in Germany that the General Staff urged this step ever since the first news 
of Russian mobilisation had become known, but that the Emperor refused his consent. 



324 Official Diplomatic Documents 

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday 
evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presi- 
dency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the 
preparation of the special edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from 
various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved 
her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams 1 between the 
Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been decided 
upon were suspended. 

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw 
Ilcrr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under- 
Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that 
mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany 
lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the 
haste of the General Stall', which sees war in mobilisation, had been 
successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided 
upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the Lokal 
Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news cal- 
culated to cause excitement in France. 

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the meas- 
ures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of 
the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and 
that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation 2 
first in order to attribute the responsibility to us. 

Jules Cambon. 

To London 

French Yellow Book No. 106 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister far Foreign Af- 
fairs, to M. Paul Ca ml/on, French Ambassador at London. 

Paris, July SO, 1914. 

Please inform 3 Sir E. Gray of the following facts concerning 
French and German military preparations. 4 England will see from 
this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive 
steps. 

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken 
by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has 
made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the fron- 
tier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has 
transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept 

1 These telegrams are referred to in the French Yellow Book, but not in the British 
Blue Book, not were they laid before Parliament together with the Blue Book. Many 
people see in them a serious endeavor on the part of the Emperor to preserve the peace. 

> < If. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 1. 

1 This information i> printed in British Blue Book No. 10.3. Enclosure 3, July :i0. If 
the French Yellow Hook prints the original despatch accurately, either Sir E. Grey 
or the French Ambassador in London must be held responsible for the alterations. 
For a discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 
421 IT. 

4 This despatch to London should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 101, 
same day, to Petrograd, which shows that Viviani believed that Germany had not even 
partiallj mobilised on July .'ilj. 



July 30, French Yellow Book No. 107 325 

our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to 
approach nearer. 

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, how- 
ever, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be 
as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory 
undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government 
of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more 
than Russia, the responsibility for the attack. 

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the 
steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France, soldiers who 
were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany 
had done so five days before. 

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been 
pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units 
transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves 
or Cologne ; nothing like this has been done in France. 

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing 
of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire 
entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; with 
us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from 
taking similar measures. 

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany 
on Saturday, the 25th ; in France on Tuesday, the 28th. 

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been 
recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 
1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been 
summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only 
circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. 
None of these measures has been taken in France. 

The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on two occa- 
sions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 
Kith army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from 
Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; 
the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier. 

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed 
parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier. 

Rene Viviani. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 107 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador of Berlin, to M. Rene 1'iviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 30, 191 4. 
The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's 
reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted 
Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally. 1 

1 This reply, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29, was sent by telegram 
on that dav to Petrograd, Paris, London, and Rome. See also French Yellow Book 
No. 104, July 30, and note. 



326 Official Diplomatic Documents 

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to 
whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula 
suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had 
just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, 
thus showing the negative 1 action of German diplomacy at Vienna. 

Jules Cambon. 

From London 
French Yellow Book No. 108 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

London, dull/ SO, 191 4- 

Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request 
addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the Ger- 
man Government a formula fur tin- intervention of the four Powers 
in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations 
of England. 2 

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, 
but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural 
to take some precautions ; that in England, as in France, there was a 
desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defen- 
sive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object 
of making any aggression. 3 

The information 4 which your Excellency has addressed to me on 
the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French 
frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that 
it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia 
and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression 
which might provoke general war. 

Sir E. Grey understood 5 my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, 
as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together 
every hypothesis. Paul Cambon. 

From Berlin 
French Yellow Book No. 100 

.1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President if the Council, Minister far Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July JO, 1914. 
In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, 
I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, 

1 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, Julv 2S, and British 
Blue Book No. 95, July 30. 

2 No such questions are mentioned in the British Blue Book. 

3 This is the natural excuse for any modern state to make, since self-defence is the 
only excuse for military preparations anywhere. 

1 French Yellow Book No. 106, same day. 

6 From French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, it appeared that Viviani believed thai 
i lermany had not yet even partially mobilised on July 30. Contrary despatches must 
have been sent, for effect. Did Sir E. Grey understand this, or was he imposed upon? 



July 30, German White Book Exhibit 18 327 

who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the interven- 
tion of the disinterested Powers. 

He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, 
and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which 
conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, 
under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great 
Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky, 
whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the 
duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude. 

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation 
on the Austrian frontier ; he told me that this mobilisation com- 
promised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that 
everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria 
would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisa- 
tion, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian 
mobilisation and consequently that of Germany. 

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told 
me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise 
if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, 1 and that this was 
not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads 
of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength 
for the German army, and " that the words of which I reminded 
him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part." 2 

The impression which I received from this conversation is that 
the chances of peace have again decreased. 

Jules Cambon. 
Germany : 

From St. Petersburgh 
German White Book Exhibit 18 

Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburgh to H. M. the Kaiser 
on July SO, 1914- 

Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, 3 after causing Your 
Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas : Thank 
God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told 
me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as 
the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sazonof 
had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat 
His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told 
him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door 
of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all 
was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer 
was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored 

1 French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27. 

* Immediately following the words referred to above Von Jagow had said (Frenrh 
YeHow Book No. 67, July 27), " If Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged 
to attack at once on her side." An attack must be preceded by mobilisation. Jagow, 
therefore, cannot have meant to give a promise in the sense in which it was understood 
by Jules Cambon. 

3 For the French version of this interview see French Yellow Book No. 102, July 30. 



328 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial 
gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not 
against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on 
the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not 
understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her 
brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him 
finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised. 

To St. Petersburgh 
German White Book Exhibit 23 

IV. His Majesty to the Czar. July 30th, 1 A.M. 
My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your 

Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisa- 
tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hun- 
gary has mobilised only against Servia, ami only a part of her army. 
If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that 
of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part 
of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly 
manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is 
threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision 
now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility 
for war or peace. (Signed) Wilhelm. 

From St. Petersburgh 
German White Hook Exhibit 23a 

V. The Czar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof, July 80th, 1914, 1-20 P.M. 
I in \xk You from my heart for ^ our quick reply. I am sending 
to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instruc- 
tions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon 
five days ago, anil for the reason of defence against the preparations 
of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not 
influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise 
very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that 
an understanding can be arrived at with us. NlCOLAS. 

Great Britain : 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 93 

Telegrams communicated by ('mint Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador 
in Loudon, July 30, H)l.' h 

(1) 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof 

[Fur text see Russian Orange Book No. 45, July 28. For 93, (2) and (3), see 
under date of July 29, Russian Orange Book Nos. 49 and 50.] 



July 30, British Blue Book No. 95 329 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 94 

Sir M. dr Bunsen, Briii.sk Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Becriccd July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

I learn that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry 
out operations 1 on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My inform- 
ant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has 
realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not re- 
main indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian 
mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is 
not generally known in Vienna this evening. 2 Unless mediation, 
which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in 
concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in 
the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable 
steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German 
Ambassador feigns 3 surprise that Servian affairs should be of such 
interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have 
spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope 
that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that 
it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest 
in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could 
already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal 
Austrian demand in a favourable spirit; 4 if approached in a proper 
manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direc- 
tion. But she was justly offended at having been completely ig- 
nored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. 
German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which 
opened any propect of possible acceptance by both sides, he per- 
sonally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in 
concert with the three other Powers. 

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is 
much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have 
upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia 
would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia. 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book X". '.>."> 

Sir M. de Bunsen. British . I mbassador at I 'ienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be 
regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia 

1 The meaning of this phrase is not perfectly clear, although it seems to contemplate 
war. 

-' C'f. French Yellow Book No. 107, same day. 

3 Expressions of this kind, implying motives and not confining themselves to facts. 
are regrettable in official documents. 

' This was denied by Austria-Hungary ; see Red Book No. 34, July 27. 



330 . Official Diplomatic Documents 

must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, hut he does not know 
how the Austrian Government are taking it. lie says that Russia 
must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would 
understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia 
measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance 
of hostile propaganda from Servian territory. 1 

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German 
Ambassador at Vienna is instructed 2 to speak seriously to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to 
provoke a European war. 

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified 
with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in 
Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire 
sincerity. 

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information 
that the German Ambassador knew 3 the text of the Austrian ulti- 
matum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the 
German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself 
that he endorses every line of it. 



British Blue Book No. 96 

Sir M. de Bun-sen, British Ambassador ut Vienna, to Sir Edward (hey. 
— (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Jul;/ 30, 1914. 

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and 
myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to 
be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, 
do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, 
but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those 
which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objec- 
tion to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, 4 al- 
though he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of 
the Servian reply. 

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had 
begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of 

1 This is an eminently fair statement, nor did Austria-Hungary desire more. Cf. 
Austru-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 20. 

2 For the instruction see< chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 07, July 
28. ' Contrast with this, British despatch based on French information, French Yellow 
Book No. 107, July 30, where Jules Cambou complains of "the negative action of 
German diplomacy at Vienna." 

3 There is no proof for this assertion. 

4 This is what Germany had demanded; see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British 
Blue Book No. 07, July 2S. 



July 30, British Blue Book No. 97 331 

a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. 
He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with 
Austria. 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 97 ' 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SO, 1914. 

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs 
this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had 
told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing 
to guarantee that Servian integrity woidd be respected by Austria. 
To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia 
would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, 
Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution 
in Russia, if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. 

M. Sazonof 1 told us that absolute proof was in possession of Rus- 
sian Government that Germany was making military and naval prep- 
arations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the 
Gulf of Finland. 

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for 
Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on 
seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof 2 to make 
some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as 
a last hope. M. Sazonof 2 accordingly drew up and handed to Ger- 
man Ambassador a formula 3 in French, of which following is trans- 
lation : — 

" If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed 
character of question of European interest, declares herself ready 
to eliminate, from her ultimatum points which violate principle of 
sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military prepara- 
tions." 4 

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if 
this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a 
European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, 
if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, 
and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly 
postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general 
mobilisation. 

1 This despatch refers to the interview described in French Yellow Book Nos. 102 
and 103. July 30. For a full discussion of the British and French presentations, see 
E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. pp. 428 ft. 

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

3 This proposal was altered at the request of the British Ambassador (French Yellow 
Book No. 113. Julv 31) acting according to the wishes of Sir E. Grey. British Blue Book 
No. 110, Julv 31. Cf. also British Blue Book 103, July 30, and No. 120, July 31, received 
and listed under date of August 1. For a fuller discussion of these despatches see 
E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 432 ff. 

' The meaning of this phrase is " demobilisation," as appears from British Blue Book 
No. 99, same day. 



3.32 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From. Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 98 

Sir K. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward (hey. — 
{Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of 
Prince Lichnowsky's : telegram recording his last conversation 2 with 
yon lie asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be 
willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops 
of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here, 
lie has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobili- 
sation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria- 
Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably 
find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you 
can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrange- 
ment and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which 
might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees 
some chance that European peace may be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position 
in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears 
are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a 
measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of 
French ambassador yesterday — Imperial Government had done 
nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, how- 
ever, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when 
they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He 
regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be 
a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram 3 received from Prince Lich- 
nowsky ' last night contains matter which he had heard'with regret, 
but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appre- 
ciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very 
late last night ; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of 
course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done. 

1 German Ambassador in London. 

2 This conversation is not mentioned in the British Blue Book, although Sir E. ( Irey 
related it to the French Ambassador. The reporl of the latter is printed in the French 
Yellow Hook No. ins, July mi. It had reference to the "military preparations," i.e. 
the mobilisation of England. Probably during the same conversation the subject of 
the neutrality of England was discussed along the Ion- mentioned in British Blue Hook 
No. 102, July 30. The British Blue Hook contains do footnote to "telegram" in the 
second line of this despatch, hut gives a footnote to "telegram" in the first line of the 
second before last paragraph, namely "See No. 102." For the importance of the 
despatch No. 11)2, see note to that despatch. 

•' See No. 102. 



July 30, British Blue Book No. 99 333 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 99 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914. 

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Govern- 
ment have been informed 1 by the German Government that unless 
Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a 
further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the 
German communication had been modified, 2 and was now a request 
to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobili- 
sation. 3 The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition 
that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the 
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the 
Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international 
discussion. 

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by 
Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the 
hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced 
that England would come to the aid of France 4 in the event of a 
conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present 
differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for 
Germany would at once modify her attitude. 

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's 
Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he 
must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, 
he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has 
done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not 
to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His 
Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done 
in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops 
are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If 
there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw 
England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declara- 
tion now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that 
peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany 
from going to war. 

1 Not in Russian Orange Book or German White Book, but given in French Yellow 
Book No. 100, July 29. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, British Blue Book No. 97, and Russian Orange 
Book No. 60, same day. 

^ ^Demobilisation, it appears from this, was the meaning of the phrase "stop all 
military preparations" given in British Blue Book No. 97, same day. 

■" A declaration on the part of England of her "solidarity with Russia and France" 
had been desired by Sazonof as early as July 24 (British Blue Book No. 6) and again on 
July 27 (British Blue Book No. 44). Evidently France was now trying to persuade 
England to take this stand at least so far as France was concerned. 



334 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Rome 
British Blue Book No. 100 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1.914- 

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany 
would he able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands 
if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, 
as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. 

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula 
might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an ex- 
change of views. 

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 1 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 101 - 

Sir Edward, Grey to Sir B. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

Your telegram of 29th July. 3 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the 
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality * 
on such terms. 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French 
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not 
take French territory as distinct from the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, 
for France, without further territory being taken from her, could be 
so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become 
subordinate to German policy. 

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make 
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from 
which the good name of this country would never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever 
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. 
We could not entertain that bargain either. 

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the 
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England 
and Oermany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate 
us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to 
act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavour- 
able and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan- 
cellor contemplates. 

1 A probable reference to suggestion contained in British Blue Book No. 08, July 28. 

2 For the substance of this despatch see No. 102 and note. 

3 British Blue Book No. 85, July 29. 

4 From subsequent publications by the British and German Governments it ap- 
pears that the subject of English neutrality had been frequently discussed in the 
years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. 



July SO, British Blue Book No. 103 335 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add 
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations 
between England and Germany is that they should continue to work 
together to preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, 
the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso 
facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's 
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will. 

And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and 
the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote 
some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she 
could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued : 
against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or 
separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, 
through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding 
object, our relations sensibly improved. 2 The idea has hitherto 
been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this 
present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone 
through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief 
and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite 
rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 102 3 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SO, 1914. 

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky 4 that Germany must not count 
upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless 
the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German 
Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of 
your telegram of 30th July. 5 

To St. Petersburgh 
British Blue Book No. 103 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July •<", 1914. 

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would 
endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian 

1 Such a promise at this time would seem to he unthinkable unless Germany here- 
tofore could not have been assured that "no aggressive or hostile policy would be 
pursued against her." 

- Sir E. Grey here recognises that through the last Balkan crisis Germany had 
worked for peace as well as he himself. 

3 No reason appears why this despatch should not have been printed immediately 
after No. 9S to wdiich it refers. The conversation there discussed followed upon the 
telegram, British Blue Book No. 85, July 29, and may be expected to have contained 
Sir E. Grey's oral answer to the Chancellor's proposal. Unfortunately the whole 
conversation is not given in the British Blue Book (see note to No. 98). Numbers 101 
and 102, therefore, seem to contain two answers to the Chancellor's enquiry. 

* German Ambassador in London. 

6 See No. 98. 



336 Official Diplomatic Documents 

territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, 
while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satis- 
faetion sufficient to pacify Austria. 1 Territory occupied would of 
course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this 
yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, 
I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further 
military preparations on all sides. 

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. 
Sazonof, 2 as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July, 3 and fears 
it cannot be modified; 4 but if Austrian advance were stopped after 
occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' 
formula might he changed to read that the Powers would examine 
how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian 
sovereign rights or independence. 

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian 
territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, 
to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can 
he arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion 
ami suspension of further military preparations, provided that other 
Powers did the same. 

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, hut the only one I can 
suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agree- 
ment at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



Tn Paris 
British Blue Book Xo. 104 
Sir Edward drey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914- 

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram 
to Sir (1. Buchanan 5 of to-day, 6 and say that I know that lie has been 
urging Russia not to precipitate a cri-ds.' 1 hope he may be able to 
support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh. 

1 This had been suggested by Sir E. Grey on the previous day, British Blue Book 
X,. vn Julj 29. 

- Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
a \,. '.C. 

1 It does ii"t appear why the Russian formula needed any modification, agreeing 
substantially with Germain - to Austria-Hungary. See also Russian 

Orange Book K I. The altered formula (British Blue Book Xo. 120 under date of 

August 1 1 was certainly much less acceptable to the Teutonic Powers. 

s Brin-li Embassador a1 si. Petersburg. 

f See No 103. 

7 Tins must refer to French Yellow Book Xo. 101. July 30. where Viviani begs 
I not to take "any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or 
partial mobilisation of her forces." It cannot refer to general pacific pressure brought 
tobearon Russia; for Russian Orange Hook No.36, July 27. and Xo. ">:;. July29 

ermanv had vainly tried to set France in do so. See also French Yellow I->i>ok 
Xo, 62, Juh 27, and French Yellow Book Xo. SO. Julv 2s. 



July 30, British Blue Book No. 105 337 

To Paris 
British Blue Book No. 105 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1.914. 

M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him 
two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was 
seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. 
I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in quest ion 
and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was 
never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish 
to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like 
me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The 
particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany 
on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, 
showing that the German military preparations were more advanced 
and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France 
had yet done. 1 He anticipated that the aggression would take the 
form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, 
or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was 
war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could 
France admit. 

I said that the Cabinet 2 was to meet to-morrow morning, and I 
would see him again to-morrow afternoon. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 
Enclosure 1 in No. 105 

Sir Edward Grey to J/. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. 
My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval 
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to 
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation 
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- 
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency 
that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in- 
stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had 
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it 
might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend 
upon the armed assistance of the other. 

1 From British Blue Book No. 104 it appeared that Sir E. Grey was familiar with 
Viviani's despatch, French Yellow Book No. 101, which shows that Viviani knew that 
Germany had not yet proceeded even to partial mobilisation. 

2 For a fuller discussion of this and subsequent Cabinet meetings, see E. von Mach, 
Germany's Point of View, McClurg & Co., pp. 263 ff. 



338 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened 
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression 
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- 
pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the 
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, 
and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given 
to them. 

Yours, etc. 

Enclosure 2 in No. 105 

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey. 

(Translation.) 
French Embassy, London. 
November 23, 191 .'. 
Dear Sir Edward. 

You reminded me in your 
letter of yesterday, 22nd Novem- 
ber, that during the last few years 
the military and naval authorities 
of France and Great Britain had 
consulted with each other from 
time to time ; that it had always 
been understood that these con- 
sultations should not restrict 
the liberty of either Government 
to decide in the future whether 
they should lend each other the 
support of their armed forces; 
that, on either side, these consul- 
tations between experts were not 
and should not be considered 
as engagements binding our 
Governments to take action in 
certain eventualities ; that, how- 
ever, I had remarked to you that, 
if one or other of the two ( rovern- 
ments had grave reasons to fear 
an unprovoked attack on the part 
of ;i third Power, it would become 
essential to know whether it 
could count on the armed support 
of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, 
and I am authorised to state that, 



L'Ambassade dc France, Londres, 
ce 23 novembre, 1912. 
Cher Sir Edward. 

Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 
22 novembre, vous m'avez rap- 
pele que, dans ces dernieres 
annees, les autorites militaires 
et navales de la France et de la 
Grande-Bretagne s'etaient con- 
siliums de temps en temps; 
qu'il avait toujours ete entendu 
que ecs consultations ne restrei- 
gnaient pas la liberte, pour chaque 
Gouvernement, de decider dans 
Pavenir s'ils se preteraient Fun 
l'autre le concours de leurs forces 
armees ; epic, de part et d'autre, 
ces consultations entre specia- 
listes n'etaient et ne devaient 
pas etre considerees comme des 
engagements obligeant nos Gou- 
verneinents a agir dans certains 
cas ; que cependant je vous avais 
fait observer epic, si l'un ou 
l'autre des deux Gouvernements 
avait de graves raisons d'appre- 
hender vine attaque non provo- 
quee de la part d'une tierce 
Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel 
de savoir s'il pourrait compter 
sur l'assistance armee de l'autre. 

Votre lettre repond a cette ob- 
servation, et je suis autorise a 



July SO, British Blue Book No. 105 



339 



vous declarer que, dans Ie cas ou 
Fun de nos deux Gouvernements 
aurait un motif grave d'appre- 
hender soit l'aggression d'une 
tierce Puissance, soit quelque 
evenement menacant pour la 
paix generale, ce Gouvernement 
examinerait imm6diatement avec 
l'autre si les deux Gouvernements 
doivent agir de concert en vue de 
prevenir l'aggression ou de sauve- 
garder la paix. Dans ce cas, 
les deux Gouvernements deli- 
bereraient sur les mesures qu'ils 
seraient disposes a prendre en 
commun ; si ces mesures com- 
portaient une action, les deux 
Gouvernements prendraient aus- 
sitot en consideration les plans 
de leurs etats majors et decide- 
raient alors de la suite qui devrait 
Itre donnee a ces plans. 

Votre sincerement devoue, 
Paul Cambon. 



in the event of one of our two 
Governments having grave 
reasons to fear either an act of 
aggression from a third Power, 
or some event threatening the 
general peace, that Government 
would immediately examine with 
the other the question whether 
both Governments should act 
together in order to prevent the 
act of aggression or preserve 
peace. If so, the two Govern- 
ments would deliberate as to the 
measures which they would be 
prepared to take in common ; if 
those measures involved action, 
the two Governments would take 
into immediate consideration the 
plans of their general staffs and 
would then decide as to the effect 
to be given to those plans. 
Yours, etc. 

Paul Cambon. 



Enclosure 3 in No. 105 ' 

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador 
in London. 

(Translation.) 
The German Army had its 
advance-posts on our frontiers 
yesterday ; German patrols twice 
penetrated on to our territory. 
Our advance-posts arc withdrawn 
to a distance of 10 kilom. from 
the frontier. The local popula- 
tion is protesting against being 
thus abandoned to the attack 
of the enemy's army, but the 
Government wishes to make it 
clear to public opinion and to 
the British Government that in 
no case will France be the aggres- 



L'Armee allemande a ses 
avant-postes sur nos bornes-fron- 
tieres, hier; par deux fois des 
patrouilles allemandes out pene- 
tre sur notre territoire. Nos 
avant-postes sont en retraite a 10 
kilom. en arriere de la frontiere. 
Les populations ainsi abandon- 
ees a l'attaque de I'armee ad- 
verse protestent ; mais le Gou- 
vernement tient a montrer a 
l'opinion publique et au Gou- 
vernement britannique que 
l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas 

1 Enclosure 3 in No. 105 was dated in the first editions of the British Blue Book, 
namely July 31, while No. 105 itself is dated July 30. The text of the Enclosure 
should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 106, on which it is based. Whether 
the French Ambassador or Sir E. Grey is responsible for the errors and transpositions, 
it is impossible to state. For a full discussion see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of 
View, pp. 421 ff., and the same author's Why Europe is at War, G. P. Putnam's 
Sons. 



340 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



la France. Tout le 16 e Corps de 
Metz renforce par une partie du 
S e venu de Treves et de Cologne 
occupe la frontiere de Metz au 
Luxembourg. Le 15 e Corps 
d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre 
sur la frontiere. Sous menace 
d'etre fusilles les Alsaeiens-Lor- 
rains des pays annexes ne peuvent 
pas passer la frontiere; des 
reservistes \r.\r dizaines de niilliers 
sunt rappeles en Allemagne ; e'est 
le dernier staile avant la mobilisa- 
tion : or, nons n'avons rappele 
aueun reserviste. 

Comme vous le voyez, l'Alle- 
magne l'a fait. J'ajoute que 
toutes nos informations concor- 
dent pour montrer que les pre- 
paratifs allemands out commence 
samedi, 1 le jour meine de la 
remise de la note autrichienne. 

Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux 
contenus dans mon telegramme 
d'hier, vous permettent de faire 
la preuve au Gouvernement bri- 
tannique de la volonte pacifique 
de 1'iin et des intentions agres- 
sives <le l'autre. 



sor. The whole lfith corps from 
Metz, reinforced by a part of 
the 8th from Treves and Cologne, 
is occupying the frontier at Metz 
on the Luxemburg side. The 
15th army corps from Strassburg 
has closed up on the frontier. 
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lor- 
raine are prevented by the threat 
of being shot from crossing the 
frontier. Reservists have been 
called back to Germany by tens 
of thousands. This is the last 
stage before mobilisation, 
whereas we have not called back 
a single reservist. 

As you see, Germany has done 
so. I would add that all my in- 
formation goes to show that the 
German preparations began on 
Saturday, 1 the very day on which 
the Austrian note was handed 
in. 

These facts, added to those 
contained in my telegram of 
yesterday, will enable you to 
prove to the British Government 
the pacific intentions of the one 
party and the aggressive inten- 
tions of the other. 



Russia : 



From Nish 
Russian Orange Book No. ">!» 



Russian Charge a" Affaires in Servia t<> Russian Minister fur Foreign 
Affair,: ' 

Nish, July 17 (30), mi 4. 
(Telegram.) 

The Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all 
the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against 
Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend 
your homes and Servia with all your might." At the solemn opening 
of the Skupschtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in 
his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that 

1 The earlier editions of the British Blue Book contained no footnote to this errone- 
ous .late. The later ones print this note : "Sic: in original. The actual date of the 
presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was. in fact. Thursday, .Inly L':-S. The Servian 
reply was dated Saturday, July -'5, and it is clearly to the latter document that 
reference is intended." 



July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 60 341 

the place of their convocation showed the importance of present 
events. He followed this with a summary of recent events — the 
Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian 
Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible 
with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of 
their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood 
Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards 
the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments 
which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His 
Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia. 1 
At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall re- 
sounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown 
by France and England 2 was also touched upon in turn, and called 
forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the 
throne ended by declaring the Skupschtina open, and by expressing 
the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task 
before the Government. 

To Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome 

Russian Orange Book No. 60 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affair* in Russian Ambassadors at 
Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. 

St. Petersburgh, July 17 (30), 1914. 
(Telegram.) 

The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked :; 
whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria 
might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom 
of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions 
we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to 
him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate 
action : 

"Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant "If Austria, recognising that 
que la question austro-serbe a the Austro-Servian question has 
assume le caractere d'une ques- assumed the character of a ques- 
tion europeenne, se declare prete tion of European interest, de- 
a eliminer de son ultimatum les dares herself ready to eliminate 
points qui portent atteinte aux from her ultimatum points winch 
droits souverains de la Serbie, violate the sovereign rights of 
la Russie s'engage a cesser ses Servia, Russia engages to stop 
preparatifs militaires." her military preparations." 

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German 
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do 

1 See Russian Orange Book No. 40. July 27. 

2 For England's attitude a few weeks earlier, see Mr. Asquit.h's speech, London 
TimesfJuly 1, 1914, referring to the Serajevo murder. "We are once more confronted 
with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of 
mankind." 

3 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 99, July 30. 



342 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we 
cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany 
and Austria may gain time for their military preparations. 

From Berlin 
Russian Orange Book No. HP 
Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 {SO), 1914. 

I learn that the order for the mobilisation of the German army 
and navy has just been issued. 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange I! .. No. 02 

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Berlin, Jul;/ 17 (30), 1014- 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the 
news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has 
just been announced, is false ; that the news sheets had been printed 
in advance so as to lie ready tor all eventualities, and that they were 
put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated. 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Book No. 63 

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, .lull/ 17 (SO), 1914. 
i Telegram.) 

I have received your telegram of Kith (20th) July, 3 and have com- 
municated the text of your proposal 3 to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that lie had received an 
identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and 
lie then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept 
our proposal. 

1 The juxtaposition of Nos. 61 and GO makes it appear as if No. 61 contained the 
reply to No. 60. This cannot be the ease. From French Yellow Hook No. 113, July 31, 
and British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1. it appears 
that the formula was changed bj Sazonof probably on .Inly 31. This would have 
been impossible if Germany had issued her order for the mobilisation of her army and 
navy on July 30. I 'f. also French Yellow Book No. L01, July 30. Asa matter of fact 
Germany mobilised on August 1 as of August 2. See British Blue Hook No. 142, 
August. 1. and the chapter on Mobilisation in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History 
of the War. 

■ British Blue Book No. 93, July 30. Enclosure No. 2, dated July 29. 

3 Tins pioposal was superseded by the proposal of July 30, printed above. Orange 
Book No. 60. To print this despatch (No. 63) after No. 60 is misleading, because the 
casual reader may see in it. Austria's refusal to accept the formula of No. 60, which is 
not the case. 



July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 65 343 

From London 
Russian Orange Book No. 64 
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 17 (SO), 1914. 

I have communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 
16th (29th) 1 and 17th (30th) July 2 to Grey, who looks upon the situa- 
tion as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I 
pointed out to Grey that — since you agreed with him to accept what- 
ever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided 
that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia — 
the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. 
At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. 
After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and 
you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible 
from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited 
you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated 
them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised 
to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation 
brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German 
Ambassador's action. 3 Grey replied that he fully understood this, 
and that he would remember these arguments. 

From London 
Russian Orange Book No. 65 
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914. 

The German Ambassador has asked Grey 4 why Great Britain 
was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied 
that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situa- 
tion was such that each Power must be ready. 

1 British Blue Book No. 93, Enclosure 2, July 30. Since the Ambassador had com- 
municated the entire telegram to Sir E. Grey, it does not appear why he should here 
speak of communicating the substance. Equally confusing is the mixture of two 
separate proposals. See second note to previous despatch. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day. 

3 This action is described in very different terms in British Blue Book No. 97, 
July 30. 

1 Omitted in British Blue Book, see above, note 1 to British Blue Book No. 98, 
July 30, and French Yellow Book No. 10S, same day. 



344 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Serbia : 

To St. Pctersburgh 

Serbian Blue Book No. 44 

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial 
Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914. 

[For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 56, undated in the Collected Dip- 
lomatic Documents, but printed among the despatches of July 2!). No reason is 
given why a despatch from the Serbian Crown Prince was known in Russia a day 
before it was published in the Serbian Blue Book as having been sent from Serbia. 
For Serbian Blue Book Nos. 45 to 47 see under July 28.] 

From. St. Petersburgh 

Serbian Blue Book No. 48 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affair*-, to Dr. M. Spalaiko- 
vitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd. 

Sir, Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914. 

I had the honour to receive your note of July 15/28, l No. 527, 
in which you communicated to trie the contents of the telegram re- 
ceived by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the 
declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely 
regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the 
petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are. 

I have, etc. 

1 Not published in Russian Orange Book or Serbian Blue Book. If the date of the 
telegram from Sazonof. July 30, is correct it would seem that Sazonof had waited al 
least two days before laying Serbia's petition before the Czar. This seems incredible. 



July 31, Au-stro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51 



345 



Friday, July 31, 1914 
SUMMARY OF DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 
Austria-Hungary 
Belgium 
France 



Germany 
Great Britain 



Sent Despatches to 

London and Petrograd, 
All representatives abroad 
London, Berlin and Paris, 
All representatives abroad 
London, etc., Petrograd 



Rome, Petrograd, Paris 
Petrograd, Berlin, Paris 

and Berlin, Brussels, 

Paris 
London, etc. ; London 



Despatches from 

Petrograd, Paris 



London, Luxemburg, 

Petrograd 
Vienna, Berlin, Brussels 

London, Luxemburg, 
Petrograd, Vienna, 
Berlin, Brussels 

Vienna, Berlin 



Russia 
Serbia 

Austria-Hungary is prepared to entertain Sir E. Grey's proposal to negotiate 
between her and Serbia. Russia's mobilisation order, however, posted in the 
early hours throughout the Russian Empire, induces her to mobilise her own 
forces in Galicia. She nevertheless continues her direct conversations with 
Russia. 

Belgium mobilises her forces but promises to observe strict neutrality. She 
receives assurances of the French minister de sua, and publishes German assur- 
ances made in the Reichstag several years ago. 

France, having promised her unconditional support of Russia on the previous 
day, is trying to obtain an unconditional promise of support from Great Britain. 

(!i rmany is deeply stirred by the Russian order of general mobilisation, which 
came while Emperor and Czar were still exchanging telegrams. She says that this 
order is making her pacific efforts in Vienna impossible and endangering her safety. 
She consequently declares "Kriegsgefahrzustand " and asks Russia, in an ultima- 
tum, to demobilise within 12 hours. At the same time she asks France to reply 
within 18 hours, whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German War. 

Great Britain : The Cabinet refuses the request of France to make her a definite 
promise of support. Sir E. Grey, however, or his assistant, Sir A. Nicolson, 
promises to bring the matter up again in the Cabinet on the next day, while Sir E. 
Grey himself gives Germany to understand that Great Britain would join France 
in case of war, making thus a declaration contrary to the decision of the Cabinet. 
Notes are addressed to France and Germany regarding their respective attitudes 
toward the neutrality of Belgium, which Sir E. Grey declares to be not "a decisive 
but an important factor, in determining our attitude." Sir E. Grey requests a 
modification of Sazonof's formula of the previous day. 

Russia alters her formula of the previous day in which she had promised to 
stop her military measures, and orders the general mobilisation of her forces. 

Serbia is silent on this day. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To London and St. Petersburgk 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 51 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and 

St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I am telegraphing as follows to Berlin : — 

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions 
yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince 



346 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following 
announcement to the German Ambassador : — 

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the dec- 
laration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer 
in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary, 1 and he there- 
fore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of media- 
tion. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage 
of hostilities as a condition precedent to this. 

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince 
Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation a quatre, and 
that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to 
be prevented. 

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary 
of State for the communications made to us through Herr von 
Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the 
situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, 
we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to nego- 
tiate between us and Servia. 2 

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military 
action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the 
British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a 
standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in 
which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian 
attitude. 

From si. Petersburgh 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52 3 
Count Szdpdry tt> ('mini Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SI, 1014- 

The order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and 
Fleet was issued early to-day. 

To the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives 
Austro-Hungarian Red Hook No. 53 
('limit Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 191. '+. 

V< >i( your information and for use in your dealings with the Govern- 
ment to which you are accredited. 

1 The only published despatch in the British Blue Book and Russian Orange Book 
tii which this can refer is Russian Orange Book No. 50, .July 211. Here, however, it is 
Sazonof, while there it is Austria-Hungary who is said to have broken off the conversa- 
tions. This despatch is not printed in the'. ( ierman White Book. 

1 This i- an enormous concession both to Great Britain and France. Heretofore 
Germany and Austria-Hungary had always refused arbitration between Austria and 
Serbia while ready to accept arbitration between Austria and Russia. 

3 Tlie juxtaposition of these despatches, Nos. 51 and 52, is as unfortunate as that. 
noted above, Russian ( trance Book Nos. 60 and 61, July 30. The mobilisation was 
in neither rase the result of the previous despatch. The Russian mobilisation was 
the result of a decision reached "five days ago," according to the Czar's telegram of 
July Mil; see German White Book, Exhibit 23a. 



July 31, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55 347 

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our 
frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia. 

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise ex- 
clusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret 
exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any 
kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neigh- 
bourly relations. 

Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburgh 
appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, 1 and from 
these we hope that things will quiet down all round. 

From Paris 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 54 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1.91 4. 

German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his 
Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered 
by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany 
also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether 
France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany 
and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. 
The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the after- 
noon. 

From. St. Petersburgh 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55 
Count Szapary to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1.91 4. 

Your Excellency's telegram 2 of the 30th July has been received. 

You will have gathered from my telegram 3 of the 29th July, that 
without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with 
M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated 
to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially 
approximated to each other. 

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations 
between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs that Russia will not 4 accept as satisfactory the 
formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the ter- 
ritory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty nor 
injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then more- 
over a general mobilisation 5 has been ordered on the part of Russia. 

1 A despatch explaining the resumption of the pourparlers seema to be lacking, 
unless No. 55, same day, explains it. 

■ Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

4 In reports of these conversations this is only stated by inference. Cf. British Blue 
Book No. 97, July 30. 

6 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52, same day. 



348 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Belgium : 

To Berlin, Paris, London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 9 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 191 4. 

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence 
Havas reporting a state of war ! in Germany, and said 2 : — 

" 1 seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French 
troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are 
massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to 
incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the 
first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French 
authorities." 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound 
to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in theloyal 
observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements 
towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude 
of the German Government will be the same as that of the Govern- 
ment of the French Republic. 

To All Belgian Missions Abroad 

Belgian Gray Book No. LO 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of 
Belgian Missions abroad. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1.914. 

The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered 3 
and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day. 

To Berlin, London, Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 11 

.1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made 
the following communication, which he had hoped for some days 1 

1 "Sl:iti' 11!' danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand), sec French Yellow Book No. 
119, July 31, and British Mine Honk No. 112, same day. 

-It is an unusual step in diplomacy for the Minister to make such a declaration 
without authority to that effect having been sent. The formal declaration of the 
French ( lovernmenl was made later. < '.{. Belgian < iray Book No. 15, August 1. 1 ! 1 1 4 . 

'It will be noted that Belgium ordered the mobilisation of her troops our I' 
earlier than < lermany. Sec I lerman White Book, p. ">."<), August 1 at5 p.m., and Brit- 
ish Blue Book No. 127, August 1. 

4 No explanation is given why the British Minister could not have done so before. 



July 31, Belgian Gray Book No. 12 349 

to be able to present to me : Owing to the possibility of a Euro- 
pean war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German 
Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect 
Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : — 

" In view of existing treaties, I am instructed : to inform the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward 
Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her 
neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers 
will respect and maintain it." 

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, 
which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added 
that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independ- 
ence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain 
our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, 
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which 
had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that 
neutrality. 

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been con- 
siderably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were 
sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves 2 energetically in the event 
of the violation of our territory. 

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed 
to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided 
to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands 
had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, more- 
over, the recent date of our new military system, and the tem- 
porary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, 
made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. 
Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong 
desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves. 

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his 
Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations 
with France and Germany, the result of which would be communi- 
cated to me. 

To Berlin, London, and Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 12 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General 
of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he ex- 

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 

2 This should be read' in the light of the Brussels Documents, published by the 
German Government, which reveal the close military understanding with Great Britain. 
The reader should decide for himself whether Belgium was in a position to defend 
herself also against the Allies. Germany says that this would have been impossible 
because Belgium had given all her military secrets to Great Britain and, therefore, 
also to France. 



350 Official Diplomatic Documents 

plained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures 
which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of 
our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no 
wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours. 

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he 
knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, 
Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor 
had instructed the latter to give. 

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a conse- 
quence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain 
newspapers had maintained that in the ease of a Franco-German war 
Belgian neutrality ' would be violated by Germany. 

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara- 
tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs 
would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which 
was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the 
two countries. 

Ilerr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated 
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared 
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but 
he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would 
weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on 
the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east. 

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood 
the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed 
public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, 
Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget 
Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian 
neutrality. 

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr 
von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed 
at that time had not changed. 



Enclosure in Xo. 12 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, May ..', 1913. 

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations re- 
specting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the 
Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the 
Reichstag on April 29th : — 

"A member of the Social Democrat Tarty said: 'The approach 
of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension 

1 For a full discussion of the neutrality of Belgium see A. K. Fuehr, The Neutrality 
of Belgium, Funk& Wagnalls Co. 



July 31, French Yellow Book No. 110 351 

in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium.' 

" Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied : ' Belgian neutrality 
is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is de- 
termined to respect those Conventions.' 

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social 
Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add 
to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between 
Germany and Belgium. 

" In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Demo- 
crat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied : 
'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed re- 
organisation of the German military system. That proposal is 
based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of 
the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international 
treaty.' 

" A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of 
Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard 
to Belgium was sufficiently clear." 

France : 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 110 

M. Paul Cam.bon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 31. 101 4- 

At the beginning of our conversation J to-day Sir E. Grey told me 
that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain 
would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict 
became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, 
and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be 
drawn in. 

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which 
took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the 
situation, the Cabinet had thought 2 that for the moment the 
British Government were unable to guarantee to us their inter- 
vention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany 
and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that 
before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situ- 
ation to develop. 

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government 
would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact 

1 This conversation is only very briefly touched upon in British Blue Book No. 116, 
same day. 

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. This was the first vote of the Cabinet 
to "intervene" or "pledge support" to France. For the second vote, likewise refusing, 
see French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1. 



352 Official Diplomatic Documents 

that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed 
an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of 
the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should 
consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France 
the help on which she relied. 1 

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been 
formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be 
modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be 
called '-' together at once in order to consider it. 

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of 
State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and 
confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion. 

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps 
to secure that the autograph letter 3 which the President of the Re- 
public has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be 
given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be 
communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I 
am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British < labinet. 

Paul Cambon. 

From Luxemburg 
French Yellow Book No. 1 1 1 

M. Mallard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to Rene Viviani, President 

of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, July •>/, 1914. 

TtlE Minister of State has just left the Legation ; he has just told 
me that the Germans have dosed the bridges over the Moselle at 
Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormel- 
dange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach 
over the Sure have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow 
the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars. 

M. Eyschen requested me— •• and this was the real object of his 
visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France 
will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I 
asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German 
Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to 
get the same declaration. 

Postscript. — l"p to the present no special measure has been taken 
by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from 
the German Legation. Me complained of the measures showing sus- 
picion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister 
of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration 

1 If France had not relied on the help of Great. Britain she might not have supported 
Russia . 

2 < Contrast this with the assurance given in the next paragraph. 

;l This letter was published bv Sir E. Grev. after repeated requests had been made, 
on Feb. 20, 1915. 



July 31, French Yellow Book No. 112 353 

from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr 
Von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it 
would be necessary for the French Government to give the same 
undertaking." 

MOLLARD. 

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna and Rome 
French Yellow Book No. 112 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 

Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, 
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

Paris, July 81, 1914. 

The British Ambassador has handed me a note J from his Govern- 
ment asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. 
Petersburgh for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict. 

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir 
E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence 
on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade 
and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order 
to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers en- 
deavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient satisfaction to 
Austria ; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she 
had received satisfaction. 

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, 2 and expressed 
the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. 
Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the 
Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition 3 (if 
Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed the 
character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready 
to eliminate from her ultimatum the -points which endanger the principle 
of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military prepara- 
tions) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops 
her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Govern- 
ment could agree to change their formula in the following way : — 

That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete 
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or in- 
dependence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying 
Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare her- 
self ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to dis- 
cuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also 
consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, pro- 
vided that the other Powers acted in the same way. 

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Govern- 
ment joined in the British suggestion, and in the following terms 

1 See British Blue Book No. 104, July 30, also British Blue Book No. 103, same day. 

- British Blue Book No. 88, July 29. 

3 French Yellow Book No. 103, British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 

2a 



354 Official Diplomatic Documents 

asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg]! to try to obtain, without 
delay, the assent ' of the Russian Government : — 

"Please inform ]\I. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. 
Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between 
the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable 
arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this 
maimer the dangers which threaten general peace. 

"The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to 
the Powers the duty of examining how Servia could give full satis- 
faction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the 
independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of 
suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to 
act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia 
and to Austria and to provide for Servia an acceptable means of 
issue from the present difficulty. 

" I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considera- 
tions in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence 2 without 
delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself 
informed." 

Rene Viviani. 

From St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 113 

M. PaUologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, Jul;/ 81, 1914. 

The news of the bombardment of Belgrade 3 during the night 
and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. 
One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations 
since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's 
attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged 
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. 

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove 
his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he 
has modified 4 his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, 
in the following way : — 

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian 
territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has as- 
sumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits 

1 Austria-Hungary wag " quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to 
negotiate between us ami Serbia" ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. .51, July 31. 
- Russia ordered complete mobilisation instead. 

3 Cf. last despatch, offer of Sir E. Grey for an agreement "after the occupation of 
Belgrade." 

4 The modified formula must have been less satisfactory than the original one, 
French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, because here Austria has to agree to "stay the 
march-of her troops" while Russia merely agrees to a "waiting attitude," instead of 
stopping her military preparations as she had first offered to do. 



July 31, French Yellow Book No. 114 355 

that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia 
can accord to the Austro-Hiuigarian Government, without injury 
to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia 
undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." 

Paleologue. 

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople 

French Yellow Book No. 114 

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council '., Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople. 

Paris, July 31, 1014. 

The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and 
Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for 
every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding be- 
tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh, or of the mediation of the four 
Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day ; 
Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has 
hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture 1 made by 
Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on 
which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a 
formula, and then modifying 2 it in accordance with the request of 
Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having 
also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors 
that British mediation will complete at London that which is being 
attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the 
beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power 
her peaceful intentions, has actually, by- her dilatory or negative 3 
attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has 
not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising 
attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since 
the 25th July 4 and subsequently continued without cessation ; 
the immediate opposition 6 of Germany to the Russian formula, de- 
clared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even 
been consulted ; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from 
Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate 
Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could 
not be obtained, to make war. 

Rene Viviani. 

1 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30. 

2 See note 2 to previous despatch. 

3 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 

1 That this was an error appears from French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. See 
also the chapters on Mobilization in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, 
Scribner's Sons. 

5 There is no proof for this assertion. On the contrary Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 51, July 31, seems to prove that Germany had agreed, for Austria-Hungary's state- 
ment that she was " prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate be- 
tween us and Serbia " came as the result of a communication transmitted to her by 
Germany. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31, while stating that the formula was 
altered at the request of Great Britain, does not say that Germany had opposed the 
original formula. 



356 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Vienna 

French Yellow Book No. 115 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was 
declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 
o'clock. 

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in 
contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold. 

Dumaine. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 116 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 31, 101 4. 

Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was very 
sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian 
army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found 
herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is 
called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been 
declared, 1 and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it 
expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and 
to close the frontier. 

At the same time a demand - is being made at St. Petersburgh that 
they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German 
side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. 
Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to 
inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet 
and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt. 

Jules Cambon. 

To St. Petersburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 117 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Paleologuc, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

Paris, July 31, 1914. 

The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military 
measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war." 

1 This proves that the previous references to "Kriegsgefahr" were erroneous. 
See French Yellow Book No. 1(11. July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 61, same day. 

2 Russian Orange Book No. 7U. August 1 (midnight). 



July 31, French Yellow Book No. US 357 

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, 
Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same 
time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government 
has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany 
will mobilise in her turn. 

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information 
at all 1 about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and 
navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the 
new military measures which they are taking to-day. 

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, 
what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany 
and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow 
(Saturday) at 1 o'clock. 

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, 
and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard 
to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed 
give any account of her intentions except to her ally. 

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have 
already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in 
the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to 
avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis. 

Rene Viviani. 

From St. Petersburg!) 
French Yellow Book No. US 

M. Paleologue, French- Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 

Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. 

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures 
for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for 
the last six days, 2 the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian 
army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious 
danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced ; really she is 
only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Ger- 
many. 

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, know- 
ing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion 
of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation. 

Paleologue. 

1 This is very strange, since the Russian mobilisation was "ordered during the 
afternoon of July 31" (German White Book. p. 558). according to M. P. Price. The 
Diplomatic History of the War, Seribner's Sons, p. 103. and London Times. Sept. 11. 
letter by Mr. Stephen Graham, who states on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia the 
first telegram to mobilise came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st July. 

2 For the error of this and similar statements see M. P. Price's book referred to in 
note to previous despatch. 



358 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From Brussels 

Fkench Yellow Book No. 119 

.1/. Klobulcowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

L'Agence Hay as having announced that the state "of danger of 
war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could 
assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the 
neutrality of Belgium. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of 
the King had always thought that this would he so, and thanked inc. 
The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subse- 
quently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this 
assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in 
accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey. 

Klobtjkowski. 
Germany: 

To Rome 

German White Book Exhibit 19 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on 
' J nil/ 'list, 191 ;. 

We have continued to negotiate between liiissia and Austria- 
Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty 
the kaiser and 1 1 is Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with 
Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts 
have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. 
In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is 1 taking such far-reaching 
measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more 
menacing. 

To St. Petersburgh 

German White Book Exhibit 24 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh on Jul;/ 31st, 1914- Urgent. 
In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to 
this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised 
her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these 
Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, 
to proclaim the threatening state of war, which docs not yet imply 
mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia 
does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria- 

' The British edition lias this footnote: "The German test ml. Is here •alien tins 
zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge' (according to all the information that has reached 
us"). 



July 81, British Blue Book No. 50 359 

Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. 
Please to communicte this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of 
communication. 1 

To Paris 

German White Book Exhibit 25 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on 
July 31st, 1914- Urgent. 

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, there- 
fore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. 2 We have 
therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to 
be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all 
measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably 
implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to 
remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 
hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary. 

Great Britain: 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 50 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Received July 31.) 
Sir, Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the 
Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against 
Servia. I have, etc. 

Maurice de Bunsen. 

Enclosure in No. 50 
Copy of note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914 

(Translation.) 
Pour mettie fin aux menees In order to bring to an end 
subversives partant de Belgrade the subversive intrigues originat- 
et dirigees centre l'integrite terri- ing from Belgrade and aimed at 
toriale de la Monarchic austro- the territorial integrity of the 
hongroise, le Gouvernement Im- Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
perial et Royal a fait parvenir the Imperial and Royal Govcrn- 
a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au ment has delivered to the Royal 
Serbie une note dans laquelle se Servian Government a note, 
trouvait formulee une serie de dated July 23, 1914, in which a 
demandes pour l'acceptation des- series of demands were formu- 
quelles un delai de quarante-huit lated, for the acceptance of which 

1 Presented at midnigjit. See Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1. 

2 The British edition adds here a footnote: "The German text adds here ' und 
obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmaehungsmassnahmen getroffen haben' (and al- 
though we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation"). 



360 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



hetires a ete accorde a Gouverne- 
ment Royal. Le Gouvernement 
Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas 
repondu a, cette note d'une 
maniere satisfaisante, le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal se 
trouve dans la necessite <lc pour- 
voir lui-meme a la sauvegarde 
de ses droits et interets et de 
recourir a cet effet a la force des 
amies. 

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient 
d'adresser a la Serbie une de- 
claration formelle conformement 
a I'article l er de la convention du 
18 octobre, 1907, relative a 
l'ouverture des hostilites, se con- 
sidere des lors en etat de guerre 
avec la Serbie. 

En portant ce qui precede a, 
la connaissance de I'Ambassade 
Royale de Grande-Bretagne le 
Ministere des Affaires Etran- 
geres a l'honneur de declarer que 
l'Autriche-Hongrie se confor- 
mera au cours des hostilites, 
sous la reserve d'un procede 
analogue de la part de la Serbie, 
aux stipulations des conventions 
de La Have du 18 octobre, 10(17, 
ainsi qu'a cedes de la 1 )eclaration 
de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909. 

L'Ambassade est priee de 
vouloir bien communiquer, d'ur- 
gence, la presente notification a 
son Gouvernement. 



a delay of forty-eight hours has 
been granted to the Royal 
Government. The Royal Servian 
Government not having answered 
this note in a satisfactory manner, 
the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment are themselves compelled 
to see to the safeguarding of 
their rights and interests, and, 
with this object, to have recourse 
to force of arms. 

Austria-Hungary, who has just 
addressed to Servia a formal dec- 
laration, in conformity with 
article 1 of the convention of the 
18th October, 1907, relative to 
the opening of hostilities, con- 
siders herself henceforward in a 
state of war with Servia. 

In bringing the above to notice 
of His Britannic Majesty's Em- 
bassy, the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs has the honour to declare 
that Austria-Hungary will act 
during the hostilities in con- 
formity with the terms of the 
('(inventions of The Hague of 
the 18th October, 1907, as also 
with those of the Declaration of 
London of the 2Nth February, 
1909, provided an analogous pro- 
cedure is adopted by Servia. 

The embassy is requested to be 
so good as to communicate the 
[ >n sent notification as soon as pos- 
sible to the British Government. 



Fr 



Rd). 



British Blue Hook No. 106 ' 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — - 
Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914- 

I learnt from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me 
this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined 2 to continue 

1 While printed here as received "n July 31, the discussion is, especially in the 
second paragraph, of events and proposals of July 29 and 30.' 

- Sec, however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. Cf. also Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 



July 31, British Blue Book No. 107 361 

the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he 
had reason to believe that Germany was now ' disposed to give more 
conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should 
act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with 
us. 

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to 
ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange 
of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which 
Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany 
might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would 
demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither 
deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless 
to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, 
and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non- 
success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from 
Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints 
of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. 
There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. lie in 
any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His 
Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four 
Powers was impossible. 



From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 107 2 

Sir. E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German 
Government to the communication 3 which you made to them through 
the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest 
any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating 
influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night 4 
that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply 
to an enquiry from the French Ambassador 5 as to whether the Im- 
perial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary 
of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- 
municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro- 
Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, 
however, yet been returned. 6 

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the 
button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he 

1 This "now" is significant. Of. British Blue Book No. 80, July 29. 

2 See note 1 to previous despatch. 

3 See British Blue Book No. 84. Julv 29. 
* I.e. Julv 29. 

6 French Yellow Book No. 109. July 30. 

6 For the answer that was returned, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 



3G2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

has not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had 
been precipitated rather than otherwise. 

From Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 10S 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July SI.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 81, H'l',. 

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and 
moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian 
mobilisation against Austria. He lias done everything possible to 
attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto- 
gether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his 
country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers ; 
and if, as lie learns is the case, military measures are now being taken 
by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible to him to 
remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that 
in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would 
take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of 
going to have an audience with the Emperor. 

1 1 is Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on 
the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar 
had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to 
mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming 
to that request. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 109 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
[Herri red July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1014. 

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal 
for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your tele- 
gram of yesterday. 1 His Excellency was so taken up with the news 
of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my im- 
mediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication 
without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that 
I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect 
upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave 
matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. 
I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the under- 
standing that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversa- 
tion, and not as an official document. 2 

His Excellency agreed. 

1 British Blue Book No. 101, July 30. 

2 From this it would appear that Great Britain at this time did not wish to bind 
herself by "an official document." 



July 31, British Blue Book No. Ill 363 

To St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 110 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- 

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of sug- 
gestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken 
place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explana- 
tions about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, 1 and discuss suggestions 
and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the 
Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army 
corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number 
against 400,000 Servians. 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Govern- 
ment to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military 
preparations. 

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are 
being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express 
this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly 
hope he will encourage them. 

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military prep- 
arations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend - them 
unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops 
into Servia. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. Ill 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, UU4- 

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between 
ivustria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling- 
block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, 
and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the in- 
dependence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in 
the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would 
undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible 
for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would 
undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands 

1 Of. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 

2 Rut Russia had herself offered to "stop all military operations." British Blue 
Book No. 97, July 30. Cf. also note 2, French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31. 



364 Official Diplomatic Documents 

on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty 
and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, 
Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia 
might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake 
to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian 
sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend 
further military operations or preparations. 

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could 
get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that 
Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, 
and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected 
it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length 
of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's 
Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences, 1 
but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became 
involved we should be drawn in. 2 

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State 
as to proposal above. 



From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 112 

Sir E. flosehen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
( lieee i red July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 81, 1914. 

According to information 3 just received by German Govern- 
ment from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian 
army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that 
" Kriegsgefahr" 4 will be proclaimed at once by German Government, 
as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation 
is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His 
Excellency added in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr" ' signified the 
taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained 
relations with a foreign country. 

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to 
him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. 
Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies. 

1 This is an eminently fair statement. Unfortunately it did not take into account 
Russia's mobilisation. From the discussion of Sazonof's formula, moreover (cf. 
British Blue Book NTo. 97, July 30, and X"- 120, July ::i printed under date of August 1), 
if appears that Sir E. Grey himself induced Sazonof to withdraw his offer to "stop all 
inilii try operations." The reason for this action is not explained in any of the pub- 

- This declaration of Sir E. Grey was made before the Belgian question was seriously 
raised. The defenders of Germany have always claimed that the invasion of Belgium 
became neees iry', because Great Britain had decided to join France at all hazards 
and that the risks of a French-English attack through Belgium were too great for 
I rerm my to run. 

3 See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 

4 "Imminence of War." 



July 31, British Blue Book No. 114 365 

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the 
authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure 
Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a 
friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria 
to reply to your last proposal, 1 and that he had received a reply to 
the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes 
of the Emperor this morning in the matter. 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 113 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July .31.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914- 

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. 2 
This decision was taken in consequence of report received from 
Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is deter- 
mined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving 
troops against Russia as well as against Servia. 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active 
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 3 

To Paris 

British Blue Book No. 114 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Audmssador at Paris, a nil 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- 

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of pros- 
pect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's 
Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger- 
man) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of 
Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. 4 

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Govern- 
ment. It is important to have an early answer. 

1 This proposal was accepted bv Austria-Hungary ; see Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 51, July 31. 

2 If this despatch is correctly dated from St. Petersburgh. July 31. the British Am- 
bassador sent this information rather late. See note to French Yellow Book No. 117. 
July 31. 

3 Considering that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 
23a) that " military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago," this 
is a strange remark. 

4 If the quintuple treaty of 1839 was in force (see Sir E. Grey's phrase "existing 
treaties"), the qualification "so long as no other Power violates it" was contrary to 
the treaty, for in that case the remaining Powers were bound to make joint cause 
against the invader. Germany has claimed that she could not rely on Great Britain's 
defence of Belgium if France should have invaded it. See A. K. Fuehr, The Neu- 
trality of Belgium, Fuuk & VV agnails Co. 



366 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Brussels 
British Blue Book No. 115 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SI, 1014. 

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I 
have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre- 
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by 
no other Power. 

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will 
maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire 
and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. 

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is 
desired. 

To Paris 
British Blue Book No. 116 
Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SI, 1014. 

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date. 1 

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, 
British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different 
from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved 
a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is 
being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. 

1 believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive 
factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 2 

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. 
I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's 
Government to reconsider this decision. 3 

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge 
at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situ- 
ation again directly there is a new development. 

From Paris 
British Blue Book No. 117 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July 31 .) 
(Telegraphic) Paris, Jul// ,11, W14. 

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his 
Excellency. 

1 British Blue Book No. 99. July 30. 

2 This was probably quite true on July 31, but it had not been so up to July 29, 
see British Blur Book No. 80, July 29, and £6. No. 100, July 30, listed under date of 
July 31. See also French Yellow Boek No. 92, July 29, last paragraph. 

3 French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. 



July 31, British Blue Book No. 118 3G7 

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of 
the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of 
Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum 
which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that 
Russian forces should be demobilised. 

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the 
total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French 
frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give 
an undertaking to comply with German demand. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to 
you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of 
England. 

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours termi- 
nate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to- 
morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Govern- 
ment's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances. 

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador : that he is not aware of 
any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. 



From, Vienna 

British Blue Book No. US 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I ah informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that 
although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, 
which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received 
instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded 
as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being 
exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, 
and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general 
war might, he seriously hoped, lie staved off by these efforts. On my 
expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Ger- 
many must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. 2 As 
regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary 
found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to 
the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the 
London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had 
stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of 
Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. 

1 This is verv strange : cf. the Czar's telegram of July 30. German White Book, 
Exhibit 23a. and note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 

2 The statement is important in view of the charge that has been made that Ger- 
many forced the war by duping Austria-Hungary when the latter was on the point 
of settling her differences with Russia. 



368 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situ- 
ation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a 
similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this 
afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of 
the above conversation. 

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire 
to interfere unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late 
Russian Minister, 1 the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of 
very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia 
had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could 
without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting 
himself strongly in the interests of peace. 

From Paris 
British Blue Book No. 119 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July J/, 1914- 

M. Cambon 2 referred to-day to a telegram 3 that had been shown 
to Sir Arthur Nicolson ' this morning from the French Ambassador in 
Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether 
we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, 
and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Rus- 
sia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of 
peace. 

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany 
under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused 
overtures 5 to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not 
only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had 
even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador 
that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be 
drawn into it. 8 That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an 
engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that 
we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand 
aside. 

M. ( !ambon then asked me for mv replv to what he had said yester- 
day. 7 

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet s to-day, 
that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we 

1 Mr. von Hartwig, whose very sudden death after the Serajevo murder has not 
yet b in explained. 

2 French Ambassador in London. 

3 i'f. the last paragraph, French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29, 

4 British Under-Secretary of State for Fo reign Affairs. 
' See British Blue Book No. S.5, July 29. 

6 British Blue Book No. 111. July 31. 

1 C{. British Blue Book No. 105, July 30. 

8 This was the first time the British Cabinet voted against joining France: sec also 
French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. On the next day, August 1. the Cabinet re- 
fused for the second time to declare British solidarity with France. See French Yellow 
Book No. 126, August 1. 



July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 66 369 

should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge 
Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, 
and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations 
of this country were involved. Further developments might alter 
this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the 
view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the 
neutrality of Belgium 1 might be, I would not say a decisive, 2 but 
an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we 
proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, 
Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the 
neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both 
France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an 
engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality 
of Belgium. 

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France 
if Germany made an attack on her. 

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things 
had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. 

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected 
proposals that might have made for peace. 3 It could not be to Eng- 
land's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We 
should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. 
In 1S70 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous in- 
crease of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mis- 
take. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the 
Cabinet again. 



Russia : 

From Vienna 

Russian Orange Book No. 66 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Vienna, July IS (31), 1011,. 

In spite of the general mobilisation, 4 my exchange of views with 
Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell 
upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatso- 
ever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of 
Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to 
carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a 
serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the 
future. 

1 This is not mentioned in Cambon's report of Sir E. Grey's remarks in French 
Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. 

2 This statement is important. 

3 There is no statement here that Sir E. Grey corrected this misconception on the 
part of the French Ambassador. 

4 Tins may refer to the Russian mobilisation or to the counter measure of the 
Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. 

2 B 



370 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From St. Petersburgh 

Russian Orange Book No. 67 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Nome. 

(Telegram.) 67. Petersburgh, Juki 18 (31), 1914. 

Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. 1 The British Am- 
bassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me 
of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications - 
in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Am- 
bassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I 
accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as 
follows : — 

(Translation.) 

"Si l'Autriche consent a ar- "If Austria consents to stay 
reter la marche de ses armees the march of her troops on 
sur le territoire serbe et si, Servian territory ; and if, recog- 
reconnaissant que le conflit nising that the Austro-Servian 
austro-serbe a assume le carac- conflict has assumed the character 
tere d'une question d'inteiet of a question of European inter- 
europeen, elle admet que les est, she admits that the Great 
Grandes Puissances examinent Powers may examine the satisfac- 
la satisfaction que la Serbie tion which Servia can accord to 
pourrait accorder an Gouverne- the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment d'Autriche-Hongrie sans merit without injury to her rights 
laisser porter atteinte a ses droits as a sovereign State or her inde- 
d'Etat souverain et a, son inde- pendenee, Russia undertakes to 
pendance, — la Russie s'engage a maintain her waiting attitude." 
conserver son attitude expec- 
tantc." 

From Berlin 

"Russian Orange Book No. 68 

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July IS (31), 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discus- 
sions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisa- 
tion against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious 
military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said 
that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, 
and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of 
Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my 
possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from 

1 Russian Orange Book No. 00, July 30. 

2 The reasons for the British wish to have the original formula modified are no- 
where given. Cf. note to French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, also British Blue 
Book No. 110, July 31. 



July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 09 371 

Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military 
measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs asserts l that the only step taken in Germany has been the 
recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manoeuvres. 

To London 
Russian Orange Book No. 69 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July IS (31), 101 4. 

I have requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my 
deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted 
in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the 
hope of finding a peaceful issue 2 to the present situation need not yet 
be abandoned. 

1 For the truth of this assertion see chapters on mobilisation in M. P. Price, The 
Diplomatic History of the War, Charles Scribner's Sons. 

2 Cf . note 1 British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey had at last practically 
done what Sazonof had wished him to do as early as July 24 ; see British Blue Book 
No. 6, July 24. 



372 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Saturday, August 1, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Sent Despatches to 



Austria-Hungary 





Petrograd 


Belgium 


Berlin, Paris and London 
London etc. 


London, Berlin 


France 


London etc. 


Berlin, Rome 




London, Berlin, Brussels etc. 


London, Luxemburg 




London, Luxemburg 




Germany 


Petrograd 


Paris 


Great Britain 


Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna 


Petrograd, Berlin, Paris, 
Vienna, Brussels, Lux- 
emburg 


Russia 


All representatives 


London, Paris 


Serbia 









Austria-Hungary explains her willingness to continue direct conversations with 
Russia, at the same time expressing her deep concern at the Russian general 
mobilisation which forces her to decree her own general mobilisation. 

Belgium receives the official assurance that France will respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, but "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, 
the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to 
modify their attitude." The German "reply is awaited." Belgium instructs her 
representatives abroad to notify the Powers of her mobilisation in notes prepared 
and sent out, undated, on July 24. She commits hostile acts against Germany 
according to the hitler's declaration, a fact which Belgium later categorically 
denies. 

France orders general mobilisation, and in despatches to London endeavors to 
blame Germany for the coming war. She again solicits the armed intervention 
of Great Britain, and promises to respect Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, with 
a proviso. Her assurances to Belgium contain no reference to an existing 
treaty, anil are in wording contrary to the assumption of the existence of a treaty. 
Her reply to Germany is "that France would do that which her interests 
dictated." 

Germany continues the exchange of royal and imperial telegrams. Russia not 
having replied to the German ultimatum requesting her to demobilise, Germany 
declares war on Russia. To the British enquiry whether she would respect 
Belgian neutrality her Secretary of Foreign Affairs replies that probably no answer 
would lie returned, because by answering they "could not but disclose a certain 
amount of their plan of campaign"; moreover, Belgium had already committed 
"certain hostile acts." She orders general mobilisation, to take effect the next 
day, August 2. 

Great Britain ; the Cabinet for the second time refuses to commit itself in favor of 
France. Sir E. Grey, however, repeats his personal promises to France, at the 
same time refusing the German request that he formulate conditions under which 
Great Britain would remain neutral. No despatches concerning the mobilisation 
of the British army arc published on this or any other day. 

Russia refuses to reply to the German ultimatum and does not demobilise. 

Serbia is silent on this day. 



August 1, Belgian Gray Book No. 13 373 

Austria-Hungary : 

From, St. Petersburgh 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56] 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 101^. 

I visited M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received 
instructions, 1 but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of 
the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general 
Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which 
I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. 
I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the 
misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with 
Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, 
assured him. 2 Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal 
with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially 
inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its 
interpretation was concerned. 

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency af- 
forded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him 
that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was 
unknown to me ; but I could only hope that the course of events had 
not already taken us too far ; in any case, I regarded it as my duty 
in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the 
goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied 
that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he 
desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Peters- 
burgh for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success 
than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London. 3 I replied that 
Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point 
of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburgh, 
so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his 
suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject 
with your Excellency. 

Belgium : 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 13 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Darignon, Belgian 

M in ister for Foreign . Iff a irs. 
(Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914- 

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately 4 if 
they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51. Julv 31. 

; ( f. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55. July 31. 

3 If Sazonof is correctly quoted, and this would seem to be the case (cf. Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. third paragraph), it appears that Russia had 
changed her attitude, and was not now desirous of direct conversations. See Russian 
Orange Book No. 69, July 31. ' British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 



374 Official Diplomatic Documents 

violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France 
has replied in the affirmative. 1 

From Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 14 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1014. 

The British Ambassador has been instructed to Inquire of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany 
would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister 
replied that he was unable to answer the question. 2 

To Berlin, Boris, and London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 15 3 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 101 4- 

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has 
made the following verbal communication to me: — 

(Translation.) 

"Je suis autorise a declarer "I AM authorised to declare 

qu'en cas de conflit international, that, in the event of an inter- 
le Gouvernement de la Repu- national war, the French Govern- 
blique, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours ment, in accordance with the 
declare, respectera la neutrality declarations they have always 
de la Belgique. Dans l'hypo- made, will respect the neutrality 
these ou cette neutrality ne serait of Belgium. In the event of 
pas respectee par une autre this neutrality not being re- 
Puissance, le Gouvernement spected by another Power, the 
francais, pour assurer sa propre French Government, to secure 
defense, pourrait etre amene a their own defence, might find 
modifier son attitude." it necessary to modify their 

attitude." 4 

1 See below, No. 15. same day. 

-d. British Blue Book No. 122. July 31, printed under date of August 1, and 
French Yellow Book No. 123, August 1, giving Germany's reason for not answering. 

3 This despatch should precede No. 13, same day. where it is referred to. 

* See British Blue Book No. 1 14, July 31, note 1, and mark the wording of the French 
announcement, which proceeds from the principle that France is released from any 
obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium "in the event of this neutrality not 
being respected by another Power." Belgium was a buffer state between the bel- 
ligerents. Small infractions of her neutrality could not have been avoided by either 
side. The principle, therefore, that any infraction by one side would release theother 
side from all obligations, and that the other side was. of course, the sole judge of what 
constituted an infraction, is the chief reason why Belgium was invaded, for if it had 
not been for this principle no " military necessity " would have existed for either side to 
contemplate even the invasion of Belgium. It. was the principle accepted by Great 
Britain (see British Blue Book No. 114, July .'ill and by France, and as events proved 
also by Germany. Contrast this declaration with French Yellow Book No. 122, 
same day. 



August 1, French Yellow Book No. 120 375 

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken 
without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde- 
pendence and our frontiers should be respected. 

To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 16 

M.Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914- 

Carry out instructions ' contained in my despatch of the 25th July. 

To Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg 

Belgian Gray Book No. 17 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers 
at Hume, The Hague, Luxemburg. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914- 

Carry out instructions 2 contained in my despatch of the 25th July. 

France : 

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome 

French Yellow Book No. 120 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, August 1, 1914. 

Two demarches were made yesterday evening by the Austrian 
Ambassadors — the one at Paris, 3 which was rather vague, the other 
at St. Petersburgh, 4 precise and conciliatory. 

Count Szecsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial 
ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia ; that it also 
repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these 
explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war 
remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would 
open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The 
Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me 
to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2. July 24, and note. 

2 See note to previous despatch and Belgian Gray Book No. 3, July 24. 

3 Not mentioned in Austro-Hungarian Red Book. See British Blue Book No. 137, 
same day. 

4 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31, and Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 56, August 1. 



376 Official Diplomatic Documents 

of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly 
answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the 
name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps 
still possible. 

At St. Petersburgh the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof 
and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a 
discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. 1 
The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, 
and proposed that the pourparlers- should take place in London with 
the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the 
British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed 
out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her 
operations in Servia. 

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show 
herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Govern- 
ment is ready 2 to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British 
proposal. 

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for 
a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by 
the attitude of Germany. 3 This Power has in fact presented an ul- 
timatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to 
agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, 
but also as against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon. The 
ultimatum is not justified, for Russia, has accepted the British pro- 
posal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the 
Powers. 

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she 
wishes for it against France. 4 Yesterday " when Ilerr von Schoen 
came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to 
take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, 
although there has been no direct dispute 6 between France and 
Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used 
all our efforts for a peaceful solution 7 and are still continuing to do so, 
added that he asked me to present his respects ami thanks to the Presi- 
dent of the Republic, and asked that we would he good enough to 
make arrangements as to him personally (des dispositions pour sa 

1 Viviani calls this an interview "yesterday evening," i.e. .July 31. In theAustro- 
Hungarian Red Book No. 5(3, it appears as an interview of "to-day," August 1. 

' l'lus is a vague description of the Russian attitude. Of. note 3 to Austro-Hun- 
gari in Red Book No. 56, August 1. 

3 Viviani blames Germany for her ultimatum. Germany claimed her ultimatum 
had Lean forced by Russia's mobilisation (British Blue Book No. 121, August 1) which 
Viviani 'In" imi deny as having taken place. If the student, therefore, agrees with 
Viviani that Germany's ultimatum spoiled the prospects of a peaceful solution, the 
further question arises " Was Germany's ultimatum forced by Russia's mobilisation?" 
In the next sentence Viviani state-, that the ultimatum was not justified. This isthe 
crux of the whole matter. For Germany's attitude see German White Rook, pp. 555 ff. 

1 Another evidence of the unfortunate suspicion of the French Government. 

: '7 p.m., July 31, see German White Rook, p 560 

■ Viviani overlooks that France had promised her support to Russia, cf. French 
Yellow Bonk No. 101, July 3D : British Blue Book No. 0, July 24, French Yellow Book- 
No. 74, paragraph -4, where ( ' I says that the "relationsof Germany with Vienna 

were no closer than those of France with Russia." 

7 For a fuller discussion of the French attitude, see E. von Much, Germany's Point 
of View, pp. 216 ff. 



August 1, French Yellow Booh No. 121 377 

propre personne) ; we know also that he has already put the archives 
of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic 
relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received 
any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination 
of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her 
peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing 
upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed x with Russia 
to begin negotiations. 

Rene Viviani. 



From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 121 

M. Jules Camion, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August 1, 1.914- 

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams 2 
from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh had explained 3 that his Government was ready to 
discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as 
to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these con- 
versations should take place in London. 

The ultimatum to Russia 4 can only do away with the last chances 
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The ques- 
tion may lie asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by 
Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsi- 
bility of the conflict on to Russia. 

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal 5 to 
Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that 
the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian 
answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen 
that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand 
their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against 
Austria ; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and 
said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point. 6 

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agree- 
ment seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Peters- 
burgh, is characteristic of her warlike policy. 

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and 
Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria ; in these cir- 
cumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals 

1 This agreement had been clue to Germany's pressure ; see despatches of previous 
days. See especially German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28. 

2 Not given in Russian Orange Book. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. 

* Sent by Germany and presented at midnight, July 31-Aug. 1 ; see German White 
Book, p. 559. See note 5 to previous despatch. 

6 British Blue Book No. 121 under date of August 1. 

6 This is different from Sir E. Goschen's own report, see British Blue Book No. 121. 



378 Official Diplomatic Documents 

were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand l why 
Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing 
like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she 
desired war on her own account. 

J. Cambon. 

To London, Berlin, and Brussels 

French Yellow Book No. 122 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French 
Minister at Brussels. 

Paris, August 1, 1914. 

The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Govern- 
ment, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French 
Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany. 

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had re- 
peatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect 
their neutrality. 

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that 
neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian 
territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing 
Power. 2 

Rene Viviani. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 123 

M. .1 ides Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August 1, W14. 

The British Ambassador has been instructed 3 by his Government 
to make to the German Government a communication identical with 
that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of 
Belgium. 

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of 
the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer 
could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans 
in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to- 
morrow afternoon. 4 

J. Cambon. 

1 A comparison of this view with that presented in the German White Hunk, pp. 557 n. 
shows how very far apart the governments of France and Germany found themselves. 

2 Contrast tin- official French declaration which contains nothing about obliga- 
tions. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, French Yellow Book No. 123, both of August 1. 

4 The part of the interview with Sir E. Goschen printed British Blue Book No. 123, 
in which Germany claims that Belgium has already committed "certain hostile 
acts" against Germany, has been omitted here. 



August 1, French Yellow Book No. 125 379 

From Borne 

French Yellow Book No. 124 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Borne, to M. Bene Viviani, President 
of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Borne, August 1, 1914- 

I went to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half- 
past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the 
attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the 
results which they may have. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the 
German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had 
said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government 
to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform 
them as to their intentions ; Germany had given France a time 
limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours. 

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what 
were the intentions of the Italian Government. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war under- 
taken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely 
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the 
consequences which might result from it according to the declaration 
of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war. 

Barrere. 

To London, St. Petersburg!!, Berlin, Vienna, Borne, Madrid, Con- 
stantinople 

French Yellow Book No. 125 

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, 
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. 

Paris, August 1, 1914- 
The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock 
this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts 
made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro- 
Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which 
has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the 
pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday : — 

(1) A British compromise, 1 proposing, besides other suggestions, 
suspension of military preparations 2 on the part of Russia, 
on condition that the other Powers should act in the same 
way ; adherence of Russia to this proposal. 

1 This seems to refer to Sazonof's altered formula. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 
67, Julv 31. 

2 This is an error, cf. note to Russian Orange Book no. 67. 



380 Official Diplomatic Documents 

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government : declaring that 
they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even 
to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were 
ready to discuss even the bads of the Austro-Servian question 
at London with the other Powers. 

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning 
all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment 
when this Power had just accepted the British formula 2 (which im- 
plies the cessation of military preparations 3 by all 4 the countries 
which have been mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic 
rupture with France. 

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the develop- 
ments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four 
hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some 
arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication 5 
from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He 
gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts 
to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid 
stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government 
would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initia- 
tive which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably 
compromise peace. 

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did 
not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning 
the attitude of France in ease of an Austro-Russian conflict. He 
confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of 
France was not doubtful. 

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result 
from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their 
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous prepara- 
tions on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, 
and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her 
side France is taking all military measures required for protection 
against too great an advance in German military preparations. 
She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance 
of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the 
conflict is forced on her. 

PiENE VlVIAXI. 

■Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. 

- Viviani fails to mention that Russia had declared full mobilisation. 

3 But nut demobilisation. The status quo cannot lie long maintained when one 
country is mobilised and the other is not. 

1 The British fleet was mobilised. (See Freneh Yellow Book No. 55, July 27.) Sir 
E. Grey nowhere offered to demobilise it. Cf. next number. 

s Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 74, same day. 



August 1, French Yellow Book No. 127 381 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 126 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, 1 August 1, 101 4. 

Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, 
the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had 
asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not 
obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their 
action ; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses. 

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to 
Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement 
to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a posi- 
tion to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession 
of this answer 2 and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in 
the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit 
a violation of Belgian neutrality. 

In the second place the British fleet is mobilised, 3 and Sir Edward 
Grey will propose 4 to his colleagues that he should state that it will 
oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, 
if the German fleet should pass through (venaient a le passer), will 
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two ques- 
tions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the 
attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this 
intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to 
allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of inter- 
vening in time. Paul Cambon. 

To London 
French Yellow Book No. 127 

M . Ilcne Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Loudon. 

Paris, August 1, 1914. 
We are warned through several channels that the German and the 
Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence Eng- 
land by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it 

1 Probably a mistake for London. 

2 This appears as if the German "Belgian" reply had not been discussed at the 
Cabinet meeting here described. Contrast Sir E. Grey's account of the Cabinet 
meeting of August 1 to the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1 . 

3 Since July 24, see French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27. 

4 This phrase and the whole tenor of the despatch imply that the Cabinet had for 
the second time voted against promising to France British support. For the first 
refusal to vote so see French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31, where the Cabinet has 
declared itself unable to promise to France "their intervention?' and British Blue Book 
No. 119, July 31. 

Sir E. Grey's promise to "propose" to the Cabinet to be "authorised" to promise 
help to France would seem to imply that he had assured the French Ambassador of 
his personal wishes in this matter. He gave this assurance, or from the despatches just 
cited from the previous date, renewed it on the very day on which he refused Germany's 
request to formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. In 
refusing this request of Germany, he gave as his reason that " we must keep our hands 
free." See British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, 1914. 



382 Official Diplomatic Documents 

breaks out, will fall mi Russia. 1 Efforts an- being made to obtain 
the neutrality of England by disguising the truth. 2 

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise mod- 
eration at St. Petersburgh ; 3 this advice has been listened to. 

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia 
to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were 
not incompatible with her sovereignty. 

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria ; this was 
fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to 
allow those Towers which are less interested to seek for means of 
composing the dispute. 

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George 
Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify 1 the first formula 
which lie had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is 
shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count 
Szecsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Szecsen affirms 
that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement 
and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. lie expressly 
adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. 

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's 
suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could 
easily he reconciled. 

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the 
very end for the realisation of this. 

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in 
the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot he disputed, Austria 
was the first ' to proceed to a general mobilisation. 

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to 
he left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has con- 
tinued ready to negotiate. 

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, 
we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success 
of these pourparlers. 

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory 
for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day. 

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 134, same day. 
I (r "elucidating the r ruth." according to one's reading of all the despatches. 
i 'ontrast with French Yellow Book No. SO, .Inly 28, where P 
that Sit- K. Grey " would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the 
liussian Government." Also French Yellow Book No. 62, Jul} 27. ["he French step" 
(Germany had asked France to declare that a solidarity of pacific intentions existed 
between tiei and Germany) >urgh would have been difficult to explain." 

' l;.u -i,m Orange l'""> ! v. 67, July 31, Viviani overlooks, first, that the modified 
formula 'eptable, because instead of promising to "sto i her military prep- 

' to maintain her waiting attitude," while \ 
Hungary in t he modified formula had " to stay the march of her troops, " which was not 
demand '1 in the first formula, and secondly that the change was not at Austria's but at 
'ii on'- request ; that Russii Followed it up with full 

is Hi error. Russia's general mobilisation took pla n the night of July 

:)ii, while iustria-Hungarj ordered general mobilisation on August 1. Tor an ex- 
haustive discussion of this ind the contradictory evidence see M. P. Price, 
Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and 
Mobilisation ■ BpokNo. 113, July 31 for Russian mobilisation, 
and British Blue Book, Nos. 127 and 1.;:., August 1, for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. 



August 1, French Yellow Book No. 128 383 

have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me 
the impending publication of Kriegsgefahrzustand. This measure has 
been taken ' by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, 
she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word. 

To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales had noti- 
fied the Russian Government of German mobilisation. 2 

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War 
confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution. 3 

Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of protec- 
tion. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation 
signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, 
in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the 
present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding 
peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their 
efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. 

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the 
notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have 
throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any 
act of provocation. 

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion 
would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it 
would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward 
Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the 
interest of the future of the European balance of power. 4 

Rene Viviani. 

From Luxemburg 
French Yellow Book No. 128 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President <>f the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914- 
The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Gov- 
ernment an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been 
given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the 
declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of 
the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he 
thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard 
to the Grand Duchy. 5 

1 But not as here implied "last Wednesday," i.e. July 29, but on Friday, i.e. July 
31 ; see British Blue Book No. 112, July 31. 

2 To begin on August 2, German White Book, p. 559, and British Blue Book No. 142, 
August 1, listed under August 2. 

3 Seemingly contradicted by British Blue Book No. 142, same day. 

4 France asks for armed British intervention in the interest of the European balance 
of power. Sir E. Grey had personally committed himself to induce the British Cabinet 
so to intervene; see notes to previous despatch. This was before German troops 
entered Belgium. It was, however, subsequent to Germany's refusal to commit 
herself on the Belgian question ; and no mention of Belgium is made here. 

6 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. and note. The assurance contained 
no reference to a treaty or an obligation under it. The French Yellow Book despatch, 
however, No. 122, Aug. 1, contained such a reference. The wording of the assurance 
given to Luxemburg has not been published. The French despatch (see next number) 
describing it, however, refers to a treaty. 



384 Official Diplomatic Documents 

This is the reason why lie has abstained from making a request 

direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of 

Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer 

by that date ; a similar demarche is being made at the same time 

with the German Minister at Luxemburg. , r 

Mollard. 

To Luxemburg 

French Yellow Book No. 129 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg. 

Paris, August 1, Wl^. 
Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in 
conformity with the Treaty of London, I Mil, 1 the Government of 
the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude. 

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be 
an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be 
guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests. 

Rene Viviani. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 130 2 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August 1, 1014. 
Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets 
of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and 
the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation 

is Sunday, 2nd August. T .-, 

Jules Cambon. 

Germany : 

To St. Petersburg!! 

German White Book Exhibit 26 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters- 
burgh on August 1st, 12.52 P.M. Urgent. 

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our 
demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 
o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement: 

" Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la 
crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que 

1 See note to previous despatch. 

- This despatch should precede No. 127. in which the information it contains is 
discussed. In thai case, however, No. 127 would hardly have been able to contain 
tin- "information" that the German mobilisation was "really in full execution" on 
August 1. Either Viviani had been erroneously informed, or he misinformed the 
French Ambassador in London. 



August 1, British Blue Book No. 120 385 

lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa 
Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait 
applique a accomplir un role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne 
et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, 
proc6da a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. 

"A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun pre- 
paratif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se 
trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement 
Imperial eut manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite 
et l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouverne- 
ini nt Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Pussies ensistant sur la cessation 
des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a 
cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait 
dirigee contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne- 
ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit : 

" Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de l'Em- 
pire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie." 

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction 
by Russian time. 

Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs 
to the American Embassy. 

From Paris 

German White Book Exhibit 27 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on 
August 1st, 1.05 P.M. 

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain 
neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister de- 
clared that France would do that which her interests dictated. 

Great Britain: 

From St. Petcrsburgh 

British Blue Book No. 120 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petcrsburgh, to Sir 
Edward Grey. — (Beceived August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, .July 31, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador 
and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined 
formula 1 as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in 
your telegram of 30th July 2 with formula recorded in my telegram of 
30th July. 3 He trusted it would meet with your approval : 4 — 

1 Russian OranEe Book No. 67. July 31. 

2 British Blue Book No. 103. July 30. 
' British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 

1 There is no desire expressed that it would meet with Austria's approval, which 
was the all-important thing, if peace was to be preserved. Nor does it appear what 
2 c 



386 Official Diplomatic Documents 

"Si l'Autriche consentira a arreter marche <les ses troupes sur 
le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume 
le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les 
Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait 
accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter 
atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverainet a son independance, la Russie 
s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante." x 

I lis Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German 
Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. 2 
He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor 
William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which 
it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor 
William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was 
concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conver- 
sation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that 
not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however 
of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which 
was already in progress. 

M. Sazonof 3 said that undoubtedly there would be better pros- 
pect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take 
place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and 
he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this. 

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His 
Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. 
It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, 
the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget 
the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 121 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador of Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
I Received A ugust 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jul;/ 31, 1914- 

Your telegram of 31st July. 4 

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly 
to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible 
catastrophe of a European war. 

a new formula could do, after Russia had ordered her general mobilisation in the 
night of July 30-31. See note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 127, same day. 

1 Translation. — "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on 

spute between Austria and Servia has 
e will allow the Great Powers to look 
ia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian 
i sovereign State or her independence, 
._„ attitude " 
None of these telegrams were published in the British Blue Book or mentioned 
in the speeches of Sir E. Grey or Mr. Asquith which induced Parliament to vote for 
war. 

3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
1 Sec British Blue Book No. Ill, July 31. 



Servia] 
assumi 
into tl 
( [oven 
Russia 


i territory ; if, recog 


nising thai the 


le matter' and deten 
mient without impai 

will undertake 0. tu: 


nine whether Sei 
ring her rights a: 
Lintain her waitii 



August 1, British Blue Book No. 122 387 

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, 
and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it 
was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal 
until they had received an answer from Russia to their communica- 
tion of to-day ; 1 this communication, which he admitted had the form 
of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial 
Government within twelve hours that she would immediately counter- 
mand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would 
be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more 
difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as 
well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying 
all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria. 2 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory 
he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable con- 
sideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and 
Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the 
Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German 
demand. 3 

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request 
of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even 
up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue 
discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from 
Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisation 
had spoilt everything. 4 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 122 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received A ugu.tt 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1.01 4. 

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July 
to Sir F. Bertie. 5 

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must con- 
sult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. 
I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might 
give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign 
in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether 
they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, 
took note of your request. 

It appears from what he said that German Government consider 

1 German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31 ; the German ultimatum. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 121, August 1, note 5. 

3 The obvious reason for this was that Germany felt herself threatened by the 
Russian general mobilisation. 

' Contrast this view with the one expressed by France, French Yellow Book No. 
120, August 1, and note 5. 

s British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 



388 Official Diplomatic Documents 

that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. 1 
As an instance of this, 2 he alleged that a consignment of corn for 
Germany had been placed under an embargo already. 

I hope to sec his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter 
further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me 
remote. 

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany 
would in any case desire to know the reply 3 returned to you by the 
French Government. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 123 
Sir Edward drey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply 4 of the 
German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was 
a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium 
affected feeling in this country. 5 If Germany could see her way to 
give the same assurance 6 as that which had been given by France it 
would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On 
the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium 
by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely 
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had 
been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting,' and as I was 
authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate 
Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. 8 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, 9 
and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could 
say was that our attitude would lie determined largely by public 
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very 

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 79 and enclosures where under date of August 29 Bel- 
gium explains tl mbargo as nut an hostile act. It is. however, very remarkable 

that tin- charge ig tins! Belgium could be made by Germany, without Great Britain 

to whom it was made at :e challenging its i uracy. Nor dors it appear from the 

published documents that Sir E. Grey was at all troubled by it or enquired about it, 
or felt called upon to deny it. 

J No other hostile arts are mentioned in the diplomatic documents published at 
the outbreak of the war. Subsequently Germany published the "Brussels docu- 
ments" which she had discovered in the Belgian archives after taking Brussels. In 
these documents "military conversations" between Great Britain and Belgium were 
ed. loi these documents see pp. 577 ff. 

■' For this reply see Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914. 

1 British Blue Book No. 122, July .31. printed under date of August 1. 

5 No mention is made of existing treaties, a violation of which on the part of Ger- 
many has often been given as the reason for Great Britain to join the war. 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. It musl !»■ remembered that as European 
friendships had shaped themselves, France and Germany were not in the same posi- 
tion, although Great Britain had addressed to them identical questions. For France 
the question was : " Will < ireat Britain remain neutral or be my ally?" For Germany 
it was: "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my enemy?" 

; Contrast this with French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. and note 2. 

8 This is what Great Britain had done in 1870. 

9 Compare this with Sir E. Grey's personal engagements toward France ; French 
Yellow Book No. 121.. August 1, and note 3. 



August 1, British Blue Book No. 125 389 

strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give 
a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate 
conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested 
that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 1 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain 

neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our 

hands free. 2 T 

1 am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 124 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward (hey. — 
(Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon, 3 
I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. 
He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet 
Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the 
respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you in- 
structed me to make. 

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the 
German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order 
a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at 
once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will 
be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His 
Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy 
is packing up. 4 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 125 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

My immediately preceding telegram. 5 

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for 

1 No valid reason is given in the British Blue Book why Sir E. Grey did not formulate 
such conditions. From the reference given in the previous despatches, however, it 
appears that Sir E. Grey was personally too deeply committed to France. (See es- 
pecially French Yellow Book No. 126. August 1.) Nor did Sir E. Grey mention this 
German request either in the subsequent cabinet meetings or in Parliament. His 
excuse offered weeks later that the German Ambassador had made this request un- 
officially seems to be contradicted by the despatch itself. It is not customary to 
repeat unofficial offers in instructions to Ambassadors, at least without saying so. 
Cf. for instance British Blue Book No. 125, August 1, and Belgian Gray Book No. 
24, August 3. 

2 Cf. note 9, page 388. 4 Cf . French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. 

3 British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 6 British Blue Book No. 124. 



390 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. 
It is as follows : : — 

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violat- 
ing that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity 
in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This 
assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic 
spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at 
Brussels has spontaneously 2 renewed the assurance to the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. 3 



From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 126 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- 
ceived A ugust 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1,914- 

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states 
thatthe German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs this morning, 1 that the French Government failed 
to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of 
yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general 
mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had 
decreed a general mobilisation, 5 and that the Russian Government 
were ready to demobilise 6 if all Powers did likewise. It seemed 
strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact 
that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Govern- 
ment should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. 
Petersburg!) requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There 
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the 
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to 
the French Government and had requested an answer the next 
day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave 
Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in- 
formed that the French Government considered that this was an 
extraordinary proceeding. 

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his pass- 
ports, but he stated that he had packed up. 7 

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book no. 15, August 1. 

' i ' ml of note 7, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 
3 Belgian Gray Book No. 9, .Inly 31. 
1 See French Yellow Book No. 125, same day. 

6 This is an error, see French Yellow Book No. 127, same clay, and note 5; also 
British Blue Book No. 127, same date. 

• < 'mi last French Yellow Book No. 125, same day, "suspension of military prepara- 
tions," which is mil the same as "demobilisation." See also note 5 to this despatch in 
French Yellow Book. 

7 This is not given in the exhaustive French despatch describing this interview, 
French Yellow Book No. 125, same day. 



August 1, British Blue Book No. ISO 391 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 127 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 

— (Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914- 

General mobilisation of army and fleet. 

From Brussels 

British Blue Book No. 12S 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914- 

Belgian neutrality. 

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday x have 
been acted upon. 

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and 
uphold 2 her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of 
her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said 
that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, 
they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against 
intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were 
excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he 
thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies. 

[For British Blue Book No. 129 see under August 2.] 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 130 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- 

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly de- 
tained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other 
British merchant-ships. 

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships 
has been ordered. 

You should request German Government to send immediate orders 
that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect 
on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His 
Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any 

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31, expecting Belgium to observe neutrality. 

2 This seems to contradict Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4, where the Belgian 
Foreign Minister relates that Belgium hail refrained from appealing to the guaranteeing 
Powers as late as 6 a.m. on August 4, and probably later. On Aug. 3, at 10 a.m., the 
Belgian Cabinet definitely voted not to appeal to the Powers. 



392 Official Diplomatic Documents 

incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I 
hope, he equally careful not to take any step which would make the 
situation between us impossible. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 131 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 191 4. 

1 still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a 
little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. 1 

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of 
Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept 
a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in re- 
gard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. 

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are 
ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able 
to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in 
order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully 
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. 

From Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 132 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- 

Following telegram from M. Sazonof 2 to Count Benekendorff 3 
of the Mist July communicated to me to-day : 4 

"(Urgent.) 

"Formule amendee conformement a la proposition anglaise: 
' Si Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire 
serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume lecarac- 
tere d'un question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes 
Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder 
an Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte a ses 
droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a 
conserver son attitude expectante.'" 5 

(Above communicated to all the Powers.) 

'Sir E. Grey here overlook.- the fact that general mobilisation l>y one nation on 
the frontier of another has always been sufficient cause for the latter to "defend itself 
by instant war." See Elihu Root quoted above, note 4 Austro-Hungarian Red Book 
No. 28, July 26. 

Sir E. Grey nowhere asked Russia to demobilise. 

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

3 Russian Ambassador in London. 

4 See British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and 
Russian Orange Hook No. 67, July 31. 

5 Translation. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 
'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if. recog- 



August 1, British Blue Book No. 134 393 

From Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 133 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- 

M. De Etter x came to-day to communicate the contents of a 
telegram from M. Sazonof, 2 dated the 31st July, which are as 
follows : — 

" The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared 3 the readiness of 
his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum 
to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and 
said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London 
with the participation of the Great Powers. 

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume 
the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be 
thankful to them. It woidd be very important that Austria should 
meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian 
territory." 

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 134 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- 
ceived August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- 

President of the Republic has informed me that German Govern- 
ment 4 were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility, that it was 
only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria 
that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, 
although the measures which the German Government have already 
taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; 
that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self- 
defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours 5 behind Ger- 
many as regards German military preparations ; that the French 
troops have ordered not to go nearer to the German frontier than a 
distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of 
provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other 

nising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of 
European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction 
which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her 
sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her 
waiting attitude." 

1 Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London. 

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

3 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. 

4 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, where it reads: "The German and 
the Austrian Governments." For the several points see the notes to the French 
Yellow Book despatch. 

6 No such claim is made either in French Yellow Book Nos. 125 or 127, same date. 



394 Official Diplomatic Documents 

hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions 
on it; ' that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia 
lias expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the 
( rerman Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; that 
French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely 
desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, 
of its being possible to avoid war. 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 135 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir (t. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- 

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian 
Government have informed German Government that though the 
situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would 
in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation 
of peace lie ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation 
between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would 
naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would 
continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge 
upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed 
against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those 
defensive military counter-measures in Galieia, which have been 
forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. 2 

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, 
in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, 
Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible 
to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed 
with German Government also by Russian Government. 

From Paris 
British Blue Book No. 136 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

( Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- 

Minister of War informed military attache this afternoon that 
orders had been given at 3.40 3 for a general mobilisation of the French 
Army. This became necessary because the Minister of AVar knows 
that, under the system of " Kriegszustand," ' the Germans have 

1 The German claim was to the very opposite effect; see Speech of the Chancellor, 
A. must 1, 1914. 

'Contrast this with the French claims in despatches of this day that Russia had 
been forced to general mobilisation by a previous Austrian general mobilisation. 

' ( 'I. German White Book, p. 560, 5 p.m., the latter being Berlin instead of Paris 
time. 4 " State of war." 



August 1, British Blue Book No. 13? 395 

called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to being their cover- 
ing troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. 
This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation 
under another name. 1 

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight 
army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. 
It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A 
zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German 
frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War 
is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is 
one for purely defensive purposes. 

From Vienna 
British Blue Book No. 137 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British . 1 mbassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1014- 

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He 
supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro- 
Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian 
Ambassador in Paris. 2 In this telegram his Excellency was given 
instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that 
there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial 
aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further in- 
structed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there 
was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the 
effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. 

Count Mensdorff 3 called again later at the Foreign Office. He in- 
formed me of a telegram 4 sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold, 5 and gave me 
the substance. 

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, 
whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly 
erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the "door had been 
banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The 
Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated 
on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had 
already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an 
infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian 
territory was being contempated by Austria-Hungary. 

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff 3 to the fact that 

1 None of this seems to be based on facts. See M. P. Price. The Diplomatic 
History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations." 

2 Not printed in French Yellow Book, but mentioned ib. No. 120, same day. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 

4 Probably Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, although this is dated July 30. 
and Sir E. Grey says "sent yesterday," i.e. July 31. 

6 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



396 Official Diplomatic Documents 

this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at 
St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. 

[For British Blue Book Nos. 13S and 139 see under August 2.] 



From Paris 

British Blue Book No. 140 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- 

The Minister of War again sent for the military attache this even- 
ing, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He 
laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had 
arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and 
which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French 
endeavours to commit no provocative act. 1 

Russia : 

To Russian Representatives Abroad 

Russian Orange Book No. 70 

Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad. 

(Telegram.) July 10 (August 1), 1911 

At midnight the German Ambassador announced 2 to me, on the 
instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by mid- 
night on Saturday, we had not begin to demobilise, not only against 
( rermany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be 
compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether 
this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added 
that we were very near it. 

From Iondon 
Russian Orange Book No. 71 
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affair*. 
(Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1914. 

Grey tells me that he has telegraphed 3 to Berlin that in his opinion 
the last formula accepted by the Russian Government oilers thebest 
prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the 
dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great 
Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered. 

1 Cf. note 3 to British Blue Book No. 134, August 1. 

-■ German White Book. Exhibit 24. July 31. 

3 Probably British Blue Book No. 131, same day. 



August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 74 397 

From London 

Russian Orange Book No. 72 

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1.914- 

The British Government have enquired ! of the French and German 
Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium. 

France answered in the affirmative, 2 but the German Government 
stated 3 that they could not give any definite answer to the question. 

From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 73 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 191 4. 

The Austrian Ambassador yesterday 4 saw Vivian i and declared 
to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the 
integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her 
grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French 
Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military 
activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under 
the guise of Kriegszustand, b mobilisation is in reality being carried 
out. 

From Paris 

Russian Orange Book No. 74 

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914- 

On the receipt in Paris of the telegram 6 from the French Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to 
you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to 
order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Repub- 
lic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled 
to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Am- 
bassador has just visited Viviani, 7 but told him nothing fresh, alleging 
the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. 8 

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 

2 Belgian Grav Book No. 15, August 1. 

3 British Blue Book No. 122, August 1. 

4 French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. British Blue Book No. 137, same day. 
i Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, and notes 5 and 6. 

6 No such telegram is printed in the French Yellow Book. On the eventful August 
1 not a single despatch exchanged between Paris and Petrograd has been printed in 
the French Yellow Book. 

7 See French Yellow Book No. 125, August 1. 

8 Cf. ib., where Viviani quotes the German Ambassador as saying that "he had 
received no fresh communication from his government." 



398 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation 
issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amaze- 
ment that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when 
a friendly exehange of views was still in progress between Russia, 
Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not neces- 
sarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in 
Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the 
Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. 

From Paris 
Russian Orange Book No. 75 
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, .July 19 (August 1), 1914. 

I hear from the President that during the last few days the Austrian 
Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council 
of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was 
ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia and also her 
sovereign rights, but 'that Russia had intentionally received this dec- 
laration in silence. I contradicted this flatly. 1 

From Berlin 

Russian Orange Hook No. 70 

Note presented by the German A mbassador at St. Petersburgh on July 19 
(August l),at 7.10 I'.M. 

(Translation.) 

Le Gouvernement Imperial The Imperial German Gov- 

s'est cll'orce des les debuts de eminent have used every effort 

la crise de la mener a une solu- since the beginning of the crisis 

tion pacifique. Se rendant a to bring about a peaceful settle- 

un desir qui lui en avait ete ment. In compliance with a 

exprime par Sa Majeste l'Em- wish expressed to him by His 

pereur de Russie, Sa Majeste Majesty the Emperor of Uussia, 

l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'ac- the German Emperor had under- 

cord avec l'Angleterre s'etait taken, in concert with Great 

applique 1 a accomplir un role Britain, the part of mediator 

mediateur aupres des Cabinets between the Cabinets of Vienna 

de Vienne et de Saint-Peters- and St. Petersburg ; but Russia, 

bourg, lorsque, la Russie, sans without waiting for any result, 

en attendre le resultat, proceda proceeded to a general mobilisa- 

a la mobilisation de la totalite de tion of her forces both on land 

ses forces de terre et de nicr. A and sea. In consequence of this 

la suite de cette mesure menu- threatening step, which was not 

1 It is not clear whether the Russian Ambassador contradicted the assertion, that 
Austria-Hungary had made tin- declaration or that Russia had received it in silence. 
For Austria-Hungary's declaration see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 47, July L'9, 
55, July 31, and 56, August 1. 



August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 76 



399 



cante ne motivee par aucun 
presage militaire de la part de 
l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand 
s'est trouve. vis-a-vis d'un dan- 
ger grave et imminent. Si le 
Gouvernement Imperial eut man- 
que de parer a ce peril, il 
aurait compromis la securitc et 
l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. 
Tar consequent le Gouvernement 
allemand se vit force de s'adresser 
au Gouvernement de SaMajeste 
l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies 
en insistant sur la cessation des 
dits actes militaires. La Russie 
ayant refuse de fa ire droit a 
(n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre 
a ') cette demande et ayant mani- 
feste par ce refus (cette atti- 
tude 3 ) que son action etait 
dirigee contre l'Allemagne, j'ai 
1'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou- 
vernement, de faire savoir a 
votre Excellence ce qui suit : — 

Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon 
auguste Souverain, au nom de 

l'Empire, relevant le defi, se 
considere en etat de guerre avec 
la Russie. 



justified by any military proceed- 
ings on the part of Germany, 1 
the German Empire was faced 
by a grave and imminent danger. 
If the German Government had 
failed to guard against this peril, 
they would have compromised 
the safety and the very existence 
of Germany. The German 
Government were, therefore, ob- 
liged to make representations to 
the Government of His Maj- 
esty the Emperor of All the 
Russias and to insist upon a ces- 
sation of the aforesaid military 
acts. Russia having refused to 
comply with (not having con- 
sidered it necessary to answer 2 ) 
this demand, and having shown 
by this refusal (this attitude 3 ) 
that her action was directed 
against Germany, I have the 
honour, on the instructions of my 
Government, to inform your 
Excellency as follows : — 

His Majesty the Emperor, my 
august Sovereign, in the name 
of the German Empire, accepts 
the challenge, and considers him- 
self at war with Russia. 



1 Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans 1'original. II faut supposer 
que deux variances avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur elles ont ete 
ins&re-es toutes les deux dans la note. 

2 The words in parentheses occur in the original. It must be supposed that two 
variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both in- 
serted in the note. 

3 This sentence contains the crux of the question. Students should ask themselves 
(a) Did Russian mobilisation contain an element of danger for Germany? (b) If it 
did, was Germany justified in replying to it with an ultimatum ? (c) Was the Russian 
general mobilisation justified by any military action previously taken by Germany? 



400 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Sunday, August 2, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 





Berlin 


Belgium 


London etc. 


Luxemburg 

< lerman Minister 


France 


All representatives 


Luxemburg, Petrograd, 




London etc. 


London, German 




Loudon 


Ambassador 


Germany 








Great Britain 


Paris, Berlin 


Berlin, Petrograd, Paris, 
Vienna, Brussels, Lux- 
emburg 


Russia 


Announcement by Sazonof 






to all representatives 





Serbia 









Austria-Hungary is notified of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. 

Belgium is notified of Germany's entry on Luxemburg territory, and receives 
herself an ultimatum from Germany at 7 o'clock in the evening; i.e. many hours 
after the British Government had promised their support to France. 

France announces to her representatives instances of Germany's troops crossing 
her frontier and committing hostile acts, and receives the promise of support from 
the British Government for which she had been working since July 27. 

Germany sends troops into Luxemburg, thus violating the neutrality of the 
duchy, but assuring her that the military measures taken are not a hostile act 
but are "solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways which have 
been leased to the Empire" against any attack of the French army. She promises 
Luxemburg a complete indemnity for any damage. 

Germany notifies Belgium that she has received "reliable information" of 
French intentions to march through Belgium, and feels herself therefore forced 
in self-defence ti> contemplate entering Belgian territory. If Belgium "should 
oppose the German troops," Germany would "to her regret be compelled to con- 
sider Belgium as an enemy." If the troops are not opposed, guarantees are 
offered for the future integrity and independence of Belgium, and the payment 
for any damage done. 

Great Britain promises her support to France during the forenoon, independ- 
ently of whether xt no German troops should invade Belgium. She is silent on 
the movement of her own troops. 

Itiis.siu defends herself against Germany's attempt "to foist" on Russia the 
"responsibility" for the war, claiming that Germany "neither could, nor had 
the right to, doubt" the many proofs of Russia's "desire for peace." The fact 
of Russia's general mobilisation is minimised. 

■Srrhin is silent. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Berlin 

Atjstro-Hungaeian Red Book No. 57 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914- 

The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer 
has been received from Russia to the German demand. 



August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 19 401 

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden 
(southeast of Bialla). 

Russia has thus attacked Germany. 

Germany, therefore, 1 regards herself as at war with Russia. 

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports ; 
he intends to leave to-day. 

Belgium : 

From Luxemburg 

Belgian Gray Book No. IS 

M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following 
facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, 
according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand 
Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the 
bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly 
towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of 
the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops 
and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasser- 
billig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occur- 
rences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London 
of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address 
an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of 
His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical pro- 
test will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs at Berlin. 

To Paris', Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 19 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh 

Sir, Brussels, August 2, 191 4. 

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassom- 
pierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, 
French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the 
latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr 
von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to 
the present he had not been instructed to make us an official commu- 
nication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings 
of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern 

1 This is not the reason given in the declaration of war, Russian Orange Book No. 
76, August 1. 

2d 



402 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their inten- 
tions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow 
us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, 
however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the posses- 
sion of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of 
with joy and gratitude. 



From Berlin 



Belgian Gray B -; No. 20 



Note 'presented by Uerr von Below Salekse, German Minister at Brussels, 
td M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. Briissel, den 2. 

August, 101 ',. 
Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, ldlJf.. 



(Translation: ) 
(Very Confidential.) x 

Reliable information has 
been received by the German 
Government to the effect that 
French forces intend to march on 
the line of the Meuse by Givet 
and Xamur. This information 
leaves no doubt as to the inten- 
tion of France to march through 
Belgian territory against Ger- 
many. 

The German Government can- 
not but fear that Belgium, in 
spite of the utmost goodwill, will 
be unable, without assistance, to 
repel 2 so considerable a French 
invasion with sufficient prospect 
of success to afford an adequate 
guarantee against danger to Ger- 
many. It is essential for the self- 
defence of Germany that she 
should anticipate any such hostile 
attack. The German Govern- 
ment would, however, feel the 
deepest regret if Belgium re- 
garded as an act of hostility 

1 This ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. (see Belgian Gray Book No. 3S, August 4), 
i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France; 
cf. British Blue Book No. 14s, August 2. where Sir E. Grey says : "After the ( !abinet 
this morning T gave M. Cambon the following memorandum." 

; This is the same argument Great Britain advanced in her second military con- 
versation with Belgium. See p. 5S0 and also note to Belgian Gray Book No. 22, 
August 3. 



(Tres Confidential.) 

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung 
liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten 
vor iiber den beabsichtigten Auf- 
marsch franzosischer Streitkrafte 
an der Maas-Strecke Givet- 
Namur. Sic lassen keinen 
Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frank- 
reichs, durch belgisches Gebiet 
gegen Deutschland vorzugehen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung 
kann sich der Besorgniss nicht 
erwehren, class Belgien, trotz 
besten Willens, nicht im Stande 
sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen fran- 
zosischen Vormarsch mit so 
grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzu- 
wehren, dass darin cine ausrei- 
chende Sicherheit gegen die 
Bedrohung Deutschlands gefun- 
den werden kann. Es ist ein 
Gebot der Selbsterhaltung fur 
Deutschland, dem feindlichen An- 
griffzu vorzukommen. Mit dem 
grossten Bedauern wiirde esdaher 



August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 20 



403 



die deutsche Regierung erfullen, 
wenn Belgien einen Akt der 
Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin 
erblicken wiirde, dass die Mass- 
nahmen seiner Gegner Deutsch- 
land zwingen, zur Gegenwehr 
auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet 
zubetreten. 

Um jede Missdeutung aus- 
zuschliesSen, erkliirt die Kaiser- 
liche Regierung das Folgende : 

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt 
keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen 
Belgien. 1st Belgien gewillt, in 
dem bevorstehenden Kriege, 
Deutschland gegeniiber eine 
wohlwollende Neutralitat einzu- 
nehmen, so verpflichtet sich die 
deutsche Regierung, beim Frie- 
densschluss Besitzstand und 
Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs 
in vollem Umfang zu garantieren. 

2. Deutschland verpflichtet 
sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, 
das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder 
zu raumen, sobald der Friede 
geschlossen ist. 

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher 
Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland 
bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den 
Koniglich Belgischen Behorden 
alle Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen 
gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen 
und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der 
etwa durch deutsche Truppen 
verursacht werden konnte. 

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen 
Truppen feindlich entgegen tre- 
ten, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen 
durch Widerstand der Maas- 
Befestigungen oder durch Zer- 
storungen von Eisenbahnen, 
Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen 
Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten be- 
reiten, so wird Deutschland zu 
seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, 
das Konigreich als Feind zu be- 
trachten. In diesem Falle wiirde 



against herself the fact that the 
measures of Germany's op- 
ponents force Germany, for her 
own protection, to enter Belgian 
territory. 



In order to exclude any possi- 
bility of misunderstanding, the 
German Government make the 
following declaration : — 

1. Germany has in view no 
act of hostility against Belgium. 
In the event of Belgium being 
prepared in the coming war to 
maintain an attitude of friendly 
neutrality towards Germany, the 
German Government bind them- 
selves, at the conclusion of peace, 
to guarantee the possessions and 
independence of the Belgian 
Kingdom in full. 

2. Germany undertakes, under 
the above-mentioned condition, 
to evacuate Belgian territory on 
the conclusion of peace. 

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly 
attitude, Germany is prepared, 
in co-operation with the Belgian 
authorities, to purchase all neces- 
saries for her troops against a 
cash payment, and to pay an 
indemnity for any damage that 
may have been caused by 
German troops. 

4. Should Belgium oppose the 
German troops, and in particular 
should she throw difficulties in 
the way of their march by a re- 
sistance of the fortresses on the 
Meuse, or by destroying railways, 
roads, tunnels, or other similar 
works, Germany will, to her re- 
gret, be compelled to consider 
Belgium as an enemy. 

In this event, Germany can 
undertake no obligations towards 



404 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Deutschland dem Konigreich 
gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen 
iibernehmen konnen, sondern 
miisste die spatere Regelung des 
Verhaltnisses beider Staaten zu 
einander der Entscheidung der 
Waffen iiberlassen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung 
giebt sich der bestimmten 
Hoffnung hin, dass diese Even- 
tuality nicht eintreten, und dass 
die Konigliche Belgische Regie- 
rung die geeigneten Massnahmen 
zu treffen wissen wird, um zu 
verhinderen, dass Vorkommnisse, 
wie die vorstehend erwahnten, 
sich ereignen. In diesem Falle 
wiirden die freundschaftlichen 
Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten 
verbinden, eine weitere und 
dauernde Festigung erfahren. 



Belgium, but the eventual adjust- 
ment of the relations between the 
two States must be left to the 
decision of arms. 



The German Government, 
however, entertain the distinct 
hope that this eventuality will 
not occur, and that the Belgian 
Government will know how to 
take the necessary measures to 
prevent the occurrence of inci- 
dents such as those mentioned. 
In this case the friendly ties 
which bind the two neighbouring 
States will grow stronger and 
more enduring. 



France 



From Luxemburg 
French Yellow Book No. 131 



M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August 2, 191 4-. 

I have the honour to bring to your Excellence's notice the follow- 
ing facts : — 

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according 
to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal 
Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of 
Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the 
south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand 
Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and am- 
munition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to 
Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences 
constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the 
( Jrand 1 >uchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The 
Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic pro- 
test against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty 
the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be 
sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at 
Berlin. The Minister of State, 

President of the Government. 
Eyschen. 



August 2, French Yellow Book No. 134 405 

From Luxemburg 

French Yellow Book No. 132 ' 

M. Mallard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- 
dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just re- 
ceived, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a 
telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, 
saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg 
do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely 
measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been 
leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. 
Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage. 

Mollard. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 133 

Note handed, in by the German Ambassador. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. 

The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens 
to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures 
taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not con- 
stitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely pre- 
ventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, 
under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem- 
burg, are under German administration. 

Von Schoen. 

From St. Peter sburgh 

French Yellow Book No. 134 

W. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene 

Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1914. 

Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German 
Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Govern- 
ment ; he will leave St. Petersburgh to-day. 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instruc- 
tions from his Government as to the declaration of war. 

Paleologue. 

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 129, same day. 



4()(i Official Diplomatic Documents 

In the Representatives of France Abroad 
French Yellow Book No. 135 

.1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

to the Representatives of France abroad. 

Paris, August 2, 101 4. 
The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany lias just de- 
clared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are 
proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to 
discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia. 

Rene Viviani. 

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con- 
stantinople 

French Yellow Book No. 136 

.1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to tin- French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, 
Berlin, Vienna, Borne, Madrid, Constantinople. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. 

This morning, French territory was violated by German troop- at 
< iry and near Longwy. They arc inarching on the fort which bears 
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle : has twice 
Keen fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this 
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg. 

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that 
the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against 
France without provocation 2 on our part, or any previous declaration 
of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilo- 
metres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, 
between our troops and the frontier. 

Rene Viviani. 

From London 

French Yellow Hook No. 137 

M. Ban! Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

London, August J, 191 4. 

After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward 
Grey made the following declaration 3 to me : — 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet 
comes into the < Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile 

1 See below, French Yellow Book No. 139. same day. 

- The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 laid the blame 
for the tirst border hostilities on the French. For translation of this speech see pp. 573- 
576 See also for the German charges, Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3. 

3 For different wording see French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and notes to 
British Blue Book No. 14S, August 2. 



August 2, French Yellow Book No. 138 407 

operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give 
all the protection in its power. 

" This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be 
taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until 
the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." 

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that 
of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Conven- 
tion of 1S67, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty 
referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the 
observance of this latter convention without the assistance of the other 
guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaran- 
teeing Powers were to act in concert. 

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important 
that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a casus 
belli. It is a specially British interest ' and there is no doubt that the 
British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will 
insist upon it, even if the business world, in which German influence 
is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Govern- 
ment committing itself against Germany. 

Paul Cambon. 

To London 

French Yellow Book No. 13S 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. 

Paris, August 2, 101 4. 

I note the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 2 30th, s 
31st 4 July and the 1st August, 6 and in that which you have sent to 
me to-day. 6 

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir 
Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in 
your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great 
Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us. 

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great 
Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French 
coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way 
that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be sup- 
ported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North 

1 This is a very important statement, for if it is true, Great Britain, even if entering 
the war because Belgian neutrality was infringed, did so for reasons of national self- 
interest, and not merely to defend the rights of a smaller nation. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 63. Other despatches of the same day but without 
bearing on the question at hand here, are Nos. 68, 69, and 71. 

'76. No. ins. 

* lb. No. 110. 

5 lb. No. 126. 

«/6. No. 137. 

The coupling of these despatches shows that the final promise contained in No. 137 
is the result of diplomatic efforts begun by France, certainly not later than on July 27. 
Cf. French Yellow Book No. 63, July 27. 



40S Official Diplomatic Documents 

Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could 
not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet. 

Rene Viviani. 
To Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 139 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. 

Paris, August 2, 1914- 

German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at 
several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to 
the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your 
text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications 
between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German 
Ambassador : — 

"The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern 
district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the 
Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the 
Imperial Government. 

"The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort ; on 
two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been 
fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle ' 
two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier 
this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, 
more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who com- 
manded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The 
German cavalry carried oil' sonic horses which the French mayor of 
Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to 
lead the said horses. 

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed 
to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts 
which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in 
arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. 
The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial 
Government the entire responsibility for these acts." 

Rene Viviani. 
Great Britain : 

From Luxemburg 

British Blue Book No. 129 2 

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 

August ,.'.) 

(Translation.) 

Luxembourg, 2 aoiit, 1914- Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- 

(TelegraphiqueO (Telegraphic.) 

Ministke d'Etat du Luxem- The Luxemburg Minister of 

bourg Eyschen vient de recevoir State, Eyschen, has just received 

1 Cf. above, No. 130, same day. 

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 132, same day. 



August 2, British Blue Book No. 138 409 

par l'intermediaire du Ministre through the German Minister in 

d'Allemagne a Liuxembourg, M. Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a tele- 

deBuchjUntelegrammeduChan- gram from the Chancellor of the 

eelier de FEmpire allemand Beth- German Empire, Bethmann- 

mann-Hollweg disant que les Hollweg, to the effect that the 

mesures militaires a, Luxembourg military measures taken in 

ne constituent pas un acte hostile Luxemburg do not constitute a 

contre le Luxembourg, mais sont hostile act against Luxemburg, 

uniquement des mesures destinees but are only intended to insure 

a. assurer contre attaque even- against a possible attack of a 

tuelle d'une armee franchise. French army. Full compensa- 

L'exploitation des voies ferrees tion will be paid to Luxemburg 

affermees a l'Empire Luxembourg for any damage caused by using 

recevra complete indemnite pour the railways which are leased to 

dommages eventuels. the Empire. 

[For British Blue Book Nos. 130 to 137 see under August 1.] 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 138 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1014- 

Your telegram of to-day. 1 

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the 
Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the 
chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany 
was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia 
were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not 
desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that 
Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful 
settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to dis- 
cuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not 
Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But 
Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she 
should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia 
had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and 
that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without 
making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the 
speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German 
Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring 
up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situa- 
tion now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her 
several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. 
Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German repre- 
sentative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain 

1 British Blue Book No. 131, August 1. 



410 Official Diplomatic Documents 

time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Govern- 
ment must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of 
war. 1 

From St. Petersburgh 

British Blue Book No. 139 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, B>L' f . 

My telegram of 31st July. 2 

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor 
to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency 
yesterday. 3 Xo progress whatever was made. 

In the evening 4 M. Sazonof 5 had an interview with the Austrian 
Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, 
did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion 
of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of 
keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, 
ami said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but 
the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether 
Austria, was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, 6 
or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In 
these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the 
abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful dis- 
cussion of this question could be expected was London, and any 
such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria- 
Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to 
bombardment. 

M. Sazonof 7 informed the French Ambassador and myself this 
morning of his conversation 8 with the Austrian Ambassador. He 
went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to 
the Austrian Government that war with Russia, must inevitably 
follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian 
domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence 

1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1 

• British Blue Book No. 120, under 'late of August 1. 

3 I.e. yesterday of July 31 or July 30. See French Yellow Book 102, July 30. 

There is no apparent rea >on why i vent reported in Paris of July 30 and so printed 

in the French Yellow Book should appear in the British Blue Book under date of August -'. 

4 The date of this interview is doubtful. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador re- 
ceive.] his instructions by telegram sent from Vienna July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book No. 50, and acknowledged by him, it. No. 55, July 31. In this latter despatch 
he refers to an " uninstructed " interview on July 29. "In the evening" cannot refer 
to July 31. It may refer to July 30, but since no such interview is mentioned by the 
Ambassador in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 5.3, it possibly refers to July 29. 

6 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

6 This occurred in interview between Sazonof and the German Ambassador on 
July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 

7 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

8 From the preceding notes it is clear that the date of this conversation cannot be 
fixed. 



August 2, British Blue Book No. 141 411 

of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, 
in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria 
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought 
that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of 
her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an 
equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the 
German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian 
ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Aus- 
trian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed 
when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate 
in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the former 
was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had 
reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. 1 
M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had 
made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been re- 
fused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for 
mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between 
Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either 
rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or 
had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian 
Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany 
had created a desperate situation. 2 

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained 
in my telegram of .'list July, 3 had been forwarded by the Russian 
Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain 
its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. 
In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. 

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the 
agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their 
armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has 
expressed her readiness to do, 4 pending a last attempt to reach a 
settlement of the present crisis. 

[For British Blue Book No. 140 see under August 1.] 

From Vienna 
British Blce Book No. 141 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

I am to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. 
I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German 

1 For a similar statement see British Blue Book No. 71, July 29. 

2 This almost sounds as it Russia claimed that she had a right to mobilise, but that 
her neighbor had not. 

3 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1. 

4 For Germany's reason for her belief that Russia could wait, while she could not, 
see previous despatch. 



412 Official Diplomatic Documents 

ultimatum J requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve 
hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt sum- 
mons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany 
would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador 
at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisa- 
tion is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia 
at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted 
to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures cor- 
responding to those taken by Germany. 1 ' There seems to be even 
greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between 
Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Am- 
bassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian 
integrity and independence. 3 He says that Russia had no intention 
to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must 
ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia 
would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that 
the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and 
that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. 4 
The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government 
also desired war from the first. 

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly 
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of 
the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of 
mediation from any quarter are being considered. 6 There is great 
anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter 
the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on 
their present course, if they have made up their mind with the 
approval of Germany. 

From Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 142 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward drey. — 

I Received August .'.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 191 ',. 

Orders have just 7 been issued for the general mobilisation of the 
navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. 

> This ultimatum was presented on July 31. German White Book, Exhibit 25. 
It seems incredible thai the Russian Ambassador refrained from telling this to Sir 
M. .!,> Bunsen until the next day. 

I i,,. despatches ol the previous days disprove this. Germany sen! her ultimatum 
after Russia had mobilised, and did not herself order general mobilisation until August 
1 t.i take effect on August 2. See British Blue Book No. 138 under date of August 2, 
and next number. 

3 They were guaranteed by Germany on July 29. Sec British Blue Book No. U7. 
July 30. 

1 Cf. previous despatch where he is railed a Russophobe. 

s This is contradicted by the statement discussed in note 1 (page 411) to the previous 
despatch. No. 140. 

'This statement is unsupported by any evidence contained in the trench bellow 

'This despatch disposes of the statements found iu previous despatches to the 
effect that Germany had mobilised earlier. 



August 2, British Blue Book No. llfi 413 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 143 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 
(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg. 

Your telegram of 1st August 1 acted on. 

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoy- 
ance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to pro- 
ceed without delay. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 144 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin. August 2, 1914. 

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing 2 to certain 
Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are 
now in a state of war. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 145 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 101 4- 

My telegram of 1st August. 3 

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to 
allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says 
that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's 
Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. 
Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- 
cautions being taken. 

From Brussels 

British Blue Book No. 146 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 2). 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 101 4- 

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. 4 

1 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. 

2 The declaration of war does not contain this reason. Cf. Russian Orange Book 
No. 76, August 1. 

3 See No. 143. 

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. IS, August 2, and British Blue Book next despatch. 



414 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From. Luxemburg 
British Blue Book No. 147 

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 

August 2.) 

(Translation.) 

(Telegraphique.) 

Luxembourg, le 2 aoi'd, 1914- 

J'ai l'honneur de porter a la 
connaissance de votre Excellence 
les faits suivants : 

Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand 
matin, les troupes allemandes, 
d'apres les informations qui sont 
parvenues au Gouvernement 
Grand ducal a, l'heure actuelle, 
out penetre sur le territoire 
luxembourgeois par les ponts de 
Wasserbillig et de Remich, se 
dirigeant specialement vers le 
sml du pays et vers la ville de 
Luxembourg, capitale du Grand 
Duche. Un certain nombre de 
trains blindes avec des troupes 
et des munitions ont ete ache- 
mines par la voie de chemin de 
ferde Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, 
ou l'ons'attend de les voir arri\ er. 
D'un instant a l'autre, ces faits 
impliquent des actes manifeste- 
ment contraire a la neutrality du 
Grand Duche garantie ])ar le 
Traite de Londres de 1867. Le 
( rouvernement luxembourgeois 
n'a pas manque de protester 
energiquement contre cette agres- 
sion aupres des representants de 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'AUe- 
magne a Luxembourg. Une 
protestation identique va etre 
transmise telegraphiquement au 
Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires 
Etrangeres a Berlin. 



(Telegraphic.) 

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- 
I have the honour to bring 
to your Excellency's notice the 
following facts : — 

On Sunday, the 2nd August, 
very early, the German troops, 
according to the information 
which has up to now reached 
the Grand Ducal Government, 
penetrated into Luxemburg terri- 
tory by the bridges of Wasser- 
billig and Remich, and proceeded 
particularly towards the south 
and in the direction of Luxem- 
burg, the capital of the Grand 
Duchy. A certain number of 
armoured trains with troops and 
ammunition have been sent along 
the railway line from Wasserbillig 
to Luxemburg, where their arrival 
is expected. These occurrences 
constitute acts which are mani- 
festly contrary to the neutrality 
of the Grand Duchy as guaran- 
teed by the Treaty of London of 
1867. The Luxemburg Govern- 
ment have not failed to address 
an energetic protest against this 
aggression to the representatives 
of His Majesty the German Em- 
peror at Luxemburg. An iden- 
tical protest will be sent by tele- 
graph to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. 



August 2, British Blue Book No. 1^8 415 

To Paris 

British Blue Book No. 14S 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914- 

After the Cabinet this morning 1 I gave M. Cambon the follow- 
ing memorandum : — 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet 
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile 
operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will 
give all the protection in its power. 

" This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be 
taken as binding 2 His Majesty's Government to take any action 
until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
place." 3 

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult 
issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind 
themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke 
out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential 
to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated 
in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with 
their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it 
necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to 
war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, 
but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle 
the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. 

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told 
him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord 
Clarendon in 1S67. He asked me what we should say about the 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more 
important matter; we were considering what statement we should 
make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare 
violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what 
had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. 4 

1 At two previous meetings the Cabinet had refused to make any promises to 
France; see French Yellow Book Nos. 110, July 31. and 1211, August 1. and note 4. 

This promise was given before Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, see Belgian Gray 
Book No. 201, August 2. 

2 This is the very opposite of French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3: "is to be 
regarded as binding the British Government. Sir E. Grey assured me of this." 

3 This formula is different from the one given in French Yellow Book No. 143, 
August 3, and quoted by Viviani in the Chamber of Deputies, French Yellow Book 
No. 159, August 4. In both the last sentence reads "from that moment on England 
and Germany would be in a state of war." There are then two distinct formulas. 
The one appears in British Blue Book No. 14S, French Yellow Book No. 137, Aug. 2, 
and in the Speech in Parliament by Sir E. Grey printed as an appendix to the British 
Blue Book. The other occurs in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and No. 159, 
August 4. 

4 British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 



416 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 149 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914- 

Yoxjh telegram of 1st August. 1 

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded 
from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained. 
Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other 
British vessels loaded with sugar. 

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in 
my telegram of 1st August, 2 I most earnestly trust that the orders 
already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships 
covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which can- 
not be justified. 

Russia : 

Russian Orange Book No. 77 

Announcement hi/ the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting 
Recent Events. 

July 20 (August 2), 1914. 

A garbled version of the events of the last few days having ap- 
peared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the 
diplomatic discussions during the period under review: — 

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which 
the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan- 
Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the 
Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded 
of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most 
formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the 
adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the 
discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects 
who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future 
attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty- 
eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to 
reply to this note. 

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note 
seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken 
note of the demands contained therein, could not hut perceive that 
some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their 
substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incom- 
patible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered 
that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and 

1 British Blue Book No. 143, under date of August 2. 

2 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. 



August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 77 417 

equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own 
hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, 1 were in- 
admissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to 
Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be 
desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hun- 
garian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their 
way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence 
of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful. 

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, 2 and had 
shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond 
the expectations, 3 not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers — 
despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade con- 
sidered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town. 

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by 
Austria, Russia had previously 4 declared that she could not remain 
indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peace- 
ful issue which might prove acceptable 5 to Austria, and spare the 
latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let 
it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement 
of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as 
an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian 
Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory interven- 
tion by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded 
to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the follow- 
ing day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accom- 
panied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having pre- 
pared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of 
a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole 
State, aroused, by its evident inanity, 6 widespread sympathy for 
Servia throughout all classes of European society. 

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain 
indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered 
it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, 
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary 
by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was 
communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps 
taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet 
had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards 
peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of 
the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered. 

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken 

1 This implies to Austria-Hungary a motive which may or may not have been hers. 

2 No evidence for this has been given. 

3 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See the despatches of July 26, especially 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 

4 This is not clear. 

5 Cf. British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1, note 4. 

5 The "dossier," Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, takes a different 
view. 



418 Official Diplomatic Documents 

by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these 
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that 
they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the 
Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue 
discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either 
in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or< as suggested by 
Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers 
not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Ger- 
many, and Italy. 

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuc- 
cessful. Austria-Hungary declined 1 a further exchange of views 
with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the pro- 
posed conference of the Powers. 

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When 
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which 
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs declared - that these conditions were Austria's recog- 
nition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European 
character, ami a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist 
upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign 
rights of Servia. 

Germany considered 3 this Russian proposal unacceptable to 
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation 
of general mobilisation 4 by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg. 

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and 
Belgrade was bombarded afresh. 

The failure of our proposals for peace* compelled us to extend the 
scope of our precautionary military measures. 5 

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that 
Russia was compelled to begin preparations 6 so as to be ready for 
every emergency. 

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia, did not on that 
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the 
situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro- 
posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided 
it complied with the conditions laid down by her. 

In spite (if this conciliatory communication, the German Govern- 
ment on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government 
that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 
19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, 
to proceed to general mobilisation. 7 

' This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See Red Book No. 50, July 30. 

- British Blue Book No. <.)7, July 30. 

:! There is no evidence of this anywhere. The formula was changed at England's 
request, British Blue Book No. 132, August 1. 

1 Russia's general mobilisation took place on July 31. That of Austria-Hungary 
on August 1. See British Blue Book No. li-'7. August 1. 

5 This is contradicted by the previous note. 

B "Begin preparations" is hardly the word for general mobilisation. 

7 In this sentence the Russian general mobilisation of July 31 is called "military 
measures" while the German order of August 1 as of August '2, is properly called 
what it is. general mobilisation. 



August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 78 419 

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German 
Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration 
of war l to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



To Russian Representatives Abroad 

Russian Orange Book No. 78 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives 
abroad. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914. 

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist 
upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to 
mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen 
upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary 
measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discus- 
sions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was under- 
taking 2 general mobilisation. 

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that 
he would take no aggressive action 3 as long as the discussions with 
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many 
proofs of Russia's desire for peace, 4 Germany neither could, nor had 
the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept 
any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independ- 
ence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompat- 
ible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European 
balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The 
European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute b is 
infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. 
By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotia- 
tions were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a 
heavy responsibility. 

1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 

2 This statement is more accurate than that contained in previous despatch. See 
Russian Orange Book No. 77 note 10. 

3 General mobilisation is universally looked upon as an aggressive act in itself. 

4 Nobody before had called a general mobilisation a "proof of a desire for peace." 

5 The previous sentence shows that so far as Russia is concerned she did not believe 
that Prussianism or frightful ness or the invasion of Belgium, but the European balance 
of power, would supply the motive for England to enter the war. 



420 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Monday, August 3, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Austria-Hungary 
Belgium 



France 



Sent Despatches : 



London, etc. 
King ( reorge 
German Minister 
London, London, etc. 
All representatives 
Berlin, Munich 



London 



The Hague, Brussels, 

London 
German Ambassador 



Germany 

Great Britain Paris Berlin, Brussels 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary is silent on this day. 

Belgium refuses to accede to the German ultimatum and appeals to Great 
Britain for "diplomatic intervention." To the informal offer of military assist- 
ance she replies, to the French Minister, that she is "making no appeal at present 
to the guarantee of the Powers." 

France offers her military assistance to Belgium, who declines it with thanks. 
She denies the German accusations of having violated Belgian neutrality, and 
having committed hostile acts against Germany. When the latter declares war 
on her. she recalls her diplomatic agents from Germany, and lodges with the latter 
formal protest against her violations of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality. 

Germany declares war on France at (i. 1"> p.m. citing as reasons several unlawful 
and hostile acts on the part of France, whom she also charges with having violated 
Belgian neutrality. 

Great Britain issues only one important despatch. It contains the Italian 
intention not to enter the war on the side of her allies of the Triple Alliance. 
This Italian declaration is sent by Sir F. < Jrey to the British Ambassador in Paris 
on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. 

Russia is silent on this day. 

Serbia is silent. 



Belrium : 



Berlin 



Belgian Gray Book No. 21 



Memorandum of an Interview a. ileal for at 1.30 A.M., on August 8, by 
Kerr von Below Saleske, Herman Minister, with Baron ran tier 
Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

At 1.30 a.m. tlio German Minister asked to see Baron van der 
Elst. He told hint that he had been instructed By his Government 
to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown 
bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in 
violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared. 1 

The Secretary-General asked Heir von Below where these incidents 
had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der 

1 Similar charges against Germany were made bv France; see French Yellow Book 
No. 136, August .'. 



August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 22 421 

Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the 
object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these 
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to 
lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, 
would be committed by France. 

To Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 22 

Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.). 

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1 
1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended 
to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in 
spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, 
without assistance, an advance of French troops. 2 

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com- 
pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In 
these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government 
to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the con- 
clusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its 
possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium 
put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany 
would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the 
ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the 
decision of arms. 

This note had made a deep and painful impression 3 upon the Bel- 
gian Government. 

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contra- 
diction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the 
name of the French Government. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality 
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her inter- 
national obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most 
vigorous resistance to the invader. 4 

The treaties of 1839, confirmed 6 by the treaties of 1S70, vouch for 
the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of 
the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King 
of Prussia. 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 

2 This is exactly the same argument advanced by Great Britain in the second of the 
Brussels documents (see p. 580) when the British officer claimed that the British 
troops would enter Belgium even unasked. 

3 The ring of sincerity in this sentence is lessened after having studied the document 
mentioned in the previous note. 

4 It would, however, have been almost hopeless, for since Great Britain had the mil- 
itary secrets of Belgium, France had them also, undoubtedly. See documents men- 
tioned in preceding notes. 

5 It had been claimed in Parliament in 1870 that the treaties of 1870 invalidated 
those of 1839. See the editor's Germany's Point of View, the chapters on Belgium. 



422 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Belgium lias always been faithful to her international obligations, 1 
she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and 
she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her 
neutrality. 

The attack upon her independence 2 with which the German 
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of inter- 
national law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. 

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals sub- 
mitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray 
their duty towards Europe. 

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than 
eighty years in the civilisation 3 of the world, they refuse to believe 
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price 
of the violation of her neutrality. 

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly 
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon 
their rights. 

To St. Petersburgh, Berlin, London, Pari*, Vienna, and The Hague 
Belgian Gray Book No. 23 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, t<> the Belgian 
Ministers at St. Petersburgh, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The 
Hague. 
(Telegram.) Brussels, August J, 1014- 

At 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly 
neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, 
while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium 
and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in 
the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of 
twelve hours was allowed within which to reply. 

Our answer 4 has been that this infringement of our neutrality 
would lie a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the 
German proposal would he to sacrifice the honour of the nation. 
( 'onscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack 
by all the means in her power. 

To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh 
Belgian" Geay Book No. 24 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh. 
Sir, Brussels, August ,1, 1914 (1® noon). 

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultima- 
tum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no act of 

1 Germany claims that this is not true in view of the Brussels documents. 

2 Germany had explicitly disclaimed making any attack on the "independence" of 
Belgium. 

3 The writer here forgot the chapter of Belgian atrocities in the Congo. 
< See preceding despatch. 



August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 25 423 

war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that 
there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers. 
The French Minister has made the following statement to me 

upon the subject : — 

(Translation.) 

"Sans etre charge d'une decla- "Although I have received no 
ration de mon Gouvernement, je instructions l to make a declara- 
crois cependant, m'inspirant de tion from my Government, I feel 
ses intentions connues, pouvoir justified, in view of their well- 
dire que si le Gouvernement known intentions, in saying that 
Royal faisait appel au Gouverne- if the Belgian Government were 
ment francais, comme Puissance to appeal to the French Govern- 
garante de sa neutralite, nous ment as one of the Powers 
repondrions immediatement a guaranteeing their neutrality, the 
son appel; si cet appel n'etait French Government would at 
pas formule, il est probable, a once respond to Belgium's ap- 
moins bien entendu que le souci peal ; 2 if such an appeal were 
de sa propre defense ne determine not made, it is probable that 
des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il — unless of course exceptional 
attendra pour intervenir que la measures were rendered necessary 
Belgique ait fait tin acte de in self-defence — the French 
resistance effective." Government would not intervene 

until Belgium had taken some 
effective measure of resistance." 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French 
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, ant! 
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal 
at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would 
decide later what ought to be done. 3 

To King George 
Belgian Gray Book No. 25 
His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King Gennje. 
(Telegram.) Brussels, Augusts, 1914- 

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship 
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England 

1 It is unusual for diplomatic agents to speak without instructions or, as it is called, 
de suo, and even more unusual to include such informal remarks in the official books 
of despatches. The French Minister to Belgium had once before spoken de suo. 
See Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31. 

When M. Davignon gave a running review of the events leading up to August 4. 
and quoted this despatch (No. 24) in No. 38, he felt constrained to explain the unusual 
procedure of the French Minister by interpolating the words "in view of the rapid 
march of events." 

2 This appeal it was decided not to make as late as 10 o'clock, August 4. See 
Belgian Gray Book No. 38. 

3 For this reply see also French Yellow Book No. 142, and British Blue Book No. 151, 
both August 3. In the British Blue Book the French offer consists of "five French 
army corps." Since that can hardly be interpolated, the above declaration cannot 
be accurate, although it has been printed in quotation marks. 



■i'24 Official Diplomatic Documents 

in INTO and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention 1 of your 
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 26 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 8, 1914- 

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with 
Germany. 2 

France : 

From The Hague 

French Yellow Book No. 140 

M. Marcel in Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Rene Vi- 
viani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 3, 1914- 

The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for For- 
eign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Ger- 
many was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, 
adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him 
to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German 
troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an 

occupation of that countrv by France. „ 

Pellet. 

From Brussels 

French Yellow Book No. 141 

}F Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to J/. Rene Viriani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August .!. 1914- 

Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian 
Government an ultimatum 3 stating that his Government, having 
learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts 

1 Cf. No. '-'I, same day, and No. 38, August 4. The appeal here made is only for 
"diplomatic intervention." Such diplomatic intervention was of course out of the 
question, since the British Cabinet, <m August 2, ha. I authorised Sir Edward Grey to 
promi e t" France British assistance in the war against Germany. Cf. British Blue 
Book No. 148, August 2. 

- See noic to preceding despatch, and to French Yellow Book No. 143 and British 
Blue Book No. I 18, both of August 2, and Belgian Gray Book No. 23, August 3. 

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 



August 3, French Yellow Book No. 143 425 

of Civet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the fir^t of 
Which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within 
seven 1 hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in 
Belgium against France. In ease of refusal the fortune of war would 
decide. 

The Government of the King answered - that the information as 
to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view 
of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were 
still quite recent; that Belgium, which since the establishment of 
her kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her 
dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to pea 
development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of 
her territory from whatever quarter it may come: and that, sup- 
posing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with 
energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, 

and notably by the King of Prussia. T - 

Klobtjkowski. 

From Brussels 
French Yellow Book No. 142 

M. KlobukowsM, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bene Vimani, 
President of the Council, Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914- 

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the 
guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by 
Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs answered : 

" It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the 
Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer 
us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee 
of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will 
weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take." 3 

Front London 

Frexch Yellow Book No. 143 

M.Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Loudon, to M.Rene Vimani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 8, 1914- 
Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you 
could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the 

. ' This is an error. It was 12 hours, see also Belgian Gray Book No. 38, Augusl ^■ 
The ultimatum was presented a< 7 p.m. on August 2, ami expired at 7 a.m. on August 3. 
It was presented several hours after Great Britain had promised her support on the 
sea to Frame, which made her an ally of France without any reference to Belgium. See 
British Blue Book No. 148, August 2. 

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. 

3 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and note 3. Also British Blue Book 
No. 151, August 3. 



426 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and 
that the chief of these declarations would be as follows : — 

" In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the 
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of 
attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing 
French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order 
to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way 
that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a 
state of war." ' 

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an opera- 
tion by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demon- 
stration in the Atlantic Ocean. 

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet 
must be considered as binding 2 the British Government. Sir 
Edward Grey has assured me of this and lias added that the French 
Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of 
this. 

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic 3 com- 
munication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. 
I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey. 

Paul Cambon. 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 144 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 

President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 3, l!>L' f - 

.TrsT as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meet- 
ing of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him 
yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great 
Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir 
Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter. 4 

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a communique 
saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give 
up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian 
coast as a point d'appui. b My answer is that respecting the coast is 
not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German 
ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality. 

Paul Cambon. 

1 For the different wording of this formula see notes to British Blue Brink No. MS. 
August _', and French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2. 
■ despatches mentioned in preceding note. 

• 3 This is very important, because it suggests that besides the irritten communications 
which are printed in tne official Books of documents, other communications were ex- 
changed between London and Paris, and undoubtedly other places too. 

4 This may account for the fact that this matter is not mentioned in the British Blue 

I'HMlk 

6 Obviously done to allay any fear of Germany in Great Britain. 



August 3, French Yellow Book No. 14? 427 

From London 

French Yellow Book No. 145 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Virion i, 
President of the Council, Minister fur Foreign Affairs-. 

Loudon, August 8, 1914- 

Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the inter- 
vention of the British fleet. 1 He has explained, in considering the 
situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality ; 
and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support 
of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House. 

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for ; 
from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Govern- 
ment, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more 
and more in our favour. Paul Cambon. 

To London 

French Yellow Book No. 146 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. 

Paris August 8, 101 4. 

I am told that the German Ambassador is said to ha -1 stated to 
the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in 
Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in 
twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this 
formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France. 

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure 
invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the 
German campaign of false news which is beginning. 

Rene Viviani. 

From Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 147 

Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- 
dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his fare- 
well audience, August 8, 1914, «' '>■'/> PM. 

M. le President, 

The German administrative and military authorities have estab- 
lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger- 
man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have 
openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the terri- 

1 Which statement did he make, the one of French Yellow Book No. 137, August 
2, or of ib. No. 143, August 3? In .Sir E. Grey's speech given in British Blue Book of 
Sept. 28, the former is given. In Viviani's speech of August 4, French Yellow Book 
No. 159, the latter is quoted as having been given by Sir E. Grey. 



428 Official Diplomatic Documents 

tory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near 
Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has 
thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nurei tb 

I am instructed, and 1 have the honour to inform your Excellency, 
these acts of aggression the German Empire 
lers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the 
acts of this latter Power. 

At the same time I have the honour to hrin^ to the knowledge 
of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French 
mercantile vessels in German ports, hut they will i iom if, 

within forty-eight hours, they arc assured of complete reciprocity. 

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only 
remains for me to request your Excellency 

furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider 
suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the stall' of the Em- 
bassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the 
German Consulate General in Paris. 

Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my 
' respect. (Signed) Schoen. 

To the French Representatives Abroad 

French Yellow Book No. 14S 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad. 

Paris, August 3, 1914. 

The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leav- 
ing this evening with the stall's of the Embassy, the German Consu- 
leneral and the lunarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has 
given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative 
and military authorities of arts of hostility which are said to have 
been committed by Frei ators accused of having flown 

over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador 
adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality 
of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of 
these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the 
German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in con- 
ce of the arts of this latter Power." 

1 formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassa- 
dor, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed 
to him a note - protesting against the flagrant violations of the French 
frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops. 

Rene Viviani. 

' Cf. New York E ening '',, [, July 22, 1916, referring to "Facts about the War" 
publi bed b; the Paris Chambei oi Commerce, in which Dr. Schwalbe is oil 
writing in the Deutsche M ' edizinischi Wo ■ m May 18, to the effeel th I 

his investigations cleared the French of the charge of having dropped bombs on 
N uremberg. 

2 Fn ach Yellow Book Nos. 136 and 139, August 2, and note to No. 136. 



August 8, French Yellow Book No. 150 429 

To Berlin 

French Yellow Book No. 149 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.) 

Paris. August 3, 1914. 

I request you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at 
once with the staff of the Embassy , leaving the charge of French 
interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. 
I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the viola- 
tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which 
notice has been given by the Prime [Minister of Luxemburg; against 
the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German 
Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian 
neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate 
military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally 
against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these 
two countries by French armies, by which he 1 has attempted to 
justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between 
Germany and France. 

Rene Viviani. 



To Munich 

French Yellow Book No. 150 

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich. 

Paris, August J, 1914- 

Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that 
you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our 
Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich. 

Rene Viviani. 

1 "He" does not refer to the last person mentioned, which was the " German Minister 
at Brussels" (for whose remarks see Belgian Gray Book X... I'D, August 2, 1914). but 
to tin- German Ambassador in Paris, not mentioned in this despatch, for it was lie who 
"attempted to justify, etc." (see French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3). This 
proves parts of the original despatch have been excised. 



430 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To London, St. Petersburg]!, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constan- 
tinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucha- 
rest, Athens, Belgrade. 

French Yellow Book No. 151 

M. Rene Yiriani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Pctersburgh, 
Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Bern/, Constantinople, The Hague, Co- 
penhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade. 

Paris, August 3, 1914- 

I learn from an official Belgian source 1 that German troops have 
violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers. 

Rene Viviani. 

Great Britain : 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 150 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received. August S.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, HU4- 

Your telegram of 2nd August : Detention of British ships at 
Hamburg. 

No information available. 



From Brussels 

British Blue Book No. 151 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August .:.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914- 

French Government have offered through their military attache 
the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. 2 
following reply has been sent to-day: — 

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering 
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not 
propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Govern- 
ment will decide later on the action which they may think it neces- 
sary to take." 

1 No such account is contained in the Belgian Gray Book, according to which, 
(No. 40. August 4,) the "armed forces of Germany " entered Belgium "this morning." 
Cf. also Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4, which announces the violation of Belgian 
territory at Gemmerich. This French despatch is, therefore, probably erroneously 
dated August 3, because no "official Belgian source " could have made the above state- 
ment truthfully on August 3. 

• Cf. Belgian ( [ray Book No. 24 and French Yellow Book No. 142, both of August 3, 
and note 3 to Belgian despatch. 



August 8, British Blue Book No. 152 431 

To Paris 
British Blue Book No. 152 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. 

On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following 
communication : ' — 

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact 
that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to 
the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di 
San Giuliano 2 replied : — 

"'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which 
might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, 
an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely 
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances 
Italy would remain neutral.'" 

In making this communication, M. Cambon 3 was instructed to lay 
stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a 
defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus 
fwderis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. 

I am, etc. 

E. Grey. 

: No reason is apparent why this Italian declaration should be sent by Sir E. Grey 
to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in 
London. There should have been an official Italian declaration available. 

2 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

3 French Ambassador in London. 



432 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Tuesday, August 4, 1914. 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 

[GN Office op Sent Despatches to Received 

ia-Hungary London 

Belgium London, Paris The Hague, Berlin, 

Madrid, Berlin London 

( rerman Mil 
Belgian Ministers at German Minister 

Entente capitals 
Entente Ministers in British Minister 
Bru; i 
France Repn if the Bru 

Powers in Paris London 

( Copenhagen 

Germany 

Great Britain Berlin, Bru Brussels, Berlin 

Russia 

Berlin 

Austria-Hungary is discussing the possibility of maintaining friendly relations 
with ( Jreat Britain. 

Behji '.in; dismi ;ses the ( rerman Minister, and issues to the Entente Mil 
her version of the events leading up 1 i the break with Germany. She di id 
lir-,i , ii >: to call on the armed intervention or assistance of the guaranteeing Powers 
under the Treaty of 1S39, but late in tli lee les to do so. 

Franci protest on what she calls Germany's violation of the Hague 

i ions sod the Tr aiy of 1S39, addressing her protest to "the Representa- 
tives of the Powers at Paris." 

i Selgium that to her "deepreg o npelled 

to iake i liose meas ires of defence ah i nsable in view 

of the mena ; oi France ;" and orders her troops to enter Belgian territory. 

. ..,:, concerning the neutrality of 
r, announces herself to be the ally of France, who is at 
by Germany of the terms of the ultima- 
tum could not have kept I I n neutral. At the same time she 
Belgium i 'Cted invasion with force of arms, this being her reply 

Million, which as the ally of France she 
could, of course, not render. 

Russia does nol enter into the discussii n on this day. 
Serbia recalls her minister and consuls from Germany. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From London 

ArsTiai-IlrxoAKiAx Red Book No. 58 

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) London, August^ -?•''?/■ 

I have just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent 
to Germany an ultimatum ' on account of Belgium. They expect a 
reply at 12 o'clock to-night. 

Sir E. Grey said to me that tit present there was no reason why he 

1 British Blue Book No. 159, same day. 



August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 27 433 

should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, 
so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any 
case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the for- 
mality ' of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to 
recall Sir M. de Bunsen. 

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for 
Great Britain, as the ally 2 of France, to co-operate with her in the 
Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean. 

Belgium : 

From Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 27 

Ilcrr wn Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(The original is in French.) 
Brussels, August j, 1914 (6 A. .1/.). 

(Translation.) 

Monsieur le Ministre, Sir, 

J'ai ete charge et j'ai 1'honneur In accordance with my instruc- 

d'informer votre Excellence que tions, I have the honour to inform 

par suite du refus oppose par le your Excellency that in con- 

Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le sequence of the refusal of the 

Roi aux propositions bien inten- Belgian Government to entertain 

tionnees que lui avait soumises the well-intentioned proposals 

le Gouvernement Imperial, celui- made to them by the German 

ei se verra, a son plus vif regret, Government, the latter, to their 

force d'executer — au besoin par deep regret, find themselves 

la force des armes — lesmesures compelled to take — if necessary 

de securite exposees comme indis- by force of arms — those meas- 

pensables vis-a-vis des menaces ures of defence already fore- 

francaises. shadowed 3 as indispensable, in 

Veuillez agreer, etc. view of the menace of France. 
(Signe) von Below. 

1 The use of this word is strange here in view of III Convention 2d Hague < '(in- 
ference, Article 1 : 

"The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not 
commence without previous and explicit warning." This Convention had been 
ratified by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France. Great Britain, and Russia. 

In this connection it may bo asked how Belgium could ratify a Convention con- 
cerning the opening of hostilities, if she was regarded, in 1907, as po i □ uirality 
guaranteed le 

2 If Sir E. i trey is correctly quoted, the use of this word is significant ; and the ques- 
tion naturally arises " Since when w: in the ally of France?" Sir E. Grey 

had I n utl orised by the British ( 'abinef in the morning of August 2 (British Blue 

Book No. 148) to promise France their support. If Great Britain was the ally of France 
when she sent her ultimatum about Belgium to Germany, the ethics of such a course 
are doubtful, in view of the fact that France and Germany were at war. CI 
French Yellow Book No. 158, August t, where President Poincare refers to Great 
Britain as an ally of France. ( !f. also Serbian Blue Hook No. 38, July 25. The whole 
sentence is. of course, a future condition, refering to the possibility of a war between 
Austria-Hungary and France. No futurity idea, however, attaches to the term "as 
the ally of France." 

3 Belgian Liray Book No. 20, August 2. 



434 Official Diplomatic Documents 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 28 

Note communicated by Sir Fraud* VUliers, British Minister at 
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, A ugust 4, 1914. 

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany 
brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to 
abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Gov- 
ernment expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal. 1 

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are pre- 
pared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in ten- 
dering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a 
view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against 
Belgium, and also offering a guarantee 2 for the maintenance of the 
future independence ami integrity of Belgium. 

From the Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 29 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914- 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening 
that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing 
to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying 
on the Scheldt. 

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce 
this decision to me. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note 
in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening. 

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. 
By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who 
have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In 
this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and 
Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. 

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that 
in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause 
the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar to be withdrawn in order to 
facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory. 

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up 
the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit ; sailing down would be 

1 Belgium had asked for British "diplomatic intervention," Belgian Gray Book 
No. 25, August 3. 

2 This is the same guarantee as was offered by Germany, who guaranteed "the 
possessions and the independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full" (Belgian Gray 
Book No. 20, August 2). "Neutrality" is omitted both in the British and German 
guarantees, Cf. British Blue Book No. 155, August 4. 



August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 31 435 

permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, how- 
ever, given me this assurance. 

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this 
exceptional measure I shall be informed of it. 

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying. 

I will at once telegraph to you. 



Note enclosed in No. 29 



The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to 
maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying 
upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of 
the actual arrangement of buoys and lights. 

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so 
drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible 
to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch 
pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc- 
tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced 
that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in 
the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the 
navigation of Antwerp. 

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there 
would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at 
night, and as the presence of the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar 
is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Govern- 
ment would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good 
enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to with- 
draw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neu- 
trality of Dutch territory. 

To London and Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 30 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- 
isters at London and Paris. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been 
violated at Gemmenich. 1 

To Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 31 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below 
Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4> 1914- 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day 
the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic- 

1 See French Yellow Book No. 151, August 3, and note. 



436 Official Diplomatic Documents 

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excel- 
lency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure 
with the staff of the legation. 

From. Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 32 

II err von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excel- 
[ency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have en- 
trusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care 
of my United States colleague. 

To Mail rid 

Belgian Gray Book No. 33 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, 
Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough 
to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that 
( vent they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador 
at Berlin. 

To Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 34 

.1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affair*, to Baron Beyens, 
Belgian Minister at Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4> 1914- 

The German Minister is leaving to-night ; ' you should ask for 
your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to 
authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge 
of Belgian interests in Germany. 

From, Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 35 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of 
part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial 

1 At the request <>f Belgium : see Belgian Gray Book No. 31, same date. 



August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 36 437 

Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian 
neutrality : — " 

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. 

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already 
entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international 
law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre- 
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected 
by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade 
Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack 
upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been 
fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the 
legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. 
For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as 
soon as our military object is attained. 

" Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling 
for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of 
extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria." 

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, 
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international 
law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing 
a wrong against us. 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 36 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, London, August 4, 1914- 

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons 
this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with 
regard to the European crisis. 

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. 
Grey, the Prime Minister read : — 

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which 
gave the substance of the second ultimatum : presented to the Bel- 
gian Government by the German Government, which had been sent 
to you this morning (see No. 27). 

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at 
Gemmenich, 2 a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson. 

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its 
Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of 
misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation 
as published in one of this evening's newspapers : — 

"Please 3 dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. This is in no sense a second ultimatum, 
but rather a declaration of the entrance of armed German forces. 

2 lb. No. 30, same day. 

3 See British Blue Book No. 157, August 4. 



438 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeat- 
ing most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of 
armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence 
whatever, annex Belgian territory. 

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly 
pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. 

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri- 
tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the 
expense of Holland. 

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not 
be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned 
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. 1 

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it 
being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." 

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note 
of the German Government the British Government had repeated 
their proposal 2 of last week, namely, that the German Government 
should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France 
had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British 
Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.' 1 

From London 

Belgian Okay Hook No. 37 4 

fount de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August J f , 191 Jf. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min- 
ters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects 
that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe 
neutrality.'' Should they resist they will have the support of Great 
Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned 
Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli- 
ance to the saiil Governments, for the purpose of resisting the use 
of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the 

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 20. August 2. Germany has not published this in- 
formation. 

' iermany could have, and according to British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. las! 
tw>> paragraphs, probably would have accepted this proposal if Great Britain would 
have coupled with it the promise that she would do what she had done in INTO. i.e. 
agree to make common cause in the interest of Belgium with either France or < rermany 
againsl the one who would violate Belgian neutrality. Tins Great Britain, however, 
could not do, because she had promised her support to France on August 2. British 
Blue Book No. 14s. 

3 Cf . Ausi m-Hungarian Red Book No. 5S, same day. Mr. Asquith neglected to 
tell Parliament that when Great Britain sent her request to Germany concerning 
Belgium, she was no longer neutral, but hound by a vote of the Cabinet (cf. British Blue 
Book No. 148, August 2) to support France who since 6.45 p.m. the previous day had 
been at. war with Germany. 

4 This despatch was later cancelled, Belgian Gray Book No. 39, same day. It has 
been omitted from the British Blue Book. 

: ' This despatch is important, because Sir E. Grey is here quoted as placing the 
neutrality of Norway, Holland, and Belgium on a par. It has often been claimed 
since that Belgian neutrality was of a different order, not voluntary, but imposed by 
the treat v of 1839. 



August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 38 439 

future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. 1 I ob- 
served to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister 
for Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case her neutrality is 
violated. 2 



To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 38 

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- 
isters at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events 
as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which 
guarantee her neutrality and independence. 

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com- 
munication 3 according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a 
European war, had asked the German and French Governments 
separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other 
Power. 

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring 
this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that 
Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her 
neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it. 

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com- 
munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and 
I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had 
guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm 
determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem pos- 
sible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, 
with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The 
Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution 
by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them 
to be necessitated by the situation. 

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication 4 
on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the 
Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French 
Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would 
respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to 
modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian 
neutrality by another Power. 

■There is no promise here of maintaining the "treaty-imposed neutrality" of 
Belgium. 

2 Cf. the "Brussels documents," pp. 577 ff. The Belgian Minister wished to dis- 
tinguish between the neutrality of his country, and the neutrality of the other two 
kingdoms. 

The omission of Sweden and Denmark in this despatch is noteworthy. 

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 11, July 31. 

4 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, but see also ib. No. 9, July 31. 



440 Official Diplomatic Documents 

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken 
all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of onr independ- 
ence and our frontiers. 

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation ' 
with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that lie had 
lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his 
Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the 
solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to 
defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He 
added : "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but 
Great Britain lias received no reply from Berlin on this subject." 

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration 
from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of 
existing treaties. 2 Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, 
at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, 
"that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Ger- 
many intends to respect." 

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, 
called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed 
to me the enclosed note (see No. 2(1). The German Government 
gave the Belgian Government a. time limit of twelve hours within 
which to communicate their decision. 

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amaz- 
ing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy 
enclosed. (See No. 22.) 

The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no 
act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there 
was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers. 

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this 
point, and said : — 

"Although in view of the rapid march of events 3 I have as yet 
received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern- 
ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in 
saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French 
rnment as one of the Towers guaranteeing their neutrality, the 
French Government would a1 once respond to Belgium's appeal; 
if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of 
e, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence 
— the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had 
taken some effective measure of resistance." 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support, which the French 
Government had been good enough to offer us in ease of need, and 
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal 
at present to the guarantee of the Bowers, and that they would decide 
later what ought to lie done. 

1 Not previously mentioned in the Belgian Gray Book. 

= "Treaties" do not seem to have been mentioned in the conversation with the 
German Minister. See Belgian Cray Book No. 19, August 2. 

■ ; ■ .ids are added here to the despatch as published Belgian Gray Book No. 

24, August 3. 



August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 40 141 

Finally, at G a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the 
following communication to me. (See No. 27.) 

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques- 
tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality. 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 39 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914- 

Great Britain this morning called ' upon Germany to respect 
Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note 
addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an 
appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German 
troops ; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gem- 
menich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain 
a similar assurance to that given last week by France ; therefore 
Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the 
subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which 
Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum 
expires at midnight. 

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British 
proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. 
(See Xo. 37.) 

To London, Paris, and SI. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Hook No. 40 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, 
and Russian Ministers at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your 
Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered 
Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements. 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all 
the means in their power. 2 

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co- 
operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. 3 

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible 
measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same 
time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence 
and integrity 4 of Belgium. 

1 British Blue Book No. 159, August 4. 

2 This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book Xo. 28, August 4. 
'This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the 

last paragraph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian < Iray Book No. 42, August 5. 
' Cf. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day. 



442 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the 
defence of her fortified places. 

France : 

From Brussels 

French Yellow Book No. 152 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914- 
The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends 
me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that 
they are firmly decided to resist ' the aggression of Germany by all 
means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France 
and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory. 
"There would be a concerted and common action having as its 
object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany 
against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance 
of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future. 

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the 
defence of her fortified places." 

Klobukowski. 

From London 

French Yellow B < No. 153 

.1/. Paul Caiubon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August \, 1914- 

Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately 
in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a 
statement 2 in the House of Commons that Germany had been 
invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her 
answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night. 

Paul Cambon. 

From Brussels 

French Yellow Book No. 154 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914- 
This morning the German Minister informs 3 the Belgian Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 

2 C'f. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. 

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 



August 4, French Yellow Book No. 157 443 

Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled 
to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which 
are rendered indispensable by the French threats. 

Klobukowski. 

[For French Yellow Book No. 155 see under August 6, and for No. 156 see under 
August 5.] 

To the Representatives of all the Powers at Paris 
French Yellow Book No. 157 

Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the 
Powers at Paris. 

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its 
armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of 
murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the 
neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the 
stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and 
of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, on the rights 
and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1 
and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern- 
ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern- 
ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German 
troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 
19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them, 1 and in violation 
of the above Convention of the Hague 

Have declared war on France at G.45 P.M. on the 3rd August, 1914. 

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find 
themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms. 

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these 
presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between 
France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914. 

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised 
nations, and especially those Governments 2 which have signed the 
Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation 
by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they 
reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves 
brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted 
word. 

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the 
principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and 
assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with 
the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law 
of war on land and sea. 

1 Only in so far as one assumes that signatures of the kingdom of Prussia are bind- 
ing on the German Empire. In 1S71 the kingdom of Prussia ceased to exist as a 
Power in relation to foreign Powers, voluntarily sinking herself in the Federation of 
German States, called the German Empire. See chapter on German Constitution 
in the editor's Germany's Point of View. 

- This includes the Government of the United States. The American Government 
has not published its reply. 



444 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The present notification, made in accordance with Article '2 of 
the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relat- 
ing to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . . 

Paris, August 4, 1914, ' P-M. 



French Yellow Book No. 158 

Message from. M. Poincare, President of the Republic, rend at the 
Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4> 1914- 

(Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.) 

(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the 

message. ) 

"Gentlemen, 

"France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated 
attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before 
any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German 
Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been 
violated. 1 The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to 
give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had 
already created. 

" For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, 
have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate 
reparation. 

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation 
which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience 
and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in 
the interest of progress and for the good of humanity. 

"Since the ultimatum 2 of Austria opened a crisis which threat- 
ened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in 
recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and modera- 
tion. 

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, 
which has not been peaceful and conciliatory. 

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, 
in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to 
the last moment, supreme efforts 3 to avert the war now about to 
break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire 
will have to bear before history. ( I r nanimous ami repeated applause. I 

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies ' were 

i Cf. note to French Yellow Books No. 136, also ib. No. 139, both of August 13; also 
Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August •!. 

- Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8 under 'late of July 22. 

■ Srr i in- discussion of t lust- efforts in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters 
on the French Yellow Book. 

'Since Km.-m.-i was the only other ally of France at this time, this includes Great 
Britain, although the time limit of her ultimatum had not expired when this speech 
was delivered. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Hook No. 58, same day. Even more 
important is the time reference here. August 1, implying that France considered Great 
Britain an allv even then in spite of the fact that the British Government had repeatedly 
denied that an alliance existed between them and France. Cf. below, note 7. 



August 4, French Yellow Book No. 158 445 

publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been 
begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peace- 
ful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she 
has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously in- 
sulted the noble Belgian nation {loud and unanimous applause), our 
neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon 
us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. {Fresh 
and repeated unanimous applause.) 

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she 
was prepared ; 1 and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant 
covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen 
behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodi- 
cally completed. 

"Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies 
with her maternal thought {loud applause) has risen eager to defend 
the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. ( / r nanimous and 
repeated applause.) 

"The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling 
of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admira- 
tion and confidence of every Frenchman {loud and prolonged applause). 

" Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere 
with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the 
crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know 
how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthu- 
siasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and 
is the best guarantee of victory {applause). 

" In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her 
side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded 
by nations any more than by individuals {loud and unanimous 
applause). 

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will 
break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined 
together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, 
and in a common patriotic faith {loud ami prolonged applause ami 
cries of ' Vive la France'). 

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally {loud and unanimous 
applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship 2 of Great Britain 
(loud and unanimous applause). 

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy 
and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands 
before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason {loud and re- 
peated applause). 'Ilaut les cceurs et vive la France I' (unanimous 
and prolonged applause). 

"Raymond Poincark." 

1 Much injustice has been done to France by her pro-allies friends who have claimed 
that France was unprepared. 

2 Cf. above, note 6. Here, but not there, a distinction is made between the re- 
lations of France with Russia and those with Great Britain. 



■44(i Official Diplomatic Documents 

French Yellow Book No. 159 

Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, /'resident of the Council in tlie 
Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1014- 

(Journal Offieiel, August 5, 191 4-) 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council. 

Gentlemen, 

The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us 
of the existence of a state of war. 

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events 
which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and 
compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against 
an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calcu- 
lated unexpectedness. 

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were 
notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose 
origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and 
before the opinion of the civilised world. 

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro- 
Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their 
lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade. 

The majority of the Powers were only semiofficially informed 
of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular 
which the press has published. 

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum 
delivered the evening before to Servia, by the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Belgrade. 

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian 
subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the 
official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It 
demanded a reply from Servia by G o'clock on the evening of Satur- 
day, July 25th. 

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, 1 without 
doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwith- 
standing their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared 
that she submitted to them almost without reserve. 2 

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary 
a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the 
advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Rus- 
sia and Great Britain. 3 

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro- 

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Rod Book No. 31, July 27, where Sazonof "found seven of 
the ten points admissible without very ureal difficulty; only the two points . . . 
seemed to him to he unacceptable in their present form," etc. 

- Cf. Introductory remarks to the despatches of July 20. 

3 Cf. the despatches of July 21, 25, 26 where it is pointed out that no such advice 
was actually given. 



August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 4A7 

Hungarian demands had been concealed ' from the Chanceries of 
the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro- 
Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance 
that their claims would be extremely moderate. 

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets 
of Paris, St. Petersburgh and London learned on 26th July that the 
Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, 
declared that the Servian reply was inacceptable, and broke off 
diplomatic relations. 

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 
24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs a note verbale 2 asserting that the Austro-Servian 
dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great 
Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. 
A similar demarche was made on Saturday, the 25th, 3 at London and 
at St. Petersburgh. 4 

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the 
threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris 
and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple 
Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia 
to submit ? 5 

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the Ger- 
man demarche, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies 6 and 
our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to 
join in it. 

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that 
our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin. 

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria- 
Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right 
to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, 
she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the com- 
promises suggested by the other Powers. 7 

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. 
This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs 
brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days 
before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire 
for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement 8 of Servia. 

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the inde- 
pendence of a brave people, but the balance of power 9 in the Bal- 

1 France knew of them before Austria-Hungary published them, French Yellow 
Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19. 

2 French Yellow Book No. 28, Julv 24. 

3 This is a mistake. See British Blue Book No. 9, July 24. 

4 Russian Orange Book No. 8, also July 24. 
6 See note 3, p. 446. 

6 Note the plural which seems to include Great Britain. 

7 For the error of this view see the French despatches of those days, and the dis- 
cussion of them in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French 
Yellow Book. 

8 Cf. Austria-Hungary's promise not to annex Serbian territory nor to touch the 
sovereignty of Serbia. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 

9 This was the question which interested Russia most; cf. British Blue Book 
No. 17, July 25, last paragraph. 



448 Official Diplomatic Documents 

kans, embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and consecrated 
by the moral support of all the great Powers. 

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its 
constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of 
Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, 
the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them. 

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action 1 by the 
Four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was 
intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring 
about an equitable adjustment of the dispute. 

On Wednesday, the 29th, 2 the Russian Government, noting the 
persistent failure of these efforts, and faced by the Austrian mobi- 
lisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of 
Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of 
four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along 
the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively. 

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to in- 
form the German Government that their measures, restricted as 
they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, 
were not in any degree directed against Germany. 

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the 
German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this 
without demur. 

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with 
the adherence of Russia, and the support of France, to bring Austria 
and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were 
encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the 
diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof. 

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that 
there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. 
Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become 
a certainty. 

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours 
later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July 
Germany, by proclaiming "a, state of danger of war," 3 cut the com- 
munications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained 
for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute 
secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could 
justify. 

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, 
Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace 
footing to a war footing. 4 

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the 
expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had 

1 (.'f. the Introductory Remarks to the despatches of these days, and the letter 
from the Belgian Minister in Petrograd printed under date of July 30. 

L ' \< rding to the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, the Russian 

mobilisation was decided upon five days before, i.e. July 25. 

' Viviani entirely omits to mention that this was the result of Russia's order of 
general mobilisat 

* There is im c-vulrnre for this statement. 



August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 44'J 

confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same 
clay she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. 
On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures prepara- 
tory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisi- 
tions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the 
summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were 
distant from the frontier had been brought up to it. 1 

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave 
us in doubt of German's intentions? 

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the Ger- 
man Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any 
active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, 2 addressed 
an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that 
Russia had ordered a general mobilisation 3 of her armies, and de- 
manded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours. 

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because 
a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement 
at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor 
for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request 
of England 4 and with the knowledge of Germany, 5 the Russian Gov- 
ernment was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the 
foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute 
and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of 
military operations and of military preparations. 

The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia was sup- 
plemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France ; 
the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and tele- 
phone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the 
frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent 
way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this 
frontier. 

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the 
sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative 
continued to shower upon us {hear, hear). 

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the 
"state of danger of war." 

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and 
that transport was being collected even for those army corps which 
were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier. 

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful 
and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the 
measures of precaution which the situation required; the general 
mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered. 

1 There is no evidence for these statements, all of which seem to be disproved 
by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani acknowledges that Germany 
had taken, up to then, no steps for even partial mobilisation, for if she had, it would 
have been impossible to urge Russia not to take any measures which "may offer to Ger- 
many a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." 

2 This is disproved by the despatches of those days. 

3 No excuse for the general Russian mobilisation is offered. 
1 British Blue Book No. 132, August 1, and note 

6 No evidence for this statement has been published. 
2c 



450 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting l for the 
acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the English propo- 
sal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia. 

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the 
extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful 
declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance 
of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier 
;it three different points. 

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guar- 
anteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, 
they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause 
for a protest by the Luxemburg Government. 

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The 
German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented 
to the Belgian 'Government an ultimatum 2 requesting facilities in 
Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying 
pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian 
Government refused, and declared 3 that they were resolved to 
defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France 
and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. 
( I ' niuii limits mill 'prolonged applause.) 

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, 
multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our fron- 
tier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and 
( 'ustoms officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday 4 
a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Luneville. 5 

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great 
Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express 
his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening 
to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a 
state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile 
acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel 
district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. 
This is the letter 6 which he handed to me on the subject : — 

" M. le President, 

"The German administrative and military authorities have 
established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on 
German territory by French military aviators. Several of these 
have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the 
territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings 
near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one 
has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Xuremburg. 



1 Because the time limit had expired. 

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 
; Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. 
' Belgian Gray Book, August 3. 

6 For a similar charge made !>y Germain' against France, see Belgian Gray Book, 
No. 21, August 3. Since the interview there mentioned took place at 1.3U a.m. the 
French attacks there mentioned must have taken place on August 2. 

6 French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3. 



August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 451 

" I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency 
that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire 
considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the 
acts of this latter Power. 

"At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowl- 
edge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain 
French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them 
if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity. 

" My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only re- 
mains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to fur- 
nish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suit- 
able to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, 
as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German 
Consulate General in Paris. 

"Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of 
my deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen." 

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pre- 
texts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has 
any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French 
aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany 
any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice 
to these wretched inventions. (Loud and unanimous applause.) 

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and 
all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary 
steps ; they arc being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness. 

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remark- 
able vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm (unanimous and pro- 
longed applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian 
army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion 
and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence 
of their country. (Renewed loud and unanimous applause.) 

The entire British fleet is mobilised x and orders have been given 
to mobilise the land forces. 2 (Loud, cheers, all the deputies rising to 
their feet.) 

Since 1912 3 pourparlers had taken place between English and 
French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters 
between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these 
letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the 
consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the con- 
tents of these two documents. 

My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval 
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 

1 And had been mobilised since July 24. See French Yellow Book No. 6(5, July 27. 
" No date is given for this order, nor is it mentioned in the British Blue Book. 
3 This is an error. The letters referred to were of 1912, but these pourparlers had 
been taking place for years previous. See first line of first letter below. 



452 Official Diplomatic Document* 

understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to 
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation 
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- 
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency 
that lias not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had 
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, 
it might become essential to know whether it could in that event 
depend upon the armed resistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect 
an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threat- 
ened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both Governments should r to prevent aggression 

and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- 
pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the 
plans of the General Stall's would at once be taken into consideration, 
and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given 
to them. 

Yours, etc., 

E. Grey. 

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 
23rd November, 1912: — 

Dear Sir Edward, Loudon, November 23, 1912. 

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, 
that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of 
France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time 
to time; that it had always been understood that these consulta- 
tions should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide 
in the future whether they should lend each other the support of 
their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between 
experts were not and should not be considered as engagements bind- 
ing our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, 
however, 1 had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two 
Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on 
the part of a third Power, it would become essenl ial to know whether 
h could count on the armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, 
in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to 
ither an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event 
threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately 
examine with the other the question whether both Governments 
should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or pre- 
serve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the 
measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those 



August ,' t , French Yellow Book No. 159 453 

measures involved action, the two Governments would take into 
immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would 
then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. 

Yours, etc., 

Paul Cambon. 

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs spoke ' of France amidst the applause of the members in a 
noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already 
found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen {loud and unani- 
mous applause). I wish in the name of the Government of the 
Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their 
cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in 
this sentiment (renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause). 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the 
following declaration : 2 

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the 
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of 
attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing 
French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order 
to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a, way that 
from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state 
of war." 

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and 
western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, the 
the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to 
justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, how- 
ever, to make clear the conclusion to lie drawn from my story and 
to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France 
is the victim. 

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired 3 
to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war 
which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France 
was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom 
we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of 
friendship (unanimous applause), by the intervention of Russia and 
of Great Britain (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising f<> their 
feet). 

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national 
forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly 
adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which 
even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose 
upon Europe. 

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, 4 a guarantee 
of the liberty and dignity of all. 

1 No date is here given. It was August 3. See Sir E. Grey's speech of that date. 

2 For the wording of this declaration which is different from that published in the 
British Blue Book see French Yellow Book Xos. 137, August 2 ; and 143, August 3 and 
notes. 

3 Germany has always denied this desire. 

* A noteworthy reference to this bugbear of European politics. 



454 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Gentleman, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me 
that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally 
ratified in 1 ( ,)04 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward 
VII of England and the Government of the Crown {applause), this 
is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring 
stroke. 

Germany can reproach us with nothing. 

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which 
( rermany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice 
(loud and unanimous applause). 

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 
1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in 
Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911. 1 

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the 
events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis. 

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with 
her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germanj formu- 
lated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still 
were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion. 

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day 
in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked 
by surprise (prolonged applause). 

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain 
is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty 
to which nations, as well as individuals, arc subject ; Italy with that 
clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that 
she proposes to preserve neutrality (prolonged applause, all the deputies 
rising t<> their feet). 

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I 
made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Charge 
d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the 
two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a 
common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another 
(renewed applause). 

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it 
is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente 
has regained in the balance of power 2 for the service of peace. The 
object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies 
and her friends, are proud to defend (loud applause). 

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in 
dispute, ami all the rest is but a pretext. 

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done 
evenihing to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend 
herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet 
declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between 
the two countries. (Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) 

1 For France's attitude toward Germany as it appears from the despatches of the 
French Yellow Book, see the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the 
French Yellow Book. 

2 See above. 



August 4, British Blue Book No. 153 455 

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is 
wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows 
how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago 
to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ; 
a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence 
of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on- 
lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been pre- 
paring with the greatest calmness and method. We are without 
reproach. We shall be without fear. (Loud applause, all the depu- 
ties rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable 
circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she 
fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (applause). 

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who arc our judges, 
we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, 
the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have 
done our duty (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet). 

Rene Viviani. 

Great Britain : 

To Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 153 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal i to His Majesty 
the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the 
following terms : — 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship 
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England 
in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your 
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German 
Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note 2 
proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian 
territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity 
of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, 
threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An 
answer was requested within twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused 3 this 
as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this vio- 
lation of a treaty 4 to which Germany is a party in common with 
themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2.5, August 3. 

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. 

* Cf. Sir E. Grey's despatch, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, August 4. 



456 Official Diplomatic Documents 

upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality 
will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate 
reply. 

From Brussels 

British Blue Book No. 154 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
( Received August 4-) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- 

German Minister has this morning addressed note ' to Minister 
for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined 
the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial 
Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to 
carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered 
indispensable in view of the French menaces. 

To Brussels 
British Blue Book No. 155 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1014- 

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied 
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His 
Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in 
their power, 2 and that His Majesty's Government will support them 
in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in 
this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offer- 
ing to the Belgian Government at once common action for the pur- 
pose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaran- 
tee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 156 
Sir Edward drey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 191 4- 

1 CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as 
to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other 
German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities 
is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international 

i Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 

2 This is in reply to the appeal for "diplomatic intervention," see British Blue 
Book No. L53, same day, and notes to Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and No. 3S, 

August 4. 



August 4, British Blue Book No. 159 457 

law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial 
Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British 
ships if such release has not yet been given. 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 157 ' 

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky , German Ambassador 
in London. — (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4-) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914- 

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the 
British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating 
most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed 
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, 
annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out 
by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to 
respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably 
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial 
acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey 
that German army could not be exposed to French attack across 
Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable 
information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neu- 
trality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French 
advance. 

From Brussels 

British Blue Book No. 158 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 4-) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4> 1914- 

Military attache has been informed at War Office that German 
troops have entered Belgian territory, 2 and that Liege has been sum- 
moned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were 
repulsed. 

To Berlin 
British Blue Book No. 159 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914- 

We hear that Germany has addressed note 3 to Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com- 

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. 

2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 



458 Official Diplomatic Documents 

pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures con- 
sidered indispensable. 

We are also informed x that Belgian territory has been violated at 
Gemmenieh. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany 
declined 2 to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France 
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin 
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory 
reply to it and to my telegram of this morning 3 be received here by 
ll' o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your 
passports, and to say that His .Majesty's Government feel bound to 
take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium 
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party 
as ourselves. 

Serbia : 

From Nish 

Serbian Blue Book No. 49 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' 'Affaires at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914. 

Please inform the Imperial Government that you have received 
instructions to leave 4 Germany, together with the staffs of the Lega- 
tion and Consulate. You should leave immediately. 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 

2 British Blue Book No. 122, under date of August 1. 

3 British Blue Book No. 153. same date. 

4 This was a natural order, because Austria-Hungary was at war with Serbia, and 
( iermany was the former's ally. The diplomatic documents do not contain the dec- 
laration of war between Germany and Serbia. 



August 5, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 59 



459 



Wednesday, August 5, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 


Petrograd 





Belgium 


Ministers at Entente 


London, Berlin, Mad- 




Capitals 


rid 




All Representatives 


Paris, The Hague 




abroad 


British Minister 




' Madrid 




France 


President's message 
Viviani's speech 


Luxemburg 


Germany 








Great Britain 








Russia 








Serbia 









Austria-Hungary sends note to her Ambassador in Russia declaring war on 
Russia. 

Belgium protests against the invasion of her territory to all "Countries having 
Diplomatic Relations" with her. 

France joins Great Britain and Russia in declaring their willingness to co- 
operate "in the defence of Belgian territory." 

Germany requests the departure from Luxemburg of the Entente Ministers. 

Great Britain declares war on Germany as of 11 a.m., and informs Belgium that 
she considers "joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force." 

Russia declares her willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain 
"in the defence of Belgian territory." 

Austria-Hungary : 

To St. Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 59 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. 

(Translated from the French.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1.914- 

I ask Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 

"On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excel- 
lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — 

" In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the 
conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia ; and 
of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabi- 
net, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities 
against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war 
with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at 
war with Russia from the present moment." 

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that pass- 
ports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the 



460 Official Diplomatic Documents 

entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who 
are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being fur- 
nished with his passport by us. 

Belgium : 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 41 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Damgnon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914- 

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain 
has informed her that a state of war existed between the two coun- 
tries as from 11 o'clock. 

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian' Gray Book No. 42 

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914- 

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, 1 Belgium 
appealed - to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre- 
sentatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the 
defence of her territory. 

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places. 

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh 
Belgian Gray Book No. 43 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 

Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. 
Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to in- 
form you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter- 
national relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added 
that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, 
whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal 
to the guarantee of the Powers. 

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British 
Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated 
to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed 
to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, 
was cancelled for the time being. 3 (See No. 37.) 

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4. 

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 

3 This paragraph is not clear. What had Sir E. Grey's offer, Belgian Gray Book 
No. 37, or its cancellation, ib. No. 39, to do with the decision of the Cabinet? 



August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 44 461 

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti- 
tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Ger- 
many a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian 
territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During 
the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great 
Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brus- 
sels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) 

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, 
and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of 
her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ- 
ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the 
defence of her fortified places. 

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received. 

To the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic 
Relations with Belgium. 

Belgian Gray Book No. 44 

M. Davignon, Belgian. Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Heads of Missions in all Countries l having Diplomatic Relations 
with Belgium. 

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

By the treaty of April 18th, 1S39, Prussia, France, Great Britain, 
Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty 
concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty 
runs : " Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually 
neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she 
has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, 2 she has 
neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neu- 
trality to be respected. 

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with 
deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing 
Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the 
obligations undertaken by treaty. 

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage 
against international law provoked by no act of ours. 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all 
the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, 
and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague 
Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral 
Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power 
repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be 
considered as a hostile act. 

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with 

1 This includes the United States. 

2 This is denied by Germany in view of the Brussels documents which show that 
Belgium had given her military secrets to Great Britain. 



462 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excel- 
lency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at 
once you should make the communication in question in writing. 

From Berlin 

Belgian Gray Book No. 45 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1014- 

I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow 
morning for Holland with the staff of the legation. 

From Madrid 

Belcia.v Gray Book No. 4G 

Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 101 4- 

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian in- 
terests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions 
to their Ambassador at Berlin. 

(See No. 33.) 

From Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 47 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Sir, Paris, August .7, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification 
of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been 
communicated to me to-day. 



Enclosure in No. 47. 
(See French Yellow Book No. 157, August 4.) 

From Loudon 

Belgian Gray Book No. 4S 

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minis- 
ter at Brussels, to M . Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Bri- 
tannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to 



August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 52 463 

resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified bv the Treaty 
of 1839. 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 49 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914- 

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of 
guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The 
British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the pro- 
visioning of Antwerp. 

From The Hague 
Belgian Gray Book No. 50 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914- 

The war buoying is about to be established. 

(See No. 29.) 

To Madrid 

Belgian Gray Book No. 51 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, 
Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914- 

Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of 
the Belgian Government. 

(See No. 46.) 

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 52 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian 
Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me 
of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, 
and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian terri- 
tory. 



464 Official Diplomatic Documents 

France : 

From Luxemburg 

French Yellow Book No. 156 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August 5, 1014- 

The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morn- 
ing, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in 
order to notify me that the German military authorities required my 
departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force 
M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and 
it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this 
communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force 
was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going 
to bring me written proof of this. 

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I 
had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked 
him ti i be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised 
to do. 

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (En- 
closure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the 
declaration which I had made the evening before, according to tele- 
graphic instructions of M. Viviani. 

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Lega- 
tion and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of 
the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on 
the subject of mv departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and 
III.) 

At the same time he told me that he had informed Ilerr von Buch 
that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the pro- 
tection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and 
the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my Ger- 
man colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this 
responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister 
of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her 
Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not 
in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances 
clearly indicated that it should lie the Luxemburg Government which 
should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen 
did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to 
him. 

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave 
quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as lie said, 
would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German 
military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached 
too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it 
and that he hail nothing to fear. 



August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 465 

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as pos- 
sible, was fixed for two o'clock ; it was at the same time understood 
that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. 
Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment 
at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take 
care that I received it in good time. 

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. 
Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of 
me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the 
Chancery. 

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and 
that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Manners and Arlon 
roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the 
Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car. 

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road 
which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone. 

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text 
of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my 
post (Enclosure IV.). Mollard. 



Enclosure I 

M. Eyschen, Minister of Stale, President of the Government, to M. 
Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary at Luxemburg. 

Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914- 

In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excel- 
lency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accord- 
ance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Re- 
public intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the viola- 
tion of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind 
as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by 
the care for her defence and her interests. 

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the 
Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third 
Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible. 

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact. 

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary 
occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions. 

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will 
have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times 
and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally ful- 
filled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of 
the Treaty of 1S67. I remain, etc., 

Eyschen. 
Minister of State, President of the Government. 
2b 



40(3 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Enclosure II 

Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the 
Government, to M. Mallard, French Minister, at Luxemburg. 

Sir, 

A short time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of 
the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in 
Luxemburg. 

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writ- 
ing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter. 

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment re- 
ceived from the German Minister. 

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no 
want of the respect due to your position and person. 

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret 
and my deep regard. Eyschen. 



Enclosure III 
To His Excellency the Minister of State, Ih. Eyschen, 

Your Excellency, 

In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General 
Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request 
the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as 
possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military 
authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of 
placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the 
last extremity of proceeding to his arrest. 

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to 
receive the assurance of my deepest regard. Von Buch. 



Enclosure IV 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. 
Eyschen, Minister if State, President of the Government of Luxem- 
burg. 
Sir, Luxemburg, August 4. 1914- 

I have just received your communication and I submit to force. 

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the for- 
tunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of 
justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour 
to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to 
watch over the safety of their lives and goods. 



August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 467 

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the 
Legation and the offices of the Chancery. 

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good 
enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the 
expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been 
able myself to express them to her. 

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have 
given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard. 

Armand Mollard. 



468 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Thursday, August 6, 1914 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES 



Foreign Office of 


Sent Despatches to 


Received 
Despatches from 


Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 


London 
The Hague 




The Hague 


( lermany 
Great Britain 
Russia 







Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador 


Serbia 


German Leg; 


ition 


Berlin 



Austria-Hungary presents her declaration of war to Russia. 

Belgium is informed by HaUunil of war regulations established for the naviga- 
tion of the Scheldt. 

Germany and Serbia sever diplomatic relations, and the former in so doing lays 
the entire blame for the war on Russia for having ordered general mobilisation 
just when Germany was hopeful of success in her attempt at mediation. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To London 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 60 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at Loudon. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914. 

I have received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August. 1 
I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostili- 
ties against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of 
war, hut that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards 
us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act 
against us before formally declaring war. 

Belgium : 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 53 

Jonkheer dc Wcede, Netherlands- Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August G, 1914- 

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy 
of the special edition of the Staatscourant, containing the declara- 
tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Bel- 
gium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany. 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Xo. 58, August 4. 



August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 



4G9 



Enclosure to No. 53 

Laws, Decrees, Nominations, etc. 

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies. 

(Translation.) 
The Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, 
and the Colonies, authorised to 
that effect by her Majesty the 
Queen, make known to all whom 
it may concern that the Nether- 
lands Government will observe 
strict neutrality in the war 
which has broken out between 
Great Britain and Germany, and 
Belgium and Germany, Powers 
friendly to the Netherlands, and 
that, with a view of the observ- 
ance of this neutrality, the fol- 
lowing dispositions have been 
taken : — 



Les Ministres des Affaires 
Etrangeres, de la Justice, de la 
Marine, de la Guerre et des 
Colonies, autorises a cette fin par 
Sa Majeste la Heine, portent a la 
connaissance de tous ceux que la 
chose concerne, que le Gouverne- 
ment neerlandais observera dans 
la guerre qui a eclate entre les 
Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, 
Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, 
et Belgique et Allemagne, une 
stricte neutralite, et qu'en vue de 
l'observation de cette neutralite 
les dispositions suivantes out ete 
arretees : 

Article 1 

Dans les limites du territoire 
de l'Etat, comprenant le territoire 
du Royaume en Europe, outre 
les colonies et possessions dans 
d'autres parties du monde, aucun 
genre d'hostilites n'est permis et 
ce territoire ne peut servir de base 
pour des operations hostiles. 



Article 2 

Ni l'occupation d'une partie 
quelconque du territoire de l'Etat 
par un belligerant, . ni le passage 
a travers ce territoire par voie de 
terre par des troupes ou des con- 
vois de munitions appartenanta 
un des belligerants ne sont permis 
non plus que le passage a travers 
le territoire situe a l'interieur des 
eaux territoriales neerlandaises 
par des navires de guerre ou des 
batiments des belligerants as- 
similes a ceux-ci. 



Article 1 

Within the limits of the terri- 
tory of the State, including the 
territory of the Kingdom in 
Europe and the colonies and 
possessions in other parts of the 
world, no hostilities of any kind 
are permitted, neither may this 
territory serve as a base for 
hostile operations. 

Article 2 

Neither the occupation of any 
part of the territory of the State 
by a belligerent nor the passage 
across this territory by land is 
permitted to the troops or con- 
voys of munitions belonging to 
the belligerents, nor is the pas- 
sage across the territory situated 
within the territorial waters of 
the Netherlands by the warships 
or ships assimilated thereto of 
the belligerents permitted. 



470 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



Article 3 

Les troupes ou lt-s militaires, 
appurtenant aux belligerants ou 
destines a ceux-ci et arrivant sur 
le territoire de l'Etat par voie 
de terre seront immediatement 
desarmes et internes jusqu'a la 
fin de la guerre. 

Les navires de guerre oil bati- 
ments assimiles a ces derniers, 
appartenant a, un belligerant, qui 
contreviendront aux prescriptions 
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront 
quitter ce territoire avant la fin 
de la guerre. 



Article 3 

Troops or soldiers belonging to 
the belligerents or destined for 
them arriving in the territory of 
the State by land will be imme- 
diately disarmed and interned 
until the termination of the war. 

Warships or ships assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent, 
who contravenes the provisions of 
articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be per- 
mitted to leave the said territory 
until the end of the war. 



Article 4 

Les navires de guerre ou bati- 
ments assimiles a, ces derniers, 
cpii appartiennent a un belli- 
gerant, n'auront pas acces an 
territoire de l'Etat. 



Article 4 

No warships or ships assimi- 
lated thereto belonging to any of 
the belligerents shall have access 
to the said territory. 



Article 5 

La disposition de l'article 4 
n'est pas applicable : 

1° aux navires de guerre ou 
batiments d'un belligerant assi- 
miles a ces derniers, et cpii par 
suite d'avarie ou de l'etat de la 
mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un 
des ports ou rades de l'Etat. Les 
navires pourront quitter les dits 
ports ou rades des que les circon- 
stances qui les ont contraints de 
s'y refugier auront cesse d'exister ; 

2° aux navires de guerre ou 
batiments assimiles, appartenant 
a un belligerant, et qui font escale 
dans un port ou une rade situes 
dans le territoire des colonies et 
possessions d'cutre-mer, exclu- 
sivement dans le but de completer 
leur provision de denrees alimen- 
taires ou de combustibles. Ces 
navires devront repartir des que 
les eirconstances qui les ont forces 



Article 5 

The provisions of article 4 do 
not apply to : — 

1. Warships or ships assimi- 
lated thereto which are forced to 
enter the ports or roadstead of 
the State on account of damages 
or the state of the sea. Such 
ships may leave the said ports or 
roadsteads as soon as the circum- 
stances which have driven them 
to take shelter there shall have 
ceased to exist. 

2. Warships or ships assimi- 
lated thereto belonging to a bel- 
ligerent which anchor in a port 
or roadstead in the colonies or 
oversea possessions exclusively 
with the object of completing 
their provision of foodstuffs or 
fuel. These ships must leave as 
soon as the circumstances which 
have forced them to anchor shall 
have ceased to exist, subject to 



August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 



471 



a faire escale ont cesse d'exister, 
avec cette condition que le sejour 
en rade ou dans le port ne pourra 
durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ; 
3° aux navires de guerre ou 
batiments assimiles, appartenant 
a un belligerant, et qui sont 
utilises exclusivement pour une 
mission religieuse, scientifique, ou 
humanitaire. 



the condition that their stay in 
the roadstead or port shall not 
exceed twenty-four hours. 

3. Warships or ships assimi- 
lated thereto belonging to a bel- 
ligerent employed exclusively on 
a religious, scientific, or human- 
itarian mission. 



Article 6 

Les navires de guerre ou bati- 
ments assimiles appartenant a 
un belligerant, ne peuvent reparer 
leurs a varies dans les ports ou 
rades de l'Etat qu'en tant que 
cette reparation est indispensable 
a, la securite de la navigation, et 
ils ne pourront en aucune facon 
accroitre leurs capacites de 
combat. 



Article 6 

Warships or ships assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent 
may only execute such repairs in 
the ports and roadsteads of the 
State as are indispensable to 
their seaworthiness, and they 
may in no way increase their 
fighting capacities. 



Article 7 

Les navires de guerre ou bati- 
ments assimiles, appartenant a 
un belligerant, et qui, au com- 
mencement de la guerre, se trou- 
veraient sur le territoire de l'Etat, 
sont tenus de le quitter dans les 
vingt-quatre heures de la publi- 
cation de la presente. 



Article 7 

Warships or ships assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent 
who may at the commencement 
of war be within the territory of 
the State must leave within 
twenty-four hours from the mo- 
ment of the publication of this 
declaration. 



Article 8 

Si des navires de guerre ou 
batiments assimiles appartenant 
a divers belligerants se trouvent 
en meme temps, dans les con- 
ditions visees a l'article 5, dans 
une meme partie du monde, et 
sur le territoire de l'Etat, un delai 
d'au moins vingt-quatre heures 
doit s'ecouler entre le depart des 
navires de chacun des belli- 
gerants. A moins de circon- 
stances speciales, l'ordre de de- 
part est determine par l'ordre 



Article 8 

If warships or ships assimilated 
thereto belonging to different bel- 
ligerents find themselves at the 
same time, in the conditions set 
forth in article 5, in the same part 
of the world and within the terri- 
tory of the State, a delay of at 
least twenty-four hours must 
elapse between the departure of 
each respective belligerent ship. 
Except in special circumstances, 
the. order of departure shall be 
determined by the order of arrival. 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



d'arrivee. Un navire tie guerre 
ou un batiment assimile, appar- 
tenant a un belligerant, ne peut 
quitter le territoire <le l'Etat que 
vingt-quatre heures apres le 
depart d'un navire de commerce 
portant le pavilion de l'autre 
belligerant. 



A warship or ship assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent 
may only leave the territory of 
the State twenty-four hours after 
the departure of a merchant ship 
which flies the flag of another 
belligerent. 



Article 9 

Les navires de guerre ou bati- 
ments assimiles, appartenant a 
un belligerant, vises a 1'article 
5 et a 1'article 7, ne peuvent etre 
ravitaill6s en denrees alimentaires 
dans les ports et les rades du pays 
que dans la mesure necessaire 
pour parfaire leurs provisions 
jusqu'a la limite normale du 
temps de paix. 

De meme, ils ne peuvent 
charger de combustible que dans 
la mesure necessaire pour pouvoir 
atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils 
out encore a bord, le port le plus 
rapproehe de leur propre pays. 

Til meme batiment ne peut 
etre ravitaille a nouveau en com- 
bustible qu'a l'expiration d'une 
periode de trois mois an moins 
apres sun precedent ravitaille- 
nicnt dans le territoire de l'Etat. 



Article 9 

Warships or ships assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent 
to which articles 5 and 7 are appli- 
cable may only be provisioned 
with foodstuffs in the ports and 
roadsteads of the country to the 
extent necessary to bring their 
provisions up to the normal limit 
in time of peace. 

Similarly they can only be 
supplied with fuel to the extent 
necessary to enable them, with 
the stock they already have on 
board, to reach the nearest port 
of their own country. 

The same vessel cannot again 
be provided with Fuel until a 
period of at least three months 
shall have elapsed since it was 
last provisioned in the territory 
of the State. 



Article 10 

Une prise ne pent etre amenee 
dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle 
est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle 
tient mal la iner, qu'elle manque 
de combustible ou de denrees 
alimentaires. 

Elle doit s'eloigner des que la 
cause de son entree dans le terri- 
toire cesse d'exister. 

Si elle ne le fait pas, Pordre 
lui sera donne de partir imme- 
diatement ; en cas de refus, il 



Article 10 

A prize may only be brought 
into Dutch territory if such prize 
is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, 
or short of fuel or foodstuffs. 



Such prize must leave as soon 
as the reasons which caused her 
to enter Dutch territory cease to 
exist. 

Should such prize fail to do so, 
immediate orders shall be given 
her to leave. In the event of a 



August G, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 



473 



sera fait usage des moyens dis- 
ponibles pour liberer la prise avec 
ses officiers et son equipage et 
pour interner l'equipage place a 
bord par le belligerant qui a fait 
la prise. 



refusal, all possible means shall 
be employed to liberate the prize, 
with her officers and crew, and to 
intern the crew placed on board 
by the belligerent who has taken 
it as prize. 



Article 11 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, de former des corps 
combattants ou d'ouvrir des 
bureaux de recrutement au profit 
des belligerants. 



Article 11 

It is forbidden in State terri- 
tory, to form a corps of com- 
batants or to open recruiting 
offices on behalf of the bellig- 
erents. 



Article 12 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, de prendre du service 
a bord de navires de guerre ou de 
batiments assimiles. 



Article 12 

It is forbidden, in State terri- 
tory, to take service on board 
warships or ships assimilated 
thereto. 



Article 13 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, d'amenager, d'armer ou 
d'equiper des navires destines a 
des fins militaires an profit d'un 
belligerant, ou de fournir ou con- 
duire a un belligerant de tels 



Article 13 

It is forbidden, in State terri- 
tory, to equip, arm, or man vessels 
intended for military purposes on 
behalf of a belligerent, or to 
furnish or deliver such vessels to 
a belligerent. 



Article 14 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, de fournir des armes ou 
des munitions a des navires de 
guerre ou batiments assimiles 
appartenant a un belligerant, ou 
de leur venir en aide d'une 
maniere quelconque en vue de 
^augmentation de leur equipage 
ou de leur amenagement. 



Article 14 

It is forbidden in State terri- 
tory to supply arms or ammu- 
nition to warships or ships 
assimilated thereto belonging to 
a belligerent, or to come to their 
assistance in any manner what- 
soever with a view to augment 
their crew or their equipment. 



Article 15 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, sauf automation pre- 
alable des autorites locales com- 
petentes, de faire des reparations 



Article 15 

It is forbidden in State terri- 
tory failing previous authorisa- 
tion by the competent local au- 
thorities, to repair warships or 



474 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



aux navires de guerre on bati- 
inents assimiles appartenant a 
un belligerant, ou cle leur fournir 
des provisions de bouche ou de 
combustible. 



ships assimilated thereto belong- 
ing to a belligerent, or to supply 
them with victuals or fuel. 



Article 16 

II est interdit, sur le territoire 
de l'Etat, de eooperer au degree- 
ment ou a, la reparation de prises, 
sauf en ce qui est neeessaire pour 
les rendre propres a tenir la mer ; 
ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou 
des marchandises confisquees, et 
de les recevoir en echange, en 
don ou en depot. 



Article 16 

It is forbidden in State terri- 
tory to take part in the dis- 
mantling or repairing of prizes 
except in so far as is necessary to 
make them seaworthy ; also to 
purchase prizes or confiscated 
goods, and to receive them in 
exchange, in gift, or on deposit. 



Article 17 

Le territoire de l'Etat comprend 
la mer cotiere sur une largeur de 
3 milles marins a raison de 60 par 
degre de latitude, a partir de la 
laisse de la basse mer. 

En ce qui concerne les baies 
eette distance de 3 milles marins 
est mesuree a partir d'une ligne 
droite tiree a travers la baie aussi 
pros que possible de l'entree, au 
point ou l'ouverture de la baie ne 
depasse pas 10 milles marins, a 
raison de 60 par degre de latitude. 



Article 17 

The State territory comprises 
the coastal waters to a distance 
of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 
(ill to the degree of latitude, from 
low-water mark. 

As regards inlets, this distance 
of 3 nautical miles is measured 
from a straight line drawn across 
the inlet at the point nearest the 
entrance where the mouth of the 
inlet is not wider than 10 nautical 
miles, reckoning 60 to the degree 
of latitude. 



Article 18 

En outre, 1'intention est attiree 
sur les articles 100, 1°, et 205 du 
Code penal; Indisch Staats- 
blad, 1905, No. 62; Art. 7, 4°, 
de la loi sur la qualite de Neer- 
landais et sur le domicile 
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1892, 
No. 268; 1910, No. 216); 
art. 2, No. .3, de la loi sur la 
qualite de sujet neerlandais 
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910, 
No. 55 ; Indisch Staatsblad, 
1910, No. 296; art. 54 et 55 



Article IS 

Further, attention is called to 
Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 
of the Penal Code; Indisch 
Staatsblad, 1905, No. 62; Ar- 
ticle 7, Section 4, of the Law 
respecting the status of Nether- 
lands nationality, and respecting 
domicile (Nederlandsch Staats- 
blad, 1892, No. 268; 1910, 
No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of 
the Law respecting the sta- 
tus of Netherlands nationality 
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910, 



Angus! 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 54 



du Code penal de Suriname ; 
art. 54 et 55 du Code penal de 

Curacao). 



De meme, Pattention des com- 
mandants de navires, armateurs 
et affreteurs, est attiree sur le 
danger et les inconvenients, aux- 
quels ils s'exposeraient en ne 
respectant pas le blocus effect if 
des belligerants, en transportant 
de la contrebande de guerre ou 
des depeches militaires pour les 
belligerants (a moins qu'il ne 
s'agisse du service postal regulier) 
ou en executant pour eux d'autres 
services de transport. 

Quiconque se rendrait coupable 
d'actes prevus ei-dessus, s'ex- 
poserait a toutes les consequences 
de ces actes, et ne pourrait 
obtenir a, cet egard aucune pro- 
tection ni intervention du Gou- 
vernement neerlandais. 



No. 55 ; Indiseh Staatsblad, 
1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 
55 of the Penal Code of Suri- 
nam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the 
Penal Code of Curacoa). 

Similarly, the attention of com- 
manding officers, owners, and 
charterers of ships is called to 
the dangers and inconveniences 
to which they would expose 
themselves by disregarding the 
effective blockade of belligerents, 
by carrying contraband of war, 
or military despatches for bel- 
ligerents (except in the course 
of the regular postal service), or 
by rendering them other trans- 
port services. 

Any person guilty of the acts 
aforesaid would expose himself to 
all the consequences of those acts 
and would not be able, as regards 
them, to obtain any protection or 
intervention on the part of the 
Netherlands Government. 



To the Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. "it 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914- 

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands 
Government : — 

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment 
of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands 
Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation. 

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 
30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that 
the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath. 

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands 
Crovernment, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in 
the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen 
and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel. 



476 Official Diplomatic Documents 

(See No. 50.) 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 55 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 191 4- 

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long- 
as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will he replaced. The exchange 
<it pilots at Hansweert is easier and hetter organised. Are you par- 
ticularly anxious to have Bath? 

France : 

From Copenhagen 

French Yellow Book No. 155 

}L Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Douinergue, Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs. 

Copenhagen, August G, 1914- 

The French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to 
your Excellency the following telegram : — 

I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. 
I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the 
staff of the Embassy and the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Darm- 
stadt with his family. The treatment which we have received is of 
such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete 
report on it to your Excellency by telegram. 

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in ac- 
cordance with your instructions, addressed to Ilerr von Jagow a 
protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory 
by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr 
von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged 
had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Co- 
blenz by French aviators, who according to his statement "had 
come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest in- 
formation as to the facts to which he attached so much importance 
and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part 
I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him 
with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the 
German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet 
read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention 
to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detach- 
ments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten 
kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a 
French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my 
opinion of this act I added : "You will admit that under no circum- 



August 6, French Yellow Book No. 155 477 

stances could there be any comparison between this and the flight 
of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons 
animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are 
distinguished. 

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour 
by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an 
importance of quite a different nature." 

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the 
facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was diffi- 
cult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled 
with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face 
to face on either side of the frontier. 

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in 
front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window 
of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. 
I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end. 

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von 
Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive 
orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive 
yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any 
anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties 
would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were 
not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another 
after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me 
anticipate what was in store for me. 

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to 
make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last 
opportunity that I should have of seeing him. 

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out 
this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could 
not fail to be painful. 

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my 
passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to 
the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to 
travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should 
go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me 
a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance. 

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me 
to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration 
of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish 
Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that 
I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night. 

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr 
von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came 
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff 
of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order 
was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse 
to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to 
send our meals to the Embassy. 



478 Official Diplomatic Documents 

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth 

came hack to tell me that his Government would not allow our return 
by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three 
days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced 
that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this altera- 
tion under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter 
to Herr von Langwerth: — 

" M. le Baron, Berlin, August 3, 1914- 

" I have been thinking over the route for my return to my coun- 
try about which you came to speak to me this evening. You pro- 
pose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself 
detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Govern- 
ment, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficul- 
ties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of 
trains. 

" Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government 
for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government 
will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swi>s Government will 
not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am 
accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed 
to foreigners. 

" I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me 
unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured 
that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country. 

" Jules Cambon." 

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the Ith 
August, Ilerr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that 
the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to 
this effect. 

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at 
Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house 
while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had 
been requested, was released after four hours. 

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a epiarter to five, 
Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to 
leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the even- 
ing, but that I should he taken to Denmark. On this new require- 
ment I asked if I should lie confined in a fortress supposing I did not 
comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would re- 
turn to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give 
the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused 
to depart from Germany. 1 therefore told Herr von Langwerth 
when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been 
given to me but "that 1 protested." 

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following 
is a copy : 



August 6, French Yellow Book No. 155 479 

"Sir, Berlin, August 4> 1914- 

"More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial 
Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, 
would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me 
every means of getting back to it quickly. 

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me 
access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to 
Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that 
I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the 
present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the 
intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am noth- 
ing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Lang- 
werth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise 
that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all 
possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland 
would not be closed to inc. Ilerr von Langwerth has been good 
enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy 
journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was 
necessary. 

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just an- 
nounced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of 
the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to 
take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject 
this proposal, with the approval of Ilerr von Langwerth. 

" In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. 
I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules 
of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I 
hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I 
am being treated. Jules Cambon." 

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey 
would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock 
in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a 
great assembly of foot and mounted police. 

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only repre- 
sented by an officer of inferior rank. 

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more 
than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at 
every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accom- 
panied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alesandra Regiment of the 
Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel 
Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut 
and the curtains of the carriages drawn down ; each of us had to 
remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or 
to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage 
before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, 
revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Charge 
d 'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to 
the same treatment. 



480 Official Diplomatic Documents 

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von 
Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the follow- 
ing letter to Ilcrr von Jagow. 

"Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914- 

"Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your 
Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed 
upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany. 

"To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal 
an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have 
hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference 
of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they 
went further. 

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the 
windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the 
corridors of the carriages at the doc if each compartment and fac- 
ing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the 
trigger, for nearly half an hour. 

" I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to 
the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, vio- 
lence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yester- 
day I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being 
treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dan- 
gerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which 
from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has 
been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were 
travelling with me to the frontier. Jules Cambon." 

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards 
Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me 
that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not 
pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had 
not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been 
forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest 
Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my 
companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was re- 
quired from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 
pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present 
rate of exchange. 1 

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von 
Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that 
we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I 
required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us. 

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish 
Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen. 

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, 
although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to 

1 Subsequently the sura thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the 
Spanish Ambassador to lie repaid to the French Ambassador. 



August 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 50 481 

Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Den- 
mark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I suc- 
ceed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested 
at sea with the officials who accompany me. 

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your 
Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of 
the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this 
crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services 
which on this occasion have been renderea to the Government of 
the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and 
by the Military and Naval Attaches. Jules Cambon. 



Russia : 

From Vienna 

Russian Orange Book No. 79 

Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh 

to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 {August 6), 
1914, at 6 P.M. 

On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excel- 
lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — 

(Translation.) 

"Vu l'attitude menacante "in view of the threatening 

prise par la Russie dans le con- attitude adopted by Russia in 
flit entre la Monarchie austro- the conflict between the Austro- 
hongroise et la Serbie et en Hungarian Monarchy and 
presence du fait qu'en suite de Servia ; and of the fact that, 
ce conflit la Russie d'apres une according to a communication 
communication du Cabinet de from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia 
Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les has seen fit, as a result of that 
hostilites contre l'Allemagne et conflict, to open hostilities 
que celle-ci se trouve par conse- against Germany ; and whereas 
quent en etat de guerre avec la- Germany is consequently at war 
dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hon- with Russia ; Austria-Hungary 
grie se considere egalement en therefore considers herself also 
etat de guerre avec la Russie a. at war with Russia from the 
partir du present moment." present moment." 

Serbia : 

To Berlin 

Serbian Blue Book No. 50 

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Lega- 
tion at Nish. 

Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914. 

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour 
to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war 
2i 



482 Official Diplomatic Documents 

which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that 
between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the 
Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests 
with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, 
the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor- 
dinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests 
His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Lega- 
tion. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith. 

From Berlin 

Serbian Blue Book No. 51 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d 'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24/ August 6, 1014. 

On the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. 
Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking oil' diplomatic relations, 
he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always 
cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that 
owing to the political groupement cur relations had to be broken off. 
He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop- 
ments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences 
for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — just when it ap- 
peared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided — had not 
ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been 
no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary 
in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria- 
Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of 
Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regu- 
larising the relations between Serbia and Austria. 



Friday, August 7, 1914 

Despatches published only by Belgium who suggests that the European 
war between the white races be not carried into Africa. 

To the Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No, 56 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at the Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August ?', 1914- 

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere 
thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure 
navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agree- 



August 7, Belgian Gray Book No. 58 483 

ment with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the ex- 
tent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert, 
since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots. 

To Paris and London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 57 

M. Daingnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris and London. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1911).. 

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central 
Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc- 
tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the 
French Government [British Government] whether they intend to 
proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the 
conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of 
the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that 
hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the 
Ubangi. 

To Paris and London 

Belgian Gkay Book No. 58 

M. Daingnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 

Ministers at Paris and London. 
Sir, Brussels, August 7, 191 4- 

With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour 
to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern- 
ment the following information : — 

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of 
the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the 
Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the 
Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer 
that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies. 

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, 
the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, 
not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, 
therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa- 
tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there 
will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct 
attack on their African possessions. 

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern- 
ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, 
during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the 
General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are con- 
tained in the conventional basin of the Congo. 

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at 
London (Paris). 



4S4 Official Diplomatic Documents 



Saturday, August 8, 1914 

France complains of Austro-Hungarian troops having been sent to Germany; 
and seems favorably inclined to accept the Belgian proposal that the war be not 
carried into Africa. 

Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later called Blue 
Book) Sir E. Goschen's final repoi including a description of the last interview 
with tL^ German Chancellor in which the now famous expression "a scrap of 
paper" occurs. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Paris 

Austro-Hun^ ?ian Red Book No. 61 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August S, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order 
to communicate to me that, according to positive information which 
has readied him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the 
French frontier. M. 1 )oumergue wishes to know without delay if this 
information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the 
Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany 
the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the 
views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition 
of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is 
commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency. 

Belgium : 

From Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 59 

Baron (luiUaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914. 

I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic 
with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it 
during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it 
before answering. 

M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day 
to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little 
difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he 
nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have 
already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity 
to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends 
also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear. 



August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 485 

Great Britain : 

From Berlin 

British Blue Book No. 160 1 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 
Sir, London, August S, 1014- 

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram 
of the 4th instant - 1 called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon 
and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the 
Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. 
Herr von Jagow 3 at once replied that he was sorry to say that his 
answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops 
having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had 
been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons 
why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, 
namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and 
easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations 
and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It 
was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the 
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity 
of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through with- 
out formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of 
time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up 
their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great 
German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of 
the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily 
understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether 
there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, 
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons 
he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. 

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the 
same date, 4 and, in compliance with the instructions therein con- 
tained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed 
the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could 
give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed 
no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their 
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform 
the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have 
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium 
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a 
party as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no 
other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, 
namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary 
that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave 

■This despatch was not contained in the original edition of the Blue Book. It con- 
tains Sir E. Goschen's recollections of his last t]uy in Berlin. 

2 See No. 153, August 4. 3 German Secretary of State. 4 See No. 159, August 4. 



486 Official Diplomatic Documents 

his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing 
out that you had mentioned 1 2 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's 
Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view 
of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were 
not possible even at the last moment that their answer should lie 
reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty- 
four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that 
case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took 
place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr 
von Jagow ' expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his 
entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make 
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get 
closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin 
was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that 
he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our 
engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have 
acted otherwise than they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it 
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of see- 
ing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agi- 
tated. 2 His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 
twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word — " neutrality," a word 
which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of 
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- 
sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that 
direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the 
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession 
to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had 
done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while 
lir was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great 
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I 
protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same 
way as he and Herr von Jagow l wished me to understand that for 
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to 
advance through Belgium and violate the lattcr's neutrality, so I 
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 
"life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should 
keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's 
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, 
or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great 
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will 
that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought 
of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that 
fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for break- 

1 German Secretary of State. 

- For the Chancellor's account of this interview .see his speech in the Reichstag, .Tun<' 
',, 1916 : " Sir Edward Goschen was during this interview so shaken to his depths that 
from a natural feeling of decency I have always refrained from speaking of it publicly, 
since what happened was personal and human." 



August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 487 

ing solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evi- 
dently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to 
hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further 
argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain 
joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the 
last moment he and his Government had been working with us and 
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. 
I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations 
fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had 
been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor- 
tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between 
Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to 
face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could 
not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation 
from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no 
one regretted this more than I. 

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy 
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram 
was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. 
It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched. 1 

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of 
State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the 
very friendly official and personal relations between us were about 
to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was 
equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority 
on international law as he was known to be must know as well or 
better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were 
many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, 
nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would 
have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow 2 
a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an 
answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in 
default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps 
as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann 3 said that that 
was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could 
not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any 
other night. 

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann 3 left me, a flying sheet, 
issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great 
Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result 
of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly 
mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which 
had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the 
attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice 
of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when 
the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- 
room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was 

1 This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 

! German Secretary of State. 3 German Under-Secretary of State. 



488 (Official Diplomatic Documents 

getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of 
what was happening. Herr von Jagow : at once informed the Chief 
of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great 
promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that mordent on we 
were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred. 

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow ' came to see me 
and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He 
said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more 
ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on 
the reputation of Berlin. lie said that the flying sheet circulated in 
the streets had riot been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the 
( Ihancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such 
a statement should be issued, and lie had replied, "Certainly not, 
until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that 
effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbour- 
hood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large 
force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to dis- 
turbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had some- 
how got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He 
had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by 
gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt 
sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the 
report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no 
excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared 
that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners 
in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been 
more full and complete. 

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent 
one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following mes- 
sage : — 

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his 
regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same 
time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings 
of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with 
other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also 
begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles 
of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence 
of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those 
titles." 

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by 
the manner of its delivery. 

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through 
this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow 1 
and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 1 1 o'clock 
on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which 
I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he 
had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should 
follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood 

1 German Secretary of Slate. 



August S, British Blue Book No. 160 489 

that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copen- 
hagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former 
route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I 
agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there 
would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding 
night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were 
doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, 
but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming 
letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. 
The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. 

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a 
strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter 
Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the 
station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, 
and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian 
and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say 
good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrange- 
ments ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A 
retired colonel of the Guards accompanied -the train to the Dutch 
frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great 
crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we 
stopped from insulting us ; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs 
and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to 
complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. 

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should 
like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable 
behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. 
One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and 
I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, 
naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches 
buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob 
outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice 
and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and 
feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, 
often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so 
readily and cheerfully gave to me. 

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all 
by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, 1 and his staff. Undeterred 
by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the 
mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came 
repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrange- 
ments for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated 
many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal 
risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in 
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the 
protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left 
in more efficient and able hands. j ] iavc e ^- c 

W. E. Goschen. 

1 American Ambassador in Berlin. 



490 Official Diplomatic Documents 



Sunday, August 9, 1914 

Austria-Hungary denies the participation of her troops in the war against 
France. 

Belgium receives a courteous note from Germany offering peace, the fortress of 
Liege having fallen into German hands. 

France wishes to offer to Germany the neutrality of the possessions in the 
Congo basin in Africa. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To Paris 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62 

Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Vicuna, August 0, 1914. 

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant. 1 
After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency 
to inform the French Government that the information regarding the 
participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete 
invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. 
Dumaine. 

Belgium : 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 60 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Tele-ram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914. 

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to 
convey to you the following information, the United States Minister 
at Brussels having declined to do so : — 

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave de- 
fence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody 
encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian 
( Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy 
into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she 
lias had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave 
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her 
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld 
the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, 
the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Bel- 
gian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The 
German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which 
can he reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 
70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 61. 



August 10, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 63 491 

her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such 
an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to 
evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. 
The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under- 
take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken 
it to oblige him. 

From Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 61 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, August 0, 1914- 

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the 
neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo 
and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin. 

Monday, August 10, 1914 

France breaks off diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary. 
Belgium refuses the German offer of peace. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Paris 

AlTSTRO-HlTNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 63 

Count, Szecsen to Count Berehtold. 

(Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1.914. 

I have received your telegram of the 9th August 1 and communi- 
cated at once the contents to M. I >oumergue. The Minister, who had 
received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his 
conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops arc not 
on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive informa- 
tion that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Ger- 
many, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her 
troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and 
that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of 
German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the 
Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has 
admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of 
our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is unde- 
niable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this 
is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62. 



492 Official Diplomatic Documents 

these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at 
Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna 
to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed 
me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use ; 
indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occa- 
sion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He 
offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order 
that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for 
me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, 
but that in view of the recall of M, Dumaine, I asked him to have my 
passport prepared. 

Belgium : 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 62 

Bamn Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Darignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914- 

In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 
o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. 

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left 
his room, and had handed him a document which the United States 
representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you. 

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at 
Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from 
Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in 
the interest of Germany. 

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col- 
league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of 
Mr. Whitlock's refusal. 

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by 
approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these mat- 
ters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the inter- 
mediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you. 

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did 
not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor 
chance of success in this form ; but, solely in order to oblige the 
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph 
to you immediately; and this I did yesterday. 

You will find the German document enclosed in original and 
translation. 

Enclosure 1 in No. 62. Enclosure 2 in No. 62. 

(Translation) 
Die Festung Liittich ist nach The fortress of Liege has been 
tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm ge- taken by assault after a brave 



August 10, Belgian Gray Book No. 62 



493 



nommen worden. Die Deutsche 
Regierung bedauert es auf 
das tiefste, dass es infolge der 
Stellungnahme der Belgischen 
Regierung gegen Deutschland 
zu bliitigen Zusammenstossen 
gekommen ist. Deutschland 
kommt nicht als Feind nach 
Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang 
der Verhaltnisse hat es angesichts 
der militarischen Massnahmen 
Frankreichs den schweren Ent- 
schluss fassen miissen, in Belgien 
einzuriicken und Liittich als 
Stutzpunkt f iir seine weiteren mi- 
litarischen Operationen besetzen 
zu miissen. Nachdem die Belg- 
ische Armee in heldenmutigem 
Widerstand gegen die grosse 
Uberlengenheit ihre Waffenehre 
auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat, 
bittet die Deutsche Regierung 
seine Majestat den Konig und 
die Belgische Regierung, Belgien 
die weiteren Schrecken des 
Krieges zu ersparen. Die 
Deutsche Regierung ist zu je- 
dem Abkommen mit Belgien 
bereit das sich irgendwie mit 
Riicksicht auf seine {voir piece 
No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit 
Frankreich vereinigen lasst. 
Deutschland versichert nochmals 
feierlichst, dass es nicht von der 
Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich 
Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, 
und dass ihm diese Absicht 
durchaus fern liegt. Deutsch- 
land is noch immer bereit das 
Belgische Konigreich unverzug- 
lich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs- 
lage es ihm gestattet. " Der hie- 
sige Amerikanische Botschafter 
ist mit diesem Vermittlungsver- 
such seines Briisseler Kollegen 
einverstanden." 



defence. The German Govern- 
ment most deeply regret that 
bloody encounters should have 
resulted from the Belgian Gov- 
ernment's attitude towards Ger- 
many. Germany is not coming 
as an enemy into Belgium. It is 
only through the force of cir- 
cumstances that she has had, 
owing to the military measures 
of France, to take the grave de- 
cision of entering Belgium and 
occupying Liege as a base for 
her further military operations. 
Now that the Belgian army has 
upheld the honour of its arms in 
the most brilliant manner by its 
heroic resistance to a very su- 
perior force, the German Gov- 
ernment beg the King of the 
Belgians and the Belgian Gov- 
ernment to spare ''Belgium the 
horrors of war. The German 
Government are ready for any 
compact with Belgium which can 
in any way be reconciled with 
their arrangements with France. 
(See No. 70.) Germany gives 
once more her solemn assurance 
that she has not been animated 
by the intention of appropriating 
Belgian territory for herself, and 
that such an intention is far 
from her thoughts. Germany is 
still ready to evacuate Belgium 
as soon as the state of war will 
allow her to do so. 

The United States Ambassa- 
dor here concurs in this attempt 
at mediation by his colleague in 
Brussels. 



494 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 63 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs', to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to 
them by the German Government through the intermediary of the 
Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly. 

(See Xo. 62 Enclosures.) 

To The Hague 

Belgian - Gray Book No. 04 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914- 

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinander- 
setzung," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain 
whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements 
which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis-. 
pute between France and Germany. 

To Loudon, St. Petersburgh, and Paris 

Belgian Cray Book No. i'i~> 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British, 
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 101 4. 

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian 
Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from 
the German Government. (See No. 02, Enclosure 2.) 

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply 
to this communication : — 

(Translation.) 

"La proposition que nous fait "The proposal made to us by 
It- Gouvernement allemand re- the German Government repeats 
produit la proposition qui avait the proposal formulated in their 
ete formulee dans l'ultimatum du ultimatum of August 2. Faith- 
2 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs ful to her international obliga- 
internationaux, la Belgique ne tions, Belgium can only reiterate 
peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet her reply to that ultimatum, the 
ultimatum, d'autant plus que more so as since August 3 her 



August 10, Belgian Gray Book No. 66 495 

depuis le 3 aout sa neutrality a neutrality has been violated, a 

ete violee, qu'une guerre dou- distressing war has been waged 

loureuse a ete portee sur son ter- on her territory, and the guar- 

ritoire, et que les garants de sa antors of her neutrality have 

neutralite ont loyalement et im- responded loyally and without 

mediateinent repondu a, son delay to her appeal." 
appel." 

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing 
the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents. 

To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 66 

.1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian. 
Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led 
to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg. 

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, 
on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the de- 
parture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court. 

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the 
Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : — 

"Your Excellency, "Luxemburg, August 8, 1914- 

" In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by 
Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves 
obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from 
Luxemburg. 

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count 
van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way 
that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von 
Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further 
stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except 
via Treves-Coblentz. 

(Signed) "von Buch." 

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count 
van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following 
terms : — 

"Sir, "Luxemburg, August S, 1914- 

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed 
copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the 
German military authorities demand your departure. 

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto. 

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you 



496 Official Diplomatic Documents 

to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by 
motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons 
connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you. 

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer. 

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present 

task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed 

between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under 

the best possible conditions. /L ,. ,, ,.„ 

(Signed) Lyschen. 

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal 
Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course 
they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous 
intentions towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, 
decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for request- 
ing the Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires to leave Belgium. 



Tuesday, August 11, 1914 

Austria-Hungary endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To London 

AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Kl'.l) BOOK No. G4 

Count Berchtold to ('mint Mensdorff at London. 

Vienna, August 11, 1.914- 

The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador 
here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian 
army corps lias been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible 
for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from thoseGer- 
man districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure 
of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assist- 
ance to Germany. 

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British 
Government that according to information obtained from a reliable 
source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded. 

Belgium : 

From Washington 

Belgian Gray Book No. 67 

Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 191 4- 

The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from 
Washington, conveying the information that the United States 
Government had, at the request of the German Government, con- 



August 11, Belgian Gray Book No. 69 497 

sented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the pro- 
tection of German subjects in Belgium. 

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, 
we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good 
and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection 
of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had 
with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may 
continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing. 



From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 68 

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914- 

I have telegraphed to Sir E. Gray the German communication and 
the proposed reply. 

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the 
entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The 
latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which 
the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow dis- 
cord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the 
treaties violated bv Germanv. 



From Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 69 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French 
Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the 
Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum. 

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government 
and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of 
their territory . 

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of 
Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium. 
(See No. 65) 



2k 



498 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Wednesday, August 12, 1914 

Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From London 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 65 

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 

(Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914. 

I have just received from Sir E. Grey the following communica- 
tion : — 

At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position 
to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you 
the following communication : — 

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, 
and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, 
without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French 
Republic, extended the war to France : — 

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and 
France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the con- 
flict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting 
on the side of France. 

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources 
Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances 
which amounted to a direct menace to France. 

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform 
the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures 
which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these 
threats. 

Sir E. Grey adds : — 

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the 
British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 
o'clock to-night. 

Belgium : 

From The Hague 

Belgian Grai Book No. 70 

Hanm Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 101 4. 

The German text contained a mistake: instead of "seine Aus- 
einandersetzung," it should read " Hire," and thus be translated "their 
conflict with France." 

(See Xo. 04.) 



August 13, Belgian Gray Book No. 73 499 

To The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 71 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914- 

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands 
Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats 
the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. 
Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate 
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her 
neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on 
her territority, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded 
loyally and without delay to her appeal. 

Thursday, August 13, 1914 

Belgium : 

From St. Petersburgh 

Belgian Gray Book No. 72 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, August 13, 1914. 

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, 
and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government 
feel at their firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily 
to be congratulated. 

(See No. G5.) 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 73 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914. 

I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I 
at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal. 

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication 
to the German Minister forthwith. 

(See No. 71.) 

[Of Friday, August 14, and Saturday, August 15, no despatches are published.] 



500 Official Diplomatic Document* 



Sunday, August 16, 1914 

France changes her attitude about not carrying the war into Africa. 
Serbia publishes the recollections of her former Minister in Vienna of the events 
leading up to the war. 

Belgium : 

From Paris 

Belgian Gray Book No. 74 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, August 16, 101 4. 

In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with 
M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to 
the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram 
and your despatch of the 7th instant. 

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had 
approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing 
the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given 
no answer. 

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation 
Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that 
such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims 
to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which 
she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir 
incident. 

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to 
obtain. 

(See Xos. 57 and 58.) 

Serbia : 

From, Vienna 

Serbian Blue Book No. 52 

M. Yur. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. X. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Nish, August 8/16, 1914. 

Fhom June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically 
surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under 
constant police supervision. Our movements and our communica- 
tions with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered ex- 
tremely difficult ; the attitude of the population towards the Legation 
and its staff was inclined to be menacing. 

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication 
with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity 



August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 501 

that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded 
our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now. 

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo 
outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement 
of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the 
consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs 
that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent 
indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed 
the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna 
and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magis- 
terial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began 
also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone — eventually by war. 

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the 
leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions 
were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was, in general, more 
moderate in the tone of its articles; Die Zeit; and the Arbeiter 
Zeitung. 

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, 
a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as 
it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the 
Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles 
the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out 
of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria- 
Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually 
withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange 
took place. 

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the 
reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the 
Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of 
absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly trav- 
elled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had 
had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count 
Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad. 

All the reserves which had been called out for the June manoeuvres 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the 
stipulated period. 

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment 
in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in 
order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, 
was much larger than is usually the case ; at the same time those 
whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called 
upon in ever increasing numbers. 

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers 
given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hun- 
garian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear 
in his political statements. 



502 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None 
of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They 
suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with 
the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, 
it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject ; that is to 
say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all 
apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some 
serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step 
would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magis- 
terial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection 
between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But at the same time 
it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any 
uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on 
the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, 
was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. 
Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time 
stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at 
Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. 
Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the 
intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to 
cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. 
Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn 
the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise 
should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia 
not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary 
Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating 
the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would 
only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian 
Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. 
I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the 
fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the 
intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers 
of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain faits 
accomplis which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to 
avoid a general European war. 

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively 
successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that 
period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria- 
Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke Euro- 
pean complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body 
were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time 
to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places. 

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations 
against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task 
was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Min- 
ister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of 
the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von 



August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 503 

Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even 
in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also 
co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives 
of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note 
would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be 
no inacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were pub- 
lished all of them were surprised, not to say dumfounded. 

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, 
a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its 
presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Bel- 
grade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with 
the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry fur Foreign Affairs 
— Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of 
the note. Yet Baron Macehio did not tell M. Dumaine that the 
note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in 
the newspapers on the following day. 

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 
11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to 
the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends 
both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised 
that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not 
believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by 
the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception 
of Die Zeit and Arbeiter Zeitung, and by demonstrations in the streets, 
which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution — 
a war with Serbia, of course. 

On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised 
that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was 
inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the 
Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of 
the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected 
even personal attacks upon the members of the staff. 

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian 
Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hun- 
gary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They 
disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note; 
they also declared it to be inacceptable. 

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the 
note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order 
by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Govern- 
ment officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation 
of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive 
movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Mon- 
archy," would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the 
dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, 
could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliat- 
ing to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it 
would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war 



504 Official Diplomatic Documents 

for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which 
amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded 
in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions 
without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her 
army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the 
conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria- 
Hungary had drafted such a note. 

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Charge 
d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only 
of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they 
feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, 
previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several 
occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent 
to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object 
the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the 
Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassa- 
dors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary. 

The day after the note was presented, Prince Koudacheff went to 
see ( 'ount Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, 
that the note as it stood was inaceeptable, and that Russia could 
not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold 
said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step, as her 
very existence was threatened ; that she could not withdraw nor 
alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the 
matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and 
that no other Power had any grounds for interference. 

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to 
the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms 
without the consent of the European concert. From conversations 
which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente 
— who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kind- 
ness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed 
quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt con- 
vinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, 
as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubt- 
edly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was con- 
firmed in this impression especially — and perhaps solely — by Ilerr 
von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Ilerr von 
Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, 
that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out 
her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Rus- 
sian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists, 
in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not 
disposeil at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed 
questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was 
necessary, according to Ilerr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson. 
Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was 
concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of 



August 17, Belgian Gray Book No. 75 505 

what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the 
matter. 

These statements of Herr von Tschirsky have induced many to 
hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, 
on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the 
latter had completed her military reorganisation, i.e., before the spring 
of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed ami 
even written about in Vienna. " The longer the matter is postponed 
the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." 
On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic 
sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelm- 
strasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that 
Herr von Tschirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him. 

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from 
Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of 
the brief time limit given the Serbian Government for a reply to the 
Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead 
to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to 
the whole question, but until July lo/26, when we met, his efforts 
had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, 
I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its 
form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and 
that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war 
were to be the price. 

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told 
me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, 
there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed 
conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian 
Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however, 
prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the 
Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and 
the Dual Monarchy. 



Monday, August 17, 1914 
Great Britain declines the Belgian proposal not to carry the war into Africa. 

Belgium : 

From London 

Belgian Gray Book No. 7."> 

Count ilr Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Sir, London, August 17, 1914- 

In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to 
inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Bel- 



506 Official Diplomatic Documents 

gian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in 
the conventional basin of the Congo. 

German troops from German East Africa have already taken 
the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. 
Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German 
port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have dsetroyed the wireless 
telegraphy station. 

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they 
were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of 
the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it. 

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending 
to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will 
take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native 
population. 

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of Ger- 
man activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo. 
(See Xos. .")7 and 58.) 

[Of Tuesday, and Wednesday, August 18, and 1'.), no despatches have been 
published.] 

Thursday, August 20, 1914 

Austria-Hungary receives from Japan a copy of the latter's ultimatum to Ger- 
many. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Tokio 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 66 

The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold. 

(Translated from the English.) 

My Lord, Vienna, August 20, WI4. 

Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information 
from his Excellency Baron Midler of the ci mmunication which was 
addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 
15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not 
received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excel- 
lency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the 
matter which I have received from Tokio. 

Enclosure 

The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation 
into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete 
understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose 
of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of 
Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to 



August 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67 507 

the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before pro- 
ceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have 
thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Govern- 
ment, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, 
in the following words : — 

"(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the 
waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that 
cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed. 

" (2) The German Government must unconditionally and without 
compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the 
leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for 
the purpose of handing this territory back to China. 

"The Japanese Government have informed the German Government 
that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the 
above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, 
at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them. 

" It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for 
a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German 
Government ; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a 
course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government 
will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end." 

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present 
attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the 
common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting 
peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government 
have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of terri- 
torial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. 
For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to 
respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern 
Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree. 

[Of Friday, August 21, no despatches have been published.] 



Saturday, August 22, 1914 
Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To Brussels 

AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 67 ' 

Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels. 

{Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna. August 22, 1914. 

I ask your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : — 

"I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of 

1 See Belgian Gray Book No. 77, August 2S. 



508 Official Diplomatic Documents 

your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Govern- 
ment : — 

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made 
to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military 
assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have 
declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as lias just been 
proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to 
submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment 
contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmis- 
sible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria- 
Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and 
considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium. 

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am 
entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the 
United States in Belgium. 

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from 
the Imperial and Royal Government. 

Sunday, August 23, 1914 

Germany refuses to reply to the Japanese ultimatum and gives the Japanese 
Ambassador his passports. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From Berlin 

AxJSTRO-HlJNGARIAN R.ED BOOK No. 6S 

Prince Hohenlohe to Count Bercktold. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, Unit. 

The Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charged 'Affaires that 
the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to 
the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed 
their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by 
Japan at 1 2 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same 
time, furnish the Japanese Charge d'Aff aires herewith his passports. 

At mid-day the Charge d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, 
and lie will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of 
the Embassy. 

Monday, August 24, 1914 
Austria-Hungary makes common cause with Germany against Japan. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To Tokio 

AuSTRO-HlTNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 69 

Count Bercktold to Freiherr von Midler at Tokio. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 24, 1914- 

The Commander of S.M.S. Elisabeth has been instructed to 
take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view 



August 28, Belgian Gray Book No. 77 509 

of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, 
to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and 
you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the 
Embassy and of the Consulates. ^<>ur Excellency should entrust 
the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American 
Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished 
with his passports. 

Wednesday, August 26, 1914 

Belgium : 

From Elizabethville 

Belgian Gray Book No. 76 

M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin, 
Belgian Minister fur the Colonies. 

(Telegram.) Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. 

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and 
attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives 
were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected. 

[Of Thursday, August 27, 1914, no despatches have been published.] 

Friday, August 28, 1914 

Belgium : 

From The Hague 

Belgian Gray Book No. 77 ■ 

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The 
Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.) 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914. 

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to in- 
form your Excellency as follows : — 

(Translation.) 
"Vu que la Belgique, apres " Whereas Belgium, having re- 
avoir refuse d'accepter les pro- fused to accept the proposals 
positions qui lui avaient ete made to her on several occasions 
adressees a plusieurs reprises par by Germany, is affording her 
I'Allemagne, prete sa cooperation military assistance to France and 
militaire a la France et a la Great Britain, both of which 
Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes Powers have declared war upon 
deux ont declare la guerre a l'Au- Austria-Hungary, and whereas 

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67, August 22. No reason appears why this 
despatch is printed here with a delay of six days. 



510 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



triche-Hongrie, et en presence 
du fait que, comme il vient d'etre 
constate, les ressortissants autri- 
chiens et hongrois se trouvant en 
Belgique ont, sous les yeux <les 
autorites Royales, du subir un 
traitement contraire aux exi- 
gences les plus primitives de 
I'humanite et inadmissibles meme 
vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat 
ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se 
voit dans la necessite de rompre 
les relations diplomatiques et se 
considere des ce moment en etat 
de guerre avec la Belgique. Je 
quitte le pays avec le personnel 
de la legation et confie la protec- 
tion de mes administr6s au Mi- 
nistre des Etats-Unis d'Amerique 
en Belgique. De la part du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
les passeports sunt remis au 
Comte Errembault de 1 )udzeele. 
(Signe) " Clary." 



as has just been proved, Austrian 
and Hungarian nationals in Bel- 
gium have had to submit, under 
the very eyes of the Belgian 
authorities, to treatment con- 
trary to the most primitive de- 
mands of humanity and inadmis- 
sible even towards subjects of an 
enemy State, therefore Austria 
finds herself obliged to break off 
diplomatic relations and con- 
siders herself from this moment 
in a state of war with Belgium. 
I am leaving the country with 
the stall' of the legation and I 
am entrusting the protection of 
Austrian interests to the United 
States Minister in Belgium. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government 
are forwarding his passports to 
Count Errembault de Dudzeele." 



Saturday, August 29, 1914 

Belgium defends herself against the charm' °f having committed, previous to 
August 1, "certain hostile arts" against Germany. 



Belgium : 



To Tin- Hague 
Belgian Gray Book No. 78 



M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at Tin Hague. 

(Telegram.) Anticerp, August 29, 1914. 

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs that T have received Austria-Hungary's declaration 
of war against Belgium, and add the following: — 

" La Belgique a toujours entre- "Belgium has always enter- 

tenu des relations d'amitie avec tained friendly relations with all 

tons ses voisins sans distinction, her neighbours without distinc- 

Elle a scrupuleusement rempli tion. She had scrupulously ful- 

les devoirs que la neutrality lui filled the duties imposed upon 

impose. Si die n'a pas cru her by her neutrality. If she 



August 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 78 



511 



pouvoir accepter les propositions 
de l'Allemagne, c'est que celles-ci 
avaient pour objet la violation 
des engagements qu'elle a pris a. 
la face de l'Europe, engagements 
qui ont ete les conditions de la 
creation du Royaume de Bel- 
gique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un 
peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, 
puisse meconnaltre ses devoirs et 
sacrifier son honneur en s'incli- 
nant devant la force. Le Gou- 
vernement a attendu, non seule- 
ment les delais de l'ultimatum, 
mais la violation de son territoire 
par les troupes allemandes avant 
de faire appel a la France et a 
l'Angleterre, garantes de sa neu- 
tralite au meme titre que l'Alle- 
magne et l'Autriche-Hongrie, 
pour cooperer au nom et en vertu 
des traites a la defense du terri- 
toire beige. 

"En repoussant par les armes 
les envahisseurs, elle n'a nieme 
pas accompli un acte d'hostilite 
aux termes de l'article 10 de la 
Convention de La Have sur les 
droits et devoirs des Puissances 
neutres. 

" L'Allemagne a reconnu elle- 
meme que son agression constitue 
une violation du droit des gens, 
et ne pouvant la justifier elle a 
invoque son interet strategique. 

" La Belgique oppose un de- 
menti formel a l'affirmation que 
les ressortissants autrichiens et 
hongrois auraient subi en Bel- 
gique un traitement contraire aux 
exigences les plus primitives de 
l'humanite. 

" Le Gouvernement Royal a 
donne, des le debut des hostilites, 
les ordres les plus stricts quant a 
la sauvegarde des personnes et 
des proprietes austro-hongroises. 
(Signe) " Davignon." 



has not been able to accept Ger- 
many's proposals, it is because 
those proposals contemplated the 
violation of her engagements 
toward Europe, engagements 
which form the conditions of the 
creation of the Belgian Kingdom. 
She has been unable to admit that 
a people, however weak they may 
be, can fail in their duty and 
sacrifice their honour by yield- 
ing to force. The Government 
have waited, not only until the 
ultimatum had expired, but also 
until Belgian territory had been 
violated by German troops, be- 
fore appealing to France and 
Great Britain, guarantors of her 
neutrality, under the same terms 
as are Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, to co-operate in the 
name and in virtue of the treaties 
in defence of Belgian territory. 
By repelling the invaders by 
force of arms, she has not even 
committed an hostile act as laid 
down by the provisions of article 
10 of The Hague Convention 
respecting the rights and duties 
of neutral Powers. 

" Germany herself has recog- 
nised that her attack constitutes 
a violation of international law, 
and, being unable to justify it, 
she has pleaded her strategical 
interests. 

"Belgium formally denies the 
allegation that Austrian and 
Hungarian nationals have suf- 
fered treatment in Belgium con- 
trary to the most primitive de- 
mands of humanity. 

"The Belgian Government, 
from the very commencement of 
hostilities, have issued the 
strictest orders for the protection 
of Austro-Hungarian persons and 
property." 



512 Official Diplomatic Documents 

To Belgian Ministers Abroad 

Belgian Gray Book No. 79 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters abroad. 
Sir, Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 

Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch ' to the 
Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt hound to call attention 
to certain allegations made by the German Government which are 
mentioned in the Blue Book 2 recently published by the British 
Government. 

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the 
despatch in question and of its enclosures. 

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the 
Government to which you are accredited. 



Enclosure 1 in No. 79. 



M. Davignon, Belgian Minister far Foreign Affairs, to Count dc La- 

luing, Belgian Minister at London. 
Sir, Brussels, August 17, lf>14. 

The Blue Book recently published by the British Government 
contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from 
Berlin on the 31st .Inly by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which 
the following passage occurs: — 

" It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] 
said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile 
acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of 
this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been 
placed under an embargo already." 

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in 
his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as a 
hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application 
of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited 
the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from 
the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which 
we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has 
wished to attribute to it. 

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the 
Moniteur helge the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, 
both by land and by sea, of a scries of products, more especially of 
cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called 
my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining 
cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely 
transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von 

1 Not previously printed. 

- British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1. 



August 20, Belgian, Gray Book No. 79 513 

Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes 
should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the 
German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought 
the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the follow- 
ing day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instruc- 
tions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and 
entire satisfaction to Germany. 

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the 
correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. 
You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as show- 
ing any hostile dispositions towards Germany ; the steps taken by 
the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those 
simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to 
adopt in such exceptional circumstances. 

It would be as well that you should address a communication to 
the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case. 



Enclosure 2 in No. 79. 



Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 

Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. 
Sir, Brussels, July 31, 101 4- 

I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the 
despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany. 

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the export 
of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having been 
merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good 
offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave 
for Germany. 

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port 
of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the 
Moniteur of to-day. 

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con- 
venience, I have, etc. 



Enclosure 3 in No. 79. 



M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below 

Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 
Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914- 

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the 
honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con- 
cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned. 

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and 
begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in 
order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree 
might be avoided. 
2l s 



514 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Enclosure 4 in No. 79. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to H err von Be- 
low Saleske, Herman Minister at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

With reference to the note which your Excellency was good 
enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to in- 
form you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs 
that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th 
July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend 
to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. More- 
oxer, when duty-free goods arc declared to be for actual consump- 
tion, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly 
the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered 
as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods 
had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though 
they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow 
them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by 
despatch receipts, bills of lading, etc., that they were to be exported 
forthwith in transit. 

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals 
was authorised on the 1st August. 

(See note, page 509.) 

Tuesday, September 1, 1914 

Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later Blue Rook) Sir 
Maurice de Hansen's, former British Ambassador in Vienna, recollections of the 
events of the last days preceding the war. 

From Vienna 

British Blue Book No. 161 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, 1<> Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir, London. September 1, 1914. 

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led 
up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, 
to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now 
to add a few comments. 

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to 
Kervia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. 
Except Ilerr von Tschirscky, 1 who must have been aware of the tenour 
if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were 
allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. 
Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron 
Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 

1 German Ambassador at Vienna. 



September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 515 

by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning 
he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn 
up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting 
State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews 
he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment 
being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna 
on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secre- 
tary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the 
same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presen- 
tation about the time we were speaking. 

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what 
was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of 
absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days 
when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed 
that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which 
was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the 
Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count 
Berehtold 1 during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency 
was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was 
given me by Count Berehtold of the impending storm, and it was 
from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast 
of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the follow- 
ing day. It is true that during all this time the Neue Freie Presse 
and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which 
pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official Fremderv- 
blatt, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, 
the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would 
shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European 
complications. 

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By 
common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral 
acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, 
on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that 
it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen 
disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon 
as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been 
rejected and that Baron Giesl '-' had broken off relations at Belgrade, 
Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets 
and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. 

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the 
most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending 
up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile 
manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the 
strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal em- 
bassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna 
and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Mon- 

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
1 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 



516 Official Diplomatic Documents 

archy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, 
and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hun- 
garian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged 
rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the 
people, exeept presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by 
the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many 
quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation 
crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. 
Count Berchtold's ' peace policy had met with little sympathy in the 
Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people 
and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punish- 
ment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed 
that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of 
submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful 
solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect 
that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must 
inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the 
cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable 
that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions 
of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as super- 
seding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance 
for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to 
me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would 
stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, in- 
fluenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no 
effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic nego- 
tiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some 
peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian 
fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed 
for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian 
Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence en- 
sued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and decla- 
ration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against 
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisa- 
tion, and Russia again responded with results which have passed 
into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's 
Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White 
Paper on the European Crisis. 2 On the 28th July I saw Count 
Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of media- 
tion mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons 3 on the 
previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peace- 
ful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read 
to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had 
gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she 
could never accept the conference which you had suggested should 
take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the 

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

« "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 

'S,v " Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933. 



September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 517 

Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly 
between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's 
Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be 
arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. 
I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter 
of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that 
whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her 
policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question 
primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace 
of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. 

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect 
of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would 
have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria 
sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to 
me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad 
to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had re- 
sulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the 
Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that 
settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, in- 
asmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in them- 
selves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most 
friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in 
my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia. 

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in 
the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in 
the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky ' abstained from inviting 
my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in 
carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of 
knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian 
Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, 
the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count 
Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade 
the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary '' with 
full powers to continue at St. Peterslmrgh the hopeful conversations 
which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. 3 
( \>unt Berchtold 4 refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), 
though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Aus- 
tria, he received M. Schebeko 5 again, in a perfectly friendly manner, 
and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. 
Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and 
Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As 
between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on 
the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko' that Count Szapary 2 
had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. 

1 German Ambassador in Vienna. 

2 Augtro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
6 Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 



51S Official Diplomatic Documents 

Sazonof ' that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the 
points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the 
maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, 1 M. Schebeko 2 
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would 
refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had 
finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a 
peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 
1st August by Count Mensdorff, 3 to the effect that Austria had. 
neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversa- 
tions. 4 M. Schebeko 2 to the end was working hard for peace. He 
was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, 8 and 
he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, 6 had re- 
sponded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to 
expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could 
probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko 2 repeat- 
edly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. 

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg!] and Vienna 
were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous 
ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany 
intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to 
St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which 
only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia 
on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' 
delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the 
greatest calamities in history. 

Russia stil! abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko 2 
had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be 
declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This 
only happened on the 6th August, when Count Berchtold 5 informed 
the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg!] had been instructed to notify the Russian 
Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the 
Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced 
hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself 
also at war with Russia." 

M. Schebeko 2 left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently re- 
quested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might 
be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the 
Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. 
On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport 
on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against 
France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. 

1 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

'■' Russi m \in'i i isador in Vienn i 

: \ii-i">-ll ingarian Ambassador in London. 

1 See No. 137, August 1. 

6 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

1 Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 



September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 519 

On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold 1 
the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved 
to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a 
further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold 's assurance that not 
only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French fron- 
tier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction 
into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops 
employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count 
Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, 
under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's 
departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his 
Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue 
made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled 
before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that 
Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the 
Republic had been assassinated. 

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in 
Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 
4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, 
and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 
4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German 
ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of 
these days transpired. The Neue Freie Presse was violently in- 
sulting towards England. The Fremdenblatt was not offensive, 
but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to 
explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's 
Government no alternative but to take part in the war. 

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, 
but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. 

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of 
the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war 
with German\', but adding that, Austria being understood to be not 
yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me 
to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to 
the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time 
that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to 
commit any act of war against us without the notice required by 
diplomatic usage. 

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to re- 
ceive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled 
to inform Count Mensdorff , 2 at the request of the French Government, , 
that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on 
the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already 
fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the 
German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. 
The rupture having been brought, about with France in this way, I 
was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, 

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



520 Official Diplomatic Documents 

that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would 
exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. 

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who 
accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his 
Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in 
Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, 
I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's 
Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold ' received me at mid- 
day. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem 
to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from 
Count Mensdorff 2 has just come in but had not yet been brought to 
him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy 
which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications 
which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into 
war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself 
then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that coun- 
try had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circum- 
stances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided 
useless argument. Then 1 ventured to recommend to his Excellency's 
consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at 
Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had 
already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his 
Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could 
be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be 
over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British 
consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being 
left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. 
He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England 
if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took 
leave of ( !ount Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the 
day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many 
marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left 
1 begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Em- 
peror Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that 
llis Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired 
health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would 
deliver my message. 

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, 
was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to 
acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that 
evening ( 14th August). In the course of the day ( 'ountess Berchtold 
and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de 
Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train 
for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. 
Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count 
Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encum- 
bered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, 

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



September 4, French Yellow Book No. 160 521 

early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place 
there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the 
entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was 
caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that 
ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as 
well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should 
be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and 
that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration 
due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own 
family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal 
and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. 
The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable 
accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, 
after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found 
that every provision had been made by the French Government, at 
the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. 
We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. 

I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen. 

(See note, p. 509.) 

Friday, September 4, 1914 
France : 

To the French Ambassadors ami Ministers Abroad 

French Yellow Book No. 160 

DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 
(September 4, 1914) 



Declaration , 



.1/. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs, /<> the French Ambassadors 
and Ministers abroad. „ . r , , , 

Fans, September 4, 1914- 

The following declaration has this morning been signed at the 
Foreign Office at London : — 

"The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective 
( rovernments hereby declare as follows : — 

"The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage 
not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three 
Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, 
no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous 
agreement of each of the other Allies. 

(Signed) " Paul Cambon. 

Count Benckendorff. 
Edward Grey." 

This declaration will be published to-dav. -^ 

Delcasse. 



PART TWO 

THE PARTS OF THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS NOT PRINTED UNDER 
PART ONE 



I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book 

Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian 
system. The following is the signification of the sounds : — 

s = sh in the English " ship." 

c = ch in the English " church." 

c = (the same, softer), 

c = ts in the English " mats." 

j = y in the English " yell." 

gj = dj in the English " adjourn." 

z = j in the French " jour." 

INTRODUCTION 

Since the dynasty of the Karageorgevic ascended the blood-stained 
throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired 
against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, 
though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim 
of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those 
territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern 
Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the 
general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of 
the Great-Servian claims. 

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been 
raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their 
aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep dis- 
appointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country 
by the anexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her 
to the verge of war. 

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at 
the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 
1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a 
solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new 
political and international conditions which had been created by the 
annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had 
not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve 
the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, 
and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with 
Austria-Hungary. 

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible 
for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations 
with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenovic, and, 
as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of 
this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her 
independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who, 

5^5 



526 Official Diplomatic Documents 

by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and 
neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to 
foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they 
permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leader- 
ship of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to 
pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the 
territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent 
' members of their military and civil administration from poisoning 
the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was 
regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. 
From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang 
up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the 
Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted 
person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which 
had been carefully prepared in Servia. However, the sacrifice of his 
life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly 
expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, 
brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanim- 
ity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable 
were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly 
and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was no 
room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest 
interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal 
conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of 
Austria-Hungary. 

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way 
by which our interests could be secured. 

It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to 
require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment 
of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the 
Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria- 
Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade 
Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was 
determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain 
her prestige and the integrity of her territories; and that she could 
not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were 
meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the de- 
mands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the 
possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy 
as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual 
Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for 
the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, 
and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking 
protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way 
open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their 
territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial 
life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered 
by Servian aspirations if they were to avoid endangering the peace 



Austro-Hungarian Red Book 527 

of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government 
met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the 
Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection 
of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. 
Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, 
however, insist that the controversy with Servia should be carried 
through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this 
State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time 
given to Servia for answering our demands would have given the 
Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for 
further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the inter- 
ference of single Powers in the interests of Servia. It was therefore 
necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although 
before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Servia had ordered 
general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, 
the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration 
of war. The suggestion of the British Government that the settle- 
ment of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference 
of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostili- 
ties, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, 
however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the 
Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro- 
Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would 
have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Servia. The 
Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting 
for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to 
Servia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future 
correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been 
lost, and Servia would have been encouraged to continue her en- 
deavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of 
Austria-Hungary. 

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Servia 
that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who 
were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary 
condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, 
their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the 
territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were repre- 
senting the common interest of the civilised world that murder and 
outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political 
controversy, and that Servia should not continue incessantly to 
menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations. 

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the 
spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these 
postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves 
beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the 
assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her 
love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the 
Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had 
they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the 



528 Official Diplomatic Documents 

world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made 
answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has 
come upon the human race. 

There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never 
have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to 
work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of 
the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not 
been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she 
had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in 
the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, 
to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisa- 
tion of the Great-Servian projects. 

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has 
extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, 
and lias, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Musco- 
vite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As 
the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards 
universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the 
Dardanelles, which would secure tn the Russian Empire predominance 
in the near East and in x\sia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an 
opening independent of the will of other countries. 

As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests 
of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to 
encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the en- 
deavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The 
powerful central European union which barred the way to the uni- 
versal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be 
isolated. The first step was to hem in the Ilapsburg Monarchy by 
the creation of the Balkan Union, anil to undermine its authority 
by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories. 
A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow 
and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the 
Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central 
Powers. 

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the 
territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans 
were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed 
Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest 
share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, 
after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and 
France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to 
be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh terri- 
tories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, through a successive 
pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal 
game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the 
Monarchy and the peace of the world, Servia was a catspaw which 
Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war. 

The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents pro- 



Austro-Hungarian Red Book 529 

vided in this collection give ample evidence of this — again and again 
almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Peters- 
burgh that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not 
annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty 
of Servia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with 
the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. 
Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the 
solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government ; as 
early as the 24th July, in the communique of that date, she assumed 
a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary 
had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the 
mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, KiefY, Moscow and 
Kasan ; this was a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she 
ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of 
the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the 
German Goverment, which had been made on the 26th, that prepara- 
tory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany 
to counter measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the 
army, and that mobilisation meant war. 

On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversa- 
tion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the 
peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make 
an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our 
territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia. 

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. 
She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possi- 
bility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking 
Servia under her protection ; she must make an end of the intolerable 
situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom 
continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary. 

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested 
that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself 
of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the 
utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and 
Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this media- 
tion. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, 
required that this should not take place under the pressure of the 
threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount 
necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation 
in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This 
demand the St. Petersburgh Cabinet answered by mobilising the 
whole of the Russian forces. 

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the 
desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St. Petersburgh 
Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe 
to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes. 

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her 
policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When 
Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, deter- 



530 Official Diplomatic Documents 

mined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of 
the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy. 

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria- 
Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of 
protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the 
threats of Russia. 

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty. 



French Yellmo Book 531 

II. The French Yellow Book 

CHAPTER I 
WARNINGS (1913) 



No. 1 

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, 

Minister for Foreign Affair*. 

Berlin, March 17, 1913. 

Our naval and military attaches are sending to their respective 
Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this 
opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these 
important documents. 

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany 
intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the 
delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. 
In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept 
the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the 
business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have 
been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in 
times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On 
the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an 
innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct 
taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind lias been reserved to the 
Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a 
new declaration of the corporate unity (personalitc) of the Empire, 
constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power. 

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German 
army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a 
possible crisis. 

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that 
country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re- 
establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with 
which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise 
occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial 
Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of 
an increase of German military strength ; the German proposals are 
represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the 
immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse- 
quence of German initiative. 

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic senti- 
ment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. 
Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, 
and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was com- 
pared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion 
will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month 



532 Official Diplomatic Documents 

in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself 
will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France 
and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patri- 
otism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, 
but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical 
analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement 
which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius 
who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counter- 
part would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to 
protect itself against the domination of force. 

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both 
countries makes the situation grave. Jules Cambon. 



Enclosure I 

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French 
Embassy at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War. 

Berlin, March 15, WIS. 

The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France lias 
caused real anger in certain circles. 

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the 
Kiihiische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather 
the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been im- 
mediately disavowed by the Government. 

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the 
Kolnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important news- 
papers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears 
to express a real feeling, a latent anger. 

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light 
on the meaning of the present armaments. 

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet 
people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary 
and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who 
is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went 
so far as to say, " It is a provocation ; we will not allow it." More 
moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that 
France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in 
this way with Germany. 

To sum up, people arc angry, and this anger is not caused by the 
shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay 
little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realis- 
ing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and 
even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to 
outrun France completely. 

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is 
Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the 
impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to con- 



French Yellow Booh 533 

sider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected 
consequence of the law of June, 1912. 

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, 
according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units 
incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in 
filling in the gaps. 1 The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right mo- 
ment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary 
of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices 
through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a 
time when Germany was opposed to France. 

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I 
beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a year 
ago, when the law of 1912 was published : 

" We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings 
of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last 
year. 

"The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete 
disillusion. 

" The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the 
Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in 
Morocco. 

" It seemed a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to con- 
quer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one 
would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out 
for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion. 

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared 
to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial 
expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because 
their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs 
to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a 
second rate power. 

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully 
withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. 
Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are deter- 
mined that such a thing shall never happen again." 

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the 
programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is 
on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occa- 
sion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, 
France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Kenan said, "her 
eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of 
Germany can well be understood. 

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe 
and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public 
opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has ac- 
cepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens 
of these two successive laws. 

1 The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years 
later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is con- 
tinually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing. 



534 Official Diplomatic Documents 

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse of 
Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd 
surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of 
the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick 
William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers. 

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, 
will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a 
centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the 
Prussians into Paris. 

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as 
does the Kolnische Zeitung, we arc in fact, and shall long remain, the 
nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of 
inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large. 

Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the 
Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as 
involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They 
want to lie feared and they are at present engaged in making the neces- 
sary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, 
i he confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority 
of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the 
face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will 
perhaps be powerless. 

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing every- 
thing to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the 
various anniversaries of 1813. 

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more 
or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should 
justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first 
decisive blows being struck at France. 



Enclosure II 

M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to 
M. Baudin, Minister >>f Marine. 

Berlin, March 15, WIS. 

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Finan- 
cial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be 
introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and 
that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us. 

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the 
German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we 
know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense 
scope," to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal 
in terms which enable us to consider the communique of the Lokal 
Anzeiger as accurate. 

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. 
We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914, 



French Yellow Book 535 

the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 
860,000. 

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions 
of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official 
newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, 
to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most 
nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day 
of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very 
much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the 
Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the 
operations. 

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays 
commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. 
At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff 
had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and 
Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, 
remarked to his sovereign, " There they will come to a stop." William 
II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the 
German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a 
plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is 
remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by 
the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at 
the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of 
young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable 
proportion of Socialists. 

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will 
throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to 
blows ; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government 
should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and 
on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of 
the campaign and its final result. 

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath 
at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his 
address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more 
disciplined in adversity than in success." 

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an 
incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked 
out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement 
against France. 

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to 
meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France 
that the danger seems to them greatest. The Kolnische Zeitung has 
said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather 
than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse. 

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the 
Kolnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense 
majority of the German people. 

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation 
which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old 



536 Official Diplomatic Documents 

Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the 
opinions which dominate Court circles. 

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donners- 
marck spoke as follows : — 

" French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil 
designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular 
opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us 
before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, 
which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government 
to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect 
ourselves." 

And the Prince added : " I have even been considered in France as 
one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. 
Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to 
prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be 
at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages 
of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile 
sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France 
and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because 
I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be un- 
favourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid 
that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but 
rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to 
avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such 
a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will 
be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which 
I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not 
sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at 
a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. 
Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as 
Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that na- 
tion will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the 
bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important 
or small it may be.' " And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exacti- 
tude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of 
500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when 
it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous." 

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared 
by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation. 

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to 
increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of 
material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but 
some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be neces- 
sary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. 

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did 
not necessitate any special financial measures. 

The military and naval law of 1912 has been provisionally covered 
by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform 
of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction 



French Yellow Book 537 

of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent to- 
gether the sum of 60,000,000 francs.) 

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been 
raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th 
January", 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite 
an important part of these loans must have been applied to military 
expenses. 

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial 
measures. 

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the 
"non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while 
the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of 
effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks. 

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be 
covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes 
woidd be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject 
to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not 
be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with 
their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and 
at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into 
effect. 

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois 
classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on 
acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they 
are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so 
heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is 
threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the war- 
like times of 1813 and the present day. 

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence 
it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to 
remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary 
enemy. 

If it is established that the German Government are doing their 
utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be 
made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the 
newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st 
July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing 
can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to ob- 
tain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard. 

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure 
resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, 
nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be neces- 
sary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming. 

To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms always 
follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provi- 
sions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law 
of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible 
that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised 
by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets 



538 Official Diplomatic Documents 

are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes 
in personnel and materiel. 

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large 
number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect 
military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by 
the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German 
people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour. 

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in 
France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German 
effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the 
call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow 
any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army 
elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. 
The morale of the active army will deteriorate. 

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps 
which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can 
do little more. 

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. 
Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations. 

Faramond. 



No. 2 

M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Paris, April ,.', 1913. 

I have just received from a. reliable source an official secret report 
concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is 
divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, 
the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest 
detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. 
Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employ- 
ment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft. 

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of _ this docu- 
ment, which seems to merit your attention. Etienne. 



Enclosure 

Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army. 

Berlin, March 1.9, 1913. 

I. — General Memorandum on the new Military Laws 

The increase has taken place in three stages : — 

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with 
regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain, 
and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was 



French Yellow Book 539 

obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and 
Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At 
the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthen- 
ing of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To 
meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 
men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better forma- 
tion of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protec- 
tion of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already 
clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a 
great effort. 

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought 
on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the 
French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance 
in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on 
France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by 
the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened 
our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase 
was from this moment considered as a minimum. 

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in 
support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria- 
Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. 
On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new hi des cadres; 
it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution con- 
templated by the new military law. 

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active 
army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the 
possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. 
The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow 
will enable her almost completely to attain this end. 

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, 
nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the 
Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsch- 
tum (German influence) all the world over. 

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one 
day increase their population. The employment of an army of black 
men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time 
a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty. 

II. — Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army, 

AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES 

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of 
the German nation. Our ancestors of 1S13 made greater sacrifices. 
It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our 
hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We must 
allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are 
an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accus- 
tom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in 
order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act 



540 Official Diplomatic Documents 

with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises 
which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage 
matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, con- 
siderable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak 
( Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would 
come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must 
prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be 
dime in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our 
financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed. 

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final 
result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must 
stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of 
keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely 
necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen 
agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, 
in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case 
of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recog- 
nise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should 
secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims 
arc capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some 
years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately 
these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like 
it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in 
order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. 

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be 
carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out 
simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; 
they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential 
leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly 
suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between 
the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World. 

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate 
at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in 
the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states 
should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions 
their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or 
neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Hol- 
land, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory 
which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the 
north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, espe- 
cially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong 
northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. 
In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great 
Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision 
would already hav been reached both on land and on sea. Our 
northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by 
Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offen- 
sive measures from this quarter. 

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and 



French Yellow Book 541 

we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against 
France, and thus protecting our flank. 

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states 
on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same 
light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to 
take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. Fortius 
purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up 
by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states 
to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, 
and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we 
could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in 
such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we 
could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisa- 
tion, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it 
might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, 
their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving 
definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we coidd in no 
circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her 
neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to 
work in this country on the lines of our interests. 

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope 
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the 
complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultima- 
tum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, 
would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international 
law. 

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand 
a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, 
or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hun- 
dred years ago ; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will 
seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will 
then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, 
the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in 
the hands of the French ; that thousands of brother Germans in the 
Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national 
question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her. 



No. 3 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, 
Minister for Foreign. Affairs. 

Berlin, May 6, 1913. 
I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the 
conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting 
in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened 
is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said 
Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. 
We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising 



542 Official Diplomatic Documents 

in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I 
replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross." 

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. 
Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof 
of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which 
it is important that your Excellency should know. 

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I 
maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit 
he paid to Ilerr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confiden- 
tially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and 
whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which 
might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The 
Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely noth- 
ing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Govern- 
ment, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe. 

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as 
extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with 
investigating the position in the Far East ; preparations have even 
been made here. 

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall 
of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary 
measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers 
and men of the reserve -to hold themselves ready for the call, in order 
that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call 
to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, 
discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of 
this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill 
would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers 
the next day. 

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was 
carrying on with regard to Morocco. 

Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, 
at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this 
is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers 
of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest con- 
fidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put 
aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. 
It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, 
who was to make the trial trip on the Imperator, did not embark. 

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order 
is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point 
I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by 
General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished 
officer of the German army. 

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must 
put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces 
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become 
necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the 
chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany 



French Yellow Book 543 

cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would 
then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army 
that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, 
to that of France. Acordingly," added the General, "we must 
anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances 
to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly 
to crush all resistance." 

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it cor- 
responds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not con- 
sider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy. 

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago. 

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which 
comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war, 
they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the 
necessary steps. They wish to be always ready. 

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of per- 
sistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form 
a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic 
ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the 
country. Jules Cambon. 



No. 4 

M. Allize, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

Munich, July 10, 1913. 

From a political point of view people are asking what is the 
object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens 
Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its 
disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful 
to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day 
after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial 
Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting 
an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, 
successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has 
assumed. 

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial 
Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in 
any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the 
risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the 
East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears 
no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the polit- 
ical and economic difficulties which will continue to increase. 

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Ger- 
many. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of 
war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a 
fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory." 

Allize. 



544 Official Diplomatic Documents 

No. 5 

Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public 
Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and 
Consular Agents). 

Paris, July SO, 1913. 

From observations which our agents in Germany have been able 
to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it 
is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate 
men's minds : — 

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a dis- 
appointment for Germany ; 

(2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer 
of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war. 

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives 
to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, 
university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, 
elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, 
artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of 
Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of 
trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Branden- 
burg, country squires from Ponierania and shoemakers from Stettin 
celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentle- 
men, officials, priests, and large Fanners from Westphalia, are unan- 
imous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding 
to their position in society or their political party. Here is a syn- 
thesis of all these opinions : 

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of 
the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the 
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the 
Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humilia- 
tion, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all 
I he mi ire serious because up to 11)11 the military supremacy of Ger- 
many was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of 
the Republic were a sort of German dogma. 

In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question 
for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion 
of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which 
followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organ- 
ised, what Pan-German greed it hail awakened, and what hatred 
it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor 
unpopular, Ilerr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany 
last winter. However, he begins to lie merely thought little of, for 
he allows it to lie known that he will have his revenge. 

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became 
restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. 
And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, 
her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact 
that she has the audacity not to lie afraid of war, these things are the 



French Yellow Book 545 

most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on 
the part of German public opinion. 

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, 
since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as 
French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the 
pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and 
financial reasons made themselves felt. 

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment 
in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be 
intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she 
had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion 
in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press 
of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their 
incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with 
irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since 
then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her 
arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Ger- 
many on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is 
the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made 
moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace 
of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial 
conquest this consolation was ottered: — "Yes, but that does not 
prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at 
home." 

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled. 

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing 
for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility 
and proximity of war? 

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question 
of the possibility and proximity of war. 

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are 
unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war 
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, 
Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour 
plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war woidd 
profit Great Britain. 

The forces consist of the following elements : — 

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace- 
loving by instinct. 

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and 
engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few 
other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently en- 
lightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences 
of war, even if successful. 

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate 
way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bank- 
ruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly 
supported by foreign capital. 

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein — 
2> 



546 Official Diplomatic Documents 

conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. 
There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans. 

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large 
southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand 
Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions: — an unsuc- 
cessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have 
derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only 
profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have diffi- 
culty in defending their political independence and administrative 
autonomy. 

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer 
peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political 
matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent 
social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave 
of warlike feeling. 

An example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members 
of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to 
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, 
and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their 
number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excite- 
ment and enthusiasm. 

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe 
in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the 
present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' 
contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the 
case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on 
the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be 
for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pes- 
simism gives free play to those who favour war. 

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The 
expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that 
Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said 
of France that it is the country w r here the civil power is supreme. 
There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than 
this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and 
more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a 
press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public 
opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimida- 
tion of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear 
ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling 
and fixed. 

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories ; each of 
these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral 
education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a 
general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the 
stream of warlike desire. 

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is 
inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better. 

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over- 



French Yellow Book 547 

population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets ; or 
for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests that alone can 
prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist 
masses. 

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time 
is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an 
immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversa- 
tion or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply 
rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are 
two historical facts mutually incompatible. 

Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be termed. 
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions 
with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in 
negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it 
easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating 
force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever 
fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and 
by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry dis- 
appointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvcreine, and other asso- 
ciations of Young Germany. 

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary 
France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the 
people who heap up pretexts for war. 

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows : 
— The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conserva- 
tive party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are 
bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session 
which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. 
It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed 
gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, 
and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of 
the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its 
family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conser- 
vative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as 
an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a 
hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with 
dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of 
the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not 
only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection 
threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its 
political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In 
the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the 
aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone 
belong to' the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits 
among the Socialists. 

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, 
the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the 
squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are 
bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character. 



548 Official Diplomatic Documents 

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at 
the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in 
the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not 
forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading 
role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the 
country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative 
instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which 
their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. 
In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties 
between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home 
of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest 
would lie unknown. 

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big 
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating 
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all 
these regard war as good business. 

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all 
kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Con- 
servatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," 
whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find 
disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young 
men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools 
and universities. 

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop 
a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Ger- 
many's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate 
with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological 
fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a 
crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of 
the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging 
obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for 
all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that 
is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem. 

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apolo- 
gists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of think- 
ing and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France 
that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is 
still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of 
the I'an-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine, 
Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known to need 
particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction 
caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the 
membership of colonial societies. 

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired 
by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They 
are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are 
now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those 
who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France 
and Germany ; they are heaping together and reckoning up their 



French Yellow Book 549 

grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts 
in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances 
chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part 
of the globe where^rance and Germany are in contact. 

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have 
been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these 
warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have 
any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man 
under arms." 

In what terms will this conversation be couched ? The opinion 
is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany 
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and 
the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she 
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. 
Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition. 

Must war then be considered as inevitable ? 

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can 
make it clear to the world that the Entente Cord/ale and the Russian 
alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and 
will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome 
terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave 
everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be ob- 
tained. 

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political 
and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not 
believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic 
to be effective. 

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a 
duel between France and Germanv. 



No. 6 
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, November 22, lull. 

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a 
conversation which took place a fornight ago between the Emperor 
and the King of the Belgians, in the presence, of the Chief of the 
General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, 
has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way 
surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with 
what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increas- 
ing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. 

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as 
did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been 
exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in 
the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. 
The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace 
against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William 



550 Official Diplomatic Documents 

II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it 
must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing 
superiority of the German army and in its certain success. 

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. 
He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed 
himself still more assured of success, "for," he said to the King, "this 
time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no con- 
ception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German 
people will be carried away when that day comes." 

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the 
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ; 
and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation 
by the ebullitions (if a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of 
unscrupulous agitati >rs. 

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless per- 
sisted in their point of view. 

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover 
seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, 
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and espe- 
eially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his 
mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity ac- 
quired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and 
who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world 
as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to 
the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to 
establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany, is, to a certain 
extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is 
realised that Germany cannot go much further. 

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. 
The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to 
impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any 
opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany 
would be glad to sec Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately 
manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last 
hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of Gen- 
eral von Moltke. 

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience 
than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to 
allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the 
object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the 
less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the gen- 
eral situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion 
in France and Germany. 

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it 
would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the 
Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly 
repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he 
likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry." 

Jules Cambon. 



German White Book 551 



III. The German White Book 

Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914- 

On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch- 
Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were 
assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The 
investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities 
has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch- 
Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Bel- 
grade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with 
arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened 
the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of 
the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal 
means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in 
employing for the achievement of these aims. 

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final 
separation of the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servia's 
policy has not been altered in the least in spite (if the repeated and 
solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these 
policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good 
and neighbourly relations. 

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years 
Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. 

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its 
intentions by Russia. 

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolu- 
tion in 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under 
Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. 
This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a 
greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the quest inn 
of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis- 
mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian states- 
men a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called 
into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from 
the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those 
parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, 
in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken 
from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be 
isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propa- 
ganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not 
compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the 
monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. 
The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this con- 
ception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able 



552 Official Diplomatic Documents 

to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that 
any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia 
directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with 
our approval. 

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria- 
Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that 
it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as 
allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria- 
Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding 
attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance 
in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests 
were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs 
continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence 
of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjec- 
tion of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the conse- 
quence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in 
Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of 
Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could 
count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to 
have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and 
westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely 
free hand in her action towards Servia, but have not participated in 
her preparations. 

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Govern- 
ment a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at 
Serajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but 
actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and 
in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment 
of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary, 
demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire 
the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examina- 
tion on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb 
societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal 
Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional ac- 
ceptance of its demands. 

The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one 
day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note. 

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a 
reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of 
Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through 
procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands 
of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations 
with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting 
further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently 
experienced. 

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, 
which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war. 

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that 
there were here concerned the a flairs of Austria alone, which it would 



German White Book 



See exhibits 
1 and 2. 



See exhibit 
3. 



have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our 
efforts toward the localising of the war, and toward con- 
vincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to 
appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her 
by the conditions. We emphatically took the position 
that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the 
arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and politi- 
cal crime, and to shield the Servians against their just 
punishment. In this sense we instructed our representa- 
tives with the foreign powers. 

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- 
municated to the Russian Government that the step 
undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive 
measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria- 
Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a 
continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the mon- 
archy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever 
to shift the balance of power in the Balkan. 

In answer to our declaration that the German Govern- 
ment desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, 
both the French and the English Governments promised 
an action in the same direction. But these endeavours 
did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia 
in the Austro-Servian disagreement. 

The Russian Government submitted an official com- 
munique on July 24th, according to which Russia could 
not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian 
conflict. 'The same was declared by the Russian Secre- 
tary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German 
Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 
26th. The German Government declared again, through 
its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that Austria-Hungary 
had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at 
her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria- 
Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain 
in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world 
rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh. 



1 Note. — This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German 
text, a translation of which is as follow.- 

"The same was declared by the Rus 
M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassado 
4.) On the afternoon of July 26th tin 
Austrian) Government declare! again 

Petersburgh that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only 
shed peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the 



ian Secretary fnr Foreign Affairs, 
', Gount Pourtales. ( See exhibit 
Imperial and Royal (thai is the 
through its Ambassador at St. 



ibilisati 



same day, however, the first news of Russiai 
(See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of t 
Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersb 
energetically to point out the danger of this Russii 
exhibits 10,* 10a, and 106.) After the official ex] 
Hungary to Russia that she did not claim ferritin 
decision concerning the peace of the world rested 
Petersburgh. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian 
Government." 



eached Berlin, 
ith, 1 he i lerma rj 
were instructed 
ibilisation. (See 

tii hi by Austria- 
ain in Servia, the 
with St. 



554 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



See exhibits 
6, 7, 8, 9. 



See exhibits 
10, 10a, 10b. 



The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation 
readied Berlin in the evening. 

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. 
Petersburgh were instructed to energetically point out the 
danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburgh was also directed to make the 
following declaration to the Russian Government : ' 

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us 
to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the 
army. 

" But mobilisation means war. 

" As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, 
this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia 
and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to 
unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary 
will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we 
are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an 
attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the 
desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as 
Austria-Hungary docs not intend to question the hitter. 
It will be easy in the further development of the affair 
to Hnd a basis for an understanding." 

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom- 
linof, gave the German military attache his word of 
honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely 
preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, 
nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the 
Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards 
Austria, i.e., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobi- 
lised, under no circumstances those situated on the German 
frontier, i.e., St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon see exhibit 
inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria- ll. 
Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging 
his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military 
attache then pointed to these mobilisation measures against 
Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany. 
In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili- 
sation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news 
about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as 
for instance the announcement of the state of war in 
Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the 
strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. 

()n July 27th, the first information was received con- 
cerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th 
Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its 
garrison. 

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the 
conflict by most emphatic steps. 

1 See note on preceding page. 



Gen. 



White Book 



555 



On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal 
to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, 
France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared 
in regard to this proposal that we could not, however 
much we approved the idea, participate in such a con- 
See exhibit f erence > as we could not call Austria in her dispute with 
12. Servia before a European tribunal. 

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, 
but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be 
expected. 

Faithful to our •principle that mediation should not extend 
to the Austro-Serman conflict, which is to be considered as a 
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our 
endeavours to bring about an understanding between these 

8ee exhibits two powers. 

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the 
conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward 
Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary 
See exhibit should decide that either the Servian reply teas sufficient, or 
15 - that it he used as a basis for further 'negotiations. The 

Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full apprecia- 
te exhibit ^' on °f '""' '"''"'" "'"' & had come too late, the hostilities 
16. having already been opened. 

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, 
and we advised I ieuua to show every possible advance com- 
patible with the dignity of the monarchy. 

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by 
the military preparations of Russia and France. 

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official 
notification in Berlin that four army districts had been 
mobilised. At the same tune further news was received 
concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of 
France, both on water and on land. 

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. 
Petersburgh had an interview with the Russian Foreign 
Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as 
follows : 

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge 
my Government to participate in a quadruple conference 1 
to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those 
demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I 
could merely promise to report the conversation and took 
the position that, after Russia had decided upon the 
baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas ap- 



See exhibit 
17. 



1 Note. — The German word translated "conference" is Konversation : 
the German text also contains the words auf freundschaftlichem Wege ("in 
a friendly manner"). 



556 Official Diplomatic Documents 

peared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, 
Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria- 
Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was 1 icing 
blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e., an infraction of 
sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to con- 
sider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial 
aspiration — a great concession on the part of a state 
engaged in war — should therefore be permitted to attend 
to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at 
the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance 
towards the sovereignty of Servia. 

"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire 
Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a 
general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to 
present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. 

"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea 
that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia." 

On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. 
Petersburgh wired the following report on a conversation 
with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : 

"The Chief of the General Stall' has asked me to call on 
him, and he has told me that he has just come from His 
Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of 
War to reiterate' once more that everything had remained 
as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He 
offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of 
honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there 
had been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man 
or horse up to the present time, i.e., 3 o'clock in the 
afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the 
future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed 
towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation. 

" As, however, I had received here many pieces of news 
concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts 
of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the 
general that his statements placed me before a riddle. 
On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news 
was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm 
might have been given. 

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to 
mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken 
in view of the abundant and positive information about 
the calling in of reserves." 

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its 
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly 
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no 
conversation in St. Petersburgh. The Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was therefore instructed on 
July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such convcrsa- 



German White Book 557 

tion with Sasonof. Count Szapary was empowered to 
explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though 
it had been pvertaken by the state of war, and to accept 
any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss 
with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the 
Austro-Russian relations. 

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which 
we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution 
See exhibit f tne CO nflict. We even as late as the 30th of July 
19 ' forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis 

for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate 
her conditions in Servia, i.e., after her march into 
Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this 

' During the interval from July 29th to July 31st 1 there 
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian 
measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the 
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of 
war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier 
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation 
was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such 
measures were denied to our representative in St. Peters- 
burgh on word of honour. 

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the 
Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis 
must have been known in St. Petersburg^ , could possibly 
have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general 
mobilisation. 

During the same days, there took place between His 

Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of 

telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention 

of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian 

See exhibits j^o^iiisation during the continuance of his own mediating 

22', 23, 23a.' activities. 

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram 
to His Majesty the Kaiser : 

" I thank You cordially for Your mediation which per- 
mits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It 
is technically impossible to discontinue our military prepa- 
rations which have been made necessary by the Austrian 
mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as 
the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my 
troops will undertake no provocative action. I give \ mi 
my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in 

1 NoTE _ The following words appear here in the German text : 
wahrend diese unserr II, un.hu,,,,, u ,,,„ Vermin, lu„„, von <!'Y"°,Zden 
Diplomat* unterstutzt, mil stewender Drvnglichkeit fortgefuhrt »!'"'' 
("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued 
with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy ). 



558 Official Diplomatic Documents 

the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your medi- 
ation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the 
peace of Europe. 

" Your cordially devoted 

" Nicolas." 

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, 
sent by H. M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. : 

" Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request 
for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your 
Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. 
While this action was taking place, Your troops were be- 
ing mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, 
as I have already communicated to You, my mediation 
has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have con- 
tinued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious 
preparations for war arc going on on my eastern frontier. 
The responsibility for the security of my country forces 
me to measures of defence. 1 have. gone to the extreme 
limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of 
the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsi- 
bility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire 
civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No 
one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might 
well have awaited the success of my mediation. The 
friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed tome 
by my grandfather on his deathbed, lias always been sacred 
to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was 
in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The 
peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia 
derides to discontinue those military preparations which 
menace Germany and Austria-Hungary." 

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobili- 
sation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against 
us ami already ordered during the afternoon ' of the 31st 
of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram 
of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon. 

After the Russian general mobilisation became known 
in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was 
instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to 
the Russian Government that Germany declared the state See exhibit 
of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisa- 
tion of the Russian army and navy which must be fol- 
lowed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military 
measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 
12 hours, and notified Germany thereof. 

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris 
was instructed to demand from the French Government a 

1 Note. — The German text says here Vormillag (morning). 



German White Book 559 

declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neu- 
See exhibit tral in a Russo-German war. 

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili- 
sation, menacing the security of our country, the labori- 
ous action at mediation of the European cabinets. 1 The 
Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which 
the Russian Government was never allowed by us to en- 
tertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, 
shows clearly that Russia wanted war. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh delivered 
his note to M. Sasonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight. 

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached 
us. 

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar 
telegraphed to II. M. the Kaiser, as follows : 

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that 
You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from 
You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., 
that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall 
continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries 
and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. 
With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried 
friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect 
with full confidence Your urgent reply." 

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied : 

" I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yester- 
day to Your Government the way through which alone 
war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply 
by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has 
reached me with the reply of Your Government. I there- 
fore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immedi- 
ate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is 
the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this 
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the 
subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly 
that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, 
under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our 
frontiers." 

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without 
the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser 
ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and 
Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m. 

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was in- 
structed that, in the event of the Russian Government not 
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he 
should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of 
war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a 

1 Note. — The German text adds here kurz vot dem Erfolge ("just as 
it was on the point of succeeding"). 



500 



Official Diplomatic Documents 



confirmation of the execution of this order had been re- 
ceived, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August See exhibit 
1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the 26 ' 
Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our 
frontier and marched into German territory. 

Thus Russia began the war against us. 

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our 
question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m. 

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and 
unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., which gave See exhibit 
no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited him- 27 ' 
self to the explanation that France would do that which 
her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the 
mobilisation of the entire French Army and Navy was 
ordered. 

On the morning of the next day France opened hostili- 
ties. 



British Blue Book 561 

IV. The British Blue Book 
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 

(1) 

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew 
of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the 
Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Serajevo, the 
capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accom- 
panied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing thr< lugh 
the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the 
Archduke and Duchess were killed. 

X< > crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout 
Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria 
was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of 
Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, 
which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the 
murderer and his accomplices. 

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives 
abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attrib- 
uted much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Govern- 
ment, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement 
amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist 
movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement 
in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish 
Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the 
seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between 
Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the 
administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. 
Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should 
not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan 
over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she 
suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th 
October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo by 
the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of 
official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling 
immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to 
the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the 
feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's atti- 
tude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other 
Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six 
months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration 
abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with 
Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and 
were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 
2o 



5G2 Official Diplomatic Documents 

— successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her 
territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her 
designs deepened. 

(2) 

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which 
swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily under- 
stood. It was a. feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe 
was disposeil to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its 
motives. 

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were imme- 
diately evident from the reports which reached the Government in 
London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Serajevo and Agram. The 
members of (lie Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were 
assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs 
in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, 
almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and 
called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs 
that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by 
the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German 
Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. 

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on dis- 
interested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direc- 
tion which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, 
though tlie attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, 
also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Govern- 
ment remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office 
maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian 
Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to 
make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of 
Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned 
with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb 
propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of 
Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parlia- 
ment, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the 
Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no 
reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian 
Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Aus- 
trian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President 
of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not war- 
rant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even 
probable. 

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on 
conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, 
but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness 
to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an inde- 
pendent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and 
French — anil also of the German — ■ Governments was that the 



British Blue Book 563 

Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that 
Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda 
which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated 
in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself 
moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador 
to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direc- 
tion. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been 
furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for 
revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial 
had been set up at Serajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. 
The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the 
Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected 
before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Govern- 
ment also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian 
subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government 
had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one 
of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was 
remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten 
guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought 
forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed 
on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose 
to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this 
to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he 
certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would 
be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government 
did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had 
founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. 

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as 
it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. 
There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no 
incalculable element which Austria could not take into full considera- 
tion. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences 
of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained 
as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that 
no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. 
Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that 
the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. 
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd 
May the Russian Minister for Eoreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the 
Duma the policy of the " Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known 
that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power 
would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the 
Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded 
as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be 
humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It 
was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Peters- 
burgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations 
bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. 
These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 



564 Official Diplomatic Documents 

1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European 
diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situa- 
tion, the products of years of development, tested and retested during 
the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product 
of years could not be pushed aside in a day. 

(3) 

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. 
On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum 
at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made 
ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national 
life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands 
involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression 
of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, 
the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian 
officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified 
men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full 
explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification 
of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian 
Government was to publish on the front page of the Official Journal 
a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her 
alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary 
was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret 
trial at Serajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent 
nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. 

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war 
I ict ween Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only 
twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there 
was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it 
may he well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the 
Austrian ultimatum. 

Austria was tinder provocation. She had to complain of a danger- 
ous popular movement against her government. What evidence she 
might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then 
knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. 
She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the 
Balkan States ; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan 
Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a 
State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient ; the devotion and 
confidence of the new citizens must beenlisted." The dispute between 
Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a 
dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had 
nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had 
no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between 
Austria and Servia ; that he would express no opinion on the merits of 
the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute af- 
fected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake ; 



British Blue Book 565 

and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that 
he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take 
any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the 
ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could 
only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 
1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, 
patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take 
on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the 
agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that G rea -t Britain intervened 
in the European crisis. 

(4) 

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an 
ultimatum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. 
Grey heard that " there would be something in the nature of a time 
limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning 
the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the 
time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Am- 
bassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. 
There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. 

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, " the key of the 
situation was to lie found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude ? 
Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his 
doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called 
it " equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the 
localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no 
time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. 
Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and 
had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French 
Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known 
to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning 
the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain 
indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in 
Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hos- 
tile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal 
with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had 
come universal alarm. 

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts 
at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be 
extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great 
Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. 
All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to 
Vienna. 

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, German}', 
and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in 
favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia 



566 Official Diplomatic Documents 

declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if 
relations between Austria and Russia became threatening." 

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Bel- 
grade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet 
Austria. 

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not ex- 
tend, had expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the 
afternoon of .Saturday, the 2.1th, she returned to Austria a reply which 
amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on 
certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and 
amending her ( institution, and subject to an explanation by Austria- 
Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of 
Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply 
went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted 
- had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Am- 
bassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left 
the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported 
that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so 
drawn, up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory 
nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same 
evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. 

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to 
Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately 
expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept 
it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of 
Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. 
The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact 
that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly 
afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and 
that her concessions were all a sham. 

(5) 

Daring the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one 
question before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought 
to an agreement ? It was evident that Russia did not believe that 
Austria, would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian 
State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was 
not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two 
nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with per- 
fect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. Hut the 
Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popu- 
lar enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept 
from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with 
Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere 
punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, there- 
fore, openly said that she would have to intervene if .Servia were 
attacked ; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use 
all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to 



British Blue Book 567 

give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostili- 
ties in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it 
was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia 
ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. 

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, 
Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to dis- 
cuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once 
accepted ; Russia said she was ready to stand aside ; but Germany 
refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," 
and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. 
These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last para- 
graph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war 
against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment 
for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to dis- 
cuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that 
refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, there- 
fore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassa- 
dors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to 
accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey 
to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to 
work for a settlement. 

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th 
July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. 
Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, 
better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 2Sth at least, both 
Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situ- 
ation was really serious ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and 
France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply 
to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make 
representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. 
But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the 
British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assur- 
ances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir 
E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the 
request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, 
if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the 
form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. 
"Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any 
method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 
press the button on the interests of peace." The telegram was 
despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th. 

(G) 

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange re- 
sponse. About riiidnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office 
from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor 
had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would 



568 Official Diplomatic Documents 

promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch 
Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused 
to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, 
but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would 
be taken from her. 

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an 
exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for 
peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was 
concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she 
desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agree- 
ment with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be 
thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. 

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, 
some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained 
a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of 
Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only 
conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria ; 
the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and 
Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she 
desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal develop- 
ment ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had 
seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace ; it was only a 
question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh. But now a new element of clanger had been introduced. 
Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack 
on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries 
had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of 
securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the 
country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. 
If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war 
would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth 
of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, 
the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard 
to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international 
treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations 
of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, 
it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet 
of that peace. 

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her 
treaty obligations in the past ; her action now was not wanton. Bel- 
gium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if 
such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death ; Germany 
feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In 
face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality 
of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent 
the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality 
in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Govern- 
ment, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and 
French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutral- 



British Blue Book 569 

ity, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. 
France gave the necessary engagement the same day ; Belgium gave 
it the day after ; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there 
could be no doubt of German designs. 

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between 
Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria 
that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. 
Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, 
if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a 
question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her 
ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of 
Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His 
Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to 
do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis 
namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. 
Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these 
discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. 

(7) 

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched 
an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her 
mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made 
for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, 
overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be 
said is that, according to the information in the possession of His 
Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded 
as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not 
publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. 
France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of 
State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint 
action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be 
received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burgh presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Satur- 
day, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no 
account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, 
and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her 
frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very 
early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded 
Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been 
guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar 
guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, 
Russia, and France had become inevitable. 

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's 
Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should 
they now remain neutral ? The grounds on which that question was 
decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. 
Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume, 1 and no 

■ See Part II. 



570 Official Diplomatic Documents 

additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be em- 
phasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British 
support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval 
assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined 
to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He 
maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinter- 
ested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would he 
enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely 
to either side in the existing dispute. lie refused to believe that the 
best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took 
no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we 
confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, 
and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain 
neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge 
to our present allies, but to ( rermany we gave three times — on the 
30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning of the 
effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment 
of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium. 

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon 
of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows : 
" In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done 
all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's 
Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of 
Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with 
every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of 
Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the 
peace of Europe. 

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. 



PART THREE 

DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY QUOTED BUT NOT CON- 
TAINED IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COL- 
LECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 



I. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG 

August 4, 1914 

[Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt of August 5, 1914] 

A terrible fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years 
after winning in war the respect of the world for our German Em- 
pire, we have lived in peace, and have guarded the peace of Europe. 
In peaceful labour we have grown strong and mighty ; and people 
have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to 
be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against 
us. The wind was sown there and now we have the whirlwind. 
We wanted to go on living -and working in peace, and like a silent 
vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the 
will: "Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause." Now 
the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch 
to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and 
France. 

Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying 
events have been distributed to you. Let me single out the facts 
which characterise our action. 

From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and la- 
boured that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the 
same ground, only Russia insisted that she should have to say a word. 
This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon 
as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached 
us we declared in St. Petersburgh, kindly but firmly, that military prep- 
arations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that 
mobilisation and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the 
most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. Eng- 
land in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and 
Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28, the 
Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria 
had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater- 
Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The 
Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical 
interest against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help, 
him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and 
St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received 
this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel 
moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, 
but he had hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilised all her troops 
573 



574 Official Diplomatic Documents 

against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had 
mobilised only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other 
corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor 
at once pointed out to the Czar that the Russian mobilisation made 
his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if 
not impossible. We nevertheless continued our mediation, — even 
to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time, 
Russia of her own accord repeated her assurance that she was mak- 
ing no military preparations against us. 

Then came July 31. In Vienna a decision was due. We had 
already succeeded so far that Vienna had renewed her personal 
exchange of opinion with St. Petersburgh, which had stopped for 
some time. But even before a decision was taken in Vienna, we 
received the news that Russia was mobilising her entire army — 
that is, she was mobilising also against us. The Russian Govern- 
ment, which from our repeated representations knew what a mobili- 
sation on our frontier meant, did not notify us, and gave us no ex- 
planatory reply. Nor until the afternoon of July 31st a telegram 
was received from the Czar in which he. said that his army was tak- 
ing no provocative attitude toward us. The Russian mobilisation, 
however, on our frontier had been vigorously begun as early as dur- 
ing the night of July 30th. Thus while we were still trying to medi- 
ate in Vienna, at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force 
rose on our long, almost open frontier. And France, while she was 
not yet mobilising, confessed that she was making military prepara- 
tions. And we'/ We had intentionally refrained, up to that mo- 
ment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of 
the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting longer, and until 
the Rowers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own 
moment of attack'/ 

To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime ! 
For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia 
demobilise, which action alone could still have preserved the peace 
of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was simul- 
taneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider 
ourselves at war with Russia if she declined. The Imperial Ambas- 
sador has followed his instructions. 

Even to-day we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand 
that she demobilise. No telegraphic news has reached us, although 
the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less impor- 
tant matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the 
Emperor was obliged to mobilise our military forces, at five o'clock 
in the afternoon of August 1st. 

At the same time, we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude 
of France. She replied to our definite enquiry whether she would 
be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do 
what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question, 
if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that 
the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been 



The Chancellor's Speech in the Reichstag 575 

rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobi- 
lized at the same hour that we did declared that she would respect 
a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen ? 
Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading 
Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been 
declared. 

As regards the one exception mentioned, I have received this 
report from the General Staff: "As regards France's complaints 
concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one case is to be ac- 
knowledged. Contrary to definite orders, a patrol of the 14th Army 
Corps, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 
2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, who returned. 
But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place, 
French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany, 
and near the Schlucht pass, French troops made an attack on our 
frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the 
protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Stair'. 

We have been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity 
of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied 
Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian 
territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is 
true that the French government announced in Brussels that it 
would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would 
do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of 
Belgium. 

France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack 
on our flank might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to 
disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. 
For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon 
as our military end is obtained. People, who like ourselves, are 
fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they 
may survive. 1 

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria- 
Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's 
remarks in the lower house of Parliament yesterday have shown what 
her stand will be. We have assured the English government that 
we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England 
remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity 
and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before 
the whole world ; and I may add, that as long as England remains 
neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the 
French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchant- 
men in the same way. 

Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this 
war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits 

1 The German word durchhauen has been translated in the English press "hack 
their way through." While the German word hauen and the English word "hark" 
are akin, their meanings, and even more their connotated meanings are very different. 
"Hack their way through" suggests brutal methods, which the word durchhauen 
does not. 



576 Official Diplomatic Documents 

of our peaceful labor and our heritage of the great past : We are 
fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which 
Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to 
protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870. 

Now the supreme hour has come which will test our people. But 
it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field, 
our fleet is well prepared, and hack of them stands the whole Ger- 
man people. — The Whole German People ! 

[For Sir E. Grey's two speeches, August 3, 1914, and Mr. Asquith's three 
speeches, August 4, 5, 6, 1014, see the facsimile reproduction of the British Blue 
Book, pp. 89 to its. 

For President Poincare's message August ■">, and M. Viviani's speech on the 
same day, see French Yellow Book Nos. 158, 159, August 5, 1914.] 



The "Brussels" Documents 577 



II. THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS 

Found by the German Government in Brussels and published in facsimile 
in a special Supplement to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" 
of November 25, 1914- 

(1) 
(Translation) 

Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] 

Minister of J]'ar respecting the Confidential Interviews. 
(Confidential.) 

Sir, Brussels, April 10, 1906. 

I have the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversa- 
tions which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which 
I have already reported to you verbally. 

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General 
Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possi- 
bilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send 
about 100,000 men. 

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret 
such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could 
only be advantageous ; but that this question of intervention had 
also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister 
of War. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at 
Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the British troops 
would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of 
Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be 
carried out in the quickest possible way. 1 Landing at Antwerp would 
take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, more- 
over, the risk would be greater. 

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., 
transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British 
Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the 
allied forces. 

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure 
the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the 
British troops — a period which he estimated ^t about ten days. 

I answered that the fortresses of Xamur and Liege were safe against 
a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men 

1 The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : — 

(Translation) 
"The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation 
of our neutrality by Germany." 
2p 



578 Official Diplomatic Documents 

would he ready to take the field. After having expresssed his entire 
satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following 
points : (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was 
in no way binding on his Government; (3) his Minister, the British 
General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the 
matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted. 

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured 
me that he had never received any confidential information from other 
military attaches about our army. lie then gave me a detailed 
statement of the strength of the British forces : we might rely on it 
that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, 
and two brigades of mounted infantry would belauded. 

lie asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces 
to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with 
this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the com- 
position of the landing force. 

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field 
army, and considered it important that no detaelunents from that 
army should be sent to Namur and Liege, as those fortresses were 
provided with adequate garrisons. 

lie drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army 
take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations 
respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the ques- 
tion of the chief command. 

1 replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised 
that I would study the other questions with care. 

Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous estimate : 
twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the 
coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a 
half months) to land 1011, 000 men at Antwerp. 

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarka- 
tion was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it 
would be better to semi on the troops by degrees as they arrived on 
the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise 
details of the daily disembarkation table. 

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed 
my visitor that that question would easily be arranged. 

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the 
problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured 
me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the 
remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the 
mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later. 

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of know- 
ing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway 
arrangements for each day. 

The British attache then spoke to me of various other questions, 
viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, 
and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the 
advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each 



The " Brussels " Documents 579 

British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gen- 
darmes to each unit to help the British military police. 

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I 
examined the question of combined operations in the event of a 
German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis 
of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes. 

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had 
laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, 
Chief of the British General Staff. 

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed 
of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, 
gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of 
extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs 
dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for 
the wounded of the allied army, etc. Nothing was settled as to the 
possible control of the Press by the Government or the military 
authorities. 

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British 
attache he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the 
troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance 
of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, 
would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the 
tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would 
carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of 
the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur- 
Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the 
second corps on the sixteenth day. 

I finally urged once again,' as forcibly as was within my power, the 
necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British 
troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day ; 
the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the 
concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other 
hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be 
achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would 
be done with that end in view. 

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of con- 
vincing the military attache of our resolve to impede the enemies' 
movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in 
Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his 
side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the sup- 
port or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his 
Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the 
French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared 
of all German warships. 

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any 
confidential information he possessed respecting the military condi- 
tion and general situation of our eastern neighbour, etc. At the same 
time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself 
well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. 



580 Official Diplomatic Documents 

I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service 
beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our 
General Staff. We had no military attaches at our legations. I 
took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether 
the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. 
But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which 
places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, 
our possible enemies. 

Major-General, 

Chief of General Staff. 

(Initialled) 

Note. — When I met General Grierson at Compiegne at the ma- 
noeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British 
army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, 
but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been 
previously estimated. 

End of September 1906. 

(Initialled) 



(2) 
(Translation) 

(Confidential.) 

The British military attache asked to see General Jungbluth. 
These gentlemen met on the 23rd April. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, 
available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six 
divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 
men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Every- 
thing was ready. 

The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would 
have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not 
asked for help. 

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this. 

The military attache answered that he knew that, but that as we 
were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our 
territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. 

As to the place of landing, the military attache was not explicit. 
He said the coast was rather long ; but the general knows that Mr. 
Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the 
Easter holidays. 

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able 
to prevent the Germans from going through. 

April 24, 1912. 



The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 581 



III. THE ALLIED ANSWER TO THE "BRUSSELS" 
DOCUMENTS 

No. 1 

Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F, 
Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 1 

Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913. 

In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unoffi- 
cially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was 
apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian 
neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have conic 
from a British source. 

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a 
British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in 
Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch 
of German troops through Belgium to France. 

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first 
to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any 
British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public 
opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was 
a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it woidd be desirable 
and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, 
to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be 
the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to 
give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into 
Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of 
other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, 
and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should 
certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory. 

I am, etc., 

E. Grey.. 

No. 2 

Extract from, a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, 
to the Belgia n Min isterfor Foreign Affa irs, dated December 23, 1911. 
{From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 1914.) 

(Translation) 

From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south 
from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. 
For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have 
positive facts to go upon. 

The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without doubt, 
the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were 

1 A record of this dispatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs. 



582 Official Diplomatic Documents 

not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked 
such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there 
about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain 
unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison with- 
out hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of oper- 
ations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and West- 
phalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have 
been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we 
should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of 
resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish 
as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif revelations 
of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the Entente 
cordiale showed us clearly what was intended. When it became 
evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threaten- 
ing danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed 
abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not 
to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. 
The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied 
than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed 
or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British 
army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our 
frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately 
invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage 
of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region 
where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our 
wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy 
provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder 
our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged 
ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great 
Britain and her allies. 

I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up 
for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the require- 
ments of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy 
in the case of a war between Germany and France. 

No. 3 

Circular Telegram, addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives 
abroad. 1 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October 14, 1014- 

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 190(i published 
in the German press, and based on documents said to have been 
found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various 
forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever 
existed. 

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel 

1 This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in 
No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publi- 
cation of the documents themselves. 



The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 583 

(now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before 
Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the 
War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels. 
In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect 
the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some 
academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel 
Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the 
Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army 
might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours 
violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may 
exist in the archives at Brussels. 

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the 
year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a 
threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, 
in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through 
Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed. 

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agree- 
ment of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of 
Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations 
that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the 
utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in 
whatever form such violation might come. 

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs 
on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, 
has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading 
from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-popu- 
lated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack 
upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago. 

No. 4 

Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master 
of Christ's College, Cambridge. 

Dear Master of Christ's, November 14, 1914- 

The enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by 
the Foreign Office in answer to your question. 

Yours truly, 

(Signed) Haldaxe. 



Enclosure 1 
Memorandum 

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged 
with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium 
had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially 
as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension 
that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever 



584 Official Diplomatic Documents 

military discussions have taken place before this war have been 
limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend 
France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans 
have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We 
had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the 
Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending 
troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated 
that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French 
fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, 
and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through 
Belgium. Xo British soldiers and no British stores were landed on 
the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium 
had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only 
after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if 
the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these 
munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak 
of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never 
discussed or contemplated by the British Government. 

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication 
of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement 
by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government 
had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the 
Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an inter- 
national obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger 
that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an 
appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been 
done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would 
violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. 
The French agreed, the ( rermans declined to agree. The appeal made 
by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White 
Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see Xo. 114 of British 
Correspondence, page 87). The reason, why Germany would not 
agree was stated very frankly byllerr von Jagow, the German Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; 
and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see Xo. 160 of British 
Correspondence, page 11(1) that we published. The attitude of the 
British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve 
the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to 
Belgium until Germany had invaded it, ami Belgium had appealed for 
assistance to maintain the international Treaty. 

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, 
and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, 
if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the 
neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This 
allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate 
the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But 
it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs 
that she herself entertains ; as it is clear now that, for some long 
time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack 



The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 585 

France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed which was issued 
by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point. 

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material 
for a reply to the German statements. 

Foreign Office, ,9th November, 1914- 



Enclosure 2 
Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Gray Book. 



Enclosure 3 
Extract from " The Times" of 30th September, 1.914. 

Neutrality of Belgium 
Official Statement 

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that 
if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or 
Great Britain would have done so. It has' declared that French and 
British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. 
We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official state- 
ment which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the 
one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier had set 
foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 
there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds : — 

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would 
oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in 
Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of 
theAgadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could 
not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for 
the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against 
attempts upon it from any and every quarter. 



Enclosure 4 

Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives 
abroad on the 14th October, 1.914- 

See above No. 3 of " The Allied Answer to the Brussels Documents." 



586 Official Diplomatic Documents 

IV. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH 
SIR EDWARD GREY 

(Published in the North German Gazette, September 6, 1914) 

According to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the 
House of Commons that the publication by the German Govern- 
ment of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war 
was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by 
telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation imme- 
diately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This 
telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The Times, appar- 
ently upon information from official sources, made the same asser- 
tion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed 
by the German Government in order that it might accuse England 
of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. 

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non- 
existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was 
dispatched from London at 11 a.m., Prince Lichnowsky on August 
1 st sent the following telegram : 

First, at 1.15 p.m. 

"... Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see 
me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regard- 
ing England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to 
war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward 
Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately." 

Second, at 5.30 p.m. 

"Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration, 
which has been unanimously framed by the cabinet: 

" 'The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- 
trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neu- 
trality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany 
could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which 
has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve 
anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the 
other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public 
feeling in this country.' 

" In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we 
respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declara- 
tion concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied 
that that was impossible for him to do, but that this epiestion would 
nevertheless play an important part in public opinion here. If we 
should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal 
of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult 
for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the 



Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 5S7 

present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action 
against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in 
any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line 
marking how far we might go before there would be intervention 
from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and 
expressed the opinion that this question would play an important 
part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible 
that we and France should remain armed against each other without 
attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether 
he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a 
compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France 
nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we 
could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would insure us 
the neutrality of Great Britain. 

" The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he did not overlook 
the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive." 

Third, at S.30 p.m. : 

"My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this 
evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been 
submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me 
are superfluous." 

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication 
that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning 
the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the 
alleged misunderstanding. 



588 Official Diplomatic Documents 



V. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. 
GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH 
LEGATION 

(Published in the North German Gazette, December 15th, 1914) 

New and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian 
complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant-Watson, the Secretary of the 
Britisli Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the 
legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Ant- 
werp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught 
trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away 
unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the 
papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the 
most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and 
the defence nf Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They 
include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, 
bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War 
and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a con- 
ference of the "Commission tic la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers," 
on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the 
British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government 
had no military secrets to hide from the British Government, and 
that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very 
close touch with each other. 

There is also a hand-written note of special interest which was 
found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to 
destroy. It follows : 

Renseignements ' 

1. Les ofheiers francais ont recu ordre de rejoindre des le 27, 
apres-midi. 

2. Le meme jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a recu ordre de con- 
centrer vers Maubeuge tons les wagons fermes disponible, en vue 
dn transport de troupes. 

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries. 

Feignies, it may he remarked, is a railway station in France on 
the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the 
Belgian frontier ; Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilo- 
metres from the frontier. 

From this notice it must be gathered that France had already 
made her first mobilisation plans on July 27, and that the British 

1 Translation : 1. The French officers have received orders to join tin' colors by 
tin- 27th in tin' afternoon. 

'J. For tin- same 'lay the Superintendent of tin' railw i\ station of Feignies has received 
orders to collect in the direction of Maubeuge all available closed coaches, with a view 
to the transport of troops. 



Documents Found in the Possession of Mr. (! rant-Watson 589 

Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian 
sources. 

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valu- 
able proof — if indeed any may be needed — of the relations existing 
between England and Belgium. It shows anew that Belgium had 
sacrificed her own neutrality in favor of the Entente, and that she 
was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to 
fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Bel- 
gian neutrality really was nothing but a "scrap of paper," to which 
she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded 
when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British 
Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Ger- 
many only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world 
and before the British people. 



590 Official Diplomatic Documents 



VI. TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN 
THE ROYAL AND IMPERIAL COURTS OF LONDON, 
BERLIN, AND PETROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KING 
GEORGE AND PRESIDENT POINCARE 



Telegrams Exchanged between His Majesty King George and 
His Majesty the Czar 

(Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914) 

No. 1 
Sir Edward (Ircy to Sir (!. Buchanan (St. Petersburgh). 

Foreign Office, 1st August, 101 1±. 

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the 
Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the 
King : — 

"My Government has received the following statement from the 
German Government : — 

" 'On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor 
by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor 
immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the 
Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action 
at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia, 
mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor 
pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at media- 
tion would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the 
Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. 
This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Govern- 
ment continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German 
Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested 
to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals 
made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely 
on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government 
recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They 
were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the 
deliberations of the (?Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con- 
eluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported the 
mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this 
action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German 
proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was 
not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against 
Germany — that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been in- 
vi >ke< 1 by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious 
counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider 
as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our 



Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 591 

country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian 
mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that 
unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike 
measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to 
mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she 
would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.' 

" I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has pro- 
duced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility 
of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the 
whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove 
the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave 
still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think 
I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do 
everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted con- 
versations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you 
are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to 
secure the peace of the world." 



No. 2 
His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George. 

1st August, 1914. 

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German 
Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government 
declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, 
Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of 
the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was 
to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this 
would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of 
such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of 
your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was 
only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria 
had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even 
then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declara- 
tion of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, 
in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised 
a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can 
mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to 
take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, 
of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops 
in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Ger- 
many. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's 
sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as 
I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William 
that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations 
continued. 

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have 



592 Official Diplomatic Documents 

done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on 
me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. 
God bless and protect you. 

II 

Telegrams Exchanged between London and Berlin, 30th July- 
2nd August, 1914 

(Published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zcitung of the 20th 
August, 1914) 

No. 1 
His Royal Highness Prince Henri/ of Prussia to His Majesty King 
George, dated SOih July, 1914. 

I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were 
so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, 
who was very thankful to receive your message. 

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with 
the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is 
in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has 
to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures 
which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken 
five days ago. 

We have also received information that France is making military 
preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but 
may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue 
their preparations. This would then mean a European war. 

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible mis- 
fortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and 
also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this 
would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, 
perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. 
I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever 
give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, 
which otherwise appears inevitable. 

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in 
his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military prepara- 
tions of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their 
example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would 
remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to 
you, and I hope that yon will receive my communication in the same 
friendly spirit which has inspired it. 

(Signed) Henry. 



No. 2 

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of 
Prussia, dated 30th duly, 1914-. 
Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's 
efforts to act with Nichi »las for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly 



Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 593 

desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which 
could not be remedied — may be prevented. My Government is 
doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to 
postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares 
herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring 
Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her 
demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their 
preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence 
in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he 
will prove that Germany and England are working together to 
prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure 
William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that 
lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe. 

(Signed) George. 



No. 3 

His Majesty the Emperor William, to His Majesty King George, dated 
31st July, 1914- 
Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals 
coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this 
evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. 
I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just 
reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation 
of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of 
the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely 
without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety 
of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already 
taken up their position. (Signed) William. 



No. 4 

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 
1st August, 1914- 
Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an 
urgent telegram J to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my 
readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of 
the negotiations between the powers concerned. 

(Signed) George. 



No. 5 

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, 
dated 1st August, 1914- 
Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has 
asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of 

1 See page 590. 
2q 



594 Official Diplomatic Documents 

France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not 
attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume 
responsibility for this. (Signed) Lichnowsky. 



No. C> 

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 
1st August, 191%. 

I HAVE just received the communication of your Government 
offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. 
To this offer there was added the question whether, under these 
conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For 
technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this 
afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must proceed according to 
the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as 
your telegram unfortunately came too late, hut if France offers me 
her neutrality, which must he guaranteed by the English army and 
navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and 
employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. 
The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by 
telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier. 

(Signed) William. 



No. 7 

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, 
daieil 1st Aligns/, 191 ',. 

Germany" is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of 
England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality 
of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to 
the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before 
the English proposals were received. In consecpience our advance 
to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, how- 
ever, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until 
Monday, the :!r<l of August, at seven P.M., in case England's assent is 
received by that time. (Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg. 



No. S 

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 
1st August, 1914. 

In answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I be- 
lieve that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a sugges- 
tion which was made in a friendly conversation between Frince 
Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how 



Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 595 

an actual conflict between the German and the French army might 
be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being 
arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see 
Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain 
whether there is any misunderstanding on his side. 

(Signed) George. 



No. 9 

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, 
dated 2nd August, 191 4- 
The suggestions of Sir Edward Grey based on the desire of creat- 
ing the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were 
made without any previous inquiry of France and without knowledge 
of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite imprac- 
ticable. , 

(Signed) Lichnowsky. 

Ill 

Telegrams from the German Ambassador at London to the 
German Imperial Chancellor, 1st August, 1914 

(Published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the Gth 
September, 1914) 

No. 1 

1st August, 1.15 p.m. 
. . . Sir Edward Grey's Private Secretary has just been to see 
me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me 
for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with 
Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will 
communicate at once. 



No. 2 

1st August, 5.30 p.m. 

Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration 
which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet : — 

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutral- 
ity of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality 
of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see 
her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given 
by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and 
tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the 
neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, 



596 Official Diplomatic Documents 

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this coun- 
try." 

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain 
the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration 
with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered 
that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great 
part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutral- 
ity in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public 
opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain 
friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention 
to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire 
to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, 
however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without 
intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian 
neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a 
great part. 

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France 
should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another 
without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange 
that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we 
wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French 
territory, I could think that w r e would give our assent to an arrange- 
ment of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great 
Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he also recog- 
nised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides. 



No. :; 

1st August, 8.80 p.m. 

My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communica- 
tion of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before 
us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous. 

IV 

Telegram from His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty" the 
Emperor William 

(Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915) 

29th .July. 1914- 
Thanks for your telegram, 1 which is conciliatory and friendly, 
whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador 
to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to 
explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro- 
Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom 
and friendship. 

1 German White Book, No. 2U. 



Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 597 



Letters exchanged between His Majesty King George and 
the President of the French Republic 

(Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915) 

No. 1 
The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George. 
Dear and Great Friend, Paris, July 31, 1914- 

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound 
to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of 
the Republic have received from Germany. The military prepara- 
tions which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, 
especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are 
being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, 
resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her 
power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely 
to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not 
appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's 
action ; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of 
the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of 
public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events. 

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war 
would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British 
Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might 
be engaged ; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the 
entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent 
of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance 
that peace would remain unbroken. 

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete 
liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters ex- 
changed in 1912 ' between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, 
Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual 
agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, 
and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable. 

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given 
in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, 
the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to 
work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which 
your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you 
quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government 
of the Republic and of all France. 

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British 
Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settle- 
ment depend. 

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined 
upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not 

1 See pp. 337 f., and Facsimile of British Blue Book, pp. 90 f. 



598 Official Diplomatic Documents 

swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in con- 
formity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act 
on the same lines. 

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if 
Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great 
Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement 
between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly 
convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, 
and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their 
diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the 
preservation of peace. 

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired 
by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely re- 
affirmed. 

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments. 

R. POINCABE. 



No. 2 
His- Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic. 
Dear and Great Friend, Buckingham. Palace, August 1, 1914- 

I must highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write 
to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for 
having stated your views so fully and frankly. 

You may lie assured that the present situation in Europe has been 
the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad 
to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together 
in endeavouring to iind a peaceful solution of the questions at issue. 

It would a be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts 
were to meet with success, anil I am still not without hope that the 
terrible events which seem so near may be averted. 

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercis- 
ing in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier 
and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted 
as a. provocative one. 

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of 
Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual 
military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus 
given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute 
these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an 
amicable settlement. 

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly 

that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may 

be ,i --.iired that my Government will continue to discuss freely and 

frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations 

with M. Cambon. T) ,• 

believe me, 

M. le President, 

(Signed) George R. I. 



INDEX 



Africa, 

British Attacks on German Territory, 

506. 
Congo. See that Title. 
German Offensive against British Cen- 
tral African Protectorate, 506, 
509. 
Great Britain declines proposal not to 
carry war into Africa, 506. 
Alsace-Lorraine, 

Inhabitants forbidden to cross frontier, 
325. 
Austria- Hungary, 
Belgium — 

War declared with, 507, 509. 
Belgian Reply, 510. 
British Ambassador — 

Comments on events from 22 July, 

514. 
Final Interview with Count Berch- 
told, 520. 
British relations with, 432, 468. 

War declared by Great Britain, 49S. 
Communications with Representatives 
at — 



Belgrade, 2, 3, 36, 40, 141, 241. 
Berlin, 51, 101, 180, 203, 241, 246, 

247, 278, 280, 400, 507, 508. 
Constantinople, 51, 101. 
London, 12, 51, 57, 65, 66, 101, 180, 
203, 243, 244, 276, 345, 432. 468, 
496, 498. 
Nish, 14. 
Paris, 12, 67, 68, 51, 180, 203, 276, 

277, 347, 484, 490, 491. 
Rome, 51, 101, 180. 203, 270. 
St. Petersburgh, 51, 68, 69, 71, 101, 
141, 145, 148. 179, 180, 202, 
203, 243, 276, 278, 280, 318, 345. 
346, 347, 373, 459. 
Semlin, 142. 
Tokio, 241, 508. 
Uskub, 6. 

Vienna, 140, 346, 506. 
General Mobilization of Army and Fleet, 

197, 272, 356, 391. 
Japan — Relations broken off, 508. 
Mediation proposals, Attitude towards, 
68, 142, 484, 490, — 252, 287, 
329, 392, 393, 394, — 302, 385, 
386,-237, 270, 274, 310, 312. 
Military Preparations, 285. 
Notification to Powers of Great-Ser- 
bian propaganda and its con- 
nection with the Serajevo mur- 
der, 101. 
Notification of state of war with Servia, 
276. 

599 



Austria-Hungary — Cont. 

Russia, Relations with — 

Direct Conversations, proposals for 
mediation &c, 277, 301, 302, 
310, 336, 347, 363. 

Refusal by Austria of Russian sug- 
gestions, 297, 309, 328. 

German efforts to prevent danger, 297. 
Mediation proposals. See that Sub- 
head, above. 
Russia will stop military preparations 
only upon certain conditions, 
331, 333. 
Russia's threatening attitude leads to 

war, 459. 
War declared by Austria, 459. 
Sandjak, no intentions to advance into 

or occupy the, 385, 3S9. 
Serbia, Relations with — 

Austrian Attitude, 19, 85, 329, — 67. 
68, 69, 140, 180, 277, 373, 484, 
— 34, 56, 61, 86, 87, S9. 90, 92, 
9.3, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 
168, 192,-77. 82. 153. 

See also Title: Mediation proposals. 

Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 
101. 

Austrian Intentions, 85, 329, 385, 
389, — 218, 302. 

Austrian official reports as to Ser- 
bian feelings towards Austria, 
2, 3, 6, 14, 36. 

British Attitude, 164, 165, 174, 192, 
193, 194, 195, 196, 226, 265, 
268, 332, 359. 

See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

French Attitude and French Reports 
of Events from Date of Serajevo 
Murder to Austria's Declaration 
of War, 1. S, 12, 15. 19, 23, 29, 
38, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 74, 77, 
78, 80, 81, 82, 83, S4, 149, 
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 
157, 158, 181, 1S3. 1.S4. is.",, 
186, 187, 190, 213. 215, 216, 
217, 21S, 219, 220, 221, 222, 
224, (247), 286. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 
German Attitude, 39, 53, 54, 59, 7s, 
80. 81, 90, 92, 97, 151, 153, 
155, 157. 181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 
226. 254, 255, 256, 257, 283, 
293, 327, 328, 551. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 
Localization of the Dispute, German 
View and Efforts, 35, 56, 78, 
91, 159, 194, 226, 256, 257, 552, 
553, 554. 



GOO 



Index 



Austria-Hungary — Cont. 

Mediation Proposals, See separate Title. 

Military action not intended bv Austria, 
153, 107. 

Military Operations not to lie under- 
taken immediatelj . L66, 107. 

Non-interference by other Powers — 
German View and Efforts. See 
Subheading: Localization of the 
Dispute, above. 

Narodna Odbrana, 101. 

Narodna Odbrana, Extract from (1911), 
116. 

Narodna Odbrana Society — 

Confidential Reports of the—, 130. 
Nish Local Committee — .Attitude on 

Serajevo Murders, 138. 
Organization and Work of, 101. 
Servian Official Gazette in the Service 

of the—, 123. 
Work of — .Deposition by Trifko 
Krstanovio, 124. 

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns 
as a Basis for Negotiations, 332, 
335, 35.3. 

Russian Attitude, 191, 225, 328, 358, 
— 71, 179, 202, 243, 246, 27s, 
280, 347, 373, — 87, 89, 161, 
193, 228, 261, 193. 228. 261, 
3H7, — 15, 51. 5s. 7 1, 82, 83, 
84, 152, 153, 154. 155, 156, 
LSI, ls4. is.",, 217. 

Set also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

Serbia's alleged willingness to enter- 
tain Austrian requirements, pro- 
vided that only judicial coopera- 
tion is asked, 38. 

Serbian Attitude, 14, 51, 53, 54, 58, 78, 

ISO. 

Serbia's General Mobilization In-fore 
delivery of answer to Austrian 

.Vote. 180. 

Serbian Note of 1908, 65, 262. 

Serbian Press, opinions of. prior to the 

Serajevo Murders, 112. 
Serbian Press on the Assassination, 135. 
Serbian sovereign rights, no infraction 

of—, 395. 
Serbian Territory not. to be seized, 69, 

190, 203. 308, 309, 385, 395. 
Serbian War Office — Pictures of a nature 

hostile to Dual Monarchy, 140. 
Situation before Presentation of Ulti- 
matum of 23 July, 2, 3. 0. 
Sokol Society Dusan the Strong — 
Report of the activities of, in Kragu- 

jevae (1912 13). 121. 
Special Points for Great Britain. 243. 
Telegrams between French and Russian 

Representatives delayed, 23G. 
Turkish Views. 217. 
Ultimatum of 23 July, 63, (34, 75, 78, 

84, 86, 97, 99, 158. 
Austrian Commentary, 523. 
Austrian Statement that Note is not 

an Ultimatum, but a Demarche 

with a time-limit, 65, 150, 100. 



Austria-Hungary — Cont. 
Ultimatum — Cont. 

Ausl ro-Hun;;arian Views, 86, 89. 
British Attitude, so, 91, 92, 93, 162, 

165, — (ill. 
French Attitude and Views, 67, S7, 

91. 160, ltd. 
Germany had no knowledge, 39, 53, 
75, 82, 149, 154. 163, 165, 173, 
174, 187, 189, 250. 
Germany approves Austrian point of 

view, 173. 174. 
Italian Views, 267. 

Point 5 — .Austrian Explanation, 146. 
Redrafting of certain Articles proposed 
by Russia, 197. 
German Attitude, 237. 
Russian Attitude and Views, 87, 89, 

94. ltd. 171, 22s, 261, 367. 
See <iL<> Title: Mediation Proposals. 
Serbian Reply, 142, 156, 157, 158, 175, 

1st), 243. 
Austrian Commentaries. 529. 
Austrian Views, 221, 251. 
British Views, 227, 229, 231. 
German Views, 192, 193, 19 1. 
Non-publication of. in German Press, 

272. 
Refusal of Austria-Hungary to accept, 

174, 2.31, 241. 
Russian Views, 235. 
Special Points to be brought before 

Great Britain, 57, 65. 
Time Chosen for Presentation, signif- 
icance of, 36, 149. 
Time Limit — 
Dangers of. 62. 

Proposals for Extension, 152, 153, 
154, 155, 156, 158, 170, 171, 172, 
181. 
Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. 
British Attitude. 93. 
German Views. 103. 
Italian Views, 196. 
Russian Views, 00. 145, 243. 
Unconditional acceptance demanded, 
104. 
War declared by Austria-Hungary, 181, 
231, 211. 217, 208, 273. 290. 
Belgium, 

Agreement for Joint Action to Resist 

< iermany, 462, 163. 
Appeal to Great Britain, France and 

Russia, 441, 442, 460. 
Austria declares War, 507, 509. 

Belgian Reply, 510. 
Communications with Representatives 
at — 
Belgrade, 149. 
Berlin, 72, 212, 281, 348, 349, 374, 

375, 401, 422, 436, 462. 
Hague, 148, 2sl. 375, 422, 434. 490, 

192, 494, 498, 499, 509, 510. 
London. 72, 281, 348. 349, 373, 374, 
375, 401, 422. 424. 435, 437, 438, 
439, 441, 400, 463, 483, 495, 
505, 512. 



In dex 



G01 



Belgium — Cont. 

Communications with Representatives 
at — Cont. 
Luxemburg, 148, 281, 375. 
Madrid, 436, 462, 463. 
Paris, 72, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375, 
401, 422, 435, 439, 400, 462, 
463, 4S3, 484, 491, 495, 500. 
Rome, 148, 281, 375. 
St. Petersburgh, 72, 281, 375, 401, 422, 

439, 460, 463, 495. 
Vienna, 72, 247, 281, 375, 401, 422. 
Congo. See that Title. 
Despatch to Representatives Abroad 
for Presentation to the respective 
Governments, 461. 
Documents of Secret Military Arrange- 
ments between Great Britain 
and Belgium, 577. 
French Offer of Support and Belgian 

Reply, 422, 425, 430. 
German Assurance that Territory would 

not be annexed, 457. 
German Minister, Departure of, 435, 430. 
German Minister's Notification to 
Belgian Foreign Secretary of 
Breaches of International Law 
by France, 420. 
German Proposal to, after Fall of Liege, 
490, 492, 494, 498. 
Belgian Reply, 494, 499. 
British Approval of Reply, 497. 
French Approval, 497. 
Russian Approval, 499. 
German Request of Free Passage of 
Troops, through, — Belgian Re- 
fusal and British Protest, 455. 
German Ultimatum and Reply, 402. 

421, 424. 

Germany declares War, 452. 

Germany discovers Documents of Secret 

Military Arrangements between 

Great Britain and Belgium, 577. 

Great Britain, Relations with, previous 

to the Outbreak of War, 577. 
Hostile Acts against Germany, 3S7. 

Belgian Reply, 512. 
Integrity of — , German Attitude, 303, 

357. British Attitude, 456. 
Interests in Germany entrusted to Span- 
ish Ambassador, 436, 462, 463. 
King Albert's Appeal to King George, 

423, 455. 
Military Arrangements between Great 

Britain and Belgium, 577-5S0. 
Military Preparations, 72, 283, 281, 442. 
Minister at Luxemburg, 495. 
Minister leaves Berlin, 462. 
Mobilization ordered, 348. 
Neutrality of — 

Belgian Request for Assurance from 

Germany, 401. 
British Action in case of Violation, 
406, 415, 424, 434, 438, 441, 456, 
460, 595. 
British Inquiry to Belgium, 351, 365, 
366, 457. 



Belgium — Cont. 

Neutrality of — Cont. 

French Reply, 221, 358, 373, 374, 

378, 389. 
German Reply (Refusal) 374, 378, 
381, 387, 388, 397, 457. 
French Assurances, 348. 
German Assurance in 1911, 349. 
German Assurance in 1913, 349. 
Violation, alleged Violation of Belgian — 
bv Germany, 424, 430, 435. 441, 
442, 457. 
Violation through Secret Military Ar- 
rangements between Great Brit- 
ain and Belgium, 577-580. 
German Chancellor's View, 436, 437. 
German Justification, 457. 
German Note to Belgian Govern- 
ment, 433, 435, 441. 
Note sent to Representatives abroad to be 
delivered to the Various Powers 
if occasion should arise, 72, 11*. 
Presentation of, 375. 
Scheldt, Navigation of — , Correspond- 
ence with Netherlands, 475, 
476, 482. 
Telegram to Representatives abroad 
announcing German Ultimatum 
and Reply, 422. 
Belgrade, 

Bombardment of, 354. 
Berlin, 

Alleged Attack on British Embassy, 4S5. 
Demonstrations by Public, 156, 181, 199. 
Bulgaria, 

Declaration of Neutrality, 313. 
Congo, 

Belgian Attitude as to, 483. 
British Attitude, 483, 505. 
French Attitude, 483, 500. 
France, 

Ambassador to Germany — , Departure, 

476. 
Army Officers on Leave recalled, 298. 
Attitude in case of Attack on Great 

Britain, 337, 451. 
Attitude in ease of War between Ger- 
many and Russia, German In- 
quiry concerning, 347, 356. 
Austro-Hungarian Troops believed on 
French Frontier, 484, 490, 491, 
496. 
Austro-Serbian Relations — 

See Title : Austria-Hungary, Serbia, 
Relations with — , French Re- 
ports of Events from Date of 
Serajevo Murders to Austria's 
Declaration of War. 
Ultimatum of 23 July — 

Advice to Servia regarding Reply, 

160. 
Attitude and Views, 87, 91, 161, 167. 
Views on and Efforts, 53, 74, 77, 
78, 81, 84, 187, 286. 
See also Title : Mediation Proposals. 
Belgian Reply to German Proposal after 
Fall of Liege. 



602 



Index 



France — Cont. 

Belgian Reply — Cont. 

Approval of, 497. 
Belgium — 

Appeal from — , 348, 442. 
Assurance to, of Respect for Neu- 
trality, 348. 
Neutrality of — 

Agreement for Joint Action in De- 
fence, 4G3. 
Reply to British Inquiry, 373, 374, 

378, 389, 397. 
Breach of International Law, 420. 
Offer of Support to Belgium, 422, 

425, 430. 
Colonies — German refusal to give 

undertakings as to, 303. 
Communications with Representa- 
tives at — 
Athens, 430. 
Basic, 213. 
Bavaria, 543. 
Belgrade, 75. 77, 78, 84, 156, 282, 

2x8, 292, 430. 
Berlin, 12, 38, 58, 75, 77, 78, 80, 
81, 84, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155 
157, 181, 186, 213, 217, 218 
222, 224, 250, 252, 2S2, 286 
288, 323, 325, 326, 353, 355 
356, 375, 377, 378, 379, 384 
406, 408, 429. 
Berne, 430. 

Brussels, 283, 358, 378, 424, 442. 
Bucharest, 430. 
Budapest, 19. 
Christiania, 190, 430. 
Constantinople. 217, 2^2, 288, 

355, 379, 406, 430. 
Copenhagen, 430, 470. 
Frankfort, 283. 
Hague. 424, 430. 
London, 39, 53, 54, 58, 75, 77. 78, 
83, 84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 
184, 186, 213, 215, 216, 218, 
219, 220, 224, 250, 251, 282, 
2S8, 290, 291, 320, 324, 326, 
351, 353. 355, 375, 378, 379, 
381, 406, 407, 425, 426, 427, 
430, 442. 
Luxemburg, 190. 352, 383, 384, 

404. 405, 404. 
Madrid, 379, 406, 430. 
Munich, 59, 284, 429. 
Rome, 39, 53, 58, 75, 77. 78, 84, 
155, 181, 183, 184, 1X0, 213, 
221, 250, 281, 282. 288, 289, 
353, 355, 375, 379, 406, 130. 
St. Petersburg!!, 15, 39, 53, 58, 75. 

77. 78. 82, 81, 1511. 152, 181, 

184, lxo, 213, 215, 217. 224, 
250. 254, 282, 283, 285, 288, 
292, 320, 321, .322, 353. 354. 
355, 150, 357, 375, 379, 405, 
400, 430. 

Stockholm, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 

78, 84, 150, 152, 150, 158. 181, 

185, 186, 213, 215, 224. 250, 



France — Cont. 

Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont. 

251, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353, 
355, 356, 375, 379, 406, 430. 
Vienna, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 
78, 84. 150, 152, 156, 158, 181, 
185, 180, 213, 224, 250, 251, 
254, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 
353, 355, 356, 375, 379, 406, 
430. 
Congo. See that Title. 
Declaration of Determination to sup- 
port Russia, 314, 316. 
Germany, Relations with — 

German Ambassador leaves Paris, 

389, 390. 
German assurance not to attack 
France if France remains neutral 
in case of German-Russian War, 
593. 
German territory violated by French, 
and French view, 427, 428, 429, 
476. 
War declared by Germany, 427, 429, 
462. 
Government Notification to Repre- 
sentatives of the Powers at 
Paris, 443. 
London Embassy — Note regarding the 
interview communicated bv, 260. 
Mediation Proposals, 91, 220, 227, 237, 
218, 251, 252, 258, 200, 264, 
281,. 290, 313, 314. 
Military Attache at Berlin — , Letter to 

Minister of War, 532. 
Military Preparations, 277, 320. 
Mobilisation Ordered. 394, 397. 
Naval Attache at Berlin — , Letter to 

Minister of Manic-, 534. 
Peace, Declaration not to conclude 

separate peace during war, 521. 
President's Letter to King George, 
351, 597. 
The King's Reply. 598. 
President's Message to French Parlia- 
ment (4 August, 1914), 444. 
President of the Council's Speech in 
the Chamber of Deputies (4 
August, 1914), 440. 
Press, Note to — suggested by German 

Ambassador, 187, 215. 
Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs 

(30 July, 1913), 541. 
Summary of Events by Foreign Min- 
ister. 313. 
Telegram to French Representatives 
Abroad on Declaration of War, 
129 
Territory, 

German Territory violated, 427, 

128, 429, 470. 
French Allegations of French — vio- 
lated by Germany. 406, 408, 476. 
Troops on the Border, 324, 393, 394, 

396. 
Warnings from Reports of Ambassadors 
in 1913, 531. 



Index 



603 



Germany, 

Africa — Attacks, 505, 509. 

Aims and Ambitions (French View in 

1913), 531. 
Ambassador preparing to leave Paris, 

389, 390. 
Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 213, 

298. 
Attitude if Russia mobilized on Aus- 
trian Frontier only, 218, 326. 
Attitude toward France if she remains 
Neutral in case of German- 
Russian War, 544. 
Austro-Russian Relations, Advice to 
Austria, 297. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 
Austro-Serbian Relations, 

Localisation of the Dispute desired, 

56, 78, 90, 150, 172. 
Mediation Proposals. .See that Title. 
Ultimatum of 23 July — 

Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163, 
166,-38, 53, 81, 149, 150, 
153, 157, 250, — 172, 173, 174. 
Prior Knowledge of — , " Private In- 
formation unable to verify," 329. 
Redrafting of certain articles pro- 
posed by Russia, 197, 237. 
Serbian Reply — 

Non-publication of — (July 15), 

272. 
Views on, 192, 194. 
Support of Austrian Action, Views 
on, 90, 92, — 12, 39, 53, 54, 58, 
59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157, 
181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 254, 282, 
283, 286, 288, 379, — 97, 172, 
173, 174, 198,-21, 25, 27,— 
500, 551. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 
Belgian Minister leaves Berlin, 462. 
Belgium, 

Brussels Documents, 577. 

Corn for Germany placed under 

Embargo, 378. 
Hostile Acts' committed by Belgium 

against Germany, 378. 
Military Preparations — Secret Ar- 
rangements with Germany, 577. 
Belgian Defence against charges, 
510. 
Neutrality of — 

Alleged Violation of, 424, 430, 

435, 441, 442, 457. 
Belgian Request for Formal Decla- 
ration, 401. 
French Attack upon Germany 

through Belgium, 457. 
Necessity to protect German Army 
from French attack through 
Belgium, 457. 
Notification to Belgian Govern- 
ment, 433, 435, 441. 
Refusal to Replv to British Inquiry, 
374, 387, 388", 397, 475. 
Proposal after Fall of Liege, 490. 
492, 494, 49S. 



Germany — Conl. 

Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont. 
Belgian Reply, 494, 499. 
British Approval, 497. 
French Approval, 497. 
Russian Approval, 499. 
Request for free Passage of Troops 
— Belgian Refusal, British Pro- 
test, 455. 
Ultimatum to, and Replv, 402, 421, 

442. 
War declared by Germany, 442. 
British Ambassador's final Interview 
and Departure from Berlin, 485. 
Communications with Representatives 
at — 
Berne, 225. 
Kovno, 225. 

London, 59, 159, 191, 226, 457. 
Paris, 59, 191, 192, 292, 385, 395. 
Rome, 358. 
St. Petersburg, 59, 86, 159, 190, 191, 

192, 225, 256, 327, 358, 384. 
Vienna, 85, 257. 
Congo. See that Title. 
Emperor — 

British Military and Naval Titles, 

Renunciation of, 488. 
Conversation with King of the 
Belgians in the presence of 
General von Moltke in 1913 — 
Attitude, 549. 
Czar's Telegrams from and to, 362, 

367, 410, 557, 596. 
King George, Telegrams to and 

from, 592, 593, 594. 
Returns to Berlin (26 July), 193. 
France, relations with — 

Allegations of Violations of Terri- 
tory. 420, 427, 428, 429, 477, — 
406, 40S, 477. 
Inquiry as to Attitude in event of 
War between Germany and 
Russia, 347. 
French Reply: "France would 
do that which her interests dic- 
tated," 347, 385. 
War declared by Germany, 427, 429. 
French Ambassador's Departure (Re- 
port) . 476. 
French Colonies — Refusal to give 

Undertaking as to, 303. 
French Military and Naval Attache's 
Letter to Ministers (1913), 532, 
534. 
Great Britain — 

Military and Naval Preparations, 
Assurance that Measures had 
no aggressive character, 343. 
Neutrality — 

Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 
303, 3S1, 426. 
British Replv, 334, 362. 
Views on, 286. 
Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 

456. 
Ultimatum from, 432, 437, 441, 442. 



604 



Index 



Germany — Cont. 

Great Britain — cont. 

War declared by Great Britain, 460. 

Imperial Chancellor's S] ch before 

Reichstag, on 4 August, 573. 
Interests in Belgium entrusted to 
United States Minister, 436, 496. 
Japanese Ultimatum, 506. 

German decision not to reply, 508. 
" Kriegsgef ahrzustand " declared, 356, 

364. 394. 
Luxemburg — Neutrality. 352, 401,461, 
405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424, 436. 
Chancellor's View, 436. 
Mediation proposals, Attitude towards. 
34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265, 294 
301, 363, 310, 329, 360, 361, 
362, — 213, 218. 222. 246, 250, 
252, 286, 325, 326, 355, — 198, 
235. 312. 313, 314, 311, 342, 
— 212,-159. 226, 241, 256, 
257, 554. 555. 557. 564, 595. 
Military anil Naval Preparations, 331. 
Commencement, 2S4, 340, 364, 365. 
Minister leaves Serbia, 481. 
Mobilization, 

Action to be taken in event, of Rus- 
sian Mobilization, 227. 364. 
Alleged Mobilization of Army and 

Navy. 342, 384, 412. 
Official Denial, 323. 
Ordered. 409. 
Preliminary Steps. 323. 324, 356, 364. 

370. 394. 
Secret — Alleged Secret Measures, 
357, 381, 367. 
Naval Preparations, 166, 321. 
Notification to Belgium of Breaches of 
International Law by Prance, 420. 
Seeking to gain time — Russian 
view, 322. 
Prince Henry — Telegrams to and from 

King George, 562. 
Reservists ordered to hold themselves 
in readiness, French Report, 190. 
Responsibility for War on Russia. — 

Russian Defence, 419. 
Russia, relations with — 

Ultimatum to Russia requiring De- 
mobilization, 278, 262, 316, 320, 
322. 3 17. 356, 366, 375, 377, 386. 
3S6, 36(1, 365, 366, 461. 
War declared by Germany, 398, 400, 
41)5, 466. 
Secret French Report concerning Arms. 
Aims and Obligations of the 
National Policy, 538. 
Summary of Events, 551. 
Support of Austria-Hungary, 172, 173, 

174, 261. 
War not desired, 161, 163. 

Contrary British and French Reports, 
375, 377, 411. 
Great Britain, 

Ambassador to Austria Hungary — 
Summary of Events from 22 
July, 514. 



Great Britain — Cont. 

Ambassador to Berlin, Final Interview 

and Departure, 185. 
Assurance to France that Fleet will 
protect French Coasts and Ship- 
ping against German Fleet, 415. 
Attitude if France and Russia reject 

Reasonable Proposal, 363. 
Attitude in case of Violation of Bel- 
gium, 595. 
Attitude in case of War between Ger- 
many, Russia and France, 595, 
596. 
Attitude in Event of an Attack on 
France, or a General War, 174, 
216, 23S, 241, 305. 367, 326, 334, 
335, 337. 351, 366, 368, 3S1, 388, 
415. 
Correspondence between Sir E. Grey 
and M. Paul Cambon (Novem- 
ber, 1612), 337. 
Russia expects that England will 
side definitely with her, 172. 
Austria-Hungary — 

Relations with, 432, 468. 
War declared by Great Britain, 49S, 
526. 
Austro-Russian Relations — 

Attitude, 365. 
Austro-Servian Relations — 

Attitude. 54, 74. S3, S4, 150, 151, 
153. 181, 213. 218, 219, 243, 
244, 261, 365. Sec also Media- 
tion Proposals. 
Ultimatum of 23 July — 

Attitude 66, 86, 61, 92, 93, 161, 
165. 
Servian Reply, Views on, 93, 165, 

229. 238, 281. 
Time-limit, Extension, Proposals 
for — 
Attitude, 92 
Belgian King's Appeal to King George, 
423, 455. 
Belgian Reply to German Proposal 
after Fall of Liege, Approval of, 
467. 
Belgium — 

Appeal from, 442. 
Neutrality of — 

Actions to be taken, 466, 415, 
424, 426. 434, 438, 441, 456. 
460, 595, 596. 
Agreement for Joint Action. 462, 

463. 
Inquiry to Belgium, 348, 366. 

Belgian Reply, 391. 
Inquiry to Prance and Germany, 
351, 365, 366, 457. 
French Reply, 358, 378. 
German Refusal to Reply, 378, 
381. 
Protest against German Demand 
to Belgium to allow Free Pas- 
sage of Troops, 455. 
Relations previous to the Outbreak 
of the War, 577. 



Index 



605 



Great Britain — Cont. 

Communications with Representatives 
at — 

Belgrade, 90, 93, 164, 165, 196, 
267, 268, 302. 

Berlin, 34, 56, 92, 163, 166, 168, 
193, 194, 227, 229, 265, 268, 
270, 294, 297, 298, 299, 303, 
£06, 307, 308, 332, 334, 335, 361, 
362, 364, 365, 3S6, 3S7, 388, 391, 

392, 393, 409, 412, 413, 416, 
430, 455, 456, 457. 

Brussels, 366, 391, 413, 430, 456, 
457. 

Constantinople, 302. 

Luxemburg, 408, 414. 

Paris, 91, 160, 161, 168, 194, 195, 
227, 258, 264, 305, 333, 336, 
337, 365, 366, 368, 389, 390, 

393, 394, 396, 415, 431. 
Rome, 61. 164, 168, 194, 233, 263, 
■ 266, 267, 301, 302, 305, 310, 

334, 360. 
St. Petersburgh, 87, 160, 161, 165, 
168, 228, 229, 230, 261, 270, 295, 
299, 300, 335, 363, 365, 385, 

394, 410. 

Vienna, 61, 86, 89, 164, 167, 192, 

196, 226, 231, 259, 262, 265, 296, 

297, 300, 309, 329, 330, 367, 

391, 395. 411, 514. 

Congo. See that Title. 

Declaration of Intention to support 

France, 333. 
Fleet — 

Mobilized, 381. 

Non-dispersal of, after Review, 218, 

230, 231. 
Protection assured to French Coasts 
and French Shipping, 3S1, 406, 
407, 425, 453. 
Germany — 

Ultimatum to, 432, 437, 441, 442, 457. 
War declared by Great Britain, 460, 
488. 
King George — ■ 

Letters from French President, 351, 
392. 
The King's Reply, 598. 
Personal Message to the Czar, 590. 

The Czar's Reply, 591. 
Telegrams from and to German Em- 
peror, 593, 594. 
Telegrams to and from Prince Henry 
of Prussia, 592. 
Luxemburg — Neutrality, British Atti- 
tude, 406. 
Mediation Proposals, 241, 247, — 91, 
92, 194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270, 
294, 305, 306, 308, 363, —213 
219, 291, — 174, 233, 396, — 
590, 592, 593, 594. 
Military and Naval Preparations — 
German Inquiry and British Reply, 

343. 
Secret — with Belgium, 577. 
Navy — See Subheading: Fleet above. 



Great Britain — Cont. 

Neutrality of, 87, 161, 165, 230. 

German Efforts to obtain Assurance 

of, 303, 381, 426. 
British Reply, 334, 362. 
German Views, 286. 
Parliament — Support of Government 

Policy, 427. 
Peace — Agreement not to conclude 
separate Peace during War, 
521. 
Serbian Appeal, 99, 219. 
Serbian Prime Minister's Thanks for 
Speech in House of Commons 
on 27 July, 302. 
Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 
456. 
Holland. See Title: Netherlands. 
Italy, 

Austro-Serbian Relations — 

Mediation Proposals, See Title: Me- 
diation Proposals. 
Ultimatum of 23 July, Time limit — 
Extension, proposals for, and atti- 
tude, 196. 
Views on, and Efforts, 28, 53, 78, 

168, 181, 183, 184, 267. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 
Declaration of Neutrality, 379, 431. 
Mediation Proposals, 194, 220, 221, 

233, 263, 281, 360. 
Position of, with regard to the Austrian 
Note to Servia, 149, 181, 183, 
184, 186, 221. 
Japan, 
Austria-Hungary — Relations broken 

off, 508. 
Declaration of Neutrality as regards 
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and 
Russia, while having no interest 
in Servia, 241. 
Ultimatum to Germany, 506. 

German Decision not to Reply, 508. 
Luxemburg, 

Belgian Minister's Departure, 495. 
French Minister's Departure, 464. 
Minister of State — Telegrams to Sir 

E. Grey (2 August), 408, 414. 
Neutrality of — ■ 

British Attitude, 406. 

Inquiry to France and Germany, 

352, 383. 
French Reply, 384. 
German Reply, 405. 
German Military Measures to insure 
against attack by French Army, 
352. 401, 404, 405, 408, 413, 
414, 415, 424. 
Chancellor's View, 436. 
Mediation Proposals, 163, 165, 166. 

Austrian-Hungary, Attitude, 241, 276, 
278, 280, 345, 373,-265, 302, 
32S, 329, 392, 393, 394, — 254, 
375, 377, 397. 
France, Attitude, 91, 227, 258, 260, 
264. — 220, 248, 251, 252, 2S0, 
290,-237, 313, 314. 



606 



Index 



Mediation Proposals — Conl. 

Germany, Attitude, 592, 593, 594, 

— 34, 163, 227, 229. 261, 265, 
294, 301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361, 
362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250, 
252, 286, 325. 326, 355, — 19s, 
235, 312, 314, 341, 342,-212, 

— 554, — 159, 220, 241, 250, 257. 
Great Britain, Attitude, 241, 247, — 

590, 592, 593, 594,-91. 92, 
194, 195, 228, 205, 268, 270, 
299, 305, 306, 308, 363,-213. 

219, 291, — 174. 233, 396. 
Italian Views, 194, 233, 263, 360,— 

220. 221, 2S1. 

Occupation of Belgrade or other point 
a condition of accepting Media- 
tion, 332, 335, 353. 
Russia. Attitude, — 243, 27s, — 590, 
596,-260, 261, 202. 294, 297. 
299, 328, 385, 392, 393, — 2s:;. 
321. 322, 323, 353. 354, 381,— 
272, 341, 370. 
Serbia, Attitude. 53, 54, 58, 78. 
Urgency of Action, 272. 
Netherlands, 

British Information that Great Britain 
expects — will resist German pres- 
sure and Offer of Support, 195. 
Declaration of Neutrality, His. 
Integrity of — German Assurance, 303. 
War Buoying in the Scheldt, 434, 463, 
475, 476, 482. 
Norway, 

British Information that Great Britain 
expects — will resist. German 
pressure and Offer of Support, 
195. 
Peace, 

Agreement of Allies not to conclude 
separate Peace during War. 521. 
Efforts. SeeTitle: Mediation Proposals. 
Russia, 

Austro-Hungary, Relations with — 
Direct. Conversations, proposals for, 
185, 229, 251, 252, 251, 286, 
323, 353. 
Refusal, 285, 287, 297. 
Engagement to stop Military Prep- 
arations if Austria takes cer- 
tain course, 331, 333. 
German Advice, 297. 
Mediation Proposals. See tint Title. 
War declared I a- Austria, 459, 481 . 
Austro-Serbian Relations — 

Austrian Statement that her Declara- 
tion of Readiness to respect Ser- 
bian Integrity and Sovereign 
Rights had been received by 
Russia in Silence — Contradic- 
tion by Russian Ambassador in 
Paris, 398. 
Ultimatum of 23 July — 

Redrafting of certain Articles pro- 
posed by Russia, 197. 
German Attitude, 237. 
Serbian Reply, Views on, 235. 



Russia — Cont. 

Austro-Serbian Relations — Conl. 
Ultimatum of 23 July — Cont. 

Time limit, Extension, proposals 
for, views on. 100, 107, 196. 
Views on and Attitude, 71, 179, 202, 
278, 280, 347, 373, — 87, 89, 
101, 168, 193, 22.S, 201, 367,— 
15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, ,84, 152, 
153, 154, 155, 156, 181, 184, 185, 
217, — 170. 196, 237, 238. 
See also Mediation Proposals. 
Belgium — 

Appeal from. 442. 
Neutrality of — 

Agreement for Joint Action, 463. 
Reply to German Proposal after 
Fall of Liege, 499. 
Communications with Representa- 
tives at — 
Belgrade, 63, 94, 98, 170, 174. 
Berlin, 90, 97, 171. 19s, 199, 235, 
237, 272, 294, 310, 312, 341. 342, 
370. 
Fiume, 270. 

London, 260, 261, 294, 32S, — 
94, 96, 171, 172, 174, 233, 234, 
235. 23S, 271), 272, 312, 314, 341, 
333. 370, 371, 396, 397. 
Nish, 310, 340. 

Paris, 94. 96, 97, 171, 173, 198, 
199, 234, 235, 312, 314. 316, 
341. 370. 397, 398. 
Prague. 197. 

Rome, 94, 96. 196. 235, 341, 370. 
Vienna, 94, 170, 197, 235, 238, 
271, 272, 328. 341, 309, 370. 
Czar — 

Personal Message from King 
George. 590. 
The Czar's Reply, 591. 
Telegrams to and from German 
Emperor, 302, 367, 410, 454, 
596. 
French Declaration of Determination 

p. Support, 314. 316. 
Germany puts Responsibility for War 

on Russia, 215, 282, 3S1, 482. 
Germany, Relations with. G3. 
German Ultimatum requiring De- 
mobilization, 366, 386, 389, 390, 
409, 411. 310, 396, 27S, 347. 
Germany declares War, 405, 406, 

— .398, — 400. 
Germany's Reasons for War with 

Russia, 551. 

Great Britain, Expectations that 

England will side with Russia 

and France, 172. 

Mediation Proposals. Attitude and 

Efforts, 260. 261, 21,2, 29 1, 297, 

299, 328, 385, 392, 393, — 2S3, 

321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,— 

237, 341, 370,-243, 278,-586. 

Mobilisation, 294, 298, 299, 362, 

364, 365, 391, -288, 289, 

292, 320, 323, 357, — 288, 289, 



Index 



607 



Russia — Cont. 

Mobilisation — Cont. 

292, 320, 323, 357,-225,— 
312, 370, — 246, 280, 346. 
Denial, Russian — of Mobilisa- 
tion, 179. 
Offer to Stop Military Prepara- 
tions if Austria takes certain 
course, 322. 
Suspension of, 321. 
Vienna Press did not publish 
Russian Communication, Ex- 
planation, 323. 
Mobilisation against Austria 
immediately, if Austrian 
Troops Cross Servian Frontier, 
295. 
Peace, Declaration not to con- 
clude separate Peace during 
War, 521. 
Troops Cross German Frontier, 

413. 
Unreadiness for War, 294. 
Salonica, 
Austrian Designs as to, British View, 
302. 
Sandjak, 
Austria has no intentions to advance 
into or occupy, 3S5, 389. 
British View, 302. . 
Scheldt, 

War Buoying Measures, 434, 464, 475, 
476, 482. 
Serajevo Murders, 

1, 2, 3. 4, 8. 

Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 101 . 

Austrian and Serbian View, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 
22, 25, 27, 28, 31, 500, 527. 

Austrian Official Reports of State of 
Serbian Feeling, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. 

Criminal Inquiry, Conclusions of, 86. 

Extracts from Records of the Court 
at Serajevo' touching the Pro- 
ceedings against Gavrilo Princip 
and Confederate, 130. 

Nish Local Committee of Narodna 
Odbrana, 138. 

Origin of the Plot, 131. 

Origin of the Bombs, 132. 

Reports from Austria and Serbian Alle- 
gations, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

Serbian Press Comments, 135. 

Transport of Assailants, and of the Wea- 
pons from Servia to Bosnia, 133. 
Serbia, 

Amsfeld Anniversary, Celebration of, 

2, 6. 

Appeal to Great Britain, 99, 219. 
Appeal to the Powers, 98. 
Austro-Hungary, Relations with — 
Austrian Intentions, 302, 369. 
Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade, 
174, — 158, 186, — 165, 192, 194. 
Austrian Official Reports as to 
Serbian Feelings towards Austria, 
2, 3, 6, 14, 36. 



Serbia — Cont. 

Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Cont. 
Austrian Statement that her Decla- 
ration of Readiness to Respect 
Serbian Integrity and Sovereign 
Rights had been Received by 
Russia in Silence — Contradic- 
tion, 398. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

Berlin Press, Attitude, 97. 

British Attitude, 305,-54, 74, 83, 
84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 213. 218, 
219, 291, — 174, — 243, 244. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

Events from Date of Serajevo Mur- 
ders to Presentation of Austrian 
Note to Serbia of 23 July — 
French Reports, and French 
Attitude and Reports. .Sec Title: 
Austria-Hungary, French Atti- 
tude and French Reports. 

German Views and Attitude, 551, — 
21, 25, 27,-482, 500,-12, 
39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81, 
151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 
187, 21.3, 215, 254, 282, 283, 
286, 288, 379,-97, 172, 173, 
174, 198. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

Italian Views and Attitude, 53, 78, 
181, 183, 184,-28. 

Localisation of the Dispute, — German 
Statement, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172. 

Mediation Proposals. Sec that Title. 

Military Action, 163, 196, 226. 

Military Operations not to be under- 
taken immediately, 166, 167. 

Narodna Odbrana Society — 
Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette, 

123. 
Nish Local Committee — Attitude 

on Serajevo Murders, 13s. 
Organization and Work of — , 101, 

116, 124. 
Work of — , Deposition by Trifko 
Krstanovic, 124. 

Non-interference by the Powers. See 
Subhead, Localisation of Dispute, 
above. 

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns 
as a Basis for Negotiations, 332, 
335, 353. 

Russian Views and Attitude, 71, 179, 
202, 278, 280, 347, 373, — 168, 
193, — 15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, 
84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 196, 
237, 238. 
See also Title: Mediation Proposals. 

Serbia's willingness to entertain require- 
ments, provided that only judi- 
cial cooperation is asked by 
Austria, 38. 

Serbian Appeal to the Powers, Possi- 
bility of, 161. 

Serbian Attitude and Views, 53, 54, 
78,-4. 6, 31. 

Serbian Note of 1908, 86, 161, 261. 



608 



Index 



Serbia — Cont. 

Serbian Preparations before Delivery 

of Austrian Note, 141, ISO. 
Serbian Press, Hostile Attitude prior 

to Serajevo Murders, 112. 
Serbian Territory not to be seized, 

14, 203, — 103, 30S, 309, 395. 
Scrl dan War Office — Pictures of a nature 
hostile to Austria-Hungary, 140. 
Situation before Presentation of Ulti- 
matum of 23 July, 34, 50. 61, 86. 
Sokol Society Dusan the Strong — 
Report on the Activities of — , in 
Kragujevac, 121. 
Special Points for Great Britain, 243. 
Turkish Views, 217. 

Ultimatum of 23 July, 80, 90. — 03, — 
04, 98, 99,-7:,. 7s. 158. 
Austrian Official Commentary, 51. 
Austrian Statement that Note is not 
an Ultimatum bu1 a Demarche 
with a time limit, 160. 161, 236. 
Austro-Hungarian Views, so, 89. 
British Views regarding Reply, 93, 165. 
British Attitude, 66,-86, 91, 92, 93, 

101, 165. 
French Advice to Serbia Regarding 

Reply, 160. 
French Attitude and Views, S7, 91, 

160, 161,-67. 

German Attitude and Views, 90, 92. 

German Denial of Prior Knowledge, 

163, 166, —38, 53, 81, 1 19, 150, 

153, 1X7, J50, — 172. 173, 174. 

German Prior Knowledge ("unable 

to confirm ")i 329. 
German Support of Austrian Action, 

172, 173, 174. 
Italian Views, 267. 

Point 5 — Austrian Explanation, 148. 
Redrafting of certain articles proposed 
by Russia, 197. 
German Attitude, 237. 
Russian Attitude and Views, 69, 70. — 

87, 161, 228, 261, 307, 191. 
Serbian Attitude, 90. 
Serbian Reply, 164, 169, 175, 195, — 
156, 157, 158. 
Austrian Official Commentaries. 
Austrian Views, 198, 221, 251. 
British Views, 229, 231. 238. 
German Views, 192, 194. 235. 
Non-publication of in German 
Press, 272. 



Serbia — Cont. 

Ultimatum, Serbian Reply to — Cont. 
Refusal of Austria to accept. 174. 

231, 236. 
Russian Views, 235. 
Special Points to be brought before 

( ireat Britain, 57, 65. 
Time Limit — 
Dangers of, 61. 

Proposal for Extension, 152-158, 
170, 171, 181. 
Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. 
British Attitude, 290. 
German Attitude, 163. 
Italian Attitude, 196. 
Russian Attitude, 160, 167, 
396. 
Unconditional Acceptance de- 

manded, 164. 
War Declared by Austria-Hungary, 
241, 268, 296,-247, —273, 344, 
359. 
British ( 'harm'' d'Affaires Leaves Bel- 
grade with Serbian Government, 
165. 
Government Leaves Belgrade, 165, 

174, 176. 
Integrity to be respected, 264. 
Kragujevac — Work of Sokol Society 

Dusan the Strong, 121. 
Mediation Proposals, Attitude 

towards, 53, 54, 58, 7s. 
Minister Leaves Berlin, 45s. 
Minister Leaves Vienna, 177. 
Mobilisation Ordered, 142, 176. 
Prince Regent — 

Appeal to the Czar, 292, — 96. 

The Czar's Reply, 237, 315. 
Speech from the Throne to the 
Skupschtina after Declaration of 
War, 340. 
Summary of Events by Minister at 
Vienna, 500. 
Triple Entente. See also Names of the 
Powers. 
Declaration not to conclude separate 
Peace during War, 521. 
Turkey, 

Austro-Servian Relations, Views on, 
217. 
Vienna, 

Demonstrations, s, 9. 

War between Great Powers, 

German Attitude, 294. 



Printed in the United States of America. 



APPENDIX 

THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COLLECTED 
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS IN PHOTOGRAPHIC RE- 
PRODUCTION 



K. U. K. MINISTERIUM DES AUSSERN. 



DIPLOMATISCHE AKTENSTUCKE 



VORGESCHICHTE des RRIEGES 



1914. 



W1EN 1915. 

AUS DER K. K. HOF UND STAATSDRUCKEREI. 



INHALTSVERZEICHJMS. 



Seitc 

1. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. Freudenkund- 
gebungen in Belgrad bei der Naehricht von der Ermordung des 'Herrn 
Erzherzogs Thronfolgers 1 

2. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. Die serbische 
Polizei hat keine MaGnahmen getroffen, um die Faden des Attentates 

in Serbien zu verfolgen 2 

3. Generalkonsul Jehlitschka, Uskiib, 1. Juli 1914. Freudenkundgebungen 

in Uskiib und Pristina bei Bekanntwerden des Attentates in Sarajevo 2 

4. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 4. Juli 1914. Der President der franzosischen 
Republik spricht die Uberzeugung aus, die serbische Regierung werde 
Osterreich-Ungarn bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verfol- 
gung eventueller Mitsclmldiger Entgegenkommen zeigen 3 

5. Gerent Herr Hoflehner, Nisch, 6. Juli 1914. Freudige Genugtuung in 
Nisch iiber das Sarajevoer Attentat 4 

6. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. Die Politik Serbiens verfolgt 
nur ein Ziel, die Abtrennung der von Sudslawen bewohnten Gebiete 
Osterreich-Ungarns und dessen sehlieCliche Vernichtung als GroOmacht. 
Serbische PreDkampagne voll Liige, Had und Geringseh'atzung. Eine 
weitere Schadigung der Stellung der Monarchie kann nicht mehr zu- 
gelassen werden 4 

7. An Freiherrn von Giesl in Belgrad, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Note der 

k. u. k. Regierung an die serbische Regierung 7 

8. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg 
und Konstantinopel, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an die serbische 
Regierung gerichteten Note. Kommentar zu dieser Note, in welchem 
die serbischen Machenschaften und Umtriebe gegen die Monarchie, 
sowie die Griinde dargelegt werden, aus denen die k. u. k. Regierung 
der provokatorischen Haltung Serbiens gegenuber so viel Langmut 
bewahrte , 11 



9. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 23. Juli 1911. Die serbische 

Regierung hat keinerlei MafJnahmen zur Aufdeokung der nach Belgrad 
weisenden Spuren des Sarajevoer Attentates ergriffen, sondern vielmehr 
getrachtet, diese Spuren zu verwischen. Die kurze Befristung der an 
Serbien gerichteten Forderungen war unerlafilich, urn den der k. u. k. 
Regierung aus langj'ahrigen Erfahrungen wohlbekannten serbischen Yer- 
schleppungskunsten keine Handhabe zu bieten 13 

10. Graf Mensdorff, London, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien ge- 
richteten Note an Sir E. Grey, der Bedenken gegen die kurze Be- 
fristung und Besorgnis wegen der Riickwirkung auf den europ'aischen 
Frieden aufierte. Darlegung des Standpunktes der k. u. k. Regierung: 
Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen; vollkommener Mifierfolg der 
Serbien gegeniiber bisber stets beobachteten konzilianten Haltung . . 14 

11. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerich- 
teten Note und Darlegung des Standpunktes der k, u. k. Regierung: 
Es handle sieh um eine Frage, welche dirckt zwischen Osterreich- 
Ungarn und Serbien ausgetragen werden mufi; das Aufhb'ren der 
durch die serbische Wuhlarbe.it seit Jahren verursaohten Unrube liege 
aber im allgemeinen europ'aischon Interesse. Der interimistisohe fran- 
zosische Minister des AuJlern vermied, die Haltung Serbiens irgend- 
wie zu beschonigen oder zu verteidigen 15 

12. Graf Szeesen, Paris. 24. Juli 1914. Deutseber Botschafter ist beauf- 
tragt, dem franzosisohen Kabinett die Anffassung seiner Regierung 
mitzuteilen, dafi serbisoher Streitfall Angelegenheit sei, die nur Oster- 
reich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe 16 

13. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutseber Botschafter hat Auftrag 
ausgefiihrt. Franzosische Regierung teilt deutsche Auffassung und hofft, 
dafj die Kontroverse eine direkte und friedliche Losang finden 
werde • ■ 16 

14. Graf Szdpary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an 
Serbien gerichteten Note nnd Erorterruig des osterreichisch-ungui- 
schen Standpunktes. Einwendungen Herrn Sazonows. Auf seine Dar- 
stellungsweise. .il-s ob Osterreich-Ungarn den Krieg wolle, wurde 
erwidert, die Monarchie sei die friedliebendste Macbt der Welt, doch 
miisse der Bedrobung unserer Dvnastie durch serbische Bomben und 
unseres Territoriums durch die serbischen revolution'aren Umtriebe ein 
Ende bereitet werden 1? 

15. Russiscbes Communique, 24. Juli 1914. Ruliland konne einem oster- 
reichisch-nngaiisch-serbischen KonHikte gegeniiber nicbt indifferent 
bleiben 18 



Seita 

16. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Der Bemerkung des 
russischen Ministers des Aufiern gegeniiber, Streitfall zwischen Oster- 
reich-Ungarn und Serbien sei keine auf diese Staaten beschrankte 
Angelegenheit und Ruflland kiinne es nieht gleiebgiltig hinnehmen, 
wenn Osterreich-Ungarn die Absicbt hatte, Serbien n aufzufressen : ', 
antwortete deutscher Botschafter, Osterreich-Ungarn liege dies vollig 
feme, eine Einmischung in seine Differenz mit Serbien konne es 
jedocb nicbt zugeben 18 

17. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Sohritt in Belgrad 
hat nieht Charakter eines formellen Ultimatums, sondern einer belristeten 
Demarche ■ 15 

18. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Es wurde 
dem russischen Geschaftstrager erklart, daO Osterreich-Ungarn keine 
Demiitigung Serbians und keine Gebietserwerbung bezweeke, sondern. 
nur die Erbaltung des Bestehenden, sowie die Verurteilung und Unter- 
druckung der gegen den Bestand der Monarchie gerichteten grofi- 
serbischen Stromungen • . . 20 

19. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Peters- 
burg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Dossier, betreffend 
die grollserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammenhange mit dem 
Sarajevoer Attentate 21 

20. An Sektionschef Freiherrn von Maccbio in Wien, Lambncb, 25. Juli 
1914. Dem vom russischen Geschaftstrager in Wien gestellten Ver- 
langen einer Fristerstreckung fiir die an Serbien gerichteten Forde- 
rungen kann nieht stattgegeben warden C9 1 

21. An. Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Bad Ischl, 2.5. Juli 1914. Mit- 
teilung und Begriindung dieses ablebnenden Standpunktes 09 

22. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914. Administrative und mil i- 
tarische Vorbereitungen in Serbien 70 

23. Freiherr von Giesl, Semlin, 25. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung 

in Serbien angeordnet 70 

24. Freiherr von Giesl. Semlin. 25. Juli 1914. Abbruch der dijiloma- 
tisohen Beziehungen zu Serbien infolge ungeniigender Antwort der 
Belgrader Regierung auf die bsterreichisch-ungarische Note .... 71 

25. Note der koniglich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 . . 71 

26. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k. 
Regierung konnte sich durch die Moglichkeit eines. Zusammenstotles 
mit liuliland nieht in ihrer Stellungnahme gegen Serbien beirren 
lassen, weil grundlegende staatspolitisehe Konsiderationen Osterreich- 
Ungarn vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu 
bereiten, dali ein russischer Freibrief Serbien die dauernde ungestrafte 



VI 

Seite 

und anstrafbare Bedrohung der Monarchie ermogliche. Die k. u. k. 
Regierung hofft, daft Rufiland irn Hinblicke 'auf das den Balkanstaaten 
bisher bewiesene Wohlwollen Osterreich-Ungarns und auf die Erkla- 
rung der k. u. k. Regierung, dall sie keinerlei territorialen Gewinn 
anstrebe und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht antasten wolle, nicht 
in die Aktion Osterreich-Ungarns gegen Serbien eingreifen werde . . 74 

27. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die For- 
derung der Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren bei der Unter- 
driiekung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien entsprang lediglicb 
praktiscben Rucksichten und nicht der Absicht, die Souveranitat 
Serbiens zu tangieren 77 

28. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 26. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botsehafter in 
St. Petersburg warnt russischen Minister des Aufjern, dall russische 
MobilisierungsmalSnahmen gegen Deutschland unaufhaltsam den Krieg 
herbeifuhren wiirden. Deutscher Militiirattache erklart russischem 
Kriegsminister, Mobilmachung gegen Osterreich-Ungarn wurde eine sehr 
bedrohliche Situation hervorrufen. Kriegsminister gibt sein Ehrenwort, 
dall keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen 77 

29. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E. 
Grey aufmerksam zu machen, daG die schon drei Stunden vor Uber- 
reichung der serbischen Antwortnote angeordnete allgemeine Mobi- 
lisierung der serbischen Armee beweise, wie weniu Neigunu; in lielgrad 
zu einer friedlichen Austragung des Streifalles bestand und win unauf- 
richtig der angeblich versbhulichc Tenor der serbischen Erklarung sei . 78 

30. An die k. u. k. Botsehafter in Berlin. Rom, London, Paris und St. Peters- 
burg, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Angesichts der Ablehnung der osterreichisch- 
ungarischen Forderungen seitens der serbischen Regierung sieht sich 
die k. u. k. Regierung in die Notwendigkeit versetzt, Serbien zu einer 
grundsatzlichen Anderung seiner bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu 
zwingen 7 8 

31. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botsehafter 
erklart dem russischen Minister des Aufiern, dali Osterreich-Ungarn 
ein Vorstofi am Balkan oder gar ein Praventivkrieg gegen Rullland 
vollig feme liege. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltiing und 
Notwehr. Osterreich-Ungarn habe keineswegs die Absicht. russische 
Interressen zu bedrohen oder gar mit Rufiland Streit suchen zu 
wollen. Erorterung der an Serbien gestellten Forderungen Osterreich- 

79 



32. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. K. u. k. 
Regierung erklart, dall die Monarchic, solange der Krieg zwischen 



vn 

Seite 
Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbian lokalisiert bleibe, keinerlei territoriale , 
Eroberungen beabsichtige 80 

33. Graf Szb'gyeny, Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. „Militarische Vorsorgen" in 
RuMand 80 

34. An die k. n. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und 
St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der Note der konig- 
lich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 und des Kom- 
mentares der k. u. k. Regierung zu dieser Note 80 

35. Graf Szbgyeny, Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. Der englische Vorschlag, den 
osterreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen StreitfaU einer in London abzu- 
haltenden Konferenz zur Regelung zu iiberlassen. wurde von Deutsch- 
land abgelehnt, da es seinen Bundesgenossen in der Auseinander- 
setzung mit Serbien nicht vor ein europ'aisches Gericht ziehen lassen 
konne 90 

36. Freiherr von Muller, Tokio, 28. Juli, 1914. Erklarung der offizibsen 
japanischen „Times", daft die japanische Regierung im Kriegsfalle 
strengste Neutralitat bewahren werde 90 

37. Note an das koniglich serbische Ministerium des AufSern, Wien, 

28. Juli 1914. Kriegserklarung an Serbien 90 

38. An Graf Szbgyeny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Es ist Sir E. Grey 
dargelegt vorden, daii Osterreich-Ungarn weder territoriale Erobe- 
rungen nooh die Vernichtung der serbischen Unabh'angigkeit beab- 
sichtige. sondern Genugtuung f'iir die Vergangenheit und Garantien 
fiir die Zukunft verlange. Der englische Konfercnzvorschlag erscheint, 
insoweit er sich auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien bezieht, angesichts 
des eingetretenen Ki-iegszustandes durch die Ereignisse uberholt. 
Konzenti'ierung der englischen Flotte 91 

39. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir 
E. Grey die groDserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammenhiinge mit 
dem Sarajevoer Morde auseinanderzusetzen und ihm darzulegen, dad 
das Entgegenkommen der serbischen Antwortnote nui" ein schein- 
bares war, bestimmt, Europa zu tauschen, so dali keinerlei Garantien 

fiir die Zukunft geboten w'aren 92 

40. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Wunsch der 
russischen Regierung, mit dem Wiener Kabinette behufs Abanderung 
einzelner seitens Osterreich-Ungarns an Serbien gerichteten Forde- 
rungen zu verhandeln. Dieser Wunsch muQte abgelehnt werden, da 
die gestellten Forderungen unerlalMich sind, um die gegen den Be- 
stand der Monarchie gerichtete serbische Bewegung zum Stillstand zu 
bringen. Serbien habe bereits durch Anordnung der allgemeineu 



vra 

Seite 

Mobilisierung einen feindseligen Akt begangen. Trotzdem habe die 
k. u. k. Regierung noch drei Tage gewartet. Nun habe Serbien die 
'Feindseligkeitm an der ungarischen Grenze erbffhet. Eine friedlicbe 
Sanierung des Yerhaltnisses zu Serbien sei, nunraehr unmbglich . . 93 

41. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Der englische 
Botschafter hat den Konferenzvorsohlag Sir E. Greys dem k. u. k. 
Minister des AuCern auseinandergesetzt und Englands Vermittlung im 
Konflikte zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien angeboten. Es 
wurde ihm erwidert, dad die Verhinderung der Feindseligkeiten infolge 
Kriegsausbrucb.es nicht mehr moglich sei. Ein Transigieren auf Grund 
der serbischen Antwortnote sei angesiehts der woblbekannten serbischen 
Winkelziige nicht moglich. Der Friede wiirde nicht dadurch gerettet 
werden, dali sich Groflmachte hinter Serbien stellen und fiir dessen 
Straffreiheit eintreten. Serbien wiirde ermutigt und der Friede bald 
wieder in Frage gestellt werden 94' 

42. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Ersuchen an die 
deut6che Regierung, das russische Kabinett darauf aufmerksam zu 
machen. dali die Mobilisierung der Militarbezirke Kiew, Odessa, 
Moskau und Kasan finer Bedrohung Osterreich-Ungams gleichkame 
und von der Monarchic und Deutschland mit den weitestgehenden 
milit'arisehen Gegenmaliregeln beantwortet werden miiilte 96 

43. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien. 28. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung 
hat Anregung Sir E. Greys, dali das Wiener Kabinett die Ant- 
wortnote der serbischen Regierung als geniigend betrachte oder als 
Grundlage fiir Besprechungen unter den Kabinetten annehme, der 

k. u. k. Regierung zur Erwagung iibermittelt 96 

44. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom, 
Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Im Hinblicke auf die oben erwahnte Anregung 
Sir E. Greys werden die Griinde wiederholt, weshalb die ser- 
bische Antwortnote nngenugend und hinterhaltig ist. Die Annahme, 
als ob die Aktion Osterreich-Ungams gegen Serbien Ruilland und 
dessen Einflufj am Balkan treffen wolle, hatte zur Voraussetzung, dali 
die gegen die Monarchic gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbischen, 
sondern audi nissisclien Ursprunges sei. Im Zeitpunkte des in Wien 
gemachten Schrittes der deutschen Regierung war Angelegenheit der 
serbischen Antwortnote durch Kriegsausbruch schon iiberholt. EinfluC- 
nahme der englischen Regierung auf Ruilland im Siime der Erhaltung 
des Fiiedens zwischen den GroDmaohten wiirde dankbar begriifit 
werden 97 

45. Graf Szteen, Paris, 20. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter in Paris 
wurde beauftragt, dortige Regierung aufmerksam zu machen, dali 



IX 

Seite 

franzosische mibtarische 'Vorbereitungen Deutschland zu gleichen Mali- 
nahmen zwingen wiirden, wodurch beide Staaten trotz ihrer Friedens- 
liebe zu gefahrlicher Mobilisierung gedrangt werden kbnnten. Deutsch- 
land z'ahle auf die Unterstiitzung Frankreichs zur Lokalisierung des 
Konfliktes zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbian 98 

46. Graf Szogyeny, Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung hat am 
26. Juli in St. Petersburg erklaren lassen, dafi sich Deutschland bei 
einer Fortsetzung der militarisehen Eiistungen RulMands veranlaUt 
sehen konnte, zu mobilisieren 99 

47. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter 
betonte Herrn Sazonow gegeniiber, daO das Wiener Kabinett, welches 
kein russisches [nteresse zu verletzen, kein serbisches Territorium za 
erwerben und die Souveidnitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten wiinsche, 
immer bereit sei, mit St. Petersburg iiber bsterreichisch-ungarisehe und 
russische Interessen Fiihlung zu nehmen. Die Bedenken, daft die 
gegen Serbien mobilisierten siidlichen Korps Rufiland bedrohen, kbnnten 
nicht ernst genomraen werden. Es sei dringend geboten, dem zu 
befiirchtenden militiirisehen Lizitieren ein rasches Ende zu bereiten. 
Der k. u. k. Botschafter raachte in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck 
aufmerksam, den die bevorstehende umfangreiche russische Mobili- 
sierung in Osterreich-Ungarn hervorrufen wtirde 99 

48. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Anregung bei 
der deutschen Regierung, dali die k. u. k. und die deutschen Bot- 
schafter in St. Petersburg und Paris angewiesen werden, zu erklaren, daft 
die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobibsierung Gegenmaflregeln in 
Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge hatte, die zu ernsten 
Konsequenzen fiihren miiftten. Osterreich-Ungarn werde sich natiirlich 

in seiner kriegerischen Aktion gegen Serbien nicht beirren lassen . .101 

49. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k. 
Regierung ist zu einer freundsehafthchen Aiissprache mit dem St. Peters- 
burger Kabinette iiber die die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu 
Ruliland direkt betre.ffenden Fragen stets bereit 101 

50. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Den Klagen 
Herrn Sazonows gegeniiber, daft kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen 
Graf Berchtold und dem russischen Botschafter stattgefunden babe, 
wird auf die jiingste Aiissprache hingewiesen, in welcher weitgehende 
Zusicherungen beziiglich der Respektierung der terfitorialen und sou- 
veranen Rechte Serbiens erteilt wurden. Es wird hervorgehoben, wie 
sehr die russische Diplomatie an dem unleidlichen Verh'altnisse Oster- 
reich-Ungarns zu Serbien schuld sei. Die Mobibsierung RuHlands 



Sc!tO 

gegen Osterreich-Ungarn zwingt die Monarchie, ihre Mobllisierung zu 
erweitern 102 

51. An die k. u. k. Botsehafter in London und St. Petersburg, Wien, 
.31. Juli 1914. Bussisches Kabinett hat englische Begierung ersucht, 
ihre Vermittlung zwiscben Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien wieder auf- 
zunehmen unter der Bedingung der vorlaufigen Einstellung der Feind- 
seligkeiten. Sir E. Grey bat die Vermittlung Frankreichs, Englands, 
Italiens und Deutschlands angeregt. Die k. u. k. Begierung ist gerne 
bereit, dem Vorschlage Sir E. Greys naherzutreten unter der Voraus- 
setzung, dafl die militarische Aktion gegen Serbien voilaufig 
ihren Fortgang nebme und dafl Rufiland die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn 
gerichtete Mobilisierung zum Stillstande bringe 103 

52. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung. 
der russischen Arm'ee und Flotte 104 

':<:>. An die k. u. k. Missionen, Wien, 31. Juli 1914. Notwendigkeit mili- 
tarischer Madnehmen in Galizien angesichts der russischen Mobilisie- 
rung. Diese sind rein defensiven Charaktera 104 

51. Graf Szecs'en, Paris, 31. Juli 1914. Erklarung der deutschen Begie- 
rung in Paris, dafl pr-iit.elil.iinl gleichfalls mobilisieren werde, wenn 
die russisehe Mobilisierung nieht binnen zwolf Stunden eingestellt 
wird. Anfrage, ob Frankreich iin Falle deutsch-russischen Krieges 
neutral bleiben werde 105 

55. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Rufiland gibt sicb selbst 
mit der formellen Erklarung nicht zufrieden, dafl Osterreich-Ungarn 
weder das serbische Territorium schm'alern noch die serbische Souvc- 
r'anitat antasten, nocb .inch die russischen Balkan- oder sonstigen 
[nteressen verletzen werde, und hat die allgemeine Mobilisierung 
angeordnet 105 

56. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914. Per k. u. k. Botschafter 
bringt nochmals Jen guten Willen des Wiener Kabinettes zum Aus- 
druck, mit Rufiland auf breitester Basis zu verbandeln. Herr Sazonow 
spricht Ansicht aus, dalJ ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg 
weniger erfolgversprechend erseheinen als solche auf dem neutralen 
Londoner Terrain 100 

57. Graf Szogyeny, Berlin, 2. August 1914.' Rufiland hat Kriegsmafinahmen 
geo-en Osterreich-Ungarn und Deutschland nicht eingestellt. Russisehe. 
Truppen baben die deutsche Grenze Uberschritten. Deutschland, das 
somit angegriffen ist, betrachtet sicb als im Kriegszustande mit Rufiland 107 

68. Graf Mensdortf, Loudon, 4. August 1914. Ultimatum Englands an 
Deutschland. Erklarung Sir E. Greys, solange Osterreich-Ungam 



XI 

Seite 
nicht im Kriegszustande mit Frankreich, sei keine Veranlassung zu 
einem Konflikte zwischen England und der Monarchic . 10T 

.59. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 5. August 1914. Kriegs- 
zustand zwischen Osterreicb-Ungarn und Ruliland infolge der droben- 
den Haltung RuGlands im bsterreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikte 
und der Erbffnung der Feindseligkeiten gegen Deutsebland .... 108 

60. An Graf Mensdorff -in London, Wien, 6. August 1914. Osterreich- 
Ungarn wird keinesfalis obne vorhergebende formelle Kriegserklarung 
die Feindseligkeiten gegen England eroffnen. Erwartet analoges Ver- 
halten Englands 108 

61. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 8. August 1914. Anfrage der franzbsischen 
Regierung, ob die Naehricht ricbtig sei, daO das Innsbrucker Armee- 
korps an die franzosische Grenze verschoben worden sei 109 

62. An Oraf Szecsen in Paris, Wien, 9. August 1914. Naehricht von der 
Teilnahme eines b'sterreichisch-ungarischen Armeekbrpers am deutsch- 
franzbsiseben Kriege ist vollst'andig erfunden 109 

63. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 10. August 1914. Franzosiscbe Regierung, welcbe 
Naehricht erbielt, dad ein bsterreichisch-ungarisches Armeekorps nach 
Deutschland gebracht worden sei, erblickt hierin eine militarische 
Hilfeleistung an Deutschland und hat daher den franzbsischen Bot- 
scbafter in Wien beauftragt, seine Passe zu verlangen 109 

64. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 11. August 1914. Auftrag, 
englischer Regierung mitzuteilen, dali die Naehricht der Entsendung 
eines bsterreichisch-ungarischen Armeekorps nach Deutschland -vbllig 
unbegriindet sei 110 

65. Graf Mensdorff, London, 12. August 1914. Kriegserklarung Frank- 
reichs und Englands an Osterreicb-Ungarn Ill 

66. Note des japanischen Botschafters in Wien an Graf Berchtold, Wien, 
20. August 1914. Mitteilung des am 15. August seitens Japans an 
Deutschland gerichteten Ultimatums 112 

67. An Graf Clary in Briissel, Wien, 22. August 1914. Auftrag, der 
belgiscben Regierung mitzuteilen, dail Osterreieh-Ungarn angesichts 
der milit'arischen Kooperation Belgiens mit Frankreich und England 
gegen Deutschland und der inhumanen Behandlung der bster- 
reicbischen und ungarischen Staatsangebbrigen in Belgien gezwungen 
ist, die diplomatischen Beziehnngen zn dem Kbnigreicbe abzubrechen 
und daO nunmehr der Ivriegs^ustand eingetreten ist 114 



xn 

" Seite 

6S. Prinz Hohenlohe, Berlin, 23. August 1914. Deutsche Regierung liifit 
japanisches Ultimatum unbeantwortet und stellt japanischem Geschatts- 
trager in Berlin seine Passe zu 114 

69. An Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio, Wien, 24. August 1914. Angesichts 
des VorgeHens Japans gegen das Deutsche Reich erhielt der Kom- 
mandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzu- 
kampfen, und wird der k. u. k. Botschafter von Tokio abberuien . .115 



1. 

Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold. 

Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. 

Wir alle stehen noch immer derart unter dem erschiitternden Eindruck der 
gestrigen Katastrophe, dad es mir schwer fallt, mit der notigen Fassung, Sach- 
lichkeit und Ruhe das blutige Drama in Sarajevo von hier aus entsprechend zu 
beurteilen. Ich bitte daher, niich vorlaufig auf die Registrierung einiger Tat- 
sachen beschranken zu diirfen. 

Gestern — den 15./28. — ■ wurde der Jahrestag der Schlacht am Amsel- 
felde festbicher als sonst begangen und der serbiscbe Patriot Milos ObilicS ge- 
feiert, der 1389 mit zwei Gefahrten den siegreicben Murad meuchlings er- 
stocben hat. 

Wo Serben leben, gilt. Obilic als der Nationalberos. An die Stelle der 
Tiirken sind aber — dank der unter der Agyde der kb'niglicben Regierung ge- 
ziicbteten Propaganda und der seit Jabren betriebenen PreChetze — nunmehr 
wir als die Erbfeinde geti'eten. 

Den drei jugendlieben Sarajevoer Attentatern Princip, Cabrinovid und dem 
dritten unbekannten Bombenwerfer scheint daber eine Wiederholung des Dramas 
auf dem Kossovopolje vorgescbwebt zu haben. Sie haben noch eine unschuldige 
Frau mitersehossen und oicigen glauben, damit ihr Vorbild noch ubertroffen zu 
haben. 

Jahrelang ist in Serbien Haii gegen die Monarchie ges'at worden. Die 
Saat ist aufgegangen und Mord ward geerntet. 

Die serbiscbe Regierung hat auf die zirka 5 Uhr nacbmittags bekannt- 
gewordene Nachricht hin die Obilic- Feier um 10 Uhr abends offiziell abstoppen 
lassen; inoffiziell und in der Dunkelheit hat sie aber noch geraume Zeit weiter 
gedauert. 

Die Leute sollen sich vor Freude in die Arms gefallen sein (Augenzeugen) 
und man hbrte Bemerkungen wie: „recht ist ihnen geschehen, wir haben das 
schon lange ervvartet," oder „das ist die Rache fur die Annexion." 



Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. 

Ich richtete heute an den < teneralsekretar des Ausw'artigen Amtes, Herrn Gruid, 
die naheliegende Frage, welche Mallregeln die kb'nigliche Polizei ergriffen habe, 
respektive zu crgreifen gedenke, urn die Fiiden des Attentats, welche notorisch 
nach Serbien hintiberspielen, zu verfolgen. 

Seine Erwiderung lautete, daft sicb die serbische Polizei bisher mit dem 
Uegonstand uberhaupt nicht befaftt katte. 



Generalkonsul Jehlitschka an Graf Berchtold. 

Vskiib 1. Juli 1914. 

Am 15./28. Juni wurde in Pristina der Vidov-Dan (Frohnleichnamstag), 
an welchem sicb diesmal die Schlacht auf dem Amselfelde (1389) zum 
525. Male j'ahrte, zum ersten Male offiziell als „Befreiungsfest" der serbiscben 
Nation gefeiert. 

Seit vier Monaten hatte ein eigenes Festkomitee daran gearbeitet, dieses 
Fest zu einem moglichst feierliehen und zu einer grofiartigen nationalserbiseheni 
Demonstration zu gestalten. 

Die beziigliche Propaganda setzte gleicbzeitig in Kroatien, Dalmatien und 
BosnieD, hauptsHchkch aber in Ungarn ein, den Teilnehmcrn wurde freie Fahrt 
auf den serbiseben Staatsbahnen, billige Unterkunt't und Verpflegung, Unter- 
stiitzung seitens der Behorden etc. zugesagt. 

Die Agitation war cine energische und zielbewuftte. 

Zur Festfeier in Pristina wurden die Gaste mit Extraziigen gebracht. 

Die verscbiedenen Festreden schwelgten in den historischen Reminiszenzen, 
welche sicb an den Schauplatz des Festes kniipften. um schlieftlich mehr oder 
minder das bekannte Tbema von der Vereinigung aller Serben und der ,Be- 
freiung der unterjocbten Briider" jenseits der Donau und der Save, ferner in 
Bosnien und Dalmatien zu variieren. 



AIs sich in den Abendstunden die Nachricht von der entsetzlichen Schand- 
tat, deren Schauplatz Sarajevo gewesen war, verbreitete, bemachtigte sich der 
fanatisierten Menge eine Stimmung, welebe ich naoh den zahlreiehen Beifalls- 
auDei'u'ngen, welehe mir von meinen absolut verlaWiehen Gewahrsmannern ge- 
meldet werden, nicht anders als unmenschlieh bezeichnen knnn. 

Angesichts dieser Haltung der Bevolkerung, welehe in gleieher Weise auch 
in Uskiib zu Tage trat, fallen alle Versuehe der serbischen Presse, die moralisehe 
Verantwortung fiir die Tat, welehe von einer reprasentativen Versammlung mit 
solch unverhohlener Genugtuung aufgenommen wird, von Serbien abzusehiitteln, 
in em erbarmliches Nichts zusammen. 



Graf SzGcsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Paris, 4. Jali 1914. 

Ich habe heme Herrn Poineare den Dank der k. u. k. Regierung fiir sein 
Beileid ubermittelt. 

Auf die serbenfeindlichen Demonstrationen bei uns anspielend, erwahnte 
er, daft nach der Ermordung des Prasidenten Carnot in ganz Frankreich alle 
Italiener den argsten Verfolgungen seitens der Bevolkerung ausgesetzt waren. 

Ich machte ihn darauf aufmerksam, daft die damalige Bluttat mit keinerlei 
antifranzosiseher Agitation in Italien im Zusammenhange stand, wahrend man 
jetzt zugeben mull, dall in Serbien seit Jahren mit alien erlaubten und 
unerlaubten Mittehi gegen die Monarchic gehetzt wird. 

Zum Schlusse sprach Herr Poineare die Uberzeugung aus, die serbisehe 
Regierung werde tins bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verf'olgung 
eventueller Mitschuldiger das grciftte Entgegenkommen zeigen. Einer solchen 
PHieht kb'nne sich kein Staat entziehen. 



Gerent Herr Hoflehner an Graf Berchtold. 

A'isch, 6. Juli 1914. 

Die Nachricht vom entsetzlicben, nur zu woblgelungenen Attentate in 
Sarajevo rief hier Sensation im vollsten Sinno des Wortes hervor. Von Bestiirzung 
oder aber Entriistung war so gut wie nichts zu bemerken, in weitaus vor- 
herrscbendera MaOe karaen nur Empfindungen der Genugtuung, ja der Freude, 
und dies vielfacb ganz unverbiillt, ohne jede Zuriickbaltung, nicht selten in ganz 
roher Form zum Ausdrueke. Dies gilt hauptsachlicb fiir die sogenannten fuhren- 
den Kreise, die Intelligenz, wie Berufspolitiker, Lebrpersonen, Beamte, Offiziere 
und die Studentensehaft. Etwas zuriiekhaltender zeigte sicli nocb die 'Kauf- 
mannscbaf't. 

Alle Erklarungen, die seitens serbischer amtlicber Stellen oder einzelner 
hb'herer Personliehkeiten abgegeben wurden und die Entriistung iiber das 
Attentat und dessen Verurteilung zum Ausdruek bringen sollen, miissen als 
bitterste Ironie auf den wirken, der Gelegenheit hatte, in den jiingst ver- 
flossenen Tagen in nachster Nalie Einblicke in das Gefiihlsleben der serbischen 
intelligenten Bevolkerung zu gewinnen. 

Der Gefertigte batte am Tage des Attentates gegen 9 Ubr abends obne 
Abnung nocb vom Gesebebenen ein biesiges Gartc-nkaffee besuelit und wurde 
bier zuerst von einem Bekannten iiber das ganz bestimmt aufgetretene Geriieht 
in Kenntnis gesetzt. Es- war cine Pein sondergleicben zu beobachten und zu 
horen, wie eine formlich frobliehe Stimmung die zahlreiehen Gaste des Lokales 
eri'alit hatte, mit welcber eisicbtlichen Genugtuung man iiber die Tat debattierte 
und wie Ausrufe der Freude, des Holmes und Spottes aufflatterten — selbst den 
an Ausbriiche des bier herrscbenden politischen Fanatismus seit langem 
Gewbbnten mullten diese Wahrnebmungen aufs aulierste deprimieren! 



G. 
Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold. 

Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. 

Icb bin nunmehr — nacb dem ungliiekseligen Verbrecben vom 28. Juni — 
wieder seit einiger Zeit auf meinem Tosten und kann mir erlauben, iiber die 
bier herrschende Stimmung ein Urteil abzugeben. 



Seit der Annexionskrise, waren die Beziehungen zwischen dor Monarchie 
und Serbien auf Seite des letzteren durch nationalen Chauvinismus, Feindselig- 
keit und eine wirksame Propaganda der groOserbischen Aspirationen in unseren 
von Sorben bewohnten L'andern vergiftet, seit den letzten beiden Balkankriegen 
hat der Erfolg Serbiens diesen Chauvinismus zum Paroxismus gesteigert, dessen 
Ausbriiehe stellenweise den Stempel des Wahnsinns tragen. 

Es sei mir erspart, hiefiir Beweise und Beispiele erbringen zu miissen, 
sie sind uberall und immer in den Kreiseu der politiscben Gesellschaft wie 
unter dem niederen Volke, in alien Parteien billig zu haben! Ich stelle es als 
bekanntes Axiom hin, dad die Politik Serbiens auf die Abtrennung der von 
Sudslawen bewohnten Gebiete und in weiterer Folge auf die Vernichtung der 
Monarchie als Groflmacht aufgebaut ist und nur dieses eine Ziel kennt. 

Niemand, der auch nur acht Tage in dem hiesigen politisehen Milieu zu 
Ieben und zu wirken bemulligt ist, wird sieh dieser Wahrheit verschlieflen. 

Infolge der jiingsten Ereignisse, welche die hiesigen politisehen Stimmungen 
beeinflussen, und dazu rechne ich das Attentat in Sarajevo, den Tod Hartwigs 
und die Wahlkampagne, hat sich der HaB gegen die Monarchie noch vertieft. 

Das Attentat in Sarajevo hat den Serben den bevorstehenden Zerfall der 
habsburgischen Staaten — auf welohen man sclion friiher seine Hoffnungen 
setzte — als in kiirzester Zeit zu erwarten, den Abfall der von Sudslawen 
bewohnten Gebiete der Monarchie, die Revolution in Bosnien-Herzegowina und 
die Unverlalllichkeit der slawischen Regimenter — als feststehendo Tatsachen 
vorgegaukelt und brachte System und scheinbare Berechtigung in ihren nationali- 
stischen Wahnsinn. 

Das so verhafite Osterreieh-Ungarn erscheint den Serben nunmebr ohn- 
m'achtig und kaum mehr wiirdig, einen Krieg mit ihm zu fiihren — zura 
Hasse gesellt sich die Verachtung — es fallt ohne Miihe als zermurbter Korper 
in den Scholl des in naher Zukunft zu verwirklichenden grollserbischen Reiches. 

Blatter, welche nicht zu den allerextremsten gehbren, besprechen in t'ag- 
lichen Artikeln die Ohnmacht und den Zerfall der .Nachbarmonarchie und. 
beschimpfen ohne Scheu und Furcht vor Ahndung ihre Organe. Sie machen 
selbst vor der erhabenen Person unseres Herrschers nicht Halt. Sogar das 
Regierungsorgan weist auf die Zust'ande in Osterreieh-Ungarn als auf die 
einzigen Ursachen des fluchwtirdigen Verbrechens hin. Die Furcht vor Verant- 
wortung besteht nicht mehr. Das serbische Yolk wird seit Jahrzehnten durch 
die Presse erzogen und die jeweilige Politik h'angt von der Parteipresse ab; 
eine Frucht dieser Erziehung ist die grollserbische Propaganda und ihre abscheu- 
liche Ausgeburt, das Attentat vom 28. Juni. 

Ich ubergehe die an Wahnwitz streifenden, von der „Times" als „tob- 
siichtig" bezeichneten Anklagen und Verd'achtigungen anlafilich des: Todes 



Hartwigs, iiberhaupt die liigenhaftc Prefikampagne, welche aber die Serben in 
der Uberzeugung bestarken diirfte, dall die Regierung und die Vertreter Oster- 
reich-Ungarns vogelfrei sind, und Bezeiclmungen wie Morder, Lump, infamer 
Osterreicher etc. fiir uns als schmiickende Beiworter gelten miissen. 

Der Tod Hartwigs hat in der Erkenntnis der Sehwere dieses Verlustes in 
der serbischen politisehen Welt einen fanatischen Kultus des Verstorbenen aus- 
gelost und man lielS sich dabei nicht allein von der Dankbarkeit fiir die Ver- 
gangenhe'it, sondern aueb von der Sorge am die Zukunft leiten und uberbot 
sich in sklavischer Unterwiirfigkeit vor Ruliland, um dessen Wohlwollen fur 
kommende Zeiten zu siohern. 

Als drifter Faktor vereinigt die Wahlkampagne alle Parteien auf der Platt- 
form der F'eindseligkeiten gegen Osterreich-Ungarn. Keine der auf die Regie- 
rungsgewalt aspirierenden Parteien will in den Verdacht konimen, eines 
schwaehliehen Nachgebcns gegeniiber der Monarehie fiir fahig gehalten zu 
werden. So wird die Wahlkampagne unter dem Schlagworte der Bek'ampfung 
Osterreich-Ungams gefiihrt. 

Man halt die Monarchic aus inneren und aufieren Griinden fiir ohnmachtig, 
zu jedcr energischen Aktion unfahig und glaubt, dali die ernsten Worte, die 
schon an mailgebenden Stellen bei uns gesprochen worden sind, nur 
Bluff seien. 

Die Urlaube des k. u. k. Kriegsministers und Chefs des Gencralstabes haben 
in der Tjberzeugung best'arkt, daD die Schwache Osteneich-Ungarns nunmchr 
evident ist. 

Ich habe die Geduld Euer Exzcllenz etwas liinger in Anspruch zu nehmen 
mir erlaubt, nicht weil ich mit Vorstehendem etwas Neues zu bringen glaubte, 
sondern weil ich diese Schilderung als Ausgang zu der sich aufdrangenden 
Konklusion betrachte, dall einc Abreohnung mit Serbien, ein Krieg um die 
Grofimachtstellung der Monarehie, ja um ihre Existenz als solche, auf die Dauer 
nicht zu umgeken ist. 

Versaumen wir es, Klarheit in unser Verh'altnis zu Serbien zu bringen, 
so werden wir mitschuldig an den Schwicrigkciten und der Ungunst der Ver- 
haltnisse bei einem kiinftigen Kampfe, der doch, ob friiher oder spater, aus- 
getragen werden muC. 

Fiir den lokalen Beobachter und den Vertreter der ostorreichisch-ungarischen 
Interessen in Serbien stellt sich die Frage so, dalS wir cine weiteie Sch'adigung 
unseres Prestiges nicht mehr ertragen kb'nnen. 

Sollten -wir daher entschlossen sein, weitgehende Forderungen, vcrbunden 
mit wirksamer Kontrollo — denn nur eino solche konnte den Augiasstall der 
groflserbischen Wiihlarbeit reinigen — zu stellen, dann muflten alle mbglichen 



Konsequenzen iiberbliekt werden und es mufi von Anfang an der starke und 
feste Wille bestehen, durchzuhalten. 

Halbe Mittel, ein Stellen von Forderungen, langes Parlamentieren und 
schlieBlieh ein faules Kompromift ware der harteste Schlag, der Osterreich- 
Ungarns Ansehen in Serbien und seine Machtstellung in Europa treffen konnte. 



7. 

Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Giesl in Belgrad. 

Wien, am 22. Jull 1914. 

Euer Hochwohlgehoren wollen die nacbt'olgende Note am Donnerstag, den 
23. Juli naehmittags, der kb'niglichen Regierung iiberreichen: 

„Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbio a Vienne a fait d'ordre de son 
Gouvernement au Gouvernement I. et R. la declaration suivante: 

„„La Serine reoonnait quelle n'a pas &t& atteinte dans ses droits par le 
fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Hercegovine et qu'elle se conformera par conse- 
quent k telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a l'article XXV 
du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbia 
s'engage des h present a abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition 
qu'elle a observed a regard de I'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle 
s'engage, en outre, h changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers i'Autriche- 
Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec oette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. "" 

Or, l'histoire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux 
dii 28 juin, ont demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif 
dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise certaines parties 
de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour spus les yeux du Gouverne'- 
ment Serbe est arrive h. se manifester au dela du territoire du Royaume par 
des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres. 

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels 
contenus dans la declaration ■ du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer 
ce mouvement: il a tolere l'activite criminelle des differentes societes et affilia- 
tions dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorifica- 
tion des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans 
les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, 
tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe 
■h, la haino de la Monarchic et au mepris de ses institutions. 



Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbio n'avait pas 
cess6 au moment ou les evenements du 28 join dernier en ont demontre au 
monde entier les consequences funestes: 

II resulte des depositions et aveux des anteurs criminels de Fattentat du 
28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a Hi trame a Belgrade, que les armes 
et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont Hi donnes 
par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la „Narodna Odbrana" 
et enfin cfue le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a Hi orga- 
nist et effectu6 par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. 

Les resultats mentionnes de instruction ne permettent pas au Gouverne- 
ment I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimite expectative 
qu'il avait observed pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres 
a Belgrade et propages de lit sur les territoires de la Monarcbie; ces resultats 
lui imposent au contraire le devoir de inettre fin a des menees qui forment 
une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillity de la Monarcbie. 

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement I. et R. se voit oblige 
de demander au Gouvernement Serbe Fenonciation officielle qu'il condamne 
la propaganda dirigee contre la Monarcbie austro-bongroise, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble 
des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu it detacher de la Monarchie des 
territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, 
cctto propagande criminelle et terroriste. 

Atin de donner un caractere solennel ii cet engagement, le Gouvernement 
Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal officiel en date 
du 26/13 juillet lencinciation suivante: 

„ r Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee 
contre l'Autriehe-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en 
dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-bongroise des territoires qui en 
font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ses agisse- 
ments criminels. 

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes 
aient partieipe it la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la, les relations 
de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'ctait solennellement engagtS 
par sa declaration du 31 mars 1009. 

Le Gouvernement Royal qui desapprouvc et repudie toute idee ou tenta- 
tive d'immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriehe- 
Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, 
les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavaut il pro- 
cedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables 
de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts it prevenir et 
a n'priiner." " 



Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de l'Armee 
Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera pubbee dans le bulletin 
officiel de l'Armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre. 

1° a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris 
de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrity 
territoriale, 

2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite „Narodna Odbrana", a con- 
fisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et a proceder de la meme maniere 
contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la pro- 
pagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendre 
les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer 
leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme, 

3-° a eliminer sans delai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce 
qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert 
ou pourrait scrvir a fomenter la propagande contre l'Autricbe-Hongrie, 

4° a eloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en general tous 
les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se reserve de communiquer 
les noras et les faits au Gouvernement Royal, 

5° a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement I. 
et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre l'intigrite 
territoriale de la Monarchie, 

6° a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot 
du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; 

des organes, dengues par le Gouvernement I. et R., prendront part aux 
recherehes y relatives, 

7° a proceder d'urgence a l'arrestation du commandant Voja Tankosi(! et 
du. nomme Milan Oiganovic', employe de l'Etat Serbe, compromis par les 
resultats de L'instruction de Sarajevo, 

8° a empecher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des Autorites Serbes 
dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; 

a licencier et punir severement les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de 
Sabac et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en 
leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere, 

9° a donner au Gouvernement I. et R., des explications sur les propos 
injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger qui, 
malgre leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesittS apres l'attentat du 28 juin de 



10 

s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la Monarchic 
austro-hongroise enlin 

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exdcution des 
mesures comprises dans les points prdcddents. 

Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la rdponse du Gouvernement Royal au 
plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 6 h du soir. 

Un mdmoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo a l'egard 
des fonctiormaires mentionnds aux points 7 et 8 est annexe 1 a. cette Note." 



L'instruction eriminelle ouverto par le tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo 
Prineip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative, crime commis 
par eux le 28 juin dr., a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes: 

1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour k Sarajevo, 
l'aichidue Francois Ferdinand f'ut formd a. Belgrade par Gavrilo Prineip, Nedeljko 
Cabrinovid, le nomrnd Milan Ciganovid et Trit'ko Grabez avec le eoncours du 
commandant Voja Tankosid. 

2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant 
lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Prineip, 
Cabrinovid et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovid et le commandant Voja 
Tankosid. 

3° Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant. du depot d'armes 
do l'armde serbe a Kragujevae. 

4° Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciganovid enseigna a Prineip, 
Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de so servir des grenades et donna, dans 
une foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets 
Browning a Prineip et Grabez. 

5° Pour rendre possible a Prineip, Cabrinovid et Grabez de passer la 
frontier© de Bosnie-Ilereegovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contre- 
bande d'arrnes, un systeme de transport secret fut organisd par Ciganovid. 

D'apres cette organisation 1 introduction en Bosnie-Hercdgovine des mal- 
faiteurs et de leurs amies fut opdrde par les Capitaines-fronticre de Sabac 
(Rade Popovid) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbid do 
Loznica avec le eoncours de divers particuliers. 



Gelegentlich der Ubergabe der vorstehenden Note wollen Euer Hoch- 
wohlgeboren miindlich hinzufiigen, dafi Sie beauftragt seien — falls Ihnen nicht 
inzwischen eine vorbehaltlose zustimmende Antwort der kbniglichen Regierung 
zugekommen sein sollte — naeh Ablauf der in der Note vorgesehenen, vom. 
Tage und von der Stunde Ihrer Mitteilung an zu rechnenden 48stiindigen 
Frist, mit dem Personale der k. u. k. Gesandtsehaft Belgrad zu verlassen. 



Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, 
St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel. 

Wkn, 22. Juli 1914. 

Le Gouvernement I. et R. s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par 
l'entremise du Ministre I. et R. a Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal 
de Serbie. (Siehe Weisung an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad vom 22. Juli 1914.) 

J'ai l'lionneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de eette 
Note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel Vous etes accredits, en 
accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici: 

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbs a adressiS a l'Autriche- 
Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. 

Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagee dans une 
politique tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de 
la Monarchic austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires 
austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. 

La Serbie devint le foyer dune agitation crimin'elle: 

Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a so former qui, soit ouverte- 
me.nt, soit clandestinement, etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le terri- 
toire austro-hongrois. Ces societes et affiliations eoraptent parmi leurs membres 
des generaux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les 
sommites du monde offieiel et inofficiel du Royaume. 

Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service de cette propa- 
gande, dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les 
organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de 
la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement 
co'ntre sa surete et son integrite. 



Un grand nombrc d'agents est appele a soutenir par tous lcs moyens l'agitation 
contre I'Autriche-Hongiie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la 
jeunesse de ces pays. 

L'esprit eonspirateur des politicians serbes, e'sprit dont les annales-du Royaume 
portent les sanglantes empreintes,.a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise 
balcanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandcs jusque la occupies en Mace- 
doine, sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En presence de ees agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee 
depuis des annees, le Gouvernement do la Serbie n'a pas oru devoir prendre 
la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi. que le Gouvernement 'Serbe a manque au devoir 
que lui imposait la declaration solennelle da 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il 
s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte de l'Europe et avec l'engagement 
qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement I. et R. a l'egard de l'attitude provocatrice 
de la Serbie 6tait inspirde du desinteressement territorial de la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbe finirait tout de memo par 
apprecier a sa jusle valeur l'amitie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude 
bienveillante [mur lis interets politiques de la Serbie. le Gouvernement 1. et R. 
esperait que le Royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cot/' une 
ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille 
evolution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de 
l'annee 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude desinteressee 
et sans ranoune l'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. 

Cette bienveillanee. manifestee par l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'egard de l'Etat voisin 
n'a cependant aucunement modifie les precedes du Royaume qui a continue a tolerer 
sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manife iti c 
au mondo entiei le 28 juin dr., jour, oil l'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic et son 
illustre ('-pouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cot etat de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a du se decider ii 
entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le 
Gouvernement Serbe 5 arreter le mouvement inoendiaire menaeant la surete et 
l'integrite de la Monanhie austro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement I. et R. est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette-de,marche, il 
se trouve on plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees qui ne 
sauraieat admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune- 
ment dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne tut continuellemcnt troublee 
par les agissements partant de Belgrade. 

C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement 1. et R. tient a la 
disposition du Gouvernement un dossier 



13 

elucidant les menses serbea et les rapports existant entrc ses menses et lo meurtre 
du 28 juin. 

Une communication identique est adress<;e aux Repr^sentants Imp£riaux et 
Royaux aupres des aulres Puissances Signatures. 

Vous etes autoris6 de laissor une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de 
Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 



Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

Telegramm. Wien, 23. JmH 1914. 

Da unter den Ententemachten England am ehesten fiir eine objektive Be- 
urteilung unseres heutigen Sehrittes in Belgrad zu gewinnen sein du'rfte, ersuche 
icli Euer Exzellenz bei der Konversation. die Sie am 24. 1. M. gelegentlich der 
(jberreichung der Zirkulamote im Foreign Office haben werden, unter anderem 
auch darauf hinzuweisen, dafl es Serbien in der Hand gehabt hiitte, den ernsten 
Schritten, die es unsererseits erwarten muDte, die Spitze abzubrechen, wenn es 
seinerseits spontan das Notwendige vorgekebrt h'atte, um auf serbisehem Boden 
eine Untersuchung gegen die serbischen Teilnehmer am Attentat vom 28. Juni 1. J. 
einzuleiten und die Verbindungen aufzudecken, die hinsichtlich des Attentates 
erwiesenermafjen von Belgrad nach Sarajevo fiibren. 

Die serbisehe Regierung hat bis heute, obwohl cine Anzahl notoriscli 
bekannter Indizien nach Belgrad weisen, in diesem Belange niclit nur nichts 
unternommen, sie hat vielmehr die vorhandenen Spuren zu verwischen getrachtet. 

So ist einem telegraphischen Bericht unserer Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu 
entnehmen, dali der durch die iibereinstimmenden Aussagen der Attentater 
kompromittierte serbisehe Staatsbeamte Ciganovic' am Tage des Attentates noch 
in Belgrad weilte, drei Tage daraut aber, als sein Name in den Zeitungen 
genannt wurde, die Stadt bereits verlassen hatte. Bekanntlich erklarte auch schon 
der serbisehe PrefJchef, dall Ciganovic' in Belgrad vbllig unbekannt sei. 

Was die kurze Befristung unserer Forderungen anbelangt, so ist dieselbe 
auf unsere langjiihrigen Erfahrungen serbischer Verschleppimgskiinste zuriick- 
zufiihren. 

Wir kb'nnen die Forderungen, deren Erfiillung wir von Serbien verlangen 
und die eigentlich im Verkehr zwischen Staaten, die in Friede und Freundschaft 
l'eben sollen, nur Selbstverstandliches enthalten, nicht zum Gegenstand von Ver- 
handlungen und Kompromissen machen und kbnnen mit Rucksicht auf unsere volks- 



14 

wirtschaftlichen Interessen nicht riskieren, eine politische Methode, wonach 
Serbien die entstandene Krise nach seinem Belieben zu verlangern in der Hand 
hatte, zu akzeptieren. 



10. 
Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. London, 24. Juli 1914. 

Zirkularnote Sir E. Grey eben iibergeben, der sie aufmerksam durch- 
gelesen. Bei Punkt 5 fragte er, wie das zu verstehen sei, Einsetzung Organe 
unserer Regierung in Serbien ware gleichbedeutend mit Aufhoren staatlicher 
Unabhangigkeit Serbiens. Ich erwiderte, Kollaboration von z. B. Polizeiorganen 
tangiere keineswegs Staatssouveranitat. 

Er bedauerte Befristung, weil dadureh die Mbgliehkeit benommen wiirde, 
die erste Erregung zu beruhigen und auf Belgrnd einzuwirken, uns eine befriedi- 
gende Antwort zu geben. Ein Ultimatum konne man immer noeh stellen, wenn 
Antwort nicht annehmbar. 

Ich fiihrte lange unseren Stand punkt aus (>Iotwendigkeit Abwehr von un- 
ausgesetzten subversiven Untemehmungen, welche Gebiet der Monarchic bedrohen, 
"Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen, vollkommenster MiOerfolg der vielfach 
bewiesenen bisherigen konzilianten Haltung gegeniiber Serbien, das jetzt iiber 
drei Wochen Zeit hatte, aus eigenem Antrieb Untersuchung gegen Teilnahme 
Attentat einzuleiten etc.). 

Der Herr Staatssekretiir wiederholte seine Bedenken gegen kurze Befristung, 
anerkannte aber, daB das, was iiber Mitschuld an Verbrechen von Sarajevo 
gesagt wird, sowie manche unserer Verlangen berechtigt seien. 

Er wiirde ganz bereit sein, die Angelegenheit als eine solche zu betiaehten, 
die nur Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien beriihre. Er ist aber sehr „apprehensiv", 
daG mehrere GrofJm'aehte in einen Krieg verwickelt werden kbnnten. Yon Rufs- 
land, Deutschland, Frankreich sprechend bemerkte er, die Bestimmungen des 
franzosisch-russischen Biindnisses diirften ungefahr so lauten, wie die des Drei- 
bundes. 

Ich legte ibm ausfuhrlich unseren Standpunkt dar und wiederholte ent- 
schieden, dail in diesem Falle wir fest bleiben miiliten, um uns doch einiger- 
mafJen Garantien zu schaffen, nachdem bisherige serbische Erklarungen niemals 



eingehalten wurden. Ioh begreife, daG er zunachst nur die Frage der Riiek- 
wirkung auf europaischen Frieden erw'age, er miisse aber auch, um unseren 
Standpunkt zu wiirdigen, sich in unsere Lage versetzen. 

Er wollte nicbt in eine n'ahere Diskussion iiber dieses Tbema eingeben, 
miisse auch noch Note genauer studieren. Er zitiere zunachst den deutschen und 
den franzosischen Botscbafter, da er mit den Alliierten Osterreich-Ungarns und 
Rulilands, die aber selbst keine direkten Interessen in Serbien haben, vor allem 
in Gedankenaustausch treten miisse. 



11. 

Graf Szgcsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Paris, 24. Juli 1914. 

Soeben dem mit der Vertretung des abwesenden Ministers des Aussern 
betrauten Herrn Justizminister Weisung vom 22. 1. M. vorgelesen und Kopie 
hinterlassen. Herr Bienvenu Martin, der durch heutige Morgenblatter vom Inhalt 
unserer Demarche in Belgrad beiliiufig informiert <var, schien durch meine 
Mitteilung ziemlich impressioniert. Ohne sich in eine nahere Erorterung des 
Textes einzulassen, gab er bcreitwillig zu, daft die Ereignisse der letzten Zeit 
und die Haltung der serbischen Regierung ein energisches Einschreiten unserer- 
seits ganz begreiflich erscheinen lassen. 

Punkt 5 der in Belgrad iiberreichten Note schien dem Herrn Minister 
besonders aufzufallen, denn er liell sich denselben zweimal vorlesen. 

Der Herr Minister dankte mir fiir meine Mitteilung, die, wie er sagte, ein- 
gehend gepriift werden wiirde. Ich nahm die Gelegenheit wahr, um zu betonen, daO 
os sich um eine Frage handle, die direkt zwischen Serbien und uns ausgetragen 
werden muli, dafl es aber im allgemeinen europaischen Interesse liege, wenn 
die Unruhe, die seit Jahren durch die serbische Wiihlarbeit gegen uns auf- 
rechterhalten werde, endlic.h einem klaren Zustand Platz mache. 

Alle Freunde des Friedens und der Ordnung, und zu diesen z'ahle ich 
Frankreich in erster Linie, sollten daher Serbien ernstlich raten, seine Haltung 
griindlich zu 'andern und uuseren berechtigten Forderungen Rechnung zu 
tragen. 

Der Herr Minister gab zu, dafi Serbien die Pflic.ht habe, gegen etwaige 
Komplizen der Morder von Sarajevo energisch vorzugelien, welcher Pflicht es 



16 

sich wohl nicht entziehen werde. Unter nachdriieklicher Betonung der Sympathie 
Frankreichs fiir Osterreich-Ungarn und der zwischen unseren beiden Landem 
bestehenden guten Beziehungen, spraob er Hoffnung aus, dad die Streitfrage 
friedlich, in einer unseren Wiinschen entsprechenden Weise ausgetragen 
werden wird. 

Der Herr Minister vermied jeden Versueh, die Haltung Serbiens irgendwie 
zu beschonigen oder zu verteidigen. 



12. 
Graf Sz6csen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramra. Paris, 24. Juli 1914. 

Baron Scboen wird auftraggemaQ heute hier mitteilen, daft unsere Kontro- 
verse rait Serbien nach Ansicht Berliner Kabinettes eine Angelegenheit sei, die 
nur Osterreich-Ungarn und .Serbien angehe. 

Ankmipfend bieran wird er zu versteben geben, daft, falls dritte Staaten 
sich einmischen wollten, Deutschland, getreu seinen Allianzverpflichtungen, auf 
unserer Seite sein wird. 



13. 
Graf Szecsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramra. Paris, 24. Juli 1914. 

Baron Schoen. hat die ihni aufgetragene Demarche socben ausgefiihrt. 

Herr Bienvenu Martin hat. ilnn gesagt, er kb'nne sich noch nicht definitiv 
auftern, soviel kbnne er aber schon jetzt sagon, daft die franzbsische Regierung 
auch der Ansicht sei, unsere Kontr.overse mit Serbien ginge ntir Belgrad und 
Wien an und dali man hier hoffe, daft die Frage eine direkte und friedliche 
Losung finden werde. 

Dem hiesigen serbischen Gesandten wurde bereits der Rat gegeben, seine 
Regierung moge in alien Punkten soweit als nur moglich nachgeben, freilich 
mit der Einschrankung: „insofcrne ihre Souveranitatsrechte nicht tangiert 
werden". 

Baron Schoen betontc die europ'aische Notwendigke.it, daD der Herd ewiger 
Beumuhk'ung in Belgrad endlich aus der Welt geschafft werden miisse. 



14. 
Graf Szdpary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914: 

Der Herr Minister dcs AulSern empfing mich, indem er mir sagte, er wisse, was 
mieh zu ihm fiihre und erklare mir gleich, daQ er zu meiner Demarche keine 
Stellung nehmen vrtirde. Ich begann mit der Verlesung meines Auftrages. Der 
Minister unterbrach mich das erste Mai bei der Erw'ahnung der Serie von 
Attentaten und fragte auf meine Auf'klarungeri, ob denn erwiesen sei, dali diese 
alle in Belgrad ihren Ursprung batten? Ich betonte, dall sie AusfluG der serbi- 
schen Aufwiegelung seien. Im weiteren Verlauf der Verlesung aufierte er, er 
wisse, worum es.sieh handle: Wir wollten Serbien den Krieg machen und dies 
solle der Vorwand sein. Ich replizierte, dad unsere Haltung in den letzten 
Jahren ein hinieichender Beweis sei, daD wir .Serbien gegentiber Vorwande 
weder suchen noch braucheo. Dio geforderten solennen Enunziationen riefen 
nicht den Widerspruch des Herrn Ministers hervor; er versuchte nur immer wieder 
zu behaifpton, dafl Pasici sich bereits in dem Sinne ausgesprochen habe, was 
ich richtig stellte. P I1 dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez", sagte er. Ich sagte 
ihm, niemand wende sich bei uns gegen Serbiens Integ-ritat oder Dynastie. Am 
lebhaftesten erklarte sich Herr Sazonow gegen die Auflb'sung der ,Narodna 
Odbrana", die Serbien niemals vornehmen werde. Weiteren Widerspruch von 
Seite des Herrn Ministers lb'ste die Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren an der 
Unterdriickung der subversiven Bewegung aus. Serbien werde also daheim nicht 
mehr der Herr sein! „Sie werden dann immer wieder intervenieren wollen und 
welches Leben werden Sie da Europa bereiten!" Ich erwiderte, es werde, wenn 
Serbien guten AVillen hat, ein ruhigeres sein, als bisher. 

Den an die Mitteilung der Note angefiigten Kommentar horte der Herr Minister 
ziemlich ruhig an; bei dem Passus, dall wir uns in unseren Gefuhlen mit jenen 
aller zivilisierten Nationen eins wissen, meinte er, dies sei ein Irrtum. Mit allem 
mir zu Gebote stehenden Nachdruck verwies ich -darauf, wie traurig es wiire, 
wenn wir ,in dieser Frage, bei der alies im Spiele sei, was wir Heiligstes h'atten 
und, was immer der Herr Minister sagen wolle, auch in Rutland heilig sei, 
kein Verstandnis in Rullland fanden. Der Herr Minister suchte die monarchische 
Seite der Angelegenheit zu verkleinern. 

Das zur Verfiigung der Regierungen gehaltene Dossier betreffend, meinte 
Herr Sazonow, wozu wir uns diese Miihe gegeben h'atten, wo wir doch bereits 
ein Ultimatum erlassen hiitten. Dies beweise am besten, dafl wir eine unparteiische 
Priifung des Falles gar nicht anstreben. Ich sagte ihm, dall fur unser Vorgehen 
in dieser zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien spielenden Angelegenheit die 
durch unsere eigene Untersuchung erzielten Resultate geniigen und wir nur 



18 

bereit seien, den M'achten weitere Aufschlusse, falls diese.lben sie interessieren, 
zu geben, weil wir nichts zu verheimlichen batten. 

Ilerr Sazonow meinte, jetzt nacb dem Ultimatum sei er eigentlich gar 
nicht neugierig. Er stellte die Sache so dar, als ob es tins darauf ankomme, 
unbedingt mit Serbien Krieg zu fiihren. Ich erwiderte, wir seien die fried- 
liebendste Macht der Welt, was wir wollten, sei nur Sicherung unseres 
Territoriums vor fremden revolution'aren Umtrieben und unserer Dynastie vor 
Bomben. 

Im Verlaufe der weiteren Ercirterungen liefs Ilerr Sazonow nochrnals 
Bemerkung fallen, dafi wir jedenfalls cine ernste Situation gesohaffen batten. 

Trotz der relativen Kubc des Herrn Ministers war seine Stellungnahme eine 
durcbaus ablehnende und gegneriscbe. 



15. 

Communique des russischen Amtsblattes. 

St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. 

Die St. Petersburger Telegrapbenagentur meldet: 
Das amtlicbe Organ verbffentlicht folgendes Communique: 
Die kaiserliche Regierung, lebhaft besorgt durch die iiberraschenden Ereig- 
nisse und durcb das an Serbien durcb Osterreich-Ungarn geriehtete Ultimatum, 
verfolgt mit Aufmerksamkeit die Entwicklung des bsterreiehisch-ungarisch-serbi- 
scben Konfliktes, in welchem Rullland nicht indifferent bleiben kann. 



16. 
Graf Szapary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. 

Nacb funfstiindigem Ministerrate hat Herr Sazonow abends den deutseben 
Botsehafter empfangen und mit ibm eine lange Unterredung gebabt. 

Der Herr Minister vertrat hiebei die wakrscheinbch als Kesultat des Ministerrates 
zu betrachtende Ansicbt, der bsterreichisch-ungarisch-serbische Streit sei keine 
auf diese Staaten beschr'ankte Angelegenheit, sondern eine europaiscbe, da der 



19 

im Jahre 1909 durch eine serbische Deldaration erfolgte Ausgleich unter den 
Auspizien ganz Europas vollzogen worden sei. 

Der Herr Minister hob hervor, dafi ihn besonders der Umstand unangenehm 
beriihrt babe, daft Osterreich-Ungarn die Prtifung eines Dossiers angeboten babe, 
wahrend bereits ein Ultimatum ergangen sei. Rufiland wiirde eine internationale 
I'riifung des von uns zur Verfugnng gestellten Dossiers verlangen. Mein deutscher 
Kollege machte Herrn Sazonovv sofort darauf aufmerksam, dafi Osterreich- 
Ungarn eine Einmischung in seine Differenz mit Serbien niebt akzeptieren 
werde und dafi aueh Deutsehland seinerseits eine Zumutung niebt annebmen 
kbnne, welche der Wiirde des Bundesgenossen als Grofimaeht zuwiderlaufe. 

Im weiteren Verlaufe des Gespraches erkliirte der Herr Minister, dafi dasjenige, 
was Rufiland nieht gleiebgiiltig binnehmen kbnne, die eventuelle Absicbt Osterreich- 
Ungarns ware „de d^vorer la Serbie". Graf Pourtales erwiderte, dafi er eine solcbe 
Intention bei Osterreich-Ungarn nicht annehme, da dies dem eigensten Interesse 
der Monarchie zuwiderlaufen wiirde. Osterreich-Ungarn sei wobl nur daran 
gelegen ,d'infliger ii la Serbie le chatiment justement m^ritd". Herr Sazonow 
habe seine Zweifel daran ausgedriickt, ob Osterreich-Ungarn, selbst wenn hier- 
iiber Erkliirungen vorliegen wiirden, sich bieran geniigen lassen wiirde. 

Die Unterredung scbloll mit einem Appcll Herrn Sazonows, Deutsehland 
mb'ge mit Rufiland an der Erhaltung des Friedens zusammenarbeiten. Der 
deutsche Botschafter versicherte dem russischen Minister, dafi Deutsehland 
gewifi nicht den Wunscb habe, einen Krieg zu entfesseln, dafi es aber selbst* 
verstandlich die Interessen seines Bundesgenossen voll vertrete. 



17. 

Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

Telegramm. Wien, 24. Juli 1914. 

Zu Euer Exzellenz gestrigem Telegramm. 

Ersuche, Sir E. Grey sofort aufzukl'aren, dafi unsere gestrige Demarche in 
Belgrad nicht als formelles Ultimatum zu betracbten sei, sondern dafi es siob 
um eine befristete Demarche handle, <lie, wie Euer Exzellenz Sir E. Grey streng 
vertraulich mitteilen wollen, — wenn die Frist frucbtlos abliiuft — einstweilen 
nur von dem Abbruche der diplomatischen Beziehungen und von dem Beginne 



notwendiger militarischer Vorbereitungen gefolgt sein wird, da wir unbedingt 
entschlossen sind, unsere berechtigten Forderungen durchzusetzen. 

Euer Exzellenz sind ermaehtigt beizufiigen, dali wir allerdings, wenn 
Serbien nach Ablauf des Termines nur unter dem Drueke unserer milit'arischeri 
Vorbereitungen nachgeben wiirde, es zum Ersatze der uns erwachsenen Kosten 
verhalten rnuGten; bekanntlieh muOten wir zweimal (1908 und 191'2) Serbiens 
wegen mobilisieren. • 



18. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzSpary in St. Petersburg. 

Wien, 24. Juli 1914. 

Ich habe den russischen Geschaftstrager am 24. Juli vormittags empfangen 
und ihn versichert, dall ich spezielles Gewicht darauf lege, ihn sobald als 
moglich von unserem Schritte in Belgrad in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm 
diesbeziiglich unseren Standpunkt darzulegen. 

Indem Fiirst -Kudascheff far diese Aufmerksamkeit dankte, verhehlte er 
mir nicht seine Beunruhigung iiber unser kategorisc.hes Vorgehen gegen Serbien, 
wobei er bemerkte, dall man in St. Petersburg immer praokkupiert gewesen sei, 
ob nicht unsere Demarche die Form einer Demiitigung fiir Serbien annehmen 
werde, was nicht ohne Reperkussion in Rufiland bleiben konnte. 

Ich lieli es mir angelegen sein, den russischen Geschaftstrager in dieser 
Richtung zu beruhigen. Unser Ziel bestehe darin, die unhaltbare Situation 
Serbiens zur Monarchic zu klaren und zu diesem Zwecke die dortige 
Regierung zu veranlassen, einerseits die gegen den derzeitigen Bestand der 
Monarchic gerichteten Stromungen bffentlieh zu desavouieren rind dureh admi- 
nistrative MaOnahmen zu unterdriieken, andererseits uns die Moglichkeit zu 
bieten, uns von der gewissenhaften Durehfuhrung dieser Mafjnahmen Rechen- 
sehaft zu geben. Ich fuhrte des liingeren aus, welche Gefahr ein weiteres 
Gewabrenlassen der grofiserbisehen Propaganda nicht nur fiir die Integrit'at 
der Monarchic, sondern auch fiir das Gleichgewieht und den Frieden in Europa 
nach si.h Ziehen wiirde und wie sehr alle Dynastien, nicht zuletzt die russische, 
durch die Einbiirgerung der Auffassung bedroht erscheinen, dafi eine Bewegung 
ungestraft bleiben konne, die sich des Mordes als eines nationalistischen Kampf- 
mittels bedient. 



21 

Schlielilich verwies ioh daraaf, dali wir keine Gebietserwerbung, s'ondern 
bloft die Erhaltung des Bestehenden bezweekten, ein Standpunkt, der bei der 
russischen Regierung Verstandnis finden miisse. 

Fiirst Kudasoheff bemerkte darauf, dafl er den Standpunkt seiner Regierung 
nicht kenne und auc'h nicht wisse, wie sich Serbien zu den einzelnen Forde- 
rungen stellen werde. 

Zum Schlusse unserer Unterredung betonte der Herr Geschiiftstrager, daO er 
nicht erraangeln werde, seiner Regierung die Auskiinfte zur Kenntnis zu 
bringen, die ich ihm uber unseren Schritt gegeben, namentlich aueh in der 
Richtung, dall unsererseits keine Demutigung Serbiens beabsichtigt sei. 



19. 

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, 
St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel. 

Wien, 25. Juli 1914. 

Im Anbuge erhalten Euer Exzellenz das in der Zirkularnote an die M'achte 
angekimdigte Dossier, das die groBserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammen- 
h'ange mit dem Sarajevoer Attentate zum Gegenstande hat. 

Euer Exzellenz wollen dieses Dossier zur Kenntnis der dortigen Regierung 
bringen. 

Memoire. 

Die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, 
die siidslawischen Teile Osterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchic loszureiften, um 
sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, reicht weit zuriick. 

In ihren Endzielen stets gleich bleibend und nur in ihren Mitteln und an 
Intensit'at wechselnd, hat diese Propaganda auf serbischem Boden zur Zeit der 
Annexionskrise einen ihrer Hohepunkte erreicht. Den schiitzenden Mantel der 
Heimlichkeiten abstreifend, war sie damals mit dem Einbekenntnisso ihrer 
Tendenzen offen hervorgetreten und hatte versucht, unter der Patronanz der 
serbischen Regierung mit alien ihr zur Verfugung stehenden Mitteln zur Ver- 
wirklichung ihrer Absichten zu gelangen. 

Wahrend die gesamte serbische Presse in gehassigen, die Tatsachen ent- 
stellenden Ausfa,llen zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie aufrief, bildeten sioh — 
von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen — Assoziationen, die diesen Kampf 
vorbereiteten. 



An Bedeutung ragte unter diesen die Narodna odbrana hervor. Aus einem 
damals bestandenen revolutionaxen Komitee hervorgegangen, war diese als 
Privatverein konstituierte, jedoch vom Belgrader Auswiirtigen Amte vollig ab- 
hangige Organisation von scrbischen Militar- und Zivilfunktion'aren ins Leben 
gerufen worden. Als ilire Griinder fungierten unter anderen: General Bozo 
Jankovid, die ehemaligen Minister Ljuba Jovanovid, Ljuba Davidovid und Velislav 
Vulovic', der Direktor der Staatsdruckerei Zivojin DaCid und die damaligen 
Hauptloute, jetzt Majore Vqja Tankosid und Milan Pribidevid. Dieser Verein 
hatte sich die Bildung und Ausriistung von Freischaren fiir den bevorstehenden 
Krieg gegen die osterreichisch-ungarisehe Monarcbie zum Ziele gesetzt. (Siehe 
Beilage 2.) 

Ein anscbaulicb.es Bild der damaligen Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana befert 
unter anderem die Aussagc des vom Kreisgericbte in Sarajevo als Zeugen ver- 
nommenen bosnisch-herzegowinischen Landesangeborigen IVifko Krstanovic", der 
sicb zu jener Zeit in Belgrad befand und der, nebst anderen Angeborigen der 
Monarcbie, von der Narodna odbrana als Komitatscbi angeworben war. Mit etwa 
140 anderen Bandenmitgliedern war Krstanovic' anfangs 1909 nach einer fur 
|die Ausbildung von Banden in Cuprija . (Bezirk Jagodina) enichteten und von 
den Hauptleuten Vqja TankosiC und Dusan Putnik geleiteten Sebule gebracht 
worden. Als Lehrer fungierten dort aussehliefilicb serbische Offiziere. General 
Bozo Jankovid und Ilauptmann Milan Pribidevid inspizierten diesen dreimonat- 
licben Bandenkurs in regelmajQigen Zeitabscbnitten. 

Dort erbielten die angebenden Komitatschis Unterriebt im Schiefien und 
Werfen von Bomben, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnen, Tunnels und 
Briicken sowie im Zerstoren von Telcgrapbenleitungen. Hire Aufgabc war es, 
naeh den Auftragen ibrer Befehlsbaber die neuerworbenen Kenntnisse in 
Bosnien und der Herzegowina in die Tat umzusetzen. 

Durcb diese ganz oftentlieb betriebene und von der serbischen Regierung 
geforderte Aktion der Narodna odbrana wurde damals der Bandenkrieg gegen 
Osterreich-Ungarn vorbereitet. Angeborige der Monarchie wurden biebei zum 
Verrato an ihrem Vaterlande verleitet und systematisch dazu erzogen, als 
serbische Emiss'are beimtiickiscbe Angriffe gegen die Verteidigungsmittel ibrer 
Heimat zu richten. 

Diese Periode der aggressiven Aspirationen fand ibrcn Abscblufi mit der 
von der serbiscben Regierung am 31. Marz 1909 abgegebenen Erklarung, in 
weleher sich diese mit der durcb die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzego- 
wina geschaffenen vbllcer- und staatsrecbtlicben Neuordnung abfinden zu wollen 
erklarte und feicrlicb versprach, mit der bsterreiehisch-ungarischen Monarchie 
in Ilinkunft in freuudsebaftlichen Beziehungen leben zu wollen. 

Mit dieser Erklarung schien aucb das Ende der eine stete Quelle der 
Unrube bildenden Bewegung gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn gekommen und der Wee 



23 

zu einer wirklich freundschaftlichen Annaherung Serbiens an die Monarchie 
betreten. Der Forderung durch die serbisehe Regierung beraubt und von ihr 
pflichtgemafi bekampft, h'atte die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda nur mehr ein 
schattenhaftes, dem baldigen Untergange geweihtea Dasein fristen konnen. Da- 
gegen batten die zwischen den siidslawiscben Teilen der Monarchie und Serbien 
auf spraehlichem, ethnisehem und kulturellem Gebiete bestehenden Beriihrungs- 
punkte zur Yerrichtung gemeinsamer, vom Geiste gegenseitiger Freundscbaft 
und paralleler Interessen getragener Kulturarbeit fiibren miissen. 
Diese Envartungcn haben sicb jedoch nicht erfullt. 

Die monarchiefeindliehen Aspirationen sind geblieben und unter den Augen 
der serbiscbcn Regierung, die nichts getan hat, um diese Bewegung zu unter- 
driicken, hat die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nur noch an 
Breite und Ticfe gewofinen. Der Haft gegen die Monarchie wurde wacherhalten 
und durch stets neue Anfachung zu einem unversbhnlichen gestaltet. Mit den 
alten, der ge'anderten Situation angepaftten und durch neue Metboden erg'anzten 
Mittoln wurde das Yolk Serbiens „zum unvermeidbchen Vernichtungskampfe" 
gegen OsteiTeiL-h-Ungarn aufgerufen. Systematiseh wurden geheimnisvolle Fiiden 
noch den siidslawiscben Gebieten der Monarchie gesponnen und deren Biirger 
zum Verrate am Vaterlande geworben. 

Vor alloin hat die serbisehe Presse seither nicht aufgehort, in diesem Geiste zu 
wirken. 

Nicht weniger als 81 in .Serbien erscbeinenden Zeitschriften mulke bis heute 
wegen ihres die inliindisehen Strafgesetze verletzenden Inhaltes das Postdebit 
entzogen werden. 

Kaum cine dor Strafnormen, welche die erhabene Person des Monarcben, die 
Mitglieder Allerhochstseines Hauses und die Integritiit des Staates schiitzen, ist 
seitens der seibiscben Blatter unverletzt geblieben. Einige wenige aus der iiber- 
reichen Fiille dieses Materials entnommene, aus verschiedenen Zeitpunkten 
staminende Proben dieser Prefistimmen sind in der Beilage 1 zusammengestellt. 

Ohne in eine dctaillierte Besprechung dieser Aullerungen der bffentlichen 
Meinung Serbiens einzugehen, muD immerhin bemerkt werden, daft sie die An- 
nexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina trotz der serbischerseits erfolgten An- 
erkennung dieses Aktes nach wie vor als einen an Serbien veriibten Eaub, der 
einer Remedur bedarf, hinstellen, ein Gedanke, der nicht bloft in den Blattern 
scharfster Richtung in alien Variationen ibrer unflatigen Sprache immer wieder- 
fcehrt, sondern der auch in der dem Belgrader Ausw'artigen Amte so nahe- 
stehenden „Samouprava" in kaum verhullter Form ausgesprochen wird (lit. b 
der Beilage 1). 

Ebenso kann nicht unterlassen werden, das Augenmerk darauf zu lenken, 
wie das am 15. Juni 1910 in Sarajevo von Bogdan Zerajic' veriibte Attentat 



24 

gegen den Laneles-Chef von Bosnien und der Herzegowina, Feldzeagmeister 
von Varesanin, publizistisch vervvertet wurde. 

Wie bekannt, hatte sich Zerajid unmittelbar nach der Tat entleibt und vor 
deren Veriibung seine gesamten Papiere yerbrarint. Unter diesen Umst'anden 
vermocbten die Motive seines Anschlages nicht vollkommen klai'gestellt zu 
werden. Immerbin konnte man aber aus einem bei ibm gefundenen Abzeichen 
schliefJen, dafJ er Krapotkinschen Ideen huldigte. Aucb die gefiihrten Erhebun- 
gen deuteten darauf bin, dafJ man es mit einem auf anarchistischen .Grund- 
lagen beruhenden Verbrechen zu tun batte. 

Dies hinderte jedocb die Presse Serbiens nicbt, den Attentater als serbischen 
Nationalbelden zu feiern und seine Tat zu /verherrlichen. Ja, die n Politika" 
verwahrte sich formlieh dagegen, dad Zerajid Anarchist gewesen sei und rekla- 
mierte ihn als ,beldenmiitigen Serben, dessen Name jeder Scrbe mit Achtung 
und Scbmerz nennen wird". 

Das Datum des 18. August*) desselben Jahres bielt die nPolitika" fur 
eine passende Gelegenheit, sich mit dem Anschlage des Zerajic", „dessen Name 
im Volke wie etwas „„Heiliges"" genannt werde", neuerlicb zu befassen und 
das Attentat in einem Gedicbte zu feiern (lit. a der Beilage 1). 

So wurde dieses Verbrechen, das mit den Aspiratiouen auf Territorien 
der Monarchie nichts zu tun hatte, fiir die Fb'rdcrung dieser Ideen ausgebeutet 
und durch die Glorifizierung des Zcrajid der Moid ganz ausdriieklich als ein 
riihmlichcs und nacliahmenswertes Mittr-1 im Kampfe ftir die Verwirklichung 
dieser Gedanken ancrkannt. Diese Sanktionierung des Mordes als einer voll- 
kommen zulassigen Methode im Kampfe gegen die Monarchie kehrt sp'ater in 
den Blattern bei Besprecbung des von Jukid veriibten Attentates gegen den 
kbnigliehen Kommiss'ar von Cuvaj wieder (lit. c der Beilage 1 ). 

Diese nicbt nur in Serbicn verbreiteten, sondern — wio sp'ater gezeigt 
werden wird — auf wohlorganisierten Schleiehwegen in die. Monarchie ein- 
gescbmuggelten Zeitungen waren es,.die bei den breiten Massen jene Stimmun- 
gen erzeugten und wacherhielten, welche einen fruchtbaren Nahrboden fiir die 
Machenschaften der monarchicfeindlichen Assoziationen boten. 

Zum Zentralpunkte dieser von Vereinen betriebenen Agitation wurde die 
Narodna odbrana. Dieselben Personen, die zur Zeit der Annexion an der Spitze 
des Vereines gestanden waren, bildeten auch jetzt seine Leitung; wieder findet 
man bier, wie seinerzeit, als die energischesten und tatigstcn Organisatoren die 
heftigstcn Gegner der MonarcHe; den General Bozo Jankovid, den Direktor 
der Staatsdruekerei Zivojin Daeie sowie die Majore Milan Pribieevie' und Voja 
Tankosid. Organisatorisch auf eine in die Breite und Tiefe gehende Basis gestellt 
und liierarcbisch straff gegliedert (siebe Beilage 2 unter „ Organisation"), besail 



Geburtstag Seiner k. und k Apostolischen MajestaL 



25 

die Narodna odbrana bald zirka 400 Ausschiisse, die eine lebhafte Agitation 
entfalteten. 

Hiezu kam, dafi die Narodna odbrana zu dem Sohiitzenbunde (mit 762 Ver- 
einen), dem Sokolbunde „Dusan Silni" (rait 2500 Mitgliedera), dem olympischen 
Klub, dem Keitervereine „Knez Wihajlo", dem Jiigerbunde und der Kulturliga 
in engste Verbindung trat und zahlreiche andere Vereine in ihre Dienste stellte, 
die alle, von der Narodna odbrana gefiihrt und unterstiitzt, in deren Sinn 
wirken. In steter gegenseitiger Durehdringung gelangten diese Vereine zu einer 
formlichen Amalgamierung, so dafi sie heute eigentlich alle nur Glieder des 
einen Kbrpers der Narodna odbrana sind. 

So spannte die Narodna odbrana fiber ganz Serbien ein engmaschiges 
Netz der Agitation, mit welchem sie alle fiir ihre Ideen Empfanglichen an sieh zog. 

Welches aber der Geist ist, in dem die Narodna odbrana wirkt, das geht mit 
geniigendor Klarheit sohon aus ihren ofliziellen Vereinspublikationen hervor. 

In ihren Statuten im Kleide eines Kulturvereines auftretend, dem nur die 
geistige und kbrperliche Entwicklung der Bevblkerung Serbiens sowie deren 
materielle Kraftigung am Herzen liegt, enthiillt die Narodna odbrana in ihrem 
Vereinsorgane (siehe Beilage 2) den wahren und einzigen Grund ihres Daseins, ihr 
sogenanntes ,reorganisiertes Programm", namlich: 

In „fanatischer und unermiidlicher Arbeit" dem serbischen Volke unter dem 
Vorwande, dall ihra die Monarchie „seine Freiheit und Sprache nehmen, ja 
Serbien zerschmettern" wolle, die „heilige Wahrheit" zu predigen, daO es eine 
unerlallliche Notwendigke.it ist, gegen Osterreich-Ungarn, diesen seinen „ersten 
und grofiten Feind", den „Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone" zu 
fiihren und das Volk „mit alien Mitteln 1 " auf diesen Kampt' vorzubereiten, der zu 
fiihj'en ist, „zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete", in denen „7 Millionen 
unterjochter Briider sehmaehten". 

AusschlielMich im Dienste dieser Idee stehen die .Kulnubestrebungen" der 
Narodna odbrana, als blolle Mittel zur Organisierung und Erziehung des Volkes 
fiir den ersehnten Vernichtungskampf gegen die Monarchie. 

In eben diesem Geiste wirken aber alle der Narodna odbrana affilierten 
Vereine, wofiir der Sokolverein in Kragujevac als Beispiel dienen rab'ge (siehe 
Beilage 3). 

Wie bei der Narodna odbrana, so stehen auch bier Offiziere, Professoren 
und Staatsbeamte an der Spitze. 

Die Ansprache, mit welcher der Vereinsprasident Major Ivovae'evii 1 die 
Jahresversammlung im Jahre 1914 eroffnete, verzichtet vollkommen darauf, das 
Turnen, das doch der eigentliche Zweck eines Sokolvereines ist, zu erw'ahnen 
und befalH sich ausschbcMieh mit der „Vorbereitung zum Kampfe" gegen den 
ggefahrlichen, herzlosen, liisternen, lastigen und gefrafiigen Feind im Norden". 



26 

der „M!ilionen serbischer Briider Freiheit und Reclit nimmt und sio in Sklaverei 
und Ketten halt". 

In dem Verwaltungsberichte dieses Vereines treten die sachlichen Aus- 
fuhningen ganz in den Hintergrund und geben nur die Stichworte fur das 
Bekenntnis des wahren „Zieles der Handlungen der Verwaltung" ab, n'amlieh: 
die Vorbereitung der nationalen Entvvicklung and der Stlirkung der „unter- 
driickten Nation" zu dem Ende, damit sie iJir „noch nicbt erfiilltes Programm, 
ihre noch nicbt erfiillte Arbeit" zu Ende fiihren und jene „grofie Tat" voll- 
bringen kb'nne, „die sich in n'achster Zeit abspielen wird": „die Befreiung der 
jenseits der Drina wohnenden Briider, welohe die Leiden des Gekreuzigten 
erdulden". 

Ja sogar der Kassier beniitzt seinen Kassenbericht zu dem Mabnrufe, man 
miisse ..Falken erziehen", die imstande sind, den „noch nicht befreiten Briidern 
ilie Freibeit zu bringen* 1 . 

Ebenso wie bci der Narodna odbrana die Kulturbestrebungen, ist also bei 
den Sokols die turnerisehe BetiUigung uicht Selbstzweek, sondern ein blofies 
Mittel im Dienste ebenderselben Propaganda, die mit denselben Gedanken, ja 
fast rait den gleichen Worten betrieben wird. 

Wenn nun die Narodna odbrana das „Yolk" zum Vernichtungskampfe 
gegen die Monarchie aufruft, wendct sie sich nicbt nur an das Volk in Serbien, 
sondern an alle siidslawischen Volkerschaften. Gelten doeh der Narodna odbrana 
die siidslawischen Gebiete der Monarchie als „unsere unterworfenen serbischen 
Gebiete". (Siehe auch Beilage 1). So sollen also aueb die siidslawischen Ange- 
horigen der Monarchie an dieser „nationalen Arbeit- teilnehmen; so soil auch 
jenseits der serbischen Grenze diese „gesunde, notwendige Arbeit" verrichtet 
werden. Und auch auf dem Boden.der Monarchie sucht die Narodna odbrana 
jene „TIelden fur diesen heiligen Kampf", denen < )bili<', der Morder Murads, 
als nachstrebenswertes Beispiel nationaler Opferwilligkeit voranlcuchten soil. 

( m aber die „Briider aulSerhalb Serbiens" zur Teilnahme an der ..Arbeit 
privater Initiative- anzuspornen, unterhiilt die Narodna odbrana eine lebhafte 
Verbindung mil den ..Briidern jenseits der Grenze". Wie diese Verbindung 
geartet jst, wird in dem Vereinsorgane nicht gesagt, wohl deshalb, weil dies zu 
jenem Teile der" „Gesamtarbeit" gelidrt, der „aus niehrfaeben Griinden weder 
wiedergegeben werden darf noch kann". 

Wie umfangreich dieser Zweig ihrer Tiitigkeil ist, laflt sich aus dem 
Umstande erkennen, dad sowohl der Zentralausschufi der Narodna odbrana als 
auch einzelne ihrer Kreisausschiisse eigene Sektionen fiir ..auswartige Angelegen- 
heiten" besitzen. 

Diese n auswSrtige" Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana und ihrer Affilierten 

ist eine auilerst. vielseitiffe. 



Das, weil behordlich kontrollierbar, relativ ungefahrlichste Mittel dieser 
Agitation sind die Yortragsreisen, welche hervorragende Vereinsmitglieder der 
Narodna odbrana nach den sudbstlichen Teilen der Monarchia unternehmen, 
wo sie in verschiedenen Vcrcinen iiber nationale und kulturelle Fragen sprecben. 
Diese Anbisse bieten den Vortragenden die von ihnen gesuebte und wohL den 
vornebmlicbsten Zweck dieser Reissn bildende Gelegonbeit, in halben, dem 
Kenner verstandlichen Wortcn und Wendungen im Sinne der wabxen Tendenzen 
dieser Vereine zu wirken. 

Unter diesen Emissiiren nimmt nebst anderen aucb der scbon mebrmals 
erwahnte Direktor der serbiscben Staatsdruckerei Zivojin Daeic" eine bervorragende 
Stellung ein, jener Zivojin DaCid, der am 8. August 1909 einen „Aufruf" an 
das serbisehe Volk erlieil, in welchem er Osterreich-Ungarn als den Feind 
Serbiens bezeiebnete and zur Vorbereitung auf den Kampf mit der Monarcbie 
errnabnte. Wiederholt unternahm Dacic Agitationsreisen naeh den siidSstlichen 
Teilen der osterreichisch-ungarischen Monarcbie. Bei einem solchen Vortrage in 
Karlovei (1912) legte er seine sonst beobacbtete Vorsioht ab und trat geradezu 
fur die „Vereinigung aller Serben gegen den gemeinsamen' Feind" ein, als den 
er in niobt miGzuverstehenden Andeutungen Osterreicb-Ungarn binstellte. 

Bedenklieber sind die Beziehungen, welebe die im Geiste der Narodna 
odbrana wirkenden serbiscben Korporationen unter dem Deckmantel der Inter- 
essen- und Kulturgemeinscbaft mit Vereinen in der Monarcbie angekniipft 
haben, denn die gegenseitigen deputativen oder korporativen Besuche dieser 
Vereine, die sich einer genaueren behordliehen Kontrolle entziehen, werden 
serbiscberseits zu allerlei monarcbiefeindlicben Macbenscbaften beniitzt. 

So hat sich beispielsweise ein zu der bekannten Feier des Sarajevoer 
Prosvjetavereines im September 1912 entsendeter Delegierter der Narodna 
odbrana nicbt gescbeut (siehe Beilage 6) bei diesem Anlasse im geheimen 
bosnische Mitglicdcr fiir seinen Verein anzuwerben. Die Entsendung eines Ver- 
treters des Kragujevacer Sokolvereines zu dieser Feier sollte den „Briidern in 
Bosnien" sagen: ,.Wir haben Euer nicht vergessen; die Fliigel des Falken der 
Sumadija sind noch m'achtig", ein Gedanke, der im intimen Yerkebre wobl 
einen ganz anderen, den friiher dargelegten Tendenze,n dieses Vereines adaquateren 
Ausdruck gefunden haben wird. (Siehe Beilage 3.) Was die Yorgange anbelangt, 
die sich bei den in Serbien abgebaltenen Zusammenkiinften dieser Art abspielen, 
so entziehen sich diese allerdings einer auf vollkommen sicherer Basis stehenden 
Kenntnis der k. und k. Behorden, denen ja fur diese Falle nur schwer kontrollier- 
bare konfidentielle ^litteilungen zur Verfiigung stehen. In diesem Zusammenbange 
ware des Besuchcs von Agramer Studenten in Serbien im April 1912 zii gedenken, 
der auf serbischer Seite durch die Veranstaltung eines offiziellem miiitarischen 
Empfanges,ja sogar einer Truppenparade zu Ebren dieser Studenten zu einer derart 
;suggestiven Demonstration gestaltet wurde, dali der Verwaltungsbericht des 



28 

Kragujevaeer Sokolvereines sagen darf. dieses „Ereignis bedeutet den Anfang und 
Keim einer groOen- Tat, die sich in der n'achsten Zukunft abspielen wird", „ein 
Keim, dei- reifen wird, wenn die Volksseele noch mehr aufwallt", „bis es keine 
Schranken gibt, die sie nicht niederreiCen kb'nnte". 

Erst vor kurzem ist es zur Kenntnis der Behorden der Monarchic gelangt, daft 
die Sukolvereine Serbiens einige analoge Korporationen in der Monarchic dazu 
bestimmt haben, sich nrit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu 
vereinigen, dessen Charakter bisher noch nicht ganz klargcstellt ist, da die 
Erhebungen dariiber derzeit noch fortdauern. Immerhin lassen die schon jetzt 
erzieltcn Ergebnisse der Nachforsehungen vermuten, dafi man hier einem der Wege 
auf die Spur gekommen ist, auf dem die subversiven Tendenzen der serbischen 
Sokols und ihrer Freunde einzelnen verfiihrten und irregeleiteten Personengruppen 
in der Monarchic eingeimpft werden. 

Diese auf breitere Schiohten gemiinzte, mehr vorbereitende Propaganda tritt 
aber an Bedeutung gegemiber jener „auswartigen Arbeit" in den Hintergrund, die 
von drr Narodna odbrana und ihren Freunden in der Agitation von Mann zu Mann 
geleistet wird. Hier ist jenes Gebiet, auf dem ihre traurigsten Erfolge liegen. 

Dureh ihre geheimen Vertrauensmanner und Emissare tragt sie das Gift der 
Aufwieglung in die Kreise der Erwachsenen ebenso wie der urteilslosen Jugend. 

So haben beispielsweise, von Milan PribiJevid verleitet, die ehemaligen 
Honvedoftiziere V. B., I>. K., V. N. und der kroatisch-slawonische Gendarmerie- 
leutnant V. K. den Heeresdienst in der Monarchic uuter bedenkliohen Umstanden 
verlassen und sich nach Serbien gewendet, wo sie inzwischen allerdings manche 
ihrer Hoffnungen getauscht selien und wenigstens zum Teile daran dcnken, in 
die von ihnen verratene Heimat zuriickzukehren. 

Die von Serbien aus in die mittleren Schulen Kroatiens und Bosniens 
getragene Agitation ist loider so bckannt, dafi sie einer Exomplifizierung nicht 
bedarf. Weniger bekannt aber ist es, dad die wegen schwerer disziplin'arer 
\ ergehen aus kroafischen und bosnischen Schulen Ausgeschlossenen in Serbien 
mit offenen Armen aufgenommen, oft sogar von Staats wegen unterstutzt und zu 
Feinden der Monarchic erzogen werden. Die serbischen Schulen mit ihren 
monarchiefeindlichen Lehrbehelfen und ihrer groflen Zahl von Professoren und 
Lehrern, die in den Rcihen der Narodna odbrana stehen, sind allerdings geeignete 
Anstalten zur Erziehung derartiger Adepten. Ein besonders beaehtenswerter 
Fall dieser Art mag hier als Beispiel Erwahmrng tinden. Im M'arz 1914 waren 
mehrcre Schiiler der Lehrerpriiparandie in Pakrac (Kroatien) wegen eines Streikes 
relegiert worden. Dieselben wandten sich nach Serbien, wo sie zum Telle sofort als 
Lehrer Anstellungen erhicltcn, zum Teile in einer Lehrerbildungsanstalt unter- 
gebraeht wurden. Mit monarehiefeindlichen Kreisen in Verbindung stehend, hat 
einer dieser Relegierten offentlich erklart, er und seine Leute wiirden zur Zeit 
dci Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzhorzog-Thronfolgers in Bosnien den Beweis liefern, 



29 

dafi Bosnien serbisches Land sei. Becht merkwiirdig mutet es an, dafl der 
koniglich serbisclie Kreisprafekt in Krajna, wie hier erganzend bemerkt sei, 
dreien aus dem Kreise dieser so arg kompromittierten Studenten gerade zur Zeit 
dei- Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand in Bosnien serbische 
Passe ausstellte, in denen er sie falschlieh als serbische Staatsangeborige 
bezeicbnete, obwohl er deren kroatische Heimatsberechtigung kennen mufite. Mit 
diesen Passen ausgeriistet, vermochten die drei Pr'aparandisten unbemerkt nach 
der Monarehie zu gelangen, wobei sie jedoeh erkannt und angehalten wurden. 

Mit all dem ware aber die „auswartige" Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana 
noch lange nicbt erschb'pfend cbarakterisiert. 

Sohon seit liingerer Zeit war die k. und k. Regierung duroh konfidentielle 
Meldungen dariiber unterricbtet, dafl die Narodna odbrana den von ibr 
gewiinsobten Krieg gegen die Monarehie auch militarisoh insoferne vorbereite, 
als sie in der Monarehie Emiss'are halte, die naeh gewohnter Bandenart im 
Falle des Ausbruches von Fekidseligkeiten die Zerstorung von Transport-Mitteln 
und -Einrichtungen bewirken und Revolten sowie Paniken hervorrufen sollten. 
(Siehe Beilage 7.) 

Das im Jahre 1913 beim Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo gegen Jovo Jag'li6i<5 
und Genossen eingeleitete Strafverfahren wegen Verbrechens der Ausspahung 
(Beilage 6) hat die Bestatigung dieser vertraulichen Mitteilungen gebracht. So 
wie zur Zeit ihrer Griindung steht auch heute noch die Vorbereitung des 
Bandenkrieges auf dem Programme der Narodna odbrana, wozu noch erganzend 
die Entwicklung einer Spionagetatigkeit trat. 

So ist das heutige sogenannte „reorganisierte Programm" der Narodna 
odbrana in Wahrheit ein erweitertes Programm: Den n Ausrottungskampf " gegen 
die Monarehie vorzubereiten, ja herbeizuftihren und dann wieder „die alte rote 
Fahne der Narodna odbrana" zu entfalten. 

Aus dieser Atmosphare des offen und geheim geschiirten Hasses gegen die 
Monarchic., verbunden mit einer sich jenseits aller Verantwortlichkeit diinkenden 
Agitation, die im Kampfe gegen Osterreich-Ungarn alle Mittel fiir zulassig erachtet 
und hiebei ganz ungescheut den gemeinen Mord als deren wirksamstes empfjehlt, 
muflten schlieDlich, auch ohne weiteres Zutun der monarchiefeindliohen Kreise 
Serbiens, Akte des Terrorismus entstehen. 

Am 8. Juni 1912 gab Lukas Jukic gegen den koniglichen Kommiss'ar in 
Agram, von Cuvaj, einen SehuO ab, duroh den der im Wagen sitze.nde Banalrat 
von Hervoid totlich verletzt wurde. Auf der Flucht erscholJ Jukic' einen ihn 
verfolgenden Polizeimann und verletzte zwei weitere. 

Wie aus der offentlich durchgefiihrten Hauptverhandlung bekannt ist, finden 
sich in den Ideen des Jukic die grundlegenden Gedanken der von der Narodna 
odbrana propagierten Plane wieder. Wenn sich Jukid auch schon seit einiger 
Zeit mit Attentatsplanen trug, so kamen diese doch erst zur Beife, als er am 



30 

18. April 1912 den Ausfiug der Agramer Studenten nach Belgrad mitgemacht 
hatte. Bei den zu Ehren der Besucher veranstalteten rauschenden Festlichkeiten 
war, Jukic zu verschiedenen Personen in Beziehung getreten, die dem Kreise 
der Narodna odbrana angehorten und mit derien er politisehe Gespraehe fiihrte. 
Wenige Tage sp'ater war Jukic wieder in Bidgrad und bier erhielt er von einem 
serbischen Major eine Bombe und von einem Genossen die Browningpistole, 
mit der er das Attentat vollfuhrte. 

Die in Agram aufgefundene Bombe war nach dem Gutachten der Sach- 
verstandigen in einem Arsenale zu milifarisehen Zwecken erzeugt' worden. 

Noch war der Anscblag des Jukic nicht vergessen, als am 18. August 1913 
der aus Amerika zugereiste Stepban Dojfiid in Agram ein Attentat gegen den 
koniglichen Kommissar Baron Skerleez veriibte — eine Tat, die der von Serbien 
aus organisierten Verhetzung der in Amerika lebenden Siidslaven entsprang — 
gleichfalls ein Werk der ..auswartigen" Propaganda der Narodna odbrana und 
ihrer Gesinnungsgenossen. 

Die von dem Serben T. Dimitrijevid verfaCte, in Chicago gedruckte 
Brosehiire ,,Natrag u staro ognjiste vase" mit ihren malllosen Ausfallen gegen 
Seine k. und k. Apostolische Majestat und ihrer Aufforderimg an die Serben 
dor Monarchie, im Hinblicke auf ihre baldige ..Befreiung" nach Serbien heim- 
zuwandern, zeigt den Parallclismus dieser in Amerika mit voller Freiheit der 
Bewegung betriebenen, von Serbien aus geleitetcn Propaganda und jener, die 
von Serbien aus in die Gebiete der Monarchie getragen wird. 

Und wieder kaum nach Jahresfrist war Agram der Schauplatz eines, diesmal 
miflgliickten Attentates. 

Am 20. Mai 1. J. versuchte Jakob Schafer im Agramer Theater einen 
Anscblag auf den Banus Freiherrn von Skerleez, woran er im letzten Augen- 
blicka durch einen Polizeibeamten gehindert wurde. Die Untersuchung ergab 
den Bestand eines Komplottes, dessen Seele Rudolf Hercigonja war. Aus den 

agen Hercigonjas and seiner funf Mitangeklagten ergab sich, daft auch 
dies Attentat seinen Ausgang von Serbien nahm. 

An einem gescheiterten Versuche zur Befreiung des Jukic" beteiligt, war 
Hercigonja nach Serbien gefliichtet (Oktober 1912). wo er gemeinsam mit 
seinem Komplizen Marojan Jaksid mit Komitatschis und Mitgliedern der Narodna 
odbrana verkehrte. Wie schon so oft bei den durch viel zu friihe Beschaftigung 
mit Fragen der Politik iiberhitzten jugendliehcn Gemiitern, war das Ergebnis 
dieses korrumpierenden Verkehres auch diesmal ein unheibvclles. Hercigonja 
kehrte mit dem in Belgrad verkundeten Dogma zuriick, dali die siidslawischen 
Lander » (sterreich-Ungarns von d.-r Monarchie abgetrennt und mit dem Konig- 
reiche vereinigt werden mtiflten. Dazu hatte er in dem Kreise, in dem er dort 
verkehrte, die Lehre eingesogen, daft dieses Ziel durch die Ausfiihrung von 



Attentaten auf hochstehende Pcrsb'nlichkeiten und fuhrende Politiker der Mon- 
archie anzustreben sei, da es nur duich diese Mittel verwirklicht werden kbnne. 

In diesem Sinne wirkte dann Hercigonja in Agram auf seine Freunde cin, 
deren einige er fur seine Ideen gewann. Im Vordergrunde seiner Plane stand 
die Veriibung eines Anschlages auf den Tlironfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. 

Wenige Monate vorher waren gegen Luka Aljinovie Erhebungen wegen 
hochverraterischer Propaganda gefiikrt worden. Im Zuge dieses Verfahrens 
hatten drei Zeugen ausgesagt, Aljinovie habe vor ihnen erklart, er hatte im 
.lahre 1913 in Belgrad zu Propagandazwecken, speziell aber zur Ausfiihrung 
eines Attentates auf den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von der Narodna 
odbrana 100 Dinar und die gleiehe Summe von einer gekeimen Studenten- 
vereinigung bekommen. 

Man sieht, wie sich die verbreeberisebe Agitation der Narodna odbrana 
und der ibr Gleicbgesinnten in letzter Zeit auf die Person des Herrn Erz- 
herzog-Thronfolgers konzentrierte. 

Aus alien diesen Feststellungen gelangt man zu dem Scblusse, daft die 
Narodna odbrana mit den um sie gruppierten monarchiefeindlicben Kreisen 
Serbiens seit kurzem den Zeitpunkt fiir gekommen erachtete, die von ihr ver- 
bteiteten Lebren durch Taten verwirklichen zu lassen. 

Beachtenswert ist aber, daft sie sicb biebei damit begniigte, fiir diese Taten 
die Anregungen zu geben und dort, wo diese Anregungen auf fruchtbaren 
Boden gefallen waren, die materiellen Hilfsmittel zu deren Verwirkliebung bei- 
zustellen, daG sie aber die einzige gefahrliche Rolle bei dieser Propaganda der 
Tat ausschlieillich der von ibr verhetzten und verfiihrten Jugend der Monarcbie 
zuschob, die ganz allein die Lasten dieses traurigen „Heldentums" zu tragen hat. 

Alle Zlige dieser Macbe finden sich in der Entstehungsgeschiehte des tief- 
betriibenden Attentates vom 28. Juni wieder. (Beilage 8.) 

Prineip und Grabez tragen den Typus der schon in der Schule von den 
Gedanken der Narodna odbrana vergifieten Jugend. 

In Belgrad, im Kreise einer von diesen Ideen erfiillten Studentenschar 
verkehrend, trug sich Prineip mit Attentatsplanen gegen den Herrn Erzherzog- 
Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand, gegen den sich damnls aus Anlafl seiner Reise nach 
den annektierten L'andern der HaO der monarchiefeindlichen Elemente Serbiens 
besonders akzentuiert hatte. 

Lam gesellte sieh der im selben Kreise verkehrende Cabrinovii! bei, dessen 
wechselnde, radikal-revolution'aren Ansiohten naeh seinem eigenen Gestandnisse 
unter dem Einflusse seiner Belgrader Umgebung und der Lektiire der serbisehen 
Blatter in die gleiehe monarehiefeindliche und zur Propaganda der Tat neigende 
Richtung gedr'angt wurden. 

Dank seiner bereits vorhandenen Dispositionen erlag Grabez diesem Milieu, 
in das er erst spater h'at, sebr rasch. 



32 

Soweit aber dieses Komplott auch gediehen und so fest der EntschluQ der 
Verschworer auch gewesen sein mag, zur Ausfiihrung des Attentates zu 
schreiten, so ware es doeh nie zu dessen Veriibung gekommen, wenn sich nicht, 
gleichwie ira Falle Jukic, Leute gefunden fatten, die den Komplizen die Mittel 
zur Veriibung des Anschlages zur Verfiigung gestellt hatten. Denn es fehlto 
ibnen, wie Princip und Cabrinovid ausdriicklich bestatigen, an den notigen 
Waffen, ebenso aber auch an Geld zu deren Anschaffung. 

Interessant ist es nun zu seben, wo sich die Komplizen ihre Werkzeuge 
zu versohaffen suchten. Milan Pribifievid und Zivojin Dafiid, diese beiden fiihren- 
den Manner der Narodna' odbrana, waren die ersten, an die sic als sichere 
Heifer in ibrer Not dachten, oftenbar deshalb, weil es im Kreise der Attentats- 
lustigen bereits zur Tradition geworden ist, die Mordwerkzeuge von diesen 
Repr'asentanten der Narodna odbrana zu beziehen. Der zufallige Umstand, dafl 
diese beiden Manner zur kritischen Zeit nicht in Belgrad weilten, vereitelte 
allerdings diesen Plan, doob waren IVincip und Cabrinovic deshalb nicht ver- 
legen, eine andere Unterstiitzungsstelle zu finden, jenen Milan Ciganovid, einen 
gewesenen Komitatschi, jetzt Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndiroktion in 
Belgrad, gleichfalls ein aktives Mitglied der Narodna odbrana, welcker in deren 
Geschichte zuerst im Jahre 1909 als Zogling der Bandenschule in Cuprija 
(Beilage 5) auftauchr. In ihrer Erwartung hatten sich denn auch Prinoip und 
Cabrinovic nicht getauscht, denn bei Ciganovic fande.n sie sofort die erbetene 
Unterstutzung. 

I lieser und durch dessen Vermittlung sein Freund, der schon mehrmals 
genannte koniglich serbische Major Voja Tankosic, ebenfalls einer der Fiihrer 
der Narodna odbrana. der im Jahre 190S Leiter der Bandensohule in Cuprija 
gewesen war (Beilage 51, traten nun als geistige Leiter und entscheidende 
Forderer an die Spitze des Komplotts, das sic mit einer abstoDenden, fiir die 
moralischon Qualifaten dec ganzen monarcbiefeindliehen Bewegung bezeichnen- 
den Selbstverstandlichkeit billigtcn. Nur ein leises Bedcnken hatten sie zuerst 
— ob die drei Verschworer auch fest entschlossen waren, die Tat zu wagen — 
ein Bcdenken, das unter ihrer suggestiven Mithilfe allerdings bald schwand. 
Dann aber waren sie zu jeder Hilfe bereit. Tankosic stelltc i Brownings mit 
Munition und -Reisegeld zur Verfiigung; 6 Handgranaten aus serbischen Armee- 
best'anden bildeten die Vervollstandigung der Ausriistung, cine Bewaffnung, die 
nach ihrer Zusammenstellung und Herkunft Reminiszenzen an den Fall Jukic* 
wachruft. Una den Erfolg der Aktion besorgt, verfiigte Tankosic die Unter- 
weisung der Verschworer im Schieften, eine Aufgabe, der sich Ciganovic' mit 
dem bekannten Erfolge unterzog. Eine spezielle, nicht erbetene Fiirsorgo ent- 
wickelten aber Tankosic und Ciganovid zur Geheimhaltung des Komplottes: sie 
stellten Zyankali mit der Weisung bei, dafi sich die Tater nach vollbrachtem 
Anschlage darn.it entleiben, ein Akt der Fiirsorge, der in erster Lime ihnen 



re 

zugute. kommen Mailte, da die Wakrung des Gekeimnisses sie auch nock den 
geringen Gefahren entrlickte, die sie bei dieser Unternekmung auf sick nekmen 
mufiten. Der sickere Tod fiir die Opfer ikrer Verfukrung, die voile Sickerkeit 
fur sick, das ist die bereits bekannte Devise der Narodna odbrana. 

Um die Ausfiikrung des Attentatsplanes zu ermoglicken, mudten die 
Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingesckmuggelt werden. Auck 
hier tritt Ciganovid kelfend auf, er sckreibt den Versckworern eine genaue 
Reiseroute vor und sickert ikuen fiir ihr Einsckleicken nack Bosnien die Unter- 
stiitzung der serbiscken Grenzbekorden. Die Art, wie dieser selbst von Prinzip 
als „mysterios" bezeicknete Transport organisiert war und durckgefiikrt wurde, 
lalit keinen Zweifel daruber ofifen, dafi dies ein wokl vorbereiteter und fiir die 
gekeimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna odbrana sckon oft begangener Schleick- 
weg war. Mit einer Selbstverstandliekkeit und Sickerkeit, die mir der Gewokn- 
keit entspringen konnen, stellten die Gienzkauptleute in Sabac und koznica 
ikren Verwaltungsapparat fiir diesen Zweek zur Verfugung. Okne Stb'rungen 
vollzog sick dieser gekeimnisvolle Transport mit seinem komplizieiten System 
von stets wcckselnden Fiihrern, die wie durck Zauberkraft herbeigerufen, immer 
zur Stelle waren, wenn man sie brauckte. Okne nack dem Zwecke dieser 1 
merkwiirdigen Reisc einiger unreifer Studenten zu fragen, liefsen die serbiscken 
Bekorden, auf die Weisung des ekemaligen Komitatsckis und untergeordneten 
Baknbeamten Ciganovid kin, diesen glatt funktionierenden Apparat spielen. Sie 
brauckten iibrigens nickt zu fragen, denn nack den erkaltenen Weisungen war 
iknen wokl klar, daft kier wieder eine .Mission'' der Narodna- odbrana zu 
erfiillen war. Der Anblick des Arsenals von Bomben und Kevolvern entlockte 
denn auck dem Fiuanzwackmanne Grbid nur ein woblwollend zustimmendes 
Lackeln, wokl ein ausreickender Beweis dafu'r, wie sekr man auf dieser .,.Strafte" 
an den Anblick derartiger Konterbande gewbbnt war. 

Sckwere Sckuld kat die kbniglick serbisclie Regierung auf sick geladen, 
als sie all dies gesckeken lieft. 

Zur Pflege freundnackbarlicker Beziehungen zu Osterreick-TTngarn ver- 
pflicktet, kat sie ikrer Presse gestattet, den Haft, gcgen die Monarckie zu ver- 
breiten; bat sie es zugelassen, daft auf ilirem Boden etablierte Vereinigungen 
unter Fiikrung koher Offiziere, Staatsbeamter, Lekrer und Rickter bffentlich 
eine Kampagne gegen die Monarckie fiikren, die auf die Revolutionierung 
ihrer Burger abzielt; hat sie es nicht verhindert, daft an der Leitung ilirer 
Militar- und Zivilverwaltung beteiligte, aller moralischen Hemmungen bare 
Manner das bffentlicke Gewissen derart vergiften, daft ilim in diesem Kampfa 
der semeiue Meuckelmord als die beste Waffe scheint. 



Serbische PreSstimmen. 

a) Die „Politika« brachte am 18. August 1910 anlaMich des 80. Geburts- 
tages Seiner k. und k. Apostoliscben Majesfat ein grofies Bild des Bogdan 
Zerajie, der zwei Monate vorher gegen, den Landesohef von Bosnien, 
Freiherra von Varesanin, ein Attentat verubt hatte. Tn dem dazu gehorigen 
Ai-tikel hieC es: ,Vor zwei Monaten, am 2. Juni (a. St.), gerade am Tage 
der Eroffhung des bosniscb-herzegowinischon Landtages, versuchte ein junger 
Scrbe, der Student Bogdan Zerajid, in Sarajevo den Landes-( Ibef von Bosnien 
und der Herzegowina, den General Marian Varesanin zu toten. Funf 
Scbusse feuerte Zerajid auf diesen Renegatei), der sicb seine Karriere im 
beriibmten Volksaufstande in Rakoviea durch Vergieflung do Blutes seiner 
leiblichen Briider gesicherl batte, durcb einen merkwiirdigen Zufall gelang 
es nicbt, ihn zu tb'ten. I lain; jagte sicb der tapfere und selbstbewuflte 
Zerajid die sechste und letzte Kugel in den Kopf und stu'rzte sofort tot 
zusammen. In Wien verstanden sir sehr gut, dali Zeraji. : das Attentat nicbt 
desbalb verubte, weil er russische und revolutionare Scbriften gelesen, sondern 
dali er dies als edler Sprosse eines Volkes getan hatte, das auf diese blutige 
Weise gegen die Fremdherrschaft protestieren wollte. Desbalb trachteten 
sie, diese ganze Sache moglicbst schnell zu vertuscben und — was gegen 
ihre Gewobnbeit ist — eine Affaire zu vermeiden, welche die osterreichische 
Regierung in Bosnien und der Herzegowina noch mebr kompromittiert 
batte. In Wien wunscbte man, dali jedes Andenken an Zerajid ausgeloscht 
und seinem Attentate jede Bedeutung abgesprocben werde. Abet' gerade 
, diese Furcbt vor dem toten Zerajid und das Verbot, dali sein Kami in 
gariz Bosnien und der Herzegowina erwahnt werde, bewirkten, dali sein 
Name im Volke wie etwas Heiliges genannt wird, beute, am IS. August, 
vielleiebt mebr als jemals. 

Am beutigen Tage ziinden aucb vvir eine Kerze auf seinem Grabe 
an und rufen: „Ehre dem Zerajid!" 

Ilier.m scbloO sicb ein Gedicbt, dessen Inbalt in Ubersetzung lautet: 

„Bosnien lebt, uocb ist es nicht tot, 

Umsonst habt Ihr seinen Leib begraben; 

Nocb spriiht es Feuer, das gefesselte Opfer, 

Nock ist's nicbt Zeit, das Grablied zu singen. 



35 

Mit Satanshand scharrtet auf Ihr die Grabe, 
Aber der lebende Tote will nicht in die Graft; 
Kaiser, hbrtest Du? im Blitzen des Revolvers 
Sausen die bleiernen Kugeln gegen Deinen Thron! 
Das sind nicht Sklaven, das ist herrliche Freiheit, 
Die aus der kiihnen Hand des Unterjochten leuchtetl 
Was zittert so dieses schreckliche Golgatha? 
Petrus zog das Schwert, Christus zu sehirmen. 
Seine Hand sank, aber aus dem Blute 
Werden tausende tapfere Hande sich erheben; 
Dieser Schuil war nur der erste Bote 
Der glorreichen Ostern nach Golgathas Peinen." 
Am 8. Oktober 1910 brachten anl'afilich des Jahrestages der Annexion 
Bosniens und der Herzegowina „Polirika" und „Mali Journal", von denen 
letzteres mit schwarzem Rande cr.schien, Artikel, in denen sie sich in 
heftigen Angriffen gegen Osterreich-Ungarn ergingen. Europa miisse sich 
iiberzeugen, dafi das serbische Volk noch immer an die Revanche denke. 
Der Tag der Revanche miisse kommen, dafiir biirgten die fieberhaften 
Anstrengungen Serbiens zwecks Organisierung seiner Wehrmacht, sowie 
die Stimmung und der Hali des serbischen Volkes gegen die Nachbar- 
monarchie. 

Aus dem gleichen Anlali schrieb die „Samouprava" am 9. Oktober 
1910: „ Schimpfworte und Exzesse sind kein Mittel, um den wahren Patrio- 
tismus zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Nur stille und wiirdige Arbeit i'iihrt 
zum Zielel" 

Am 18. April 1911 hiefl es in der „Politika": „Aufier einigen Zynikern 
wiirde es niemand in Serbien gerne sehen, wenn Konig Peter nach 
Wien oder Budapest reisen sollte. Durch die Annexion Bosniens und der 
Herzegowina ist ein fiir allemal die Moglichkeit einer Freundschaft zwischen 
Serbien .und Osterreich-Ungarn zerstort worden. Das fiihlt jeder Serbe." 
Die „Beogradske Novine" sohi-eiben am 18. April 1911: „Auch die 
meisten Regierungsmanner mifibilligen die geplante Reise des Kb'nigs Peter 
zu Kaiser Franz Joseph. Der Sturm der Entrlistung, der sich wegen des 
Planes dieser Reise des Konigs des ganzen Serbentums bem'aehtigt hat, ist 
vollkommen begreiflich." 

Das „Mali Journal" vom 19. April 1911 sagt: „Ein Besuch des Konigs 
Peter beim Herrscher von Osterreich-Ungarn ware eine Beleidigung des 
ganzen Serbentums. Durch diesen Besuch wiirde Serbien das Recht auf 
die Piemontrolle verheren. Die Interessen Serbiens kbnnen sich niemals 
mit den Interessen Osterreichs decken." 



30 

j) Am 23. April 1011 fiihren „Politika a , „Mali Journal", „Tribuna", 

„Beogradske Novine" und „Vecernje Ncvosti" zu dem Plane eines Besuohes 
Kbnig Peters am Wienei' ffofe aus: Zwischen Serbian und Osterreich- 
Ungarn konne niemals Freundschaft existieren. Der geplante Besuch des 
Konigs Peter sei daher fiir Serbian eine „schandliche Kapitulation", eine 
..Demiitignng Serbiuns". eine „feierliehe Sanktionierung aller Verbreclien 
und Missetaten, <lii* Osterreich-Ungam an Serbien und dem serbischen 
Volke begangen habe". 

g) Am IS. April 1912 schreibl „Trgovinski Glasnik^ in einem mit ,I)er 

Zerfall in Osterreich" uberschriebenen Artikel: ..In Osterreich-Ungarn 
herrscht cin Zerfall nach alien Seiten. Was jenseits der Donau und Save 
gescbieht, das ist nieht mehr eine deutsehe, magyarische, bohmische odor 
kroatische Krise, das ist eine allgemeine b'sterreichisehe Krise, eine Krise 
der Dynastic selbst. Wir Serben konnen mit Zufriedenheit einer solchen 
Entwicklung der Dinge in Osterreich zuseken." 

]i) In einem ..Die Grenzen Albaniens" betitelten Artikel greift der 

^Balkan" Osterreich-Ungarn mit folgenden Ausfuhrungen an: Wenn Europa 
zu schwach sei, urn Osterreich Halt zu gebieten, wiirden Montenegro und 
Serbien dies tun, indem sic Osterreich zurufen: n Halt, weiter geht es nieht! 
Ein Krieg zwischen Osterreieh-Ungarn und Serbien ist unausbleiblich. Wir 
haben das tiirkische Reich zerstiiejcelt, wir werden auch Osterreich zer- 
stiickeln. Einen Krieg haben wir beendet, jetzt stehen wir vor einem 
zweiten." 

i) „Yeeernje Novosti" vom 22. April 1913 richten einen Aufruf an das 

serbische reisende Publikum und an die serbischen Kaufleute. sie mogen 
die Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft boykottieren. Niemand solle mit 
den Schiffen dieser bsterreichischen Gesellschaft fahren "der Waren rrans- 
portieren lassen. Alle, die dies t'aten, wiirden von einem Ausschusse mit 
Geldbuiien bestraft. Die Gelder wiirden der Komitatschikasse zuflieOen, 
welche fiir die Verwendung im kommenden Kriege mit Osterreich 
bestimmt sei." 

k) Die „Tribuna" vom 26. Mai 1913 schreibt aus Anlafi dor Besitz- 

ergreifung Ada Kalehs durch Osterreieh-Ungavn : ,,Das schwarz-gelbe 
verbreeherische Osterreich hat wieder einen r'auberischen Trick durch- 
gefuhrt. Es ist ein Bieb, der, wenn er nieht einen ganzen Sack Geld 
stehlen kann, sich auch mit einem Dinar begnugt." 

/) Am 10. Juni 1913, ard'aWieh der Wiederkehr des Jahrestages des 

Attentates auf den koniglichen Kommissar in Agram durch den Studenten 
Luka Jukid brachten die serbischen Blatter Gedcnkartikel. In einem Artikel 
der .Pravda" heillt es: „Es mufl aus tiefster Seele wehe tun, dall nieht 
jeder so gehandelt hat, wie unser Jukic. Wir haben keinen Jukid mehr, 



aber wir haben den Hall, wir habon den Zorn, wir haben heute zehn 
Millionen Jukic\ Wir sind fest uberzeugt 4 dafi Jukid bald dureb sein Arrest- 
fenster den letzten KanonenscbuJl der Freiheit vernehraen wird." 

m) „Mali Journal" vom 7. Oktober 1913 bringt an leitender Stelle einen 

Artikel, in welchem Osterreich-Ungarn die Existeuzberechtigung abgesprocben 
wird und die slawischen Nationalitaten aufgefordert werden, den Angrifls- 
karapf, den Serbien zu unternehmcu gedenke, zu unterstiitzen. 

n) Der „Piemont" vom 8. Oktober 1913 sebreibt zu dem Gedachtnistage 

der Annexion: „Heute sind es fiinf Jahre, dafi mittels eines kaiserlicben 
Dekretes die Souver'anit'at des Habsburger Szepters uber Bosnien und die 
Ilerzegowina ausgebreitet wurde. Den Schmerz, der an diesera Tage dem 
serbischen Volke zugefiigt wurde, wird das serbische Volk noeb durch Jahr- 
zebnte fiiblen. Besch'amt und vernichtet stohnte das serbiscbe Volk ver- 
zweifelt. Das Volk legt das Geliibde ab, Racbe zu iiben, urn durob einen 
beroisoben Schritt zur Freibeit zu gelangen. Dieser Tag bat die bereits 
eingeschlaiene Energie geweckt und der wiederbelebte Held wird eines 
Tages die Freibeit sucben. Heute, wo serbische Graber die alten serbisoben 
Lander zieren, wo die serbische Kavallerie die Seblacbtfelder von Mazedonien 
und Altserbien betreten bat, wendet sicb das serbisebe Volk, nachdem es 
seine Aufgabe im .Siiden beendet bat, der entgegengesetzten Seite zu, von 
wo das Stbbnen und Weinen des serbischen Bruders gehort wird, wo der 
Galgen baust. Serbische Soldaten, die heute in Dusans Reiebe mit jenen 
Albanesen k'ampfeu, die gegen uns der Staat aufwiegelte, welcher uns 
Bosnien und Herzegowina nahm, legten heute das Geliibde ab, daD sie 
gegen die ,zweite Tiirkei" ebenso vorgeben werden, wie sie mit Gottes 
Hilfe gegen die Balkan-Tiirkei vorgegangen sind. Sie legen dieses Geliibde 
ab und hoffen, dall der Tag der Rache naht. Eine Tiirkei verscbwand. Der 
gute serbisebe Gott wird geben, dad auch die „zweite Tiirkei'' verschwindet." 

, o) Das „Mali Journal" vom 4. November 1913 sebreibt: „Jedes Streben 

nach einer Ann'aberung an Osterreich-Ungarn kommt einem Verrate an 
dem serbischen Volke gleich. Serbien muli sich mit den Tatsachen abfinden 
und immer vor Augen halten, dali es in Osterreich-Ungarn seinen gefahr- 
lichsten Feind hat, den energisch zu bekampt'en die heiligste Pflicht jeder 
serbischen Regierung sein mull." 

p) Am 14. Janner 1914 heiflt es in der ,Pravda": „Unsere Neujahrs- 

wiinsche gelten in erster Linie unseren noch nicht befreiten, unter fremder 
Knechtschaft seufzenden Briidern. Die Serben mogen aushalten; nach 
Kossovo kam Kumanovo und unser Siegeszug ist noch nicht beendet." 

q) .Novosti" vom 18. Janner 1914 brachten ein Bild der Wasserweihe 

in Bosnien mil folgendem Text: „Auch in Orten, die uuter fremdem Joche 



38 

seufzcn. bewahren dio Serben ihre Sitten, bis sie der Tag der Freiheit in 

heller Begeisterung finden wird." 
r) Die „Zastava" gesteht im Janner 191-1: ,Serbien eifert die b'.ster- 

reichisch-ungarischen Serben zur Revolution an." 
s) Das „Mali Journal" vora 9. Marz 1914 sckreibt: „Serbien kann das 

Siibelrasseln Franz Ferdinands anl'aftlieh der Skufariaffaire nie vergessen." 
t) Am 4. April 1914 schreibt die „Zastava": „Die bsterreiehischen Staats- 

miinner, die nur eine Politik des Hasses, eine Bureaukratenpolitik fiibren, 

nicht aber eine weit ausbliekende Politik, bereiten selbst den Untergang 

ihres Staates vor." 
u) Die „Pravda" vom 8. April 1914 sagt: „Osterreich hat heute seine* 

Existenzberechtignng verloren." 
v) In den Osternumraern (April 1914) geben alls serbischen Blatter der 

Iloffnung Ausdruck, daft auch die nichtbefreiten, unterjochten, gedruekten 

Briider bald eine frohe Aui'erstehung 1'eiern werden. 
?p) In der „Tribuna" vom 23. April 1914 heiftt es: „Die Pazifisten haben 

em neues Sehlagwort erfunden, das vom „Patriotismus Europas". Dieses 

Programm kann aber rrar dann venvirklicht werden, wenn Usterreich auf- 

geteilt wird." 
x) Das „Mali Journal" vom 12. Mai 1914 schreibt: „Was im Privat- 

leben Verbreehen heiftt, nennt man in Osterreich Politik. Die Gesehichte 

kennt ein Unircheuer mid dieses Ungeheuer heiftt Osterreich." 



Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse des Vereines ,,Narodna odbrana" heraus- 

gegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens. (Narodna odbrana, izdanje sfredisnog 

odbora narodne odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija ..Davidovid", Decanska 

ulica br. 14, Ljub. Davidovica.) 

In einer kurzen Einleitung wird zun'achst bemerkt, daft diese Broschiire 
„keine vollkommene, ersohopfende Wiedergabe der Gesamtarbeit der Narodna 
odbrana bilde, da sie dies aus mehrfachen Grunden weder sein darf nocli sein 
kann". 

Diese Schrift ist in drei Abschnitte geteilt, deren erster aus XIV Kapiteln 
besteht und programmatischer Natur ist, wahrend der zweite Abschnitt einen 
Bericht iiber die Vereinst'atigkeit entkiilt und im dritten Beispiele fur die 
Organisation ahnlicher ausliindischer Vereine angefiihrt werden. 

Im I. Kapitel ..Entstehung und Tatigkeit der ersten Narodna odbrana" 
wird bemerkt, dafl dieser Verein anlaWiob der in Serbien dureh die Annexion 
Bosniens und der Herzegowina entstandenen Volksbewegung mit folgenden 
Zielen gegriindet wurde: 

1. Hebung, Ermutigung und St'arkung des NationalgefiLhls. 

2. Einschreibung und Sammlung von Freiwilligen. 

3. Formierung von Freiwilligeneinbeiten und deren Vorbereitung zur 
bewaffneten Aktion. 

4. Sammlung von freiwilligen Beitragen, Geld und anderen Erfordernissen 
zur Verwirklichung ihrer Aufgabe. 

5. Organisierung, Ausriistung und Einexerzierung einer besonderen auf- 
standischen Truppe (Komitee), bestimmt zu besonderer und selbstandiger Krieg- 
fiihrung. 

6. Entwieklung einer Aktion in alien anderen Ricbtungen der Verteidigung 
des serbischen Volkes. 

Ankniipfend hieran wird bemerkt, dafS dureh die Anerkennung der Annexion 
seitens der GroDmachte dieser ganzen Arbeit des Vereines ein Ende bereitet 
worden ist, worauf unter Beibehaltung der bestehenden Vereinsverfassung 
zu einer Reorganisation des Programmes und zu neuer Arbeit geschritten 
worden sei, damit bei Wiederholung cines 'ahnlichen Anlasses n die alte rote 
Kriegsfakne der Narodna odbrana v.ieder entfaltet werden kb'nnc". 



40 

Im II. Kapitel „Die neue hcutige Narodna odbrana" wird zun'achst aus- 
gefuhrt: „Man hat zur Zeit der Annexion die Erfahrung gemacht, dali Serbien 
fiir den Kampf, den ihm die Verh'altnisse auferlegen, nioht vorbereitet ist und 
dall dieser Kampf, den Serbien aufzunehmen hat, viel ernster und schwieriger 
fet, als man dachte; die Annexion war nur einer der Schlage, den die Feinde 
Serbiens gegen dieses Land gefu'hrt hatten, ein Schlag, deni bereits viele 
andere Schlage vorangegangen sind, und dem rjoch andere folgen werdcn. 
Damit ein neuer Uberfall Serbien nicht ebenso unvorbereitet trifft, ist es not- 
ivendig, sieh vorzubereitenj zu arbeiten." A]s Ziel dieser in den breitesten 
Schichten des Volkes zu leistenden „Arbeit" wird die „Vorbereitung des 
Yolkes zum Kampfe in alien Richtungen der nationalen Arbeit, entsprechend 
den heutigen Zeiterfordernissen" bezeiclinct und werden als Mittel hiezu 
„St'arkung des nationalen BewuOtseins, kb'rperliche Ubungen, das wirtschaftliche 
und gesundheitliche Wohlergehen, Hebung der Kultur etc." hervorgehoben, 
„insoweit auf diesem Gebiete neben dem Staate der einzelne und die Gesellschal't 
wirken kann und muli". 

I i;\s Kapitel 111 „Die drei Hauptaufgaben* beginnt mit dem Hinweise 
darauf, dall die Annexion gelehrt habe, das NatiosalbewulStsein in Serbien sei 
nicht so stark, als es in einem Lande sein sollte, welches als ein kleiner TeiL 
von 3 Millionen die Hoffnung und Stiitze fiir 7 Millionen des unterjochteni 
serbischen Volkes bilde. Die erste Aufgabe des Vereines bestehe daher in der 
Starkung des nationalen Bewufstseins. Die zweite Aufgabe sei die Pflege kbrper- 
licher Ubungen, die dritte die Erzielang einer richtigen Wertung dieser sport- 
lichen Betatigung. 

In dem IV. „Voni Sehieliwesen" handelnden Kapitel wird der AVert einer 
guten Ausbildung im Schieflen speziell fiir die serbischen Verh'altnisse hervor- 
geboben, da dort die militarische Ausbildung nur Monate dauere. Diese Aus- 
fiihrungen konkludieren in' dem Satze: 

„Einem neuen Schlage, wie die Annexion einer war, muli ein neues 
Serbien entgegentreten, worin jeder Serbe vom Kinde bis zum Greise ein 
Schiitze ist." 

Kapitel V, welches das „VerhUltnis der Narodna odbrana zur Pokolschal't" 
behandelt, beginnt mit einem allgemeinen kulturpolitischen Exkurs uber die 
Bcdingungen der Krafte der Staaten. Hiebei wird ..auf den Niedergang der 
Tiirkei verwiesen und ankniipfend hieran gesagt: 

„Die alten Tiirken vom Siiden der verschwinden nach und nach und nur 
noch ein Teil unseres Volkes leidet unter ihrcr Herrschafr. Aber neue Turken 
kommen vom Norden, furchtbarer und gefahrlicher als die alten. Kulturell und 
wirtschaftlich starker, gehen die nbrdlichen Feinde auf uns los. Sic wollen uns 
unsere Freiheit, unsere Sprache cehruen, uns z.erscbmettern. Die Vorzeichen 



des Kampfes, der da kommt, sind ftihlbar. Das serbische Volk steht vor dec! 
Frage, sein oder nicht sein" 

„Was wollen wir mit den Vortragen", lautet die Uberschrift des VIL Kapitels, 
dessen wesentlichster Inhalt sich in dem Satze erschopft: 

„Die Narodna odbrana veranstaltete Vortrage, welche mehr oder weniger 
Agitationsvortr'age waren. Es wurde das Programm unserer neuen Arbeit ent- 
wickelt. Bei jedem Vortrage wurde von der Annexion gesprochen, von der 
Arbeit der alten Narodna odbrana and den Aufgaben der neuen. Die Vortrage 
werden nie aufbb'ren Agitationsvortr'age zu sein, sie werden sicli jedoch inimer 
mehr nach den einzelnen Fachern entwickeln und sioh mit alien Fragen unseres 
gesellschaftlichen und nationalen Lebens befassen." 

In den Kapiteln VITI „Tarigkeit der Frau in der Narodna odbrana", IX 
„Detail- und Kleinarbeit" und X „Renaissanee der Gesellschaft" wird unter 
Hinweis auf die Aufgaben der Narodna odbrana die Vorbereitung und Ver- 
tiefung der Vereinsarbeit und die Notwendigkeit einer Regenerierung der 
Individuen, des Volkes und des Staates behandelt. 

Das Kapitel XI „Neue Obilide und Singjelice" *) sagt einleitend: 
„Es ist ein Irrtum zu behaupten, Kossovo sei gewesen und voriiber. Wir 
befinden uns mitten im Kossovo. Unser heutiges Kossovo ist die Finstemis und 
Unkenntnis, in welcher unser Volk lebt. Die anderen Griinde des neuen Kossovo 
leben an den Grenzen im Norden und Westen: Die Deutschen, Osterreicher 
vmd Seliwabas mit ihrem Vordringen gegen unseren serbischen und slawisehen 
Siiden." Ankniipfend hieran wird unter Hinweis auf die Heldentaten des Obilid 
und Singjelic; auf die ^Notwendigkeit der Aufopferung im Dienste der Nation 
hingewiesen und gesagt: „Die nationale Arbeit ist mit Opfern verbunden, 
namentlicb in der Tiirkei und in Osterreich, wo solche Arbeiter von den. 
Behbrden verfolgt, in den Kerker und an den Galgen gebracht werden. Auch. 
fiir die-sen Kampf gegen die Finstemis und Unwissenheit sind solcbe Helden 
nbtig. Die „Narodna odbrana" zweifelt nicht, dali im Kampfe mit Gewehr und 
Kanone gegen die Schwabas und unsere sonstigen Feinde, dem wir entgegen- 
gehen, unser Volk eine Reihe von Helden stellen wird. Doch ist die Narodna 
odbrana damit nicht zufrieden, denn sie betrachtet auch die heutigen sogenannt 
friedliehen Verh'altnisse als Krieg und fordett gleichfalls Helden fiir diesen 
heutigen Kampf, den wir in Serbien und jenseits der Grenze fiihren." 



*) Milos Obi lie (audi Kobilic) schh'ch sich — nach der serbischen Tradition — naeh der Schlacht 
auf dem Ajnsetfelde in das turkischo Lager und ermordete dort Sultan Mnrad (von Kallay, n Geschiebte der 
Semen", I. Bd ). Stephan Singjelic, Knez von Resara. spielte wahrend des serbischen Aufstandes 
(1807—1810) eine Rolle. 1809 verteidigte Singjelic; die Redoute von Tschagar gegen die Tnrken nnd soil 
sich, da er der Ubermacht nicht gewachsen war, mit einem Telle der Seinen und mit zahlreichen Tiirken 
in die Luft gesprengt haben. (von Kallay, „Die Geschichte des Berbisehen Aufstandes." 



42 

Tiber die „Verbindung mit den Briidem und Freunden fiandelt das 
XII. Kapitel, dessen wesentlichster Inhalt sich in folgenden Satzen zusammen- 
dr'angt: 

„Zu den Hauptaufgaben der Narodna odbrana gehort die Aufrechterhaltung 
der Verbindung mit unseren nalien und ferneren Briidern jenseits der Grenze 
und unseren ubrigen Freunden in der Welt. Mit dem Worte „Volk" meint die 
Narodna odbrana unser ganzes Volk, nicht nur jenes in Serbien. Sio hofft, daft 
die von ibr in Serbien goleistete Arbeit den Briidern auflerhalb Serbiens ein 
Ansporn zu lebhafterer Teilnahme an der Arbeit privater Initiative werde, 
damit der beutige neue Aufschwung fur die Schaffung einer kriiftigen serbiscben 
Narodna odbrana in alien serbiscben Gebieten unter einetn vor sich gehe." 

„Zwei wichtige Aufgaben" benennt sich Kapitel XIII, welches ausfiihrt: 

„Indem wir auf dem Standpunkte stehen, dall durch die Annexion Bosniens 
und der Herzegowina das Vordringen gegen unsere Lander vom Norden her 
vollkommen zutage getreten ist, erachtet die Narodna odbrana und nennt dem 
Volke Osterreich als unseren ersten und groDten Feind." Diese Arbeit (n'amlich 
Osterreich dem serbischen Volke als dessen gToOteri Feind zu bezeichnen) 
betrachtet der Verein nach den folgenden Ausfiihrungen als eine gesunde, 
notwendige Aufgabe, als seine Grundpflicht. Dann fahrt die Broschiire fort: 

„Wie einst die Tiirken vom Siiden auf uns losgegangen sind, so geht 
heute Osterreich vom Norden her auf uns los. Wenn die Narodna odbrana die 
Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Osterreich predigt, so predigt sie eine heilige 
Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage." 

Der durch diese Propaganda entstohende HaG gegen (Jsterreich sei aller- 
dings nicht das Ziel, sondern die natiirliche Konsequenz der Arbeit, deren 
Zweck die Selbsterbaltung und Freiheit sei. Wenn hiebei der Hali gegen Oster- 
reich aufkeime, so sei es (Jsterreich, welches ihn durch sein Vorgehen s'ae, 
welches Vorgehen den „Kampf gegen Osterreich bis zu dessen Ausrottung 
auferlegt". 

Nach einem Lobe der modernen Auffassung der nationalen Idee wird 
bemerkt, daD bei Besprechung der „Befreiung und Vereinigung" zu viel mit 
Phrasen gearbeitet werde. Dem Volke mu'sse gesagt werden: 

„Die Befreiung unserer unterworfenen serbischen Gebiete und deren Ver- 
einigung mit Serbien ist fiir unseren Herrn, unseren Kaufmann, unseren Bauer 
notwendig wegen der fundamentalsten Bedurfnisse der Kultur, des Handels, 
wegen des Brotes und des Raumes. In dieser Erkenntnis wird das Volk mit 
grollerer Opferwilligkeit bei der nationalen Arbeit zugreifen. Unserem Volke 
mull gesagt werden, daG die Freiheit Bosniens fiir dasselbe notwendig ist, nicht 
nur aus Mitleid mit den dortselbst leidenden Briidern, sondern wegen des Handels 
und der Verbindung mit dem Meera. 



43 

Die „beiden Aufgaben" der Narodna odbrana werden dann nochmals in 
folgendem SchluDsatze zusammengefafit : „Neben der Aufgabe, dem Volke die 
ihm seitens Osterreichs drohende Gefahr zu erklaren, hat die Narodna odbrana 
noch die wiehtige Anfgabe, unter vollstandiger Wahrung der heiligen nationalen 
Erinnerungen dieses neue, gesunde und in seinen Folgen machtige Erfassen 
des Nationalismus und der Arbeit zum Zwecke der Befreiung und Vereinigung 
in das Volk zu tragen." 

Das XIV., Schluflkapitel, beginnt mit einem Appell an die Regierung und 
das Volk Serbiens, sich mit alien MitteLn fur den Kampf vorzubereiten, „den 
die Annexion vorangezeigt hat". 

In folgendem Satze wird bierauf die Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana noch- 
mals rekapituliert: 

„Indem die Narodna odbrana zeitgemaQ, den veriinderten Verhaltnissen 
entsprechend wirkt, dabei alle zur Zeit der Annexion gekniipften Verbindungen 
aufrechterhalt, ist sie heute dieselbe, die sie zur Zeit der Annexion war. Sie 
ist auch heute odbrana (Wehr), sie ist auch heute Narodna (des Volkes). Sie 
versammelt auch heute urn ihre Fahne die Staatsbiirger Serbiens, wie sie sie 
zur Annexionszeit versammelt hat. Damals rief man nach dem Kriege, heute 
ruft man nach der Arbeit, damals wurden Meetings, Demonstrationen, frei- 
willige Komitees, Gewehre und Bomben verlangt, heute wird die stills, fana- 
tiscbe, unermudliche Arbeit und wieder Arbeit in der Richtung der Aufgaben 
und Pflichten verlangt, we.lche wir vorgefiihrt haben, als vorl'aufige Vorbereitung 
fiir den Kampf mit Gewehr und Kanone, welcher kommen wird." 



ffber die Organisation der Narodna odbrana enthalt diese Brosehiire und 
der Jahresberieht dieses Vereines folgende Daten: 

Ein Zentralausschufi mit dem Sitze in Belgrad, leitet alle Agenden der 
Narodna odbrana. Diesem sind alle anderen Ausschiisse der Narodna odbrana 
untergeordnet. Der Zentralausschufi teilt sich in vier Sektionen: fiir kulturelle 
Arbeit, fiir korperliche Fortbildung, fiir die finanzielle Gebarung und fiir aus- 
wartige Angelegenheiten. 

Kreisausschusse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politischen Kreisbehb'rden 
leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Kreisen. Jeder Kreis- 
ausschufi teilt sich in je eine Sektion fiir kulturelle Arbeit (Vorstand ist der 
im Orte befindliche Obmann einer Filiale der n Kulturliga"), fiir kbrperliche 
Fortbildung (Vorstand ist ein im Orte befindliches Mitglied des Schiitzen-, 
Sokol-, Jager-, Reitervereines) und fiir finanzielle Gebarung; bei einzelnen 
Kreisausschiissen besteht auch eine Sektion fiir auswartige Angelegenheiten. 

Bezirksausschiisse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politrschen Bczirks- 
behorden leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Bezirken, 



44 

Ortsausschiisse sind die leitenden Organo in den einzelnen Orten. 

Vertrauensm'anner befinden sich in jenen Orten im Innern des Landes, wo 
die Notrwendigkeit, einen Aussckufi zu bilden, nicht besteht. 

Vereine, „welcho mit der Arbeit der Organisation der Narodna odbrana in 
engster Yerbindung stehen" und von dieser in jeder Hinsicht untevstiitzt werden, 
sind: der Schiitzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, der Sokolbund „Dusari .Silni" mit 
2500 MitgHedern, der olympische Klub, der Reiterverein „Knez Mihajlo L , der 
Jagerbund und die Kulturliga. 

Alle diese Vereine sind ahnlich organisiert wie die Narodna odbrana, beniitzen 
auch deren Lokalitaten, bezw. Veieinsbauser, dercn Bibliotheken etc.; angesehene 
Mitglieder dieser Vereine sind Sektionsvorstande in din Ausschiissen der Narodna 
odbrana. 



Auszug aus dem ..Bericht Uber die Tatigkeit des Sokolvereines Dusan Silni in 

Kragujevac in den Jahren 1912 und 1913" (Kragujevac, Druckerei ..Buducnost ' 

Tih. Lekic 1914). 

An der Spitze dieses Berichtes ist die Anspraehe abgedruckt, mit welcher 
der President des Vereines, der kiiniglich serbische Major Kovafievid, die Jahres- 
versammlung ira Jiinner 1914 begriiHte. 

,Es ist Euch bekannt", begann der President, „da£i das Sokohvesen, im 
Kanypfe gegen den Germanismus entstanden, eine rein slawische Institution ist, 
welche das Ziel verfolgt, alle slawischen Briider zu vereinigen, zu begeistern 
und durcb Kultur und Gewalt fur den Kampf gegen den Feind des Slawen- 
tums vorzubereiten. 

Wir Serben als ein Teil der groflen Slawengemeinschaft haben die Sokol- 
idee aufgcnoraraen und der gerueinsckafdichen Arbeit fur unser und unserer 
Briider Wohlergehen und Gliick zugestimmt. 

Auch wir Serben wollen im Geiste des Sokols leben und arbeiten, denn 
wir wiinschen die Miiden und Matten zu beleben, die Sehwachen und Ver- 
kummerten zu stiirken, die Gefangenen und Gefesselten zu befreien. Wir haben 
dies auch jetzt und in den friiheren Kriegen getan. Wir haben einen Teil 
unserer Briider von dem Ubermute des Feindes im Siiden befreit. Wir haben 
ihnen die Fesseln aufgerissen, sie der Qualen entledigt und ihnen die Freiheit 
gegeben, damit sie in ihr das Gliick, die Gleiehheit und Briiderschaft fiihlen." 

Nach einigen Worten der Lobpreisung dieser „edlen Arbeit 1 ", welche 
r einen Teil der grofien Sokolidee verwirkliohte", fuhr Major Kovac'evie' fort: 

„Aber meine Briider und Schwestern, unser Feind im Nordon ist gefahr- 
licher und herzloser, weil er kulturell und bkonomiseh starker ist. 

Dieser Feind ist in seinen Geliisten unersattlich; er halt Millionen unserer 
Briider in Sklaverei und Ketten. Er nahm ihnen die Freiheit und das Recht 
und unterwarf sie alle seinen Diensten. Die Briider murren, rufen und bitten 
um je raschere Hilfe. 

Wir diirfen sie nicht auf Gnade und Ungnade diesem fiirehterlichen und 
gefrafligen Feinde iiberlassen. Wir miissen ihnen je eher zu Hilfe eilen, weil 
dies zu tun unsere Pflicht ist. Kb'nnten wir denn schlielilich gliicklich sein, 
wenn so viele Briider in Sklaverei leben, leiden und murren? 

Briider und Schwestern! 

Der Feind ist gefahrlich, liistern und liistig. Seien wir immer auf der Hut! 



46 

Arbeiten wir mit noch grofierer Lust und Aufopferung. Seien war genan 
in der heiligen Sokolpflicht, treu uiid ausharrend. 

Bereiten wir uns zum Kampfe und fur die gerechte Sokolidee vor. 

Vereinigen und gesellen wir uns zu unzahlbaren Sokolschw'armen und 
denken wir immer an jene Wahrheit, welche die serbischen Sokolasen auf 
ihrer Fahne geschrieben haben : Dail nur ein gesundes, kraftiges, national- 
bewuOtes und gut organisiertes Volk geeignet ist, sich zu verteidigen, zu 
kampfen und zu siegen". 

An diese Ansprache des Prasidenten sehhefit sich der Bericht des Ver- 
waltungsausschusses an. Nach einer Schilderung der Erfolge der letzten Kriege, 
welche den Verein wahrend zweier Jahre an einer Betatigung hinderten, heilit 
es dort: „Es kam der Tag, an dem wir zu unserer Arbeit zuriickkehren, weil 
unser Programm noch nicht erfiillt, weil unsere Aufgabe noch nicht beendet 
ist. Noch ein grofier Teil unseres Volkes erduldet die Leiden des gekreuzigten 
Christus; wir haben noch' unsere Briider jenseits der Drina zu besuehen; wir 
haben noch die Stadt Sarajevo und das Vermachtnis des heiligen Sava*) auf- 
zusuchen; wir haben das Heimatland des Marina Novak, des Deli Radivoj und 
des alten Vujadin zu besichtigen; wir haben das Gebirge Romanija zu iiber- 
schreiten und zu sehen, warum sich Travnik in Nebel gehiillt hat, es mufi 
einmal jenes Lied aufhciren: Aoj, Bosnien, Du Waisenkind vor Gott, hast Du 
nirgends Leute Deines Stammes ..." 

Nach einer Besprechung diverser Unternehmungen des Vereines wird 
betont, dall der Verein zu den „Brudervereinen jenseits der Save und Drina" 
Beziehungen unterhielt und speziell die Entsendung von Delegierten zu der in 
Sarajevo abgehaltenen Jubelfeier der Prosvjeta betont. Hiezu bemerkt der 
Bericht: „Durch Absendung der Repr'asentanten zu den Briidern nach Bosnien 
beabsichtigte der AusschuQ, denselben hiemit zu sagen: „Wir haben Euer nicht 
vergessen, die Flugel des Falken der Sumadija sind noch machtig." 

Nach eingehender Schilderung eines Besuches der Agramor Studenten in 
Serbien**) und der Fahnenweihe des „Verbandes der nuchternen Jugend" 
sckliefit der Verwaltungsbericht mit folgenden Satzen: 

„Diese Erscheinungen — die Ankunft der Briider Kroalen in der Sumadija 
und die Zusammenkunft der „niichternen Jugend" aus alien Gegenden des 
Serbentums weifi die Verwaltung richtig zu wurdigen und man wird nicht 
iibeitreiben, wenn man sagt, dali diese Ereignisse den Anfang und Keim einer 
groflen Tat bedeuten, die sich in der n'achsten Zukunft abspielen wird. 

"j Der big Savn ist Sehutzpatron der Serben (gestorben 1236). Ducatus saneti Save heilit Herzego- 
wiua. Vermachtnis deB hi. Sava ist also rait Herzegowina gleichbedeatend. 

•*) Dieser Besach der Agramer Studenten (April 1912) in Belgrad, Nis, Seniendria n. 8. w. wnrde in 
Serbien zu einer gro&en, monarchiefeindlichen Demonstration beniitzt. Den Ausniiglem wurden milittuische 
Ehren erwlesen, es fanden in der Militarabademie und im Offizierskasino Dejeneuxe und BiUle statt. In Nia 
wurde zn Ehren der Besucher sogar eine militarisehe Farade abgehalten. 



47 

Sie sind der Ausdruck eines grofien, bisher noch stillen Erwachens des 
nationalen Bewufttseins und der Starke einer unterdriickten Nation, • welchor 
man nicht erlaubt, dad sie sich emporhebt und einigt. Noch eine Zeitlang und 
dieser Keim wird reifen und wenn die Volksseele noch mehr aufwallt, wird es 
keine Schranken geben, die sie nicht zerreillen kann, koine Hindernisse, die sic 
auf ihrem Wege niclit wird niederreiiien konnen. Die Arbeit an der Kraftigung 
dieser Macht, die Mithilfe und Beschleunigung des Laufes dieser nationalen 
Entwieklung, die Vorbereitung und die Unterstiitzung dieser Idee war der Ver- 
waltung stets das Ziel ihrer Handlungen." 

Der Bericht des Kassiers fiihrt vorerst alle jene an, die dem Verein ihre 
Unterstiitzung- liehen. Nebst einer Reihe von Mitglicdern des Kragujovacer 
Kreisausschusses werden hiebei dankend ervvahnt: 

Der Kreisausschufl der „Narodna odbrana" in Kragujevac, insbesonders 
dessen Rittersektion, die dem Sokolvereine ofters mit reichlichen Unterstiitzungen 
zu Hilfe kam ; der Direktor des Gymnasiums in Kragujevac, der den Sokolen 
jStandig seine vaterlicke Aiifmerksamkeit zeigte" ; der Divisionskommandant 
der Sumadija, der den Verein reichlich unterstiitzte ; der President des Kreis- 
gerichtes in Kragujevac, der Ivreisvorstand und der Gemeindevorstand in 
Kragujevac. 

Nachdem der Kassier der im Kriege gefallenen Vereinsmitglieder gedacht 
hat, schlieilt er seinen Bericht mit folgenden Worten : 

„Nach dem so gl'anzenden Siege fiber einen Teil unseres Feindes hofft 
die Vereinsleitung, dali Ihr alle von nun ab noch mehr, fester und lieber Euch 
der Tiitigkeit des Sokoltums widmen werdet, damit Ihr in unserem Falkenhorst 
Falken erzieht, die im gegebenen Zeitpunkte eines Tages in der Lage sein 
werden, hoch aufzufliegen und auf ihren m'achtigen Schwingen auch alien 
unseren noch nicht befreiten Briidem Briiderschaft, Liebe und Freiheit zu 
bringen." 

Der Jahresbeiicht ist unterfertigt von dem Majore M. J. Kovacevic 1 als 
Prases, dem Gerichtsselcretiir D. V. Brzakovi<; als Sekretar und von 10 Vor- 
standsmitgliedcrn, unter denen sich zwei Professoren (Emil Lukic und Milan 
Jankovh!) sowie ein weiterer Offizier (Infanteriemajor Michael Vasic) befinden. 

Aus diesem Jahresberichte und aus einer von dem Kragujevacer 
vereine dem „Srpski Soko" in Tuzla zur Ausfiillung zugesendeten, gleioh 
vom Major Kovacevic' und Gericktssekretar Brzakovic gezeichneten Tabelle 
hervor, dali die Sokolvereine in Serbien mit einzelnen derartigen Vereinen i 
der Monarchie in einern bisher nicht bekannt gewesenen engeren Vi?i I 
stehen. 



Das serbische Amtsblatt im Dienste der Narodna odbrana. 

Dem serbisohen Amtsblatte „Srpski novine" vom 28. Juni 1914 (n. St.) 
lag als Beilage ein Aufruf der „Narodna < Mbrana" bei, der alien Abonnenten 
des Blattes zugestellt wurde. 

In diesem Aufrufe finden sich die folgenden Stellen: 

„Bruder und Schwestem! Nur ein Teil des Kossovo wurde geracht, nur 
ein Teil des St. Veittages (Vidovdan) gesiihnt. Ebenso weit und breit, vvie die 
Gebiete sind, in denen imsere Volkssprache gehb'rt wird — die serbisebe, 
kroatische und sloweniscbe — von Kikinda bis Monastir, von Triest bis Carevo- 
Solo, ebenso weit und breit ist die Bedeutung des St. Veittages und des 
Kossovo. So viel nationale Seelen auf diesem Territorium weinen, so viel Ketten 
unserer Bru'der knirschen, so viel Arbeit ist noeb zu leisten, so viel haben wir noch 
zu opfern. Der St. Veittag konnte friiher fiir uns einen Tag der Trailer be- 
deuten, aber heute, wo wir scion tief in die neue Geschichte des Volkes 
gescbritten sind, wo binter uns groGe und glorreiche nationale Gescbehnisse 
steben und uns noch groflere und glorreichere erwarten, heute, wo wir in der 
Mitte des Schaffens des grofien nationalen Staates steben, heute mull fur uns 
der St. Veittag ein Tag groDer Freude und Stolzes wegen des Gescbehenen sein, 
da es aus ihm entsprossen ist und noch mebr wegen dessen, was kommen 
■wird. Serben und Serbinnen! Millionen unserer Briider. Slowenen, Kroaten und 
Serben auGerhalb unserer Grenzen scbauen heute auf uns, die Kinder des 
Konigreiehes, und ihre Brust wijlbt die Freude und die Hoflnung, indern sie 
imseie heutige majestatisebe Manifestation fiir die nationale Sache betrachten. 
Pem Mutigen hill't Gott! Vorwarts alle! Es ruft uns derjenige Teil unserer 
geheiligten Aufgabe, der noeb unverwirklicht geblieben ist. Am St. Veittage 1914 
in Belgrad. 



Beilago 5. 



Zeugenaussage des Trifko Krstanovic Uber die Narodna odbrana. 

Der Biickergehilfe Trifko Krstanovic - In Zavidovici wurde von einer 
Gendarmeriepati'ouille in der Nacht vom 6. zum 7. Juli 1914 verhaftet, weil 
duroh eine, kurz nach Verubung des Attentates gegen den Herrn Erzherzog 
Franz Ferdinand von ihm gemachte AufSerung, dieses Attentat sei zu erwaitea 
gewesen, der Verdacht entstanden war, daO er von deni Komplotte Kenntni3 
gehabt habe. 

Er wurde deshalb dem Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo eingeliefert. Bei der 
Abhorring des Veihafteten ergab sich, dafi seine AufJerung den gegen ihn rega 
gewordenen Verdacht nicht rechtfertigte, da sie, lediglich auf seinen friiheren 
Kenntnissen von der Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana beruhend, bloll der Aus- 
druck seiner Uberzeugung gewesen war, dafi bei der in Serbien gegen die 
osterr.-ungar. Monarchic und speziell gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand 
entfalteten Agitation eine derartige Tat erwartet werden mufite. Das gegen 
Krstanovic' eingeleitete Verfahi'en wurde' deshalb mangels jedes Tatbestandes 
eingestellt und der Genannte mit Rticksicht auf seine fur die Untersuehung 
wichtigen Kenntnisse uber die Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana als Zeuge ein- 
vernommen. 

Ein die hier interessierenden Umstande betreffender Auszug aus diesem 
am 19. Juli 1914 aufgenommenen Zeugenprotokolle folgt hiemit: 

„Im Herbste des Jahres 190S iiberschritt ich auf der Mokra Gora bei 
Visegrad die Grenze nach Serbien, um mir Besch'aftigung zu suchen. Zuerst 
kam ich nach Bajina Basta im Bezirke Uzice und da ich dort keinerlei Be- 
sch'aftigung fand, ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich gerade zu der Zeit der Ver- 
kiindigung der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina emlangte. Da ich sah, 
dafi wegen der Annexion in der Bevblkerung eine grofie Bewegung und 
Erregung entstanden war und dafi ich keinerlei Besch'aftigung werde finden 
konnen, ging ich in das k. a. k. Konsulat und ersuchte, mich nach Hause 
abzufertigen. Dort sagte man mir, dafi ich nachmittags kommen moge und dall 
man mich dann in die Heimat abfertigen werde. Als ich jedoch aus dem 
Konsulate hinausging, erwischte mich auf der Strafle ein Gendarm und fragte 
mich, woher ich sei; in der Meinung, ich sei ein Spion, fiihrte er mich in 
eine Karaula. Hier verhorte man mich und als ich ihnen sagte, dafi ich gerne 
nach Hause moehte, begann mich ein Unteroffizier zu schmahen, wieso ich 
jetzt aus Serbien wolle, d^ sie gerade jetzt mehr Leute brauchen, weil es -zu 



50 

einem Kriege mit Osterreich kommen ktinnte. Als ich ihm s.igte, daft ich nichts 
211m Leben babe, antwortete er mir, dall ich voile Versorgung finden werde, 
wenn ich mich in das Komitee einschreibe. Ich war in jener Not damit ein- 
verstanden und ein Gendarm fiihrte mich in das Gasthaus „Zelenom Yijencu" 
(„zum griinen Kranz") und stellte mich dort dem Voja Tankosic", dem Fiihrer 
dos Komitees und Kapit'an im reguliiren Heere vor. Hier beim ..griinen Kranze" 
wurdc ich in Kost und Wohnung genommen und wic ich sab, vvaren hier auch 
andcre vom Komiteo wohnhaft. Voja Tankosiij sagte mir, dall es der Zweck 
des Komitees sei, -ii h zu unterricliten im Bombcnwerfen, in der Zerstdrung 
von Briicken, Tunnels, Telegfaphen und Eisenbahnon, und zwar deshalb, wed 
e Iciclit zu cinnm Kriege zwischen Serbien und Osterreich kommen konnte. 
Hierauf fiihrte mich ein Mann in ein ararisches kleineres Hans neben dem 
Finanzministcrium, wo die Kanzleien des Komitees sicb befanden und hier in 
der Kanzlei iraf ieh Milan Pribicevic, weleher mich in das Komitee einschrieb. 
Boi diescr Einschreibung fragte mich Milan Piibii'cvi.'. ob mir Voja Tankosic 
gesagt habe. welche Pflichten ich als Komita habe, worauf ich antwortete: n ja B . 
Er sagte mir, dall die Eingeschriebenen tiichtig, stark und opferwillig sein 
miiflten. Damals waren wir etwa 70 eingeschrieben. In Belgrad haben wir 
nichts gemacht. Nach etwa 1 '/, Monaten teilte uns unser Fiihrer Tankosic mit, 
dad die Groflmachte unser Komitee verboten haben und daft wir uns aus Belgrad 
entferncn und irgendwo in einem vril.ire.nen Orte verstecken mu'ssen, wohin 
Fremde nicht kommen, Aul' diese Weise sandten sic uns in die Stadt Cuprija. 
Hier iibten uns ein die Ofh'ziere Voja Tankosii', Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvozdid 
und Mitar Djinovie 1 , der in die montenegrinische Bombenaffaire verwickelt war 
und in Montenegro crschossen wurde. Es wai uns verboten, mit den ubrigen 
Leuten zu verkehren, damit man nichts von unserem Zwecke erfahre und auch 
nichts davon, wic viele wir waren. Wir iibten uns in dem Werfcn von Bomben, 
in dem Errichten von Minen und in der Zerstorung von Telegraphen, Eisen- 
bahnen, Tunnels und Briicken. Alle 11 Tage kamen zu uns Milan Pribicevic', 
General Bozo Jaukovie, der Apotheker Skaric, del Vbgeordnete Zivko Rafajlo- 
vic, ein gewisser Glisie Milutin, Beamter im Finanzministerium, und diese 
sahen zu, wie wir iibten und beglichen jedesmal fiir uns die Kosten der Ver- 
pflcgung. Unscre Lehrer sagten uns, dall wir Komitees, sobald der Krieg ver- 
kiindigt sei, voraus gchen werden, hinter uns die Frciwilligen und dann das 
regul'are [leer. In Cuprija waren wir etwa 140 Mann. Wir bekamen auiler der 
Kost, Wohnung und Kleidung je 25 Para taglich fur Tabak. Die Schule 
dauerte beilaufig 3 Monate, d. h. bis Mar/. 1909. Dann sagten uns die Mit- 
glieder des Aussehusses, dall wir entlassen waren, daft jeder gehen kiinne, 
wohin er wolle, denn die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina sei von 
den Groftmachten anerkannt und unser Komitee habe keinen Zweck mehr. 
I'.ei der \uflosung des Komitees sagte mir General Bozo Jankovid, dall icb in 



51 

den Dienst des Bozo Milanovic" in Sabac trete und 50 Dinar monatlich Lohn 
erhalte. Er sagte mir nicbt, welcher Dienst das sein werde. Ich nahm an, weil 
ich mich als Komitee gegenuber dem General Jankovic zu folgen verpflicbtet 
fiihlte und auch da icb nichts zum Leben hatte und rnir ein Brot suchen 
muftte. So kam_ ich im Marz 1909 nach Sabac und meldete mich bei Bozo 
Milanovic", Kaufmaim in Sabac. General Jankovii! hatte mir gesagt, daft Bozo 
Milanovic - der Vorstand der Narodna odbrana in Sabac sei und dad ich bei 
ilim in dicser Narodna odbrana dienen werde. Als ich dem Bozo Milanovic' das 
Schreiben des Generals gab und er es gelesen hatte, sagte er mir, daft ich 
ihm treu dienen und seine Auftrage ausfiihren miisse. Der hauptsaehlichste 
Dienst werde fur mich sein Briefe auszutragen, wohin sie eben lauten. Falls 
ich einen Brief nicht dorthin tragen werde, wohin er gerichtet sei und falls 
irgend jemand anderer zu diescm Briefe kiimo, so sei das mit meinem Leben 
verbunden. Gleich nachsten Tages gab mir Bo/o Milanovic einen gcschlossenen 
Brief, den ich ?u Cedq LukiO, Finanzwachtmeister in Serbisch-Raca, tragen 
sollte. Am Wege nach Baca', im Orte Bogatir, stellte mich der Bezirkskapetan, 
nahm mir den Brief ab, Sffnete und lis ihn. In dem Brief stand, daft Lukic" 
sofort drei Boote kaufen solle, damit sie fertig waren, falls sie gebraucht 
wiirden. Dem Briefe waren loo Dinar beigeschlossen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit 
sagte mir der Kapetan, daft vom Ministerium der strenge Auftrag gekommen 
sei, daft die Komitatschi auf eigene Faust nichts tun diirfen, damit nicht eine 
internationale diplomatische Intervention provoziert werde. Ich kehrte nach 
Sali.'. zuriiek und meldete dem Bozo Milanovic, was mir geschehen war. Bozo 
Milanovid wendete sieh an den Kreisprafektcn und dieser ordnete an, daft mir 
der Revolver, den mir der Kapetan in BogatiC abgenommen hatte, zuriick- 
gestellt werde. Auch ordnete er an, daft der Kapetan don Brief an Cedo Lukic, 
an welehen er lautcte, zu expedieren habe. Derartige Briefe habe ich vom 
Marz 1909 bis zum Oktober 1910 ausgetragen, und zwar habe ich wahrend 
dieser Zeit nach Serbisch-Raea 43 Briefe, nach Lo/.nica 55 Briefe, nach 
Zvornik 5, nach Ljubivija 2 Briefe getragen und nach Koviljaca weifi ich nicht 
wie viele. Ich habe mir deswegen gemerkt, wie oft ieli in jedem < Irte war, 
weil diese Orte von Sabac sehr weit entfernt sind. Die Briefe habe ich an die 
Leiter der Zollamter in den bctreffenden Orten getragen und von diesen habe 
ich wieder Briefe als Antwort erhalten und zu Bozo Milanovic getragen. Ich 
erinnere mich, daft ich auch einigemale Briefe nach Sepacka Ada getragen 
habe. Mein Gehilfe im Anstragen von Briefen war ein gewisser Vaso Eric 1 , 
gebiirtig aus Srebrenica. Nach Belgrad habe ich Briefe von Bozo Milanovic! 
jedc Woche getragen und an Milan Pribicevic 1 und I!o/.o Jankovic' zugestellt. 
Von dem Inhalte dieser Briefe habe ich nichts gewufit und hat mir auch 
niemand hieriiber etwas gesagt. Soviel ich sehen konnte, waren die Briefe, 
welche Bozo Milanovic absandte, nicht chiffriert, wahrend die Briefe, welche 



52 

die Zollamtsleiter sendeten, mit besonderen Zeichen geschriebcn waren, was 
ich beobaehtet babe, als sie Bozo Milanovid bffnete. Einmal brachte ich dem 
Bozo Milanovid ein solches chiffriertes Sebreiben, ich glaube aus Zvornik, und 
dieser sendete mich mit dem Sebreiben zu Mik.i Atanasijevid, Professor in 
Sabac, damit er es deebiffrieie. Dieser vollfiihrte das, wie cr das gewohrdich 
tat; aber vielleiebt vergaft er den Brief zu scblieBen, so dad ich ihn lesen 
konnte. In dem Briefe stand, daft von sieherer Seite gemeldet werde, dafl Geld 
mit dem Bildnisse des Thronfolgers zu pragon sei und dad dies ein Zeichen sei, 
daft Kaiser Franz Joseph abdizieren werde. Etwa nach 8 Monaten meiner Dienst- 
leistung bei Bozo Milanovid gab mir Bozo seine Visitkarte, auf welcher ein 
Totenkopf aufgezeichnet war und auf dor aufgescbrieben stand, dall ich zum 
Vertrauten (povjerenik) der Narodna odbrana ernannt sei. Bei dieser Gelegen- 
heit sagte er mir, daft es sieh um Spionage handle 

Von dem Offizier Dusan Opterkid, dem. Mitgliede der Narodna odbrana, 
erfuhr ich einmal, dafl die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien und Herzegowina 23 Mil 
glieder habe. Sonst i»t mir aber nicht bekannt, ob und welche Organisation die 
Narodna odbrana in Bosnien hat. 11m und wieder gab mir Milan Pribidevid 
einen Revolver oder aber Geld zum Ankauf eines Revolvers, damit ich ilin den 
Finanzern an der Grenze gebe, welche als Komitatschis dienten, da sie keinen 
Revolver batten und auch kein Geld, um sieh einen solcben selbst zu kaulcn. 
Wie mir scheint, gab ihnen Milan Pribidevid diese zur Ehrung, weil sie ebeu 
Komitatschis waren. Eme andere Bescha'ftigung mit Waffen hatte ich nicht. 

Einmal bekam ich zur Zeit meiner Dienstleistung \"it Bozo Milano\'id den 
Auftrag. mit einem Manne zu eiuem Bauern in Lijesnica an der Drina zu 
gehen mid dieser Bauer werde uns informieren und alles, was notwendig wird, 
i damit wir zwei den Ljubo Stanaridid, serbischen Reserveoffizier, der 
nach Bijeljina gefliichtet war. tbten, Der Ausschuft der Narodna odbrana hatte 
namlich erfahren, daft Ljubo Stanaridid I'm den serbischen Staat gefahrlich sei 
und hatte bescblossen, daft er getb'tet werden solle. 

Von Bozo Milanovid erhielten ich und jener Mann den Auftrag, an einem 
bestimmten Orte iiber die Drina zu gehen und Ljubo Stanaridid, der gerade 
am Ufer der Drina auf der bosniscben Seite im Bijeljiner Bezirke wohnhaft ist, 
zu toten. Teh und jener Mann waren m die Drina gestiegen, aber weil das 
\Va ser tief war und wir auch sahen, daft Ljubo nut dem Gewehr auf der 
Schulter um seiu Haus herumgeho, kehrten wir zum Hause |enes Bauern 
zuruck. Weil ich sah, daft wir ihn mit dem Messer nicht toten kb'nnen, sendete 
ich jenen Mann nach Sabac, damit er Bozo Milanovid melde, daft es nicht 
mbglich sei, den Stanaridid auf diese Weise, wie er wolle, namlich mit dem 
Messer, zu toten. Daraufhin erhielt ich vom Bozo Milanovid den Auftrag, daft 
wir ihn auf jeden Fall toten. Dann haben wir uns entschlossen, ihn mit dem 
Gewehre zu erschieften. Dieser Mann, der mit mir war, hatte nach dem Auf- 



53 

trage des Bozo auf Stanariclc' zu schieften und ihn zu toten und ich hatte zu 
kontrollieren, ob dieser Auftrag ausgefiihrt werde. Inzwischen jedoch kam ein 
bcrittener Gendarm und brachte vom Ivreisprafekten in Sabac den Auftrag, daft 
wir zuriickkehrcn und von der urspriinglichen Absicht abstehen sollen. Und so 
kehrten wir nach Sabac zuriiok. 

Im Oktober 1910 verlangte ich vom Bozo Milanovie, dad er mir den 
Lohn erhohe und als er mir das nicht tun wollte, bedankte ich mieh fur den 
Dienst. Aus Sabac ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich niit dem General Jankovjc' 
zusammentraf, der mich verhaften Hell, deshalb, wed ich den Gehorsara auf- 
gesagt habe. Sie zogen mich dutch verschiedene Gefangnisse, etwa durch zwei 
donate und alles deswegen, weil ich ihnen den Gehorsam aufgesagt hatte und 
sie sich furchteten, daft ich ihre Geheimnisse verrate. Zum Schlusse entschieden 
sich die Behb'rden, mich nach Bosnien zu expediereu. In Sabac sagte mir ein 
Gefangener, daft es sich urn mein Leben handr.lt. Die Gendarmen begleiteten mich 
bis Zvornik, wo sie mich den bosnischen Gendarmen ubergaben. So kam ich 
im Dezember 1910 nach Bosnien. 

Von irgend einer Schwarzen Hand wetfj ich nichts Bestimmtes mit Aus- 
nahmo dessen, was ich von dieser Hand in serbisehen Zeitungen gelesen 
habe. Hcute erinnere ich mich nicht daran, was von dieser Schwarzen Hand 
in Zeitungen geschrieben war. Ebenso tveifi ich nichts von der Schwarzen Liste. 
In Serbien herrschte nach der Annexion ein allgemeiner Unwille und Haft 
gegen die Person des bsterreichischen Thronfolgers, denn er war allgemein als 
ein Blutfeind der Serben angesehen. 

Im iibrigen berief sich Krstanovic" auf seine friiheien Angaben, von denen 
bloft die folgenden zur Erganzung der vorstehenden Aussage von Interesse sind. 

Das Komitee, in das Krstanovic durch Milan Pribicevic aufgenommen 
wurde, gelangte von der Norodna odbrana zur Anfstellung. In der Schule in 
Cuprija befanden sich 20 — 22 Angehbrige aus der Monarchic. Unter den 
Schlilern war auch Milan Ciganovic. 

In der Schule zu Cuprija wurde gelehrt, daft die Komitees bereit sein 
mtissen, auf Befehl der Norodna odbrana nach Bosnien zu gehen und dort 
nach 'den von ihren Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Auftragen zu handeln. 



Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo Uber das Strafvertahren 
gegen Jovo Jaglieie und Genossen wegen Verbrechens der Ausspahung. 

Im J aire 1913 wurde eine von Jovo Jaglidid und mehreren Komplizen 
in Bosnien zugunsten Serbians betriebene Aussp'ahungsaktion aufgedeckt. Das 
hierauf in Sarajevo eingeleitete Strafverfahren lieferte unter anderem auch 
folgendes, einen Einblick in die Methoden der grofiserbischen Propaganda und 
speziell der Narodna odbrana bietendes Materiale. 

Jovo Jaglieie gab an, dad er im Monata August oder September 1912 
zum ersten Male dem gewesenen Viebrevisor in Foi'a, Petar Klarid genannt 
Pesut, begegnete, weleher im Herbst 1912 naeh Montenegro gerliiehtet und 
dnnn Komitatscbi geworden war. 

Bei der ersten Zusammenlcunft fragte Klarid den Jaglieie, ob er den Rade 
Milosevic! aus Kalinovik kenne und meinte auf die Antwort des letzteren, dafi 
Milosevic im Spital schwer krank liege: n Schade, wenn er stirbt, wir haben 
Merkwurdiges gesprochen, hat er Dir nielits davon erwahnt?" Auf die ver- 
neinende Antwort erwiderte Klarid: ,Ich h'atte Dir etwas Wiehtiges mitzuteilen, 
wir sind Serben und miissen etwas Wiehtiges fur Serbien tun, komme zu mir 
in meine Kanzlei". Dort entspann sich nun zwischen ihnen folgendes Gespr'ach: 

„Jovan, ich will ]>tr etwas erz'ahlen, ich kenne Dieh noeh nicht, ob Du 
mich verraten wirst? Ich sage es Dir trotzdem und wenn Du das Herz hast 
verrate mich!" 

Auf die Frage des Jaglieie, urn was es sich denn handle, antwortete Klarid: 
„Bruder, in Serbien existiert ein Verein „Narodna odbrana". In diesen Verein 
sollen viele Leute eintrcten; es sind auch schon viele in Bosnien und der 
Herzegowina sowie in der ganzen Monarchic angeworben; es gibt Leute dabei 
von Intelligenz und Wohlhabende, das sind grofie Kopfe, und wenn es die 
keinnen, warum sollen es nicht auch wir tun, damit wir auch etwas dazu bei- 
tragen". 

Auf die Frage, welche Ziele dieser Verein verfolgt, antwortete Klarid: 

„Der Verein verfolgt den Zweck: z. B. Du bist in Kalinovik, Du meldest 
mir, was es dort Neues gibt, wie viel Milit'ar, Kanonen, Munition, verschiedene 
Gewehre, wet kommt, wer geht u. dgl. Wir haben eine geheime Scbrift „Chiffre" 
und korrespondieren mit derselben. Wenn Du treu bist, erhaltst Du sie auch." 



55 

Jaglicie' hatte Furcht, daft Klaric' ihn nur ausforsche, um ihn dann zu 
verraten und ersuehte ihn daher, er solle ihm einige Namen von Mitgliedern 
Dennen, worauf Klaric eine Zeitlang nachdachte und dem Jaglicie; dann einen 
Namen nannte, der diesem Yertrauen einfliiflte. 

Hierauf sagte ihm Klaric.: „Soll ich Dir den ....Chiffre"" geben?" Jaglicid 
war damit einverstanden. KJarir, welcher den Chiffre auswendig kannte, schrieb 
ihn auf einen Zettel auf und ubergab ihn dem Jaglicie\ 

Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit erz'ahlte Klarid von seinem Aufenthalt in 
Banja-Koviljaca (bei Loznica), wo er dutch den serbischen Hauptmann 
Todorovic'*) Unterricht im Bombenwerfen erhalten hat und sagte auf die Frage 
des Beschuldigten, warum er dies gelernt habe: „Wenn es zu etwas kommt, 
wie ich Dir bereits gesagt habe, ist es notwendig, dafi ich mit Bomben umzu- 
gehen verstehe, dafi ich Dich einiibe und Du dann die anderen, damit Pulver- 
magazine und sonstige wichtige Objekte in die Luft gesprengt werden, weil 
wir in diesem Falle Bomben aus Serbien erhalten werden" 

Hierauf beschrieb Klarid das Aussehen der Bomben und sagte, dafl er 
bereits Leute angeworben habe, welche im Falle eines Krieges die Telegraphen- 
und Telephondrahte durchschneiden werden. 

Bei diesen Zusammenkunften erfuhr Jaglicie" von Klari(! auch, dafl es zu 
den Aufgaben der Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana gehort, bsterreichisch-unga- 
rische Soldaten zur Fahnenrlueht zu verleiten, Freiwillige (Komitatschis) anzu- 
werben, Banden zu organisieren, Objekte und Depots zu sprengen u. s. w. 
Auch teilte ihm Klarid mit, dafi selbst die chiffi ierte Korrespondenz zwischen 
den serbischen und bosnischen Mitgliedern nicht der Post anvertraut, sondern 
durch siehere Boten uber die Grenze befbrdert wird. 

Klarid hat dem Jaglicid welters etz'ahlt, daft gclegentbch der Prosvjetafeier 
(im September 1912) mit der zu dieser cntsendeten Deputation aus Seibien 
auch ein serbischer Major in Sarajevo im Hotel ..Europe" geuohnt hat**) 
welchem Klarid Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana zufuhrte, die dieser beeidete. 

Von einem Spione erfuhr Jaglicie', daft Bomben nach Sarajevo kommen 
werden odei schon gekommen sind, dafi diese das Aussehen von Seifenstucken 
haben***) und daft man auch diesem Spione 2 — 3 Stiicke senden oder dafi 
er sich solche abholen werde. 

*; Hauplmann Kosta Todorovn. war damals lats, : iehlieli Grcn/kommissar und Leiter des serbischen 
Ktindscliafrsdienstcs fur die Grcnzstrecke Rae*— Ljuboija 

**J Zu der Prosvjetafeier war der serbische Major Mika Jankovie als serbischer Delegiener erseliieiien 
***) Die bei dem Sarajcvocr Altentale gcgen Erxhcrzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten und die im 
Jalirc 101*3 in der Save bei Breko gefundenon, aus dem koni;H serbischen Arsenate in Krugujevac staminen- 
tlcn Bomben kbnncn tatsachlieh mil Seifenstucken veryliehcn werden. 



Aus konfidentiellen Meldungen iiber die ..Narodna odbrana". 

Die Leitung der Narodna odbrana besteht aus Vertretern aller Partei- 
richtuflgen, urn auch die Fortschrittler und die Gegner der Verschworer zu 
gewinnen. Ihr eigentlicher Spiritus rector ist der jetzige Major Pribicevic\ Die 
Sekret'arstelle ist iramer mit e.inem beurlaubten Offizier besetzt. 

Aufgabe der Narodna odbrana ist es, in den sudslawischen Teilen Oster- 
reich-Ungarns eine wirksame Propaganda in Miliuir- und Zivilkreisen zu ent- 
wiokeln, urn so eine Revolution vorzubereiten, cventuelle Mobilisierungen zu 
stbren, Paniken und Revolten bervorzurufen u. s. w. 

Die Organisation besitzt in der Monarcbie mehrere Vertrauensmanner und 
Emissaro, die eine stille Propaganda von Maim zu Mann betreiben. Einzelne 
haben spezielle Missionen, um bei wii htigen Briicken, Knotenpunkten etc. einige 
Leute — wombglicb Eisenbahnbeamte — anzuwerben, welche die Aufgabe 
haben, im geeigncten Momente etwa erhaltene Weisungen durehzufuhren oder 
durchfiihren zu lassen. 

Der Verkehr zwiscben den Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana wird mbglichst 
durch persiinliehe Fiihlungnahme bewerkstelligt. 

Als Mitglieder werden hauptsachlich junge Leute, Arbeiter, Eisenbabner 
geworben. 



Auszug aus den Akten des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo 
Ober die dort anhangige Untersuchung gegen Gavrilo Princip und Genossen wegen 
des am 28. Juni 1914 an Seiner k. und k. Hoheit dem Herrn Erzherzoge Franz 
Ferdinand von Osterreich-Este und Ihrer Hoheit der Frau Herzogin Sophie von 
Hohenberg verubten Verbrechens des Meuchelmordes. 

I. Die Tat und die Tatersckaft. 

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovirf, Trifko Grabez, Vaso CubriloviiS und 
Cetres Popovid sind gestandig, in Gemeinsckaft mit dem fliiektigon Mekemed 
Mekmedbasid ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Herrn Erzkerzogs Franz Ferdinand 
gebildet und mit Bomben, teilweise auck mit Browningpistolen ausgeriistet, 
Hbckstdemselben am 28. Juni 19 1 4 auf Seiner Rundt'akrt durck Sarajevo zwecks 
Veriibung des geplanten Attentates aufgelauert zu kaben. 

Nedeljko Cabrinovid ist gestandig, als erster unter den Ver'sekworern gegen 
den Wagen des Herrn Erzkerzogs eine Bombe gesckleudert zu kaben, die ikr 
Ziel verfeklte und die beim Explodieren lediglick Insassen des dem erzkerzog- 
lieken Automobile folgenden Wagens verletzte. 

Gavrilo Princip ist gestandig, aus einer Browningpistole zwei Sckiisse gegen 
das erzkerzoglicke Automobil abgegeben zu kaben, durck welcke der Herr Erz- 
kerzog Franz Ferdinand und die Fran Herzogin Sopkie von Hokenberg totlick 
verletzt wurden. 

Beide Tater geben die Mordabsickt bei Veriibung der Tat zu. 

Diese Gestiindnisse kaben durck die gepflogenen Erkebungen ikre voile 
Bestatigung gefunden und ist festgestellt, dall weiland Herr Erzkerzog Franz 
Ferdinand und weiland Frau Herzogin Sopkie von Hokenberg an den Folo-en 
der von Gavrilo Princip auf sie abgegebenen Eevolversckiisse gestorben sind. 

H. Entstekung des Komplotts. 

Die Besckuldigten kaben, im wesentlicben iibereinstimmend, vor dem Unter- 
suckungsrickter nackstekende Angaben gemaekt: 

Im April 1914 faDte Princip wakrend seines Aufentkaltes in Belgrad, wo 
■er in dortigen Kaffeekausern mit vielen serbiscken Studenten verkekrte, den Plan 
zur Ausfukrung eines Attentates auf weiland Herrn Erzkerzog Franz Ferdinand. 



58 

Diese Absicht hat er mit dem ihm bekannten, damals gleichfalls in Belgrad 
anwesenden Cabrinovid besproclien, der sich damals schon mit dem gleichen 
Gedanken trug und der zur Teilnahme an dem Attentate sofort bereit war. Uber 
die Veriibung ernes Anscblages auf den Herrn Erzherzog wurde in dem Kreise, in 
dem Princip und Cabrinovid verkehrten, oft gesprochen, da der Herr Erzherzog 
als gefahrlicher Feind des serbisehen Volkes gait. 

Die zur Ausfiihrung der Tat notigen Bomben und Waffen wollten sich 
Prineip und Cabrinovid, da sie selbst die Mittel zu deren Ankauf nicht besaCen, 
zuerst von dem serbisehen Major Milan Pribiccvid oder von der Xarodua odbrana 
besehaffen. Da aber Major Pribidevid und das mafigebende Mitglied des genannten 
Vereines, Zivojin Dacid, zu jener Zeit verreist waren, beschlossen sie zu traehten, 
die Waffen von dem ihnen bekannten ehemaligen Komitatsehi und derzeitigen 
Staatsbahribeamten Milan Ciganovid zn erhalten. 

Nun trat Princip durch Vermittlung i-ines intimen Bekannten des Ciganovid 
mit diesem in Verbindung. Ciganovid suchte hierauf den Princip auf, sprach mit 
ihm uber das geplante Attentat, das er vollkommen billigte und erkl'arte zunachst, 
daft er es sich noch iiberlegen wolle, ob er die Waffen hiezu beistellen solle. 
Auch Cabrinovid sprach mit Ciganovid wegen der Waffen. 

Zu Ostern zog Princip den gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Trifko Grabez 
ins Vertrauen, der sich nach seinem Gestandnisse gleichfalls zur Mitwirkung an 
dem Attentate bereit erklarte. 

In der folgenden Zeit hatte Princip wiederholt Gespracho mil Ciganovid 
iiber die Ausfiihrung des Attentates. 

Inzwischen hatte sich Ciganovid wegen des geplanten Attentates auch mit 
dem ihm eng befreundeten serbisehen Major Voja Tankosic ins Einvernehmen 
gesetzt, der dann fur diese Zwecke die Browningpistolen zur Vcrfugung stellte. 

Grabez gesteht in Ubereinstimrnung mit den Angaben des Princip und 
Cabrinovid zu, am 24. Mai in Begleitung des Ciganovid den Major Tankosid 
iiber dessen Wunseh in seiner Wohnung besucht zu haben. Nach der Vorstellung 
babe Tankosid dem Grabez gesagt: „Bist Du dieser, bist Uu entschlossen?" 
worauf Grabez erwiderte: „Ich bin es". Als Tankosic dann fragte: „Versteht 
Ihr aus dem Revolver zu schieflen?" und Grabez hierauf verneinend antwortete, 
sagte Tankosic zu Ciganovic: „Ich werde Dir einen Revolver geben ; gehe und 
unterrichte sie im Schieflen". 

Hierauf fiihrte Ciganovic den Princip und den Grabez zur Militarschiefl- 
st'atte in Topeider und erteilte ihnen in einem bei der Sehieflstatte liegendera 
Walde Unterricht im Schieflen mit Browningpistolen auf Ziele. Hiebei erwies 
sich Princip als der bessere Schiitze. Ciganovid hat den Princip, Grabez und 
Cabrinovid auch mit dem Gebrauche der ihnen spiiter iibergebenen Bomben 
vertraut gemacht. 



Am 27. Mai 1914 ubergab Ciganovic dem Princip, Cabrinovie" und Grabez 
nach deren ubereinstimmenden Gestandnissen 6 Bomben, 4 Browningrevolver 
und geniigende Mengen Munition, sowie eine Glastubc mit Zyankali, damit sie 
sich zwecks Wahrung des Geheimnisses nach veriibter Tat vergiften. Uberdies 
gab iknen Ciganovic! Geld. 

Schon zu Ostern hatte Prinoip den Danilo Ilii ! . von seinem Attentatsplano 
unterriehtet. Bei der Kiickkehr nach Sarajevo ersuchte er nun diesen, einige 
weitere Personen zu werben, die sich an dem Attentate beteiligen, damit es 
sicher gelinge. Hierauf hat Hid nach seinem Gestiindnisse den Jaso Cubrilovic, 
Cetro Popovic" und Mehemed Mehmedbasic" hiezu geworben. 

III. Herkunft der Bomben. 

Bei Yeriibung des Attentates war nur eine der Bomben zur Verwendung 
gelangt. Die iibrigcn fiinf Bomben wurden sp'ater von der Polizei in Sarajevo 
zustande gebracht. 

Diese Bomben sind nach dem Gutachten der gerichtlichen Sachverstiindigen 
serbische Handgranaten, die fabriksm'aliig erzeugt wurden und fur miht'arische 
Zwecke bestimmt waren. Sie sind identisch mit den 21 Bomben, die im Jahre 
1913 in der Save bei Brcko gefunden wurden und die sich zum Teile noch in 
der Originalpackung befanden, aus der sich mit Sicherheit ergab, daQ sie aus 
dem serbischen Waffenlager in Kragujevac stammten. 

Damit ist festgestellt, dafi auch die bei dem Attentate gegen den Herrn 
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten Granaten aus den Vorraten des 
Kragujevacer Armeedepots stammen. 

Grabez nennt die ihm und seinen Komplizen iibergcbenen Granaten ganz 
spontan „Kragujevacer Bomben" 



rV. Transport der drei Attentater und der Waffen von Serbien 
nach Bosnien. 

Prinzip gibt hieruber folgendes an : 

Ciganovic" sagte dem Cabrinovie", Grabez und Princip, sie sollten ihren Weg 
iiber Sabac und Loznica nach Tuzla nehmen und sich dort an Misko Jovanovitf 
wenden, der die Waffen ubernehmen werde. Zun'achst sollten sie nach Sabac 
gehen und sich dort beim Grenzhauptmanne Major Rade Popovic melden, fur 
den er ihnen einen Zettel mitgab, den Princip iibernahm. Am 28. Mai verliellen 
die drei Komplizen mit den Waffen Belgrad. In Sabac ubergab Prinzip den 
Zettel, den er von Ciganovic erhalten hatte dem Major Popovic", der hierauf alle 
drei auf das Kommando fuhrte und ihnen einen Passierschein ausstellte, in 
welchem best'atigt wurde, dafi einer von ihnen Finanzwachmann und die beiden 



60 

anderen dessen Kameraden seien. Der Passierschein enthielt auch den Namen 
dieses angeblichen Finanzwachmaniies, doch habe er den Namen vergessen. 
Gleichzeitig iibergab ihnen Major Popovid ein geschlossenes Sckreiben fiir den 
Grenzhauptmann in Loznica, der Pravanovid, Prdanovid oder Predojevid hieO. 

Princip, Cabrinovid und Grabez iibernachteten in Sabac und reisten am 
n'achsten Morgen mit der Bahn naeh Loznica, und zwar auf Grand des ihnen 
vom Major Popovid ausgefertigten Passierscheines mit halber Fahrkarte. Mittags 
kamen sie in Loznica an und iibergaben dem dortigen Grenzhauptmanne den 
Brief des Majors Popovid, in dcm es hiefi: ,,Schau, dafj Du diese Leute empfangst 
und sie durchfuhrst, wo Du weiflt." Der Grenzhauptmann sagte, cr werde seine 
Finanzwachleute von der Grenze rufen und die drei dem sichersten Manne an- 
vertrauen. Darauf telephouierte er und bestellte die drei Komplizen fiir den 
n'achsten Morgen, 7 Uhr, in seine Kanzlei. 

Am anderen Morgen vereinbarten die drei Verschworer, dafj Cabrinovid mit 
dem Passe des Grabez offen den Weg nach Zvornik nehine, Princip und Grabez 
aber die Grenze heimlich uberschreiten. Dieser Plan wurde mit dem Grenz- 
hauptmanne besprochen und hiebei beschlossen, dafj ein Finanzwachmann aus 
Ljesnica, namens Grbid, den Princip und Grabez in seine Karaula mitnehmen 
und iiber die Grenze bringen solle. C!abrinovid ging dann zu FufJ nach Banja 
Koviljada in der Richtung gegen Zvornik. Princip und Grabez fuhren mit dem 
Finanzwachmanne Grbid nach Ljesnica, wo sie die Bornben und den Revolver in 
einem Hotelzimmer ablegten. Hiebei sah der Finanzwachmann Grbid diese 
Objekte. Princip selbst bezeichnete diese Reise als mystis'ch. 

Grabez sagte im wesentlichen konform mit Princip aus und fiigte erg'anzend 
bei, Grbid habe gelacht, als er die Bombe und die Revolver sah und lediglich 
gefragt, wohin in Bosnien sie mit diesen Bomben gingen. Der Finanzwachmann 
habe sich jedenfalls gedacht, dali Grabez und Princip eine Mission h'atten. 

Grbid und ein zweiter Finanzwachmann haben den Princip und Grabez auf 
einem Kahne zu einer Insel in der Drina gebracht. Dort wies sie Grbid an, auf 
einen Bauer zu warten, der sie abholen werde. Sie iibernachteten auf der Insel 
in einem Bauernh'auschen, wohin Grbid sie gewiesen hatte. Am n'achsten Tage 
kam ein Bauer, der sie wahrend der Nacht zuerst durch einen Sumpf und dann 
iiber das Gebirge bis in die Nahe von Priboj brachte, wo er sie wieder dem 
dortigen Lehrer Cubrilovid, der bereits auf sie gewartet zu- haben schien, zur 
Weiterbefb'rderung iibergab. 

Dieser brachte sie dann weiter nach Tuzla zu Misko Jovanovid. 

Cabrinovid sagte iiber die Vorgange der Reise bis zu dem Momente, in 
dem er sich von Princip und Grabez trennte, im wesentlichen iibereinstimmend 
mit diesen aus und fiigte nur erg'anzend bei, dafj Major Popovid ihnen erzahlt 
habe, er sei erst am Tage vor ihrer Ankunft in Sabac aus Belgrad gekommen. 



In Loznica beschlossen Cabrinovic, Princip und Grabez sich zu treDnen, 
da es zu geiahrlich ware, wenn sie zu dritt gingen. Der Grenzhauptmann in 
Loznica, dem sie hievon Mitteilung machten, lobte ihren Plan und gab dem 
Cabrinovic' einen Brief fur den Lehrer M. Jaklojevic* in Mali-Zvornik mit. 
Cabrinovic' ubergab hierauf die von ihm getragenen Bomben, Browning und 
Munition dem Princip und Grabez und ging in Begleitung eines ihm beigege- 
benen Finanzwachmannes nacb Mali-Zvornik. 

Dort fand er den Lehrer Jaklojevic, dem er den Brief des Grenzhaupt- 
mannes von Loznica ubergab. Dieser avisierte hierauf den serbischen Grenzposten. 
Als Cabrinovic 1 spater mit dem Lehrer zu diesem Grenzposten kam, wartete 
dort bereits ein Mann auf sie, der sie mit einem Kahne iiber die Drina nacb. 
GroQ-Zvornik in Bosnien brachte. 

Von dort begab sich dann Cabrinovic' nach Tuzla zu Misko Jovanovic\ 

Nachtrag. 

Knapp vor Abschluft dieses Memoires wird vom Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo 
ein Zeugenprotokoll vorgelegt, aus dem sich ergibt, dafl ein Angehoriger der 
Monarchic einige Tage vor dem 28. Juni d. J. dem k. Und k. Konsulate in 
Belgrad die Meldung crstatten wollte, dalS er vermute, es bestehe der Plan auf Erz- 
herzog Franz Ferdinand w'ahrend seiner Anwesenheit in Bosnien ein Attentat zu 
veriiben. Dieser Mann soil nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, die ihn unmittelbar 
vor dem Betreten des k. und k. Konsulates aus nichtigen Grtinden verhafteten, 
an der Erstattung dieser Meldung verhindert worden sein. Aus den in dem frag- 
lichen Zeugenprotokolle enthaltenen Angaben wiirde folgen, daO die betreffenden 
Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentate Kenntnis gehabt und diesen Mann 
nur verhaftet hatten, um ihn an der Erstattung der Anzeige zu hindern. 

Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgepriift sind, kann iiber deren Stichhaltig- 
keit im gegenwartigen Zeitpunkte noch kein Urteil abgegeben werden. Mit Kiick- 
sicht auf die hieiiiber schwebenden Erhebungen entziehen sich die naheren. 
Details der Zeugenaussage derzeit einer genaueren Wiedergabe. 



Die serbische Presse Uber das Attentat. 

a) Das Belgrader Blatt „Balkan u schreibt am 29. Juni iiber die beiden Atten- 
t'ater: 

Nedeljko Cabrinovid, von Beruf Typography war von anarehistischen 
Ideen erfullt und als unruhiger Geist bekannt. Er weilte bis vor 20 Tagen 
in Belgrad, wohin er nach dem Kriege kam und in der Staatsdruckerei 
besch'aftigt war. Vor seiner Abreise erkliirte er, daC er sicb nacli Triest 
begebe, wo er in einer neuen Druekerei Arbeit bekommen werde. Gavrilo 
Prineip weilte gleiebfalls bis vor kurzem in Belgrad. Wahrend des Krieges 
bat er sicb als Freiwilliger gemeldet, wurde jedoch nicht angenommen. wes- 
balb er Belgrad veiliefi. Er kehrte aber zu Weihnacbten des vorigen Jahres 
wieder nacb Belgrad zuriick, besucbte eine Zeitlang das Gymnasium und 
verliefi Belgrad fast zu gleioher Zeit wie Cabrinovid, jedoeb auf einem 
anderen Wege als dieser. Prineip war sebweigsam, nervb's, lernte gut, ver- 
kehrte mit einigen gleiebfalls aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina stammen- 
den Mittelschiilern und in der letzten Zeit aueh mit Cabrinovid. Er neigte 
sozialistisohen Ideen zu, obwohl er urspriinglich der fortsehrittlichen Jugend 
angehb'rt hat. Prineip ist ebenso wie Cabrinovid in Sarajevo aufgewachsen; 
beide verband seit ihrer Kindbeit eine unzertrennliehe Freundscbaft. 

b) Der „Piemont" vom 1. Juli verweist darauf, dali nacb dem lauten Proteste 
des Attentates Zerajic der Protest Princips gefolgt sei. Das Werk des letz- 
teren finde gleiebfalls seine Aufklarung im bosniscben Begierungssystem. 
Der Dmstand, dali Prineip den Puichoakt am heiligen Nationaltag Vidovdan 
veriibte, welcber fiir die Vomabme der Manb'ver gewahlt worden war, lnsse 
die Yerzweiflungstat des jungen Martyrers veislandlicber .und natiirlicber 
ersoheinen. 

(Das Blatt wurde wegen dieses Artikels von der Polizei konfisziert, 
die Konfiskation jedoch tags darauf von der ersten Instanz des Belgrader 
Gerichtes annulliert.) 
\c) Der jungradikale _Odjek" vom 3. Juli sagt: man habe den Herrn Erzherzog 
Franz Ferdinand am Tage des nationalen Entbusiasmus naeh Sarajevo gesendet, 
um eine brutale Manifestation dor Gewalt und L'nterwerfung zu feiern. 



63 

Dieser brutalo Akt muflte brutalc Gefiihle des Widerstandes, des Hasses 
und der Rache herausfordern. 
\d) Das nationalistische Partoiorgan „Srpska Zastava" vom 3. Juli sagt in einem 
Artilcel, betitelt r Verdaehtigungen und Drohungen: „Das Attentat stellt sich 
immer mehr als ein Erzeugnis der ungesunden Verhaltnisse in der Monarchic 
dar. Andererseits ruft die wilde Verfolgung des serbischen Volkes in Bosnien 
und der Herzegowina den Abscheu der ganzen zivilisierten Welt hervor." 

e) Das fortschrittliehe Blatt ,Pravda" vom 3. Juli schreibt: „Die Wiener Politik 
ist zynisch. Sie beutet den Tod des ungliicklichen Paares fiir ihre abscheu- 
lichen Ziele gegen das serbische Volk aus." 

f) Die „Agence des Balkans" vom 3. Juli meldet: „Die in Bosnien und der 
Herzegowina gegen die Serben verubten Verbiechen sind unter den Auspizien 
und auf direkte Anstiftung der bsterreichisch-ungarischen Zivil- und Militar- 
behbrden begangen worden." 

jg) Die „Pravda° vom 4. Juli sagt: r AUe bisher in Osterreieh begangenen 
Morde und Attentate haben stets eine und dieselbe Quelle gehabt. Die 
unterdriickten Volker der Monarehie muflten zu dieser Art des Protestes greifen, 
weil ihnen kein andercr Weg mbglieh war. In einem Chaos der Schreekens- 
herrschaft ist es natiirlich und vollkommen begreiflich, dafl sich die Ara 
der Attentate eingebiirgert hat. 

h) Der „ Balkan" vom 5. Juli bemerkt, dafl Osterreich-Ungarn „wegen Ver- 
folgung Unschuldiger unter internationale Kontrolle gestellt werden muflte"; 
denn Osterreich-Ungarn sei weniger konsolidiert als die Tiirkei. 
i) Das „Mali Journal" vom 7. Juli schreibt: „Ein SprolMing des Mittelalters 
wurde dieser Tage in Sarajevo ermordet. Ermoidet hat ihn ein Knabe, der 
das Leid um sein geknochtetes engeres Vaterland bis zum Paroxismus 
fuhlte, das Leid, das ihm die Rauber der Lander seiner Viiter angetan 
haben. Was hat daraufhin das offizielle Osterreich-Ungarn getan? Es hat 
mit allgemeinen Massakiierungen, 1'liinderungen und Zerstorungen des ser- 
bischen Lebens und Eigentums geantwortet. Dutch solches Heldentum 
zeichnen sich nur die Nichtsnutzigen aus. Die Feigen sind immer grofle 
Hidden, wenn sie sicher sind, dali ihnen nichts geschehen wild. Man ver- 
gleiche nur Princip und Cabrinovie mit diesen Helden und man wird 
gleich den groften Unterschied merken. Zivilisation und Gerechtigkcit sind 
in Osterreich-Ungarn eine grofle Liige." 

j) Die „Tribuna" vom 7. Juli sagt: „Wir sind der Ansicht, dafl die Mordtat 
von .Sarajevo bestellt wurde, um die Ausrottung der Serben mit einem 
Schlag durchzufiihren." 

{ k) Der n Piemont" vom 8. Juli meldet aus Bajina Baschka, dafl die bsterrei- 
chischen Behorden in Bosnien ein Christenmassaker vorbereiten. 



64 

I) Der „Balkan" vom 8. verbffentlieht einen Bericht aus Bosnien unter dem 
Xitel „Bartholom'ausnaeht in Sarajevo" und tritt fiir einen allgemeineu 
Boykott gegen alle in Serbien lebenden Osterveicher ein. 

m) Das „Mali Journal" vom 8. fordert zum Boykott gegen die Donau-Dampf- 
schiflahrts-Gesellschaft auf. 

n) Unter dem Titel „Nichts aus Osterreich-Ungarn!" schreibt die n Tribuna" 
vom 8., es sei am besten, aus Osterreich-Ungarn niehts zu beziehen, aucb. 
die bsterreiehischen und ungarischen Bader nielit zu besuchen und keine 
Arzte aus Osterreich-Ungarn zu berufen. Die Privatinitiative kb'nne in der 
angedeuteten Richtung viel ausrichten. Der Staat und die Behtirden haben sich 
darein nicht einzumischeu. Es sei genugend, an die Burger zu appellieren. 
o) Die „Stampa" vom 8. bebauptet, dafl die Sarajevoer Polizei die verhafteten 
Attentater der unmensclilichsten und scbamlosesten Tortur aussetze, um von 
ihnen unwahre Gest'andnisse zu erpressen, auf Grund welcher dann Anklagen 
gegen das serbisehe Volk erboben werden sollen. 

p) Die „Agence des Balkans" vom 9. meldet aus Belgrad: „ Absolut siohere 
Privatmeldungen kiindigen an, dafJ in Bosnien und der Herzegowina ein 
allgemeines Massaker der Serben unmittelbar bevorstehe." 

<yj Anknupfend an die Auflerung des Premierministers Asquitb bei der Mit- 
teilung der Nachricht vom Tode des Herrn Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand, dafl 
er fiir das Scbieksal der Mensehbeit bosorgt sei, veroffentlicht der .Balkan" 
am 9. Juli einen historiscben Uberblick fiber die Ereignisse der letzten 
40 Jabre, aus dem er ableitet, dafl das serbisehe Volk in diesem Zeitraume 
den furchtbaren Qualen der jesuitischcn Politik Osterreieh-Ungarns ausgesetzt 
war. Schli' IMich muflte Herr Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, wie alle Sohne 
Loyolas, welche nur im Blutc der Menschen arbeiten und dem Prinzipe, 
„der Zweck beiligt die Mittel", buldigen, vom Scbieksal ereilt und ein 
Opfer des Jcsuitismus werden, wie es auch das ganze Osterreich-Ungarn 
werden wird. Durcb den Untergang Osterreieh-Ungarns aber soil der Menseh- 
beit Ruhe und Frieden gegeben werden. Wenn man alle diese Wahrheiten 
resumiert, dann kommt man zum Sehlusse, dafl Asquitb. ivihigen Gemiits 
die Todesnaehricbt h'atte mit den Worten beglciten konnen: ,Ich bin fiir 
das Scbieksal der Mensehbeit nicht mehr besorgt". 

r) Die „Politika" vom 9. Juli fiihrt im Leitartikel unter der Ubersehrift 
„Unverschamte Liigen" aus: „Die Art und Weise, wie die Untersuchung 
iiber das Sarajevoer Attentat gefiihrt wird, liiflt often erkennen, welche 
Ziele Osterreieh dabei verfolgt. Da die Attentater ungeachtet aller Torturen, 
denen sie ausgesetzt sind, nicht das sagen wollen, was man von ihnen 
verlangt, wurden andere Individuen ausfindig gemacht, die sich bereit 
erkliirten, unter gewissen Bedingungen eine gewisse Mitschuld an dem 



65 

Attentate einzngestehen, zugleich aber alle jene zu beschuldigen, die 
Osterreich unangenehm sind. Diese Methode ist vorlaufig gelungen, denn 
die gedungenen Individuen erziihlen alles, was man von ihnen will und 
die osterreichische Polizei sorgt daftir, dafl diese Liigen sofort nach alien 
Windrichtungen verbreitet werden. Osterreich hat ja kein Schamgefuhl 
und es glaubt, daG sich jemand finden werde, der solchen Liigen Glauben 
schenkt. " 

s) Die „Starnpa" vom 9. sagt, es sei noch nieht alles, was sich in Bosnien 
und der Herzegowina ereignet hat, aufgedeckt und in die Offentlichkeit 
gedrungen! Das werde strengstens verheimlicht. Die Wahrheit werde aber 
dennoch friiher oder spater an die Oberflache komnien. Das blutdiirstige 
Osterreich will sich eben an serbischem Blute satt trinken und tut es auch. 
Es verlautet, dafi es heute ungef'ahr 10.000 Verwundete und Tote in 
Bosnien gebe. 

t) Die „Politika u vom 10. Juli richtet maQlose Beleidigungen gegen Mitglieder 
des Allerhbchsten Kaiserhauses. 

u) Das Handelsblatt „Trgovinski Glasnik" vom 10. Juli spricht von der Ver- 
derbtheit und Skrupellosigkeit der osterreiehiseh-ungarischen Politik, die 
es jesuitisch, riicksichtslos und unehrenhaft nennt. Sie sei dem serbischen 
Volke in Osteneich-Ungarn eine Mahnung, dafi es nicht in einem Kultur- 
staate lebe, welcher Leben und Eigentum garantiere, sondern dali es stets 
bereit und bewaffnet sein niiisse, sich vor der Rauberei der Behbrden 
und der Regierung zu verteidigen. Nach den letzten Ereignissen diirfe 
das serbische Volk nicht mehr wie ein Lamm warten, welches jeden Tag 
abgeschlachtet werden kdnnte, sondern wie ein Lowe, der bereit ist zur 
blutigen Abwehr. 

v) In der ,Stanipa" vom 10. Juli heiQt es: Nichts sei ewig und auch 
Osterreich-Ungarn werde nicht ewig in Bosnien und der Herzegowina 
bleiben. Die Zeit sei nicht fern, wo die Serben, welche die Macht der 
Tiirken brachen und die Bulgaren straften, um die Ivan Planina am 
Trebevic ki - eisen werden. 
w) Die n Pravda" vom 10. Juli fordert unter dem Titel „Boykott gegen die 
Nichtsnutzigen" zum Boykott der osterreichischen Firmen in Belgrad sowie 
der osterreichischen Waien aut' und sagt, es sei Pflicht der „Narodna 
odbrana", die strengste Durchfuhrung des Boykotts zu uberwachen. 

x) Der „Zvono" vom 16. Juli erkl'art Princip als Sohn der Gr'afin Lonyay, 
dem die Aufgabe zuteil wurde, den Tod des Kronprinzen Rudolf an 
dessen Morder, Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, zu rachen. 

y) Das „Mali Journal" vom 19. Juli verbffentlicht einen Bericht, worin es heiflt: 
Prmcip sei von einem osterreichisch-ungaiischeri Agcnten zum Attentat 



66 

angestiftet worden. In Wien sage man, der wahre Schuldige sei nur in, 
der osterreichisch-ungarisehen Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu tinden. 
z) Das fiihrende jungradikale Blatt „Odjek" vom 20. Juli schreibt: ..Osterreich- 
Ungarn gibt durch hundert Beweise kund, daD es den Titel des kranken 
Mannes in Europa erwerben will. Wahrend in Serbien nicht ein einziger 
b'sterreicbiscber Biirger beliistigt worden ist, wQrden in Bosnien und der 
Herzegowina Dorfer und Stadte gepliindert. Diese Tatsacbe ist ein neuer 
Beweis dafiir, urn wie viel Serbien kulturell und moraliscb bbber steht 
als Osterreicb-Ungarn." 



Oer OrtsausschuB der Narodna odbrana in Nisch iiber das Attentat gegen den He; rn 
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. 

Dem k. und k. Ministerium des Aufiern ist von einem verlaHlichen 
Konfidenten, dessen Name gegebenenfalls bekanntgegeben wird, eine vertrauliche ■ 
Mitteiking zugekommen, wonacb der Ortsausschufi der Narodna odbrana in 
Nisch ktirzlich eine Sitzung abliielt, in welcher der Vorsitzende dieses Aus- 
scbusses, dei- Direktor der Nischer Strafanstalt Jasa Nenadovid, auf das gegen 
den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand veriibte Attentat zu sprechen kam 
nnd hiebei folgendes ausfiihrte. 

Serbien mufite sieh diesraal unbedingt eines Mittels wie das Attentat gegen den 
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand bedienen, weil eben dieser wegen seines aggresiven 
nnd exzentrischen Charakters eine eminente und fatale Gefahr fur Serbien und 
mbglicherweise auch fur weitere slawische Kreise bedeutete. Er hatte, ware er 
am Leben geblieben, in Kiirze Serbien zum Kriege herausgefordert oder es 
angegrifi'en, in welchem Falle Serbien, das ja jetzt materiell so geschwacht und 
mit seiner Armeereorganisation noch nicht fertig ist, unbedingt verloren gewesen 
ware. Nun aber ist durch den Sarajevoer Mord Serbien gerettet und damit 
einer jener aus dem Wege geraumt, die Serbien gefahrlieh sind. Serbien wird 
jetzt einige Jakre lang Ruhe haben, da der neue Thronfolger es sieh ~wohl 
uberlegen wird, in den Spuren seines Vorgangers zu wandeln. 

Wenn er auch wufite, so fiihrte der Redner weiter aus, dafi die Ermordung 
des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand fiir Osterreich-Ungarn ein schwerer Schlag und 
grofler Schmerz sein wird und dali darauf Torturen fiir miser dort lebendes Volk 
folgen werden, so hatte er doch nicht gedacht, dafi seine Voraussetzungen in 
solchem Mafie eintreffen und daG die Kroaten sieh derart benehmen werden. 
Hatten ihm doch seine Freunde in Bosnien und der Herzegowina auch ver- 
sichert, dafi die bsterreichisch-ungarischen Behorden feige sind und in ihrem 
Auftreten nicht iibertreiben diirfen; leider aber hatten sieh diese Freunde und 
durch sie auch wir getauscht. Wenn es so weiter andauert, so miissen Revolver 
und Bomben erst recht ihre wahre Rolle spielen. Was immer auch der 
serbische Gott gibt, auf diese Art darf man , es nicht weiter gehen lassen. 

Die Ausfiihrungen des Redners fanden bei seinen Zuhorern vollste 
Zustimmung. 



Nachtrage nach SchluB des Druckes. 

1. Zu Beilage 8. 

Der Lehrer Cubrilovic', welcher bei Priboj die Fiihrung des Princip und 
Grabez iibemahm, hat ein voiles Gestiindnis abgelegt, aus dem sich folgende 
wichtige Daten ergeben. 

Im Jahre 1911 wurde Cubrilovic' aus Anlafi eines Sokolausfluges nacb 
Sabac durch Bozo FoviC, einem Voi'standsmitgliede der Narodna odbrana, in 
die Ziele dieses Vereines eingeweiht und dann zuni Kommissar der Narodna 
odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnien) bestellt. Uber seine Einladung wurde spater 
Misko Jovanovid zum Kommissar der Narodna odbrana fiir Tuzla ernannt. 

Als Mittelsniann beirn Verkehre mit der Narodna odbrana fungierte ein 
Bauer, eben derselbe Bauer, der den Princip und Grabez mit der Mitteilung 
zu. Cubrilovic' brachte, er fulire zwei serbische Studenten mit Waffen zu ihm. 
Als er dies erfuhr, babe er gewuOt, daft dies eine ,Botschaft u der Narodna 
odbrana s.-i. Princip und Grabez haben ihm gesagt, daft sie Bomben und Revolver 
bei sich haben, um ein Attentat gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand 
auszufiihren. 

2. Monarchiefeindliche Bilder im Belgrader Kriegsministerium. 

Vor. dem Empfangssaale des koniglich serbischen Kriegsministeriums be-' 
finden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen 
von serbischen Kriegserfolgen sind, w'ahrend das vierte die Verwirklichung der 
monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. 

Uber einer Landschaft, teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Sudungarn) 
geht die „zora", die Morgenrbte der serbischen Hoffnungen auf. Im Vorder- 
grunde stent eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schild die Namen aller 
„noch zu befreienden Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Vojvodina, Syrniien, 
Dalmatien etc. stehen. 



69 



20. 
Graf Berchtold an Sektionschef Freiherrn von Macchio in Wien. 

Telegramm. Lambach, 25. Juli 1914. 

Russischer Gesch'aftstrager telegraphiert mir, er sei von seiner Regierung 
dringend beauftragt, eine Fristerstreckung fur das Ultimatum an Serbien zu 
verlangen. Ieh ersuehe Euer Exzellenz, ihm in meinem Narnen zu antworten, 
dafi wir eine Verlangerung der Frist nicht zugeben konnen. Euer Exzellenz 
wollen binzufiigen, dafi Serbien auch naeh dem Abbrucbe der diplomatischen 
Beziehungen durch uneingeschrankte Annahme unserer Forderungen eine fried- 
liche Losung herbeifiihren kann, doch wiirden wir in diesem Falle genptigt 
jsein, den Riickersatz aller unserer durch milit'arische Mafinahmen verursachten 
[Kosten und Schiiden von Serbien zu verlangen. 



21. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Bad Ischl, 25. Juli 1914. 

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information and Regelung Ihrer Sprache: 

Der russische Gesch'aftstrager hat heute vormittag beim Herrn Ersten 
Sektionschef vorgesprochen, um im Namen seiner Regierung den Wunsch aus- 
zndrticken, dafl die in miserer Note an Serbien angegebene Frist verlangert 
werden mcige. 

Dieses Brsuchen wurde damit begriindet, dafi die Machte von unserem 
Schritt iiberrascht worden seien und dali die russische Regierung es als eine 
naturliche Riicksicht des AViener Kabinettes gegen die anderen Kabinette 
betrachten wiirde, wenn den letzteren Gelegenheit gegeben wurde, die Grund- 
lagen unserer Mitteilung an die Machte zu priifen und das von uns in Aussicht 
gestellte Dossier zu studieren. 

Der Herr Erste Sektionschef antwortete dem Herrn Gesch'aftstrager, dali er seine 
Ausfiihrungen sofort zu meiner Kenntnis bringen werde; er kunne ihm aber 
schon jetzt sagen, dafi keine Aussicht bestehe, dall eine Verlangerung der 
angegebenen Frist von unserer Seite gewahrt wiirde. Was die Griinde 
anbelange, die die russische Regierung zur Erhartung des von ihr vorgebrachten 
Wunsches angefuhrt habe, so schienen dieselben auf einer irrtiimlichea 



70 

Voraussetzung zu beruhen. Unsere Note an die Machte hatte keineswegs 
den Zweck verfolgt, dieselben einzuladen, ihre gegenstandliche Auffassung 
bekannt zu geben, sondern nur den Charakfer einer Information gehabt, die 
wir als eine Pflioht internationaler Hoflichkeit angesehen h'atten. Im ubrigen 
betrachteten wir unsere Aktion als eine nur uns und Serbien beriibrende Ange- 
legenheit, zu der wir trotz unserer seit Jabren bekundeten Geduld und Lang- 
mut dureh die Entwicklung der Verkaltnisse zur Verteidigung unserer vitalsten 
llnteressen sehr gegen unseren Wunsch gezwungen worden sind. 



22. 
Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold. 

iTelegramra. Belgrad, 95. Juli 1914. 

Ministerrat gestern abends und heute friib zusaramengetreten, nach raehr- 
faeben Versionen soil mir Antwort auf unsere Note noeh vor Ablauf der Frist 
ubergeben werden. Wie ich bore, wird Hofzug zusammengestellt; Geld der 
Nationalbank und der Eisenbabn sowie die Akten des Ministeriums des AuOern 
werden in das Innere des Landes gebracht. Einige meiner Kollegen sind der 
Auffassung, dali sie der Regierung folgen miissen, speziell auf der russisehen 
Gesandtschaft wird gepaekt. 

Garnison bat in Feldausrustung Stadt verlassen. Munitionsdepots der Festung 
wurden evakuiert. Am Bahnhof starker milit'ariseher Verkebr. Die Sanitats- 
kolormen baben Belgrad in der Richtung naeh Suden verlassen. In Befolgung 
der mir inzwischen zugekommenen Weisungen werden wir im Falle Abbrucbes 
mit dem Zuge 6 Uhr 30 von Beljjrad abreisen. 



23. 
Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold. 

Semlin, 25. Juli 1914. 

Um 3 Uhr nacbmittags wui'de in Serbien die allgemeine Mobilisierung 
angeordnet. 



24. 
Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Semlin, 25. Juli 1914.' 

Ich habe infolge ungeniigender Antwort der koniglich serbischen Regierung 

auf unsere am 23. 1. M. gestellten Forderungen die diplomatischen Beziehungen 

mit Serbiea fiir abgebrochen erkl'art und mit Personal der Gesandtschaft Belgrad 

verlassen. 

Die Antwortnote wurde mir 2 Minuten vor 6 Uhr abends ubergeben. 



25. 
Note der koniglich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914. 

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a recu la communication du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuad6 que sa reponse eloignera 
tout malentendu qui menace de gater les bons rapports de voisinage entre la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie. 

Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu 
tant a la tribune de la Skoupchtina Nationale que dans les declarations et les 1 
actes des representants responsables de 1'Etat, protestations qui furent coupees 
court par la declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18 mars 1909, ne se 
sont plus renouvelees vis-a-vis la grande Monarchie voisine, en aucune occasion, 
et que depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui. se 
sont succedes, que de la part de leurs organes aucune tentative n'a ete faite 
dans le but de changer l'etat de chose politique et juridique cr6e en Bosnie- 
Hercegovine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune representation sauf en ce qui 
concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement I. et R. a 
recu une explication entierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois 
donne des preuves de sa politique pacifiste et moderee pendant la duree de la 
crise balcanique et c'est grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans 
l'interet exclusif de la paix europeenne que cette paix a 6te preservee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas etre rendu responsable pour des 
manifestations d'un caractere privd telle que les articles des journaux et le 
travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous 
les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui dchappent en regie generale au 
controle officiel. D'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution 
de toute une serie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et 



72 

l'Autriche-Hongrie a montre une. grande prevenance et a reussi de cette faeon 
a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les 
affirmations d'apres lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient 
partioipe a la preparation de l'attentat commis a Sara'ievo. II s'attendait a ce 
qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce 
crime et il etait pret, pour prouver par des actes son ontiere correction, a agir 
contre toutes les personnes a l'egard desquelles des communications lui seraient f'aites. 

Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement I. et R., le Gouvernement 
Royal est dispose a remettre au tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa 
situation et a son rang pour la complicite duqu'el dans le crime de Sarajevo 
des preuves lui seraient fournies et specialement il s'engage a faire jmblier a la 
premiere page du Journal Official en date du 13/20 juillet l'enoneiation suivante: 

„Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait 
dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie c'est a dire l'ensemble des tendances qui 
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des terri- 
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore siucerement les consequences funestes 
de ces agissement criminels." 

„Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officieis et fonctionnaires 
serbes aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement I. et R., a la 
propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage 
auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s' etait solennellement engage par sa decla- 
ration du 31 mars 1909." 

„Le Gouvernement, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative 
d'une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-. 
Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, 
les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavant il procedera 
avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de 
pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a ' prevenir et a 
reprimer." 

Cette enonciation sera portee ii la connaissance de l'Armee Royale par un 
ordre du jour*au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi, par son Altesse Royale le Prince 
Heritier Alexandre et sera publico dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'Armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre: 

1° d'introduire a sa premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina, une 
disposition dans la loi de la Presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniero la 
plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie austro- 
hongroise ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance generale serait 
dirigee contre l'integrite territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge lors de 
la revision de la Constitution qui est prochaine, a faire introduirc dans 
l'article XXII de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les public 



73 

cations ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui actaellement aux termes 
categoriques de l'article XII de la Constitution est impossible. 

2° Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve — et la note du Gouver- 
nement I. et R. ne lui en fournit non plus aucune — que la socieHe' „Narodna 
Odbrana" et autres soei^te's similaires aieDt commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque 
acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membr'es. Neanmoins le 
Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement I. et R. et dissoudra 
la soci£t4 „Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre soci^te qui agirait contre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

3° Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage a ^liminer sans deiai de 
l'instruetion publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fermenter 
la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement I. et R. lui 
fournira des faits et des preuves, de cette propagande. 

4° Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme a eloigner du service mili- 
taire et de l'administration les officiers et fonctionnaires pour lesquels l'enquete 
judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables. d'actes dirig^s contre l'intt'grite du 
territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et il attend que le Gouvernement 
I. et R. lui communique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et 
fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre. 

5° Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement 
compte du sens et de la ported de la demande du Gouvernement I. et R. que 
la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du 
Gouvernement I. et R., mais il declare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui 
repondrait aux principes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle^ 
ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage. 

G" Le Gouvernement Royal — cela va de soi — considere de son devoir 
d'ouvrir line enquete contre qui sont ou qui eventuellement auraient 6t6 meles 
au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du Royaume. 
Quant a la participation de cette enquete des organes des autorit^s austro- 
hongroises, qui seraient deiegu^s a cet effet par le Gouvernement I. et R. la 
Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la 
Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cepeudant dans des cas 
concrets des communications sur les re'sultats de l'instruetion en question 
pourraient etre donn^es aux organes austro-hongrois. 

7° Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proc^der des le soir meme de la remise 
de la note a Farrestation du Comandant Voislav Tankositch. 

Quant a Milan Ziganovitch qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise 
et qui jusqu'au 1 5 juin etait employ^ (comme aspirant) a la direction des 
chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre decouvert et un mandat d'amener a 6t6 
lanc£ contre lui. Le Gouvernement L et R. est pri6 de vouloir bien dans la forme 



aceoutumee faire connaitre le plus tot possible les preemptions de culpability ainsi 
que les preuves eventuelles de leur culpability qui ont etc$ recueillies jusqu'a ce jour 
par l'instruction a Saraievb aux fins d'enquete ulterieure. 

8° Le .Gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendra les mesures prises pour 
empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. 

II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquete et punira s^verement 
les fonctionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne SabaO — Lozniea, qui ont manque 
leurs devoirs et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Saraievo. 

9° Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos 
que ses fonctionnaires tant en Serbie qua l'&ranger ont tenus apres l'attentat dans 
des interviews et qui, d'apres Faftirmation du Gouvernement I. et R., ont 6l& 
hostiles envers la Monarchic des que le Gouvernement I.'et R. lui aura indiqud 
les passages en question de ces propos et des qu'il aura demontr£ que les propos 
employes ont en effet etc tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, au sujet de quoi le 
Gouvernement Royal lui-meme aura soin de recueillir des preuves et con- 
fictions. 

10° Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement I. et R. de ['execu- 
tion des mesures comprises dans les points precedents, en tant que oela n'a pas 
&t6 deja fait par la presente note, aussitot que cliaque mesure aura 6t6 ordonnee 
et exe.cute.e. 

Dans le cas ou le Gouvernement I. et R. ne serait pas satisfait de cette 
reponse, le Gouvernement Royal serbe, considcrant qu'il est de Finteret 
commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret comme 
toujours d'accepter une entente paeitique, soit en remettant cette question a la 
decision du Tribunal International de la Haye soit aux Grandes Puissances qui 
ont pris part a l'elaboration de la declaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite 
le 18/31 mars 1909. 



26. 

Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz£pa>y in St. Petersburg. 

Wien, '2b. Juli 1914. 
In dem Augenblicke, wo wir uns zu einem ernsten Vorgehen gegen 
Serbien entschlossen haben, sind wir uns naturlicb auch der Moglichkeit eines 
sicb aus der serbiscben Differenz entwickelnden Zusammenstoftes mit Rullland 
bewulit gewesen. Wir konnten uns aber durch diese Eventualitat nicht in unserer 
Stellungnahme gegeniiber Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staats- 
politische Konsiderationen uns vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein 
Ende zu machen, daft ein russischer Freibrief Serbien die dauernde, ungestrafte 
und unstrafbare Jiedrohung der Monarchic ermogliche. 



75 

Fur den Fall, als Rufiland den Moment fiir die grolJe Abrechnung mit den 
europaischen Zentralmachten bereits fiir gekommen erachten sollte und daher 
von vorneherein zum Ivrieg entschlossen ware, erscheint allerdings nachstehende 
Instruierung Euer Exzellenz uberflussig. 

Es ware aber immerhin denkbar, dafi Rufiland, nach der eventuellen Ab- 
lehnung unserer Forderungen dureh Serbien und angesichts der sieh fiir uns 
ergebenden Notwendigkeiu eines bewaffneten Vorgehens, mit sich selbst zu Bate 
ginge und dad es sogar gewillt sein kbnnte, sieh von den kriegslustigen 
Elementen nicht mitreiiien zu lassen. 

Dieser Situation sind die nachfolgenden Darlegungen angepafit, die Euer 
Exzellenz im gegebenen Moment und in der Ihnen geeignet erscheinenden 
Weise und nach der von Ihnen zu ermessenden Opportunist bei Herrn Sazonow 
und dem Herrn Ministerprasidenten verwerten wollen: 

Ich setze im allgemeine'n voraus, dafi Euer Exzellenz unter den gegen- 
w'artigen Verhaltnissen ein enges Einvernehruen mit rhrem deutschen Kollegen 
hergestellt haben, der seitens seiner Regierung gewifi beauftragt worden sein 
diirfte, der russischen Regierung keinen Zweifel dariiber zu lassen, dafi Oster- 
reich-Ungarn im Falle eines Konfliktes mit Rufiland nicht allein stehen wiirde. 

Dariiber gebe ich mieh keiner Illusion bin, daD es nicht leicht sein wird, 
fiir unseren unvermeidlich gewordenen Schritt in Belgrad bei Herrn Sazonow 
Verstandnis zu finden. 

Es gibt aber ein Moment, das seinen Eindrnek auf den russischen Minister 
des Aullern nicht verfehlcn kann und das ist die Betonung des Umstandes, dafi 
die osterreicBisch-ungarische Monarchie, dem von ihr seit Jahrzenten fest- 
gehaltenen Grundsatze entsprechend, auch in der gegenwartigen Ki'ise und bei 
der bewaffneten Austragung des Gegensatzes zu Serbien keinerlei eigenniitzige 
Motive verfolgt. 

Die Monarchie ist territorial saturiert und tragt nach serbischem Besitz 
kein Verlangen. Wenn der Kampf mit Serbien uns aufgezwungen wird, so 
wird dies fiir uns kein Kampf nm territorialen Gewinn, sondern lediglieh ein 
Mittel der Selbstverteidung und Selbsterhaltnng sein. 

Der Inhalt des Zu-kularerlasses, der an sich schon beredt genug ist, wird 
in das rechte Licht gertickt durch das Dossier iiber die serbische Propaganda 
gegen die Monarchie und die Zusammenhange, die zwischen dieser Propaganda 
und dem Attentat vom 28. Juni bestehen. 

Auf dieses Dossier wollen Euer Exzellenz die Aufmerksamkeit des Herrn 
russischen Ministers ganz speziell lenken und dartun, es sei eine in der Ge- 
schichte singulare Erscheinung, dafi eine Grofimacht die aufruhrerischen 
Umtiiebe eines angrenzenden kleinen Staates durch so lange Zeit mit so beispiel- 
loser Langmut geduldet hatte wie Osterreich-Ungarn jene Serbiens. 



76 

Wir wollten keine Politik gegen das Aufstreben der christliehen Balkan- 
staaten machen und haben daher — trotzdem uns der geringe Wert serbischer 
Versprechungen bekannt war — nach der Annexionskrise vom Jahre 1908 zu- 
gelassen, daft sich Serbien beinahe um das Dnppelte vergrbftere. 

Seitdem hat die subversive Bewegung, die in Serbien gegen die Monarchic 
gen'ahrt wird, so exzessive Formen angenommen, daO die Lebensinteressen 
Osterreich-Ungarns und selbst unsere Dynastie durch die serbische Wuhlarbeit 
bedroht erscheinen. 

Wir miissen annehmen, dafl das konservative, kaisertreue UuIMand ein 

energisches Vorgehen unsererseits gcg liese Bedrohung aller staatlichen Ord- 

nung begreiflieh rind sogar notwendig finden wird. 

YYenn Euer Exzellenz in Ihrem Gespr'ach mit Herrn Sazonow an diesem 
Punkte angelangt sein werden, wird der Moment gekommen sein, an die Auf- 
stellving unserer Beweggriinde und Absichten den Hinweis zu kniipfen, daft wir 
zwar — wie Euer Exzellenz bereits in dev Lage gewesen waren darzulegen — 
keinen territorialen Gewinn anstreben und aueh die Souveranitiit des Konig- 
reiches nieht anzutasten gedachten, daft wir aber andererseits zur Durebsetzung 
unserer Forderungen bis zum Auflersten gehen wiirden. 

Daft wir bisher, soweit es an uns lag, bestrebt waren, den Frieden zu er- 
halten, den aueh wir als das kostbarstc Gut der Volker betrachten, zeige der 
Verlauf der letzten 40 Jahre und die geschichtliche Tatsaehe, dall unser Aller- 
gnadigster Herr Sich den glorreiehen Namen eines Hiiters des Friedens er- 
worben hat 

Wir wiirden fine Stb'rung des europaischen Friedens schon deshalb auf 
das lebhafteste bedauern, weil wir stets der Ansicht waren, daft das Erstarken 
der Balkanstaaten zur staatlichen und politischen Selbst'andigkeit unseren Bezie- 
hungen zu Ruftland zum Vortei) gereichen wiirde, aueh alle Moglichkeit <-ines 
Gegensatzes zwiscben urn und KuftlanJ beseitigen wiirde und weil wir'immer 
boreit waren, die. grofien politischen interessen Ruftlands bei unserer eigenen 
politischen Orientiei'ung zu beriicksichtigen. 

Eine weitere Duldung der serbischen Umtriebe wiirde unsere staatliche Exi- 
stenz uritergraben und unseren Bestand als Groftmacht, daher aueh das europ'aische 
Gleichgewicht, in Frage stellen. Wir sind aber iiberzeugt, daft es Ruiilands 
eigenstes, von seinen tiiedliehen Staatsleitern wohlver'standenes Interesse ist, daft 
das gegenw'artige europaische, f'iir den Weltfrieden so niitzliehe Gleichgewicht 
erhalten bleibe. Unsere Aktion gegen Serbien, in welchcr Form immer sie 
erfolgt, ist eine durchaus konservative und ihr Zweck die notwendige Erhaltung 
unserer europaischen Stellung. 



27. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz4pa>y in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 25. Ju/i 1914. 

Da Punkt 5 "unserer Foiderungen, n'amlich die Beteiligung von k. u. k. 
Funktionaren bei der Unterdriiekung der subversive!! Bewegung in Serbien, 
besonderen Widerspruch Herrn Sazonows hervorgerufen, wollen Euer Exzellenz 
sich iiber diesen Punkt strong vertraulich dahin 'aufiern, dafi dessen Einschaltung 
lediglich praktischen Riicksichten entsprang und keineswegs der Absicbt, die 
Souveranit'at Serbiens zu tangieren. Wir denken bei Punkt 5 „collaboration" 
an die Erricbtung eines gebeimen „bureau de surete" in Belgrad, welches nach 
Art der analogen russiscben Einricbtungen in Paris funktionieren und rait der 
serbischen Polizei und Verwaltungsbehorde kooperieren wiirde. 



28. 
Graf Szapary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 26. Ju/i 1914. 

Aus Anlafi von Geriicbten iiber russische Mobilisierungsmallnahmen bat Graf 
Pourtales den russiscben Minister in dor ernstesten Weise darauf aufmerksam 
gemacbt, dafi heutzutage Mobilisierungsmafinahmen als diplomatiscbes Druck- 
mittel hcichst gefahilich seien. Denn in diesem Falle gelange die rein militarische 
Erw'agung der Generalst'abe zum Wort und wenn in Deutscbland einmal •auf 
den Knopf gedriickt werde, sei die Saohe unaufhaltsam. Herr Sazonow ver- 
sicberte dem deutschen Botschafter unter Ehrenwort, dali die beziiglichen 
Geriichte unrichtig seien, dali bisber kcin Pferd und kein Reservist eingezogen 
sei und dali es sich lediglich um vorbereitende MalJnahmen in den Milifar- 
beziiken Kiew und Odessa, vielleicht Kasan und Moskau handle. 

Unmittelbar nachher erhielt der kaiserlich deutsche Milit'arattache per Kurier 
spat abend eine Einladung zu Kriegsminister Suchomlinow, weloher sich darauf 
berief, dafi Graf Pourtales dem Minister des AufJern iiber die russischen 
Riistungen gesprochen babe und da der Botschafter einzelne militarische Details 
mifjverstanden haben konnte, nehme er Gelegenbeit, ihn ausfiihrlicher zu 
informieren. In folgendem mir zur Verfiigung gestellten Telegramm des Grafen 
Pourtales nach Berlin sind die diesfalligen Mitteilungon des Majors von Eggeling 
zusammengefalit : 

Militarattache meldet iiber Gesprach mit i-ussischem Kriegsminister: Herr 
Sazonow hat ihn gebeten. mieh iiber militarische Lage aufzukl'aren. Der Herr 
Kriegsminister gab mir sein Ehrenwort, daft noch keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre 
ergangen sei. Vorlaufig wiirden lediglich vorbereitende MaGnahmen getroffen, 
kein Pferd ausgehoben, kein Reservist eingezogen. Wenn Osterreich serbische 



78 

Orenze uberschreite, werden aaf Osterreich gerichtetc Militarbezirke Kiew, 
Odessa, Moskau, Kasan mobilisiert. Unicr keinen Umstanden an deutseher Front, 
Warschau, Wilna, St. Petersburg- Man wiinscht dringend Frieden mit Deutschland. 
Anf meinc Fragc, zn welchem Zweck die Mobilisierung gegen Osterreich, Achsel- 
zucken und Hinweis anf Diplomaten Sprach dem Herrn Minister aus, dafi man 
bei uns Wiirdigung fur freundschaftliche Absicht zeigen, aber auch Mobil- 
machvmg gegen Osterreicb allein als sehr hedrobhck ansehen werde. Herr 
Minister betonte nachdriicklichst und wiederholt dringendes Bediirfnis und 
Wunsch auf Frieden. 



29. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mer.sdorff in London. 

Telegramm. Wiev, 26. Juli 1914. 

Herr von Tsckirsehky teilte mir auftraggemafl heute mit, laut eines in 
London am 25. d. M., 3 Ubr nachmittags, aufgegebenen Telegrammes des 
Fursten Liehnowsky habe Sir E. Grey diesem die Skizze einer Antwortnote 
Serbiens u'bersendet und in dem begleitenden Privatschreiben bemerkt, dafl er 
hoffe, das Berliner Kabinett wiirde sich angesicbts des versohnlichen Tenors 
dieser Antwort in Wien fur deren Annabme verwenden. 

Ich halte es fiir angezeigt, dall Euer Exzellenz dem Herrn Staatssekretar gegen- 
iiber auf die Sache zuriickkommen und ibn darauf aufmerksam machen, dafi fast 
zur selben Zeit, als er dieses Schreiben an Fiirst Lichnowsky richtete, namlich 
gestern um '6 Ubr nachmittags, Serbien bereits die allgemeine Mobilisierung 
seiner Arme angeordnet hat, was beweist, dafi in Belgrad zu einer friedlichen 
Austragung der Saehe keine Neigung bestand. Die Uberreiehung dor, wie es 
seheint, schon vorher nach London telegraphierten Antwort an den k. und k. 
Gesandten in Belgrad fand mit emem unseren Forderungen nicht entsprechenden 
Inhalte erst um C Uhr naeh erfolgter Ausschreibung der Mobilisierung statt. 



30. 

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und 

St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 26. Juli 1914. 

Wir haben, nachdem Serbien die ion uns aufgestellten Forderungen ab- 
gelehnt hat, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu diesem Lande abgebroehen. 

Ich ersnche Euer Exzellenz nunmehr, sich sofort zum HeiTn Minister des 
Auflern oder dessen Stellvertreter zu begeben und sich ihm gegenuber beilaufig 
in folgender Weise auszusprechen : 



"79 

Die kbniglich serbische Kegierung hat es abgelehnt, die Forderungen, welche 
wir zur dauernden Sicherung unserer von ihr bedrohten vitalsten Interessen an 
sie stellen muliten, zu erfiillen, womit sie bekundet hat, dali sie ihre sub- 
versiven, auf die stete Beunruhigung einiger unserer Grenzgebiete und ihre 
schlieliliche Lostrennung aus dem Gefiige der Monarohie gerichteten Bestre- 
bungen aufzugeben, nicht willens sei. 

Zu unserem Bedauern und sehr gegen unseren Willen sind wir dadurch 
in die Notwendigkeit versetzt worden, Serbien durch die scharfsten Mittel zu 
einer grundsatzlichen Anderung seiner bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu 
zwingen. 



31. 
Graf SzSpary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. 

Soeben lange Unterredung mit Herrn Sazonow gehabt. Sagte dem Herrn 
Minister, ich hiitte den Eindruck, dail man iiber den Charakter unserer Aktion 
in RuQland in Irrtumern befangen sei. Man imputiere uns, hiemit einen Vorstofl 
auf den Balkan unternehmen und den Marseh nach Salonich oder gar naoh 
Konstantinopel antreten zu wollen. Andere wieder gingen so vveit, unsere Aktion 
nur als den Aut'takt eines Pr'aventivkrieges gegen Rullland zu bezeiehnen. All 
dies sei irrig, zum Teile geradezu unverniinftig. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei 
Selbsterhaltung und Notwehr gegenuber einer feindseligen, unsere Integritat 
bedrohenden Propaganda des Wortes, der Schrift und der Tat. Niemandem in 
Osterreich-Ungarn falle es ein, russische Interessen bedrohen oder gar Handel 
mit RulMand suchen zu wollen. Das Ziel jedoeh, das wir uns vorgesetzt, seien 
wir unbedingt entsehlossen zu erreiohen und der Weg, den wir gewahlt h'atten, 
schieD uns der zweckdienlichste. Da es sich aber um eine Aktion der Notwehr 
handle, kbnne ich ihm nicht verhehlen, daO man sich bei einer solchen durch 
gar keine wie immer gearteten Konsequenzen beirren lassen kbnne. 

Herr Sazonow stimmte mir bei. Unser Ziel, wie ich es ihm geschildert 
habe, sei ein vollkommen legitimes, aber er meine, der Weg, den wir zu dessen 
Erreichung verfolgen, sei nicht der sicherste. Die Note, die wir iiberreicht h'atten, 
sei in der Form nicht gliicklich. Er habe sie seitdem studiert und wenn ich 
Zeit h'atte, mochte er sie nochmals mit mir durchschauen. Ich bemerkte, daC 
ich zu • seiner Disposition sei, aber weder autorisiert sei, den Notentext mit ihm 
zu diskutieren, noch denselben zu interpretieren. Seine Bemerkungen seien aber 
natiirlich von Interesse. Der Herr Minister nahm sodann alle Punkte der Note 
durch und fand heute von den zehn Punkten sieben ohne allzu groOe Schwierig- 
keiten annehmbar, nur die zwei Punkte, betreffend die Mitwirkung von k. u. k. 



so 

Funktion'aren in Serbian und den Punkt, betreffend die Entlassung von unserseits 
zu bezeichnenden Offizieren und Iieamten, fand er in diesor Form unannehmbar. 
Beziiglich der beiden erstcn Punkte war ich in der Lage eine authentische 
Interpretation im Sinne Euer Exzellenz Tolegrammes vom 25 d. M zu geben, 
beziiglich des dritten meintc ich, dafl er oine notwendige Forderung sei. 
Ubrigens seien die Dinge im Rollen. Die Serben hatten schon gestern mobili- 
siert und was sich seither noch ereignet habe, sei mir unbekannt. 



32. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz3pa>y in St. Petersburg. 
Telegramm. Wien, 27. Juli 1914. 

Ich erm'achtige Euer Exzellenz, Herrn Sazonow gegeniiber sich dahin aus- 
zusprechen, dafl, solange der Krieg zwschen Osterreich-Ungam und Serbian 
lokalisicrt bleibe, die Monarchie irgendwelche temtoriale Eroberungen keineswegs 
beabsichtige. 

33. 
Graf Szogy^ny an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. 

Ilcrr Sazonow erklarte dem deutschen Botschaftor, er konne ihm „garan- 
tieren, dafi russischerseits kcine Mobflisierung vorgenommen worden sei; aller- 
dings waren gewisse notwendigste milit'arische Vorsorgen getroffen." 

Deutseher Militarattache' in St. Petersburg meldet, daC „russiseher Kriegs- 
minister ihm sein Ehrenwort gegeben habe, dali nicht ein Mann, noch ein Pferd 
mobilisiert sei; doch seien naturlieherweise gewisse militarische Vorsorgen 
getroffen worden"; Vorsorgen, die, wie der deutsche Militarattache seiner Meldung 
als von sich aus hinzufiigt, „allerdings ziemlich weitgehend seien." 



34. 

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris 
und St. Petersburg. 

Wien, 27. Jnli 1.914. 

In der Anlage erhalten Euer — den mit unseren Bemeikungen versehenen 
Text der Note, welche die kb'niglich serbische Regierung unterm 25. 1. M. an 
den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad gerichtet hat. 



Note der konigl. serbischen Regierung an die k. und k. Regierung vom 12. 25. Juli 
1914. 



tlbcrsetzuiig. 

Die konigl. serbische Regierung hat 
die Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung 
vom 10. d. M. erhalten und ist uber- 
zeugt, daO ihre Antwort jedes MiOver- 
standnis zerstreuen wird, welches die 
f'reundnachbarlichen Beziehungen zwi- 
sehen der osterreichisch-ungarischen Mon- 
archic und dcm Konigreiche Serbien 
zu stbrcn droht. 

Die konigliehe Regierung ist sich 
bewudt, daft der grofien Nachbarmon- 
archie gegeniiber bei keinera Anlasse 
jcne Protcstc erneuert warden, dh 
seinerzeit sowohl in der Skupschtina, 
als auch in Erklarungen und Hand- 
lungen der verantwortlichen Vertreter 
des Staates zum Ausdrucke gebracht 
wurden und die durch die Erklarung 
dor serbischen Regierung vom 18. Mar/. 
1909 ihren Abschlull gefunden haben, 
sowio weiters, daft seit jcner Zeit weder 
von den verschiedenen einander folgen- 
den Rcgierungen des Konigreiches, noch 
von deren Organen der Versuch unfer- 
nommen wurde, den in Bosnien und 
der Herzegowina geschaftenen politischen 
und rechtlichen Zustand zu andern. Die 
konigliehe Regierung stellt fest, dad 
die k. und k. Regierung in dieser Rich- 
tung keinerlei Vorstellungen erhoben 
hat, abgesehen von dem Falle eines 
Lclnbuches, hinsichtlich dessen die 



AimicrK ii limn. 



Die konigl. serbische Regierung 
beschrankt sich darauf festzustellen, dad 
seit Abgabe der Erklarung vom 18. Marz 
1909 von Seite der serbischen Regie- 
rung und ihrer Organe kein Versuch 
zur Anderung der Stellung Bosniens 
und der Herzegowina unteinommen 
wurde. 

Damit veischiebt sie in bewuCt will- 
kurlicher Weise die Grundlagen unserer 
Demarche, da wir nicht die Beliauptung 
aufgestellt haben, dali sie und ihre Or- 
gane in dieser Richtung ofriziell irgend 
etwas unternommen hatten. 

UnserUravamengehtvielmelirdahin, 
dali sie es trotz der in der zitierten Note 
ubernomnienen \ crpflichtungen unter- 
lassen hat, die gegen die territoriale 
Integritat der Monarchie gerichtete Be- 
wegung zu unterdrucken. 

Ihre Verpflichtung bestand also 
darin, die ganze Richtung ihrer Politik 
zu andern und zur ostcrreichisch-unga- 



k. und k. Regierung eine vollkommen be- 
friedigende Aufklarung erhalten hat. 
Serbien hat wlihrend der Dauer der 
Balkankrise in zahlreichen Fallen Be- 
weise ftir seine pazifistiscbe und ge- 
m'alligte Politik geliefert und es ist nur 
Serbien und den Opfern, die es aus- 
schlielMich im Interesse des europaischen 
Friedens gebracht hat, zu dauken, wenn 
dieser Friede erhalten geblieben ist. 

Die kbnigliche Regierung kann 
nicht fiir Aullerungen privaten Charakter 
verantwortlich gemacht werden, wie es 
Zeitungsartikel und die friedliehe Arbeit 
von Gesellschaften ist, Auflerungen, die 
fast in alien Landern ganz gewohnbehe 
Erscheinungen sind und die sich im 
allgemeinen der staatlichen Kontrolle 
entziehen. Dies umsoweniger. als die 
kiinigliche Regierung bei der Losung 
einer ganzen Reihe von Fragen, die 
zwischen Serbien und Osterreich-Ungarn 
aufgetaueht waren, groiles Entgegen- 
kommen bewiesen hat, wodurch es ihr 
gelungen ist, deren grbfJeren Teil zu- 
gunsten des Fortschrittes der beiden 
Nachbarlander zu Ibsen. 



Die konigliche Regierung war des- 
halb dureh die Behauptungen, dafi An- 
gehorige Serbiens an der Vorbereitung 
des in Sarajevo verubten Attentates teil- 
genoraraen hatten, schraerzlieh uber- 
raseht. Sie hatte erwartet, zur Mit- 
wirkung bei den Nachforschungen iiber 
dieses Verbrechen eingeladen zu werden 
und war bereit, urn ihre voile Korrekt- 
heit dureh Taten zu beweisen, gegen 
alle Personen vorzugehen, hinsiehtlieh 



rischeu Monarchic iD ein freundnach- 
barliohes Verhaltnis zn treten, nicht 
blofl die Zugehorigkeit Bosniens zur 
Monarchic ofliziell nicht anzutasten. 



Die Behauptung der kbnigl. serbi- 
schen Regierung, dall die Aufierungen 
der Presse und die Tatigkeit von Ver- 
einen privaten Charakter haben und sich 
der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen. steht 
im vollen Widerspruche zu den Einrich- 
tungen moderner Staaten, selbst der 
freiheitliclisten Richtung auf dera Ge- 
biete des PreG- und Vereinsrechtes, das 
einen bffentlich rechtlichen Charakter 
hat und Presse sowie Vereine der staat- 
lichen Aufsicht unterstellt. Ubrigens 
sehen auch die serbischen Eiurichtungen 
eine solche Aufsicht vor. Der gegen die 
serbische Regierung erhobene, Vorwurf 
geht eben dahin, dafJ sie es ganzlich 
unterlassen hat, ihre Presse und ihre 
Vereine zu beaufsichtigen, deren Wir- 
ken im monarchiefeindlichen Sinne sie 
kannte. 



Diese Behauptung ist unrichtig; die 
serbische Regierung war liber den gegen 
ganz bestimmte Personen bestehenden 
Verdaeht genau unterrichtet und nicht 
nur in der Lage, sondem auch nach 
hren internen Gesetzen verpflichtet, 



S3 



welcher ihr Mittellungen zugekommen 
waren. 

Den Wiinschen der k. und k. Re- 

gierung entsprechend, ist die konigliche 
Regierung somit bereit, dem Gerichte 
,ohne Riicksicht auf Stellung und Rang 
jeden serbischen Staatsangehbrigen zu 
iibergeben, fur dessen Teilnahme an 
dem Sarajevoer Verbrechen ihr Beweise 
geliefert werden sollten; sie verpflichtet 
sich insbesondere auf der ersten Seite 
des Amtsblattes vom 13./26. Juli fol- 
gende Enunziation zu verbffentlichen: 
„Die konigl. serbische Regierung 
verurteilt jede Propaganda, die gegen 
Osterreich-Ungarn gerichtet sein sollte, 
d. b. die Gesamtheit der Bestrebungen, 
die in letzter Linie auf die LosreifJung 
einzelner Gebiete von der osterreichisch- 
ungarischen Monarcbie abzielen und 
sie bedauert aufricbtig die traurigen 
Folgen dieser verbrecberischen Machen- 
schaften. 



Die kbniglicbe Regierung bedauert, 
dali laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. 
Regierung gewisse serbisehe Offiziere 
und Funktion'are an der eben genannten 
Propaganda mitgewirkt und dali diese 
damit die freundnacbbarlicben Bezie- 
hungen gefahrdet batten, zu deren 
Beobaehtung sicb die kbniglicbe Re- 
gierung durch die Erklarung vom 



ganz spontan Erhebungen einzuleiten. 
Sie hat in dieser Richtung gar nichts 
unternommen. 



Unsere Forderung lautete: 

„Die konigl. serbische Regierung 
verurteilt die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn 
gerichtete Propaganda . . ." 

Die von der konigl. serbischen 
Regierung vorgenommene Anderung der 
von uns geforderten Erklarung will 
sagen, daO eine solche gegen Osterreich- 
Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nicbt be- 
stebt oder daf) ihr eine solche nicht 
bekannt ist. Diese Formel ist unauf- 
richtig und hinterhaltig, da sicb die 
serbische Regierung damit fiir sp'ater 
die Ausflucht reserviert, sie h'atte die 
derzeit bestehende Propaganda durch 
diese Erklarung nicht desavouiert und 
nicht als monarchiefeindlich anerkannt, 
woraus sie weiter ableiten kbrmte, dafi 
sie zur Unterdriickung einer der jetzigen 
Propaganda gleichen nicht verpflichtet sei. 

Die von uns geforderte Formulie- 
rung lautete: 

„Die konigliche Regierung bedauert, 
dafi serbische Offiziere und Funktion'are 
mitgewirkt baben " 

Auch mit dieser Formulierung und 
dem weiteren Beisatze „laut der Mit- 
teilung der k. und k. Regierung" ver- 
folgt die serbische Rcsrierune den ben-its 



84 



31. M'arz 1909 feierlich veqiflichtet 
hatte. 

„Die Regierung. . . ." gleiehlaatend 
mit dem geforderten Texte. 

Die konigliche Regierung ver- 
pflichtet sich weiters: 

1. Anlaftlich des nachsten ord- 
nungsm'aftigen Zusammentrittes der 
Skupschtina in das Preftgesetz eine 
Bestimmung einzuschalten, wonach die 
Autreizung zum Hasse und zur Ver- 
acbtung gegen die Monarchie sowie 
jede Publikation strengstens bestraft 
wiirde, deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen 
die territoriale Integritat Osterreich- 
Ungams gerichtet ist. 

Sie verpflichtet sich anlaftlich der 
demn'aehst erfolgenden Revision der 
Verfassung in den Artikel XXII des 
Verfassungsgesetzes einen Zusatz aufzu- 
nehmeh, der die Konfiskation derartiger 
Publikationen gestattet, was nach den 
klaren Bestimmungen des Artikels XXII 
der Konstitution derzeit unmoglioh ist. 



oben angedeateten Zweck, sicb fur die 
Zukunft freie Hand zu wabren. 



Wir hatten gefordert: 

B l. Jede Publikation zu unter- 
driicken, die zum Hasse und zur Ver- 
acbtung gegen die Monarchie aufreizt 
und deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen 
die territoriale Integritat der Monarchie 
gerichtet ist. " 

Wir wollten also die Verpflichtung 
Serbiens herbeil'iihren, dafur zu sorgen, 
daft derartige Preftangriffe in Hinkiinft 
unterbleiben; wir wiinschten also einen 
bestimmten Erfolg auf diesem Gebiete 
sichergestellt zu wissen. 

Statt dessen bietet uns Serbien die 
Erlassung gewisser Gesetze an, welche 
als Mittel zu diesem Erfolge dienen 
sollen, u. zw. : 

a) ein Gesetz, womit die fraglichen 
monarcbiefeindliclien Preliaufterungen 
subjcktiv bestraft werden sollen, was 
uns ganz gleichgiiltig ist, umsomehr als 
bekanntermaften die subjektive Ver- 
folgung von Preftdelikteu 'aufterst selten 
miiglich ist und bei einer entprechend 
laxen Behandlung eines sole-hen Gesetzes 
auch die wenigen Falle dieser Art nicht zur 
Bestrafung kommen wiirden; also ein 
Vorschlag, der unserer Forderung in 
keiner Weise entgegenkommt, da er 
uns nicht die- geringste Garantie f'iir 
den von uns gewiinschten Erfolg bietet; 

I) ein Nachtragsgesetz zu Art. XXII 
der Konstitution, das die Konfiskation 
gestatten wiirde — ein Vorschlag, der 
uns gleichfalls nicht befriedigen kann, 
da der Bestand eines solchen Uesetzes 



85 



2. Die Regierung besitzt keinerlei 
Hcwei.se dafiir und auoh die Note der 
k. und k. Regierung liefert ihr keine 
solchen, dafi der Verein n Narodna 
odbrana" und andere ahnliche Gesell- 
schaften bis zum heutigen Tage durch 
eines ihrer Mitglieder irgendwelche ver- 
breeherischen Handlungen dieser Art 
begangen h'atten. Nichtsdestoweniger 
•wird die kb'nigliche Regierung die For- 
derung der k. und k. Regierung an- 
nehmen und die Gesellschaft Narodna 
odbrana sowie jede Gesellschaft, die 
gegen Osterreieh-Ungarn wirken sollte 
auflosen. 



3. Die koniglich serbische Regie- 
rung verpflichtet sicli ohne Verzug aus 



in Serbien uns nichts niitzt, sondern nur 
die Verpflichtuug der Regierung, es 
auch anzuwenden, was uns aber nicht 
versprochen wird. 

Diese Vorschl'age sind also voll- 
kommen unbefriedigend — dies umso- 
mehr, als sie auch in der Ricbtung 
evasiv sind, dafi uns nicht gesagt wird, 
nnerhalb welcher Frist diese Gesetze 
erlassen wiirden und dafi im Falle der 
Ablehnung der Gesetzvorlage durch die 
Skupschtina — von der eventuellen 
Demission der Regierung abgesehen — 
alles beim alten bliebe. 

Die monarcbiefeindliohe Propa- 
ganda der Narodna odbrana und der 
ihr afh'lierten Vereine erfiillt in Serbien 
das ganze bffentlieho Leben; es ist 
daher eine ganz unzulassige Reserve, 
wenn die serbische Regierung behauptet, 
dafi ihr dariiber nichts bekannt ist. 

Ganz abgesehen davon ist die von 
uns aufgestellte Forderung nicht zur 
Ganze erfiillt, da wir uberdies verlangt 
haben: 

Die Propagandamittel dieser Gesell- 
schaften zu konfiszieren ; 

die Neubildung der aufgelbsten 
Gesellschaften unter anderem Namen 
und in anderer Gestalt zu verhindern. 
In diesen beiden Richtungen 
schweigt das Belgrader Kabinett voll- 
kommen, so dafi uns auch dareh die 
gegebene halbe Zusage keine Garantie 
dafiir geboten ist, dafi dem Treiben der 
monarcliiel'eindlichen Assoziationen, ins- 
besondere der Narodna odbrana, durch 
deren Auflosung definitiv ein Ende be- 
reitet ware. 

Auch in diesem Falle verlangt die 
serbische Regierung erst. Nachw«ise 



86 



dem bffentlichen Unterrichte in Serbien 
alles auszuscheiden, was die gegen 
Osterreich-Ungarn gericktete Pro- 
paganda fordern konnte, falls ihr die 
k. und k. Regierung tatsaehliche Nach- 
weise fiir diese Propaganda liefert. 



i. Lie konigliehe Eegierung ist 
auch bereit, jene Offiziere und Beamten 
aus dem Milit'ar- und Zivildienste zu 
entlassen, hinsichtlich welcher durch 
gerichtliche Untersuchung festgestellt 
wird, dall sic sich Handlungen gegen 
die (erritoriale Integritat der Monarchic 
haben zuschulden kommen lassen; sie 
erwartet, dall ihr die k. und k. Regie- 
rung zwecks Einleitung des Verfahrens 
die Namen dieser Offiziere und Beamten 
und die Tatsachen mitteilt, welcho den- 
selben zur Last gelegt werden. 



5. Die konigliehe Regierung mull 
bekennen, dall sic sich iiber den Sinn 
und die Tragweito jenes Begehrens der 
k. und k. IvC'MCrung nicht voile Rechcn- 



dafur, dall ira bffentlichen Unterrichte 
Serbiens eine monarchiefeindliche Pro- 
paganda gotrieben wird, wiihrend sie 
docb wissen mufl, dafi die bei den 
serbisehen Schulen eingefuhrten Lehr- 
binlier in dieser Richtung zu bean- 
standenden Stofl' enthalten und dad ein 
grofser Teil der serbisehen Lebrer im 
Lager der Narodna odbrana und der 
ihr affilierten Vereine steht. 

Ubrigens hat die serbische Regie- 
rung auch hier einen Teil unserer 
Forderung nicht so erfullt, wie wir es 
verlangt haben, indem sie in ihrem Text 
den von uns gewunschten Bcisatz „so- 
wohl was den Lehrkorper als auch was 
die Lelirmittel anbelangt", wegliell — 
cin Beisatz, welcher ganz klar zeigt, 
wo die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda 
in der serbisehen Schule zu suchen ist. 

Indem die koniglich serbische Re- 
gierung die Zusage der Entlassung der 
fraglichen Offiziere und Beamten aus 
dem Militar- und Zivildienst an den 
Umstand kniipft, dafJ diese Personen 
durch ein Gerichtsverfahren scliuldig 
befunden werden, schrankt sie ihrc 
Zusage auf jene l'alle ein, in denen 
diesen Personen ein st'rafgesetzlich zu 
ahndendes Delikt zur Last liegt. La 
wir aber die Entfernung jener Ofli/.ierc 
und Beamten verlangen, die monarchie- 
feindliche Propaganda betreiben, was ja 
im allgemeinen in Serbien kein ge- 
riehtlich strafbarer Tatbestand ist, er- 
scheint unsere Forderung auch in diesem 
Pnnkte nicht erfullt. 

Mit dieser- Frage hat das allgc- 
meine Vb'lkerrecht ebensowenig etwas 
zu tun, wie das Stratprozefireeht; es 
liandelt sich urn eine Angclegenheit 



K7 



schaft geben kann, welches dahin geht, 
dafi die kbniglieh serbische Regierung 
sich verpfliehten soil, auf ihrem Gebiete 
die Mitwirkung von, Organen der 
k. und k. Regierung zuznlassen, docb 
erkliirt sie, dafi sie jene Mitwirkung 
anzunebmen bereit ware, wek-he den 
Grunds'atzen des Volkerrechtes und des 
Strafprozesses sowie den freundnachbar- 
licben Beziehungen enteprechen wiirde. 
6. Die kb'nigliche Regierung halt 
es selbstverstandlich fur ihre Pflicbt 
gegen alle jene Personen eine Unter- 
suchung einzuleiten, die an dem Kom- 
plotte vom 15./28. Juni beteiligt waren 
oder beteiligt gewesen sein sollen und 
die sich auf ihrem Gebiete befinden. 
Was die Mitwirkung von biezu speziell 
delegierten Organen der k. und k. Re- 
gierung an dieser Untersuchung anbe- 
langt, so kann sie eine solcbe nicht 
annebmen, da dies eine Verletzung der 
Verfassung und des Strafprozefigesetzes 
ware. Doch kbnnten den osterreichisch- 
ungarischen Organen in einzelnen Fallen 
Mitteilung von dem Ergebnisse der 
Untersuchung gemacht werden. 



rein staatspolizeilicher Natur, die im 
Wege einer besonderen Vereinbarung 
zu lb'sen ist. Die Reserve Serbiens ist 
daher unverstandlich und ware bei ihrer 
vagen, allgemeinen Form geeignet, zu 
unuberbruckbaren Schwierigkeiten bei 
AbschlufJ des zu treffenden Abkommens 
zn fiihren. 



Unser Verlangen war ganz klar 
und nicht midzuverstehen. Wir be- 
gehrten : 

1. Einleitung einer gerichtliehen 
Untersuchung gegen die Theilnehmer 
am Komplotte. 

2. Die Mitwirkung von k. und k. 
Organen an den hierauf beziiglichen 
Erhe.bungen („reeherches" im Gegen- 
satze zu „enquete judiciaire"). 

Es ist uns nicht beigefallen, k. und k. 
Organe an dem serbisch'en Gerichts- 
verfahren teimehmen zu lassen; sie 
sollten nur an den polizeilichen Vor- 
erhebuDgin mitwirken, welche das 
Materiale fur die Untersuchung herbei- 
zuschaffen und sicherzustellen hatten. 

Wenn die serbische Regierung uns 
hier miflversteht, so tut sie dies be- 
wufJt, denn der Unterschied zwische.n 
r enquete judiciaire" und den einfachen 
B recherches" mud ihr gelaufig sein. 

Da sie sich jeder Kontrolle des 
einzuleitenden Verfahrens zu entziehen 
wiinscht, das bei korrekter Durch- 
fiihrung hochst unenviinschte Ergebnisse 
fiir sie liefern wiirde und da sie keine 
Handhabe besitzt, in plausibler Weisc 
die Mitwirkung unserer Organe am 
polizeilichen Verfahren abzulehnen 
(Analogien fiir solche polizeiliche Inter- 



88 



7. Die konigliche Regierung hat 
noch am Abend des Tages, an dem ihr 
die Note zukam, die Verhaftung des 
Majors Vo'i'slav Tankosii? verfugt. 

Was aber den Milan Ciganovic! an- 
belangt, der ein Angehb'riger der iister- 
reichiseh-ungarischen Monarchic ist und 
der bis zum 15. Juni (als Aspirant) bei 
der Eisenbahndirektion bedienstet war. 
so konnte dieser bisher nieht ausge- 
forscht werden, weshalb ein Steekbrief 
gegen ihn erlassen wurde. 

Die k. und k. Regierung «ird ge- 
beten, zweeks Durchfuhrung der Unter- 
suchung so bald als moglich die be- 
stehenden Ycrdachtsgriinde und die bei 
der Untersuchung in Sarajevo ge- 
sammelten Schuldbewcise in deriibliehen 
Form bekanntzusreben 



8. Die serbisehe Regierung wird 
die bestehenden Mallnahmen wegen 
Unterdruckung des Schmuggelns von 
Waffen und Explosivstoffen verscharfen 
und erweitern. 

Es ist selbstvorstandlich, dad sie 
sofort cine Untersuchung einleiten und 
jene Beamten des Grcnzdienstes in der 
Linie Sabac — Loznica strong bestrafen 
wird, die ihre Pfiicht verletzt und die 
Urhcber des Verbrechens die Grenze 
haben uberschreiten lassen. 

9. Die konigliche Regierung ist 
gerne bereit, Aufkliirung iiber die 



ventionen bestehen in grofler Menge), hat 
siesich auf einenStandpunkt begeben, der 
ihrer Ablehnung den Schein der Be- 
rechtigung geben und unserem Ver- 
langen den Stempel der Unerfiillbar- 
keit aufdriicken soil. 



Diese, Antwort ist hinterh'altig. 

Ciganovic ging laut der von uns 
veranlaGten Naehforschungen drei Tage 
naeh dem Attentate, als bekannt wurde, 
daft Ciganovic an dem Komplotte be- 
teiligt sei, auf Urlaub und begab sich 
iiber Auftrag der Polizeipr'afektur in 
Belgrad nach Ribari. Es ist also zu- 
nachst unriclitiu, dall Ciganovic sehon 
am 15./28. Juni aus dem serbischen 
Staatsdienste schied. Hiezu kommt, dali 
der Polizeiprafekt von Belgrad, der die 
Abreise des Ciganovic selbst veranlafJt 
hat und der wuflte, wo dieser sich auf- 
halte, in einem Interview erklarte, ein 
Mann namens Milan Ciganovic existiere 
in Belgrad nicht. 



Der kbniglich serbischen Regierung 
miissen die beziiglichen Interviews ganz 



89 



Auflerungen zu geben, welche ihre 
Beamten in Serbien und im Auslande 
nach dera Attentate in Interviews ge- 
macht haben und die nach der Be- 
hauptung der k. und k. Regierung der 
Monarchie feindselig waren, sobald die 
k. und k. Regierung die Stellen dieser 
Ausfuhrungen bezeiehnet und bewiesen 
haben wird, daft diese Aullerungen von 
den betreffenden Funktionaren tats'ach- 
lich gemaeht worden sind. Die konig- 
liche Regierung'wird selbst Sorge tragen, 
•die nbtigen Beweise und Uberfiihrungs- 
mittel hieftir zu sammeln. 

10. Die kbnigliche Regierung wird, 
insofern dies nieht sehon in dieser Note 
geschehen ist, die k. und k. Regierung 
•von der Durchfiihrung der in den vor- 
stehenden Punkten enthaltenen MaB- 
nahmen in Kenntnis setzeu, sobald eine 
dieser MaOregeln angeordnet und durch- 
gefiihrt wird. 

Die ko'nigl. serbische Regierung 
glaubt, daft es ira gemeinsamen Interesse 
liegt, die Lbsung dieser Angelegenheit 
nicht zu ubersttirzen und ist daher, falls 
sich die k. und k. Regierung dureh 
diese Antwort nieht fur befriedigt er- 
achten sollte, wie immer bereit, eine 
friedliche Lbsung anzunehmen, sei es 
durch Ubertragung der Entscheidum 
dieser Frage an das internationale Ge 
richt im Haag, sei es durch Uberlassung 
der Entscheidung an die Grofimachte. 
welche an der Ausarbeitung der von 
der serbischen Regierung am 18./31. 
Marz 1909 abgegebenen Erkl'arung mit- 
gewirkt haben. 



genau bekannt sein. Wenn sie von der 
k. und k. Regierung verlangt, dafi diese 
ihr allerlei Details iiber diese Interviews 
liefere und sich eine fbrmliche Unter- 
suchung hieriiber vorbehiilt, zeig-t sie, 
dad sie auch diese Forderung nicht 
ernstlich erfiillen will. 



90 

35. 
Graf Szogyeny an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. 

Der von England gemachte Vermittlungsvorschlag, cs solltcn Deutsohland, 
Italien, England und Frankreich zu einei' Konferenz in London zusammenfxeten, 
ist deutscherseits mit der Begriimbmg abgelehnt worden, daG es fiir Doutschland 
unmoglich sei, seinen Bundesgeirossen in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien 
vor ein europaisches Gerieht zu ziehen. 



36. 
Freiherr von Miiller an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Tolio, 28. Juli 1914. 

Die heutige offiziose japanische Times enthalt einen Leitartikel, der am 
Schlusse besagt, dal) Japan mit den drei in Betracht kommenden Grolimacbten 
Osterreich-Ungam, Deutsohland und Rufiland auf bestem FuG stehe, w'ahrend es 

an Serbien in keiner Weise intcressiert sei. Im Kriegsfalle wiirde die kaiser- 
lielic Regierung selbstversfandlich strengste Neutral it'at bewahren. 



37. 
Graf Berchtold an das kbniglich serbische Ministerium des AuRern in Belgrad. 

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. 

Le Gouvernement. Royal de Serbie. n'ayant pas repondu d'une maniere 
satisfaisante a la Note qui lui avait &ti remise par le Ministre d'Autriehe- 
Hongrie a Belgrade a la date du 23 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement I. et R. 
se trouve dans la necessity de pourvoir lui-meme a la sauvegarde de ses droits 
et interets et de reconrir a cet effet a la force des armes. 

LAutriclie-Hongrie se consider* done des ee moment en etat de guerre 
avec la Serbie. 



38. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szbgy6ny in Berlin. 

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. 

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information und zur Mitteilung an den Herrn Staats- 
sekretar: 

Ich liabe nachstehendes Telegramm des Grafen Mensdorff unterm 27. 1. M. 
erhalten: 

„Ick hatte heute Gelegenheit, Sir E. Grey ausfiihrUch darzulegen, dafs 
unsere Aktion nicht Aggression sondern Selbstverteidigung und Selbsterhaltung 
sei und wir keine territorialen Eroberungen nock Vernichtung serbischer 
Unabhangigkeit beabsichtigen. Wir wollen gewisse Genugtuung fur Vergangen- 
heit und Garantien fur die Zukunft. 

Hiebei verwertete ich einige Anhaltspunkte aus dem Erlasse Euer Exzellenz 
an Graf Szapary. 

Sir E. Grey sagte mir, er sei sehr enttauscht dariiber, daO wir die serbische 
Antwort so behandeln, als wenn sje ganz ablelinend ware. 

Er hatte geglaubt, diese Antwort wiirde eine Basis liefern, auf vvelcher die 
vier anderen Regierungen ein befriedigendes Arrangement ausarbeiten kbnnten. 

Das war seine Idee beim "Vorscklag einer Konferenz. 

Die Konferenz wiirde sieh versammeln unter der Voraussetzung, dad sowohl 
Osterreich-Ungarn wie Rufiland w'ahrend des Versuches der anderen Machte, 
einen befriedigenden Ausweg zu iinden, sieh jeder militarischen Operation 
enthaltcn wiirden. 

(Heutige Erklarung Sir E. Greys im Unterhaus fiihrte Konferenzprojekt 
aus.) Als er vom Enthalt militarischer Operationen unsererseits gegen Serbien 
sprach, machte ich die Bemerkung, ich fiirchte, es sei vielleicht schon zu sp'at. 
Der Herr Staatssekret'ar meinte, wenn wir entschlossen sind, unter alien Dra- 
st'anden mit Serbien Krieg zu fiihren und voraussetzen, dali Rutland ruhig 
bleiben wird, so nehmen wir ein grolles Risiko auf uns. Kb'nnen wir Ruflland 
dazu bewegen, ruhig zu bleiben, habe er nichts mehr zu sagen. Wenn nicht, 
sind die Moglichkeiten und Gefahren unberechenbar. 

Als Symptom der Beunruhigung sagte er mir, die grolle englische Flotto, 
die nach den Manovern in Portsmouth konzentriert wurde und heute auseinander 
gehen sollte, wiirde vorlaufig dort bleiben. „„Wir hatten keine Reserven ein- 
berufen, aber nachdem sie versammelt sind, kb'nnen wir sie in diesera Augen- 
blick nicht nach Hause schicken.^" 

Seine Idee von Konferenz hat den Zweck, wenn mbglich Kollision zwischen 
den GrolSmachten hintanzuhalten und er diirfte also auf Isolierung des Konfliktes 
hinzielen. Falls aber Rufiland mobilisiert und Deutschland in Aktion tritt, so 
fallt die Konferenz von selbst in Briich." 



Ich glaube Euer Exzellenz gegeniiber nicht besonders hervorhcben zu 
sollen, daft der Greysche Konferenzvorschlag, insoweit er sick auf unseren 
Konflikt mit Serbien bezieht, angesichts des eiligetretenen Kriegszustandes durch 
die Eroignisse uberholt erscheint. 



30. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

Telegraram. fVien, 28. Juli 1914. 

Wir legen das groftte Gewicht darauf, daft Sir E. Grey unser Vorgehen 
gegen Serbien im allgemeinen und speziell unsere Ablehnung der serbischen 
Antwort in unparteiischer Weise wiirdige, und ersucbe ich Euer Exzellenz daher, 
Gelegenheit zu nehmen, deni Herrn Staatssekretar das Ihnen auf dem Post- 
wege iibermittelte Dossier im Detail und unter Hervorhebung der besonders 
markanten Stellen auseinanderzusetzen; in demselben Sinne wollen Euer Exzellenz 
die kritischen Bemerkungen zn der serbischen Note (Text der Note mit unseren 
Bemerkungen versehen ist gestern an Euer Exzellenz per Post abgegangen) mit 
Sir E. Grey durchsprechen und ihm klarlegen, daD das serbische Entgegen- 
kommen nur ein scheinbares war, bestimmt, Europa zu t'auschen, ohne fiir die 
Zukunft irgendeine Garantie zu bieten. 

Da die serbische Regierung wulite, dad uns nur erne vorbehaltlose An- 
nahme unserer Forderungen befriedigen kbnne, ist die serbische Taktik klar zu 
durchschauen: Serbien akzeptierte, um Eindruck auf die europ'aische Offentlich- 
keit zu machen, mit allerlei Vorbehalten eine Anzahl unserer Forderungen, darauf 
bauend, daO es nicht in die Lage kommen werde, seine Zusagen zu erfullen. 
Ein Hauptgewicht bei der Konversation Euer Exzellenz mit Sir E. Grey ware 
auf den Umstand zu legen, daft die allgomeine Mobilisierung der serbischen 
Armee fiir den 25. Juli nachmittags 3 Uhr angeordnet wurde, wahrend die 
Antwort auf unsere Note erst knapp vor Ablauf der Frist, das hehlt wenige 
Minuten vor (i Uhr, iiberreicht wurde. Wir hatten vorher keine militarischen 
Vorbereitungen getrofl'en, durch die serbische Mobilisierunff wurden wir aber zu 
solchen gezwungen. 



93 

40. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. 

2>\i Euer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelung Ihrer Spraohe: 

Der kaiserlich russisohe Botschafter sprach heute bei mir vor, um mir seine 
Riickkehr aus Ruftland von kurzcm Urlaube mitzuteilen und gleichzeitig einem 
telegraphischen Auftrage Herrn Sazonows nachzukommen. Letzterer hatte ihm 
mitgeteilt, daft er eine langere, freundschafthche Ausspraehe mit Euer Exzellenz 
gehabt hatte (Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 27. d. M.), in deren Verlaufe 
Hochdieselben mit grofter Bereitwilligkeit die einzelnen Punkte der serbischen 
Antwortnote durchgesprochen hatten. Herr Sazonow sei der Ansicht, daft Serbien 
in weitgehendem Mafte unseren Wiinschen entgegengekommen sei, daft aber 
einige Forderungen ihm ganz unannekmbar schienen. was er auoh Euer Exzellenz 
nicht verhehlt habe. Es schiene ihm unter diesen Umst'anden, daft die serbische 
Antwortnote geeignet sei, den AusgangspUnkt zu einer Verstandigung abzugeben, 
wozu die russisohe Regierung gerne die Hand bieten moohte. Herr Sazonow 
wolle mir daher vorsohlagen, daft der Gedankenaustausch mit Euer Exzellenz 
Fortsetzung finde und Euer Exzellenz diesbeziiglich mit Instruktionen versehen 
werden. 

In meiner Entgegnung betonte ich, daft ich auf einen derartigen Vorschlag 
nicht eingehen konne. Eine Verhandlung iiber den Wortlaut der von uns als 
unbefriedigend bezeichneten Antwortnote konnte bei uns niemand verstehen und 
niemand billigen. Es ware dies umsoweniger moglich, als sich, wie der Botschafter 
wisse, bereits eine tiefgehende allgemeine Erregung der offentlichen Meinung 
bem'achtigt hatte, iiberdies unsererseits heute der Krieg an Serbien erklart 
worden sei. 

Auf die Auseinandersetzungen des Botschafters, welche haupts'achlich darin 
gipfelten, daft wir die durchaus nicht abgeleugnete feindselige Stimmung in 
Serbien durch eine kriegerische Aktion nicht niederringen, im Gegenteile nur 
steigern wiirden, gab ich ihm einige Streiflichter hinsichtlich unseres derzeitigen 
Verhaltnisses zu Serbien, welches es unvermeidlich mache, ganz gegen unseren 
Willen und ohne jede egoistische Nebenabsicht unserem unruhigen Nachbar 
mit dem nb'tigen Nachdrucke unsere ernste Absicht zu zeigen, nicht langer 
eine von der Regierung geduldete, gegen den Bestand der Monarchic gerichtete 
Bewegung zuzulassen. Die Haltung Serbiens nach Empfang unserer Note sei 
iibrigens nicht darnach gewesen, eine friedliche Beilegung zu ermoglichen, indem 
Serbien, nochbevor es uns seine ungentigende Antwort iibergeben lieft, die allgemeine 
Mobilisierung angeordnet und schon dadurch uns gegeniiber einen feindseligen 
Akt vorgenommen habe. Trotzdem hatten wir noch drei Tage zugewartet. 



Gestern seien nun serbischerseits gegen uns die Feindseligkeiten an der ttngarischen 
Grenze eroffhet worden. Dadurch sei uns die Moglichkeit benommen, bei unserer 
Serbien gegeniiber bewiesenen Langmut weiter zu beharren. Die Herbeifuhrung 
einer griindlichen aber friedlichen Sanie.rung unseres Verhaltuisses zu Serbien 
sei uns nunmehr unmiiglich gemaeht worden und wir seien gezwungen, don 
serbischen Provokationen in der Form entgegenzutreten, die unter den gegebencn 
Umstanden der Wiirde der Monaichio allein entspreche. 



41. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

Telegramra. Wien, 28. Mi 1914. 

Der engliscbe Botschafter, welcher heute bei mir vorspraoh, hat mir auf- 
traggem'afi den Standpunkt Sir E. Greys zu unserem Konflikte mit Serbien in 
folgender Weise auseinandergesetzt: 

Die englische Regierung habe mit lebhaftem Interesso den bisherigen Ver- 
lauf der Krise verfolgt und lege Wert darauf, uns zu versichern, dafi sie 
Sympathien fur unseren Standpunkt bege und unsere Griefs gegen Serbien 
vollkommen verstehe. 

Wenn somit England keinen Grund babe, unseren Streitfall rait Serbien 
an sich zum Gegenstande besonderer PrUokkupation zu machen, so kb'nne der- 
selbe doeh nicht der Aufmerksamkeit des Londoner Kabinetts entgehen, weil 
dieser Konflikt weitere Kreise zieben und dadurch den europaischen Frieden 
in Frage stellen konne. 

Nur aus diesera fur England in Betracht kommenden Grunde habe sich 
Sir E. Grey veranlaflt gesehen, eine Einladung an die Iiegierungen jener 
Staaton zu riehten, die an diesem Kondikte nieht naher interessiert seien 
(Deutschland, Italien und Frankreicli), uni gemeinschaftlieh mit ihnen im Wege 
fortlaufenden Gedankenaustausches die Moglichkeiten zu priifen und zu erb'rtern, 
wie die Differenz mogliehst rasch ausgeglichen werden konnte. Nach dem 
Muster der Londoner Konferenz wahrend der letzten Balkankrise sollten, nach 
Ansehauung des englisehen Staatssekret'ars, die Londoner Botschafter der 
genannten Staaten sich zu dem angegebcnen Zwecke in fortlaufendem Kontakte 
mit ihm halten. Sir E. Grey habe bereits von den betreffenden Regierungen selir 
freundschaftlich gehaltene Antworten erhalten, worin dieselben dem angereg-ten 
Gedanken zustimmen. Gegenwartig ware es der Wunseh des Herrn Staatssekretiirs, 
wenn nioglich, deu Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zwisehen Osterreich-Ungarn 



95 

und Serbien in elfter Stunde zu verhindcrn, wenn dies aber nicht tunlich ware, 
doch vorzubeugen, daO es zu einem blutigen Zusammenstolie komme, eventuell 
dadurch, daC die Serben sich zuriickziehen konnten, ohne den Kampf aufzu- 
nehmen. Die von Serbien an uns eingelangte Antwort scheine die Mb'glichkeit 
zu bieten, eine Basis fur eine Verst'andigung abzugeben. England sei gerne 
bereit, hiebei in unserem Sinne und nach unseren Wiinschen seinen EinfluC 
zur Geltung zu bringen. 

Ich dankte dem Herrn Botschafter fiir die Mitteilung Sir E. Greys und 
erwiderte ihm, daD ich der Auffassung des Herrn Staatssekretars voile Wiirdi- 
,gung zu zollen wisse. Sein Standpunkt sei aber von dem meinigen naturgem'afj 
verschieden, da England an dem Streitfalle zwischen uns und Serbien nicht 
direkt intci essiert sei und der Herr Staatssekretar wohl kaum griindlich orien- 
tiert sein konne iiber die schwerwiegende Bedeutung der zu lbsenden Fragen 
fiir die Monarchic. Wenn Sir E. Grey von der Moglichkeit rede, den 
Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zu verhindern, so komme dieser Gedanke zu 
spat, da gestern bereits serbischerseits auf unsere Grenzsoldaten geschossen und 
heute von uns der Krieg an Serbien erklart wurde. Was die Idee eines Tran- 
sigierens aufGrund der serbischen Antwortnote anbelangt, miisse ich eine solche 
ablehnen. Wir hatten die integrate Annahme gefordert, Serbien habe sich durch 
Winkelziige aus der Verlegenheit zu ziehen gesucht. Uns seien diese serbischen 
Methoden nur zu gut bekannt. 

Sir Maurice Bunsen konne unseren Standpunkt durch seine hier erworbenen 
Lokalkenntnisse gewifi richtag einsch'atzen und werde in der Lage sein, Sir 
E. Grey hieriiber ein genaues Bild zu geben. 

Insoferne Sir E. Grey dem europaischen Frieden dienen wolle, wiirde 
er gewifj nicht auf Widerstand bei uns stofien. Er miisse jedoch bedenken, daC 
der europaische Friede nicht dadurch gerettet wiii-de, dafl sich GroOm'achte hinter 
Serbien stellen und fiir dessen Straffreiheit eintreten. Denn selbst wenn wir auf 
einen solehen Ausgleichsversuch eingehen wollten, wiirde dadurch Serbien nur 
umsomehr ermutig-t, auf dem bisherigen Pfade weiterzugehen, was den Frieden 
binnen der allerkiirzesten Zeit abermals in Frage stellen mbchte. 

Der englische Botschafter versickerte mich zum Schlusse, dafJ er unseren 
Standpunkt vollkommen verstehe, andererseits aber bedauere, dafl unter diesen 
Umst'anden der Wunsch der englischen Regierung, einen Ausgleich zu erzielen, 
derzeit keine Aussicht auf Verwirklichung habe. Er hoffe, mit mir weiterhin in 
Kontakt bleiben zu diirfen, was ihm wegen der groCen Gefahr einer 
europaischen Konflagration von besonderem Werte ware. 

Ich erwiderte, ich stiinde dem Herrn Botschafter jederzeit zur Verfiigung, 
womit unsere Konversation schlofj. 



42. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin. 

Telegramm. Wien, am 28. Juli 1914. 

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz sieh sofort zum Heixn Reichskanzler oder 
Staatssekretar zu begeben und ihrn folgendes in meinem Namen mitzuteilen: 

Nach iibereinstimmenden Nachrichten aus St. Petersburg, Kiew, Warsehau, 
Moskau und Odessa trifft RuMand umfangreiche militarisehe Vorbereitungen. 
Ilerr Sazonow bat zw;ir ebenso wie der russische Kriegsmimster unter Ehren- 
wort versichert, dall eine Mobilisierung bisher nicht angeordnet wurde, der 
letztere hat jedoch dem deutsehen Militar-Attach£ mitgeteilt, dall die gegen 
Osterreieh-Ungarn gelegenen Militiirbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan 
mobilisiert vverden wiirden, wenn unsere Truppen die serbische Grenze iiber- 
scbrirten. 

Unter diesen Umst'anden mochte ich das Berliner Kabinett dringend er- 
suchen, der ErwSgung naher zu treten, ob nicht Rutland in freundschaftlicher 
"Weise darauf aufmerksam geraaeht werden sollte, dafi die Mobilisierung obiger 
Bezirke einer Bedrohung Osterreieh-Ungarns gleichkame and daker, falls sie 
tats'achliek erfolgt, sowohl von der Monarchie als vom verbiindeten Deutsehen 
Reiche mit den weitestgehenden milit'arischen Gegenmallregeln beantwortet 
■werden miiflte. 

Um Ruliland ein eventnelles Einlenken zu erleichtern, sehiene es tins 
angezeigt, dall ein soldier Schritt vorerst von Deutschland allein unternoramen 
■werden sollte: doch waren wir natiirlioh bereit, den Schritt auch zu zweien zu 
machen. 

Eine deutliche Sprache sehiene mir in diesem Augenblick das wirksamste 
Mittel, um Ruliland die ganze Tragweite eines drohenden Verhaltens zum Be- 
wufltsein zu bringen. 



43. 

Graf Berchtold an Graf Szb'gy^ny in Berlin. 

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. 

Der kaiserlieh deutecke Botschafter hat hier mitgeteilt, daO Sir E. Grey 
sicli mit der Bitte an die deutsche Regierung gewendet habe, sie mb'ge ihren 
EiiiHul) bei der k. u. k. Regierung geltend machen, daft diese die Antwort aus 



97 

Belgrad entweder als geniigend betrachte oder als Grundlage fur Besprechungen 
unter den Kabinetten akzeptiere. 

Herr von Tschirschky war beauftragt, den englischen Vorschlag dem Wiener 
Ivabinette zur Erwagung zu unterbreiten. 



44. 

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris 
und Rom. 

Telegramm. Wien, 29. Juli 1914. 

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information: 

Ich habe heute dem kaiserlich deutschen Botschafter das nachfolgende 
Memoire in Beantwortung eines von demseiben bei mir unternommenen Schrittes 
zukommen lassen: 

Memoire. 

Die k. u. k. Regierung hat mit dem ergebensten Danke von der Mitteilung 
Kenntnis genommen, welche ihr der Herr kaiserliche deutsohe Botschafter am 
28. 1. M.- uber das Ersuchen des englischen Kabinettes gemacht hat, es mbge 
die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung ihren Einfluti beim Wiener Kabinette geltend 
machen, damit dieses die Antwort aus Belgrad entweder als geniigend betrachte 
oder aber als Grundlage fiir Besprechungen annehme. Was die Atissprache 
des Herrn englischen Staatssekret'ars zu Fiirst Lichnowsky betrifft, mochte die 
k. u. k. Regierung zunaohst darauf aufmerksam machen, dali die serbische 
Antwortnote keineswegs, wie dies Sir E. Grey anzunehmen scheint, eine Zu- 
stimmung zu alien unseren Forderungen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme enthalte, 
dafi vielmehr in den meisten Punkten Vorbehalte formuliert sind, welche den 
Wert der gemachten Zugestandnisse wesentlich herabdriicken. Die Ablehnung 
betreffe aber gerade jene Punkte, welche einige Garantie fur die faktische 
Erreiehung des angestrebten Zweckes enthalten. 

Die k. u. k. Regierung kann ihre ITberraschung iiber die Annahme nicht 
unterdriicken, als ob ihre Aktion gegen Serbien RulMand und den russischen 
EinfluO am Balkan treffen wolle, denn dies hatte zur Voraussetzung, dafi die 
gegen die Monarchic gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbisch, sondern 
russischen Ursprungs sei. Wir sind bisher vielmehr von der Auffassung aus- 



ns 

gegangen, dall das offizielle RuCIand diesen der Monarchie feindlichen Tendenzen 
t<- 1 ti -tehe und richtet sich unsere gegenwartige Aktion ausschliefilich gegen 
Serbien, wahrend unsere Gef'iihlc fur Rullland, wie wir Sir E. Grey versichern 
konnen, durchaus ffeundschaftliche sind. 

Im ubrigen rauB die k. u. k. Eegierung darauf hinweisen, dafl sie zu 
ihrem lebhaften Bedauern nicht mehr in der Lage ist, zu der serbiselien 
Antwortnote im Sinnc der englischen Anregung Stellung zu nehmen, da im 
Zeitpunkte des hier gemachten deutschen Schrittes der Kriegszustand zwischen 
der Monarchie unci Serbien bereits eingetreten war und die serbische Antwort- 
note demnr-ch durch die Ereignisse bereits iiberbolt ist. 

Die k. u. k. Regierung erlaubt sich bei diesem Anlasse darauf aufmerksam 
zu machen, dall die koniglich serbische Regierung noeh vor Erteilung ihrer 
Antwort rr.it der Mohilisierung der serbisehen-Streitkrafte vorgegangen ist und 
dall sie auch nachher drei Tage verstreichen liefi, ohne die Geneigtheit kund- 
zugeben, den Standpunkt ihrer Antwortnote zu verlassen, worauf unsererseits 
die Kriegserklarnng erfnlgte. 

Wenn im iibrigen das englische Kabinett sich bereit findet, seincn Einflull 
auf die russische Regierung im Sinne der Erhaltung des Friedens zwischen 
den Grofimachten und der Lokalisierung des uns durch die jahrelangen serbischen 
Umtriebe aufgezwungenen Krieges geltend zu machen, so kaun dies seitens der 
k. u. k. Regierung nur begriifit werden. 



45, 

Graf Szecsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Paris, 29. Juli 1914. 

Frankreich trifft unzweifelhaft gewisse militarische Vorbereitungen, wie 

dies von den Zeitungen vielleie.ht mit gewisser Ubertreibung verkiindet wird. 

Wie ieh streng vertraulich erfahre, ist Baron Schoen beauftragt, diese Vor- 
bereitungen heute bei Herrn Viviani zur Sprache zu bringen und darauf hin- 
zmveisen, dad Deutschland unter diesen Umsfanden gezwungen werden. konnte, 
ahnliche Mallnahmen zu treffen, die natiirlich nicht geheim bleiben konnten und 
deren Bekanntwerden in der Offentlichkeit grofte Aufregung verursachen wiirde. 
So konnten beide Lander, trotzdem sie. nur den Krieden anstreben, zu einer 
wenigstens teilweisei) Mobilisierung gcdrangt werden, was gefahrlich ware. 

Ferner wird Baron Schoen auftraggemafi erklaren, Deutschland wiinsche 
lebli.ift, dafi der lvonflikt zwischen uns und Serbien iokalisiert bleibe, wobei 
Deutschland auf die Unterstiitzung seitens Frankreichs zahle. 



99 



46. 
Graf Szogyeny an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegraram. Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. 

Bereits Sonntag hat die deutsche Regierung in St. Petersburg erkl'art, daft 
die russische Moliilisierung die deutsche Mobilisierung zur Folge hiitte. 

Darauf erfolgte russischeiseits die mit meinem Telegramme vom 27. d. Mts. 
gemeldete Antwort. Hierauf wurde heute neuerdings nach St. Petersburg tele- 
graphiert, daft durch das weitere Fortschreiten der russischen Mobilisieiungs- 
maftnahmen Deutschland veranlaftt werden kb'nnte, zu mobilisieren. 



47. 
Graf Szripary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. 

Da ich vom deutschen Botschafter erfahren habe, Heir Sazonow zeige sieh 
fiber Euer Exzellenz angebliche Abgeneigtheit, Gedankenaustausch mit Rufiland 
fortzusetzen und iiber vermeintlich weit iiber das notwendige Mali ausge- 
dehnte und daher gegen RulMand gerichtete Mobilisierung Osterreich-Ungarns 
sehr aufgeregt, suehte ich den Herrn Minister auf, um einige rnir vorhanden 
scheinende Unklarheiten zu beheben. 

Der Herr Minister begann damit zu konstatieren, daft Osterreich-Ungarn 
kategorisch weiteren Gedankenaustausch ablehne. Ich stellte auf Gruud Euer 
Exzellenz Telegrammes vom 28. d. M. richtig, daft Euer Exzellenz es zwar 
abgelehnt hatten, nach allem, was vorgefallen, iiber die Notentexte und den oster- 
reichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikt uberhaupt zu diskutieren, daft ich aber fest- 
stellen miisse, in der Lage gewesen zu sein, eine viel breitere Basis des Gedanken- 
austausches dadurch anzuregen, daft ich eildiirte, wir wiinschten keine russischen 
Intercssen zu verletzen, hatten nicht die Absicht, natiirlich unter der Voraus- 
setzung, daft der Konflikt zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert 
bleibe, serbisches Territorium an uns zu bringen und ged'achten auch die 
Souyeranitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten. Ich sei iiberzeugt, daft Euer Exzellenz 
iiber bsterreichisch-ungarische und russische Interessen immer bereit sein wiirden, 
mit St. Petersburir Fuhlunsr zu nehmen. 



Herr Sazonow meinte, in territorialer Hinsicht habe or sich iiberzeugen 
lassen, aber was die Souverrinit'at anbelangt, miisse er den Standpunkt festhalten, 
die Aufzwingung unserer Bedingungen sei ein Vasallentum. Dieses aber verstofte 
gegen das Gleichgewicht am Balkan und letzteres sei das in Frage kommende 
russisohe Interesse. Nun kam er wieder auf die Diskussion iiber die Note, die 
Akt.ion Sir E. Greys etc. zuriick und wollte mir neuerlich nahelegen, dafl man 
unser legitimes Interesse zwar anerkenne und voll befriedigen wolle, daf) dies 
aber in eine fiir Serbien annehmbare Form gekleidet werden sollte. Ich meinte, 
dies sei kein russisches, sondern ein serbisches Interesse, worauf Herr Sazonow 
geltend machte, russisohe Interessen seien in diesem Falle eben serbische, so. 
dali ich dem Circulus vitiosus durch Ubergang auf ein anderes Thema ein 
Ende machte. 

Ich erw'ahnte, ich hatte gehb'rt, man sei in Ruflland beunruhigt, weil wir 
fiir die Aktion gegen Serbien acht Korps mobilisiert haben. Herr Sazonow 
bestiitigte mir, dali nicht er, der hievon gar nichts gewuBt, sondern der General- 
stabschef diese Bedenken geauflert habe. Ich suchte dem Herrn Minister darzu- 
legen, dall jeder Unbefangene sich leicht iiberzeugen konne, unsere siidlichen 
Korps konnten keine Bcdrohung fiir Ruflland bilden. 

leh bedeutete dem Herrn Minister, dali es gut ware, wenn sein kaiserlicher 
Herr iiber die wahre Situation informiert wiirde, umsomehr als es dringend 
geboten sei, wenn man den Frieden wolle, dem militarischen Lizitieren, welches 
sieh jetzt auf Grund falscher Nachrichten einzustellen drohe, ein rasches Ende 
zu bereiten. Herr Sazonow meinte sehr charakteristischerweise, er konne dies 
dem Generalstabsohef mitteilen, denn dieser sehe Seine Majestat 
alle 'Page. 

Der Herr Minister .-agte mir weiter, es werde heute ein Ukas unterzeiebnet, 
weleher eine Mobilisierung in ziemlich weitem Umfang anordne. Er konne mir 
aber auf das alleroffiziellste erklaren, dali diese Truppen niebt dazu bestimmt 
seien, iiber uns herzufallen; sie warden nur Gewebr bei Fuli bereit stehen fiir 
den Fall, als Ruftlands Balkaninteressen gefahrde.t wiirden. Fine, note explicative 
werde dies feststellen, denn 'es handle sich nur urn eine VorsichtsmaOregel, die 
Kaiser Nikolaus gerechtfertigt gefunden habe. da wir, die wir ohnedies den 
Vorle.il rascherer MobiKsierurjg biitten, nunmehr auch den so grolien Vorsprung 
liatten. Ich machte Herrn Sazonow in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck auf- 
merksam, den eine solche MaGregel bei uns erwecken werde. Ich miisse be- 
zweifeln, dali die note explicative diesen Eindruck zu mildern geeignet sein 
werde, worauf der Herr Minister sich nochmals in Versicherungen uber die 
llarmlosigkeit (!) dieser Verfiigung erging. 



101 



48. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzogyGny in Berlin. 

Telegramm. Wien, 29. JuU 1914. 

Soebeh wurde mir von Herm von Tschirschky mitgeteilt, der russische 
Botschafter habe ihm gesagt, dali er von seiner Regierung verstandigt worden 
sei, dali die Militarbezirke von Kiew, Odessa, Moskau nnd Kasan mobilisiert 
viirden. Rufiland sei in seiner Ehre als Grofimacht gekrankt und genotigt, 
entsprechende Maftnahmen zu ergreifen. Die russische Mobilisierung wird von 
unseren galizischen Korpskoramanden bestiitigt nnd wurde, einer Meldung dejs 
k. u. k. Militarattaches zufolge, heute aucb von Herrn Sazonow dem deutschen 
Botschafter gegeniiber nicht mehr geleugnet. 

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, vorstehendes unverziiglich ziir Kenntnis der 
deutschen Regierung zu bringen und hiebei zu betonen, dafi, wenn die russi- 
schen MobilisierungsmaOnahnien nicht ohne Siiumen eingestellt werden, unsere 
allgemeine MobilisierUng aus militarischen Griinden unverziiglich veranlaCt 
werden miillte. 

Als letzter Versuch, den europaischen Krieg hintanzuhalten, hielte ich es 
fiir wiinschenswert, daD unser und der deutsche Vertreter in St. Petersburg 
eventuell auch in Paris sogleich angewiesen werden, den dortigen Regierungen 
in freundschaftlicher Weise zu erklaren, dali die Fortsetzung der russischen 
Mobilisierung GegenmaDregeln in Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge 
haben wiirde, die zu ernsten Konsequenzen fiihren miifiten. 

Euer Exzellenz wollen hinzufugen, dali wir uns selbstverstandlich in unserer 
kriegerischen Aktion in Serbien nicht beirren lassen werden. 

Die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg und Paris erhalten unter einem 
die Weisung, die vorerw'ahnte Erklarung abzugeben, sobald ihr deutscher Kollege 
anologe Instruktionen erhalt. 



49. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzSpaYy in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 30. Juli 1914. 

Antwort auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 29. Juli. 

Ich bin selbstverstandlich nach wie vor bereit, die einzelnen Punkte unserer 
durch die Ereignisse iibrigens befeits iiberholten an Serbien gerichteten Note 



102 

durch Euer Exzellenz Herrn Sazonow erlautern zu lassen. Auch wiirde ich bcson- 
deren Wert daranf legen, bei dieser Gelegenheit der mir duroh Ilerrn Sobebeko 
verdolmetschten Anregung entspreehend auch die unsere Beziehungen zu Rut- 
land direkt betreffenden Fragen einer vertrauensvollen und freundsehaftlichen 
Aussprache zu unterziehen, wovon sich eine Behebung der in diesem Belange 
bedauerlicherweise bestehenden Unklarheiten und Sicherstellung der so wiinschens- 
werten friedliohen Entwicklung unserer Nachbarverhaltnisse erhoii'en lielle. 



50. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdpa>y in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 30.Juli 1914. 

Zu Eurer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelnng Rarer Sprache: 

Ich habe heute Herrn Scbebeko auseinandergesetzt, es sei mir gemeldet 
worden, dali Herr Sazonow iiber meine glatte Ablehnung seiner Proposition 
bezuglich Aussprache mit Euer Exzellenz peinlieh beruhrt sei, wie nicbt minder 
daruber, daO kein Gedankenaustausch zwiscben • mir und Herm Schebeko statt- 
gefunden babe. 

Bezuglich des ersteren Punktes batte ich Euer Exzellenz bereits telegraphisch 
freigestellt, auch weiterhin seitens Herrn Sazonows etwa gewiinschte Erl'aute- 
rungen bezuglich der Note — welche Ubrigens durch den Kriegsausbmch 
iiberholt erscheint — zu geben. Es kbnne sich dies allerdings nur im Rahmen 
nachtriiglicher Aufklarungen bewegen, da es niemals in unserer Absicht gelegen 
war, von den Punkten der Note etwas abhandeln zu lassen. Auch hatte ich 
Euer Exzellenz erm'achtigt, unsere speziellen Beziehungen zu Ruilland mit 
Herrn Sazonow fieundsckaftlich zu besprechen. 

DaO Herr Sazonow sich daruber beklagen konnte, es hatte kein Gedanken- 
austausch zwischen Herrn Schebeko und mir stattgefunden, mull auf einen 
Irrtum beruhen, da wir — Herr Schebeko und ich — vor zwei Tagen die 
aktuellen Fragen durchgesprochen batten, was mir der Herr Botschafter mit 
drni llemerken bestatigte, er habe Herrn Sazonow in ausfuhrlicher Weise iiber 
diese Unterredung referiert. 

Herr Schebeko fiihrte dann avis, warum man in St. Petersburg unser "Vor- 
gehen gegen Serbien mit solcher Besorgnis betrachte. Wir seien eine Gmft- 
macht, die gegen den kleinen serbischen Staat vorgehe, ohne dall man in 
St. Petersburg etwas daruber wisse, was wir mit demselben beabsichtigten, ob wir 
dessen Souveianitat tangieren, ihn ganz niederweirfen oder gar zertreten wollten. 



103 

Durch historisehe und andere Bande mit RuOland verbunden, konne letzterem 
das weitere Schicksal Serbiens nicbt gleichgultig sein. Man habe sioh in 
St. Petersburg angelegen sein lassen, mit allem Nachdruck auf Belgrad ein- 
znwirken, dafi es alle unsere Forderungen erfiille, allerdings zu einer Zeit, wo 
man noch nicht wissen konnte, was fiir Forderungen wir nacbmals gestellt. 
Aber selbst bezuglich dieser Forderungen wiirde man alles einsetzen, um 
wenigstens das Mogliche durebzubringen. 

Ich erinnerte den Herrn Botscbafter daran, dafi wir wiederbolt betont h'atten, 
wir wollten keine Eroberungspolitik in Serbien treiben, aucb dessen Souver'anit'at 
nicbt antasten, blofi einen Zustand herstellen, der uns Sicherheit biete gegen 
Beunruhigung seitens Serbiens. Hieran kniipfte ich eine langere Erb'rterung 
unseres unleidlicben Verbaltnisses zu Serbien. Aucb gab ich Herrn Schebeko 
deutlich zu verstehen, in welch hohem Mafie die russische Diplomatie, wenn aucb 
gewifi gegen den Willen der leitenden Faktoren, an diesen Zustanden schuld sei. 

Im weiteren Verlaufe unserer Unterredung .erwahnte ich die nunmehr zu 
meiner Kenntnis gelangte russische Mobilisierung. Nacbdem sich dieselbe auf 
die Militarbezirke Odessa, Kiew, Moskau und Kasan beschranke, trage dieselbe 
einen hostilen Charakter . gegen die Monarchie. Was der Grand bievon sei, 
wisse ich nicht, da ja gar kein Streitfall zwischen uns und RuOland existiere. 
Osterreicb-Ungarn habe ausschheOlich gegen Serbien mobilisiert, gegen Rufiland 
nicht einen Mann, was allein aus dem Umstande zu ersehen sei, dali das I., X. und 
XI. Korps nicht mobilisiert worden seien. Bei dem Umstande jedoch, dali Rufi- 
land offensichtlich gegen uns mobilisiere, miifiten auch wir unsere Mobilisierung 
erweitern, wobei ich jedoch ausdrucklich erwahnen wolle, dafi diese Mafinahme 
selbstverstandlich keinen feindseligen Charakter gegen Rufiland trage und sich 
lediglich als notwendige Gegenmafinahme gegen die russische Mobilisierung 
darstelle. 

Ich bat Herrn Schebeko, dies seiner Regierung zu melden, was er mir 
zusagte. 



51. 
Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 31. Juli 1914. 

Ich telegraphiero wie folgt nach Berlin: 

Herr von Tsehirsehky hat auftraggemafi gestern hier Mitteilung iiber eine 
Unterredung zwischen Sir E. Grey und Furst Lichnowsky gernacht, in welcher der 
englische Staatssekretiir dem deutschen Botschafter das Nachfolgende eroffnete: 



104 

.Sazonow habe die englische Regierung wissen lassen, daft er nach der 
Kriegserklarung Osterreich-Ungarns an Serbien nicht mehr in der Lage sei, 
mit Osterreich-Ungarn direkt zu verhandeln und Jaher die Bitte ausspreche, 
England moge seine Vermittlung wieder aufbehmon. Als Voraussetzung betrachto 
die russische Regierung die vorlanfige Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten. 

Zu dieser russischen Eroffnung bemerkte Sir E. Grey zu Fiirst Lichnowsky, 
England denke an eine Vermittlung a quatre und halte dieselbe fur dringend 
geboten, wenn nicht ein Weltkrieg entstehen solle. 

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem Herrn Staatssekretar, fiir die uns durch 
I Term von Tsehirsehky gemaobten Mitteilungen verbindlichst zu danken und 
ihm zu erklaren, dad wir trotz der Anderung, die in der Situation sekher durch 
die Mobilisierung RuDlands eingetreten sei, gerne bereit seien, dem Vorschlag 
Sir E. Greys, zwischen uns und Serbien zu vermitteln, naher zu treten. 

Die Voraussetzungen unserer Annahme seien jedoch natiirlich, dafi unsere 
milit'arische Aktion gegen Serbien einstweilen ihren Fortgang nehme und dall 
das englische Kabinett die russische Regierung bewege, die gegen uns gerich- 
tete russische Mobihsierung zum Stillstand zu bringen, in welchem Falle selbst- 
verstandbch auch wir die uns durch dieselbe anfgezwungenen defensiven mili- 
t'arischen Gegenmallregeln in Galizien sofort wieder riickgangig machen wiirden. 



52. 
Graf Szapary an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 31. Jutt 1914. 

Heute friih Ordre zur allgemeinen Mobilisierung der gesamten Armee und 
Flotte erfolgt. 



53. 

Graf Berchtold an die k. und k. Missionen. 

Telegramm. Wien, 31. Juli 1974. 

Zu Euer etc. Information und Verwertung bei dortiger Regierung: 

Da von der russischen Regierung Mobilisierungen an unserer Grenze 

angeordnet worden sind, sehen wir uns zu militarischen JVIallnahmen in Galizien 

jijezwungen. 



105 

Diese Mafinahmen sind rein defensiven Charakters und lediglich unter dem 
Brucke der russischen Vorkekrungen erfolgt, die wir sehr bedauem, da wir 
selbst keinerlei aggressive Absichten gegen RuOland haben und die Fortdauer 
der bisherigen guten nachbarlichen Beziehungen wiinschen. 

Die der Situation entsprechenden Pourparlers zwischen dem Wiener und 
St. Petersburger Kabinett, von denen wir uns eine allseitige Beruhigung erhoffen, 
nehmen inzwischen ihren Fortgang. 



54. 
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramrn. Paris, 31. JuU 1914. 

Deutscher Botschafter hat im Auftrage seiner Regierung hier erklart, dafl, 
wenn angeordnete russische allgemeine Mobilisierung nicht binnen 12 Stunden 
eingestellt wird, Peutschland gleicbfalls mobilisieren werde. Gleicbzeitig fragte 
Baron Schoen, ob Frankreich im Falle deutscb-russischen Krieges neutral bliebo. 
Diesbeziiglicke Antwort binnen 18 Stunden erbeten. Termin lauft morgen, 
Samstag, 1 Ubr nachmittags ab. 



55. 
Graf Sz£pa>y an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramrn. St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. 

Euer Exzellenz Telegramrn vom 3& d. M. erhalten. 

Hochdieselben werden meinem Telegramrn vom 29. d. M. entnommen 
baben, dall ich', ohne einen Auftrag abzuwarten, Konversation mit Sazonow 
nahezu auf der mir nunmehr aufgetragenen Grundlage wieder aufgenommen habe, 
obne da(l sieh die beiderseitigen Standpunkte wesent.lich gen'ahert hatten. 

Inzwischen hat sich allerdings aus den vom deutschen Botschafter mit 
russischem Minister des Auflern gefuhrten Konversationen ergeben, daO 
Ruliland sich selbst mit einer formellen Erkl'arung, Osterreieh-Ucgarn werde 



weder das serbische Territorium schmalern noch die serbische Souver'anitat 
antasten, noch russische Balkan- oder sonstige Interessen verletzen, nicht 
zufriedengeben wlirde, und ist auch seither rnssischerseits die allgemeine 
Mobilisierung angeordnet worden. 



56. 
Graf SzSpaYy an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. St Petersburg, 1. August. 1914. 

Bei einem heutigen Besuehe legte ich Herrn Sazonow dar, daft ich Instruk- 
tionen erhalten hiitte, ich miisse aber vorausschicken, die augenblickliche, 
durch die russische. allgemeine Mobilisierung in Wien geschaffene Lage sei mir 
ganzlich unbekannt, so daft ich von dieser bei Verdolmetschung meiner noch 
vorher abgegangenen Weisungen vollkommen abseken miisse. Ich sagte, daft die 
beiden Weisungen Euer Exzellenz von dem Miftvcrst'andnis handeln, als ob wir 
weitere Verhandlungen mit Ruftland abgelelint hatten. Dies sei, wie ich ihm 
schon ohne Auftrag versichert hiitte, ein Irrtum. Euer Exzellenz seien nicht nur 
gerne bereit, mit RuQland auf breitester Basis zu verhandeln, sondern auch 
speziell geneigt, unseren Notentext einer Besprechung zu unterziehen, sofern es 
sich um dessen Interpretation handle. 

Ich betonte, wie sehr die Instruktionen Euer Exzellenz an mich einen 
weiteren Beweis guten Willens bbten, wenn ich ihm auch noch einmal in Er- 
innerung rufen miisse, daft mir die durch die seitherige allgemeine Mobilisierung 
geschaft'ene Situation unbekannt sei, ich konne nur hoffen, daft uns der Gang der 
Ereignisse nicht schon zu weit gei'iikrt habe; jedeni'alls hiitte ich es fiir meine 
PHieht gehalten, im gcgenwartigen hochernsten Augenblicke den guten Willen 
der k. u. k. Regiemng nochmals zu dokumentieren. Herr Sazonow erwiderte, er 
nehme. von diesem Beweise guten Willens mit Befriedigung Akt; doch mb'ehte 
or mich aufmerksam machen, daft ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg aus 
tiahelicgenden Griinden weniger Erfolg versprechend erschienen als solche auf 
dem neutralen Londoner Terrain. Ich erwiderte, Euer Exzellenz gingen, wie ich 
schon dargelegt hiitte, vom Gesichtspunkte einer direkten Fiihlungnahme in 
St. Petersburg aus, so daft ich nicht in der Lage sei, zu seiner Anregung 
beziiglich Londons Stellung zu nehmen, doch wiirde ich Euer Exzellenz hievon 
Middling erstatten. 



57. 
Graf Szngyeny an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Berlin, 2. August 1914. 

Der Herr Staatssekretar sagte mir soeben, daB von RuBland keine Antwort 
auf deutsche Anfrage eingelangt sei. 

Russische Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze bei Schwidden (siidb'stlich 
Bialla) iibersehritten. 

RuBland hat daher Deutschland angegriffen. 

Deatschland betrachtet sieh daher im Kriegszustande mit RuBland. 

Russischer Butschafter hat heute vormittags Piisso zugestellt erhalten; er 
wird voraussichtlieh noch heute abreisen. 



58. 

Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. London, 4. August 1.914. 

Ich habe eben Sir E. Grey gesehen. Englische Regierung hat an Deutsch- 
land Ultimatum wegen Belgiens gerichtet, erwartet Antwort heute um Mitternacht. 

Sir E. Grey, sagte mir, er sehe vorlaufig keine Veranlassung zu einer Mitteilung 
an die k. u. k. Regierung und keine Ursache, mit uns in Konflikt zu geraten, 
solange wir nicht im Kiiegszustande mit Frankreich sind. Jedenfalls hoffe er, 
daB wir keine Feindseligkeiten eroftnen wiirden ohne vorherige Formalitat der 
Kriegserklarung. Er wird Sir M. de Bunsen nicht abberufen. 

Falls wir mit Frankreich im Kriegszustande wiiren, wiirde es fiir England 
als Bundesgenosse Frankreichs wohl schwer sein, mit demselben im Atlantisclien 
Meere zn kooperieren und nicht im Mittellandischen Meer. 



59. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzdpaYy in St. Petersburg. 

Telegramm. Wien, 5. August 1914. 

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem dortigen Minister des AuOern folgende 
Note zu ubergeben: 

„D'ordre de son Gouvernement, le soussigne 1 Ambassadeur d'Autricbe- 
Hongrie a l'honnenr de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des 
Affairos Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit: 

Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la 
Miiiiavchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie, et en presence du fait qu'en suite 
de ce conflit la Russie, d'apres une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru 
devoir ouvrir les hostility's contre 1'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve, par 
consequent, en etat de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autricbe-Hongrio se 
considers egalement en £tat de guerre avec la Russie." 

Nach Uberreichung dieser Note wollen Euer Exzellenz sich die Ausfertigung 
der Passe erbitten und unges'aumt mit dem gesamten Botsehaftspersonal, aus- 
genommen etwa zuriickzulassende Organe, abreisen. Herrn von Schebeko 
wenlen gleichzeitig unsererseits die passe zugestellt. 



60. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

Telegramm. Wien, 6. August 1914. 

Erbalten Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 4. 1. M. 

Icb ersuche Hochdieselben Sir E. Grey zu versichern, dafi wir keinesfalls 
ohne vorhergehende formelle Kriegserklarung Feindseligkeiten gegen England 
erbffnen wiirden, aber auch erwarteten, dall England uns gegeniiber ein analoges 
Verhalten beobachteu und vor Eintritt des formellen Kriegszustandes keine 
liostilen Akte gegen uns unternehmen werde. 



61. 
Graf SzScsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Paris, S. August 1914. 

Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a fait appeller pour me dire que, selon 
des renseignernents positifs qui lui seraient parvenus, le corps d'armee d'lnns- 
bruck serait transports a la frontiere francaise. Monsieur Doumergue desire 
savoir d'urgence si eette nouvelle est exacte et -au oas affirmatif quelles sont 
les intentions du Gouvernement I. et R. La France se trouvant en guerre avec 
l'Allemagne envoi de nos troupes a la frontiere francaise n'est pas compatible 
selon l'avis du Ministre avec Stat de paix existant entre FAutricbe-Hongrie et 
France. Monsieur Dumaine est charge 1 d'une demarche semblable aupres de 
Votre Excellence. 



62. 

Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz6csen in Paris. 
Telegramm. Wien, 9. August 1914. 

Mit Bezug auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 8. d. M. 

Nach mit Generalstab genommener Riiekspraehe ermiiehtige ich Euer 
ENzellenz, franzosischer Regirrung zu erklaren, dal) Nachrichten iiber Teilnahme 
unserer Truppen an deutsch-franzosischem Krieg vollstandig erfunden. Analog 
babe icb micb Herrn Dumaine gegeniiber ausgesprocben. 



63. 
Graf Szecsen an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Paris, 10. August 1914. 

Reeu telegramme du 9 aout. Ai immSdiatement communique 1 contenu a 
Monsieur Doumergue. Ministre qui avait reeu rapport telegraphique analogue 
de Monsieur Dumaine sur sa conversation avec Votre Excellence a reconnu 
que nos troupes ne se trouvaient pas a la frontiere francaise, mais il dit avoir 
renseignernents positifs qu'un corps d'armSe austro-bongrois a ete transports en 



110 

Allemagne, ce qui permet a celle-ci de retirer ses troupes des territoires 
allemands occup^s par nos soldats et constitue, selon avis du Miuistre, facili- 
tation des operations de guerre allemandes. J'ai a difterentes reprises attire 
attention da Ministre sur le texte de la re|>onse de Votre Excellence, il a 
reconnu qu'on no pouvait pas parler de participation effective de nos troupes 
a la guerre franco-allemande, mais il insista sur ce que presence de nos troupes 
sur territoire allemand £tait incontestable et que ceci constituait aide militaire 
pret£ a l'Allemagne. Dans ces conditions il a charge Ambassadeur de France 
a Vienne de dernander immfidiatement ses passeports et de quitter Vienne 
aujourd'hui avec tout le personnel de l'Ambassade. Le Ministre m'a dit que 
dans ces circonstances ma presence iei ne saurait efre d'aucune utility, mais 
que, vu excitation populaire, elle pourrait donner lieu a des incidents regret- 
tables qu'il de'sirerait e'viter. II m'a offert de mettre des ee soir un train a ma 
disposition pour quitter la France. J'ai repondu qu'il me serait impossible 
d'avoir instruction de Votre Excellence jusqu'au soir mais que, vu le rappel de 
Monsieur Dumaine, je le priai de me faire deRvrer mes passeports. 



64. 

Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 

117™, 11. August 1914. 

Franzosische Regierung hat ibren hiesigen Botschafter beauftragt, seine 
Passe mit der Motivierung zu verlangen, daft ein osterreichisch-ungarisches 
Armeekorps nach Deutschland entsendet worden sei, wodurch es der deutscben 
Heeresleitung ermoglicht wiirde, ihre Truppen aus den deutscben Gebieten 
zuriickzuziehen, welcbe von unseren Abteilungen besetzt seien. Diese Maflnahme 
unseres Generalstabes bedeute eine militarisehe Hilfeleistung an Deutschland. 

Euer ExzeUenz wollen zur Kenntnis der englischen Regierung bringen, 
dali den an zustandiger Stelle eingeholten lnformationen zufolge die 
franzosischerseits aufgestellte Behauptung unbegriindet ist. 



65. 
Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. London, 12. August 19 14. 

Jo viens de recevoir de. la part de Sir E. Grey la communication 
suivante: 

„Sur la demande du Gouvernement francais qui nest pas a me me do 
communiqucr directement avec Votre Gouvernement, j'ai a Vous faire la com- 
munication suivante: 

„Apres avoir declare la- guerre a la Serbie et pris ainsi la premiere initia- 
tive des hostility en Europe, le Gouvernement austro-hongmis s'est mis sans 
aucune provocation du Gouvernement do la Republique francaise en etat de 
guerre avec la France: 

I-. Apres que l'Allemagne avait succesivement declare' la guerre a la Russie 
et a la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en declarant la guerre a la 
Russie qui combattait deja aux cotes de la France. 

2. D'apres de nombreuses informations dignes de foi l'Autriche a envoyo 
des troupes sur la frontiere allemande dans des conditions qui constituent uno 
menace directe a 1'egard de la France. 

En presence de cet ensemble de faits le Gouvernement francais se voit 
oblige de declarer au Gouvernement austro-hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les 
niesures qui lui permettront de repondre a ees actes et a ces menaces." 

Sir E. Grey ajoute: Rupture avec la France ayant et£ amenee de 
cette maniere, le Gouvernement de Sa Majoste britannique se voit oblige 
d'annoncer que l'ctat de guerre existe entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Autriclie- 
Ilongrie a partir de minuit. 



66. 
Der japanische Botschafter an Graf Berchtold. 

Wien, 20. August 1914. 
Monsieur le Comte, 

No doubt Your Excellency have already been informed by His 
Excellency Baron Muller of the nature of the communication made 
ito the German Government by my Government on the 15 th inst. ; 
but, for Your Excellency's personal information, I beg to enclose 
therewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject 
although I have no instruction to do so. 



113 



The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present 
situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government 
for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the 
regions of Eastern Asia which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore 
in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese 
Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with 
a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on 
the 15"' of August 1914. 

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the 
waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels, which cannot 
be so withdrawn, to be disarmed. 

'2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without com- 
pensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau 
before the 16 th of September 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China. 

The Japanese Government have declared to the German Government that 
unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be 
received before noon of Sundav the 23 nl instant, the Japanese Government shall 
take such action as they deem necessary. 

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of 
time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should, 
unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese 
Government the latter will be obbged to take the necessary measures in order 
to accomplish their object. 

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude 
is, as already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests 
of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by con- 
solidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, 
and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a 
policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently, 
the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost 
care, the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to 
injure them. 



67. 
Graf Berchtold an Graf Clary in Brtissel. 

Telegramm. Wien, 22. August 1914. 

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem kbniglieh belgischen Minister des AuOern 
sofort folgendes mitzuteilen: 

„D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de notifier a Votre Excellence 
ce qui suit: 

Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse^ d'accepter les propositions qui lui 
avaient 6t6 adresse^es a plusieurs reprises par 1'Allemagne, prete sa cooperation 
militaire a la France et a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux, ont declare 
la guerre a l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient 
d'etre constats, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongro'is se trouvant en Belgique 
ont, sous les yeux des autorites Royales. du subir un traitement contraire anx 
exigences les plus primitives de l'numanite' et inadmissible meme vis-a-vis 
des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la necessity de rompre 
les relations diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en elat de guerre 
avec la Belgique. 

Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Legation et confie la protection 
de mes administr^s au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Ame>ique en Belgique. 

De la part du Gouvernement I. et R. les passeports sont remis au Comte 
Errcmbault de Dudzeele. 



68. 
Prinz Hohenlohe an Graf Berchtold. 

Telegramm. Berlitz, 23. August 1914. 

Dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager wurde heute durch das Aus- 
wartige Amt mitgeteilt, dafl die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung nicht die Absicht 
habe, eine Antwort auf das japanisehe Ultimatum zu erteilen. Die deutsche 
Regierung habe ihrem Botschafter in Tokio den Auftrag erteilt, naeh Ablauf 
der von Japan fur heute 12 Uhr gestellten Frist Japan zu verlassen und sie 
werde zu gleicher Zeit dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager seine Passe 
zustellen. 

Zu Mittag wurden dann dem Herrn Geschaftstrager die Passe zugestellt 
und wird derselbe mit dem Botschaftspersonal Berlin morgen friih verlassen. 



69. 
Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio. 

Telegramm. Wien, 24. Augtist 1914. 

Der Kommandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" erhielt den Auftrag, in Tsingtau 
mitzuk'ampfen. Ersuche Euer Exzellenz, mit Riicksicht auf das Vorgehen Japans 
gegen das uns verbiindete Deutsche Reich Ihre Passe zu verlangen. Konsulate 
zu verstandigen und mit Kolonie und Botschafts- und Konsulatspersonal nach 
Amerika abzureisen. Schutz unserer Staatsangehorigen und Interessen wollen 
Euer Exzellenz amerikanischem Botsehafter anvertrauen. Hiesigem japanischen 
Botschafter werden Passe zugestellt. 



ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE. 



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. 






m 




.: *;>* 



■ M - 



J3 

W 



Correspondance diplomatique 



RELATIVE A LA 



Guerre de 1914. 



(24 JUILLET-29 AOUT. 



ANVERS. 

I.WRIMERIE ET PUBLICITE FtOR BURTON. SOCIETE ANONVME. 
COURTE RUE NEUVE. 28. 



TABLE DES MATIERES. 



Dat( 



24 juillei 
24 juillet 



25 juillet 
26juillet 

27 juillet 



28juiUet 
2!< juillet 



M. Davignon aux Legatior 
A Paris, Berlin, Londre: 
Vienne et S'-Petersbourg. 



M Davignon aux Legations 
a Rome. La Haye et Lu- 
xembourg. 



Le Comte Clary et Aldringen 
a M. Davignon. 



Le Baron Beyens a M. Davi- 
gnon. 



Le Comte Errembault de 
Dudzeele a M. Davignon. 

M. Davignon aux Legations. 
A. Berlin. Pans. Londres. 
Vienne. Saint-Pelersbourg. 
Rome. ,La Haye. Luxem- 
bourg. 



M. Davignon a tous les Chefs 
a l'etranger. 



Le Baron Beyens a, M. Davi- 
gnon. 



Communication du texte de rultimatum aus- 
tro-hongrois a la 'Serbie 



Envoi d'une note a remettre eventuellement 
aux Ministres respectifs des Affaires Etran- 
geres pour leur faire connaitre la volonte 
de la Belgique de rester neutre en cas de 
conflit europeen 

Les dites Legations remettront aux Ministres 
des Affaires Etrangeres une note identique 
a'celle qui aura ele- communiques aux cinq 
Puissances garantes de la neutrality beige. 

Communication de la r£ponse du Gouverne- 
ment serbe a 1'ultimatum austro-hongrois. 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois juge la 
reponse de la Serbie insuffisante et rompt 
les relations diplomatiques avec elle. . . . 



Le Gouvernement britannique propose l'inter- 
vention a Vienne et a Saint-Petersbourg de 
l'Angleterre, de la France, de 1'AllemagTie 
et de l'ltalie pour trouver un terrain de con- 
ciliation. L'AUemagne seule n'a pas encore 
repondu 



Le Gouvernement beige a mis l'arm^e sur le 
pied de paix renforc6. Cette mesure ne doit 
pas etre confondue avec la mobilisation. . 



La France donne l'assurance a la Belgique 
qu'aucune incursion des troupes franchises 
n'aura lieu en Belgique mSme si des forces 
importantes etaient massees sur les fron- 
tieres beiges 

La mobilisation de l'armSe beige est deb- 
tee et le samedi l er aout en est le premier 
jour 

Le Gouvernement anglais a demand^ sSpare- 
ment aux Gouvernements francais et alle- 
mand si chaeun d'eux etait pret a respecter 
la neutrality de la Belgique pourvu que 
l'autre Puissance ne la viole pas 

Le Baron van der Elst rappelle au Ministre 
d'Allemagne les assurances donnees par 
1'Empire a la Belgique au sujet du respect 
de sa neutrality 

La France a accepts la proposition de l'An- 
gleterre de ne pas violer la neutrality beige 
dans le cas ou celle-ci serait respecter par 
l'Allemagne. (Voir n° 11.) 

L'AUemagne refuse de repondre a la proposi- 
tion anglaise de respecter la neutralit6 de 
la Belgique. (Voir n° 11.) 

La France explique les conditions dans las- 
quelles elle respectera la neutrality de la 
Belgique 



M Davignon aux Legations 
a Rome. La Haye, Luxem- 
bourg. 

M Eyschen A M. Davignon 



M. Davignon aux Legations 
pre.s des Puissances garan- 



M. de Below Saleske a M. 
Davignon. 

Entrevue entre M de Below 
Saleske "et le Baron van 
der Elst. 



M Davignon aux Legations 
;i Pans, Londres, Vienne. 
Berlin, s;nnt-Fetersbouig, 
La Haye. 

M Da\u'non aux Legations 
a. Berlin. Paris. Londres. 
Vienne et S l -P£tersbourg 

S. M. le Roi a S M le Roi 
d'Angleterre. 

Le Comte de Lalaing 'a. M 

Davignon. 



M. de Below Saleske a M 
Davignon. 



Sir F H Villiers a M Da\i- 



Le Baron Fallon a M Dav 



Ex6cutez les instructions donnt-es par la let- 
tre du 24 juillet (voir n u 2} 

Ex6cutez les instructions donnees par la let- 
tre du 2o juillet (voir n° 3) 

Le President du Gouvernement luxembour- 
geois proteste contre La violation de la neu 
le.iltte du Grand-Duche garantie par le traite 
de Londres de 18S7 

Le Minisire de France a rendu publique sa 
declaration du 1" aout. La Belgique atta- 
cherait le plus grand prix a recevoir de 
l'AUemagne une assurance analogue & celle 
donnee par la France 

Remise de l'ultimatum de l'AUemagne. L'Em- 
pire somme la Belgique de ne pas s'opposer 
au passage des troupes allemandes. . . . 

L'AUemagne se plaint a la Belgique de la 
violation de ses frontieres par des dirigea- 
bles et une patrouille venant de France. 

Response du Gouvernement beige a l'ultima- 
tum allemand. La Belgique ne peut faillir 
aux devoirs que lui imposent les traites 
de 1839. ..." 

Tfilegramme adressf pour faire connaitre aux 
Ministres du Roi pies des grandes Puissan- 
ces le sens de l'ultimatum allemand et de 
la reponse du Gouvernement beige. . . . 

La Belgique a fait savoir a la France que 
pour l'instant elle ne faisait pas appel 4 la 
garantie des Puissances Elle apprGciera 
ulterieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire 

La Belgique fait un supreme appel au Gou- 
vernement anglais pour la sauvegarde de 
sa neutrality 

L'Angleterre declare qu'elle fera la guerre a 
l'AUemagne si la neutrality de la Belgique 
est- violee. (Voir n° 23 ) 

L'AUemagne executera. au besoin par la force 
des armes, les mesures de s£curit£ qu'elle 
juge indispensables vis a ' vis des menaces 
franchises 

L'Angleterre s'attend a ce que la Belgique r6- 
siste par tous les moyens possibles a la 
pression de l'Allemagne tendant a lui faire 
abandonner son nMe de pays neutre et a ce 
qu'elle fasse appel aux Puissances garantes 

La Hollande fait savoir au Gouvernement 

' beige qu'elle sera peut-£tre obligee d'insti- 

tuer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre. . . 

Violation du territoire national a Gemmenich 



M. de Below Saleske a M. 
Davignon. 



M. Davignon au Baron Gre- 

nier. 



Remise des passeports au Ministre d'Alle- 
magne • • 

L'AUemagne remet aux Etats-Unis le soin de 
la protection des interets allemands en 
Belgique 

Le Gouvernement beige demande au Gouver- 
nement espagnol de se charger de la pro- 
tection des intents beiges en Allemagne. . 



N° 


Date | 


1 


RESUME 


Pago 


34 


4 aout 


M. Davignon au Baron 
Beyens. 




12 


35 


4 aout 


Le Baron Beyens k M. Davi- 
gnon. 


Discours prononce' par M. de Bethmann-Hol- 
- weg au Reichstag et dans kquel le Chance- 
lier de l'Empire reconnait que l'Allemagne 
commet une injustice en passant outre aux 
protestations des Gouvernements luxem- 
bourgeois et beige 


IS 


36 


4 aout 


Le Comte de Lalaing a M. 
Davignon. 


Expose de l'attitude de l'Angleterre dans le 
conflit europGen 


1.1 1 


37 


4 aout 


Le Comte de Lalaing a M. 
Davignon (telegramme). 


L'Angleterre s'attend a ce que la Norvege. 
la Hollande et la Belgique rSsistent a la 
pression de l'Allemagne et gardent la neu- 
trality Elles seront soutenues dans ce cas 


13 


38 


4 aout 


M. Davignon aux Minislres 
du Boi a Paris. Londres et 

Saint-Petersbourg. 


Resum6 de la situation diplomatique. Comme 
aucun fait de guerre ne s'est produit a 1'ex- 
piration de rultimatum. le Conseil des 
Ministres a decide, le 3 aout, a 10 heures. 
de ne pas encore faire appel aux Puissan- 
ces garantes 


13 


39 


4 aout 


Le Comte de. Lalaing a M. 
Davignon. 


L'Angleterre a somme PAllemagne de respec- 
ter la neutrality de la Belgique. L'ultimatum 
expire a minuit 


14 


40 


4 aout 


M. Davignon aux Ministres 
de Grande Bretagne. Fran- 
ce et Bussie a Bruxelles. 


Les forces allemandes ayant penStre en Bel- 
gique, le Gouvernement du Roi fait appel 
a l'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie 
pour cooperer, comme garantes. a la defense 
de son territoire 


14 


41 


5 aoOt 


Le Comte de Lalaing a M 
Davignon. 


L'Angleterre a declare la guerre a l'Allema- 


15 


42 


5 aoiit 


M. Davignon aux Legations 
k Paris, Londres et Saint- 
Petersbourg. 


La Belgique fait appel aux Puissances ga- 
rantes de sa neutrality 


15 


43 


5 aout 


M. Davignon aux Legations 
a Paris, Londres et Saint- 
Petersbourg. 


Expose de la situation diplomatique. . 


15 


44 


5 aout 


M. Davignon a tous les Chefs 
de mission a l'etranger. 


En vi de Particle 10 de la V 6 Convention de 
La Haye de 1907, la Belgique, en repoussant 
par la force une atteinte a sa neutrality, 
ne pose pas un acte hostile 


15 


45 


5 aout 


Le Baron Beyens a M. Davi- 
gnon. 


La Mission da Roi en Allemagne quittera 


15 


46 


5 aout 


Le Baron Grenier a M. Davi- 
gnon. 


Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge de la 
protection ties interets beiges en Allemagne. 


16 


41 


5 aout 


Le Baron Guillaume a M 
Davignon. 


L'Allemagne a declare" la guerre a la France 


16 


48 


5 aout 


Sir F H. Villiers a M. Davi- 
gnon. 


L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme ga- 
rante a la defense du territoire beige. . . 


16 


49 


5 aout 


Le Comte de Lalaing a M. 
Davignon. 


La flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage 
de l'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvers. 


16 


50 


5 aout 


Le Baron Fallon a M. Davi- 


Le balisage de guerre va etre etabll (Voir 




51 


5 aout 


M. Davignon au Baron Gre- 
nier. 


Le Gouvernement du Roi remercie le Gouver- 
nement espagnol de bien vouloir se charger 
de la protection des interets beiges en Alle- 




52 


5 aout 


M. Davignon aux Legations 
a Paris. Londres et Saint- 
Petersbourg. 


La France et la Russie acceptent de cooperer 
avec l'Angleterre a la defense du territoire 


16 







S a out 
9 aoiil 



M de w eede a M Da^ 11 non 

M Davignon au Bai n I al 

Ion 

Le Baton Fallon a Al. Davi- 
M Davignon au Baron Fal- 



M D ivie i aux i i ration 

,i Paris el a Londi I li 
gramme 



Le Baron Fallo 



M Davignon aux 

n de Ru: sie el 

I I 



M Davignon au x I 
a Londres, Paris el Sai 
P6tersbourg. 



M. Brand Whitlock a M Da 
\ ignon 

n \ rs a M Davi- 

. J] 



M Klobukbwski 



Le Baron Fallon a M Davi- 
gnon. 

M. Davignon au Baron Pal- 



'.nmniuiiii.'.iUon <ie la declaration de neutra- 
liti ■ Pays Bas dans la guerre entre la 
Belgique et I'Allemagne 

R6glementation de la navigation commerciale 
n i Esc mi (Voir n ■ 50 ) 

Meme sujet 

M ime ■ ii jet 

Le Gouvernement Lielge souhaite que la guerre 
n - .. nde pas en Afrique centrale. Les Gou- 
vernements francais et anglais se rallient- 
ils ;i notre proposition de neutraliesr le 
' i in i onventionnel du Congo 

! i ttre pour expliquer le telegramme precedent 



La France reserve sa reponsi La pro] 
beige de neutraliser le bassin du Congo. 

Communication d'une nouvelle proposition de 
I'Allemagne reproduisant l'ultimatum du 

.... 

Le Gouvernement francais esl dispose a pro- 
i lamei la neutrality du bassin du Congo 
(Voir n° i9 

I'ransmission du texte allemand (contenanl 
Line faute) de la seconde proposition de 

l*Emi ■! d'une traduction [conti ■ 

autre en i d cette iei ■ 

l e « iom ernemenl a i ecu Les nou> i 11 
sitions «in Gouvernement allemand et y 
repondra prochainement, ... 

■ hi .ouvenitTnent allemand le sn 
qu'il attache au mot ■ auseinandi i 

Le i vernemenl du Roi communique aux 

Repn sentants des Puissances gai mti - le 
,,..,:,. de la seconde note allemande ainsi que 
i ,, de la response qu'il -■■ propose de i irt 
a cette communication 

embou oi it prii 

■ in Roi pres la i oui Gr; nd-Dui all 
de quitter Luxemb i V'u les < rconstances 
le Gouvernemenl belgi n'a p . pris urn me 

ie a ■ I ■ esentanl tlu 

Luxemboui Bru: 1 1 - 

i i ; * .: \. Lqu i u cepti ni de i ro- 
■ ■ i en Belgiqut 

ive la repon e que 
le G iuvi 1 1 emenl bi tge propose d ■ 
second ultimatum de I'Allemagne. (Voir 

M ' ' ■ 

rnement de la R6publique donne 

,..!:,, fe] I i a ce projet 
d ■ reponse (Voir n° 65 I 

Le ti xte allemand contenait une faute I ■ 

ti i onflit avec la Franca ■ 

i | ■ position allemande repri 

osition formulee dans l'ultimatum du 
2 aoat. La Belgique ne peul (rue n 
reponse a eel ultimatum. 



N* 


Date 




RESUME 


Pace 


72 


13 aout 


M. Sazonow a M. Davignon. 


Le Gouvernement russe felicite la Belgique 

de son attitude ferine et digne, (Voir n° 65.) 


22 


73 


13 aout 


Le Baron Fallon a M. Davi- 
gnon. 


La reponse du Gouvernement beige a la se- 
conde proposition allemande a et6 remise 
le 13 aout 


22 


74 


16 aotit 


Le Baron Guillaume a M. 
Davignon. 


La France n'est plus d'avis de neutraliser le 
bassin conventional du Congo, (Voir n ' 57 


Zl 


75 


17 aout 


Le Comte de Lalaing a M. 
Davignon. 


Le Gouvernement anglais refuse de se rallier 
& la proposition beige de neutraliser le bas- 


23 


76 


£6 aout 


M. Tombeur a M. Renkin. 


Les Allemands ont attaque le 22 aout le 


23 


77 


28 aout 


Le Comte Clary a M. Davi- 
gnon. 


L'Autriche-Hongrie declare la guerre a la 


23 


78 


29 aout 


M. Davignon au Baron Fal- 
lon. 


Reponse du Gouvernement beige a la declara- 
tion de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie. . . 


23 


79 


29 aout 


M. Davignon a tous les Chefs 
de mission a 1'etranger. 


Renseignement sur des allegations alleman- 
des contre la Belgique mentionnees au Blue 


24 



CORRESPONDANCE DIPLOMATIQUE 

RELATIVE 

A LA GUERRE DE 1914. 

(24 juillet— 29 aout.) 



Lellre adresste par le Ministre du Roi a 
Vienne a M . Davignon, Ministre des Af /aires 
Elrangeres 

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'lionneur de vous faire parvenir, sous 
ce pli, le texte de l'ultiinatum de FAutriche- 
Hongrie a la Serbie. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Comte Errembault de Dudzeele. 
Annexe au N» 1. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est 
vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, 
par l'entremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal 
a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement 
Royaf de Serbie : 

■ Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie a 
Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, 
au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal la decla- 
ration suivante : 

ii La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas et6 
atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli 
cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se con- 
formera par consequent a telle decision que 
les Puissances prendront par rapport a Farti- 
cle 25 du Traits de Berlin. Se rendant aux 
conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie 
s'engage des a present a abandonner l'attitude 
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a obser- 
ved a regard de l'annexion depuis Fautomne 
dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer 
le cours de sa politique actuelle envcrs FAu- 
triche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette 
derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. » 

Or, l'histoire des dernieres annexes, et notam- 
ment les ev6nements douloureux du 28-juin, 
ont demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mou- 
vement subversif dont le but est de detacher 
de la Monarchie austro-hongroise .certaines 
parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui 
a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement 
serbe, est arrive a se manifester au dela du 
territoire du royaume par des actes de terro- 
risme, par une serie d'attentats et par des 
meurtres. 

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satis- 
faire aux engagements formels contenus dans 
la declaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait 
pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a tolere 
i'activite criminelle des diffexentes societ^s et 
affiliations dingoes contre la Monarchie, le 
langage effrene de la presse, la glorification 
des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'offi- 



ciers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse- 
ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine 
dans l'instruction publique, tolere enfin toutes 
les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la 
population serbe a la haine de la Monarchic 
et au mepris de ses institutions. 

Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement 
Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment 
oil les evenemenls du 28 juin dernier en ont 
demontrti au monde entier les consequences 
funestes. 

II resulte des depositions et aveux des au- 
teurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que 
le meurtre de Sarajevo a fete tram6 a Belgrade, 
que les armes et explosits donl lis nirurlriers 
se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes 
par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes fai- 
sant partie de la nNarodna Odbrana", et enfin 
que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de 
leurs armes a ete organist et effectue par des 
chefs du service-frontiere serbe. 

Les r£sultats mentionnfe de l'instruction ne 
permettent pas au Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude 
de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observer 
pendant des ann^es vis-a-vis des agisseinrnis 
concentres a Belgrade et propages de la sur 
les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats 
lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre 
fin a des menses qui forment une menace 
perpetuelle pour la tranquillity de la Monar- 
chie. 

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouver- 
nement Imperial et Royal se voit oblige de 
demander au Gouvernement serbe l'enoncia- 
tion offioielle qu'il condamne la propaganda' 
dirigee cnnlre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, 
e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspi- 
ri'iil en dernier lieu a deliii'tier de la Monar- 
chie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il 
s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, 
cette propagande criminelle et terroriste. 

Afin de donner un caractere solennel a cet 
engagement, le Gouvernement Royal.de Serbie 
fi t.i i Miblier a la premiere page du "Journal 
officiels en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) I'enon- 
ciation suivante : 

ii Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie con- 
damne la propagande dinge> contre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances 
.Tui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui 
en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les 
consequences funestes de ces agissements cri- 
minels. 

» Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des 
officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient parli- 
cipe a la propagande susmentionnee et com- 
promis par li les .relations de bon voisinage 



auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'^tait solen- 
nellement engage par sa declaration du 31 
mars 1909. 

» Le Gouvernement Royal, qui dfeapprouve 
et repudie toute id6e du tentative d'immixiion 
dans les destinfes des habitants de quelque 
partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soil, con 

sidere de sun devoir d'avertir for llemenl 

les offjciers, les fonetionnaires et tout.- la po 
pulation du royaume que dorenavant il pro- 
cedera avec la derniere nsueur contre les 
personnes qui se rendraient coupables de 
pareils agissements qu'il mettra tons ses ef- 
forts a prevenir et a reprimer. » 

Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement 
a I i connaissance de l'Armee.Royale par un 
ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera 
publiee dans le "Bulletin officiel.. de l'armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en 
outre: 

1° a supprinur toute publication qui excite 
a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie el 
dont la tendance gene>ale est dirigeis contre 
son inlegnte territoriale, 

2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite 
« Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer to 

moyens de propagande, et h pr der di la 

meme maniere contre les autres societes el 
affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la pro- 
pagande contre la Monarchie austro hongroi- 
se; le Gouvernement Royal prendra lis mesu- 
res necessaires pour que lis societes rl 
ne jmissent pas continuer leur ai livik- sous un 
autre nom et sous une autre forme, 

3° a elimincr sins delai .1.- l'instruction 
publique en Serbie, tint on ce qui concerne 
U- corps enseignanl que Irs moyens destruc- 
tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a 
fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche- 
Hongrie, 

V a eloigner du service militaire et de 
['administration en general tons les officiers 
et fonetionnaires coupables de In propa>.,inile 
contre la Monarchie auslro-hungroise el ■). ,n I 
le Gouvernement Imperial ef Royal 
de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gou- 
vernement Royal, 

5" a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des 
organes du Gouvernement Imperial it Ro il 
dans la suppression du mouvement subversif 
dirige contre l'integrite territoriale de la Mo 
narchie, 

6° a ouvrir une enqueue judiciaire contre les 
partisans du complol du 28 juin se trouvant 
sur territoire serbe; 

des organes, delevues par le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal, prendronl pari aux recher- 
ches y relatives 

7° a proceder d'urgence a I'arrestation du 
Commandant Voija Tankosic el du nomine 
Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de l'Etat serbe.com 

promts par les resultats de I'instrucl de 

Sarajevo, 

8" a empScher, par des mesures efficaces, 
le concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic 
illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la 
frontiere; 

a licencier et punir severement les fonetion- 
naires du serviee-froniieiv de Schabatz et de 
Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du 
crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage 
de la frontiere, 

9° a donner au Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal des explications sur les propos injus- 
tifiahles de hauts fonetionnaires serbes tant 
en Serbie qua l'elranger, qui, malgre leur 



position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres l'at- 
tentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des 
interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin 

to" d'avertir sins retard, le Gouvernement 
Imperial el Royal de I'execution des mesures 
comprises dans les points precedents. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial el Ro; al attend 
la reponse du Gouvernemenl Royal au plus 
l.'inl jusqu'au sumedi, 2£ de ce mois, a 6 hcu- 
n du soir 

Un memoire concernanl les resultats de ['in- 
struction ile Sarajevo a I'egard di s fonction 
naires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 esl annexe 
a cette note 

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter voire Excellence de 
vouloir purler le contenu de cede note a la 
connaissance du Gouvernemenl aupres duquel 
vous etes accredits, en accompagnanl cette 
communication du commentaire que voici : 

Le 31 mars 1909, le Gouvernement Roval 
serbe a adresse a I'Autriche-Hongrie la decla- 
rati lonl le texte esl reprbduil ci-dessus. 

Le Iendemain meme de cette declaration la 
Serbie s'esl engagee dans une politique ten- 
dant a inspirer des Kites subversives aux res- 
sortiss ints - rbi - de i i Monarchie austro-hon- 
groise et a prep irer ainsi la si p iration des 
territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la 
Serbie. 

La Serine devint le foyer d'une agitation 
criminelle. 

Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas 
a se former qui, soil ouvertement, soil, cl.m- 
destinement, etaionl destinies a creer des dfc- 
ordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois i !i s 
- 'ei'i: 5 et affiliations comptent parmi leurs 
membres des generauj el des diplomates, di s 
fonetionnaires d'Etat el des juges, bref les 
sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du 
royaume. 

Le jnurnalisnie serbe est presque entiere- 
meiii au service de cette propagande, dirigee 
contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne 
passe sans que les organes de la pressi ■ rbi 
n exciti 'lit leurs lecteurs a la haine et au m£- 
pns de la Monarchie voisine ou a des attentats 
diriges plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa 
Mini,' el son integrite. 

In grand nombre d'agents est appele. a sou- 
tenir par Ions les moyens l'agitation contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie el a corrompre dans les 
provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays 

L'espril conspirateur des politiciens 
esprit dont les annates du royaume portent 
les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recru- 
descence depuis la derniere ense lialkanique 
des individus ayanl fait partie des bandes jus- 

qno-la OCCUpeeS en Mae, di une sent Venus se 

nieiire ei 1 1 disposition de la propagande ter- 
roriste contre I'Autrfche-Hongrii 

En pri sence de ces agissements, auxquels 
I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des n 
nei - le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pa? 
cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'esJ 
ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque 1 au 
devoir que lui imposait la declaration solen- 
nelle du 31 mars 1909, et e'est ainsi qu'il s'est 
mis en c mtradiction avec la volonle de I'Eu- 
rope et avec 1'engagemenl qu'il avail pris vis- 
a-vis de I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal ii I'egard de 1'attitude provocatrice 
d ■ I i s irbie i tail inspiree du desinteressemenl 
territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise 
et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe fini- 



rait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste 
valeur l'amitie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En ob- 
servant une attitude bienveillante pour les 
interels politiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royau- 
me se deciderait finalement a suivre de son 
cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autri- 
chi Hongrie s'attendait surtout ii une pareille 
evolution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, 
lorsque, apres les evenements de l'annee 1912, 
le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal rendit pos- 
sible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans 
rancune, t'agrandissement si considerable de 
la Serbie. 

Cette bienveillance manifestee par l'Autri- 
che-Hongrie a l'egard de l'Etat voisin n'a ce- 
pi ndant aucunement modifie les precedes du 
royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son 
territoire une propagande, dont les funestes 
consequences se sont manifestoes au monde 
entier le 28 juin dernier, jour oii l'heritier 
presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre 
epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot 
trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cet etat de choses le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider 
a entreprendre de nouvellcs et pressantes de- 
marches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouver- 
nement serbe a arr^ter le mouvement incen- 
diaire menacant la surete et 1'integrite de la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est per- 
suade qu'en entreprenant cette demarche il 
se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments 
de toutes les nations civilisees.qui ne sauraii i 
admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont 
on puisse se servir impuneinenl dans la lutte 
politique, et que la paix europeerme fut con- 
tinuellement troublee par les agissements par- 
tant de Belgrade 

C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le 
Gouvernement Imperial el Royal tient a la 
disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Gran- 

de-Bretagne un dossier elucidanl les mi - 

serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menees 
et le meurtre du 28 juin 

Une communication identique est adressee 
aux representanls Imperiaux et Royaux au- 
pres des autres Puissances signataires. 

Vous etes aulorise de laisser une copie de 
cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Mi- 
nistre des Affaires Elrangeres. 

Vienne le 24 juillet 1914. 



Annexe. 

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tri- 
bunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrila Princip el 
consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity 
y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin 
dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations 
suivanles 

1" Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, 
"lors de son sejour a Sarajevo, 1'Archiduc 
Francois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par 
Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le noni- 
me Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec 
le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic. 

2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning 
avec munition, moyennant lesquels les inal 
faiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livres 
a. Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez 
par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le comman- 
dant Voija Tankosic 



3" Les bombes sont des grenades a la main 
provenant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe 
a Kragujevac. 

4° Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, 
Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et 
Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et 
donna, dans une forfil pres du champ de tir 
a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets 
Browning a Princip et Grabez. 

5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabri- 
novic ct Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bos- 
nie-Herzegovine et d'y introduire clandestine- 
ment leur contrebande d'armes, un sysUVme 
de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. 

D'apres cette organisation l'introduction en 
Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs 
armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres 
de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Lozniea ainsi 
que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loz- 
niea avec le concours de divers particuliers. 



N" 2. 

Leitre adressee par M Davignon, Mvnish 
des Ajfairi . Hrange-res, aux Xfinislres <hi ll"i 
a Pans, Berlin, Londres, I ienne et Saini- 

Phersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet I'M i 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demande si, 
dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait 
pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont 
garanti son independance et sa neutralite, une 
communication destinee a leur confirmer sa 
resolution de remplir les devoirs internatio- 
naux que lui imposent les traites au 'is cu une 
guerre viendrait a eclater aux frontieres de la 
Belgique- 

II a ete amene h la conclusion qu'une telle 
communication serait prematuree. a l'heure 
presente mais que les en'enements pourraient 
s; precipiter el ne point lui laisser le temps 
de (aire parvenir, au moment voulu, les 
instructions opportunes a ses representants 
a l'etranger. 

Dans cette situation, j!ai propose au Roi et 
a mes collegues du Cabinet, qui se sont ral- 
lies a ma maniere de voir, de vous donner, 
des a pressnt, des indications precises sur la 
demarche que vous auriez a faire si l'eventua- 
Iite d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait 
plus menacante. 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre 
signee, mais mm datee dont vous aurez a don- 
iH i' lecture el a laisser copie an Ministre 'les 
Affaires etrangeres si les circonstances exigent 
cette communication. 

Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le nio- 
ment d'agir. 

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a l'heure 

oil la miil>ilif.il I' l'armee beige sera de-- 

cretee, si. contrairement a noire sincere espoir, 
el aux apparences de solution paoifique, nos 
i nseignements nous amenaient a prendre 
cette inesure extreme de precaution. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

Annexe au N° 2. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La situation internationale est grave; l'even- 
tualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs puissances 



ne peut filre 6cart6e dcs preoccupations du 
gouvernement du Roi. 

La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupu- 
lous- exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que 
lui imposent les traitfe du 10 avril 1839. Ces 
devoirs, elle s'attachera infibranlablement a 
les remplir, quelles que soienl les circonstan- 
ces. 

Les dispositions amicales dcs puissances a 
son egard ont ete affirmees si souvenl que la 
Belgique a la contiance de voir son territoire 
demeurer hors de toute atteinte si .lis Imsli- 
liles venaienl a se produire a ses frontieres. 

Toutes lis mesures necei res pour assurer 

I'observation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas 

ii i- ete prises oar te Gouvernement du Roi. 

L'armec beige est mobilised el se porte sur 

les posil sstrategiq u .1 - poui assurer 

la defense du pays i ' Ii n p ct d. i neutra- 
lity Li s forts d'Anvers i ! di la Mi use sont 
• ii etal de defense. 

II esl a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Mi- 
nistry d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesu- 
res. Elles n'onl d'autre but que de mettre la 
Belgique en situation de remplir ses obliga- 
tions internationales; i Hi 3 ne soul et n'ont pu 
etn inspires, cela \ a de soi, m par le dessein 
de prendre pari a une lutte arm£e des puis- 
s nun s in par iin sentimenl de defiance envers 
aucune d'elles 

Mr conformant aux ordres recus, j'ai l'hon- 
neur de remettre a Voire Excellence une copie 
ii- l.i .I. claration du gouvernemenl .In Roi el 
tie La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte. 

Une em unication identique a ele faite aux 

autres Puissances garantes de la neutrality 
beige 

Je saisis, etc. 



lellrc adressee par 1/ Davignon, Minis/re 
des Affaires Elrangen - aui Minislres du [tin 
n Rome, I a lliiin- el Luxembourg. 

Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1914 

Monsieur Ii Ministre, 

J'ai adresse a vos Collegues accredits au- 
pres des Puissances garantes dc I'indfipen- 
dance et de la neutrality de la Belgique one 
circulaire, sins date, dont vous trouverez le 
texle sens ce pli. 

Si la menace dune guerre franco-allemande 
devenail imminente, cette circulaire serail 
communiquee aux Gouvemements des Puis- 
- inces garantes, pour leur faire connaitre no- 
i i, olution bien arretee de remplir les de- 
voirs intemationaux que nous imposenl les 
trades de 1839 

La communication donl il s'agit ne serait 

efn - in [ue sur un ordre teleigraphique de 

in. i part 

Si les eiiv. instances m'amenent a donner cet 
ordre, je vous prierai, egalement par la voie 

lelem'aplnque, de dollller laissaliee de no- 
ire demarche an gouvernemenl aupres duque! 

vous .1. - i. .hie. . ii lui communiquanl une 

copie dc la circulaire ci-jointe, a litre de ren- 
s. i- le ment, et sans demander qu'il vous soil 
donne aclc de cette . ommunication 
Mon telegramme vous indiquerait, eventuel- 

leineni, l.i date qui devrait etre attril e a 

la circulaire, dale que vous auriez sum d'in- 
senre sur la copie que vous remettriez au 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 



II va de soi que la presente depeche et Son 
annexe doivent consfrver un caractere slnc- 
tement confidentiel, jusqu'au recu de nouvei- 
les instructions dc ma part. 

(s) Davignon, 

Annexe au N" 3. 

(Voir I'annexe au N" 2.) 



I.i-iin- adressie par h Ministre au Roi <i Bel- 
grade a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Belgrade, le 25 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous 
ce pli, le texte de la reponse faite par le gou- 
vernement serbe a la communication austro- 
hongroise du 10/23 juillet. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Michotte de Welle. 

Annexe au N" 4. 

Le Gouvernemenl Royal serbe a urn la 
communication du Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal du lo de ce mois et il est persuade que 
,i i ' is . loignera loul malentendu qui me- 
nace de gatcr les bons rapports de voisinage 
entre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et le 
Royauine de Serine. 

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les 
protestations qui out apparu taut de la tribune 
ile In Skoupchtina nalionale que dans les de- 
clarations et les actes des representants res- 
ponsables de 1'Elat, protestations qui furent 
. nip. courl par les declarations du Gouver- 
nement serbe, fades le 18 mars 1909, ue se 
soul, plus reii.eivelees vis-a-vis de la grande 
Monai'clue voisine en aucune occasion et que, 
depuis ce temps, autanl de la part des Gouver- 
nemcnls Royaux qui se sont succede que de 
la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a 
ele faite clans le but de changer l'etat de 
choses politique el juridique cree en Bosnie 
.1 Herzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal con- 
state que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune represen- 
tation, Sllll ell re i|iil e.meenie tin llVTC SCO- 

l.iue el .in sujel de laquelle le ( 1< ui vcrncment 
Imperial et Royal a recu une explication en- 
h. rem. el siilisi.iisaiile La Serbie a de nom- 
breuses fois donne des preuves de sa politique 
pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la 
ense balkanique, el c'esl grace a la Serbie 
el au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans I'interet 
exclusil de la paix europeenne que cette paix 
a ete prcservee. Le Gouvernement Royal nc 
p. id pas etre rendu responsable pour les 
manifestations d'un caractere prive, telles que 
les articles des journaux el le travail paisible 
des societes, manifestations qui se produisent 
dans presque Ions les pays comme une chose 
ordinaire el qui 6chappe, en regie generate, 

in troli officiel.d'autant moins que le G'ou- 

vei'ie mi ui i: ^al, lore de la solution de toute 
un.- serie di questions qui se s<.nl presentees 
entre la Serine el I" ^utriche-Hongrie, a inontre 
une grande provenance et a rcussi, de cette 
fa.;. hi, a en reel. a le plus grand nombre au 
profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 



C'est pourquoi le Gouvernemeht Royal a 
Hi peniblement surpris par les affirmations, 
d'apres lesquelles des personnes du Royaume 
de Serbie auraient participiS a la preparation 
de 1 attentat commis a Saraji i/o . attendail 
a ce qu'il soit invite a collabon r a ta recherche 
de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime, et it 
etait pret, pour prouver son entiere correc- 
tion, a agir contre toutes les personnes a re- 
gard desquelles des communications lui se- 
raient faites, se rendant done au desir du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est dispose 1 
a remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans 
egard a sa situation et a son rang, pour la 
complicity duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, 
des preuves lui seraient fournies, et speciale- 
ment, il s'engage a faire publier a la premiere 
page du "Journal officieln en dale du 13.(20) 
jmllet, t'enonciation suivante : 

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condam- 
ne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre 
1'Aulnche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des 
tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu ii deta- 
cher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des 
territoires qui en font parlie, et il deplore sin- 
cerement les consequences funestes de ces 
agissements criminels.Le Gouvernement Royal 
regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires 
serbes aient participe, d'apres la communica- 
tion du Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a 
'la propagande susmentionnee, et compromis 
par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquel- 
lcs 1c Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solen- 
nellement engage par sa declaration du 31 
mars 1909, qui desapprouve et repudie toute 
idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les 
destinees des habitants de quelque partie de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de 
son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers 
et fonctionnaires et toute la population du 
royaume que, dorenavant, il procedera avec 
la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui 
se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, 
qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a 
reprimer.w 

Cette enonciation sera portee a la connais- 
sance de l'armee Royale par un ordre du jour, 
au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi, par Son Altesse 
Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera 
publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel de 
l'armee. 

Le Gcuvernement Royal s'engage en outre : 

1. D'introduire dans la premiere convocation 
reguliere de la SkOupchtina une disposition 
dans la loi de la presse.par laquelle sera punie 
ile la maniere la plus severe la provocation 
a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publi- 
cation dont la tendance generate serait dirigee 
contre l'inlegrite terntoriale de I'Autriche- 
Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de 
la Constitution, qui est prochaine, a faire 
introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution 
un amendement de telle sorte que les publi- 
cations ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce 
qui actuellement aux termes categoriques de 
['article 22 de la Constitution est impossible. 

2. Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune 
preuve et la note du Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune 
que la societe «Narodna Odbrana» et autres 
sucietes similaires aient commis, jusqu'a ce 
jour quelques acles criminels de ce genre, par 
le fait dun de leurs membres. Neanmoins, le 
Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra 
la societe "Narodna Odbrana» et toute autre 
societe qui agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. 



3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage 
a eliminer sans delais de 1'instruction publi- 
que en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou pourrait 
servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal lui fournira des fails et des 
preuves de cette propagande. 

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme 
a eloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui 
1'enquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont 
coupables d'actes diriges contre l'integnte du 
terntoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, 
el il attend que le Gouvernement Imperial e 
Royal lui communique ulterieurement les 
noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonction 
naires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'en 
suivre. 

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'i 
ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens 
et de la portee de la demande du Gouver 
ment Imperial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage 
ii accepter sur son territoire la collaboration 
des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal, niais il declare qu'il admettra la colla- 
boration qui r6pondrait aux principes du droit 
international et a la procedure criminelle ainsi 
qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage. 

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, 
considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete 
contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuelle- 
ment, auraient ete meles au complot du 15 
juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire 
du royaume. Quant a la participation a cette 
enquete des agents ou autorites austro-hon- 
grois qui seraient delegufe a cet effet par le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouver- 
nement Royal ne peut pas l'accepler, car ce 
serait une violation de la Constitution et de 
la loi sur la procedure criminelle; cependant 
dans des cas concrels des communications sur 
les resultats de 1'instruction en question pour- 
raient etre donnees aux agents austro-hon- 
grois. 

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait prouder, 
des le soir meme de la remise de la note, a 
l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankos- 
sitch. Quaut a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est su- 
jet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui 
jusqu'au 15 juin eiait employe (comme aspi- 
rant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a 
pas pu encore etre arrets. 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie de 
vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire 
connaitre le plus tot possible, les presomplions 
de culpabihte ainsi que les preuves eventuelles 
de leur culpabilite qui ont £16 recueillies jus- 
qu'a ce jour par 1'enquete a Sarajevo, aux 
fins d'enquete ulterieure. 

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et 
etendra les mesures prises pour empecher le 
trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers 
la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de 
suite une enquete et punira severement les 
fonctionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne Scha- 
balz-Loznitza qui ont manque, a leurs devoirs 
et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sara- 
jevo. 

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volon- 
tiers des explications sur les propos que ses 
fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, 
miiI cn apres l'attentat dans des entrevues et 
qui, d'apres l'affirmation du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal, ont ete hostiles envers la 
Monarchie, des que le Gouvernement Impe- 
rial et Royal lui aura communique les passa- 
ges en question de ces propos, et des qu'il 
aura demontre que les propos employes ont, 
en effet, 616 tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, 



quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui menu 
aura soin de reeueillir des preuves el con 
victions 

10 Le GouvernemenI Royal mformera le 
Gouvernement Imperial el Royal de I'execu 
tion des mesures comprises dans les points 



■la n a pas ete deja 
aussit6l que chague 
i I executee 
.< rjii nn-ri I Imperial 



pas pi 



i 



precedents 

fail par la presente note, 

mesure aura ete ordonne 

Dans le cas oil le Goi 
et Royal ne seraii pas satis 
le GouvernemenI - rbi 
de 1'interet commun de 
solution de cette question, esl pr 
toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soil 

i'ii remettant cette question a la decisi In 

Tribunal international de La Ilaye, soit aux 
Grandes Puissances qui out pris pari a 1'ela- 
boration de la declaration qm )e Gouverne- 
ment serbe a faite le IS 131) mars 1909 

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet 1914 



N» 5. 

Communication faite le 20 juillet 1914 par 
In Ligation d'Autriche-Hongrie u Bruxelles u 
M le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 

M. Pachitch a donne hier avaut hemes 
la reponse du' Gouvernement serbe a la note 
auslro-hongroise. Cette reponse n'ayant pas 
ete jugee satisfaisante, les relations diploma- 
lupies ont ete rompues et le Ministre et le 
personnel de la Legation d'Autriche ont quitte 
H rule La mobilisation serbe avail ete de- 
cretee deja avant 3 heures. 



N° 6. 

Ttlegramme adressi pur le Baron Beyens, 
Ministre ilu Roi a Berlin, a M Davignon, 
Ministre des Allaire:-. Etrangeres 

Berlin, 27 juillet 1914 
D'apres mi tfilegramme du Charge <l Vffain s 
Britannique a Belgrade, le GouvernemenI ser- 
be a rede sur tous les points de la Hole autri- 
lie une. II admet menie l'immixtion de tone- 
tionnaires autrichiens si celle-ci peul s'accor- 
ill r avec les usages du droit des gens Le 
i lharge d'Affaires Britannique estime qui ci tte 
reponse devrait satisfaire i'Autriche dans le 
cas oil celle-ci ne voudrait pas la guerre 
Neanmoins l'impression est plus favorable ici 
aujourd'hui, surtout parce que les hostilites 
contre la Serbie n'ont pas commence Le Gou- 
vernement Britannique propose l'intervention 
de 1'Angleterre, de rAllemagne, de la France 
'•I de I Italic a Saint-Petersbourg el a Vienne 
pour trouver un terrain de conciliation L'Al- 
lemagne seule n'a pas encore repondu L'Em- 
pereur decidera. 



N" 8 

Lenre adressee pur M Oamgnnn, Ministre 

des Affaires Etrangeres, am Ministres <lu Rot 
a Berlin, Pan,, Londrrs, Vienne, Saint Pi 

tersliiillri/. Rome I. a Htll/e. Lie, rem liimra 

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement du Roi a decide de ineltre 
I'armee sur le pied de paix renforce 

Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune facon 
confondue avec la mobilisation 

A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire, 
la Belgique toute entiere constitue en quelque 
sorte une zone fronliere. Son armee, sur le 
pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'unc 
classe de milice sjus les amies. Sur le pied 
ile paix renforce ses divisions d'armee et sa 
division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de '■'• 
classes ont des effectifs analogues a ceux des 
corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones 
frontieres des Puissances voisines. 

Lis renseignements vous permettraient de 
repondre aux questions qui pourraient vous 
etre posces. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

is) Davignon. 



I.etire adressie pur M. Davignon, Ministre 
<les Allaire-, Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Hut 
a Berlin, Paris el Lunches. 

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

M. le Ministre de France etant venu me 
montrer un telegramme de l'Agence Havas, 
decretant l'etat de guerre en Allemagne. ma 
dit Je profite de cede occasion pour vous 
declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes tran- 
caises n aura lieu en Belgique, meme si des 
forces importantes etaient massees sur les 
frontieres de voire pays. La France ne veul 
pis avoir la responsabilite d'accomplir vis-a- 
vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hoslilite. 
Des instructions dans ce sens seront donnees 
aux autorites franchises. 

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa com- 
munication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remar- 
quer que nous avions toujours eu la plus 
grand' confiance dans la loyaute que nos 
deux I'.lals voisins mettrawnt a tenir leurs 
engagi minis a notre egard. Nous avons aussi 
tout lieu de crone que lallitude du Gouver- 
nement allemand sera identique a celle du 
Gouvernement de la Republique francaise. 

Veuillez agreer, elc 

(s) Davignon. 



N" 7. 

T/iegrarnme adresse pur le Comte Errem- 
bault de Dudzeele, Ministre du Roi u I ienne, 
a .1/ Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. 

Vienne, 28 juillet 1911 
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres me no- 
tifie la declaration de guerre de lAulrirlic 
Hongrie a la Serbie. 



Tiligramme adressi par t\l Davignon, Mi- 
nistre des Affaires "Etrangeres, a tous les 
Chefs de mission a Vitranger 

Bruxelles, 31 juillet 1914. 

Le Ministre de la Guerre me fait savoir qui 
la mobilisation est decretee et que le samedi 
I" aoul est le premier jour de la mobilisation, 
(s) Davignon. 



Let tre adressee pur M .Davignon,Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, aux Minislres du Roi a 
Berlin, Londres el Fun-,. 

Bruxelles, le 3] juillel 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Ministre d'Angleti rre a demande a me 
voir d'urgence el m'o fail la communication 
suivanle, qu'il souhaitail etre a meme de m'ex- 
poser depuis plusieurs jours. En mison de 
la possibility d'une guerre europeenne, Sir 
Edward Grey a demande aux Gouvernemenls 
francais et allemand, separement, si chacun 
d'eux elait pret a respecter la neutrality de 
la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune puissance ne 
la viole. 

«Vu les traitcs qui existent, je suis charge 
d'informer le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
de Belgique de it qui precede el de dire que 
Sir Edward Grej presume que la Belgique 
fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neu- 
trality el qu'elle desire el s'altend a ce que 
lis autres puissances I'observent et la main- 
tiennent". 

I:> me suis empress^ de remercier Sir Fran- 
cis Villiers de cette comm ation que le 

Gouverhement beige apprecie particulierement 
el j'ai ajoule que la Grande-Bretagne el lis 
autres nations garantes de notre independance 
pouvaient etre assurees que nous ne neglige- 
rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neu- 
trality, et que nous el ions convaincus que les 
autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports 
d'amitic el de confiance, que nous avions 
toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient 
et maintiendraienl cette neutralite. 

Je n'af pas manqui d'af firmer que nos forces 
militaires corisiderabl meni developpees a la 
suile de notre reorganisation recente, etaient 
a meme de nuns permettre de nous defendre 
energiquement en cas de violation de notre 
territoire. 

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, 
Sir-Francis m'a pun un pen surpris de la 
rapidite avec laquelle nous avions decide la 

mobilisation de notre am J'ai fail remar- 

qner que les Pays-Bas avaienl pi is une n solu- 
tion identique avant nous el qui d'autre part 
la date recente de notre nouveau regime mili- 
taire et les mesures transitoires que nous 
avions du decider a cette occasion, nous impo- 
saient des mesures urgentes el completes. Nos 
voisins et garants devaienl voir dans celle 
resolution le desir de manifester notre pro- 
fonde volonte de inamtenir nous-memes noire 
neutralite. 

Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma reponse 
et m'a annonce que son Gouvernemenl atten- 
rt lit cette reponse pour conlinuer les negoeia- 
tions avec la France et l'Allemagne, negocia- 
tions dont la conclusion me serait communi- 
quee. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Leltre adressci par 1/ Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres aux Minislres'du Roi 
a Berlin, Londres et Puns. 

Bruxelles, le 31 pullet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
Ce matin, au cours d'unc conversation que 
le Secretaire General de mon Deparlement a 



eue avec M. de Below, il a explique' au Mi- 
nistre d'Alleinagne la portee des mesures mili- 
taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'el- 
les etaient une consequence de notre volonte 
d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, 
qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune facon une 
attitude de defiance covers nos voisins.' 

Li Secretaire General a demande ensinle an 
Ministre d'AUemagne s'il avait connaissancc 
de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son 
predecesseur M de Flotow, et de la reponse 
que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait charge 
celui-ci de lui faire. 

Vu cours de la polemique soulevee en 1011 
par le d6pdl du projel hollandais concernant 
lis Fortifications de Flessingue, certains jour- 
naux avaienl affirine qu'cii cas de guerre fran- 
co-allemande. noire neutralite serail violee 
par l'Allemagne. 

Le Deparlenient des Affaires Etrangeres 
avait sugg£r£ 1'idee qu'une declaration faite 
au Parlemenl allemand a ['occasion d'un debal 
sur la politique etrangere serail de nature a 
apaiser I'opinion publique el a calmer ses 
defiances, si regrettables au point de vue ilis 
relations des deux pays. 

M, de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il 
avail eie tres sensible aux sentiments qui 
aviieiit inspire noire demarche. II declarail 
que l'Allemagne n'avail pas l'intention de vio- 
ler notre neutralite, mais il estimait qu'en 
faisanl publiquement une declaration, l'Alle- 
magne affaiblirait sa situation militaire • a 
\is <l ■ la France qui, rassuree du cote du 
Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du cell- de 
l'Est. 

Le Baron van der Elst poursuivanl, dit qu'il 
comprenail parfaiterrienl les objections qu'a- 
vajenl faites M. de Bethman-Holweg a la 
declaration publique suggeree el it rappela que 
depuis lors en 1013, M. de Jagow avait fait 
a la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des 
declarations rassurantes quant au respeel de 
la neutralite de la Belgique. 

M il- Below repondit qu'il elait au courant 
de la conversation avec M. de Flotow el qu'il 
etail certain que les sentiments exprimes a 
cette epoque n'avaienl pas change. 

Veuillez agreer, etc.. 

(s) Davignon. 

Annexe au n° 12. 

Leltre adressie par I,- Ministre da it,,i a Ber- 
lin, a 1/ Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Elrangt n 

Berlin, le 2 mai 1013. 
Men-M in- le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaitre, 
d'apres I'officieuse ..Norddeulsche Allgemeine 
Zeitungn, les declarations faites, an i ours de 
. ace 'In 29 avril de la commission du 
budget du la ichstag, par le secretaire d'Etat 
auj Mian's Etrangeres et le Ministre de 
I,, Guerre, relativement a la neutralite de la 
Belgique 

» I'n inenilire du parti social-democrate dit : 
En Belgique on voit avec apprehension s'ap- 

procher i guerre franco-allemande, car on 

craml que l'Allemagne ne respectera pas la 
neutralite 'le la Belgique. 

» M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Af- 
faires Etrangeres repondit: la neutralite de la 
; ., esl determined par des conventions 

internationales el l'Allemagne est decidee a 
respecter ces conventions. 



» Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre 
membre du parti social-democrate. M. de 
Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien a ajouter 
aux paroles claires qu'il avail prononcees rela- 
tivement aux relations de I'Allemagne avec la 
Belgique. 

ii A de nouvelles interrogations d'un mem- 
bre du parti social-democrate M di Hi eringen, 
Ministre de la Guerre, repondil la Belgique 
ne joue aucun rule dans la justification du 

projet de reorganisal militaire allemand; 

celui-ci se trouve justifii par la situation en 
Orient. L'AUemagne ne perdra pas de-vue quo 
la neutralite beige est garantie par les traites 
internationaux. 

» Un membre du parti progressisle ayant 
encore parle de la Belgique, M de Jagow fit 
remarquer a nouveau que sa declaration con- 
cernani la Belgique etait suffisamment claire.n 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Beyens. 



Te'le'gramme adresse par le Comte de La- 
laing, Ministre du Roi a Londres, a M . Davi- 
gnon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangi s rfs. 

Londres, 1" aout L914. 

L'Angleterre a demande separement a la 
France et ii I'Allemagne si elles respeeteraient 
le territoire de la Belgique daiis le cas ou 
leur adversaire ne la violerait pas. (in attend 
la reponse allemande. La France a accepte. 



N" 14. 

Tiligramme adresse par le Baron Beyens, 
Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M Davignon, 
Mnnstre des Affaires Etrangbres. 

Berlin, 1" aout 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a ele charge 
de demander au Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres si en cas de guerre, I'Allemagne respec- 
terait la neutralite de la Belgique et le Ministre 
aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas repondre a cette 
question. 



Lettre adressbe par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangbres, aux Minislres du Roi 
<! Berlin, Paris et Utndres. 

Bruxelles, 1" aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le 
Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la 
communication suivante 

"Je suis autorise a declarer qu'en cas de 
conflit international, le Gouvernement de la, 
Republique, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours declare, 
respectera la neutralite de la Belgique. Dans 
I'hypothese ou cette neutralite ne serail pas 
respectee par une autre puissance, le Gouver- 
nement francais, pour assurer sa propre ill 
fense, pourrait etre amene a modifier son atti- 
tude." 

J'ai remercie Son Excellence .et ai ajoute 
que de notre cdte nous avions pris sans aucun 
retard toules les mesures voulues pour faire 
respecter notre independance et nos frontieres. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



N° 16. 

Tiligramme adresse par le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangbres aux Legations du Roi a- 
Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Piters- 
bourg 

Bruxelles. 1" aout 1914. 

Exficutez instructions donnees par lettre du 
2', jilillel. 

(s) Davignon. 
(Voir piece N° 2.) 



N» 17. 

Tilegramme adressi par le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres aux Legations ii Rome, La 
Haye, Luxembourg. 

Bruxelles, le 1™ aoi'it 1914. 
Executez instructions donnees par lettre du 
25 juillet. 

(s) Davignon. 
(Voir piece n° 3.) 



THigramme adressi par M. Eyschen, Pre- 
sident du Gouvernement luxembourgeois, it 
M . Diirignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangbres. 

Luxembourg, 2 aout 1914. 
J'ai l'honneur de porter a la connaissance 
de Votre Excellence les fails suivants: Diman- 
che 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes alle- 
mandes, d'apres les informations qui sont 
parvenues au Gouvernement Grand. Ducal a: 
l'heure actuelle, ont penetrt sur le territoire 
luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig 
et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers 
le Sud du pays et vers la ville.de Luxembourg, 
capitate du Grand Duche. Un certain nombre 
de trains blinded avec des troupes et des muni- 
tions ont ete achemines par la voie de chemin 
4f f'i' ile Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, oil Ton 
s'attend a lis voir arriver d'un instant a l'au- 
tre. Ces fails impliquent des actes manifeste- 
ment conlraires a la neutralite du Grand Du- 
che, garantie par le traite de Londres de 1867. 
Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas 
manque de protester energiquement contre 
cette agression auprts du Representant de 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne a Luxem- 
bourg. Une protestation identique va etre 
transmise telegrophiquement au Secretaire 
d Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. 
Le Ministre d'Etat, 
President du Gouvernement: 
(s) Eyschen. 



N» 19. 

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangbres, aux Minislres du Roi 
a Paris, Berlin, Londres^ Vienne et Saint-Pi- 
trrsbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 2 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de 

Baesompierre le Ministre d'Allemagne qu'un 

communique de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de 

France, a la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait 



la declaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait 
faite le 1" aout. Rencontrant M. de Below, 
ce dernier m'a remercie de cette attention et 
a ajoute que jusqu'a present il n'avait* pas ete 
charge de nous faire une communication offi- 
cielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinion 
personnelle sur la securite avec laquelle nous 
avions le droit de considerer' nos voisins de 
l'Est. J'ai immediatement repondu que tout 
ce que nous connaissions des intentions de 
ceux-ci, intentions indiquees dans les multi- 
ples entretiens anterieurs, ne nous permet- 
iait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction 
vis-a-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant 
4 ajouter que nous attacherions le plus grand 
prix a elre en possession d'une declaration 
formelle dont la nation prendrait connaissance 
avec joie et reconnaissance. 
Veuillez agrfer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Note remise, le 2 aoUt, a 19 heures, par M. 
Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. 
Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Elrangires. 

Briissel, den 2 August 1914. 

Kaiserlich 

Deutsche Gesandtschaft 

In Belgien. 

TRES CONFIDENTIEL. 

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlas- 
sige Nachrichten vor ueber den beabsichtigten 
Aufmarsch franzosischer Streitkrafte an der 
Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen 
Zweifel ueber die Absichl Frankreichs, durch 
belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzu- 
gehen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der 
Besorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz 
besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, 
ohne Hulfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch 
mit so grosser Aussicht auf Ertolg abzuweh- 
ren. dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit 
gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden 
werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbster- 
haltung fur Deutschland. dem feindlichen An- 
griff zuvorzukornmen. Mit dem grossten Be- 
dauern wiirde es daher die deutsche Regie- 
rung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der 
Peindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiir- 
de, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner 
Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch 
seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. 

Urn jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, er- 
klart die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende: 

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feind- 
seligkeiten gegen Belgien. 1st Belgien gewillt. 
in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland 
gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutralitat ein- 
zunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche 
Regierung, beim Frieden'sschluss Bezitzstand 
und Unabhangigkeit des Kbnigreichs in vol- 
lem Umfang zu garantieren. 

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obi- 
ger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Kflnigreichs 
wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede geschlos- 
sen ist. 

3. Bei emer freundschaflticher Haltung Bel- 
giens ist Deutschland bereit.im Einvernehmen 
mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behorden alle 
Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung 
anzukaufen und, jeden Schaden zu ersetzen. 



der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht 
werden konnte. 

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen 
feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem 
vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befes- 
tigungen Oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen- 
bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen 
Kunstbauten Schwierigkeilen bereiten, so 
wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern ge- 
zwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu 
betrachten. In diesem Falle wiirde Deutsch- 
land dem Konigreich gegeniiber keine Ver- 
pflichtungen tibernehmen kiinnen, sondern 
mtisste die spiitere Regelung des Verhaltnisses 
beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung 
der Waffen iiberlassen 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der 
bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventua- 
litat nicht eintreten, und dass die Kbnigliche 
Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnah- 
men zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinde- 
ren, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorslehend 
erwahnlen, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle 
wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die bei- 
de Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere 
und dauernde Fesligung erfahren. 

Annexe au N° 20. 

Traduction de Vultimalum de CAUemagne. 

Le Gouvernement allemand a recu des noa- 
velles sures d'apres lesquelles les forces fran- 
caises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la 
Meuse par Givet et Namur.' Ces nouvelles ne 
laissent aucun doute sur l'intention de la 
France de marcher sur l'Allemagne par le 
territoire beige. Le Gouvernement Imperial al- 
lemand ne peut s'empecher de craindre que 
la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure volonte, ne 
sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours 
une marche francaise d'un si grand develop- 
pement Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude 
suffisante d'une menace dirigee contre l'Al- 
lemagne. 

C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation 
pour l'Allemagne de prevenir cette attaque de 
1'ennemi 

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tres 
vivement que la Belgique regardat comme un 
acte dhostilite contre elle le fait que les me- 
sures des ennemis de l'Allemagne 1'obligent 
de violer de son cote le territoire beige. 

Afin de dissiper- tout malentendu le Gou- 
vernement allemand declare ce qui suit 

1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hos- 
tilite contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique con- 
sent dans la guerre qui va commencer a pren- 
dre une attitude de neutralise amicale vis-a-vis 
de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de 
son cote s'engage, au moment de la paix, a 
garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans 
tcute leur etendue 

2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition 
enoncee a evacuer le territoire beige aussitdt 
la paix conclue 

3 Si la Belgique observe une attitude ami- 
cale, l'Allemagne est prete, d'accord avec les 
autontes du Gouvernement beige a acheter 
contre argent complant tout ce qui est neces- 
saire a ses troupes et a indemmser pour les 
dommages causes en Belgique. 

i Si la Belgique se comcorte dune facon 
hostile contre les troupes allemandes et par- 
ticulierement fait des difficulty a leur marche 
en avant par une opposition des fortifications 
de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes 
chemins de fer. tunnels ou autres ouvrages 



d'art, I'Allemagne sera ■ .1 ■! iu. . di considerer 
la Belgique en'enm mil 

Dans ce cas I'AHemagne ne prendra aucun 
engagement vis-4-vis du royaume, mais elle 
laissera le roglement ulterieur des rapports 
des deux Etats I'un vis-a-vis de I'autre a la 

d< i is les .ii.'i' - Le Gouvernement .illo- 

mand a 1'espoir justifie que cette eventualite 
ne se produira pas el que le Qouverni mi nl 
beige siiii.i prendre les mesures appropriees 
pour I empecher de se produire. Dans ce cas 
|i - r. lations d .mud" qui unissi nl les deu.i 
Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et du- 
rables, 



N" 21. 

Note sur Venlrevue demandee le 3 aovt & une 
heart- et demie, pur M. de Below Saleske, 
MinistTc a"Allemagne, a M le Baron run der 
Elst, s Get .'/ au Mini Here di I ' 

fanes Etrangeres. 

A une heure el demie de la nuit, le Ministre 
d'Allem demandi i voir le Baron van 

der Elst. II lui a rtit qu'il etail charge par 
son Gouvernement de nous informer que des 
dirigeables francais avaient jelo des bombes et 
qu'une patrouille de cavalerie francaise, vio- 
lant le droit des pens, attendu que la | 
n'etail pas declarer, avail traverse 1 la fron- 
tiere 

Le Secretaire General a demands a M. de 

B is faits s'etaient passes; en Alle- 

lui fut-il repondu. Le Baron van der 
Elst fit. remarquer que dans ce cas il ne 

pouvail -.-'•■ pliquer le but de sa nmunica- 

hon M de Below dit que ces actes, contraires 
au droii des gens, etaient de nature a faire 
supposer d'autres actes contre le droit des 
pens que poserait la France. 



Wolf rrn'isr pur M Tinri, /in-n , M , it : 
Affaire Etrangeres, a M de Below Saleske, 
Ministre d'Allemagnc. 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914 

(7 heures du matin). 

Par : tiotedu2aoul 1914 It Gouvernement 

allemand a fait connaitre que d apr£s des nou- 

ires les forces franchises auraienl I'in- 

n hi r sue la Meui i par I rivi I i I 

Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meil- 

leure volonte ne serail pa i t de repousser 

cours une marche en avant des troupes 

tr ;aises. 

: ! Gouvi rnement allemand s'estimefait 
"'■hiralion de prevenir cette attaque et 
:■ le territoire beige. Dans ces condi- 
tions, I'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement 
du Roi de prendre vis-i-vis d'elle une attitude 
amicale et s'engage au moment de la pai 
garantir l'lntegritS du Royaume et di - 

dans toute lour edendue. La noti ajou- 

te que si la Belgique fait des difficulty a la 

marche en avant des troupes allemandes, 1'Al- 

e sera obligee d comme 

et de laisser le reglemi nt ulle>ieur 

ux Etats l'un vis-a-vis de I'autre .i la 

in des amies. 

I. note a provoque ch. 

lu Roi un profond et douloureux edonne- 



Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France 

sont en contradicl avec ti s declarations for- 

melles qui nous onl ete faites le ler aout, 
au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique, 

D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre atti nt 
une. \ iolal ion de la neutralite beige venail a 
i tre * ommise par la France, la Belgique rem 
plirail I iu - devoirs internationaux et sun 
armee oppos rail a I'envahisseur la plus vi- 
goureuse n sistanci 

Les traites de 1839 confirmed par les traites 
de 1870 consacrenl 1'independance et la neu- 
trality de la Belgique sous la garantie des 
Puissances el not.unment du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majesty le Roi de Prusse. 

La Belgique a toujours •■<<■ fidele a ses obli- 
gations internationales; elle a accompli ses 
devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartiality 
elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir 
mi faire respecter sa neutrality. 

L'atteinte a son independance dont la me- 
nace '■ Gouvernement allemand cOnstituerait 
une flagrante violation du droit des gens. 
Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la viola- 
lion du droit 

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les 
propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait 
i'honneur de la nation en mcnie temps qu'il 
trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de l'Europe. 

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue 
depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du 
monde, d se refuse a croire quo 1'independance 
de la Belgique ne puisse etre conserves qu'au 
prix de la violation de sa neutralite. 

Si cet espoir etait decu le Gouvernement 
beige est fermemenl decide a repousser par 
tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte 
a son droit. 



N" 23. 



Tele 



'in:, adressi par 1/ Davignon, Mi- 
nistre des iffaires Elrangkres, aux Ministres 
du Ii.'i. ii Saint-Petersbourg Berlin, LonOn s, 
Paris, Vienne, Lu Hayc. 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1014 
1. Ulemagne a ri ens hii r soir 7 heures une 
la neutralite amicale compor- 

l.llll le I 

aintien de l'jndepi ndance du 
Ro; . i ; ■ 1 1 1 el de ses possessions a conclu 
la paix, ne i.'.r'ii i en cas de n fus d 

imme ennemie, d 
p hi-.- fixe a dou:! ,- ores Nous avons repondu 
que l'atteinte a noire neutralite serail. une vio- 
lation flagrante du droit des gens. L'a 
lion de la proposition allemande sacrifierait 
I'honneur de la nation. Consciento de son de- 
voir la Belgique est. fermement. deadfe a re- 
pousser mu' agression par tous nionns 

(si Davignon. 



N" 24. 

Lellre adresste par 17. Davignon, Ministre 

des Aft n ' I '•:' islri s du Roi 

it Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Pi- 
tersbourg 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout, 1914. 
(a. midi). 
Monsii ur le Ministre, 
Comme vous le savez, I'Allemagne a 
a la Belgique un ultimatum expiranl ce ma 



3 aout, a 7 heures. Aucun (ait de guerre ne 
s'etant encore produit a l'heure actuelle, le 
Conseil des Ministres a decide qu'il n'y avail 
pas lieu, pour le moment, de faire appel aux 
Puissances garantes. 

Le Ministre de France m'a dit a ce sujet : 
«Sans etre charge d'une declaration de mon 
Gouvemement, je crois cependant, m'inspi- 
rant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire 
que si le Gouvemement royal faisait appel au 
Gouvernement franca is, comme puissance ga- 
rante de sa neutralite, nous repondrions im- 
mediatement a son appel; si cet appel n'elait 
pas formule, il est probable, a moins bien 
entendu que le souci de sa propre defense ne 
determine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il 
attendra pour mtervenir que la Belgique ait 
fait un acte de resistance effective." 

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de l'appui 
que le Gouvernement francais voulait bien 
nous offrir eventuellement et lui ai dit que 
le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, 
pour l'instant, a la garantie des Puissances et 
se reservait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce qu'il 
y aura lieu de faire. 

(s) Davignon. 



TMegramme adressi pa? S. M. le Roi a 
S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre. 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914. 
Me souvenant des nombreuses marques d'a- 
mitie de Votre Majeste et de ses predecesseurs, 
de l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870, 
et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle vient 
encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme 
appel a 1'intervention diplomatique du Gou- 
vernement de Sa Majeste pour la sauvegarde 
de la neutrality de la Belgique. 

(s) Albert. 



THtgrarnme adress£ par le Ministre du Roi 
a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

Londres, 3 aoiit 1914. 
J'ai montre votre telegramme au Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres qui l'a communique 
au Conseil des Ministres. Le Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres m'a dit que si notre neu- 
trality etait violee.'c'etait la guerre avec l'Al- 
lemagne. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 
(Voir piece N° 23.) 



N» 27. 

Lettre adresse'e par M. de Below Saleske, 
Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Minis- 
tre des Affaires Etrangeres (L'original est en 
francais). 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 
(6 heures du matin). 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai ete charge^ et j'ai l'honneur d'informer 
Votre Excellence que par suite du refus oppo- 
se par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi 
aux propositions bien intentionnees que lui 



avait soumises le Gouvernement Imperial, ce- 
lui-ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, forc6 
d'executer — au besoin par la force des armes 
— les mesures de securite exposees comme 
indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces francai- 
ses. 

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre, les 
assurances de ma haute consideration. 

(s) von Below. 



Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Mi- 
nistrc d'Angleterre, it M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. 

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement 
beige que si l'AHemagne exerce une pression 
dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner 
son role de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la 
Belgique rtsiste par tous les moyens possi- 
bles. 

Le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique, 
dans ce cas, est prSt a se joindre a la Russie 
et a la France, si la Belgique le dfeire, pour 
offrir au Gouvernement beige sans delai une 
action commune, qui aurait comme but de 
register aux mesures de force employ&s par 
l'Allemagne contre la. Belgique et en meme 
temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir 
l'independance et l'integritS de la Belgique 
dans l'avenir. 



LelVre adresse'e par le Ministre du Roi a La 
Rage a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

La Haye, le 4 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a dit 
hier soir que le Gouvernement de la Reine 
serait peut-etre obliged dans les circonstances 
graves actuelles, d'instituer sur l'Escaut le 
balisage de guerre. 

Le Jhr. Loudon m'a lu un projet de note 
qui allait m'annoncer cette decision. 

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce 
pli, une copie de la note en question qui m'a 
ile remise dans la soiree d'hier. 

Comme vous le verrez, l'Escaut ne sera fer- 
mi que pendant la nuit. Pendant le jour, la 
navigation sera possible mais seulement avec 
des pilotes neerlandais qui ont et6 munis des 
indications nautiques necessaires a ce sujet. 
De cette facon les interets de la defense du 
territoire neerlandais et ceux de la navigation 
beige d'Anvers sont sauvegarde's. 

Vous -emarquerez qu'ensuite le Gouverne- 
ment des Pays-Bas nous demande qu'en cas 
oil le balisage de guerre serait institue, nous 
fassions retirer les bateaux-phare «Wielingen» 
et «Wandelaar» en vue de faciliter le maintien 
de la neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas. 

Je vous ferai remarquer que le terme em- 
ploye dans cette note «remonter l'Escaut» n'est 
pas assez explicite; descendre le fleuve sera 
permis dans les memes conditions. Le Minis- 
tre vient de m'en donner l'assurance. 



Aussitot que le Gouvernement neerlandais 
aura decide cette mesure d'exception j'en serai 
informed 

II (aut environ six heures pour effectuer ce 
balisage de guerre. 

Je vous telegraphierai aussitot. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 

Note annexee au N° 29. 

Le Gouvernement de la Reine pourrail s* 
voir oblige dans l'interel du maintien de la 
neutrality du terntoire des Pays-Bas d'msti- 
tuer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre, c'est- 
a-dire d'enlever ou de modifier unc partie du 
'balisage actuel et des pharos. 

Toulefois, ce balisage de guerre a ete concu 
de maniere a ce qu'apres son institution ll 
sera encore possible de remonter l'Escaut pour 
gagner Anvers pendant le jour, mais seule- 
ment avec des pilotes neerlandais, qui ont ete 
munis des indications nauiiques necessaires 
a ce sujet. En agissant de la sorte, le Gouver- 
nement de la Reine est convaincu de pouvoir 
tenir compte egalement des interets de la de- 
fense du territoire neerlandais et de ceux de 
la navigation beige d'Anvers. 

Apres l'institution du balisage de guerre sur 
l'Escaut, il n'y aurait plus de raison d'entrer 
dans la passe de mer de Flessingue pendant 
Ja nuit et comme la presence des bateaux- 
phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaar» nest pas 
indispensable pour la navigation pendant le 
jour, le Gouvernement Neerlandais mettrait 
un haul prix a ce que le Gouvernement Royal 
Beige vouliit bien, au cas ou le balisage de 
guerre serait institue' par lui, faire retirer 
lesdits bateaux en vue de faciliter le maintien 
de la neutrality du terntoire des Pays-Bas. 



Tiligramme adressi par M. Davignon, Mi- 
mslre des Affaires Etrangires. aiu Ministres 
du Rot a Londres el a Paris. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 

L'Etat Major fait savoir que le territoire 
national a ete violS a Gemmenich. 

(s) Davignon. 



Leltrc adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangires, a M de Below Sales- 
ke, Ministre d'Allemagne 

Bruxelles, le i aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- 
cellence que des aujourd'liui le Gouvernement 
du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de 
caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des 
relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence 
trouvera sous ce pli les passeporls qui sont 
lires a son depart et a celui du per- 
sonnel de la Legation. 
Je saisis, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Lettre adressie par M. de Below Saleske, 
Mimisl/re d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi- 
nistry des Affaires Elrangeres. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai l'honneur d'accuser reception a Votre 
Excellence de sa lettre du 4 aout et de Lui 
faire savoir que j'ai remis la garde de la 
Legation Imperiale a Bruxelles aux soins de 
mon collegue des Etats-Unis. 
Je saisis, etc. 

(st de Below. 



Tiligramme adressi par M Davignon, Mi- 
nistre des Affaires Etrangires, a M. le Baron 
Grenier, Ministre du Rm a Madrid. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 

Veuillez demander au Gouvernement espa- 
gnol s'il veut bien se charger de la protection 
des interets beiges en Allemagne et, dans ce 
cas, donner les instructions necessaires a son 
Ambassadeur a Berlin. 

(s) Davignon. 



N 34. 

Tiligramme adressi par 1/ Davignon, Mi- 
nistre des Af/aires Etrangires, a M le Baron 
Beyens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 19i4. 
Le Ministre d'Allemagne quitte le pays ce 
soir; demandez vos passeporls. Nous prions 
le gouvernement de Madrid d'autoriser l'Am- 
bassadeur d'Espagne de vouloir bien se char- 
ger de la protection des interets beiges en 
Allemagne. 

(s) Davignon. 



N" 35. 

Lellrc adressie par le Ministre de Belgique 
a Berlin a M Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangires. 

Berlin, 4 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci- 
apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro- 
nonce aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag 
par le Chancelier de l'Empire et relative a 
l'odieuse violation de notre neutrality : 

» Nous nous trouvons en etat de legitime 
defense et la necessity ne connait pas de lois. 
Nos troupes onl occupe Luxembourg et 
ont. peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela 
est .n contradiction avec les prescriptions du 
droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, 
declare a Bruxelles qu'elle etait resolue a res- 
pecter la neutrality de la Belgique, aussi 
longtemps que l'adversaire la respecterait 
Mais nous savions que la France se tenail 
prete pour envahir la Belgique La France 
I vail attendre. Nous pas Une attaque fran- 
chise sur notre flanc dans la region du Rhin 
infeneur aurail pu devenir fatale, C'esl ainsi 
que nous avons ete forces de passer outre aux 
protestations justifiees des Gouvernements lu- 



xembuurgeois et beige. L'injuslice que nous 
commettons de cette facon, nous la reparerons 
des que noire but militaire sera alteint. 

» A celui qui est menace au point oil nous 
le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme, 
il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de 
se degager; nous nous trouvons cote a cote 
avec l'Autriche.» 

II est a remarquer que M. de Bethmann- 
Hollweg reconnait, sans le moindre detour, 
que l'Allemagne viole le droit international 
en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle 
commet une injustice a notre egard. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Beyens. 



N° 36. 

Lettre adresste par le Ministre du Roi a 
Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres, le 4 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le 
Premier Ministre a fait cet apres-midi a la 
Chambre des Communes une nouvelle de- 
claration relativement a la cnse europeenne. 

Apres avoir rappele les principaux points 
exposes hier par Sir E. Grey, le Premier 
Ministre a donne. lecture : 

P d'un telegramme de Sir F. Villiers, recu 
ce matin, qui iait connaitre la leneur du se- 
cond ultimatum adresse par le Gouvernement 
allemand au Gouvernement beige et qui vous 
a ete remis ce matin; (voir N° 27). 

2° du telegramme par lequel vous m'annon- 
cez la violation de la frontiere a Gemmenich, 
dont j'ai remis copie a Sir A. Nicolson; 

3° d'un telegramme adresse ce matin par 
le Gouvernement allemand a son Ambassa- 
deur a Londres dans le but evident d'egarer 
I'opinion publique sur son attitude. En voici 
la traduction d'apres un journal de ce soir : 
"Veuillez dissiper toute mefiance que. le Gou- 
vernement Britannique pourrait avoir au su- 
jet de nos intentions, en repetant, de la ma- 
niere la plus positive, l'assurance formelle que 
meme en cas de conflit arme. avec la Belgique, 
l'Allemagne n'annexera sous aucun pretexte 
le territoire beige. 

■> La sincerity de cette declaration est cor- 
roboree par le fait que l'Allemagne a solen- 
nellement donne sa parole a la Hollande de 
son intention de respecter sa neutrahte. 

» II est evident que nous ne pourrions nous 
annexer le territoire beige d'une maniere 
avantageuse sans faire, en meme temps, une 
acquisition terntoriale au detriment de la 
Hollande. 

» Priere de faire bien comprendre a Sir 
E. Grey qu'il etait impossible d'exposer lar- 
me.e allemande a une attaque franchise portee 
en traversant la Belgique, attaque qui, d'apres 
des informations absolument incontestables, 
etait projetee. 

» En consequence l'Allemagne n'a pas tenu 
compte de la neutralite beige afin d'eviter 
ce qui est pour elle une question de vie ou 
de mort, une attaque franchise par la Bel- 
gique. » 

M. Asquith a ensuite expose a la Chambre 
qu'en reponse a cette note du Gouvernement 
allemand le Gouvernement britannique lui 
avait renouvele sa proposition de la semaine 
derniere, a, savoir de donner au sujet de la 



neutralite beige les memcs assurances que la 
France en avait donnees la semaine derniere, 
tant a l'Angleterre qu'a la Belgique. Le Cabi- 
net anglais accordait a celui de Berlin jusqu'a 
minuit pour lui faire connaitre sa reponse. 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 



N^ 37. 

THigramme adresse par le Ministre du Rot 
a Londres ii M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

Londres, 4 aout 1914. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a fait 
savoir aux Mmistres anglais en Norvege, Hol- 
lande, Belgique, que l'Angleterre s'attend a 
ce que ces trois Royaumes resistent a la pres- 
sion de l'Allemagne et gardent la neutralite. 
Dans leur resistance ils seront soutenus par 
l'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prete a 
cooperer avec la France et la Russie si tel 
est le desir de ces trois Gouvernements en 
offrant alliance aux dits Gouvernements, pour 
repousser l'emploi contre eux de la force par 
l'Allemagiie, et garantie, pour le maintien 
futur de l'independance et de I'integrite des 
trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer que la 
Belgique est neutre ,i perpetuite. Le Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres a repondu : c'est pour 
le cas de neutralite violee. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 



Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Mmistres du Rot 
a Paris, Londres el Saint-Petersbourg . 

Briixelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre., 

J'ai l'honneur de porter a votre connaissan- 
ce l'ordre des faits successifs qui ont marque 
pendant les derniers jours les relations de la 
Belgique avec certaines des Puissances garan- 
tes de sa neutralite et de son mdependance. 

Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'Angleterre me 
fit une communication verbale aux termes de 
laquelle, en prevision d'une guerre europeen- 
ne, Sir E. Grey avait demands aux Gouver- 
nements allemand et francais, separement, 
si chacun d'eux etait resolu a respecter la 
neutralite de la Belgique dans l'eventualite 
oil cette neutralite ne serait pas violee par 
aucune autre puissance. 

En raison des traites existants, Sir Francis 
Villiers etait charge do porter cette demarche 
a la connaissance du Gouvernement du Roi 
en ajoutant que Sir E. Grey presumait que 
la Belgique etait resolue ii maintenir sa neu- 
tralite et qu'elle s'attendait a ce que les autres 
puissances la respectent. 

J'ai dit a M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que 
nous appreciions hautement cette communcia- 
tion qui repondait a notre attente et j'ai ajoute 
que la Grande-Bretagne ainsi que les autres 
Puissances garantes de notre independance 
pourraient etre pleinement assurees de notre 
ferme volonte de maintenir notre neutralite, 
celle-ci ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs pas pou- 
voir Stre menacee par aucun de ces Etats avec 
lesquels nous entretenons les rapports les plus 
cordiaux et les plus confiants. Le Gouverne- 
ment, ai-je fait remarquer, avait donne une 



preuve de cette resolution en prenant des a 
presenl toutes les mesures militaires que la 
situation 1 lii paraissait cuuiporter. 

A son tour, M. le Ministre.de France se 
dei lara, le 1" aout, dans une conversation 
verbale, autonse Jx faire connaitre au Gou- 
vernement beige, qu'en cas de conflit inter- 
national, le Gouvernement de la Republique, 
conformement a ses declarations constantes, 
respecterait le territoire de la Belgique et qu'il 
in' sorait amene a modifier son attitude que 
dans le cas de violation de la neutralite beige 
par une autre Puissance. 

Je remerciai Son Excellence et ajoutai que 
nous, avians deja pns toutes les dispositions 
requises pour assurer le respect de notre 
independance et de nos frontieres. 

Le '.' aout, dans la matinee, j'eus avec Sir 
Francis Villiers un nouvel entrelien au cours 
duquel il me fit part de ce qu'il avail transmis 
telegraphiquement samedi, des la premiere 
heure, a son Gouvernement noire conversation 
du 31 juillet en ayant soin de reproduire fide- 
lement la declaration solennelle qu'il avail 
recu. 1 1 1 it- de la volonte de la Belgique de 
,1. fendre ses frontieres, de quelque cote qu'el- 
les soienl envahies, II ajouta : "Nous savons 
que la France vous a donne des assurances 
formelles, niais l'Angleterre n'a recu a ce sujet 
aucune reponse de Berlin. 

Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en moi aucune 
emotion particuliere, parce que la declaration 
du Gouvernement allemand pouvait paraitre 
surabondante en presence des trailes exis- 
tants. D'ailleurs le Secretaire d'Etat aux af- 
faires Etrangeres avait affirme a la seance 
de la commission du Reichstag du 29 avnl 
I'M:', ..que la neutralite de la Belgique est 
etablie conventionnellement et que l'AUema- 
gne a I'intention de respecter ce trade" 

Le meme jour, M. de Below Saleske, Minis- 
tre d'AUemagne, se presenta au Mimstere des 
Affaires Etrangeres a 19 heures et me remit 
la note ci-jointe (voir piece N° 20). Le Gou^ 
vernement allemand accordait au Gouverne- 
ment beige un delai de douze heures p.our 
lui faire connaitre sa decision. 

Aucune hesitation ne pouvait se manifes- 
ler au sujet .If la reponse qu'appelait la pro- 
position surprenante du Gouvernement alle- 
mand. Vous en trouverez une copie sous ce 
pli (Voir i'ir, e \ ' -'.' 

L'ultimalum expirait le 3 aoiit, a 7 heures 
.In matin ; comme a 10 heures aucun fait de 
guerre ne s'etait produit, le Conseil des Minis- 
tres decida qu'il n'y avail pas lieu, pour le 
anoinrnt, de faire appel aux Puissances ga- 
ranl. s. 

Vers iin.li, le Ministre de France m'inter- 
rogi a sur ce point et me dit : 

« Bien qu'en raison de la soudainetS des 
evenements je ne sois encore charged d'aucune 
declaration, je crois cependant, m'inspirant 
des intentions bien connues de mon Gouver- 
nement, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement 
Royal f.usait appel au Gouvernement fran- 
cais comme puissance garante de sa neutra- 
lite. il repondrait immediatenient a son appel. 
Si eel appel n'elait pas formule il .'si proba- 
ble, a minus bien entendu que le souci de sa 
propre defense ne determine des mesures ex- 
.- I'll. .un. lies, qu'il attendrait, pour interve- 
nir, que la Belgique ait fait un acte de resis- 
tance effective. » 

J'ai reinercie M. Klobukowski de l'appui 
flue le Gouvernement francais voulait bien 



nous offrir eventuellement et lui ai dit que le 
Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, 
pour 1'instant, a la garantie des Puissances 
et se reservait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce 
qu il y aura lieu de lan. 

Enfin, le 4 aout, a 6 heures du matin, le 
Ministre d'AUemagne me fit la communica- 
tion Sllivanle : (voir piece N" 'il}. 

Le Conseil des Mimslres delibere en ce mo- 
ment an sujet de I'appel aux Puissances ga- 
rantes de notre neutralite. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Tiligramme adresst par le Ministre du Roi 
a Lrni, Ires a M . Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres, 

Londres, 4 aoiit 1914. 

L'Angleterre a somme ce matin l'Allemagne 
it.' respecter la neutralite beige. L'ultimatum 
dit que vu la note adressee par l'Allemagne a 
la Belgique menacant cette derniere de la for- 
ce des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de 
ses troupes, vu la violation du territoire beige 
a Gemmenich, vu le fait que l'Allemagne a 
refuse de donner a l'Angleterre la meme as- 
surance que celle donnee la semaine derniere 
par la France, l'Angleterre doit demander a 
nouveau une reponse satisfaisante au sujet du 
respect de la neutralite beige et d'un traite 
dont l'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien 
qu'elle-meme. L'ultimatum expire a minuit. 

En consequence de l'ultimatum de l'Angle- 
terre a l'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise 
que je vous ai transmise par telegramme est 
annulee pour le moment. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 

(Voir piece N" 37.) 



Lellre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etramjeres, aux Mimslres de 
Grande-ISretagne, de France et de Russie. 

BriLxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement beige a le regret de de- 
voir annoncer a Votre Excellence que ce ma- 
tin les forces armees de l'Allemagne ont pe- 
netre sur le territoire beige en violation des 
engagements qui ont ele pns par traite. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement 
decide a resister par tous les moyens en son 
pouvoir. 

La Belgique fait appel a l'Angleterre, a la 
France et a la Russie pour cooperer, comme 
garantes, a la defense de son territoire. 

11 y aurail une action concertee et commune 
ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de- 
forces employees par l'Allemagne contre la 
Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le 
rnaintien de 1'independance et de 1'mtegrite 
de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. 

La. Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir decla- 
rer qu'elle assumera ]a defense des places for- 
tes. 

Je saisis, etc. 

is 1 Davignon. 



15 



TtUgrnmme adresse par le Ministre du Roi 
A Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Elrangeres 

Londres, 5 aout 1914. 

L'Allemagne ayant fejete les propositions 
anglaises, l'Angleterre lui a declare que l'etat 
de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir 
de onze heures 

(si Comte. de Lalaing 



Tilegramme adressi par M Davignon Mi- 
nistre des Affaires Elrangeres, aux Ministres 
du Roi a Paris, Londres cl Sainl-Pelersbourg. 

Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. 

Apres la violation du territoire a Gemme- 
nich, la Belgique a fait appel, par l'intcrme- 
diaire de leurs Representanls accreditees a 
Bruxeiles, a l'Angleterre, a la France et a la 
Russie pour coope>er, comme garantes, a la 
defense de son territoire. 

La Belgique assume la defense des places 
fortes. 

(s) Davignon. 



letlre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre. 
\des Affaires Elrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi 
\a Paris, Londres el Saint-Pitersbourg. 

Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Par ma dep^che du 4 aout (voir piece A' 38), 
j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exposer la suite des 
ev^nements qui ont marqu£ les relations in- 
lernationales de la Belgique du 31 juillel au 
4 aout. J'ajoutais que le Conseil des Ministres 
examinait la question»de savoir si la Belgique, 
dont. le territoire avait £te envahl depuis le 
matin, ferait appel a la garanlie. 

Le Conseil venait de se decider en faveur 
de laffirmative, larsque le Ministre d'Angle- 
terre me fit savoir que. la proposition dont il 
m'avait saisi et d'apres laquelle le Gouverne- 
ment britannique £tait dispose a repondre a 
notre appel en garantie, elait annulee pour 
le moment. (Voir piece N° 37). 

Un telegramme de Londres m'apprit que ce 
changement d'attitude etait motive par un 
ullimatum de l'Angleterre laissant a l'Alle- 
magne un d£lai de dix heures pour 6vacuer le 
sol beige et respecter la neutrality de la 
Belgique (Voir piece N° 39). Dans la soiree, 
le Gouvernement du Roi a adresse, par Tin 
lermMiaire de leurs repre'sentants respectifs 
a Bruxeiles. a la France, a la Grande-Breta- 
gne et a la Russie, la note dont vous trouverez 
la copie ci-jointe. (Voir niece N° 401 

Comme vous le Temarquerez la Belgique 
fait appel k l'Angleterre, a la France et a 
la Russie pour cooperer comme garants a la 
defense de son territoire et au maintien dans 
1'avenir de l'inde'pendance et de l'integritS 
du territoire. Elle assurcra .la defense des 
places fortes. 



Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons pas l'accueil 
qui a Hi reserved a notre appel. 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

N" 44. 

l.eitre adrcssle par M Davignon, Ministre 
des iffaires Etrangires, aux Chefs dc mission 
dans tons les pays enlrelenant avec la Belgi- 
que des rwpports dvplomaUques 

Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Par le traite du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la 
France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie 
se sunt declarers garantes du traite conclu 
le meme jour entre S. M. le Roi des Beiges et 
s M le Roi des Pays-Bas.Ce traite porte : » La 
Belgique formera un Etat mdependant et per- 
petuellement neutre.» La Belgique a rempli 
toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a 
accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyalc 
impartiality, elle n'a neglige^ aucun effort 
pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutra- 
lity 

Aussi esl-ce avec line pinible emotion que 
I" Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les 
forces armees de l'Allemagne, puissance ga- 
rante de notre neutrality, ont penetre sur le 
territoire de la Belgique en violation des en- 
gagements qui ont el.e pris par traite. 

II est de notre devoir de protester avec in- 
dignation contre un attentat au droit des gens 
qu'aucun acte de notre pari n'a pu provoquer. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement 
decide a repousser par tous les moyens en 
son pouvoir l'atteinte portee a sa neutrality 
et il rappelle qu'en vertu de l'article 10 de la 
convention de La Haye de 1907, concernant 
les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et 
des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sir 
terre, ne peut etre considered comme un acte 
hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de 
repousser, meme par la force, les atteintes a 
sa neutrality. 

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence une 
audience au Ministre des Affaires Elrangeres 
et donner lecture a Son Excellence, de la 
prteente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. 
Si I'audience ne pouvait vous etre immediale- 
ment accordfe, vous ferez par e>crit la com- 
munication dont il s'agit. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

N- 45. 

Ttlearamirte adresse par le Ministre du Ftni 
a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai- 
res Elrangeres. 

Berlin, le 5 aout 1914. 
J'ai recu mes passeports. Je quitterai Berlin 
demain matin avec personnel pour la Hollan- 
ds 

Is) Baron Beyens. 

N° 46. 

TeUqramme adresse" par le Ministre du Roi 
a Madrid, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Elrangeres. 

Saint-Sebastien, 5 aout 1914. 
Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge des 
inlerets beiges en Allemagne. Il donne au- 



jourd'hui telegrapln.pi. nnnl fits instructioi 
a son Ambassadeur a Bt'rlin. 

(s) Baron Grenier. 
(Voir piece N" 33 ) 



L, 
Par. 
Elm 


Hire ad, 
Is a M. 
ngeres. 


,-,.„■,■ 
Davig 


par le \hn 
mm, Mi, ■11,1 


isl 


de 


rf. 


u Roi a 
Affaires 








Paris, le 


5 


ao 


nl 


1914. 






Mor 


isieur 


le Ministre, 













I 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parveriir, sous 
ce pli, line copie de la notification de I'etat 
de guerre existanl enlre la France et l'Alle- 
magne, qui m'a 6t6 remise aujo'ufd'hui. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Guillaume. 

Annexe au N" 47. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand, apres 
avoir laisse ses forces arinees franchir la fron- 
tiere el si- livrer sur le territoire frai 
divers actes de nieurtre et de violence; apres 
aveir vioIS la neutrality du Grand Duche de 
Luxembourg au mepris des stipulations de la 
convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et 
de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 
1907 ir les droits el devoirs <l. < Pm lances 
el des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur 
terre (articles t a 11), conventions signees de 
lui; apres avoir adressS un ultimatum an 
Gouvernement royal de Belgique, tendant a 
exiger le passage des forces allemandes par 
le territoire beige, en violation des Traites 
du 19 avril 1839 egalemenl signes par lui et 
de la susdite convention de La Haye; 

\ il.-rhrr la guerre a la France le 3 aoiit 
1914, a 18 heures 45; 

Le Gouverncmenl de la Republique se voit 
dans i es conditions oblige de son i ote de 
recourir a la force des armes. 

II a en consequence l'honneur de faire sa- 
voir par la presente au Gouvernemenl Royal 
que 1'eial de guerre exisle entre la France 
el 1'AIlemagne a dater du 3 aoiit, IS heu- 
res 45, 

Le Gouvernemenl de la RSpublique pro- 
teste aupres de toutes les nations civilisees 
et specialenient aupres des Gouvernements 
signataires des conventions et trades sus- 
rappeles, contre la violation par 1'Empire al- 
lemand de ses engagements internationaux; 
il fait toutes reserves quant aux represailles 
qu'il pourrait se voir am. nr a exercer contre 



Le Gouvernement de la Rfipublique, qui 
enlend observer les principes du droit des 
gens, se conformera durant les hostihl.s et 
sous reserve de reciprocits aux disposilions 
des conventions inlernalionales signers par 
la France concernant le droil de la guerre 
sur terre et sur mer. 

La presente notification faile en conformity 
de Particle 2 de ladile II" Convention de La 
Haye du 18 octobre 1907 relative a I'ouverture 
des hostilities est remise a M. le Ministre de 
Belgique a Paris, le 5 aoflt 1914, a 14 heures. 



Communication faile le 5 aout par Sit Fran- 
cis Villiers, Ministre d Anglelerre, a M. Ua- 
vignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement 
beige que le Gouvernement de S. M. Bri- 
tannique considere I'action commune dans le 
but de resister a I'AUemagne ...mnie etant 
en vigueur et justifiee par le Iraile de 1839. 



N" 49. 

TiUgramme adresst par le Ministre du Roi 
a Londres a .1/ Davignon, Ministre des Affai- 
res Etrangeres 

L Ires, 5 aout 1914. 

L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme 
garante a la defense de notre territoire. La 
flotte anglaise assurer,! le libre passage de 
l'Escaut pour le ravitaillemenl d'Anvers. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 



Telcgramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi 
a La Haye a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

La Haye, 5 aout 1914 
Le balisage de guerre va etre etabli. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 



I Voir piece N° 29). 



Telegrarnme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- 
nistire des Affaires Etrangeres, a M le liaron 
Grenier, Ministre du Roi a Madrid 



Bruxelles, 



II 1914 



Exprimez au Gouvernement espagnol les 
remerciements tres sinceres du Gouverne- 
ment du Roi. 

(s) Davignon. 

(Voir piece \* 46.) 



Leltre adresstc par M linen, mm, Ministre 
des Iffain . Etrangeres aui Ministres du Rm 
a Pans, Londres et Saint-Pe'tersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 5 aout 1914 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les 
Mmistres de France et de Russie ont fait ce 
matin une d-marche aupres de moi, pour 
me faire connaitre la volonbi de leurs gou- 
vernements de rtpondre a notre appel et de 
cooperer avec 1'Angleterre a la defense de 
notre territoire. 

Veuillez agrSer, etc. 

(s) Davignon 



Lellre adressie par le Ministre des Pays- 
Bas a M. Davignon, Ministre des A//aires 
Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles, le 6 aoiit 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint a 
Voire Excellence un exemplaire du numero 
extraordinaire du «Staatscourant», contenant 
la declaration de neutrality des Pays-Bas dans 
la guerre entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, et 
1'Angleterre et l'Allemagne. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Jonkheer de Weede.i 

Annexe au N» 53. 

LOIS, ARRETES. NOMINATIONS, etc. 

Ministere des Affaires etrangeres. de la Justice. 

de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies. 

Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, de 
la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et 
des Colonies, autorises a cette fin par Sa 
Majeste la Reine, portent a la connaissance 
de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le 
Goiivernement neerlandais observera dans la 
guerre qui a eclate entre les Puissances amies 
des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, 
et Belgique et Allemagne, une stride neu- 
trality et qu'en vue de l'observation de cette 
neutralite les dispositions suivantes ont ete 
arretees : 

ARTICLE I. 

Dans les limites du territoire de l'Etat, com- 
prenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, 
outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres 
parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilites 
n'est permis et ce territoire ne peut servir 
de base pour des operations hostiles. 

ARTICLE 2. 

Ni l'occ.upation d'une partie quelconque du 
territoire de l'Etat par un belligerant, ni le 
passage a travers ce territoire par voie de 
terre par des troupes ou des convois de muni- 
tions appartenant a un des belligerants ne 
sont permis, non plus que le passage a travers 
le territoire situ£ a l'interieui- des eaux terri- 
toriales neerlandaises par des navires de guer- 
re oil des batiments des belligerants assimiles 
a ceux-ci. 

ARTICLE 3. 

Les troupes ou les militaires, appartenant 
aux belligerants ou destines a ceux-ci et arri- 
vant sur le territoire de l'Etat par voie de 
terre seront immfidiatement desarmes et in- 
ternes jusqu'a la fin de la guerre. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- 
les a ces derniers, appartenant a un belli- 
gerant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions 
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter 
ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- 
les a ces derniers, appartenant a un bellige- 
rant. qui contreviendront aux prescriptions 
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce 
territoire avant la fin de la guerre. 



ARTICLE 4. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi- 
miles a ces derniers, qui appartiennent a un 
belligerant, n'auront pas acces au territoire 
de l'Etat. 

ARTICLE 5. 

La disposition de l'article 4 n'est pas appli- 
cable : 

r aux navires de guerre ou batiments d'un 
belligerant assimiles a ces derniers, et qui 
par suite d'avarie ou de l'etat de la mer sont 
tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de 
l'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits 
ports ou rades des que les circonstances qui 
les ont contraints de s'y reiugier auront cess6 
d'exister; 

2° aux navires de guerre ou batiments 
assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et 
qui font escale dans un port ou une rade 
situes dans le lerritqire des colonies et pos- 
sessions d'outre-mer. exclusivement dans le 
but de completer leur provision de denrees 
alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires 
devront repartir des que les circonstances qui 
les ont forces a faire escale ont cesse. d'exister, 
avec cette condition que le sejour en rade ou 
dans le port ne pourra durer plus de 24 heu- 
res. 

3° aux navires de guerre ou batiments as- 
similes, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui 
sont utilises exclusivement pour une mission 
religieuse, scientifique, ou bumanitaire. 

ARTICLE 6. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi- 
miles, appartenant a un belligerant, ne peu- 
vent reparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou 
rades de l'Etat qu'en tant que cette reparation 
est indispensable a la securite de la naviga- 
tion, et ils ne pourront. en aucune fagon ac- 
croitre leurs capacites de combat. 

ARTICLE 7. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- 
le^. appartenant a un belligerant, et qui, au 
commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient 
sur le territoire de l'Etat, sont tenus de le 
quitter dans les 24 heures de la publication 
de la presente. 

ARTICLE 8. 

Si des navires de guerre ou batiments assi- 
miles appartenant a divers belligerants se 
trouvent, en meme temps, dans les condi- 
tions visees a l'article 5, dans une memo par- 
tie du monde, et sur le territoire de l'Etat. 
un delai d'au moins 24 heures doit s'ecouler 
entre le depart des navires de chacun des 
belligerants. A moins de circonstances spe- 
ciales, l'ordre de depart est determine par 
l'ordre d'arrivee. Un navire de guerre ou un 
bailment assimile, appartenant a un belli- 
gerant, ne peut quitter le territoire de l'Etat 
que 24 heures apres le depart d'un navire 
de commerce portant le pavilion de l'autre 
belligerant. 

ARTICLE 9. 

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- 
les, appartenant a un belligerant, vises a 
l'art. 5 et a l'art. 7, ne peuvent etre ravitailles 



en denrees alimentaires dans les ports et lea 
rades du pays que dans la mesure ntassaira 
pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'a la li- 
mite normale du temps dc paix. 

De memo, Hs ne peuvent charger de com/ 
bustihle que dans la mesure necessaire pour 
pouvoir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont 
encore a bord, le port le plus rapproche de 
leur propre pays. 

Un mime batiment ne peut etre ravitaille 
a nouveau en combustible qua l'expiration 
d'une periode de trois mois au moins apres 
son precedent ra\ itaillement dans le terri- 
toire de l'Etal. 

ARTICLE 10. 

Une prise ne peut <Hre amenee dans le 
territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de na- 
viguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, quelle man- 
que de combustible ou de denrees alimen- 
taires. 

Kile doit s'eloigner des que la cause de 
son entree dans le territoire cesse d'exister. 

Si elle ne le fait pas, l'ordre lui sera donne 
de parlir immediatemenl; en cas de refus, ll 
sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour 
liberer la prise avec ses officiers et son equi- 
page et pour interner I'equipage placed a bord 
ipar le belligerant qui a fait la prise. 

ARTICLE 11. 

II est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, 
de former des corps combattants ou d'ouvrir 
des bureaux de recrutement au profit des 
belligerants. 

ARTICLE 12. 

II est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de 
prendre du service a bord de navires de guer- 
re ou de batiments assimiles. 

ARTICLE 13 

II est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat. 
d'amenager, d'armer ou d'equiper des navires 
destines a des fins militaires au profit d'un 
belligerant, ou de fournir ou conduire a un 
belligerant de tels navires 

ARTICLE 14 

II est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de 
fournir des armes ou des munitions a des navi- 
res de guerre ou batiments assimil^s apparte- 
nant a un belligerant, ou de leur venir en aide 
d'une maniere quelconque en vue de l'aug- 
mentation de leur equipage ou de leur ame- 
nagemcnt. 

ARTICLE 15. 

I! est interdit. sur le territoire de l'Etat, sauf 
autorisation prealable des autorites locales 
competentes, de faire des reparations aux na- 
vires de guerre ou batiments assimiles appar- 
tenanl a un belligerant, ou de leur fournir des 
provisions de bouche ou de combustible. 

ARTICLE 16. 

I! est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de 
cooperer au degreement ou a la reparation de 
prises, sauf en cc qui est necessaire pour les 
rendre propres a tenir la mer; ainsi que 
d'acheter des prises on des marchandises con- 
fisquees, it de les recevoir en echange, en don 
ou en dep6l. 



ARTICLE 17. 

Le territoire de l'Etat' comprend -la mer 
cflticre sur une largeur de 3 milks marms 
a raison de 60 par degr£ de latitude, a partir 
de la laisse de la basse mer. 

En ce qui concerne les baies, cette distance 
de 3 milles marins est mesuree a partir d'une 
ligne droite tiree a travers la baie aussi pies 
que possible de I'enlree, au point oil l'ouver- 
ture de la baie ne depasse pas dix milles ma- 
rins, a raison de 60 par degre de latitude. 

ARTICLE 18. 

En outre, 1'attention est attiree sur les arti- 
cles 100, 1°, et 205 du Code penal ; Indiscb 
Staatsblad 1905, N" 62 ; Art. 7, 4°, de la loi sur 
la qualile de Neerlandais et sur le domicile 
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1892, N° 268; 1910, 
N" 210); art. 2, N° 3, de la loi sur la qualite 
de sujet neerlandais (Nederlandsch Staatsblad 
1910, N* 55; Indisch Staatsblad 1910, N" 296; 
art. 54 et, 55 du Code penal de Suriname; 
art. 54 et 55 du Code p<5nal de Curacao). 

De meme, 1'attention des commandants de 
navires, armateurs et affreteurs, est atliree Bur 
le danger et les inconvenients auxquels ils 
s'exposeraienl en ne respectant pas le blocus 
effrctif des belligerants, en transportant de la 
contrebande de guerre ou des depeches mili- 
taires pour les belligerants (a moins qu'il ne 
s'agisse du service postal regulier) ou en exe- 
cutant pour eux d'autres services de transport. 

Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes pre- 
vus ci-dessus, s'exposerait a toutes les conse- 
quences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir 
a cet egard aucune protection ni intervention 
du Gouvernement neerlandais. 



THigramme adress^ par M. Davignon, Mi- 
nistrr des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. h< Baron 
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. 

Bruxelles. 6 aout 1914. 

Veuillez communiquer au Gouvernement 
neerlandais la note suivante : 

Le Gouvernement beige a pris note de l'eta- 
.blissement du balisage de guerre sur l'Escaut 
et de ce que le Gouvernement hollandais as- 
surera le maintien de la navigation. 

II conviendrait que la navigation put se 
faire a partir de 30 minutes avant le lever 
"du soleil jusqu'a 30 minutes apres son coucher 
et que 1'echange des pilotes se fit a Bath.- 

Si desireux qu'il soit de oonsentir aux de- 
mandes du gouvernement hollandais, le Gou- 
vernement beige estime qu'il y a lieu, a raison 
des ports du littoral, de maintenir les bateaux- 
phares de Wielingen et de Wandelaar, ainsi 
que les bouees du chenal de Wielingen. 

(s) Davignon. 

(Voir piece N° 50.) 



TtUgramme adresst par le Ministre du Rni a 
La Haye, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

La Haye. 6 aoul 1914 
La navigation sur l'Escaut pent so faire des 
I'aube et tant qu'il fait clair. Les bouees de 



Wielingen seront retablies. L'echange des pi- 
lotes a Hansweert est plus facile et mieux 
organise. Insistez-vous pour Balh. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 



N • 56 

Telegramme adressi pur M .Davignon,Minis- 

tre des All aires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron 
Fallon, Minislre du Roi a La Haye 

Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914. 
Veuillez exprimer au Gouvernement neer- 
landais les remerciements sinceres du Gou-" 
vernement beige pour Irs mesures prises pour 
assurer la navigation sur l'Escaut. Le Gou- 
vernement est d'accord avec le Gouvernement 
hollandais au sujet de la duree de la naviga- 
tion. 11 avait propose Bath, mais accepte Hans- 
weert, puisque ce port est mieux outille pour 
l'echange des pilotes. 

(s) Davignon. 



Tilegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- 
nislre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres 
du Roi a Paris et a Londres. 

Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914. 
La Belgique souhaite que la guerre ne soit 
pas etendue en Afrique centrale. Le Gouver- 
neur du Congo beige a reiju pour instructions 
d'observer une attitude strictement defensive. 
Priez le Gouvernement francais (anglais) de 
faire savoir si son intention est de proclamer 
la neutrality au Congo francais (colonies bri- 
tanniques du bassin conventionnel du Congo), 
conformement a l'article onze de l'Acte gene- 
ral de Berlin. Un telegramme de Boma an- 
nonce que les hoslilites sont probables entre 
Francais et Allemands dans l'Ubangi. 

(s) Davignon. 



J'attacherais du prix a savoir si le Gouver- 
nement de la Republique (de S. M. britanni- 
que) partage cette maniere de voir et, le cas 
echeant, s'll entre dans ses intentions, a l'oc- 
casion du conflit actuel, de se prevaloir de 
la disposition de l'article II de l'Acte general 
de Berlin pour placer sous le regime de la 
neutrality celles de ses colonies qui sont com- 
prises dans le Bassin conventionnel du Congo. 

J'adresse une communication identique a 
votre collegue a Londres (Paris). 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Lettre adressie par le Minislre du Rot a 
Paris a ill. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le 8 aout 1914 

Monsieur le Minislre, 

J'ai eu l'honneur de parler au President de la 
Republique de votre telegramme d'hier. Je 
l'avais recu dans la soiree et 1'avais immedia- 
temenl communique au Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres. On avait demande a reflechir 1 avant 
de me repondre. 

M. Poincare m'a promis de parler de cette 
question aujourd'hui au Mmistre des Colo- 
nies. A premiere vue, il ne verrait guere d'in- 
convtaient a proclamer la neutrality du Congo 
francais, mais il reserve cependant sa reponse. 
II croit que des fails de guerre ont deja eclate 
dans l'Oubanghi. 11 a profile de la circonstance 
pour me rappeler que la protection que nous 
accorde la France s etend aussi a nos colonies 
et que nous n'avons rien a craindre. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Guillaume. 



TiUgramme adresse par le Minislre du Roi 
a La Rage a M. Davignon, Minislre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 



Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Minislre 
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Rot 
a Paris et a Londres. 

Bruxelles, le 7 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Comme suite a mon telegramme de ce ma- 
tin, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de porter a 
la connaissance du Gouvernement francais 
(anglais) l'mformation suivante: 

Tout en prescrivant au Gouverneur General 
du Congo de prendre des mesures de defense 
sur les frontieres communes de la colonie 
beige et des colonies allemandes de l'Est afri- 
cain et du Kameroun, le Gouvernement du 
Roi a invite ce haut fonctionnaire a s'abstenir 
de toute action offensive contre ces colonies. 

Vu la mission civilisatrice commune aux na- 
tions colonisatrices, le Gouvernement beige 
desire, en effet, par un souci d'humanite., ne 
pas etendre le champ des hostilites a l'Afrique 
centrale. II ne prendra done point l'initiative 
d'infliger une pareille epreuve a la civilisation 
dans cette region et les forces militaires qu'il 
y possede n'entreront en action que dans le 
cas oil elles devraient repousser une altaque 
directe contre ses possessions africames. 



La Haye, 9 aout 1914. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a prie 
de vous transmettre les informations suivan- 
tes, parce que le Ministre d'Amerique a Bru- 
xelles s'y refuse. 

La forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut 
apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- 
ment Allemand regrette tres profondeinent 
que par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement 
beige contre l'Allemagne, on en est arrive a 
des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne 
vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, e'est si ule- 
ment par la force des evenements qu'elle a 
du, a cause des mesures militaires de la Fran- 
ce, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en 
Belgique et d'occuper Liege comme point d'ap- 
pui pour ses operations militaires ulterieures. 
Apres que l'armee beige a par sa resistance 
heroique contre une grande superiorite, main- 
tenu l'honneur de ses armes, le Gouverne- 
ment allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le 
Gouvernement beige d'eviter k la Belgique les 
horreurs ulterieures de la guerre. Le Gouver- 
nement est pret a tous accords avec la Bel- 
gique qui peuvent se concilier avec ses arran- 
gements (voir piece N° 70) avec la France. 
L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement 
qu'elle n'a pas l'intention de s'approprier le ter- 



20 



ritoire beige et que cette intention est loin 
d'elte L'Allemagne csl toujours prete ci eva- 
cuer Li Belgique aussitot que l'etat de guerre 
le lui permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avail prie 
son collegue de se charger de cede tentative 
de mi diation Le Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
■■ ■ n .1 accepte sans enthousiasme cette mis- 
sion Je in'™ suis charge pour lui faire plai- 



. 



Fallon. 



Ttligmmme adrcsse par le Ministre du Roi 
a Purr, a M. Davignon, Ministre dei Affaires 
Elrang&res. 

Paris, 9 aoiil 191',. 
Le Gouvernemenl franeais est Ires dispose 
.i proclamer la neutrality des possessions du 
Bassin conventionnel du Congo et prie l'Es- 
pagne de le proposer a Berlin. 

(s.) Baron Guillaume. 
(Voir piece N°' 59.) 



N» 62. 

Lcllre adrcsste par le Ministre du Roi a 
La Haye, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai- 
res Btrangeres. 

La Haye. le 10 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Repondant a un appel telgphonique, hier a 
9 lieures du soir, je me suis rendu au Depar- 
temenl des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Le Jhr. Loudon ma dit que mon collegue 
I \ magne sortait de son Cabinet et lui avait 
remis un document que le Representant des 
Etats-Unis a Bruxelles avait refuse de vous 
transmettre 

Le diplomate americain, charge de la Lega- 
tion d'Alli m i- ne i Bi ixi Hi s a pretendu qu'il 
ii ' pas recu d'ordres speeiaux de Washing- 
ton pour intervenir officiellement aupres du 
Gouvernenient beige dans l'interet de t'Alle- 
magne. 

Le Ministre d'Amerique a, en consequence, 
telegraphic a son collegue a La Haye, lequel 
a informe le Representant allemand du refus 
de Mr. Whitlock. 

La premiere demarche a done ete faite par 
le Gouvernement allemand aupres de l'ambas- 
sadi hi des Etats-l nis .i Berlin. 

Dans ces conditions et vu l'urgence que 
presentent ces affaires, M. von Muller a prie 
le Jhr Loudon de servir d'intermediaire du 
Gouvernement allemand aupres de vous. 

Son Excellence m'a lu le texte alle- 
mand du document. Je n'ai pas cache mon 
etonm menl de cette tentative de mediation 
el sa faible chance de succi s dans cetle forme; 
niais uniqueinent pour etre agreable au Mi- 
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas 
j'ai promis de vous lelcgruphier lmmediate- 
menl , ce que j'ai fait hier. 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, le document 
allemand dans son texte original et en traduc- 
tion. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 

1" Annexe au N°62. 

Die Festung Luttich ist nach tapfrer Gegen- 
wehr im Sturm genommen worden. Die Deut- 
sche Regitrung bedauert es auf das tiefste, 



dass ps mfolge der Stellwngnahme der Bel- 
gisohi n Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blu- 
ligen Zusammenstdssen gekommen ist. 
Deutschland koinmt nicht als Feind nach Bel- 
gien. Nur unter dem Zwang des Verhaltmsse 
hal es angesichts der militarischen Massnah- 
fn.ji Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss 

(as liissen, in Belgien einzurucken und 

Luttich ais Stutzpunkt fur seine weiteren 
militarischen Operatt'onen besetzen zu mus- 
sen. Nachdem die Bi Igisi he Krmee in helden- 
mutigem Widi rstand gegen dii grosse Ueber- 
legenheit due Wat it mehre auj das glanzendste 
gewahrl hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung 
s ine Majeslat den Konig und die Belgische 
Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken 
des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche .Re- 
gierung isl zii jedem Abkommen mil Belgien 
bereil das sich irgendwie mil Rucksicht auf 
seine (ooir piece A' 70) Auseinandersetzung 
mil Frankreich vernigen lasst. Deutschland 
ver ii herl nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht 
von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Bel- 
gisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese 
Absicht durchaus fernhegt. Deutschland is 
noch immer bereil das Belgische Konigreich 
unverziiglich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs- 
!■!-'■ '-s ilim.gesl.illrl ..Der hiesige Amerika- 
nische Botschafter isl nut diesem Vermitt- 
lungsversuch seines Brusseler Kullegen em- 
verslanden.» 

2™ Annexe au N° 62. 

(Traductron.) 

La forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut 
apres one defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- 
menl allemand regrette le plus profondement 
que par suite de lallitude du Gouvernement 
beige contre l'AUemagne on en soil arrive a 
des rencontres sanglantas, L'Allemagne ne 
vu hi pas en ennemie en Belgique. C'est seu- 
lemenl par la force des evenements quelle a 
dii, a cause des mesures militaires de la Fran- 
ce, prendre la grave determination d'entrer 
en Belgique et d'occuper Liege comme point 

d'appui pour srs operal s militaires ulte- 

rieures Apres que 1'arm'ee beige a, dans une 
• heroique contre une grande supe- 
riorite, maintenu l'honneur de ses .hum.-, de 
de la facon la plus brillante, le Gouvernement 
allemand prie Sa MajeSte le Roi et le Gou- 
vernement beige d'eviter a la Belgique 
les horreurs ultericures de la guerre. Le Gou- 
vernement allemand est pret a tout accord 
avec la Belgique, qui pent se concilier de n'lin- 
porle quelle maniere avec ses arrangements 
avec la France. L'Allemagne assure encore 
une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas ete di- 
rigfie par l'intention de s'approprier le terri- 
toire beige et que cette intention est loin d'elle. 
L'Allemagne est encore toujours prete a eva- 
cuer la Belgique aussitot que l'etat de la 
guerre le lui permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'ac- 
cord avec cette tentative de mediation de son 
collegue de Bruxelles. 



N 63. 

Te'le'gramme adresse" par M Davignon, Mi- 
nistre des Affaires i'.lrangeres, a M. le Baron 
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. 

Bruxelles, le 10 aoiit 191-5. 
Le Gouvernement du Roi a recii les propo- 
sitions que le Gouvernement allemand lui a 



tail parvenir par l'entremise du gouvernement 
neerlandais. II vous transmeltra prochaine- 
ment sa reponse. 

(s) Davignon 
(Voir piece N° 62 el annexes I 

N" 64. 

TiUgramme adresse par M Davignon, Mi- 
nislr'e des Affaires Etrangeres, au Mimslre du. 
Roi a La Haye. 

Bruxelles, 10 aout 1914. 

Un doute subsisle. quant a la signification du 
mot «auseinandersetzung» que vous traduisez 
par «arrangement". Veuillez vous informer si 
dans la pensee du Gouvernement allemand it 
s'agit des arrangements que nous aurions pris 
avec la France ou du reglement du differend 
entre la France et l'Allemagne. 

(s) Davignon. 



N" 65. 

Lettre adresste par M. Davignon, Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, attx Ministres de Grande 
Rretagne, Russie et France, accridites en Bel- 
gique. 

Bruxelles, le lO.aoiit 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- 
cellence que le Ministre du Roi k La Haye, 
a la demande du Mimslre des Affaires Etran- 
geres des Pays-Bas, nous a transmis la pro- 
position suivante du Gouvernement allemand 
(voir piece N° 62, annexe 2). 

Voici le texle de la reponse que le Gou- 
vernement du Roi se propose de faire a cette 
communication : 

»La proposition que nous fait le Gouverne- 
ment allemand reproduit la proposition qui 
avail ete formulee dans rultimatum du 2 aout. 
Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux.la Belgique 
ne peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultima- 
tum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa 
neutrality a ete violee, qu'ime guerre dou- 
loureuse a ete portee sur son terntoire et que 
les garants de sa neutrality bnt loyalement et 
immediatement repondu a son appel.» 

Le Gouvernemenl du Roi tient a ce que les 
Puissances garantes de la neutrality de Bel- 
gique aient conaaissance de ces documents. 

Je saisis. etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



M. von Buch adressa a M. Eyschen. Presi- 
dent du Gouvernement, une ietlre dont la 
traduction suit: 

((Luxembourg, le 8 aout 1914. 
Excellence, 

En consequence de 1'attitude complelemenl 
hostile que la Belgique a prise vis-a-vis de 
l'Allemagne, les autorites nulitaires se voient 
contraintes d'insister pour le depart d'ici du 
Ministre de Belgique. 

Son Excellence le. general commandant fait 
pner le Comte van den Steen de Jehay, d'or- 
ganiser son voyage de depart.de telle facon 
qu'il puisse, endeans les 24 heures, entrer en 
relation personnellement a Coblence avec le 
general, de Ploetz, au sujet de son voyage 
ulterieur. Le depart n'est possible que par la 
voie Treves-Cobieiice." 

(s) de Buch. 

M. Eyschen transmit cette lettre le meme 
jour au Comte van den Steen de Jehay, dans 
les termes suivants : 

(.Luxembourg, le 8 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai le tres vif regret de vous communiquer 
ci-joint copie d'une lettre du Ministre d'Alle- 
magne rn'informar.t que l'autonte militaire 
allemande demande votre depart. 

Vous y trouverez les conditions y attachees-. 

M. von Buch me dit que les autorites mili 
taires conseillenlient plutot le voyage par che- 
min de fer, parce que le voyage par automo- 
bile vous exposerait a litre arrete Crop souvent 
pour des motifs de controle. Mais le choix 
vous est abandomuS. 

Le Ministre d'Allemagne viendra chez moi 
prendre votre reponse. 

Je ne saurais vous dire combien la t&che 
que je remplis en ce moment m'est 'penibli 
Je n'oublierai jamais les relations si agreables 
que nous avons eues et je fais des vceux pour 
que votre voyage se fasse dans les meilleures 
conditions. 

(s) Eyschen. » 

Le Gouvernement beige estimant que le Gou- 
vernement Grand Ducal n'avait pas eu le 
choix de son attitude et que cello qu'il avait 
el& oblige d'adopter n'impliquait en aucune 
maniere une intention discourtoise a l'egard 
du Roi et de la Belgique, decida qu'il n y 
avait pas lieu, dans ces conditions, de prier 
le Charge d'Affairesdu Grand Duche de quit- 
ter la Belgique. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres. uur Ministres du Roi 
a Londres, Paris el Sainl-Pilersbourg . 

Bruxelles, le 10 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaitre les 
circonslances qui ont amene le depart de' Lu- 
xembourg du Representant du Roi. 

Le general commandant des troupes alle- 
mandes dans le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg 
/it part, le 8 aout, au Ministre d'Allemagne 
en cette ville, de la volonte des autorites nuli- 
taires de provoquer le depart du Representant 
du Roi pres la Cour Grand Ducale. 



Lettre adressie <i .1/ Davignon, Ministre des 

Affaires Etrangeres, par le Mimslre des Elats- 
Unis, accrtdtte a Bruxelles. 

Bruxelles, le 11 aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
La Legation a rec.u aujourd'hui de Washing- 
ton une depeche 1'inforrnant que le Gouver- 
nement des Etats-Unis avait, a. la demande 
du Gouvernement allemand, consenti a litre 
de courtoisie Internationale, a accepter la pro- 
tection des interets des sujets allemands en 
Bejgique. 



En vertu des instructions qui accompa- 
gnaient cette depeche, nous nous occuperons 
done, si vous n'y voyez pas d'inconvenient, 

d'exercer nos buns et amicaux o .1 ipn 

du Gouvernement du Roi, pour la protection 
des sujets allemands. Les agreables rapporis 
que nous avons eus a ce sujet jusqu'a present 
me donnent la conviction que e'est avec le me- 
nu' el mutuel sentiment que nous pourrorts les 
poursuivre, dans le mcine but 

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Mi 
nistre, pour vous renouveler i'assurance de ma 
haute consideration. 

(s) Brand Whitlock 



N 68 

Lellre adressee a M Davignon, Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, par sir Francis II I il- 
tiers, Ministre d'Angleterre 

(Traduction.) 

Bruxelles, le 11 aoiit 1014. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai telegraphic a Sir Edward Grey la com- 
munication allernande et la reponse projetfe. 
J'ai recu l'ordre d'exprimer a Voire Excel- 
lence I'entiere approbation du Gouvernement 

de Sa Majeste britannique, Ce der r ne peul 

que se declarer d'accord sur les termes de la 

rr| se que le Gouvernement beige se propose 

de [aire .1 une tentative de semer la desunion 
parmi les pays maintenant urns, pour la de- 
fense di s Traites violes par l'Allemagne. 
Je saisis, etc. 

(s) F. H. Villiers. 
(Voir piece N° 65.) 



«ihre» et done traduire «son conflit avec la 
France-. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 
(Voir piece N° 64 .) 



1 FV 1 '•{/ ramme adresse' par M. Davignon, Mi- 
nislre des Aflaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron 
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. 

Bruxelles. 12 aoiit 1914. 

Priere de remettre le telegramme suivant 
au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres : La propo- 
sition que nous fail le Gouvernement allemand 
reproduil la proposition qui avail ete tormulee 
dans l'ultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele a ses 
devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut 
que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, d'au- 
tant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutrality 
a 1 tc viol6e, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete 
portee sur son territoire et que les garants 
de sa neutrality ont loyalement et lmmedia- 
tement repondu a son appel. 

(s) Davignon. 



N° 72. 

Telegramme adresse a M. Davignon, Minis- 
tre des Affaires Etrangeres, par S. E. M. Sazo- 
noff President du Conseit des Ministres dc 

Russie. 

Saint-Petersbourg, 13 aout 1914 
Veuillez remercier le Gouvernement Royai 
pour sa communication et lui exprimer le 
plaisir que le Gouvernement Imperial eprouve 
a voir son attitude ferme et digne dont il le 
felicite tres vivement. 

(s) Sazonoff. 
(Voir piece N° 65.) 



Lellre adressee a M Davignon, Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre de France, 
accredile a Bruxelles. 

Bruxelles, le 11 aout 191 '1 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'lionneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- 
cellence que le Gouvernement francais donne 
son entiere adhesion a la* reponse que le gou- 
vernement beige se propose de faire au nouvel 
ultimatum de 1'Allemagne. 

Cette reponse esl ben celle qu'on pouvait 
attendre d'un Gouvernement el dun peuple 
qui ont resiste aussi heroiquemenl a la viola- 
tion odieuse de leur territoire. 

La France continuera a remplir ses devoirs 
de garante de la neutralite beige et de fidele 
amie de la Belgique 

Je saisis, etc. 

(s) Klobukowski. 

(Voir piece N° 65.) 



N 70. 

Tiltgramme adresse a M Davignon, Ministre 

des Allaire: F.irangeres, par le Ministre du 
Roi a La Haye. 

La Haye, 12 aout 1914. 

Le texle allemand contenail une faute; au 
lieu de -seine ausemantlersetzung" il faul lire 



N" 73. 

Lellre adressee a M . Davignon, Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre du Roi a 
La Haye. 

La Haye, le 13 aoiit 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai i'ii l'lionneur de recevoir votre tele- 
gramme d'hier et j'ai remis aussilol a M. 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres la reponse 
de la Belgique a la seconde proposition alle- 
rnande. 

Son Excellence m'.a promis de faire parvenir 
immediatement au Ministre d'Allemagne la 
communication du Gouvernement du Roi. 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Fallon. 
(Voir piece IT 71.1 



N« 74. 

Lellre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a 
Paris « M Davignon, Ministre des ,-Uiaires 
Etrangeres 

Paris, le 16 aoul 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
Au cours de 1'entretien que j'ai eu ce matin 
avec M. de Margene, j'ai amene la conversa- 
tion sur les affaires coloniales et sur la de- 



marche.que vous m'avez charge de faire par 
votre telegramme et votre dep§che du 7 de ce. 
mois. 

Mori interlocuteur m'a rappele que le Gou- 
vernement de la Republique s'etait adrcsse a 
l'Espagne qui n'avait pas donne reponse avant 
d'avoir l'avis de l'Angleterre. II parait que 
celle-ci continue a ne pas donner de reponse. 

M. de Margerie estime qu'en presence de la 
situation actuelle, il importe de frapper l'Al 
lemagne partout oil on peut l'atteindre ; il 
croit que telle est aussi 1'opinion de l'Angle- 
terre qui aura certes des pretentions a faire 
valoir; la France desire reprendre la partie 
du Congo, qu'elle a du ceder a la suite des 
incidents d'Agadir. Un succes, me dit mon 
interlocuteur, ne serait pas difficile a obtenir. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Guillaume. 

(Voir piices N" 57 et 58.) 



Leltre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a 
Londres, a M. Davignon, Mimstrc des A/laires 
Elrangeres. 

Londres, le 17 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

En reponse a votre de.pe.che du 7 aout, j'ai 
1'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gou- 
vernement britannique ne peut se rallier a la 
proposition beige tendant a respecter la neu- 
trality des possessions des Puissances bellige- 
rantes dans le bassin conventionnel du Congo. 

Les troupes allemandes de l'Est Africain al- 
lemand ont deja pris l'offensive contre le 
protectorat anglais de l'Afrique centrale. D'au- 
tre part, des troupes britanniques ont deja 
attaque. le port allemand de Dar-Es-Salaam, oil. 
elles ont d^truit la station de telegraphie sans 
fil. 

Dans ces circonstances, meme si le Gouver- 
nement anglais etait persuade de l'utilite po- 
litique et strategique de la proposition beige, 
il'ne pourrait 1'adopter. 

Le Gouvernement de Londres croit que les 
forces qu'il envoie en Afrique seront suffi- 
santes pour vaincre toute opposition. II fera 
tous ses efforts pour empecher des souleve- 
mcnts dan's la population indigene. 

La France est du meme avis que l'Angle- 
terre, vu l'activite allemande que Ton remar- 
que pres de Bonar et Ekododo. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 

(Voir pieces N" 57 et 58.) 



TtUgramme adressi par le Vice-Govverneur 
du Katanga a M. Renkin, Ministre des Colo- 
nies. 

Elisabethville, 26 aout 1914. 

Allemands continuant leurs escarmouches 

au Tanganika ont attaque le 22 aout le port 

de Lukuga. lis ont eu deux noirs lues et deux 

blesses. De nouvelles attaques sont attendues. 

(s) Tombeur. 



des 



N° 77. 

Telegramme adresse par le Comte Clary et 
Aldringen, Ministre d'Avtriche'Hongrie, a M. 
Davignon, Ministre des Aft aires Elrangeres, 
transmis pur Vintermidiaire du Mir'"'" 
Affaires Elrangeres des Pays-Bas. 

La Haye, le 28 aout 1914. 

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai 1'hon- 
neur de notifier a Votre Excellence ce qui 
suit : "Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse 
d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaieni Hi 
adressees k plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, 
prete sa cooperation militaire a la France et 
a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux ont 
declare, la guerre a l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en 
presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre 
constate, les ressortissants autrichiens et hon- 
grois se trouvant en Belgique ont sous les 
yeux des autorites Royales, du subir un traite- 
ment contraire aux exigences les plus primi- 
tives de l'humamte et inadnnssable meme 
vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, l'Autri- 
che-Hongrie se voil dans la necessite de rom- 
pre les relations diplomatiques et se considere 
des ce moment en 6tat de guerre avec la Bel- 
gique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de 
la Legation et confie la protection de mes 
administrfe au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Ame- 
rique en Belgique. De la part du Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal les passeports sont 
remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.» 
(s) Clary. 



Tiligramme adresst par M. Davignon.'Mi- 
nistre des Affaires Elrangeres a M. le Baron 
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haije. 

Anvers, le 29 aout 1914. 

Priere accuser reception a Legation Au- 
triche par intermediaire Ministre Affaires 
Etrangeres declaration de guerre Aulriche- 
Hongrie a Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit: 

«La Belgique a toujours entretenu des re- 
lations d'amitie avec tons ses voisins sans 
dislinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les 
devoirs que la neutralite lui impose. Si elle 
n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions 
de l'Allemgane. e'est que celles-ci avaient pour 
objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a 
pris a la face de l'Europe, engagements qui 
ont Hi les conditions de la creation du Royau- 
me de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, 
quelque. faible qu'il soit, puisse m^connaitre 
ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'incli- 
jiant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a 
attendu, non seulement les de.lais de l'ultima- 
tum, mais la violation de son territoire par 
les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel 
a la France et a l'Angleterre. garantes de sa 
neutralite au me.me titre que l'Allemagne et 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour .cooperer au nom et 
en vertu des traites a la defense du territoire 
beige. 

En renoussant par les armes les envahis- 
seurs. elle n'a meme pas accompli un acte 
d'hostilite aux termes de l'article 10 de la 
convention de La Haye, sur les droits et de- 
voirs des Puissances neutres. 



L'AUemagne; a rcconnu etle-meme que son 
agression consiitue une violation du droit des 
gens et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoque 
son interet strategiquo. 

La Belgique oppose un dementi formel a. 
['affirmation que les ressorlissants aulrichiens 
el hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un (rai- 
tement contraire aux exigences les plus primi- 
tives de 1'humanite. 

Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des 1e dS- 
hut des hostilites, les ordres les plus stricts 
quant a la sauvegarde des perSOnnes et des 
proprietes austro-iiongroises. 

(s) Davignorj. 



Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Minisire 
des Affaires Etrangires, aux Legations du 
Roi a Velranger, 

Anvers, le 29 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Minisire, 

Sous la date du 17 aout, j'ai adresse au Mi- 
nistre du Roi a Londres une lettre dans 
laquelle j'ai cru devoir relever certaines alle- 
gations produites par le Gouvernement alle- 
mand, et dont faisait mention le Blue Book 
I'll] >l ir rcccinment par le Gouvernement an- 
glais. 

J'ai l'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une 
c ipii di ci tte lettre et de ses annexes. Veuil- 
lez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au 
Gouvernemenl aupres duquel vous etes accre- 

dlte 

Vcuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

I" Annexe au N" 79. 

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Minisire 
des Af/aires Etrangires, au ('mute de La- 
laing, Minisire du Hoi a Londres. 

BriLxclles, le 17 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Comte, 

Le Blue Bool; public recemment par le Gou- 
vernement britannique reproduit, sous le 
n" U'l' [page 65), le, texte d'un teJegramme 
de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E, Gro- 
schen a Sir E. Grey, telegramme dont j'ex- 
trais le passage suivanl . 

n It appears from what he (His E.\r. Ile'ncj 
o The Secretary ol Slate) said that German 
i) Government consider that certain hostile 
" aels have been already committed by Bel- 
li gium. As an instance at this, lie a d 
« that a consignemenl of corn of Germany 
u had been placed under an embargo al- 
ii read.\ » 

Le fait auquel le Secretaire d'Etat allcniand 
des Affaires Etrangeres a fait allusion dans 
son entretien avec Sir E. Groschen, et qu'il 
considerait comme -un acte hostile de la part 
de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute a ['ap- 
plication des arretes royaux du 30 juillet, qui 
ont prohihc provisoirement l'exportation de 
Belgique de certains produils. Comme vous 
le constaterez par l'expose que je tiens a vous 
faire ci-apres, le fait qui nous est reproche n'a 
nullement Ir caractere qu'on a voulu lui don- 
ncr en Allemagne, 



Pes arretes royaux- dates du 30 juillet et 
publics au Monitcur beige du lendemain ont 
prohibe a litre provisoire, par toutes les fron- 
tieres do terre et de mep, l'exportation d'une 
serio de produits, des cereales notamment. 
Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre 
d'Allemagne a Bruxellcs me signala que la 
douane d' Anvers retenait des chargements de 
grains a destination de 1' Allemagne qui, sim- 
plement transbqrdes dans notre port, ne fai- 
saient fen realile qu'y transiter. M. de Below 
Salesko demandait la libre sortie des bateaux 
porlant ces chargements. Le jour meme ou i) 
recut la reclamation du Ministre d'Allema- 
gne, mon Department en saisit le Ministers 
des Finances, et des le surlendemain 2 aout, 
celui-ci nous annonca qu'il avait ete, transmis 
a la douane beige des instructions donnanl 
pleine et eiitiere satisfaction a l'AUemagne, 

Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieup 
le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux una 
copie de la correspondance echangee a cs 
sujet avei M it' Below Saleske. Vous y ver- 
rez que rien dans notre attitude ne pouvait 
etre considers comme teriioignant de dispo- 
sitions bust i les a l'egard de l'AUemagne ; les 
mcsiiivs prises par le Gouvernement beige a 
ee momenl ne constituaient one les simples 
precautions que tout Etat a le droit et le de- 
voir de prendre dans des circonstances aussi 
exceptionnelles. 

II scrait bon que vous adressiez au Gouver- 
nement de S. M. Britannique une communi- 
cation aim de 1'eelairer sur la realitu des 
fails. 

Vcuillcz agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

2™ Annexe au N° 79. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Sa- 
leske, Ministre d'Allemagne. 

Bruxelles, 3 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Comme suite a la lettre que Votre Excel- 
lence a liien voulu m'adresser le 31 juillet 
j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que mon col- 
l ' - ii- des Finances a porte a la connaissance" 
du service des douanes que les prohibitions 
etablies par Irs arretes royaux du 30 juillet 
ecoule i visent qui I exportation propn ment 
ilr. el i -'''inl'iil done pas aux marchan- 
dises regulieremenl aeclarees en transit lors 
de 1'importatiah.Au surplus, lorsque des mar- 
chandises libres de droits sont declarers en 
consuin mation, bien qu'elles soient en realite 
destinies .i l'exportation, elles font commune- 
menl I'objel de declarations de libre entree 
sp6ciales qui sonl considerees comme des 
documents de transit. Enfin, s'h arrivait que 
de telles marchandises avaient ete declarees 
en consommation sans restrictions, comme si 
elles di'v.innt rester effectivement dans le 
pays, la douane en permettraii encore la sor- 
tie du moment ou il serail dument etabli, 
par lis documents dexpeditioi manifestes, 
connaissemenls, etc., qu'elles devaient etre 
exporters immediatemenl en transit. 

.Ii puis ajouter que l'exportation des grains 
auxquels se rapportait la lettre precitee de la 
Legation Imperiale a ele autorise le 1" aout. 

Je saisis, etc. 

(si Davignon. 



Letlic adressie par M. Uavujnon, Minislre 
ties Affaires Etrangeres, a Jf. de Below Sa- 
leske, Minislre d'AUemagne. 



le 1" aout 1014. 



Mo 



iieur lr Minislre, 



En reponse a la lettre do Votre Excellence 
du 31 juUlel, j'ai l'honneur de Lui lain; 
savoir que l'arrete beige du 30 juillet ne 
vise, que ['exportation ~et nun le transit des 
produils cites. 

J'ai cu soin de faire part de votre commu- 
nication a mon eollegue des finances, en ie 
priant de vouloir bien donner aux bureaux 
de la douane des instructions precises de na- 
ture a prevenir toute erreur dans l'application 
de l'arrete precite. 

Je saiis, etc. 

(s) Davignon, 



4™ Annexe au N° 79. 

LctlTa adressee par M. de Below Saleske, 
minislre d'AUemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi- 
nistrc des A I Inircs Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le Minislre, 

On m'a informe d'Anver's que la douane a 
defendu le depart des bateaux charges de 
grams pour I'Allemagne. 

Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'uno 
exportation de grains, mais d'un transit, parce 
que la marchandise ,i ete seulement transbor- 
dee a Anvers,' j'ai 1'honneur de recourir a 
votre ibienveillante enlremise afin qu'on 
laisse partir pour I'Allemagne les bateaux en 
question. 

En meme temps, je prio Voire Excellence 
de me faire savoir si le purl d'Anvers est fer- 
ine pour le transit des marchandises enume- 
rees au Moniteur d'aujourd'hui. 

En attendant la reponse de Votre Excellen- 
ce dans le plus href delai possible, je profile 
de cetle occasion, etc. 

(s) de Below Saleske. 



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 



1914 
LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE 

1 

PIECES 

RELATIVES AUX NEGOCIATIONS 

QUI ONT PRECEDE LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERRE! 

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE ( 1" AOIJT 1914) 

ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOLIT 1914) 

DECLARATION DU h SEPTEMBRE 1914 




PARIS 
IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE 



MDCCCCXIV 



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 



DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 



GUERRE EUROPEENNE 



TABLE DES MATIERES. 



.OS. 


NOMS 


LIEU 
et 


SOMMAIRE. 


,«„. 








CHAPITOE PREMIER.' 










AVERTISSEMENTS. 












(1913.) 










191.1. 






1 


M.Jul 


s Camkoin 


Berlin, 17 mars . . 


Transmission lie rapports de I'altacbe militaire et de ('atta- 
che naval a Berlin sur la nouvelle loi raililaire. Efforts 
du Gouvernement allemand pour represenler cette loi 
comme une reponse au projet francais de loi de trois ans 
et pour exaller dans les masses le sentiment guerrier. . . . 

Annexe 1. — Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Serret. Les 
armemenls allemands sont destines a mettre la France 
dans un elal d'lnferiorile deGn.tif. Colere provoquee dans 
les milieux officiels par les mesures de precaution 
franraises. 

Annexe 11. — Rapport de M. de Faramond. Le projet 
de loi militaire a pour objet de rendre facile une offen- 
sive foudroyante contre la France ConBance des Alle- 
mands dans la superiority de leur armee. Mesures finan- 
cieres projclees pour couvrir les depenses militaires. 


3 


2 


M. En 


ENNE 


Paris. 2 avril .... 


Envoi d'un rapport officii'! el secret allemand sur le renfor- 


9 




Annexe. — Texte de ce rapport. Apercu riHrospeclif 
sur les armements successes provoques par la Conference 
d'Algesiras, I'affaire d'Agadir et la guerre balkanioue. 
Ni Scessite d'accomplir un nouvel efforr, d'habiluer 1'opi- 
nion publiquc a l'ldee de guerre, de susciler des troubles 
dans les colonies franchises ou anglaises et de prevoir I'in- 
vasion de la Belgique et de la Hollaode. 


3 


M Ju'le 




Berlin. 6 mai 


Fin de la ense ballaniejue. Elle a failli ainener I'Alleraagne 






4 
.6 


M. All 

Note au 

M. Jule 




Munich, lojuillc.. 
Paris. 3ojtiilIel.. 

Berlin, 22 nov.... 


comme destines a provoquer une guerre dans laquelle elle 
s'habitue a voir la seule solution possible au\ dilficulles 


14 

15 
21 


Sentiments dominants dans i'opinion allemande : desir d'une 
revanche tT.Agndtr, crainte de resurrection d'une France 
forte Impinssanee du parti de la paiv. Formation, com- 
position el developpemenl croissant d'un parti de la 
guerre, encourage dans ses ambitions par la faiblcsse pre- 


Conversation du Roi des Beiges avec I'Empereur. qui a cesse 
d'etre pacifique, cede au courant belliqueux donl son fils 
est le centre, et se familiarise avec la perspective d'un 





CHAPITRE II. 

PRELIMINA1RES. 



DE LA MORT DE L'ARCinDUC HErilTlER (28 JU1N 191^) 
X LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIE.NNE X LA SERBIE (23 JUILLET I9 1^ 



M. DC MAINE 

M. DrMAi.NE 

M. de Manbeville 

M. PALEOLOGDE 

M. D'ApCHrEB 

M. DoMAIKE 

M. DCMAINE 

Rapporl * consulaire de 
Vienne. 

M. Jules Camdon 

M. ElENTENC-MABTnt 

M. BlENTENC-MARTm 

M. Ddmafne 

M. Paul Cambox 

M. BlENTENC-MARTm 

M. Allies 



1914. 

Vienne. a 8juin... 

Vienne, 1 juillct.. 
Berlin, ft juillet... 

Petcrsbourg,6juiIl. 

Budapest, 1 ijuill.. 
Vienne, i5 juillet. 

Vienne, » 9 juillet. 
Vienne, igjuillel. 

Berlin, si Juillet.. 

Paris, 11 juillet.. 
Paris, aa juillet.. 

Vienne, 13 juillet. 

Londres, 23 juillcl. 

Paris. i3 juillet . . 
Munich, 33 juillet. 



Nouvelle de I 



t de l'archi'duc Francois-Ferdinand A 

Exploitation de eet e\£nement par le parti militaire autri 
chien 

ConGance aflecU'e du Gouvernemenl allemand dtuis un ar 
rangement a 1'amiable du differend auslro-serbe 

M. Sazonoffa a^erti PAmbassadcur d'Autricbe que le Gou 
vernemenl ru^se ne saurait accepter que I'nssassinat de 
i'Arrbiduc servU c!e pretcxle a une action sur terriloire 



Oplii 



mc office! de coi 
preparalifs milita 



nde, rontraslanl avec de sd 
en Hongrie 



,es journaux officieux aulricbiens pnchcnlune guerre 
an panserbismc , la Ru^sie el la France leur par 
1. (■(■■■ d'etat d'inlenenir 



apport consula 



Les milieux politiques aulricbiens <cmblcnt resolus a 
guerre degression contre la Serbie, et les milieux n 
laircs envisagenl levenLualile dun conflit curopeen. . 



e Gomernement allemand. qui a deja envojd des lav 
preliminaires de mobilisations, declare calegoriquement 
qu'il ignore la lencur de la note que f'Aulricbe doll en 
voyer a la Serbie 



L'AHemagne appuiera (orlemenl. les demarches 
cbiennes, sans cbcrcher a jcuer un role de medialic 

Le Gouver'nement franca 
France de donner anaic 
moderation 



Dispnsilit 



concilianles de la Russie et de la Serbie. Indi 
assurantes fournies aux diplomates etrangers 
oleuts de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne , 



Graves inquietudes de sir Edward Grey a la suite d'unc 
conversation avee 1'Ambassadeur dAIIemagne. Conseils de 
prudence et de moderation donnes a 1'Ambassadcur d'Au 
tricbe-Hongrie 



Remise prochaine de !a Note autrtcbi'cnne a la Serbie. Im- 
pressions conlradicloires des diplomates sur son contenu 
ct sa portee. Assurances apaisantes donnles a Vienne.. . . 



le des milieux ofliciels'baxarois, en particuller du 
nt du Conseil, qui a eu connaissance de la Note 



EOS. 


NOMS 


LIEU 


SOMMAIRE. 


PAGES. 






CHAP1TRE IIL 






IA 


NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA REPONSE SERBE. 

(Du vcndredi 24 juillet au samedi 25 juillet.) 




22 


M. Rene Viviam 


Rcval, 2 4 juillet.. 


D'accord avee M. SazonoiT, M. Vivian, p'rie M. Bienvenu- 
Mariin, Ministre interimaire lies Affaires etrangeres. de 
donner des instructions pour que de Paris et de Londres 
des conseils de moderation soient adresses au Comte 
Berchtold. la remise de la Note aulrichienne la veiUe au 


39 


23 


M. Bienyenc-Martin 


Paris, th juillet . . 


Instructions Iransmises dans ce sens a Vienne, oil eiles ne 
parviennent qu'apres la remise de la Note a Belgrade. . . 


40 


2> 


M. BienvenuMabtin 


Vienne. la juillet. 
Paris. 24 juillet.. 


Texte de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie , communiquee 
dans la matinee du ik juillet par le Comte Siecsen a 


40 


Analyse de cette Note. Le Comte Szecsen a ele avise, lors- 
qu'il l'a apportee, de la penible impression que ne pou- 
vaient manquer de produire, spijcialement dans les 
conditions acluelles , I'elendue des exigences autricbiennes, 
comme la brievele du delai fixe a la Serbie pour la re» 


26 


M. Biesvenu-Mabtin 


Paris, 24 juiUet.. 


Conseil donne par le Gouvernement francais au Gouvernc- 
ment serbe d'accepter les demandes de 1'Aulricbe dans 
tout ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'admissible et de proposer 


46 


27 
28 

29 


M. Biesvekh-Mastin 

M. Jules CamdOS 


Paris, a4 juillet.. 
Paris, 2 4 juillet. . 

Berlin, 24 juillet.. 


Renseignements donnes a nos ambassadeurs sur les ten- 
dances belliqueuses du parti militoire autrichien, sur la 
difficulle pour la Serbie d'accepter I'lntegralite des exi- 
gences autricbiennes et sur le ton menacant de 1# presse 


47 
48 


Demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour appuyer, 
au nom de son Gouvernement, la demarche de 1'Aulricbe- 
Hongrie, approuver sa Note, et faire ressortir les « conse- 
quences incalculable qu'enlralnerait , en raison du jeu 
des alliances, loute tentative d'immixtion d'une tierce 


Manifestations austrophiles et chauvines a Berlin; pessi- 


30 

3t 
32 




Berlin. r.i juillet.. 

Pelersbourg, a4 j*. 
Londres, a \ juillet. 


M. de Jagow declare approuver la Note autrichienne, mais 
si- defend absolument d'en avoir counu prealablement le 
conlenu. 11 espere que ja Serbie recevra de ses amis le 
conseil de ceder. La presse olTicielle se solidarise egale- 


50 
5i 
52 




Dispositions pacifiques du Gouvernement russe, malgre 
.'emotion profonde produile dans le public par la remise 




Sir E. Grey expose a M. Paul Cambon son projet de media- 
lion a quatre, Pessimisme du Comte Bencltendorf au 







Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeenne. 





-* 


NO MS 


LIEU 


SOMMA1BE. 


f AC E , 




33 
34 

3D 
36 

37 

38 

30 
40 
41 

42 
43 

44 
45 

46 

47 


M. Paul CiMBOK 


Paris. 24 j 

Berlin, i5 

Paris, 25 j 

Londres , 2 

Pelersbour 

Paris. 25 j 
Londres, 2 
Berlin, 25 

Berlin, 25 
Berlin, 25 

Rome, 25 

Vienne. 2 

Belgrade, 
Berlin, »5 


a juillet. 

uillel... 

juillet.. 

uiUel... 

jjmllel. 

;,?5j'- 

uillct... 
ijuMlet. 
udlel. . 

udlel. . 
juillet. . 

juillet. . 
juillet. 

ijuillet 

juillet. . 


Une intervention officieuse de l'AIIemagne a Vienna semble 
a M. Paul Cambon le meilleur moyen d'arreter le conllit. 

Sir E. Grey veut proposer a I'Allemagne il'agir en commun 
a Vienne el a Pelersbourg . en vue de soumettre le conQit 
austro-serbe a la mediation des qualrc puissances non 
mlcressees dans la queslnm. Conseils de prudence donnes 


53 

53 

54 

55 

56 
56 

58 

58 
59 

09 

60 

60 
61 

62 




Lc Mini-tre de Belgique a Berlin loit dans la' crise en cours 
I'execution ,1c projets de guerre premedites par I'AUe- 




Rfaume de la situation. A Paris, M. de Scboen vient de- 
mentir au Qua! d'Orsay le caractere menacant de sa de- 
marche de la veille. A Londres, I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche 
declare que la Note autrichienne n'a pas 1c caractere 
dun ultimatum. Sir E. Grey fait donner des conseils de 
prudence a Belgrade et expose a I'Ambassadeur d'Alle- 




Le Gouvernement allemand se refusant it inlervenir entre 
Vienne et Belgrade, Sir E. Grey fait remarquer au prince 
Licbnowsky que celte altitude conlnbuera a amener un 
conllit general dans lequel PAngleterre ne saurait rester 




Efforts de conciliation de M. Sazonoff : il demande i Vienne 
une prolongation du delai impart! a la Serbie pour sa 




M. Jules Cambon 

M. Jules Cambon 

M. Dumajsk 




Le Gouverfiemcnt francais appuie cette demande de prolon- 




Le Gouveriiemcnt anglais s'associe egalement a cette dc- 




M. de Jagow declare de nouve lategoriquement n'avoir 

pas <■■ connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant sa re- 
mise. II repood evasivement a one demande du Charge 
d'Affaircs d'Angleterre pour inlervenir a Vienne en vue 
,!.- prevenir un conflit et de prolonger le delai de 




Le Charge d'AIfaires de Itussie prescnle a son lour eelle 
deffniere demande a Berlin. II insiste sur t'urgencc dune 




Sur un,- nouvellc demarche pressante du Charge d'Affaircs 

de Uiismc , M ,lt Jagow declare qu',1 COnsidere le diffc- 
rend austro-serbe comme une affaire purcment locale. 

qui duil rester limitce a I'Autrid t a la Serine el qui 

ne lui parait pas susceptible d'amenec des .lilln illes ml. r- 




l.'Andai ...il'ur de Bessie a Rome demande au gonverne- 
ment italitn dml a w i ,,< |„,ur la iirolmigalion du delai 




Le i verne il autrichien elude la demande de prolon- 
gation du delai, qu'a prcscnlee a Vienne le Charge d' Af- 
faires de Itussie 




Resume de !., reponse scrbe a la Note autrichienne 

La nonvelle du depart de Belgrade du Minislre, d'Autriche 

provoqur ii I'.eilni <\> , ni am legations de rhauvim-nie l.es 











m* 


NOMS 

DES SIGNATAIRES. 


LIEU 


SOMMAIRE. 


«-. 


48 




Vienne, a5 juillet . 


L'Ambassadeur <k France a Vienne, en raison du retard 
impost au telegramme qui lui a ete envoye de Pari3, ne 
rec,oit pas assez t6t ses instructions pour s'associer en temps 
utile a la demarche de son collegue de Russie 


62 










Teste de la reppnse serbe a la Note austro-hongroise 

APITRE IV. 


63 






CH 






3e LA ROPTCRE DES RELATIONS DTPLOMATIQUES (25 juillet 1Q14 ) A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE 








(28 juillet igi4) de l'Autriche a ca. Serbie. 




50 

51 




Paris, 26 juillet.. 
Rome, 26 juillet. . 


Resume de la situation le 25 au soir, telle quelle results 
de 1'attitude intransigeante de 1'Aulriche-Hongrie. Im- 
pressions ressenties dans les differentes capitales et ten- 
tative pour empecber 1'aggravation du conflit qui resul- 
terait de mesures militaires contre la Serbie prises par 
le Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Sir E. Grey espere 
encore preventr un condit par iintervention des quatre 


69 
70 


L'ltalie participera aui efTorts pour le mainlien de la pais, 
mais veut se tenir en dehors du conflit s'd eclate 




53 

54 




Rome, 26 juillet. . 
Paris, 26 juillet.. 

Petersbourg, 26 
juillet. 


La Russie conserve l'espoir d'une solution paeifique; l'opi- 


71 
71 


M. Bienveno-Marti.n 


Le Gouvernement francais nppnie la demande de "mediation 
que la Serbie adresse au Gouvernement anglais, sur les 


M. SaionotT. toujours anime du meme esprit de conciliation, 
propose une conversation directe entre Vienne-et Peters- 
bourg sur les modifications a introduire dans l'ultimatum 




55 


M Domaine.. 


Vienne, 36 juillet. 


L'Ambassadeur de Russie, de retour a Vienne, se propose 
d'y presenter une nouvelje proposition d'arrangemenl . . . 


72 


56 




Paris, 26 juillet.. 


Demarche de M. de Scboen au Quai d'Orsay pour crue la 
France intervienne avec l'AUemagne a Petersbourg seule- 
ment, pour donniT des conseils pacifiques. Son refus de 
repondre , faute d'instructions , a la demande de mediation 


73 


57 


Note pour le Ministre. . . . 


Paris, 26 juillet.. 


Nouvelle visite i\< 1 rAmhassiuleur d'AIIemagne pour affirm er et 
acccntuer le sens paci6que de sa pr^cedente demarche. 11 
refuse de se prononcer sur 1'opportunite de conseils de mo- 
deration a donner par l'AUemagne a Vienne, et persiste a 
tenter d'engager le Gouvernement francais dans la voie 
d'une demarche commune de « solidarity paciGque» a Pe- 
tersbourg uniquemenl, de qui, selon lui, depend la paix. 


74 


53 
59 




Christiania, 26 juil- 
let. 

Luxembourg , 26 


Ordre a la flotle allemande de Norvege de rentrer en Alle- 


76 
76 








60 


M. Farces... 


Bale, 27 juillet. . . 


Premiers preparatifs de mobilisation dans le Grand-Duche 


77 





M- BlEavENC-MdRTIN. 



M. DB Fleoriao 
M. Paleologue. 

M. BOMPABD.. . . 

M. BE. Feeobiau 
M. Jules Cajiibo:* 

M. DE Fleubiau 

M. DE Fl.EIRHt 

M. BlENYKNU-M V 

M. DE FlKURIAU. 
M. Barbebe . . . 

M. Jules Cam don 

M. Jules Camoos 



Paris. 27 juillet . 



Paris, 37 juillet .. 



Londres, 57 juilipt 



Saint-Pelcrsbo 
3? juillet. 



Constantinople, 27 
juillet. 



Londres, 27 juillet. 
Berlin. 2 7 juillet.. 

Londres, 27 juillet. 

Londres, 27 juillet. 

Paris. a7ju.Het.. 

Londres, a 7 juillet. 
Home, 37 juiUot.. 

Berlin. 3 7 juillet.. 

Berlin. 37 juillet.. 

Paris, 17 juillet. . 



.esume des trois demarches successives de M. de Schocn. La 
situation s'aggrave. I'Autriche refusant a la fois de se 
contenter des concessions de la Serbie et d'entrcr en con- 
versation a ce sujet avec les Puissances. — Nouvelle 
proposition anglaise de rechercher a Paris, Rerlin.Rome 
et Londres les moyens d'eviter une-crise, la Russie et I'Au- 
tnclie, lis Puissances clirectement inleressees, restant a 
1'ecart 



ouvelle demarche de M. de Schocn au Quai d'Orsay. lendant 
visiblement a comprometlre la France a 1'egard de la 
Russie, tout en gagnant du temps poor facililer une ac- 
tion militaire de I'Autriche en Serhir, mn: i'AIIemagne 
ne fait rien pour relarder 



Les amhassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche laissent en- 
tendre qu'ils sont stirs de la neutrality anglaise, malgre 
le langage qui a etc tenu par Sir A. Nicolson au prince 
Lichnovfski 



Dispositions 



:ilianles de M. Sa 



off. 



On cstime a Constantinople que le conflit austro 
tera localise el que la Russie n'interviendra pas 
de la Serbie 



La Grande-Rrelagnc arretc la demobilisation de sa (lotto et 
avertil I'AHemagne qu'une invasion de la Serbie par 
tnche risque d'amener une guerre curopcenne 



M. de Jagow donne de vagues 
dare, en reponse a une qi 
ruobiliserait pas si la Russie 1 
tiere autricliienne- Le Secret; 
inquietudes. 



ifiques et de- 
on, que I'AHemagne ne 
lobiiisaitquesurla 1 
illj.it t.inoi^ne de 



ir E. Grey propose que les Amhassadeurs de France, d'Al- 
lemagne' et d'llalie a Londres examinent, de concert ave< 
lui , le inoyen de rcsoudre Irs difliculles actuclles 



lemande la mediation anglaise; il 

1 |>tii|i't "le mediation a quatre prOconise 



Le Gouvernement francais accepte la proposition anglai 
qu'une action siocerement moderalricc de t'Allemagn 

Vienne tmurrait tnuifluis srulr hurc aboutir 



ent italicn accepte egalemenl la 



Le Marquis de San Giuliano declare n'avoii 
sance preaiable de la Nolo autricliienne 
hesiter, a la proposition de Sir E. Grey. 

M. de Jagow repousse Pidee d'une conft 
sances, tout en proteslant de son desi 



se derobe ii de nouvelles instances de M, Jules Cambon ii 
cet egard. Opportunity de renouveler sous une forme ciif- 

lerenle la proposition anglais.- pour, mi'llre I'Alkniaghe 



re Comte Siersen vient remeltre.au Quai. d'Orsay u 
morandum de son Gouvernement pour juslifier le: 

contre la Serbie. — Texte de ce memorandum . . . . 



BOS. 


NOM 


LIEU 
et 


SOMMAIRE. 


PACES. 




75.£u. 


Communique du Bureau 
tie la Pressc. 


Vienne. 28 juillet. 


Communique oflicieux du Bureau de la Presse viennoisc au 
sujet de la reponse serbe, representee comme insuffisanle. 


96 




76 


M. Rene Vitiam 


A [>or<l tie la Fran- 
ce. 28 juillet. 


Accuse tie reception des communications recues de M. Bien- 
venu-Martin et approbation des reponses qu'il a failes, 
soil a M. de Schoen , soiU la proposition de Sir E. Grey. 


97 




77 
73 


M. BrENVENO-MABTm 


Paris,' 28 juillet.. 
Paris, s8 juillet. . 


Resume de la situation : refus de l'Allemagne d'intervenir a 
Vienne, objection qu'elle oppose a la proposition anglaise, 
remise du memorandum aulricbien. Dangers de la silua- 


98 
. 98 




Visite de M. de Schoen au Qtiai d'Orsay. 11 proteste a nou- 
veau de ses sentiments pacifiques. mai? se derobe toujours 
a. I'examen <\es moyens pratiques de prevenir le conilil. . 




79 


M. BieNVEKO-Mab™ . . 


Paris, 38 juillet.. 


Rerommandalion a M. Dumainc de se tem'r en contact avec 
son collegue d'Angleterre, pour presenter a Vienne la 


99 




80 
81 
83 


M. Jules Cambon.. ...... 


Londres, 28 juillet. 

Berlin. 28 juillet.. 

Saint- Petersbonrg, 

28 juillet. 

Vienne, 28 juillet. 


L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres insiste, comme 
M. de Schoen a Paris, sur 1'utih'te June action modera- 
trice de l'Angleterre a Pelersbourg uniquement. D'autre 
part, M. Sazonoff accepte la proposition anglaise de 
mediation, mais il voudrait la fatre preceder d'une 
conversation directe avec Vienne, dont 11 attend de 


99 

100 
102 

J 02 




M. de Jagow se montre toujours hostile a la conference 
proposee par Sir E. Grey, et appuie son attitude dilatoire 
sur la nouvclle des efforts russes pour une entente directe 




M. Sazonoff est oblige de conslaler que 1'Autriche se derobe 








La declaration de guerre de 1'Autriche a la Serbie rend 
inutile loute tentative de conciliation, au dire du comle 
Bercbtoldqui romptainsi tout pourparler avec Petersbourg. 








CHAPITRE V. 








De la declabation de 


3UEBRE DE L'AlJTBICHE A LA SeBBIE (28 juillet 1914) A L'ULTIMATUW 

e l'Allemagne a la Rlssie (3t juillet 1914). 






84 


M. Babrere...... . . . 


Rome, 39 juillet. . 


. La Consulta estime que la declaration de guerre de I'Au- 

tricbe ne doit pas empccb.r la continuation des efforts 

1 diplomatiques pour la reunion d'une conference h 


105 




85 


1 


Paris, 29 juillet . . 


L'Allemagne semble renoncer a 1'espoir d'une pression 
franco-anglaise sur la Russic seule, mais continue dc se 
refuser a agir sur Vienne. Dans ces conditions il paiait 
indispensable que la Russie se rallie definitiveraenl el de 
suite a la proposition angl.iise dc mediation aqualre, pour 
-la fairc accepter par Berlin a\ant que les mesurcs mili 
taires dc I'Autricbc He compromeltent definitivcmcnl la 


105 




86 


M. Paleologoe. . 


Saint-Petersbourg, 
39 juillet. 

Bruielles. 39 juil- 
let. 


Lc Gouverncment russe adhere enlicremenl a celte pro- 






87 


M. Kloqcsowski. ^,~. .. . 


Inquieludes soulevees , : i Bruxrlles par ralliuj.de cnigmalique 


107 




88 




-Francfort, agjuil- 
let. 


Imporlants roouvc-ments de troupes srgiioles: a'utour de 


107 









™* 


NOM 


LIEU 


SOMMA.1RE. 


P.CS. 


89 
90 
91 

92 

93 
94 

95 

96 
97 

98 

99 

ioo 

101 

102 
103 




Munich, iff juillet. 

Vienne, 39 juillet. 

Sainl-Petersbourg, 
agjuiHet. 

Berlin, 29 juiilei . 

Vienne. 19 juillet. 
Pant, agjuiUet.. 

Paris, 19 juiUet.. 

Rome, ag juiUet. . 
Paris, *9JuiUet... 

Londres. agjuiUet. 

Belgrade , 39 juill. 

Saint-Peters bo urg, 
a 9 juiUet. 

Paris, So jaillet . . 

Saint-Petersbourg, 
3o juiUet 

Saint -Pelersbourg, 
3o jaillet. 


Preparatifs miliuires dans 1'Allemagne du Sud 


108 
10S 

109 

109 
HI 

111 

112 
113 

114 

114 
115 
115 

116 
117 

117 


M Drawn 


L'Autriche se derobe a la conversation direcle a laquelle elle 




M. de Jagow s'est mainlenu dans son attiiude dilatoire, 
•vaguement pacifique, rejetant la responsabilite evenluelle 
du conflit sur la Russie, tout en declarant placer son 
espoir dans une entente direcle de Vienne et Petersbourg, 
au succes de laquelle il pretend chercher a travailler.. . . 

L'Autriche semble decidee a la guerre; elle y est poussee 
energiquement par M. de TchirsLy, ambassadeur d'AHe- 


M. Bjenteno-Mahtw 


M. de Schoen est venu dire que 1'Allemagne allait consulter 
Vienne sur ses intentions, que cela fournirait une base de 


La Russie eir presence de I'attitude inquietante de 1'Alle- 
magne et du refus du comte Berchtod de continuer les 
pourparlers et des preparatifs mililaires de 1'Aulriche, 
est obligee de proceder a une mobilisation partielle 

M. de San Giuliano explique I'attitude de 1'Allemagne et de 
1'Aulriche par leur conviction erronee que la Russie aban- 




Les conversations direcles austro-russes ayant ete inter- 
rompues par la declaration de guerre de 1'Aulriche a la 

/ Serbie, les gouvernemeuts Erancais et russe prient Sir E. 
■Grey de reprendre a Berlin sa proposition (['intervention 
a quatre, et d'agir sur 1'ltalie pour obtenir son plein 


L'Allemagne n'ayant voulu accepter que le principe de la 
mediation a quatre. Sir E. Grey, pour eviler toule nouvelle 
reponse dilatoire, laissera au gouvernement allemand le 
choix de la forme sous laquelle cette inlervenlion lui 
parailra praticable. 11 considere la situation comme tres 


Le Gouvernement serbe a obtenu de la Russie l'assurance 
que celle puissance ne se desintcressera pas du sort de la 




L'ambassadi'ur d'Allemagne a Petersbourg est venu declarer 
que son pays mobiliserait si la Russie n'arrfitail pas ses 




Informe de cette demarche mena( t ante, le Gouvernement 
francais se declare resolu a remplir luutes les obligations 
de lalliance russe, tout en continuant de travailler a une 
solution pacifique, et en demandant au Gouvernement 


Le Gouvernement russe se declare pr£t a ndgocier jusqu'au 
bout, tout en restant convaincu que 1'AUemagne ne veut 




Sur une nouvelle demarche moins comminatoire de I'am- 
bassadeur d'Allemagne, M. Saionoff s'esl empresse de 
faire une nouvelle proposition, indiquant que la Russie 
interrompra ses preparatifs militaires si 1'Aulriche se 
declare pre"te a eliminer de son ultimatum lea clauses qui 







BOS. 


NOMS 


LIEU 


SOMMAIRE- 


*« 


104 

105 
100 

107 

108 

100 
110 

111 
112 

113 
114 

115 
110 

117 


M. Domains 


Vienne.3oj„illel. 

Berlin, 3ojuillet. . 
Paris, 3ojuiUct... 

Berlin, 3o juillet.. 

LonJres, 3o juillet. 

Berlin. 3o juillet.. 
Londres,3i juillel. 

Luxembourg, 3i 
juillet. 

Paris, 3i juillet... 

i Saint-Petersboorg. 
Paris, 3i juillet... 

Vienne,3i juillet.. 
Berlin. 3» juillet.. 

Paris, 3i juillet... 


A la suite d'un entretien Ires cordial entre I'ambassadeur de 
Rusbie et le comte Bercbtold, une nomelle tenlative de 
conversation directe auslro-russe sera faite a Pelersbourg 


118 
119 

120 
121 

122 
122 

124 
124 

125 
126 

127 
127 

128 
128 


Le Gouvernement allemand dement la nouvelle de la mobi- 
lisation , mais prend loutes les mesures necessaires pour 


M. Paul Cambon est invite a porter a la connaissance du 
Gouvernement anglais tous les renseignements concor- 
dats qui prouvent les mesures mdilaires actives et mena- 
cantes prises par l'AUeraagne depuis le 25 juillet . tandis 
que la France maintient ses troupes de couverture a dix 


M. dc Jagow declare inacccplable pour 1'Aulriche la propo- 




L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'a pas apporle de reponse a !a 
demande de sir Edward Grey que le Gouvernement 
aileraand propose lui-mt'me une formule de mediation ii 
qualre. Le prince Licbnowski a queslionne le Gouverne- 
ment anglais sur ses preparatifs mililaires. Les renseigne- 
ments donncs a Sir E, Grey sur les preparatifs mililaires 
de 1'Alkmagne 1'ont amene a estimer, comme M. Paul 
Cambon, que le moment est venu d'envisager en commun 




M. de Jagow declare que, pour gagner du temps, il va agir 
directement a Vienne en demandant les conditions autri- 
cbiennes, eludant ainsi de nouveau la demande de sir 




Sir E. Grey avertit 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres 
que 1'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre dans un 
conflit general ou la France serait impliquee. 11 a dit 
d'autre part a M. Paul Cambon que le Gouvernement 
anglais ne pouvait nous garantir son intervention. 

La letlre autographs que M. le President de la Republique 
a adressee au Roi d'Angleterre a ete remise a celui-ci 

Le Minislre d'Etat luxembourgeois signale les preparatifs 
mililaires a la frontiere allemande et demande a la France 
1'engagement de respecter la neulralite du Grand- 




Le Gouvernement francais demande a Pelersbourg, en vue 
de repondre au desir de 1'Angleterre, de modifier la 
proposilion de M. SazonofT a 1'Autricbe pour la rendre 
acceptable par cette puissance et a permettre une solution 


Le Gouvernement russe a acceple de modifier SB formule, 
malgrel'c'aiolion provoquee par le bombardcroent de Bel- 
grade et 1'ai lion ujiisUiinraent provocalrice de l'Aulri<.he- 




Les efforts paralleles poursuivis par I'Anglelerre et la Russie 
en vue du inaintiun de la paix se sont rejoints et permel- 
traient d'esperer une entente avec I'Aulriche-Hongne qui 
s'y montre plus disposee. Mais 1'allitude de I'Allemagne 
donne limprcssion que cette puissance n'a poursuivi de- 
puis le debut que Humiliation de la Russie. la desegre- 
gation de la Triple-Entente, et, si ce resultat ne pouvait 


A son tour, I'Allemagne decrete nl'etat de danger de guerre » 






Ed annoncant a Paris 1'ultimatum adresse a la Russie, 
M. de Schcen demande au Gouvernement francais dc lui 
dire, avant le lendemain a une heure de 1'aprevmidi, 
quelle sera l'attitude de la France en cas de conflit russo- 





M. Paleologc 
M. KIobdkow; 



Bruulles,3ijuillei 



SOMMAIRE. 



rnemenl beige recoit Insurance officielie 
respecters la neutralite bejge. 



DeCLABATION DE GUEhllE DE l'AlLEMA 
ET X LA FRANC 



M. Jules Cambon. 



M. Rene VlVUHI 

M.Jules Cambon 

M. Evscubh 

M. MOLLARD 

Note de M. de Scuoen 



CHAPITRE VI. 

; a la Russie (samedi i er aout, a 7 h. 10 du soir) 
IudcU 3 aout, a 18 h. 45). 



Berlin, i" aou 
Luxembourg, 2 

Luxembourg, aanul 



Les Ambassadcurs d'Aulriclte a Paris el a Petersburg font 
deux demarcbes dans un sens compliant, Malheureusement 
1'altiludc de 1'Allemagne ne permet plus ^uirc. W '< sprier 
une solution paciliquc 



L'Autriche-Hongrie annoncc a Petcrsbourg qu'elle acceptc 
de discuter le fond dc son differend avec la Serbie; man 
la sommalion adresseepar I'Aiiemagnc a la Russie tl'tvoii 
a tlcmobiliser dans les douze heures parait emporter les 
dernieres csperances de paix 



■■\,v 



Informc des dispositions concilianles de I'Autriche ri de 
I'acceplation par la Russie de la formule anglaise, M. de 
Schoen nc parle plus dc son depart et protcslc de scs dis- 
positions pacifiques, lout en declarant qu'il n'a pas rec,u 
de nouvcllc information de son Gouvernement 



Sir E. G«j declare que 1'Angleterre a refuse la promessr 
de garder la neutralite que 1'AlIemagne lui demand a it. 
Le respect de la neutralite beige importe beaucoup a 
1'Angleterre et I'Ailemagne n'a pas rcpondu a la question 



P osee 

La mobilisation francaise a ete ordonnee di 
comme reponse aux preparatifs allemands 



Le Ministre d'Etat luxembourgeois demande au Gouvern 
menl francais une assurance de neutralite semblablc 
celle qu'a recue la Belgique 



Cello assurance est don net? par le Gouvernement francais . 
La mobilisation general* est ordonnee a Berlin 



Explications lournies pa 
declare que les mesur 
□uement preventives e 

controle Grand-Ducln 



le Gouvernement allcmand qu 
s prises en Luxembourg sonl u'ni 



Mei 



explication loucbanl I'entree des troupes allemande 
1 ie Grand-Ducb* -Je Luxembourg 



«t 


NOMS 


LIEU 
et 


SOMMAIRE. 




134 
135 

13b 
137 

138 

139 
140 

141 

142 
143 
144 

145 
146 

147 

148 
149 
150 

151 

152 




Pclersbourg, a aout 
Paris; vaotefc*;. 

Londres, a aout., . 

La Haye, 3 aout. . 

* Bruielles, 3 aout.. 

Bruxelles, 3 aout.. 
Londres, 3 aofit . . 
Londres, 3 aout. . 

Londres, 3 aout. . 

Paris, 3 aout.... 

Paris, 3 ao6t 

Paris, 3 aout , 

Pa/is, 3 aout 

Paris, 3 aout . . 

Paris, 3 aout... . 
Bruxelles, k aout.. 


Communication de cette nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques 


142 

142 

143 

143 

144 

145 

145 

146 
146 
147 

147 

14S 

148 

149 

149 

150 

150 
151 

151 


M. PaulCAMDON 

M. Rene VrviAfli. ...... . 

M. PaarCaMBON.. 


Les agents diplomatiques francais a 1'etranger sont invites a 
faire connaitre cette situation aux gouvernements aupres 


Sir E. Grey a donne l'assurance que la flolte britannique 
defendrait les coles franchises conlre toute altaque alle- 
mande par mer. La violation de la neutralite de la Bel- 


Le President du Conseil communique aux Cbambres fran- 
chises les declarations de Sir E. Grey relatives au concours 


Protestation adressee a Berlin conlre les violations de la 


Le Ministre d'Allemagne a La Haye annonce au Gouverne- 
raent neerlandais l'entree des troupes imperials en 
Luxembourg el en Belgique, a litre de mesures preven- 


Le Gouvernement beige repousse la sommalion qui lui est 
adressee d'avoir a laisser aux troupes allumandes le libre 


11 ne croit pas encore le moment venu dc faire appcl a la 
garantic des puissances pour defendre son independancc . 

La declaration concemanl l'intenenlion de la flolte anglaise 

Demarche infructueuse de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a 
Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey pour obtenir ('assurance 
que la neutralite de I'Angh-lerre ne dependrait pas du res- 


Sir E. Grey fait aux Communes la declaration relative a 
l'inlervcn'tiori de la flolte anglais,- et lit line leltre du roi 


M. Rene Viviani 


Le Gouvernement francais dement a Londres la nouvelle 
d'apres laquelle la fronliere allemande aurait ete viole'e 


Declaration de guerre remise par l'Ambassadeur d'AHe- 


Communication de cette nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques 


Instructions envoyees a M. Jules Cambon, a Berlin, pour 
Le Ministre de France a Munich recoit l'inslruction de dc- 


Vioialion du terriloire beige par les troupes allemandcs. . . . 

Appel adresse par la Belgique a 1'Angleterre , a la France et 
a la Russie 





Documents diplomatique?. — Guerre europe* 













L J1 


NOMS 

DO SIGNATURE. 


LIEU 


SOMMAIRE. 


PAOES 


153 


M. Paul Cambob 


Loudres, k aout.. . 


Le Gouvernement allemand sera invite par le Gouvernement 
anglais a relirer avaol mmuit son ultimatum a la Bel- 




154 
15b 




Brujelles, 4 aout.. 
Cnpenhague, 6 aout 


Le Gouvernement allemand declare a Bruxelles qu'il se \oil 


152 

152 


Transmission d'un rapport d'apres lequel M. Jules Cambon 
rend compte au Gouvernement des circonstances de son 
voyage de retour et des vexations dont it a ete I'objet. . . 




156 




Pans, j aout 


Rapport adresse au Gouvernement par M. Mollard au sujet 
de son depart de Luxembourg, impose par les autorites 


157 


157 


M. ReneVmixi 

(Circulaire aux puissances.) 


Paris, 4 aotit. 


Texte de la notification aux Puissances de 1'etal de guerre 


|,,M 


15S 


M. Raymond Poincahe , 

Presitl Ii la Republique. 

(Message au Parlemenl.) 


Paris, 4 aout 


Message du President de la Republique lu J !a seance du 


161 




159 


M. Rene VrtUKi, Presi- 
dent du Conseil. (Dis- 
coursau, Cbambres.) 




Textc du discours prononce par le President du ConSeil a la 


163 






CHAPITRE VII. 








DECLARATION DE LA TRIPLE-ENTENTE. 




1130 




Paris, 4 septembre 


Declaration de 1'Angleterre, de la Russie et de la France , 
relalivement a leur engagement reciproque de ne pas con- 
dure de paix separee, ct de ne pas poser de conditions ile 
pan sans accord prealable avec chacun des autres allies . 


174 






ANNEXES. 








ANNEXE I. 






EATRAJTS du 
PE 


Livre hleu relatifs a la position prise par i/angleterre 

DANT LES POURPARLERS QUI ONT PRECEDE LA GUERRE. 




6 




Saint - Petersburg, 


Conversation entre M. SazonoiT, M Paleologue et Sir .1. Bu- 
chanan concernant une declaration eventuelle de solida- 
rity de 1'Angleterre a\ec la Russie et la France dans la 


179 
















SirE. Grei 


Londres, 29 juillet. 


Renseignements donnes a M. Paul Cambon sur les >ues du 
Gouvernement anglais au sujet de son attitude: ne pas 
donner a 1'Allemagne de fausse impression sur ("abstention 
possible de 1'Angleterre, ne pas prendre d' engagement 


180 


P b 




Sir E. GtiEY 


Londres, agjuillct. 


Comple-rendu d'un entretien avec I'AmbaasadeUB d'Alle- 
magne pour I'avertir que i'Antrlelerre ne s'engageail nul- 
lement a ne pas intervenir si (a crise se developpail el si 


IS1 





NOM 

S1GNATAIRE. 



LIEU 
et 

fE D'ESVOI. 



. 3ojuillet.. 



Conversation avec le President de la Republi'que, qui estime 
qu'une declaration de l'Angleterre affirmant son inten- 
tion de soutenir la France, don't la volonte pacifique est 
certaine, arreterait l'Alleniagne dans ses velleites de 
guerre 

Declaration faite a 1'Ambassadeur de France que, au point 
ou en est la crise, le Gouvernement anglais ne peut 
prendre aucun engagement definitif , 

Assurance donnee relativement a la protection des coles et 
de la marine franchises par la flotte angtaise contra toute 
altaque de la flotte allemande par la Pas-de-Calais ou la 
mer du Nord 



EXTRAITS DD LIVRE BLEU RELATIFS AUX PROPOSITIONS FAITES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT ALLEMAND 
AU GOUVERNEMENT ANGLAIS EN TOE D'OBTENIR LA NEUTRALITE DE L'ANGLETERRE. 



Sir E. Goschen . 



Berlin, 29 juillet. 



Londrcs, 3o juillet 



OfFres faites par le Chancelier de 1'Empire a I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre pour tenter d'obtenir la neutralite anglaise : 
promesse de respecter I'integrile du territoire francais, 
mais non de ses colonies; intentions a 1'egard de la 
Hollande et de la Belgique. Proposition d'une entente 
generate de neutralite entro I'Allrmagne et l'Angleterre . . 

Rcfus des propositions allemandes, non seulement inaccep- 
tables en fait, mais dont 1'acccptation sei-ait une honte 
pour la reputation de l'Angleterre. Inutilite d'examiner la 
perspective d'une convention generate de neulralite entre 



l'Ang 


eterre et 


1'AH 


;magne poi 


r Taven 


ir. 


L'Ang 


eterre 


veut 


garder so 




iere liberte 


d'action 


et 


conti 


mer a 


coop 


rer au m 


aintien de la pa 


x en El 


rop 


b: e'es 


t pour 


1'Alle 


magne la 




facon de n: 




de 


bonni 




tions 















Compte rendu d'une conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'AHe- 
magne relativement a la neutralite beige. Le prince 
Licbnowsky insiste pour que le Gouvernement anglais 
formule les conditions aaxquelles l'Angleterre garderait 
la neutralite; il lui est repondu que le Gouvernement 
anglais refuse definitivement toute p: 
neutre et veut garder les mains libres. 



ANNEXE II bis. 

TENTATIVES ALLEMANDES POUR OBTENIR, SOUS LE COUVERT D'UN « MALENTENDU ■, LA GAR AN TIE, 
PAR L'ANGLETERRE DE LA NEUTRALITE DE LA FRANCE 

dans une guerre germano-russe (Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord), 20 aout uji4). 



Londres, 3t juillet. 



Compte rendu d'une soi-disant demande telephonique visant 
on engagement eventuel de l'Allemagne de ne pas attaquer 
la France si celie-ci reste neutre dans une guerre entre 
l'Allemagne et la Russ>e 



Tel 



de PEmpereur Guillaume au Roi George V pou 
declarer qu'il ne peut arrSter sa mobilisation contro 1 
Russie et la France, mais n'attaquera pas la France 
dans l'bypothesa ou celte puissance offrirait sa neulralit 
garantte par I'armee el la flotte anglaises 





EOS. 


NOM 


LIEU 
et 


SOMMAIRE. 


«_. 




3 
ti 


M. DE BETHMArfN HOLLWEG. 

S. M. le Roi George V... 


Berlin, i" aout... 
Londres, i"aoitt . . 


Telegramme au prince Lichnowsky, repruduisant I'engage- 


189 
189 




Telegramme du Roi d'Angleterre a 1'Empereur d'Allemagne 
declarant que 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne s'est mepris el 
que sir Edward Grey n'a parle avec le prince Lichnowsy, 
que des movens de retander un conflit arme entre ia 
France ct t'AIiemagne jusqu'a ce qu'un terrain d'entente 
definitif ait ete trouve enlre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et !a 




5 


Prince LicQNOwSE.'v 


Londres. 2 ao6l.. ■ 


Avis donne a M. de Belhmann Hollweg que les conversations 
donl il avail fait etatont ete abandonnees comme *futHes». 


189 






EXTRAITS DU LIVItE BLEU 
DANS I 


ANNEXE III. 

VISANT LE REFUS DE L'ANGLETERRE D'ADMETTRE LE POINT DE VIE ALLEMAND 
A QUESTION DE LA VIOLATION DE LV NEUTRALITE BELOE. 






153 




Londres, k aout. . 


Demande d'engagement immediat de I'Allemagne, qu'elle 


190 












155 




Londres, U aout. . . 


Declaration a la Belgique que I'Anglelerre est prfite a s'unir 
a la France et a la Russie pour resister a unc aiioque de 
I'AHemagne contre la Belgique ft puur garanlir 1'inte- 


190 








157 


M DE J 


Berlin, U aout. . . . 


Declaration communiqupe par 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a 
Londres que malgrc la violation jugee necessaire de la 
Belgique aucune annexion de terntoire n'aura lieu. Preuve 
dnnnt-e de la sincerite de eclte declaration par I'affinna- 
tion que la neutralite de la Hoi Ian tie sera respectee, une 
annexion da territolre bel<je ne poavant itre profitable sans 










159 
160 




Londres, k aout . . 
Londres, 8 aout. . 




191 




Rapport de 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin sur ses 
dernieres conversations avec M. de Jagow, M. de Beth- 
mann Hollweg et M de Zimmermann. Le Chancelier de 
















1'Empire ne peut s'expliquer que, *pour un inot , neutra- 
list, que, ipour un chiffon de papier» I'Anglelerre aille, 
faire ia guerre a une nation a laquelle elle est appa- 
rentee et qui ne desirait nen tant que d'etre son amie. 
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre essaye de faire comprendre 
a son interlocuteur que e'est une question de vie ou dc 
mort pour 1'honneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de ienir 
l'engagement solennel qu'elle a signe de defendre la neu- 


192 








A 


<JNEXE IV. 








BATBAITS DU UV 


?E ORIS INDIQGANT LES CONDITIONS DANS LESQUELLES L'ALLEMAGNE 
A VIOLE LA NEUTRALITE BELGE : 












37, a8, 3o, 3i, 35, 3 9 , 4o, 4i.44.48, 5i. 6o. 71.. 


195 



■a* 


NOM 




LIEU 
et 


SOMMAIRE. ; 


PACES. 




.- 














ANNEXE V. 










EXTRA1TS DU LIVBE BLAHC. 




' 








Telegr.imroes ecbanges enlre l'Empereur d'Allemagne Guil- 
laume II et l'Empereur de Russie Nicolas II, du 28 juil- 










ANNEXE VI. 






EXTRAITS DU LI V til ORA 


SGE 


1ELAT1FS A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSrE. 




76 
77 
78 




Sain 
Sain 
Sair 


l-Petersbourg, 
' avril. 

t-Pelersbourg, 

l-Petersbourg, 
aoiit. 


Note remise par 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Saint- 
Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de 


213 

213 
215 


Communique du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie 
resumant Ics evenements qui se sont succede du a3 jmllet 


M. Sjzonofp 


Cireulaire du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie 





MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 



DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 



1914 



LA GUERRE EUROP&ENNE 



I 

PIECES 

RELATIVES AUX NEGOCIATIONS 

QUI ONT PRECEDE LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERRE 

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (1 ER AOUT 191 4 S 

ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOUT 1914) 

DECLARATION DU 4 SEPTEMBRE 19U 




'['■■:fo,$ <t;.BM l' I .. I .. 



PARIS 
IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE 



MDCCCCXIV 



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 



DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 



LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE 



1914 



Note. — Les droits de traduction en anglais et de reproduc- 
tion dc la traduction anglaise du. present Livre Jaune, pour tous 
pays, appartienucnt au journal anglais The Times. 



CHAPITRE PREMIER 



AVERTISSEMENTS 

(11)13) 



t)ocUMENT3 WPL0M4TIQUES. — Guerre europn 



— 3 



N° 1. 

M. Jules Cambon, Arobassadeur de la Republique a Berlin, 
a M. Jonnart, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 17 mars 191) 

Nos attaches militaire et naval adressent a leurs Ministres respectifs des rapports sur 
la nouvelle loi militaire allemande. J'appelle 1'attention de Votre Excellence sur ces 
importants documents. 

L'etude des moyens financiers destines a pourvoir aux mesures militaires que 
lAUemagne a en vue retarde seule la publication des propositions definitives du Gou- 
vernement. Malgre le patnotisme affecte avec lequel les classes riclies accepteni le 
sacrifice qui leur sera demande, elles n'en sont pas moins, particulierement dans le 
monde des affaires, mecontentes des mesures financieres annoncees, et elles sentent 
qu'une contribution forcee, imposee en pleine paix, cree pour lavenir un precedent 
redoutable. D'autre part, les Gouvernements confederes ont oppose une vive 
resistance a 1'innovation qui attribuera a l'Empire des ressources tirees de 1'impot 
direct. Jusqu'ici les impots de cette nature elaient reserves aux Etats confederes, et 
ceux-ci voient dans 1'abandon de cette regie une affirmation nouvelle de la person- 
nalite de l'Empire, qui constitue une certaine diminution de leur propre souverainele. 

Quoi qu'il en soit, en augmentant la force de larmee allemande, l'Empire veut ne 
rien laisser a limprevu, au cas oil une crise eclaterait. 

Les innovations de I'Allemagne ont fait surgir un fait inattendu pour elle : la pro- 
position du Gouvernement de la Republique retablissant le service de trois ans, et la 
resolution virile avec laquelle cette proposition a ete accueilhe en France. L'im- 
pression d'etonnement que ces projets ont produite a ete mise a profit par le Gou- 
vernement Imperial pour insister surlanecessite absolue de l'augmentation des forces 
militaires de I'Allemagne; ses projets ont ete presentes comme une reponse. C'est le 
contraire de la verite, puisque ('immense eflort militaire que la France accepte n'est 
que la consequence des initiatives de I'Allemagne. 

Les Autorites Imperiales ne cessent d'exalter le sentiment patriotique. L'Empereur 
se complait a rappeler tous les jours les souvenirs de 1 8 1 3 . Hier soir, une retraite 
militaire a parcouru les rues de Berlin et des discours ont ete prononces dans lesquels 



— Il- 
ia situation presente etait assimilee a celle d'il y a un sierle. L'entrainement de ('opi- 
nion aura sa repercussion dans les discussions qui s'ouvnront le mois prochain au 
Reichstag, et j'ai lieu de craindre que le Chancelier lui-meme ne soit pousse a faire 
dans ses declarations des allusions aux relations de la France et de l'Allemagne. II 
fallait s'altendre a ce qu'on exaltat le patnotisnie de la nation au moment ou on lui 
demande de nouveaux sacrifices, mais c'esl abuser du rapprochement historique que 
de comparer le temps present a i8i3. Si le mouvement qui, il y a un siecle, 
emportait le peuple allemand contre l'homme de genie qui aspirait a la domination 
universelle, pouvait trouver aujourd'hui quelque equivalent, c'esl en France qu'il le 
faudrait cherchcr, puisque le peuple francais ne songe qu'a se defendre contre la 
domination de la force. 

II n'en est pas moins vrai que cet etat de {'opinion dans les deux pays rend la 
situation grave. 

Jules Cambon. 



Annexe I. 



Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Attache militaire pres 1'Ambassade 
de la Republique Franchise a Berlin, 
a M. Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre. 

Berlin, le i5 mars igi3. 

Le mouvement patriotique qui s'est manifeste en France a cause dans certains milieux 
une veritable colere. 

Je ne pretends certes pas que ['article virulent de la Gazette de Cologne soit 1'expression 
d'un sentiment general. C'est I'explosion de rage d'un journaliste impulsif, aussitot desavoue 
par le Gouverncment. 

Mais, malgre son inconvenance , la manifestation de la Gazette de Cologne n'est pas 
ncgligeable; ellc .1 ete approuvee dans son esprit, sinon dans sa forme, par plusieurs jour- 
naux assez importants , et elle me parait correspond™ a un sentiment . reel , a une colere 
latente. 

11 est interessant de le constater, parce que le sens des armements actuels s'en trouve 
eclaire d'une lumiere plus vive. 

Depuis quelque temps deja, on rencontre des gens qui declarent les projets inilitaires de 
la France cxtraordinaires et injustices. Dans un salon, un membre du Reichstag et non un 
energumene, parlant du service de trois ans en France, allait jusqu'a dire : « C'est une pro- 
vocation, nous ne le permettrpns pas ... De plus moderes, inilitaires ou eivils, soutiennent 
couramment la these que la France, avec ses quarante millions dames, n'a pas le droit de 
rivaliser .iin<.i aver I'Allemagne. 

En somme, on est furieux, et cetle colere ne results pas des criailleries de certaines 
I'euilles franraises auxquclles les gens serieux ne s'arretent guere. C'est du depit. On enrage 
de voir que, malgre Teflon enorme entrepris 1'annee dcrniere, continue et accru encore 



— 5 — 

cette annee, on ne pourra probablement pas encore cette fois inettre la France hors de 
Course. 

Nous mettre definitivement hors de course , puisque nous ne voulons ni ne pouvons etre 
avee elle, c'est cela en efTet que poursuit 1'Allemagne. On ne saurait trop le repeter et la 
prochaine loi.que 1'opinion francaise regarde un pen trop comme une explosion spontanee , 
n'est que la suite fatale, attendue, de la loi dejuin 1912. 

Celle-ci, en efiet, en cream deux corps d'armee nouveaux, avait laisse a dessein, suivant 
la maniere aHemande.de grandes unites et des regiments incomplets. II etait evident quon 
n'attendrait pas longtemps pour combler les lacunes 1 ' 1 . La crise balkanique a fourni une 
merveilleuse occasion, eclatant juste a point voulu, pour permettre d'exploiter le centenaire 
des guerres de delivrance, d'obtenir plus facilcment des sacrifices au souvenir de ceux 
consentis naguere, deja contre nous. 

Pour bien montrer la genese de ce programme militaire, je me permets de rappeler ce 
quVcrivait , il y a un an , lors de 1'apparition de la loi de 1 9 1 2 , mon predecesseur, le colonel 
Pelle : 

(i Nous decouvrons tous les jours combien sont profonds et durables les sentirnents d'or- 
gueil froisse' et de rancunes contre nous provoqu^s par les evenements de 1'an dernier. 

« Le traite du (1 novembre 1911 est une profonde disillusion. 

« Le ressentiment eprouve dans toutes les parties du pays est le meme. Tous les Alle- 
mands, jusqu'aux socialistes, nous en veulent de leur avoir pris leur part au Maroc. 

« II semblait, il y a un ou deux ans, que les Allemands fussent partis a la conquele du 
monde. lis s'estimaient assez forts pour que personne n'osat entamer la lutte contre eux. Des 
possibility indefinies s'ouvraient a 1'industrie allemande, au commerce allemand, a ('expan- 
sion allemande. » 

« Naturellement, ces idees et ces ambitions n'ont pas disparu aujourd'hui. Les Allemands 
ont'toujours besoin de debouches, d'expansion economique et coloniale. lis estiment qu'ils 
y ont droit parce qu'ils grandissent tous les jours, parce que 1'avenir leur appartient. lis 
nous regardent, avec nos Ito millions d'habitants, comme une nation secondaire. 

» Dans la crise de 1911, cette nation secondaire leur a tenu tete, et 1'Empereur et leGou- 
vernement ont ced4. Lopinion publiquc ne l'a pardonne ni a eux, ni a nous. Ellcne vcut pas 
qu'un parcilfa.it puissc se reproduire. » 

Et au moment ou la seconde et formidable partie du programme va etre rfalisee, oil la 
force militaire allemande est sur le point d'acquerir cette superiority definitive qui nous for- 
cerait a subir, le cas £cheant, 1'humiliation ou lYcrasement, voici que soudain la France 
refuse d'abdiquer, et quelle montre, comme disait Renan, « son pouvoir eternel de renais- 
sance et de resurrection ». On comprend a merveille le depit allemand. 

Sans doute le Gouvernement invoque la situation gen^rale de 1'Europe et parle du p6ril 
slave. Pour ma part, 1'opinion me semble en reality indifferente au peril slave et cependant 
elle a accepte avec une tres belle tenue, sinon plus, les charges enormes de ces deux lois 
consecutives. 

Le 1 mars dernier, centenaire dc l'organisation de la lev£e en masse de 1'Allemagne 
contre nous, une foule £norme s'est pressee, malgrd une pluie battante, a la parade mili- 
taire devant le chateau, au milieu du Tiergarten devant les st3tues de la reine Louise et de 
Frederic-Guillaume III, entourees de monceaux de fleurs. 



probleme qui nous est pos6 aujourd'hui se serait done pose quelques annfes plus lard et d'une 
plus angoissante encore, puisque la diminution de nos contingents amoindrit sans cesse le chilTre 
tre efleclif dc paix. 



— 6 — 

Ces anniversaires, rappelant la lutte contre la France, vont se r^peter loute I'annee. Ea 
1916 on celebrera lecentenaire de la premiere campagne de France, de la premiere entree 
des Prussiens a Paris. 

En resume, si 1'opinion publique allemande ne montre pas la Fiance du doigl. comme 
le fait la Gazette de Cologne, e'est cependant contre nous quelle est et restera longtemps 
braquee. Elle trouve que pour nos ko millions ^'habitants nous tenons au soleil une place 
vraiment trop grande. 

Les Allemands desirent la paix, ne cesse-t-on de proclamer, et l'Empereur plus que tout 
autre, piais jls ne I'entendent pas dans le sens de concessions mutuelles ni d equilibre des 
armements. lis veulent qu'on les craigne et ils sont en train de faii'e les sacrifices necessaires. 
Si, a quelque occasion, leur orgueil national se Irouve blesse, la confiance que pourra avoir 
le pays dans l'enorme superiority de son armee favorisera une explosion de colore nationale 
devant laquelle la moderation du Gouvernemgnt imperial sera peut-etre impuissante. 

II faut constater d'ailleurs que le Gouverne'nient met tout en oeuvre pour chauffer le sen- 
timent national . en fetant avec eclat tous les anniversaires de 1 8 1 3. 

Au reste, la tournure de 1'opinion n'aurail pour effet que de donner a une guerre un 
caractere plus ou moins national. Par quelque pretexte que I'Alleniagne justilie une confla- 
gration europeenne, nul ne peut faire que les premiers coups decisifs ne soient pas portes 
contre la France. 



Annexe II. 



M. de Faramond, attache naval pres l'Arabassade de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bai'DIN, Ministre de la Marine. 

Berlin, le lb mars ■ 9 1 3. 

En vous rendant compte de 1'examen du budget de la marine par la Commission du 
Reichstag, j'ai dit qu'aucune loi navale ayant pour objet un accroissement de la flotte ne 
serait presentee cette annee et que tout 1'effort militaire serait dirige contre nous. 

Bien que le nouveau projet de loi destine^ a augmenter les elfectifs allemands ne soit pas 
encore depose devant le Reichstag, nous savons qui! s'agit d'un » renforcement militaire de 
grande envergure », suivant I'expression dr la Gazette de I'Allemagne du Noirl. 

Les iournaux oflicieux out d'ailleurs commente le projet militaire dans des termes qui 
permeltent de tenir pour exact le communique du Lokal Anzeirjer. 

Les etVectifs allemands s'elevent actuellement a 720,000 homines; nous sommes autorises 
a conclure que , le 1" octobre 1 y 1 Ix , l'armec impeViale sera portee a un chifl're voisin de 
860,000 hommes. 

L'importance du chiflre serait moindre si les previsions de la nouvelle loi (d'apresceque 
nous ont laisse entrevoir les feuilles oflicielles) n'avaient pas pour tendance, comme du reste 
les dispositions de la loi de 1912, de mettre les corps d'armee voisins de notre frontier© 



— 7 — 
dans un etat aussi rapproche que possible du pied de guerre, afin de pouvoir, le jour meme 
de 1'ouverture des hostilites, nous attaquer brusquement avec des forces tres superieures 
aux notres. C'est pour le Gouvernement imperial une necessite imperieuse d'obtenir un 
succes des le debut des operations. 

Les conditions dans lesquelles l'Empereur allemand engagerait aujourd'hui une lutte 
contre la France ne sont plus les memes qu'il y a quaranle ans. Au debut de la guerre 
de 1870. 1'Etat-Major prussien avait envisage la possibility dune offensive victorieuse des 
Franeais et Moltke, privoyant que nous pourrions a la rigueur parvenir jusqu'a Mayence, 
avait dit a son souverain : « La ils se heurteront ». Guillaume II ne peut pas admettre une 
retraite clans ses calculs, quoique le soldat allemand ne soit plus aujourd'hui, corome il y a 
quarante ans, un homme simple, religieux et prel a mourir sur un ordre de son roi. Tenant 
compte des quatre millions de suffrages socialistes exprimes aux dernieres elections et du 
fait que le droit de vote n'est acquis en Allemagne qua 2 5 ans, on peut penser que larmee 
active, composee de jeunesgens de 20 a 25 ans, doit comporter dans ses rangs une propor- 
tion serieuse de socialistes. 

Certes, ce serait folie de croire que les socialistes allemands leveront la crosse en fair le 
jour ou la France et I'Allemagne en viendront aux mains; mais il sera extremement impor- 
tant, pour le Gouvernement imperial de leur persuader, dune part que nous sommes les 
agresseurs, et d'autre part qu'ils peuvent avoir pleine confiance dans le commandement et 
le resultat. 

Lors du dernier serment des recrues de la garde a Potsdam , j'ai ete frappe d'entendre 
l'Empereur prendre pour theme de son discours au_x jeunes soldats « le devoir d'etre plus- 
courageax et plus discipline dans la mauvaise fortune que dans la bonne ». 

Et c'est parce qu'une premiere defaite allemande aurait pour 1'Empire une portee incal- 
culable que Ion trouve dans tous les projets militaires elabores par le grand Etat-Majof 
I'objectif d'une offensive foudroyante contre la France. 

En realite, le Gouvernement imperial veut se mettre en etat de faire face a toules les 
eventualites possibles. C'est du cote de la France que le danger lui parait le plus grand. La 
Gazette de Cologne l'a dit dans un article haineux et violent dont la Wilhelmstrasse a desa- 
voue la forme plutdt que le fond. 

Mais nous devons nous persuader que l'opinion exprimee par la Gazette de Cologne est a 
1'heure actuelle celle de l'inmense majorite du peuple allemand. 

A cet egard, je crois interessant de citer une conversation qu'un membre de notre 
ambassade a eue lautre soir avec le vieux prince Henckel de Donnersmark, parce quelle 
pourrait bien refl&er la pensee qui domine dans les milieux de la Cour. 

F.iisant allusion au nouveau projet militaire allemand, le prince de Donnersmark a dit : 
« Les Franeais ont tout a fait tort de croire que nous nourrissons de sombres desseins et que 
nous desirons une guerre. Mais nous ne pouvons pas oublier qu'en 1870 l'opinion populaire 
a force le Gouvernement Franeais a nous attaquer follement, sans etre pret. Qui peut nous 
assurer que l'opinion publique, si prompte a s'enllammer en France, ne mettra pas quelque 
jour le Gouvernement de la Republique dans l'obligation de nous faire la guerre? C'est 
contre ce danger que nous voulons nous premunir ». 

Et le prince a ajoute : « On ma souvent regarde en France comme un des artisans de la 
guerre de 1870. Cela est tout a lait faux. Si j'ai travaille aux consequences de la guerre, 
j'avais au contraire fait mon possible pour en empecher 1'explosion. Quelque temps avant la 
guerre, me trouvant a un diner oil etaient reunies les personnalites les plus considerables du 
regime imperial, je pris la parole pour deplorer les sentiments d'inimitie qui se maniles- 
taient deja entre la France et la Prusse. On me repondit que si je parlais ainsi , c'est que 



j'avais peur d'une lutte dont Tissue serait certainement defavorable a la Prusse. Je repiiquai : 
« Non , ce n'est pas parce que j'ai peur que je repudie l'idee d'une guerre entre la France et 
la Prusse, mais bien parce que je crois qu'il est de 1'interet des deux pays de 1'eviter. Et 
puisque vous avez fait allusion aux chances d'une telle lutte, je vais vous dire mon opinion. 
J'ai la conviction que vous serez battus pour la raison que voici : en depit des brillantes 
qualites que je reconnais aux Francais et que j'admire, vous n'etes pas exacts. Par exacti- 
tude, je n'entends pas le fait d'arriver a 1'heure a un rendezvous, mais j'entends la ponc- 
tualite dans toute 1'etendue du mot. Le Francais, qui a une grande facilite de travail, n'est 
pas aussi ponctuel que I'AUemand dans l'accomplissement de ses devoirs. Dans la prochaine 
guerre, la nation vielorieuse sera celle dont tous les serviteurs du haul en bas de 1'echelle 
seront exacts a remplir leur devoir, si important ou si infinie que soit ce devoir. » Et le 
prince de Donnersmark a ajoute : « La ponctualite, qui a joue un si grand role lorsqu'il 
s'est agi, il y a quarante ans, de mouvoir une armee de 000,000 homm.es, aura une impor- 
tance encore bien plus grande au cours de la prochaine guerre ou Ion devra mettre en action 
des masses autrement nombreuses ». 

Sous cctte forme, le vieux prince a exprime la confiance qu'ont tous les Allemands dans 
la superioritc de leur organisation militaire. 

Lorsque j'ai parle plus haut du nouveau pmjet allemand, je n'ai fait allusion qua un 
accroissement des ellectil's. Mais le projet comportera aussi une augmentation du materiel et 
des ouvrages de defense dont le detail n'est pas connu , mais dont on peut se faire une idee 
par le chillre des depenses envisagees pour v faire lace : i ,2 5o, 000,000 de francs. 

L'execution de la loi du quinquennat dr 1911 n'avait pas necessite de mesure finaneiere 
speciale. 

La loi militaire et navale de 1012 avait ete provisoirement couverte par les excedents 
budgetaires des annees 1910 et 1911, par une rclorme de la loi sur 1'alcool el pat 1'ajourne- 
ment de labaissement de 1'iinpot sur les sucres (ees deux dernieres ressources ne repiesen- 
tent d'ailleuis ensemble iju'une somme d'une soixantaine de millions de francs). 

11 faut en outre rappeler que de gros emprtints ont ele fait receniment par l'Empire et la 
Prusse : cinq cents millions de marks le 29 Janvier 1912 et trois cent cinquanle millions de 
marks le 7 mars 1913. Une part assez importanle de ces emprunts a du etre affectee aax, 
depenses militaires. 

La loi militaire de 191 3 exigera des mesurcs financieres tout a fait exceptionnelles. 

D'apres les indications donnees par la presse officieuse, les depenses dites « d'une fois » 
s'eleveraient a un milliard de marks et les depenses » permanentes » annuelles resultant de 
l'augmentation des ellectil's depasseraient deux cents millions de marks. 

II paralt ii ]>eu pres certain que les depenses non renouvelables seront couvertes par une 
contribution de guerre predevee sur le capital. On exempterait les petites fortunes et Ton 
frapperait dune taxe progressive les fortunes superieures a 20,000 marks. Presente sous 
cette forme limpot de gurrre ne saurait deplaire aux socialistes, qui pourront ainsi, sui- 
vant lour tactique habituelle, repousser le principe de la loi militaire et voter les credils qui 
en assurent l'execution. 

Le Gouveinement craint qu<' parmi les classes riches et bourgeoises, cette imposition 
extraordinaire dun milliard portant exclusivement sur la fortune acquise ne cree un durable 
mecontentement; aussi fait-il tout ee qui est en son pouvoir pour persuader ceux qu'il va 
ranconner si durement que la s^curite de l'Empire est menaeee et pour etablir une analogic 
entre lis temps belliqueux de 1 8 1 3 <'t la periode actuelle. 

En letant bruyammenl le centenaire de la guerre de I'JndependancCi on veut convaincre 



— 9 — 

le peuple de la necessite du sacrifice et iui rappeler que la France est , aujourd'hui comme il 
y a cent ans, 1'ennemi here'dilaire. 

Si nous constatons que le Gouvernement allemand s'efforce d'obtenir que cette enorme 
taxe ne soit pas acquiltee en plusieurs echeances; et si comme le disent certains journaux, 
le payement integral devait etre realise avant le l" juillet 1 9 1 k , il y aurait la pour nous une 
indication redoutable, car rien ne saurait expliquer une telle hate des autorites militaires a 
posseder un tresor de guerre liquide d'un milliard dans leur caisse. 

En ce qui eoncerne la couverture des depenses permanentes qui resulleront de 1'applica- 
tion des lois de 1912 et igi3, rien n'a encore ele dit. Une nouvelle legislation sera evi 
demment necessaire pour procurer les ressources annuelles. 

Je conclus : en Allemagne 1'execution d'une reforme militaire suit toujours de tres pres 
la decision prise de 1'accomplir. Toutes les dispositions nouvelles prevues par la loi du 
quinqucnnat de 191 1 et par la loi de 1912 sont deja mises en vigueur. 11 est fort possible 
qu'une partie du materiel dont la nouvelle loi va autoriser l'achat soit en cours de fabri- 
cation. Les secrets militaires sont si bien gardes ici qu'il est extremement difficile de suivre 
les mouvements du personnel et du materiel. 

Avec 700,000 homines sous les arnies (sans compter les reservistes lort nombreux qui 
sont actuellement en instruction) une organisation militaire parlaite et une opinion publique 
qui se laisse dominer par les appels belliqueux de la Ligue militaire et de la Ligue navale, 
le peuple allemand est a cette heure un voisin bien dangereux. 

Si le service de trois ans est adopte et immediatement applique en France, les conditions 
seront moins inegales fan prochain. Les eflectifs allemands seront encore sensiblement plus 
considerables que les notres, mais l'appel de tout le contingent disponible ne permettra plus 
la selection et amenera dans les rangs de larmee allemande des elements de second ordre et 
meme des unites peu desirables. La valeur morale de I'armee active y perdra. 

Les Allemands ont voulu rompre lequilibre des deux camps qui divisent l'Europe , par 
Un grand effort supreme, au dela duquel ils ne peuvent plus grand'ehose. 

lis n'avaient pas cru la France capable d'un grand sacrifice. L'adoption du service de 
tfois ans chez nous dejouera leurs calculs. 

Faramond. 



N° 2. 

M. Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre, 

a M. Jonnart, Ministre fles Affaires etransjeres. 



Paris, le 2 avril 1913. 



Je viens de recevoir d'une source sure communication d'un rapport officiel et secret 
.sur le renforcement de I'armee allemande : il se divise en deux parties: une premiere 
de generalites, et une seconde, d'ordre technique, precisant dans le plus grand 

Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre euiopecnne, 7 



— 10 — 
detail, arme par arme, les mesures a prendre ; ce qui concerne l'emploi des auto- 
mobiles et l'utilisation de l'aeronautique est parliculierement frappant. 

Tai l'honneur de vous adresser ei-joint une copie de la premiere partie de ce docu- 
ment, qui me parait devoir retenir votre attention. 

Etienne. 



Annexe. 



Note Jiir le renjorccment dc I'armee allemande. 

Berlin, le 19 mars 1913. 

1. — - GeNERALITES SUB LES NOL'VELLES LOIS MIL1TAIRES. 

/./augmentation a eu lieu en trois eta pes : 

1° La Conference d'Algesiras a enleve les derniers doutes sur l'existence dune entente 
entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Russie. Nous avons vn, d'autre part, que I'Autriche- 
Hongrie etait obligee d immobiliser des forces contre la Serbie et I'ltalie ; enfin, notre flotte 
n'etait pas, a ce moment-la, assez forte. A la fin du conflit, on s'occupa done en premiere 
ligne de renforcer 'a defense de nos cotes, d'augmenter notre force navale. Contre l'inten- 
tion anglaise d'envoyer un corps d'expedition de 100,000 hommes sur le continent, on 
devait repondre par une meilleure formation des reserves, qui devaientetre employees, d'apres 
les circonstances, au service sur les cotes, dans les forleresses el dans les sieges. II etait clair 
deja a celle epoque qui! sorait indispensable de faire un grand effort. 

2° Les Francais ayant viole les conventions marocaines, auienerent ('incident d'Agadir. A 
cetle epoque, les progres de I'armee franchise, le relevement moral de la nation, 1'avance 
technique prise dans le domaine <le ['aviation et dans relui des mitrailleuses, rendait une 
attaque contre les Francais moins facile que dans la periode precedente. De plus, il fallait 
s'altendre a une attaque de la flotte anglaise. Cetle situation difficile ouviit les yeux sur la 
necessity d'une augmentation de I'armee. Cette augmentation ful. des celte epoque, consi- 
dered comme un minimum. 

3° La guerre des Balkans aurait pu nous entrainer a la guerre pour soutenir notre alli^. 
La nouvelle situation au sud de 1'Autriche-Hongrie diminuait la valeur de l'aide que cet allie 
pouvait nous apporter. D'aulre part, la France s'etait renforcee par line nouvelle loi des 
cadres; il fallait done avancer les dates d'execution prevues pour la nouvelle loi militaire. 

On prepare 1'opinion a un renlurcement nouveau de I'armee active,, qui assurerait a 1A1- 
lemagne une paix honorable, et la possibilite de garantir comme il convient son influence 
dans les affaires du monde. La nouvelle loi mililaire et le complement qui doit la suivre, 
permettront presque completement de repondre a ce but. 

Ni les ridicules criailleries de revanche des chauvinistes francais , ni les grincemenls de 
dents des Anglais, ni les gestes desordonnes des Slaves ne nous detourneront de notre but 
qui est de fortifier et d'elendre le Deutscbthum (puissance germanique) dans le monde entier. 

Les Francais peuvent armer tant qu'ils voudront; ils ne peuvent, du jour au lendemain, 
augmenter leur population. L'emploi d'une arniee noire sur les theatres d'operations euro- 
peens restera pour longlemps un reve, du reste depourvu de beauty. 



1 1 



II. BLT F.T DEVOIRS DE NOTRE POLITIQUE RATIONALE, DE NOTRE ARMEE 

ET DE NOS ORGANES SPECIAUX All SERVICE DE L'ARMEE. 

Notre nouvelle loi militaire nest qu'une extension de I'ceuvre d'education mililaire du 
peuple atlemand. Nos ancetres de 1 8 1 3 ont fait de plus gros sacrifices. C'est notre devoir 
sacre d'aiguiser l'epee que 1'on nous a mise en main , et de la tenir prete pour nous defendre 
comme pour porter des coups a notre ennemi. 11 faut faire penitrer clans le peuple I'Me que 
nos armemenls snnt une riponse aux armaments et a la politique francaise. II faut I'habituer a 
penser qu'une guerre offensive de notre part est une necessite pour combattre les provoca- 
tions de l'adversaire. II faudra agir avec prudence pour n'eveiller aucun soupcon, et eviter 
les crises qui pourraient nuire a notre vie economique. II faut mener les affaires de telle 
facon que sous la pesante impression d'armements puissants, de sacrifices considerables, et 
dune situation politique tendue, un dechainement [Loschlagen] soit considere comme une 
delivrance , parce qu'apres lui viendraierit des decades de paix et de prosperity comme -apres 
iS'TO. II faut preparer la guerre au point de vue financier; il y a beaucoup a faire de ce 
cote J la. II ne faut pas eveiller la meliance de nos financiers , mais bien des choses cependant 
ne poun ont etre cachees. 

II n'y aurait pas a s'inquieter du sort de nos colonies. Le resultat final en Europe le reglera 
pour elles. Par contre, il faudra susciter des troubles dans le Nord de I'Afrique et enRussie. 
C'est un moyen d'absorber des forces de l'adversaire. II est done absolumenl necessaire que 
nous nous mettions en relations, par des organes bien choisis, avec des gens influents en 
Egypte, a Tunis, a Alger et au Maroc, pour preparer lesmesures necessaires en cas de guerre 
europeenne. Bien entendu, en cas de guerre, on reconnaitrait ouvertement ces allies secrets; 
et on leur assurerait, a la conclusion de la paix, la conservation des avantages conquis. On 
peut realiser ces desiderata. Un premier essai, qui a ete fait il y a quelques annees, nous 
avail procure le contact voulu. Mallieureuscment, on n'a pas consolide suifisamment les re- 
lations obtenucs. Bon gre mal gre, il faudra en venir a des preparatifs de ce genre, pour 
mener rapidement a sa fin une campagne. 

Les soulevemcnts provoques en temps de guerre par des agents politiirues demandent a 
etre soigneusement prepares, et par de 3 moyens materials, lis doivent eclater simultanement 
avec la destruction des moyens de communication; ils doivent avoir une tete dirigeante que 
l'on peut trouver dans des chefs influents, religieux ou politiques. L'ecole egyptienne y est 
parliculierement apte, elle relie de plus en plus entre eux les intellectuels du monde 
musulman. 

Quoi qu'il en soit, nous devons etre forts pour pouvoir aneantir d'un puissant elan nos 
ennemis do 1'Est et du 1'Ouest. Mais dans la prochaine guerre europeenne, il faudra aussi 
que les pedis Etals soienl contraints a nous suivre, ou soient domptes. Dans certaines con- 
ditions, leurs armees et lours places fortes peuventctre rapidement vaincues ou neutralises, 
ce qui pourrait etre vraisemblablement le cas pour la Belgique et la Hollandc, alin d'inter- 
iln, i notre ennemi de I'Ouest un territoire qui pourrait lui servir de base d'operation dans 
notre flanc. Au Nord, nous n'avons a craindre aucune menace du Danemark ou des Etats 
scandinaves, d'autant plus que dans tous les cas, nous pourvoirons a la concentration d'une 
forte armee du Nord, capable de repondre a toute mauvaise intention de ce cote. Au cas le 
plus defavorable, le Danemark pouirait etre force par i'Angleterre a abandonner sa neu- 
tralite; mais a ce moment, la decision serait deja intervenue sur terre ct sur mer. Notre 
armee du Nord , dont les forces pourraient etre notablement augmentees par les formations 



— 12 — 

hollandaises, repondrait par une defensive extremement active a toute offensive de ce 
cdle. 

Au Sud, la Suisse forme un boulevard extremement solide, et nous pouvons compter 
quelle defendra energiqueinent sa neutralite contre la France, protegeant ainsi notre 
flanc. 

Comme on la dit plus haut, on ne peut considerer de meme la situation vis-a-vis des 
petits Etats de notre frontiere Nord-Ouest. La , ce sera pour nous une question vitale , et le 
but vers lequel il faudra tendre, c'est de prendre ('offensive avec une grande superiorite des 
ies premiers jours. Pour cela, il faudra concentrer une grande armee, suivie de fortes for- 
mations de landwehr, qui determineront les armees des petits Etals a nous suivre, ou tout 
au moins a rester inactives sur le theatre de la guerre, et qui les ecraseraient en cas de 
resistance armee. Si Ion pouvait decider ces Etats a organiser leur systeme fortifie de telle 
facon qu'il constitue une protection efficacede 1 notre flanc, on pourrait renoncer a [invasion 
projetee. Mais, pour cela, il faudrait aussi , particulierement en Belgique, qu'on reformat 
l'armee , pour quelle oflrit des garanties serieuses de resistance efficace. Si , au contraire , son 
organisation defensive etait etablie contre nous, ce qui donnerait des avantages evidents a 
notre adversaire de 1'Ouest, nous ne pourrions, en aucune facon, offrir a la Belgique une 
garantie de la securite de sa neutralite. Un vaste champ est done ouvert a notre diplouiatie 
pour travailler, dans cepays, dans le sens de nos interets. 

Les dispositions arretees dans ce sens permettent d'esperer que 1'offensive peut £tre prise 
aussitdt apres la concentration complete de l'armee du Bas-Rhin. Un ultimatum a breve 
eeheance, que doit suivre immediatement l'invasion, permettra de justifier suiTisamment 
notre action au point de vue du droit des gens. 

Tels sont les devoirs qui incombent a notre arrnee, et qui exigent un effectif eleve. Si 
ji'ennemi nous attaque. ou si nous voulons le dompter, nous ferons comme nos freres d'il y 
a centans; I'aigle provoque prendra son vol, saisira 1'ennemi dans ses serres acerees, et le 
rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons alors que les provinces de l'ancien empire alle- 
mand : Comle de Bourgogne et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains des 
Francs; que des milliers de freres allemands des provinces balliques gemissent sous le joug 
islave. C'est une question nationale de rendre a 1'Allemagne ce quelle a autrefois possede. 



N° 3. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 6 mai igi3. 

Je parlais ce soir avec le Secretaire d'Etat de la Conference des Ambassadeurs et 
des resultats obtenus a la seance d'hier a Londres. La crise dont 1'Europe etait me- 
nacee est, a ses yeux, ecartee, mais seulement pour quelque temps: « U semble, me 
disait M. de Jagow, que nous marchons dans un pays de montagnes. Nous venons de 
passer un col difficile et nous voyons d'autres hauteurs se dresser devant nous. » — 
« Celle que nous venons de surmonter, lui repondis-je, etait peut-etre la plus dure k. 
Tasser. » 



— 13 — 

La crise que nous venons de traverser a ete tres serieuse. Ici. on a consider^ Ie 
danger de guerre conune imminent. J'ai eu la preuve des preoccupations de 
1'AUemagne par un certain nombre de faits qui! importe que Votre Excellence 
connaisse. 

J'ai recu hier la visite d'un de mes collegues avec qui j'entretiens des relations 
particulieres et cordiales. Lors de la visite qu'il a faite aM. de Jagovv, celui-ci lui a de- 
mande, a titre confidentiel quelle etait exactement la situation de la Russie en 
Extreme-Orient et si cette Puissance a, en ce moment, quelque chose a redouter de 
ce cote qui y puisse retenir ses forces. L'Ambassadeur lui repondit qu'il ne voyait 
rien, absolument rien, qui put etre une cause de preoccupation pour le Gouveme- 
ment russe et que celui-ci avait les mains libres en Europe. 

Je disais plus haut que le danger dune guerre avait ete envisage ici covnme tres 
proche. Aussi ne s'est-on pas contente de tater le terrain en Extreme-Orient, on s'est 
prepare ici-meme. 

La mobdisation de 1'armee allemande ne se borne pas a l'appel des reservistes a la 
caserne. II y a, en Allemagne, une mesure preparatoire qui n'existe pas chez nous et 
qui consiste a prevenir les officiers et les hommes de la reserve de se tenir prets 
pour l'appel, a(in qu'ils puissenl prendre les arrangements qui leur sont necessaires. 
C'est un « garde a vous » general, et ll faut 1'incroyable esprit de soumission, de disci- 
pline et de secret qui existe en ce pays, pour qu'une pareille disposition puisse 
exister. Si un pared avertissement etait donne en France , le pays fremirait tout en- 
tier et la presse le dirait le lendemam. 

Cet avertissement a ete lance, en i 9 1 1 , au cours des negoeialions que je poursui- 
vais sur le Maroc. 

Or, il a ete lance de nouveau, d y a une dizame de jours, c'est-a-dire au moment 
de la tension austro-albanaise. Je le sais, et le tiens de plusieurs sources dillerenles, 
nolamment d'officiers de reserve qui font dit a des amis dans la plus stride intimite. 
Ces messieurs ont pris les mesures necessaires pour assurer a leur famille, en coffre- 
fort, les moyens de vivre pendant un an. On a meme dit que c'etait pour cette meme 
raison que le Kronprinz, qui devait faire le voyage d'essai de I'lmperator, ne s'est pas 
embarque. 

La decision qui a fait prendre cette mesure preparatoire a la mobilisation repond 
aux idees du Grand Etat-Major general. Sur ce point, j'ai ete mis au courant dune 
conversation tenue dans un milieu allemand par le general de Moltke, qui est consi- 
dere ici comme 1'olTicier le plus distingue de 1'armee allemande. 

La pensee de I'Etat-Major general est d'agir par surprise. « II faut laisser de cote , a 
dit le general de Moltke, les lieux communs sur la responsabilite de Pagresseur. 
Lorsque la guerre est devenue necessaire, il faut la faire en mettant toutes les chances 
de son cote. Le succes seul la justifie. LAllemagne ne peut ni ne doit laisser a la 
Russie le temps de mobiliser; car elle serait obligee de maintenir sur sa fronliere Est 
une force telle qu'elle se trouverait en situation d'egalite, sinon d'inferiorite , avec la 
France. Done, a ajoute le general , il faut prevenir notre principal adversaire des qu'il 
y aura neuf chances sur d>x d'avoir la guerre, et la commencer sans attendre pour 
ecraser brutalement toute resistance. » 



— 14 — 

Voila exactemenl 1'etat d'ame ties milieux militaires, qui repond a l'elat dame 
des milieux politiques, ceux-ci ne considerant pas la Russie, au contraire de nous, 
comme un ennemi necessaire. 

Voila ce qu'on pensait el disail entre soi il y a quinze jours. 

II faut retenir de cetle aventure la legon que renferment les faits que j'ai presente's 
plus haut : ces gens-ci ne craignent pas la guerre, ils en aeceptent pleinement la pos- 
sibility et ils out pris leurs mesures en consequence. Ils vealent elrc tnujnurs prels. 

Comme je le disais, cela exige des conditions de secret et de discipline et une 
volonte perseverante : l'entliousiasme ne suffit pas a tout. Cette lecon peut etre utile 
a mediler dans le moment oil le Gouvernemenl de la Republique demande au Par- 
lement les moyens de fortifier le pays. 

Jules Cambon. 



N°- 4. 

M. Allize, Ministre de la Republique en Baviere, 

a M. Stephen Pichon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Munich, le 10 juillet lQl3. 

Au point de vue politique, on se demande a quoi serviront les nouveaux arme- 
ments. Reconnaissant que personne ne menace 1'AUemagne, on considere que la 
diplomatic allemande disposail deja de forces assez considerables el dalliances assez 
puissantes pour defendre avec succes les interets allemands. Comme je le relevais 
deja au lendemain de 1'accord marocain de ign. on estime que la Chancellerie 
imperiale sera aussi incapable dans I'avenir que dans le passe d'adopter une politique 
exterieure active et de remporter, lout au raoins sur ce terrain, des succes qui justi- 
fieraient les sacrifices que la nation s'impose. 

' Cet etat d'esprit est d'autanl plus inquietant que le Gouvernemenl imperial se 
trouverait actuellement soutenu par I'opinion publique dans toute enlreprise oil il 
s*engagerait vigoureusement , meme aux risques d'un conflit. L'etal de guerre, auqucl 
tous les evenements d'Orient habituent les esprits depuis deux ans, apparait, non 
plus comme une catastrophe lointaine, mats comme une solution aux difficulty 
politiques et economiques qui n'ironl qu'en s'aggravant. 

Puisse 1'exemple de la Bulgarie exercer en Allemagne une influence salutaire. 
Comme me le disait naguere le Prince-Regent : • Le sort des armes est toujours 
incertain; toute guerre est une aventure, el bien fou est celui qui la court se croyant 
assure de la victoire. » 

Aluze. 



— 15 



N° 5. 



Note a M. Stephen Pichon , Mimstre des Affaires e/rangeres 

(surl'opinion publique en Allemagne, d'apresles rapports des agents diplomat iques et consulages), 

Paris, le 3o juillet 1913. 

Des observations que nos agents en Allemagne ont pu recueillir aupres de per- 
sonnes en mesure de penetrer dans les milieux les plus divers. Ion peut tirer cettb 
conclusion que deux sentiments dominent et irritent les esprits : 

i" Le traite du /t novembre 1911 serait, pour l'Allemagne, un deboire; 

2° La France — une France nouvelle — insoupe.onnee jusqu'a 1'ete de 1911 — 
serait belliqueu.se. Elle voudrait la guerre. 

Deputes de tous les partis du Reichstag, depuis les conservateurs jusqu'aux socia- 
listes, et representant les contrees les plus differenles de l'Allemagne, universitaires 
de Berlin, de Halle, d'lena et de Marbourg, etudiauts, inslituteurs, employes de 
commerce, commis de banque, banquiers, artisans, commenjants, industriels, rae- 
decins, avocats,' redactcurs de journaux democrates et de journaux sociahstes, 
publicistes juifs, membres des syndicate ouvriers, pasteurs et boutiquiers de la 
Marche de Brandcbourg, hobereaux de Pomeranie el cordonniers de Stettin felaut 
le 5o5 e anniversaire de leur association, chatelains, fonctionnaires, cures et gros 
cultivateurs de Westphalie sont uuanimes sur ces deux points, sans nuances notables, 
selon les milieux et les partis. Voici la synlhese de toutes ces opinions : 

Le traite du /( novembre est une defaite diplomatique, une preuve de I incapacity 
de la diplomatie allemande et de l'incurie du Gouvernement, si souvent denoncees, 
la preuve que l'avenir de l'Empire nest pas assure sans un nouveau Bismarck, 
une humiliation nationale, une deconsideralion europeenne, une atleinte au prestige 
allemand, d'aulant plus grave que, jusqu'en 1911, la suprematie militaire de rAlle- 
magne etait incontestee et que 1'anarchie fran^aise, limpuissance de la Bepublique 
etaient une sorte de dogme allemand. 

En juillet 191 1, le « coup d'Agadir » posa vraiment, pour la premiere fois, la 
question marocaine comme une question nationale, important a la vie ft a l'expan- 
sion de 1'Empire. Les revelations et proces de presse qui suivirent out suffisamment 
demontre comment la campagne avait ete organisee, quelles convoitises panger- 
maniques elle avait allumees et quelles rancunes elle a laissees. Si 1'Empereur est 
discute, le Chancelier impopulaire, M. de Kiderlen, fut l'homme le plus hai de 
l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant d commence a n'etre plus que deconsidere, 
car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche. 

Done, pendant 1'ete de 1911, lopiiuon publique allemande se cabra en face de 
1'opinion fran^aise pour le Maroc. Et 1'attitude de la France, son calme tranquille, 
son unite morale refaite, sa resolution de faire valoir son droit jusqu'au bout, le 



— 16 — 

fait qu'elle a 1'insolence de n'avoir pas peur de la guerre, sont le plus constant, \& 
plus grave sujet d'inquietude et de mauvaise humeur de lopinion publique allemande. 

Pourquoi done 1'Allemagne n'a-t-elle pas fait la guerre pendant 1'ele de 1 9 1 1 , 
puisque lopinion publique, encore que moins unanime et resolue que 1'opinion 
franchise, y etait cependant favorable? Oulre la volonte pacifique de l'Empereur et 
du Chancelier, on fait valoir dans les milieux competents des raisons militaires et 
financieres. 

Mais ces evenements de 1911 ont cause line profonde desillusion en Allemagne. 
Une France nouvelle, unie, resolue, decidee a ne plus se Iaisser intimider, est 
sortie du suaire dans lequel on la contemplait s'ensevelissant depuis dix ans. Avec 
une surprise melee d'irritation , lopinion publique allemande a decouvert, de de- 
cembre a mai, a travers la presse de tons les partis qui reprocbaient au Gouvernement 
imperial son incapacity, sa lachete : que la vaincue de 1 870 n'avait cesse depuis de 
guerroyer, de promener en Asie et en Afrique son drapeau et le prestige de ses 
amies, de conquerir de vastes territoires; que 1'Allemagne avait vecu d'heroisme 
honoraire, que la Turquie est le seul pays oil elle ait fait, sous le regne de Guil- 
laume II, des conquetes morales, bien compromises maintenant par la bonle de la 
solution marocaine. Cbaque fois que la France faisait une conquete coloniale, on 
consolait cette meme opinion en disant « Oui, mais cela n'empeche pas la decadence, 
1'anarchie, la decomposition de la France a 1'interieur. » 

On se trompait, et on trompait I'opmion. 

Etant donne ces sentiments de lopinion publique allemande, qui tient la France 
pour belbqueuse, que peut-011 augurer de l'avenir au point de vue dune guerre pos- 
sible el prochaine? 

L'opinion publique allemande est divisee, sur la question de 1'eventualite d'une 
guerre possible et prochaine, en deux courants. 

Jl y a dans le pays des forces de paix , mais inorganiques et sans cbefs populaires. 
Elles considerent que la guerre serait un malheur social pour 1'Allemagne, que l'or- 
gueil de caste, la domination prussienne et les fabricants de canons et de plaques 
de cuirasses en tireraient le meilleur benefice, que la guerre profilerait surtout a 
J'Angleterre. 

Elles se decomposent ainsi qu'il suit : 

La masse prolonde des ouvriers, des artisans et des paysans qui sont pacifiques 
-d'inslinct. 

La noblesse degagee des interets de carriere militaire et engagee dans les affaires 
industrielles — tels les grands seigneurs de Silesie et quelques autres personnables 
ties influentes a la Cour — - et assez eclairee pour se rendre compte des consequences 
politiques et sociales desastreuses d'une guerre, meme victorieuse. 

Un grand nombre d'industriels, de commei\;ants et de financiers de moyenne 
importance, dont la guerre, meme victorieuse, amenerait la banqueroute, parce que 
leurs entreprises vivent de credit et sont surtout commanditees par des capitaux 
etrangers. 

Les Polonais, les Alsaciens-Lorrains, les habitants du Scblesvvig-Holstein conquis, 



— 17 _ 
fnais non assimiles, et en hostilite sourde contre la politique prussienne, soit environ" 
7 millions d'Ailemands annexes. 

Enfin, les Gouvernements et les classes dirigeantes des grands Etats du Slid, la 
Saxe, la Baviere, le Wurtemberg et le Grand-Duche de Bade, sont partages entre 
ce double sentiment : une guerre malbeureuse compromettrait la Confederation, 
dont ils ont tire de grands a vantages economiques; une guerre victorieuse ne profi- 
terait qu'a la Prusse et a la prussianisation, contre laquelle ils defendent avec 
peine leur independance politique et leur autonomie administrative. 

Ces elements preferent, par raison ou par instinct, la paix a la guerre; mais ce ne 
sont que des forces poliliques de contrepoids, dont le credit sur 1'opinion est limite, 
ou des forces sociales de silence, passives et sans defense contre la contagion d'une 
poussee belliqueuse. 

Uq exemple eclairera cette idee : les 1 1 o deputes socialistes sont des partisans 
de la paix. lis ne sauraient empecher la guerre, car elle ne depend pas d'un vote du 
Reiclistag, et, en presence de cette eventualite, le gros de leurs troupes ferait chorus 
dans la colere ou dans 1'enlhousiasme avec le reste du pays. 

II faut noter enfin que ces partisans de la paix dans la masse croient a la guerre, 
parce qu'ils ne voient pas de solution a la situation actuelle. Dans certains contrats, 
notamment dans les contrats d'editeurs, on a introduit la clause de resiliation en cas 
de guerre. Ils esperent cependant que la volonte de l'Empereur, d'une part, et les 
difficulles de la France an Maroc, d'autre part, sont pour quelque temps des garan- 
lies de paix. Quoi qu'il en soit, leur pessimisme laisse libre jeu aux partisans de la 
guerre. 

On parle quelquefois de parti militaire allemand. L'expression est inexacte, 
meme pour dire que I'Alleniagne est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir militaire, 
comme on dit que la France est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir civil. II y a 
un etal d'espritplus digne d'altenlion que ce fait historique, parce qui! constitue un 
■danger plus evident et plus prochain. II y a un parti de la guerre, avec des chefs, des 
troupes, une presse convaincue ou payee pour fabriquer 1'opinion, des moyens 
varies et redoutables pour intimider le Gouvernement. II agit sur le pays avec des 
idees claires, des sentiments ardents, une volonte fremissante et lendue. 

Les partisans de la guerre se divisent en plusieurs categories, chacun tire de sa 
caste, de sa classe, de sa formation intellectuelle et morale, de ses interets, de ses 
rancunes, des raisons particulieres qui creent en un etat d'esprit general et 
accroissent la force et la rapidite du courant belliqueux. 

Les uns veulent la guerre parce qu'elle est inevitable etant donnees les circon- 
stances actuelles. Et pour 1'AUemagne, il vaut mieux plus tot que plus tard. 

D'autres la considerent comme necessaire pour des raisons economiques tirees 
de la surpopulation, de la surproduction, du besoin de marches et de debouches; 
ou pour des raisons sociales : la diversion a l'exterieur peut seule empecher ou 
relardcr la montee vers le pouvoir des masses democratiques et socialistes. 

D'autres, insuffisamment rassures sur 1'avenir de 1'Empire , et croyant que le temps 
travaille pour la France, pensent qu'il faut precipiler i'evenement.. II n est pas rare de 
rencontrer, a la traverse des conversations ou des brochures patrioliques, le senti- 

Docdments DinoaiAiiQCES. — Cucrrc curopeeDne. 3 



— 18 — 
ment obscur, mais profond, qu'une Allemagne libre et une France ressuscitee sont 
deux fails historiques incompalibles. 

D'autres soul bclliqueux par » Bismarckisme », si Ton peut ainsi dire. lis se sentent 
humifies d'avoir a disculer avec des Francais, a parler droit, raisOn, dans des nego- 
ciations ou des conferences oil ils n'ont pas facilement eu toujours raison, alors 
qu'ils < > u t la force plus decisive, lis tirent dun passe recent un orgueil sans cesse 
alimente par des souvenirs vecus, par la tradition orale et par leslivres, et blesse 
par les evenements de ces dernieres annees. Le depit irrite caraclerise 1'esprit disso- 
ciation des « VVehrvereine » et autres groupements de la Jeune Allemagne. 

D'autres veulent la guerre par haine mystique de la France revolutionnaire. 
D'autres enfin, par rancune. Ce sont cesderniers qui amassent les pretexlcs. 

Dans la realite, ces sentiments se concretised ainsi : les hobereaux, representes 
au Reichstag par le parti conservateur, veulent eluder a tout prix l'impol sur les 
successions, inevitable si la paix se prolonge. Le Reichstag, dans la derniere seanoe 
de la session qui vient de se clore, en a vote le principe. C'est une atleinte grave aux 
interets et aux privileges de la noblesse terrienne. D'aUtre part, cette noblesse est 
une aristocratie militaire, et il est inslructif de comparer 1'annuaire de farmee avec 
I'annuaire de la noblesse. La guerre seule peut faire durer son prestige el servir ses 
interets familiaux. Dans la discussion de la loi militaire, un orateur du parti a fait 
valoir en faveur du vote la necessite de ravancement des olliciers. Enfin, cette classe 
sociale, qui forme une hierarchic dont le roi de Prusse est le couronnement 
supreme, constate avec terreur la democratisation lie I' Allemagne et la force grandis- 
sante du parti socialiste el considere que ses jours sont comptes. Non seulement ses 
interets maleriels sont menaces par un formidable mouvement hostile au protec- 
tionnisme agraire, mais encore sa representation politique diminue a chaque legisla- 
ture. Dans le Reichstag de 1878, i| y avait 162 membres (sur 397) appartenant a 
la noblesse; dans celui de 1898, 83; dans le Reichstag de 1912, 57. Sur ce der- 
nier nombre, 27 seulement siegenl a droite, \k au centre, 7 a gauche, un sur les 
bancs socialistes. 

La grande bourgeoisie, representee par le parti national liberal, parti des satis- 
faits, n'a pas les memes raisons que les hobereaux de vouloir la guerre. Elle esl belh- 
queuse cependant, sauf exceptions. Elle a ses raisons d'ordre social. 

La grande bourgeoisie n'est pas moins affligee que la noblesse de la democratisation 
de l'Allemagne. En 1871, elle avait 1 a5 representants au Reichstag; 1 53 en 187/1; 
99 en 1887; en 1912, 45. Elle n'oublie pas qu'ils jouerenl le grand role parlemen- 
laire au lenclemain de la guerre en servant les desseins de Bismarck contre les hobe- 
reaux. Aujourd'hui, mal assise entre des instincts conservateurs et des idees libe- 
rales, elle demande a la guerre des solutions que ne trouvent pas ses representants 
incapables el piloyables. En outre, les industriels doctrinaires professent que les 
difficulles qu'ils ont aveo leurs ouvriers ont leurs origines en France, loyer revolu- 
tionnaire des idees d'eniancipation — sans la France, l'industrie serait tranquille. 

Enfin, fabricants de canons el de plaques d'acier, grands marehands qui deman- 
dent de plus grands marches, banquiers qui speculcnt sur l'age d'or el la prochaine 
indemnite de guerre, pensent que la guerre serait une bonne affaire. 



— 19 — 

Parmi les « Bismarckiens » il faut compter les fonctionnaires de toutes carrieres, 
representees assez exactement au Reichstag par les conservateurs libres ou parti d'Em- 
pire, parli des retraites dont les idees fougueuses se deversent dans la Post. Ds 
font ecole et souche dans les groupements de jeunes gens dont 1'esprit a etc prepare 
et tendu par 1'ecole on l'universite. 

L'universite, exception faite pour quelques esprils distingues, developpe une 
ideologie guerriere. Les eebnomistes demontrent a coups de statistiques'Ia necessite 
pour 1'Allemagne d'avoir un empire colonial et commercial qui reponde au rende- 
ment Industrie) de FEmpire. II y a des sociologues fanatiques qui vont plus loin. La 
paix armee, disent-ils, est un ecrasant fardeau pour les nations, elle empeche 1'ame- 
lioration du sort des masses et favorise la poussee socialisle. La France, en s'obsti- 
n'ant a vouloir la revanche, s'oppose au desarmement. H faut une fois pour toutes 
la redmre a 1'impuissance pour un siecle, c'est la meilleure et la plus rapide faqon 
de resoudre la question sociale. 

Historiens, philosophes, publicistes politiques et autres apologistes de la » deutsche 
Kultur » veulent imposer au monde une maniere de sentir et de penser qui soit spe- 
cifiquement allemande. lis veident conquerir la suprematie intellectuelle qui, de 
l'avis des esprits lucides, reste a la France. C'est a cette source que s'alimente la 
phraseologie des pangermanistes comme aussi les sentiments et les contingents des 
Kriegcsvereine., des Wehrvereine et autres associations de ce genre, trop connues 
pour qu'il soit necessaire d'insister sur ce point. II convient de rioter seulement 
que le mecontentemcnt cause par le traite du !\ novembre a considerablement accru 
le nombre des membres des societes coloniales. 

II y a enfin les partisans de la guerre par rancune, par • ressentinient. Ce sont les 
plus dangereux. lis se recrutent surtout parmi les diplomates. Les diplomates alle- 
mands onl tres mauvaise presse dans 1'opinion publique. Les plus acharnes sont 
ceux qui, depuis ioo5, ont ete meles aux negociations entre la France et 1'Alle- 
magne; ils accumulenl et additionnent les griefs contre nous, et un jour, ils preseiv 
leront des comptes dans la presse belliqueuse. On a 1'impression que c'est surtout au 
Maroc qu'ds les chercheront, bien qu'un incident soit toujours possible sur tousles 
points du globe ou la France et 1'Allemagne sont en contact. 

II leur faut une revanche, car ils se plaignent d'avoir ete dupes. Pendant la discus- 
sion de la loi militaire, un de ces diplomates belliqueux declarait : « L'Allcmagne ne 
pourra causer serieusement avec la France que quand elle aura tous ses hommes 
vahdes sous les armes ». 

Comment s'engagera cette conversation? C'est une opinion assez repandue, 
meme dans les milieux pangermanistes, que 1'Allemagne ne declarerait pas la guerre, 
etant donne le systeme d'alliances defensives et les dispositions de 1'Empereur. Mais 
quand le moment sera venu, il devra, par tous les moyens, contraindre la France a 
1'altaquer. On 1'offensera, s'il le laut. C'est la tradition prussienne. 

Faut-il done tenir la guerre pour falale? 

II est peu probable que 1'Allemagne ose risquer 1'aventure, si la France peut faire 
aux yeux de 1'opinion la preuve decisive que 1'entente cordiale et l'alliance russe ne 
sont pas seulement des fictions diplomatiques, mais des reaiites qui existent et qui 



— 20 — 
joueront. La flotte anglaise inspire une salutaire terreur. Mais on sait bicn (|ue la vic- 
toire sur mer laissera tout en suspens, que e'est sur terre que se regleront les comptes 
decisifs. 

Quant a la Russie, si elle a dans l'opinion un poids plus considerable qu'il y a 
trois ou quatre ans, dans les milieux poliliques et militaires, on ne croit pas que 
son concours soit assez rapide et energique pour etre efficace. 

Les esprits s'habituent ainsi a considerer la prochaine guerre comme un duel enlre 
la France et 1'AIlemaene. 



N" 6. 

M. Jules Cambon-, Ambassadeur de la Republique franqaise a Berlin, 
a M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 22 novembre 1913. 

Je tiens d'une source absolument sure la relation d'une conversation que l'Empe- 
r.eur aufait cue avec le Roi des Beiges, en presence du Chef d'Elat-Major General 
de Moltke, il y a une quinzaine de jours, conversation qui aurait, parait-il, vivement 
frappe le Roi Albert; je ne suis nullement surpris de son impression, qui repond a 
celle que moi-meme je ressens depuis quelque temps : I'hoslilite conlre nous s'ac- 
centue el 1'Empereur a cesse d'etre partisan de la paix. 

L'interlocuteur de 1'Empereur d'AUemagne pensait jusqu'ici, comme tout le monde, 
que Guillaume II, dont 1'inllueuce personnelle s'etait exercee dans bien des circon- 
stances critiques au profit du maintien de la paix, etait toujours dans les memes 
dispositions d'esprit. Cette fois, il 1'aurait trouve completement change : 1'Empereur 
d'AUemagne n'est plus a ses yeux le champion de la paix contre les tendances belli- 
queuses de certains partis allemands. Guillaume II en est venu a penser que la guerre 
avec la France est inevitable et qu'd faudra en venir la un jour ou 1'autre. II croit 
naturellementa la superiorite ecrasante de I'armee allemande et a son succes certain. 

Le General de Moltke parla exactemeiu comme son souverain. Lui aussi, il declara 
la guerre necessaire et inevitable, mais il se montra plus assure encore du succes, 
« car, dit-il au Roi, cette fois, il faut en finir, et Voire Majeste ne peut se douter de 
1'enthousiasme irresistible qui, ce jour-la, enlrainerale peuple allemand tout entier-'. 

Le Roi des Beiges protests que c'elait travestir les intentions du Gouvernemenl 
francais que les traduire de la sorte el se laisser abuser sur les sentiments de la nation 
lranc,aise par les manifestations de quelques esprits exaltes ou d'intrigants sans 
conscience. 

L'Empereur et son Chef d'Elat-Major n'en persisterent pas moins dansleurmaniere 
de voir. 

Au cours de celte conversation 1'Empereur etait, du resle, apparu surmene et 
kritable. A mesure que les annees s'appesanlissent sur Guillaume II, les traditions 



— 21 — 

familiales, les sentiments retrogrades de !a Cour, et surtout 1'impatience des 
militaires prennent plus d'empire sur son esprit. Peut-etre eprouve-t-il on ne 
sail quelle jalousie de la popularile acquise. par son fils, qui llalte les passions 
des pangermanistes et ne trouve pas la situation de 1'Empire dans le monde 
egale a sa puissance. Peut-elre aussi la replique de la France a la derniere 
augmentation de 1'armee allemande, donl l'objet elait d'elablir sans conleste la supe- 
riorile germanique, est-elle pour quelque chose dans ces amerlumes, car, quoi qu'on 
dise, on sent qu'on ne pent gut-re aller plus loin. 

On peut se demander ce qu'il y a au fond de cette conversation. L'Empereur et 
son Chef d'Etat-Major General ont pu avoir pour objectif d'impressionner le Roi des 
Beiges et de le disposer a ne point opposer de resistance au cas oil un conflit avec 
.nous se produirait. Peut-etre aussi voudralt-on la Belgique moms hostile a cerlaines 
ambitions quise mamfeslent ici a propos du Congo beige, mais cette derniere hypo- 
these ne me parait pas concorder avec I'intervention du General de Mollke.. 

Au reste, 1'Empereur Guillaume est moins maitre de ces impatiences qu'on ne le 
croil comnumement. Je 1'ai vu plus d'une fois laisser echapper le fond de sa pensee. 
Quel qu'ait ete son objeclif dans la conversation qui m'a ete rapportee. la confidence 
n'en a pas moins le caraclere le plus grave. Elle correspond a la precarite de la situa- 
tion generale et a l'elat d'une cerlaine partie de l'opinion en France el en Allemagne. 

S'il metait pe'rmis de conduce, je dirais qu'il est bon de lenir compte de ce fait 
nouveau que 1'Empereur se familiarise avec un ordre d'idees qui lui repugnait autre- 
fois, et que, pour lui emprunler une loculion qu'il aime a employer, nous devons 
tenir notre poudre seche. 

Jules Cambon. 



— 23 



CHAPITKE II 
PRELIMINAIRES 



DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC IIERITIER 

(28 JUIN 1914) 

A LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE A LA SERBIE 

(23 JllLLET 1914) 



- 25 — 



N°7. 



M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur do France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des. Affaires etran- 

geres. 

Vienne, le 28 juin 1914. 

La nouvelle vient de parvenir a Vienne que I'Archiduc heritier d'Aulriclic et sa 
femme ont ele assassines aujourd'hui a Serajevo par un eludiant originaire de 
Grahovo. Quelques instants avant l'altentat auquel lis ont succombe, lis avaicut 
echappe a 1'explosion d'une bombe qui a blesse piusieurs olbciers de leur suite. 

L'Empereur, en ce moment a Ischl, en a ete aussitot avise tele^rapliiqiument. 

Dumaine. 



IN" 8. 

M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Vienne, h 3 juillet 191 i. 

Le crime de Serajevo suscite les plus vives rancunes dans les milieux mililaires 
autrichiens et chez tous ceux. qui ne se resignent pas a laisser la Serbie garder dans 
les Balkans le rang qu'elle a conquis. 

L'enquete sur les origines de 1'atlentat qu'on voudrait exiger du Gouvernement 
de Belgrade dans des conditions intolerables pour sa dignite, fournirait, a la suite 
d'un refus, le grief permettant de proceder a une execution militaire. 

Dumaine. 



N°9. 

M. de Manneville, Charge d'affaires de France a Berlin, 

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 

geres. 

Berlin, le !x juillet 1914. 

Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres ma dit hier, et a repete aujour- 
d'hui a 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, qu'il esperait que la Serbie dounerait satisfaction 
aux demandes que 1'Autriche pouvait avoir a lui adresser en vue de la recherche et de 
la poursuite des complices du crime de Serajevo. II a ajoute qu'il avait confiance quit 
en serait ainsi parce que la Serbie , si elle agissait autrement , aurait contre elle l'opinion 
de tout le monde civilise. 

Le Gouvernement allemand ne parait done pas partager les inquietudes qui se 
manifestent dans une partie de la presse allemande au sujet d'une tension possible 
des rapports entre les Gouvernements de Vienne et de Belgrade, ou du moius il n« 
veut pas en avoir lapparence. 

de Manneville. 



N° 10. 

M. Paleologoe, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbonrg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Sainl-Petersbourg, 6juillet 1 9 1 4. 

Au cours d'un entretien qu'il avait term a avoir avec le Charge d'aflaires d'Autriche- 
Hongrie, M. SazonolT a signale amicalement a ce diplomate liintation inquietante 
que les attaques de la presse autricbienne contre la Serbie risquent de produire dans 
son pays. 

Le Comte Czernin ayant laisse entendre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois 



— 27 — 
serait peut-etre oblige de rechercher sur le territoire serbe les instigateurs de 1'attentat 
de Serajevo, M. Sazonoff 1'interrompit : « Aucun pays plus que la Russie, a-t-il dit, 
n'a eu a souffrir des attentats prepares sur territoire etranger. Avons-nous jamais 
pretendu employer contre un pays quelconque les precedes dont vos journaux 
menacent la Serbie? Ne vous engagez pas dans cette voie ». 
Puisse cet avertissement n'etre pas perdu. 

Paleologue. 



N° 11. 

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, Consul general de France a Budapest, 

a M. ReneViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 

geres. 

Budapest, le il juillet 1914. 

Interpelle a la Chambre sur 1'etat de la question austro-serbe , M. Tisza a declare 
qu'il fallait avant toute cbose attendre le resultat de l'enquete judiciaire, dont il s'est 
refuse pour 1'instant a reveler quoi que ce soit. Et la Chanibre l'a approuve haute- 
ment. II s'est montre tout aussi discret sur les decisions prises dans la reunion des 
ministres a Vienne, et n'a pas iaisse deviner si on donnerait suite au projet de 
demarche a Belgrade dont les journaux des deux mondes ont retenti. La Chambre 
s'est inclinee derechef. 

En ce qui concerne cette demarche, il semble qu'il y ait un mot d'ordre pour en 
attenuer la portee : la colere hongroise s'est comme evaporee a travers les articles 
virulents de la presse , unanime maintenant a deconseiller ce pas qui pourrait etre 
dangereux. Les journaux officieux notamment voudraient que 1'on substituat a ce 
mot de « demarche", aux apparences comminatoires, le terme qui leur parait plus 
amical et plus poli de « pourparlers ». Ainsi, officiellement, pour le quart d'heure, 
tout est a la paix. 

Tout est a la paix, dans les journaux. Mais le gros public ici croit a la guerre et la 
craint. Et par ailleurs, des personnes en qui j'ai toute raison d'avoir confiance m'ont 
affirme savoir que chaque jour des canons et des munitions etaient diriges en masse 
vers la frontiere. Vrai ou non, ce bruit ma ete rapporte de divers cotes avec des 
details concordanls; il indique au moins quelles sont les preoccupations generates 
Le Gouvernement, soit qu'il veuille sincerement la paix, soit qu'il prepare un coup, 



— 28 — 
fait maintenant tout son possible pour calmer ces inquietudes. Et c'est pourquoi le. 
ton des journaux gouvernementaux a baisse d'une note, puis de deux, pour etre i 1 
1'heure actuelle presque optimiste. Mais ils avaient eux-memes propage 1'alarme 
a plaisir. Leur optiniisme de commande est actuellement sans echo, la nervosite de 
la Bourse, barometre que Ion ne saurait negliger, en est une preuve certaine; les 
valeurs sans exception sont tombees a des coins invraisemblablement bas; la rente 
bongroise 4 o/o etait colee hier 79,95, cours qui n'a jamais ete cote depuis la pre- 
miere emission. 

d'Apchier le Maugin. 



N° 12. 

M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Vienne, te 1 5 juillot 1914. 

Certains organes de la presse viennoise, discutant 1'organisation militaire de la 
France et de la Russie, presentent ces deux pays comme hors d'etat de dire leur mot 
dans les affaires europeennes, ce qui assurerait a la nionarchie dualiste, soutenue 
par 1'Allemagne, d'appreciables facilites pour soumettre la Serbie au regime qu'il 
plairait de lui imposer. La Militdrische Rundschau 1'avoue sans ambage. « L'instant 
nous est encore favorable. Si nous ne nous decidons pas a la guerre, celle que nous 
devrons faire dans deux ou trois ans au plus tard s'engagera dans des circonstances 
beaucoup moins propices. Actuellement, c'est a nous qu'appartient 1'initiative : la 
Russie n'est pas prete, les facteurs moraux et le bon droit sont pour nous, de meme 
que la force. Puisqu'un jour nous devrons accepter la lutte, provoquons-la tout de 
suite. Notre prestige, notre situation de grande Puissance, notre bonueur sont en 
question : plus encore, car vraisemblablement il s'agirait de notre existence, d'etre 
ou ne pas etre, ce qui reellement est aujourd'hui la grande affaire. » 

En rencherissant sur elle-meme, la Neue Frcie Presse de ce jour s'en prend au 
Comte Tisza de la moderation de son second discours, oil il a dit : « nos relations 
avec la Serbie auraient toutefois besoin d'etre clarifiees ». Ces mots provoquent son 
indignation. Pour elle, 1'apaisement, la securite ne peuvent resulter que d'une guerre 
au couleau contre le panserbisme, el c'est au nom de 1'humanite quelle reclame lex- 
termination de la maudite race serbe. 

Dumaine. 



— 29 — 



N° 13. 

M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene: Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etraa- 

geres. 

Vienne. 1 9 juillet 191^. 

Le Chancelie.r du Consulat qui m'a remis son rapport semestnel resumant les fails 
divers d'ordre economique qui out fait 1'objet de ses etudes depuis le debut de 
l'annee, y a joint une partie d'information politique provenant dune source serieuse. 

Je 1'ai prie de rediger brievement les renseignements qu'il a recueillis sur la remise 
prochaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, que les journaux annoncent depuis 
quelques jours avec insi stance. 

Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte de cette note d'information, mteressante en 
raison de sa precision. 

Dumaine. 



N° 14. 

Note. 
{Extrait d'un rapport consulaire sur la situation economique et politique en Autriche.) 

Vienne, le 20 juillet 1914. 

II resulte de renseignements fournis par une personnalite particulierement au 
courant des nouvelles officielles que le Gouvernement fran^ais aurait tort de s'en 
rapporter aux semeurs d'optimisme : on exigera beaucoup de la Serbie, on lui 
imposera la dissolution de plusieurs societes de propagande , on la sommera de 
reprimer le nalionalisme, de surveiller la frontiere en collaboration avec des com- 
missaires autricbiens, de faire la police des ecoles au point de vue de l'espril anti- 
autrichien, et il est bien difficile qu'un Gouvernement acceple de se faire ainsi le 
sergent de ville d'un Gouvernement etranger. On compte avec les echappaloires par 
lesquelles la Serbie voudra sans doute esquiver une reponse claire et directe; c'est 



— 30 — 
pourquoi on lui fixera peul-etre un delai bref pour declarer si elle accepte oui ou 
non. La teneur de la Nolo et son allure imperative garantissent presque surement 
que Belgrade refusera. Alors, on operera militairement. 

II y a ici, el pareillement a Berlin, un clan qui accepte 1'idee du conflita dimen- 
sions generahsees, en d'autres termes, la conflagration. L'idee directrice est pro- 
bablement qu'd faudrait marcher avant que la Bussie ait terrnine ses grands perfec- 
tionnements de l'armee et des voies ferrees, et avant que la France ait mis au point 
son organisation militaire. Mais ici, il n'y a pas accord dans les hautes spheres : du 
cote du comte Berchtold et des diploma tes, on voudrait lout au plus utie operation, 
localisee contre la Serbie. Mais tout doit etre envisage comme possible. On signale 
un fait singulier : generalement 1'agence telegraphique officielle, dans ses resumes 
et revues de presse etrangere, ne tient compte que des journaux ollicieux et des 
organes les plus importants; elle omet toule citation, toute mention des autres. 
C'est une regie et une tradition. Or, depuis une dizaine de jours, 1'agence offi- 
cielle fournit quotidienuement a la presse d'Autriche-Hongrie une revue complete 
de toute la presse serbe, en donnant une large place aux journaux les plus ignores, 
les plus petits et insignifiants, qui par cela meme out un langage plus libre, plus 
hardi, plus agressif et souvent injurieux. Ce travail de l'Agence officielle a visible- 
ment pour but d'exciter le sentiment public et de creer une opinion favorable a la 
guerre. Le fait est siirnificatif. 



X I"). 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

.1 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 21 juillet 1914. 

II me revient que le representant de la Serbie a Berlin aurait fait hier une 
demarche a la \\ ilhelmstrasse pour dire que son Gouvernement etait pret a accueillir 
ia requete de 1'Aulriche motivee par l'altentat de Serajevo, pourvu qu'elle ne 
demandat que des concours judiciaires en vue de la repression et de ia prevention 
des attentats politiques, mais il aurait etc charge de prevenir le Gouvernement 
allemand qu'il serait dangereux de chercher par cette enquete a porter atteinte au 
prestige de la Serbie. 

Confidentiellement, je puis dire egalement a Votre Excellence que le Charge 
d'affaires de Russie, a l'audience diplomatique d'aujourd'hui, a parle de cette ques- 



— 31 — 
tion a M. de Jagow. II lui a dit qu'il supposait que le Gouvernement allemand con- 
naissait actuellement tres bien la Note preparee par 1'Autriche et etait par suite a 
meme de dormer 1'assurance que les difficultes austro-serbes seraient localisees. Le 
Secretaire d'Etat a proteste qu'il ignorait absolument le contenu de cette Note et s'est 
exprime de meme avec moi. Je n'ai pu que m'etonner d'une declaration aussi peu 
conforme a ce que les circonstances conduisent a penser. 

II m'a ete assure d'ailleurs que, des mainlenant, les avis preliminaires de mobili- 
sation qui doivent mettre 1'Allemagne dans une sorte de « garde a vous » pendant les 
epoques de tension, ont ete adresses ici aux classes qui doivent les recevoir en pareil 
cas. C'est la une mesurg ii laquelle les Allemands, etant donne leurs habitudes, 
peuvent recourir sans s'exposer a des indiscretions et sans emouvoir la population. 
Elle ne revet pas un caractere sensationnel , et nest pas forcemeat suivie de mobili- 
sation effective ainsi que nous 1'avons deja vu, mais elle n'en est pas moins signifi- 
cative. 

Jules Cambon. 



N° 16. 

M. Bienyenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. , 
a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, ic 21 juillet igi4. 

J'attire specialement votre allenlion sur des informations que je re^ois de Berlin : 
TAmbassadeur de France signale 1' extreme faiblesse de la Bourse de Berlin d'hier, et 
1'attribue aux inquietudes que la question serbe commence a provoquer. 

M. Jules Cambon a des raisons tres serieuses de croire que lorsque lAutriche fera 
i Belgrade la demarche qu'elle juge necessaire a la suite de 1'attentat de Seraievo, 
lAllemagne l'appuiera de son autorite, sans chercher a jouer un role de mediation. 

Bienvenu-VIartin. 



- 32 - 



N° 17. 



M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, 
Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, If 2? juillct 191 4. 

M. Jules Cambon ayant interroge M. de Jagovv sur la leneur de la Note autri- 
chienne a Belgrade, ce dernier lui a repondu qu'il n'en connaissait nullement le 
libelle ; notre Ambassadeur en a marque toute sa surprise. II constate que la baisse de 
la Bourse de Berlin conlinue et que des nouvelles pessimistes circulent." 

M. Barrere a egalement enlretenu de la menie question le Marquis de San Gin- 
liano, qui s'en montre inquiet et assure qu'il agit a Vienne pour qu'il ne soit demande 
a la Serbie que des clioses realisables, par exemple la dissolution du Club bosniaque 
ct non une enquete judiciaire sur les causes de l'altentat de Serajevo. 

Dans les circonstances presentcs, la supposition la plus favorable qu'on puisse faire 
est que le Cabinet de Vienne, se sentant deborde par sa presse ct par le parti mili- 
taire, cberche a obtenir le maximum de la Serbie par une intimidation prealable, 
directe et indirecte, et s'appuie sur l'Allemagne a cet effet. 

J'ai prie 1'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne d'user de toute son influence sur le 
Comte Bercbtold pour lui representee dans une conversation amicalc, combien la 
moderation du Gouvernement autnehien serait appreciee en Europe, et quelle 
repercussion risquerait d'avoir une pression brutale sur la Serbie. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



!N° 18. 

M. Duviaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Bilnvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le 11 juillet 19 i4. 

On ne sait rien en,coie des decisions que le Comte Bercbtold, prolongeant son 
sejour a Ischl, tente d'obtenir de l'Empereur. On attribuait au Gouvernement l'inten- 



— 33 — 
tion d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur envers la Serbie, d'en finir avec elle, «de la 
traiter comme une autre Pologne ». Huit corps d'armee seraient prets a entrer en 
campagne, mais M. Tisza, tres inquiet de 1'agitation en Croatie, serait intervenu acti- 
vement dans un sens moderateur. 

En tous cas, on croit que la d-marche a Belgrade aura lieu cette seuiaine. Les de- 
mandes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois relativement a la repression de 1'attentat 
ct a certaines garanties de surveillance et de police paraissent acceptables pour la 
dignite des Serbes; M. Jovanovich croit qu'elles scront accueillies. M. Pacbitch desire 
un arrangement pacifique, mais se declare pret a toute resistance. II a conOance 
dans la force de 1'armee serbe ; il compte, en outre, sur 1'uuion de tous les Slaves de 
la Monarchie pour paralyser leffort dirige contre son pays. 

A moins dun aveuglement absolu, on devrait reconnaitre ici qu'un coup de force 
a les plus grandes chances d'etre funeste, aussi bien aux troupes austro-hongroises 
qu'a la cohesion deja si compromise des nationalites gouvernees par 1'Empereur. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne, M. de Tchirsky, se montre partisan des resolutions 
violentes, tout en laissant volontiers entendre que la Chancellerie impdriale ne serait 
pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, parti hier 
pour la campagne, en raison des declarations rassurautes qui lui ont ete faites au 
Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, m'a confie que son Gouvernement n'aura pas d'ob- 
jection contre des demarches visant la punition des coupables et la dissolution des 
associations notoirement revolutionnaires, mais ne pouvait admettre des exigences 
humiliantes pour le sentiment national serbe. 

DOUAINE. 



N°19. 

M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France a Londres , 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 2 2juillet 1914. 

Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des impressions recueillies par notre 
Ambassadeur a Berlin, relativement aux consequences de la demarche que le Gou- 
\erncment auslro-hongrois se propose de faire a Belgrade. 

Ccs impressions m'ont ete confirmees par une conversation que j'ai eue hier avec 
le Principal Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres. Sir E. Grey m'a dit avoir 
recula visite de 1'Ambassadeurd'AUemagne, qui lui a declare qu'a Berlin on s'attendait 
a une demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres du Gouvernement serbe. 
Le Prince Lichnowski a assure que le Gouvernement allemand s'employait a retenir 
cl a moderer le Cabinet de Vienne, mais que jusqu'a present il n'y reussissait pas et 
qu'il n'etait pas sans inquietude sur les suites d'une telle demarche. Sir E. Grey a re- 

Doccments diplouatiqdes. — Ciii-rre curopeconc S 



— 34 — 
pondu au Prince Lichnowski qu'il voulait croire qu'avant d'intervenir a Belgrade, ie 
Gouvemement austro-hongrois se serait bien renseigne sur les circonstances du com- 
plot dont 1'archiduc heritier et la duchesse de Hohenberg ont ete victimes, se serait 
assure que le Gouvemement serbe en ayait eu connaissance et n'avait pas fait tout ce 
qui dependait de lui pour en prevenir les effets. Car s'il ne pouvait pas etre prouve 
que la responsabilite du Gouvemement serbe fiit imphquee dans une certaine mesure , 
I'intervention du Gouvemement austro-hongrois ne se justifierait pas et souleverait 
contre lui 1'opinion europeenne. 

La communication du Prince Lichnowski avait laisse Sir E. Grey sous une impres- 
sion d'inqui£tude qu'il ne m'a pas dissimulee. La meme impression m'a ete donnee. 
par 1'Ambassadeur d'llalie qui redoute, lui aussi, l'eventualite dune nouvelle ten- 
sion des rapports austro-serbes. 

Ce matin, j'ai recu la visile du Minisfre de Serbie, qui partage egalement les ap- 
prehensions de Sir E. Grey. II craint que l'Autriche ne' mette le Gouvemement 
serbe en presence d'une demande que la dignite de celui-ci et surtout la suscepti- 
bilite de 1'opinion publique ne lui permettent pas d'accueillir sans protestation. 
Comme je lui objectais le calme qui parait regner a Vienne et dont temoignent tous 
les Ambassadeurs accredites dans cette capitale, ll m'a repondu que ce calme officiel 
n'elait qu'apparent et recouvrait les dispositions les plus foncierement hostiles contre 
la Serbie. Or, a-t-il ajoute, si ces dispositions viennent a se manifester par une de- 
marche depourvue de la mesure desirable, il y aura lieu de tenir compte de 1'opinion 
publique serbe, surexcitee par les mauvais procedes dont l'Autriche a abreuve ce 
pays et rendue moins patiente par le souvenir encore tout frais de deux guerres vic- 
torieuses. Malgre les sacrifices dont la Serbie a paye ses recentes victoires, elle peut 
mettre encore sur pied 4oo,ooo hommes et 1'opinion publique, qui le sait., n'est pas 
disposee i tolerer une humiliation. 

Sir E. Grey dans un eotretien avec rAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie l'a prie 
de recommander a son Gouvemement de ne pas s'ecarter de la prudence et de la 
moderation necessaires pour eviter de nouvelles complications, de ne demander a 
la Serbie que des mesures auxquelles celle-ci puisse raisonnablement se preter et 
de ne pas se laisser entrainer an dela. 

Paul C\MbON. 



— 35 - 

N° 20. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 
a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg et Rome. 

Paris, le 2 3 juillet 191 i. 

Les premieres intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avaient ete, selon les 
informations recueillies par 1'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, d'agir avec la plus 
grande rigueur contre la Serbie, en tenant huit corps d'armee prets a entrer en 
campagne. 

Ses dispositions actuelles seraient plus conciliantes : en reponse a une question 
que lui posait M. Dumaine , a qui j'avais present d'appeler 1'attention du Gouvernement 
autrichien sur les inquietudes eveillees en Europe, le baron Macchio a affirme a 
notre Ambassadeur que le ton et les demandes qui seront formulees dans la note 
autrichenne permettent de compter sur un denouement pacilique. Je ne sais quelle 
foi il faut accorder a ces assurances, en raison des habitudes de la chancellerie im- 
periale. 

Dans tous les cas, la note autricliienne sera remise dans un tres bref delai. Le 
Ministre de Serbie estime que M. Pachitch acceptera, par desir d'un arrangement, 
les demandes relatives a la repression de l'attentat et a des garanties de surveillance 
et de police , mais qu'il resistera a ce qui attenterait a la souverainete et a la dignite 
de son pays. 

Dans les cercles diplomatiques de Vienne, 1'Ambassadeur dAUemagne preconise 
des resolutions violentes, tout en convenant que peut-elre la Chancellerie impe- 
riale n'est pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point; 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, 
se fiant aux assurances qui lui ont ete donnees, s'est absente de Vienne et a confie, 
avant son depart, a M. Dumaine, que son Gouvernement n'elevera pas d'objections 
contre la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations revolutionnaires, 
mais qu'il ne pourrait tolerer des exigences humiliantes pour le sentiment national de 
la Serbie. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N° 21. 

M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Munich, le 2 3 juillet 1914* 

La presse bavaroise parait croire qu'une solution pacifique de 1'incident au'stro- 
serbe est non seulement possible, mais meme vraisemblable; dans les spheres offi- 



— 36 — 

cielles, au contrairc, on aflecle, depuis quelque temps, avec plus ou rnoins de since- 
rity, un reel pessimisme. 

Le President dn Conseil nolamment m'a dil aujourd'hui que la note aulricliienne, 
donl il avait connaissancc , etait, i son avis, redigoe dans des termes acceptables pour 
Ja Serbie, mais que la situation actuelle ne lui en paraissait pas moins ties serieuse. 

Alluc. 



37 — 



CHAPITRE III 

LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA REPOINSF SERBE 

DU VENDRED1 24 JLILLET AU SAMEDI 25 JUIL1 ET) 



— 39 — 



IV 2'2. 

M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Je vons serais oblige de Iransmettre d'urgence a M. Dumaine les informations et 
instructions suivantes : 

Reval, ie 2 4 juillet 1914, a 1 hcure du matin. 

Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres russe, nous 
avons ete amenes a envisager les dangers qui pourraient resulter d'une demarche 
eventuelle de 1'Autriche-Hongrie a 1'egard de la Serbie, relativement a 1'attentat dont 
a ete victime 1'archiduc heritier. Nous sommes tombes d'accord pour penser qu'il 
convenait de ne rien negliger pour prevenir une demande d'explications ou quelque 
mise en demeure qui equivaudraient a une intervention dans les affaires interieures 
de la Serbie, et que celle-ci pourrait considerer comme une atteinte a sa souverai- 
nete et a son independance. 

En consequence, nous avons estime qu'il y avait lieu, dans une conversation amicale 
avecle ComteBerchtold, delui donner des conseils de moderation, propres a lui faire 
comprendre combien serait mal inspiree une intervention a Belgrade, oil Ion pourrait 
voir une menace de la part du Cabinet de Vienne. 

L'Anibassadeur dAngleterre, mis au courant par M. Sazonovv, a exprime 1'idee 
que son Gouvernement se joindrait sans doute a une demarche tendant a ecarter un 
danger qui peut menacer la paix generale, et a telegraphie dans ce sens a son Gou- 
vernement. 

M. Sazonow a adresse des instructions a cet efiet i M. Schebeko. Sans qu'il s'agisse 
ici d'une action collective ou concertee des representants de la Triple Entente a 
Vienne, je vous prie de vous entretenir de la question avec les Ambassadeurs de 
Russie et dAngleterre, et de vous entendre avec eux sur le meilleur moyen , pour 
chacun de vous, de faire entendre sans retard au Comte Berchtold les conseils de 
moderation que nous parait reclamer la situation presente. 

J'ajoute qu'il y aurait lieu de prier M. Paul Cambon de faire valoir aupres de Sir 
E. Grey l'utilite de cette demarche , et d'appuyer la suggestion que l'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre en Russie a du presenter 4 cet effet au Foreign Office. Le Comte Benc- 
kendorfi est charge de faire une recommandation analogue. 

Rene VrviAM. 



— 40 — 



I\° 23. 



M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France. 

Paris, le 24 jnillet lgii. 

J'ai transmis d'urgence a" Vienne vos instructions, niais il resulte des informations 
de presse de ce matin que la Note autrichienne a ele remise hier soir a six heures a 
Belgrade. 

Cette note, dont 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie ne nous a pas encore remis 
le texte officiel. parait tres accenluee; elle tendrait non seulement a obtenir la pour- 
suite des Serbes meles direclement a latlenlat de Serajevo, mais demanderait la 
repression immediate dans la presse et dans 1'armee serbe de toute propagande anti- 
autrichienne. Elle donnerait jusqu'a samedi soir, a six beures, a la Serbie pour 
s'executer. 

En transmettant vos instructions a M. Dumaine, je l'ai prie de se concerter avec 
ses collegues anglais et russe. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N° 24. 
Texte de la Note auliichienne. 

(Notecommuniqute par leComte Szecsen, Ambassadeur d'AutricheHongrie, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., le vendredi 2 !x juillet 1914, a 10 h. 1/2 du matin.) 

Vienne, le 2 4 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi 2 3 juillet cou- 
rant, par 1'entremise du Ministre imperial et royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au 
Gouvernement royal de Serbie : 

.. Le 3 1 mars 1 909 le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouver- 
nement au Gouvernement imperial et royal la declaration suivante : 

•> La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinle dans ses droits par le fait accompli 
cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision 
que les Puissances prendront par rapport a 1'article XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se ren- 
dant aux conseils des grandes puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a abandonner 
1'attitude do protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de lannexion 
depuis i'aulotnne dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique 
actuelle envers 1'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied 
d'un bon voisinage. » 



— 41 — 

Or, 1'hisloire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux du 
28 juin ont demontre l'existcnce en Serbie d'un mouvemont subversif dont le but est 
de detacher de la Monarchie auslro-bongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce 
mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe est arrive a se 
manifester au deli du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une se'rie 
d'atlenlats et par des meurlres. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satislaire aux engagements formels contenus 
dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement. 
II a tolere 1'aclivile criminelle des difierentes socieles et affiliations dirigees contre la 
Monarcbie, le langage eU'rene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'altentals, la 
participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une 
propagandc malsaine dans linstruclion publique, tolere enlin toutes les manifestations 
qui pouvaient induice la population serbe a la haine dc la Monarchie et au mepris 
de ses institutions. 

Cettc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas ccsse au 
moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les 
consequences funestcs. 

II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs cnminels de l'attentat du 28 juin 
que le meurtre de Serajevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont 
les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonc- 
tionnaires serbes faisant parlie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en 
Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organise et eflectue par des chefs du 
service-frontiere serbe. 

Les resultats mentionnes de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement im- 
perial et royal de poursuivre plus Iongtemps l'attilude de longanimite expectative 
qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade, 
et propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie r res resultats lui imposent au 
contraire le devoir de metlre fin a des nienecs qui forment une menace perpetuelle 
pour la tranquillile de la Monarchie. 

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement imperial et royal se voit oblige 
de demander au Gouvernement serbe I'enonciation olficielle qu'il condamne la pro- 
pagande dirigee contre la Monarchie auslro-bongroise, e'est-a-dire 1'ensemble des 
tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarcbie des territoires qui 
en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par lous les moyens, cette propagande 
criminelle el lerroriste. 

Afin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet engagement le Gouvernement roval de 
Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal ojpcicl en date du 13/2G juillet 
I'enonciation suivante : 

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tolerances qui aspirent en dernier lieu 
a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il 
deplore sincerement les consequences funesles de ces agissements criminels. 

Le Gouveriiement royal regrelte que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient 
participe a la propagande sus mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon 

Docdments DlPLOMATlQtES. — Guerre europtennc. 6 



- 42 — 
voisinage auquel le Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellement engage par ses decla- 
rations du 3 i mars 1909. 

Le Gouvernement royal qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'im- 
mixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que 
ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les ofliciers, les lonctionilaires 
et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere- 
rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, 
agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » 

Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de larrnee royale 
par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesle le Roi et sera pubhee dans le BulLiin ojjiciel de 
I'armce. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage en outre : 

1° A supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Mo- 
narchie, et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrite territoriale. 

2° A dissoudre immediatement la societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer, 
tous ses moyens de propagande, et a proceder de la meme maniere contre les autres 
societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement royal preudra les mesures necessaires pour que 
les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous uu autre noui et sous 
uiie autie forme. 

3" A eliminer sans delai de 1'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui con- 
cerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait 
servir a fomenter la propagande contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie. 

^i" A eloigner du service militaire et de l'adrninistration en general tous les offi- 
ciers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hon- 
groise et dont le Gouvernement imperial et royal se reserve de comiuuniquer les 
horns et les faits au Gouvernement royal. 

5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial 
et royal dans h suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre l'inlegrite territo- 
riale de la Monarchie. 

6° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se 
trouvant sur lerritoire serbe; des organes di'legu^s par le Gouvernement imperial et 
royal prendront part aUx recherches y relatives. 

7° A proceder d'urgence a 1'arrestation du commaudant Voija Tankosic et du 
nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de 1'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de 
1'instruction de Serajevo. 

8" A empeeher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autoriles serbes dans 
le tralic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; 

A licencier et punir sevefetncnl les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Scliabatz 
et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facili- 
iant le passage de la frontiere. 

9° A donner au. Gouvernement imperial et royal. des explications sur les propos 



— 43 — 

injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qua 1'etranger qui, malgre 
leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres i'attentat du 28 juin de s'expnmer dans 
des interwiews dune maniere hostile envers la Monarchic austro-hongroise. Enfin; 

lo° D'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement imperial et royal de i'execution des 
mesures comprises dans les points precedents. 

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la reponse du Gouvernement royal au 
plus tard jusqu'au samedi 2 5 de ce mois a cinq heures du soir (1). 

Un memoire concernant les resultats de 1'instruction de Serajevo a 1'egard des 
fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexfe a cette note. 

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter voire Excellence de vouloir bien porter le contenu de cette 
Note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, en 
accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici : 

Le 3 1 mars i 909 le Gouvernement royal serbe a adresse a rAutriche-Hongrie la 
declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. 

Le lendemain meme de cette declaration , la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique 
tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, 
limilrophes a la Serbie. 

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle : 

Des socictes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soil 
clandestinement, etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le territoire austro-hon- 
grois. Ces societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des 
diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref, les sommites du monde 
officiel et inofliciel du royaume. 

Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service de cette propagande, 
dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la 
presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie voisine 
ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa surete et son integrite. 

Un grand nombre d'agents est appele a soutenir par tons les moyens 1'agitation 
contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse 
de ces pays. 

L'esprit conspirateur des poliliciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume 
portent les sanglantes cmpreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise 
balkanique; des individus ayant fait parlie des bandes jusque-li occupees en Mace- 
doine, sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Au- 
triche-Hongrie. 



(1) L'Amkissadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a adresse au Ministre des AITaires elrangeres, par lellre parti- 
culicre, la rectification suivante, dans la journee du 2i juillet : «Dans )a enpie de ta depeclie que j'ai eu 
t'honncur de remettre ce matin a Voire Excellence, il etail dit que mon Gouvernement attendait la reponse 
du Cabinet de Belgrade au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 2 - 5 de ce mois a cinq heures du soir. Notre Ministre 
a Belgrade n'ayant remis sa note hier qu',i six heures du soir, le delai pour la reponse se trouve proroge 
de ce fait jusqu'a demain samedi six heures du soir. 

■ « J'ai cru de mon devoir d'informer Votre Excellence de cette legere modification dans Texpii-ation du 
delai fixe pour la reponse du Gouvernement serJ>e. 

6. 



— Ilk — 

En presence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriclie-Hongrie est exposee dcpuis 
des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre 
mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait 
la declaration solennelle du 3i mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contra- 
diction avec la volonte de l'Europe et avec 1'engagement qu'il avail pris vis-a-vis de 
l'Autriclie-Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement imperial et royal a legard de l'altitude provo- 
catrice de la Serbie etait inspiree du desmteressement territorial de la Monarchie 
austro-bongroise et de 1'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait lout de meme par 
apprecier a sa juste valeur l'amitie de I'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une altitude 
bienveillante pour les interets poliliques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement imperial et 
roval espdrait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cole une ligne 
de conduite analogue. L'Aulriche-Hongrie s'allendail surloul a une pareille evolution 
dans les idees poliliques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de 1'annee 1912, 
le Gouvernement imperial el royal rendit possible, par une attitude desintcressee et 
sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. 

Cetle bienveillance manifestee par l'Autriclie-Hongrie a l'egard de 1'Elat voisin n'a 
cependant aucunement modifie les precedes du royaume, qui a continue a lolerer 
sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestoes 
au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour oil 1'heritier presomplif de la Monarchie et 
son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de eel elat de choses, le Gouvernement imperial et royal a du se 
decider a enlreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener 
le Gouvernement serbe a arreter le mouvement incendiaire menacant la surete et 
1'integrite de la Monarchie auslro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est persuade qu'en entreprenanl cette demarche, 
il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de loules les nations civilisees qui ne 
sauraienl admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune- 
ineiil dans la littte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut continuellement troublee 
par les agissements partant de Belgrade. 

C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement imperial et royal tient a la 
disposition du Gouvernement de la Republique franchise un dossier elucidant les 
menees serbes el les rapports exislant enlre ces menees et le meurlre du 28 juin. 

I omrnunicalion identique est adressee aux representanls imperiaux et royaux 

aupres des autres Puissances signataires. 

Vous etes aulorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le 
Ministrc des Affaires etrangeres. 



Annexe. 



L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gravillo Princip et 
consorts du chel d'assassinat et de complicite y relative-, crime commis par eux le 28 jum 
dernier, a jusqu'ici abouli aux conslatalions suivantes : 



— lib — 

1° Le complot ayant pour hut d'assassiner, lors de son sejour ;'i Serajevo, i'archiduc 
Francois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par Gravillo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le 
nommiS Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant VoijaTankosic. 

2° Les six bombes et les qualre pistolcts Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels 
les malfaiteurs ont commis 1'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et 
Grabez par le nomine Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 

3° Les bombes sont des grenades J main provenant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe 
a Kragujevaks. 

W Pour assurer la reussite de 1'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et 
Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir 
a Topschider, des lemons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et a Grabez. 

5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie- 
Herzegovine et d'y introduiie clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, tin systeme de 
transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. 

D'apres cette organisation, l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des mallaiteurs et de 
ieurs amies fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Sabac (Popovic) et de Loznica, 
ainsi que par le douanier Budivoj Grbic de Loznica, avec le concours de divers particuliers. 



N° 25 

M. BiE?(VEi\u-MARTiN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France, et a 
Londres, Berlin, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Belgrade. 

Paris, le i!i juillet igia\ 
J'ai 1'honneur de vous informer que la Note autrichienne, remise a Belgrade ieudi 
soir, ma ele laissee en copie, ce matin, par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. 
Le comte Szecsen m'a fait connaitre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois attend 
la reponse du Gouvernement serbe jusqu'a samedi a5, a cinq heures du soir (l). 

La Note s'appuie sur l'engagement pris par la Serbie , le 3 l mars 1909, de recon- 
nailre lannexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et reproche au Gouvernement serbe 
d'avoir tolere une propagande anti-autrichienne, a laquefie cut pris part les fonction- 
naires, l'armee et la presse, propagande menacante pour la securile et 1'integrite de 
l'Autricbe, et dont le crime du 28 juin, trame a Belgrade , selon les constatations de 
l'instruction, a demontre les dangers. 

Le Gouvernement autrichien se declare oblige de mettre fin a une propagande 
qui constitue un danger permanent pour sa tranquillite, et d'exiger du Gouvernement 
serbe une enonciation officielle de sa volonte de la condamner et reprimer, par la 
publication, au Journal ojjicicl du 26, d'une declaration dont les termes sont indiques, 
reprouvant, regrettant et mena<;ant de sevir. Un ordre du jour du Roi a l'armee 
serbe porterait egalemenl cette declaration a sa connaissance. En outre, le Gouver- 

(1) Voir note page 43. 



— lib _ 

nrniPiil serbe s'engngerait a supprimerles publications, \ dissoudreles Socieles, arevo- 
quer les officiers el fonclionnaires dont les noms seraient communiques par le Gou- 
Ternemctit aulrichien, a accepter la collaboration de fonclionnaires autrichiens pour 
k suppression de Taction subversive signalee, ainsi que pour 1'enquete sur l'atterjtat 
de Serajevo, eniin a proceder a Tarrestation immediate d'un officier el dun employe 
serbes qui y sont compromis. 

An memorandum aulricbien est annexee une Note, resumant les constalations de 
1'instruction du crime de Serajevo et affirmant qu'il a ete trame a Belgrade, que les 
borabes out ete fournies au* assassins et emanent dun depot de 1'armee serbe, enfin 
que les assassins ©at ete exerces et aides par des olficiers et employes serbes. 

En rendant visite, aussilot apres cette communication an Directeur politique p. i. 
le Comte Szecsen la informe, sans aucun commeutaire, de la remise de la 
Note. M. Berlbelot n'a pu que signaler, sur me.s indications, a l'Ambassadeur 
d'Autricbe-Hongrie, 1'impression d'inquietude eveillee par les informations parues 
dans la matinee sur le contenu de la Note autriehienne, et le sentimenl pemble 
que jie roanquerait pas d'eveiller, dans 1'opir.ion francaise, le moment choisi pour 
une demarche si imperative et de si court delai; c'esl-a-dire 1'heure on le Presi- 
dent de la Republique et le President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
de la Republique avaient quittc Petersbourg et se rrouvaient en mer, par consequent 
hors d'etat d'exercer, d'accord avec les Puissances qui n'etaient pas directernent inte- 
ressees, Taction apaisante si desirable entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, dans Tinteret de 
la paix generale. 

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a encore aucune donnee sur les intentions de son Gou- 
vernement. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demande a etre requ par moi, cet apres-rnidi, a 
cinq heures. 

Bienvenu-Martis. 



IN 26 

M. BiENVENu-MARTtN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

a M. Tiiieiuut, Ministre dc France a Stockholm (pour le President 
du Conseil) et a Belgrade, Vienne, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Pe- 
tersbourg. 

Paris, le 24 juillet 191^. 

M. Vesnitchn'avait, ce matin encore, recude son Gouvernement aucuu telegramme 
de nature a le renseigner s.ur ses intentions et ne connaissait pas le contenu de la 
Note autrichienne. 

A la demande de conseil qu'il formulait a la Direction politique, M. Berthelot 
Jul a dit, a litre tout personnel, que la Serbie devait chercher a gagner du temps, le 



— 47 — 
lenne de 48 heures constituant peul-etre plulot une « mise en demeure » qu'un 
ultimatum proprement dit; qu'il pouvait y avoir lieu, par exemple, d'oflirir imme- 
diatcment satisfaction sur tous les points qui n'etaient pas inconciliablos avec la 
dignite et la souverainete de la Serbie ; il Iui a ete conseille de faire remarquer que 
les constatations de ['instruction autriGluenne de Serajevo etaienl rnilalerales, et que 
la Serbie, tout en elant prelc a seur contre tous les complices d'un crime qu'elle 
reprouvait hautement, demandait a etre mise au courant des preuves, pour pouvoir 
les verifier rapidement; de chercher surtout a echapper a la prise directe de 
FAutriche, en se declarant prete a se soumettre a 1'arbitrage de 1'Europe. 

J'ai demande a Londres et a Petersbourg les vues et les intentions des Gouverne- 
ments anglais el russe. II resulte, d'aulre part, de nos informations, que l'ltalie n'a 
recu qu'aujourd'liui communication de la Note autrichienne, au sujet de laquelle 
clle n'avait ete ni pressentie ni meme avertie. 

BrENVENU-MARTIN. 



IN" 27 

M. Bienvenu-JVIartin, Ministre des Afl'aires etrangeres 

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), Belgrade, Londres, 
Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Bome. 

Paris, le 2i juillet igi4- 

L'Ambassadeur de France a Vicnne me fait savoir que l'opinion a etc surprise par 
la soudainete et 1'exageiation des demandes autrichiennes, mais que le parti mili- 
taire parait craindre surtout que la Serbie ne cede. 

Le Ministre de Serbie en Autriche pense que son Gouvernement se montrera tres 
conciliant en ce qui concerne la punition des complices de I'altentat el les garauties 
i donner en vue de la suppression de la propagande anli-autricbienne, mais qu'il 
ne saurait accepter un ordre du jour a 1'armee dicle au Roi, ni le licenciement 
d'olTiciers suspects a 1' Autriche, ni 1'intervention de fonctionnaires etrangers en 
Serbie. M. Jovanovitcli estime que s'il etait possible d'engager une discussion, le 
conflit pourrait encore s'arranger, avec le concours des Puissances.. 

Notre Ambassadeur a Berlm rend compte de lemotion provoquee par la Note 
autrichienne et de l'etat d'esprit du Charge d'affaires de Russie, qui pense qu'une 
grande partie de l'opinion en Allemagne souhaiterait la guerre. Le ton de la presse 
est menacanl et parait avoir pour but d'intimider la Russie. Notre Ambassadeur doit 
voir ce soir M. de Jagow. 

M Barrere informe que l'ltalie agit a Vienne dans un sens moderaleur et cherche 
a enter des complications. 

Bif.kvenu-Martin. 



— 48 — 

N° 28 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), et a Belgrade, Londres, 
Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, le 2& juillet 191A. 

M. de Schoen est venu me communiquer, sans vouloir men laisser une copie, 
mais en men donnant lecture a deux reprises, sur ma demande, une Note de son 
Gouvernement. 

Celte Note s'exprime presque textuellement de la maniere suivante : 

« Les declarations des journaux austro-hongrois relatives aux circonstances dans 
lesquelles l'attentat sur la personne de I'heritier du trone d'Autriche et de son epouse 
a eu lieu, devoilent nettement le but que la propagande panserbe s'etait propose et 
les moyens dont elle s'est servie pour latteindre. D'apres les faits connus, il ne peut 
non plus y avoir aucun doute, que cost a Belgrade qu'il faut chercher le centre 
d'action des agitations qui tendaient a detacher de l'Autriche-Hongrie les provinces 
slaves du Sud pour les reunir au royaume dc Serbie et que c'est la tout au moins 
que s'est developpee son aclivile, avec la connivence de membres du Gouvernement 
el de 1'armee. 

« Les menees serbes remonlent a un grand nombre d'annees. Le chauvinisnie pan- 
serbe s'est particulierement manifesto pendant la crise bosniaque. C'est a la modera- 
tion du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, a son grand empire sur lui-meme, a 1'inter- 
vention energique des Puissances que Ton est redevable si les provocations aux- 
quelles l'Aulricbe-Hongrie a ete, a cette epoque, en buttede la part de la Serbie, 
n'ont pas suscite un conflit. La promesse faite alors par le Gouvernement serbe 
d'adopter une attitude irreprochable n'a pas ete tenue. Sous les yeux, tout au moins 
avec la tolerance tacite de la Serbie ofDcielle, la propagande panserbe a continue, 
dans I'enlretemps, a croitre en etendue et intensite. C'est sur son coniple qu'il faut 
mettre ce dernier forfait, dont on doit recherclier la trame a Belgrade. II est indubi- 
table quil ne serail conciliable ni avec la dignite ni avec 1'esprit de conservation de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise de rester plus longtemps inactive en presence de 1'agita- 
tion qui se poursuit de ce cole-la de sa frontiere et qui constitue une menace perpe- 
tuelle pour la surete et 1'integrite de ses territoires. En raison de cet etat de choses, 
la conduile dc merae que les revendicalions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
doivcnl elre considiirees comme juslifiees. Cependant l'atlitude que l'opinion pu- 
blique aussi bien que le Gouvernement ont adoptee dans ces derniers temps en 
Serbie, n'exclul pas la crainle que le Gouvernement serbe se refusera a acceder a ces 
reclamations el mime qu'il se laissera cntrainer a une attitude provocalrice a l'egard 
de lAutriche-Hongrie. Si celle-ci ne veut pas renoncer definilivement a son rang de 
Grande Puissance, il ne rcstera au Gouvernement auslro-hongrois plus rien d'autre 
a faire qu'a poursuivre ses revindications aupres du Gouvernement serbe. en exercant 
une forle pression et au besoin en prenant des mesures militaires dont le choix 
des moyens doit lui elre laisse. » 



— 49 — 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a appele parliculierement mon attention sur les deux 
derniers paragraphes de sa Note, indiquant avec insistance, avant de les lire, que 
c'etait la le point capital. J'en ai note litteralement le texte, que voici : « Le Gouver- 
nement allemand estime que la question actuelle est une aETaire a rtgler exclusi- 
vement entre l'Autriche-Hongrie el la Serbie et que les Puissances ont le plus 
serieux inleret a la restreindre aun deux Parties interessees. 

« Le Gouvernement' allemand desire ardcmment que le conflit soil localise, toule 
intervention dune autre Puissance devant, par le |eu naturel des alliances, pro- 
voquer des consequences incalculables. » 

J'ai fait remarquer a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'autanl ll paraitrait legitime 
qu'on demandatla punition de tons les complices de 1'attentat de Serajevo, autant, 
au contraire, il semblait difficile d'exiger des mesures inacceptablcs pour la dignite 
et la souverainete de la Serbie : le Gouvernement serbe, meme s'il voulait s'v sou- 
mettre, risquerait d'etre emporte par une revolution. 

J'ai egalemenl fait observer a M. de Schoen que sa Note n'envisageait que deux 
hypotheses : celle d'un refus pur et simple, ou celle d'une attitude de provocation 
de la Serbie. Une troisieme hypothese (qui laisserait la porte ouverte a un accom- 
modement) devrait en tous cas etre envisagee : celle d'une acceptation de la Serbie, 
qui consentirait a donner immediatement toutes les satisfactions pour la punition des 
complices et toutes les garanties pour la repression de la propagande anti-autrichienne, 
compatibles avec sa souverainete et sa dignite. 

J'ai ajoute que si, dans celte limile, les satisfactions poursuivies par I'Aulriche 
etaient admissibles, les modalites de leur application pourraient etre examinees; si la 
Serbie donnait des preuves evidentes de bonne volonte, on ne pourrait comprendre 
que l'Autriche refusat de se preler a la conversation. 

Peut-etre ne fallait-il pas rendre trop difficile a de tierces Puissances, qui ne sau- 
raient ni moralement ni sentimentalement se desinteresser'de la Serbie, une attitude 
conforme au desir exprime par I'Allemagne de localiser le conflit. 

M. de Schoen a reconnu la valeur de ces considerations et a declare vaguemenl 
que 1'espoir restait toujours possible. Comme je lui demandais s'il fallait attribuer a 
la Note autrichieune le caractere d'une simple mise en demeure, permettant une 
discussion, ou d'un ultimatum, il a repondu qu'il n'avait pas de sentiment personnel. 

Bienvenu-Mabtin. 



N° 29. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le ih juillet 1914. 

La remise de la Note autrichieune a la Serbie a cause une profonde emotion. 
L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche declare que son Gouvernement ne saurait rien relran- 

Doccments DIPLOMATIQDE5. — Guerre europeenne. 7 



- 50 — 
cher de ses exigences. A. la Wilhelmstras.se , ainsique dans lapresse, ontient le mOme 
langage. 

La plupart des Charges daffiiires presents a Berlin sont venus me voir ce matin. 
lis manifestent pen d'espoir dans une issue pacifique. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a 
remarque aveo amertume que 1'Autriche avait remis sa Note au moment meme ou le 
President de la Republique ef le President du Conseil avaient quitte Pclersbourg. E 
inchnc a penser qu'une grandc partie de 1'opinion en Allemagne souhaite la guerre et 
voudrait saisir cette occasion dans laquelle 1'Autriche se montrera sansdoute plus unie 
que par le passe et ou 1'Empereur d' Allemagne, par un sentiment de solidarity 
monarchique et par liorreor de ['attentat, est moins porte a se montrer conciliant. 

M. de Jagow doit me recevoir a la fin de lapres-midi. 

Jules Cambom. 



IS" 30. 

|M. Jules Cambon, Ainbassadeur de la Republique franchise a Berlin, 
a M. Bien\ end-Martin, Ministre des AQaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 2a juillet 1914. 

J'ai dernandeau Secretaire d'Etal, dans L'entrevue que j'ai eue avec lui, aujuurd'hui, 
s'il elait exact, comme I'annoncaienl les journaux, que 1'Autriche eiil remis une Note 
aux Puissances sur son difierend avec la Serbie, s'il lavait rei;ue, et comment il l'ap- 
preciait. 

M. de Jagow m'a repondu affirmativement, ajoutant que la note elait euergique , el 
qu'il l'approuvait, le Gouvernement Serbe ayant depuis longtemps. lasse la patience 
autncliienne. 11 considere d'ailleurs cette question comme d'ordre interieur pour 
1'Autriche et il espere quelle sera localisee. 

J'ai continue eu lui disant que n'ayant recju encore aucune instruction, je ne vou- 
lais echanger avec lui que des vues toutes personnelles. Je lui ai demande alors si 
vraiment le Cabinet de Berlin avait totalement ignore les exigences aulrichiennes 
avant qu'elles fussent communiquees a Belgrade et, comme il me I'afnrmail, je lui ai 
manifesto ma surprise de le voir ainsi s'engager a soulenir des pretentions dont il 
ignorait la limite et la portee. 

«C'estbien, m'a dit M. de Jagow en m'interrompant , parce que nous causons 
enlre nous personnellement que je vous laisse me dire cela. » 

« Cerlainement, ai-je dit; mais si Pierre l or s'humiiie, la Serbie sera probablement 
livree a des troubles interieurs, cela ouvrira la porte a de nouvelles eventuahtes, et 
savez-vous ou vous serez conduit par Vienne ? » J'ai ajoute que le langage desjournaux 
allemands n'etait pas le langage de gens indillerents et Strangers a I'affaire, mais 
annoncait un appui actif. Enfin, j'ai remarque que la brievete du delai imparti a 
la Serbie pourse soumetlre, impressionnerait facheusement I'Euiope. 



— 51 — 

M. de Jagow me repondit qu'il s'attendait bicn a « un peu d'emotion » de la part 
des amis de la Serbie, mais qu'il complait qu'ils lui donneraient de bons conseils. 

« Je ne doute pas, lui dis-je alors, que la Russie fasse effort aupres du Cabinet de 
Belgrade pour 1'amener aux concessions acceptables; mais ce qu'on demande a l'un 
pourquoi ne pas le demander a l'autre; et si Ton compte que des conseils seront donnes 
a Belgrade, n'est-il pas legitime de compter que, d'un autre cote , des conseils seront 
aussi donnes a Vienne? » 

Le Secretaire d'Etat se laissa aller a dire que cela dependait des circonstances.mais 
se reprenant aussitot, il reptita que l'affaire devait etre localisee. II me dcmanda si 
vraiment je trouvaisla situation grave. " Assurement, lui repondis-je, car, si ce qui se 
passe a ete reflechi, je ne comprends pas qu'on ait coupe les ponts derriere soi. » 

Tout indique que l'AHemagne se dispose a appuyer d'une facon singulierement 
energique 1'attitude de l'Autriche. La faiblesse, manifestee depuis quelques annees 
par lalliee austro-hongroise , affaiblissait la confiance que Ton avait ici en elle. On la 
trouvait lourde a trainer. Les mauvais proces, comme 1'aflaire d'Agram et 1'affaire 
Friedjung, rendaient sa police odieuse en la couvrant de ridicule. On ne lui deman- 
dait que d'etre forte, mais Ion est satisfait quelle soit brutale. 

Un article paru dans le Lokal Anzeigcr de ce soir indique aussi dans la Chancel- 
lerie allemande un etat d'esprit dont, a Paris, nous sommes naturellementportesane 
pas tenir assez de compte , je veux parler du sentiment de la solidarite monarchique. 
Je suis convaincu que ce point de vue doit etre grandement considere pour apprecter 
1'attitude de 1'Empereur Guillaume, dont la nature impressionnable a du etre sensible 
4 1'assassinat dun Prince qui l'avait rei^u quelques jours auparavant. 

H n'en est pas moins frappant de voir le soin avec lequel M. de Jagow, et tous 
les fonctionnaires places sous ses ordres, affectent de dire k tout le monde qu'ils igno- 
raient la portee de la Note autrichienne remise a la Serbie. 

Jules Camion, 



N° 31. 

M. Paleologde, Ambassadeur de France a 'Sa'ini-Petersbourg, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etraiigeres p. i. 

Fitersbourg, Is 24 juillet 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a donni communication aM. Sazonoff d'une 
note comminatoire k la Serbie. 

Les dispositions de 1'Empereur de Russie et de ses Ministres sonj des plus pa.ci« 



— 52 — 

fiques, ainsi que Ie President de la Republique et le President du Consefl ont pti 
s'en assurer directement; mais {'ultimatum que le Gouvernement austro-liongrois 
vient de remettre au Cabinet de Belgrade apporte dans la situation un element nou- 
veau et inquietant. 

L'opinion publique russe ne lolererait pas que 1'Autriche fit violence a la Serbie. 
La brievete du delai assigne pour l'ultimatum rend plus difficile encore Paction mo- 
deralrice que les Puissances de la Triple Entente pourraient exercer a Vienne. 

D'autre part, M. Sazonoff presume que I'AUemagne voudra soutenir son alliee, et 
je crains que cette impression ne soil exacte. La solidarity de la Triple Entente, en 
s'affirmant, peut seule empechei les Puissances germaniques d'accentuer leur atti- 
tude provocante. 

Paleologue. 



N° 32. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 2 i juillet 1914. 

Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant entretenu de son desir de ne rien negliger pour conjurer la 
crise, nous avons et6 d'accord pour penser que le Cabinet anglais pourrait demander 
au Gouvernement allemand de prendre l'initiative d'une demarche a Vienne pour 
offrir une mediation ..entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie, des quatre Puissances non direc- 
tement interessees. Si 1'AUemagne s'y prete, on gagnera du temps et c'est l'essentiel. 

Sir Ed. Grey m'a dit qu'il entretiendrait le Prince Lichnowsky du projet que je 
viens d'exposer. J'en ai fait part a mon CoUegue de Russie, qui apprehende une 
surprise de I'AUemagne et suppose que 1'Autriche n'aurait pas envoye son ultimatum 
sans accord prealable avec Berlin. 

Le Comte Benckendorff m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowsky, a son retour de conge, 
il y a un mois environ, lui avait temoigne des vues pessimistes au sujet des rapports 
entre Petersbourg et Berlin. 11 avait note 1'inquietude causee dans ceite derniere 
capitale par les bruits d'entente navale entre la Russie et 1'Angleterre. par la visitc 
du Tzar a Bucarest et par le renforcement de 1'armee russe. Le Comte Benckendorff 
en avait conclu qu'on envisagerait volontiers en Allemagne une guerre avec la 
Russie. 

Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat a ete frappe , comme nous tous de 1'air soucieux du 
Prince Lichnowsky depuis son retour de Berlin et il pense que si I'AUemagne l'avait 
voulu, elle aurait pu empecher la remise de f ultimatum. 



— - 53 — 

La situation est done des plus graves, et nous ne voyons aucun moyen d'enrayer 
la marche des evenements. 

Cependant le Comte Benckendorff croit bon de tenter la demarche sur laquelle 
je me suis mis d'accord avec Sir Ed. Grey. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 33. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le ilx juillet igi4. 

Le Ministre serbe a re?u cette nuit de M. Pachitch un telegramme disant que le 
Gouvernernent austro-hongrois lui avait adresse son ultimatum dont le delai expire 
demain, soit samedi a 6 heures. M. Pachitch ne donne pas les tennes de la commu- 
nication autrichienne, mais, si elle est telle que le Times de ce jour le rapporte, il 
semble impossible que le Gouvernernent serbe puisse 1'accepter. 

Nous nous sommes demande avec mon Collegue russe, qui considere comme 
extremement difficile pour son Gouvernernent de ne pas soutenir la Serbie, quelle 
intervention pourrait arreter le conflit. 

Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant convoque pour cet apres-midi, je me propose de lui suggerer 
de reclamer Intervention officieuse du Gouvernernent allemand a Vienne pour 
empecher une attaque subite. 

Paul Cambon. 



IN 34. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil) , Belgrade, Saint-Peters- 
bourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, le ik juillet igi4- 

L'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche ayant communique la Note de son Gouvernernent & 
Sir Ed. Grey, celui-ci a fait observer que jamais declaration aussi formidable n'avait 
ete adressee par un Gouvernernent a un autre; il a attire 1'attention du Comte 
Mensdorff sur les responsabitites assumees par 1'Autriche. 



— 54 — 

Envisageant une possibility de couilit enLre PAutriche et la Russic, Sir Ed. Grey 
se propose de reclamer le concours du Gouvernement ailemand en vue d'une 
mediation des quatre Puissances non interessees directement dans I'affaire Serbe : 
Angletcrre, France, Italie et Allemagne; cette mediation s'exercerait a la fois a 
Vienne et a Petersbourg. 

J'ai donne au Ministre de Serbie des conseils de prudence et suis dispose a 
m'associer a toute action conciliante a Vienne, dans Fespoir que FAutriche ne main- 
tiendra pas Fintegralite de ses exigences vis-a-vis d'un petit Etat, si celui-ci se montre 
dispose a donner toutes les satisfactions jugees compatibles avec son independance 
et sa souverainete. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N° 35. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, ie 25 juillct 191 A. 

Le Ministre de Belgique se montre tres preoccupe des evenements. 

II considere que PAutriche et PAllemagne ont voulu profiter du coikx>uts de cir- 
constances qui fait qu'en ce moment la Russie et lAngleterre leur paraissent mena- 
cees de troubles inteneurs, et qu'en France le regime mditaire est discute; aussi ne 
croit-il pas a Pignorance que le Gouvernement de Berlin affecte au sujet de la 
demarche de PAutriche. 

II pense que si la forme n'en a pas ete soumise au cabinet de Berlin, le moment 
en a ele babilement choisi avec lui pour s,urprendre la Triple Entente dans un 
moment de tk'sorganisation. 

II a vu PAmbassadeur d'ltalie qui vient d'interrompre son conge pour rentrer. 
II paraitrait que PItalie serait surprise, pour ne pas dire plus, d'avoir ete tenue a 
l'ecart de toute 1'adaire par ses deux alfiees. 

Jules Cambon. 



— 55 



N° 36. 



M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. , 

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), et a Londres, Berlin, 
Petersbourg, Vienne. 

Paris, le 25 juillet njii. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagae est venu protester a midi contre un article de 
L'Echo de Paris, qui qualiliait de « menace allemande » sa demarche d'hier. M. de 
Schoen a dit a un certain nombre de journahstes, et est venu affirmer a la Direction 
politique, qu'il n*y a pas eu « concert » entre 1'Autriche et l'Allemagne pour la Note 
autrichienne et que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait celle-ci, bien qu'il Petit 
approuvee ulterieurement, quand elle lui a ete communiquee, en meme temps 
qu'aux autres Puissances. 

Le Baron de Schoen a ajoote qa'iL n'y avail pas davanlage « menace » : le Gouver- 
nement allemand s'etait contente d'indiquer qu'il estimait desirable de localiser le 
conflit et que l'intervention d'autres Puissances risquerait de 1'aggraver. 

Le Directcur politique p. L a pris acte de la demarche du Baron de Schoen. 
L'ayant prie de repeter les termes memes des deux, derniers parag raphes de sa Note, 
il lui a fait remarquer que les termes indiquaient la volonte de l'Allemagne de s'in- 
terposer entre les Puissances et l'Aulriche. M. Berthelot a ajoute qu'aucune confi- 
dence n'ayant d'ailleurs ete faite a aucun journaliste, l'information de L'Echo dc Paris 
n'engageait que ce journal, et marquait seulement que la demarche allemande parais- 
sait avoir ete connue autre part qu'au Ouai d'Orsay, et en dehors de lui. L'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne n'a pas releve 1'allusion. 

D'aulre part, l'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche a Londres est venu egalement rassurer 
Sir Edward Grey, en lui disant que la Note autrichienne ne constituait pas un « ulti- 
matum «, mais une « demande de reponse avec limitation de temps »; ce qui signifiait 
que, si les demandes aulnchiennes ne sont pas acceptees ce soir a six heures, le 
Ministre d'Aulriche quittera Belgrade, et le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois commen- 
cera les actes de « preparation • mihtaire, mais non les » operations » rnilitaires. 

Le Cabinet de Londres, comme ceux de Paris et de Petersbourg, a fait donner a 
Belgrade le conseil d'exprimer des regrets pour les complicites qui pourraient etre 
prouvees dans I'attentat de Serajevo et de promettre a cet egard les plus larges 
satisfactions. II a ajoute que, pour le reste, c'est a la Serbie qu'il appartient de 
repondre, dans les termes que l'interet du pays lui paraitra conseiller. Le Ministre 
d'Anglelerre a Belgrade doit consulter ses Collegues fran^ais et russe et conseiller 
au Gouvernement serbe, si ceux-ci en ont egalement linstruction, de donner satisfac- 
tion sur tous les points ou il jugera pouvoir le faire. 

Sir E. Grey a dit au Prince Lichnowsky (qui ne lui a fait jusqu'ici aucunc commu- 
nication analogue a celle de M. de Schoen a Pans) que, si la Note autricliienne n'ame- 
nart aucune dilliculte entre l'Aulriche et la Puissie, le Gouvernement anglais n'aurait, 



— 56 — 
pas a s'en occuper, mais qu'il elait a craindre que la raideur dc la Note et la brievete 
du delai indique n'amenassent une tension. Dans ces conditions, la seule chance 
qu'on aperc,oive d'eviter un conflit consisterait dans une mediation de la France, de 
l'Allemagne, de 1'Italie el de I'Anglelerre, l'Allemagne seule pouvant exercer dans ce 
sens une action sur le Gouvernement de Vienne. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a repondu qu'il Iransmeltrait cette suggestion a Berlin, 
mais a laisse entendre a 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui est son parent, que l'Allemagne 
ne se preterait a aucune demarche a Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin'. 



N° 37. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le a5 juillet 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu au Foreign Office affirmer que son Gouver- 
nement refuserait de s'immiscer dans le conflit qui divise 1'Autriche et la Serbie. 

Sir E. Grey a repondu que, sans le concours de l'Allemagne a Vienne, 1'Angleterre 
ne saurait agir a Petersbourg. Si cependant 1'Autriche et la Russie mobilisaient toutes 
deux, ce serait bien 1'occasion d'une intervention des quatre autres Puissances. Le 
Gouvernement allemand maintiendrait-il alors son attitude passive et refuserait-il de 
sejoindre a 1'Angleterre, a la France et a l'llalie? 

Le Prince Lichnousky ne le pense pas, puisqu'il ne s'agirait plus de difficulty's 
entre Vienne et Belgrade, mais d'un conflit entre Vienne et Petersbourg. 

Sir E. Grey a ajoute cette observation que, si la guerre venait a eclater, aucune 
Puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinteresser. 

de Fleuriau. 



N° 38. 

M. PaLeolocue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, 
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Petersbourg, le 25 juillet 191^. 

Le Gou,vernement Russe va s'efforcer d'obtenir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
une prolongation du delai assigne par 1'ullimalum, afin que les Puissances puissent 



— 57 — 
se former une opinion sur le dossier judiciaire dont la communication leur est 
offerte. 

M. Sazonoff a prie l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne de signaler a son Gouvernement 
le danger de la situation; il s'est abstenu toutefois de faire allusion aux mesures que 
la Russie serait sans doute amenee a prendre, si la Serbie. etait menacee dans, son 
independance nationale ou dans lintegrite de son territoire; les reponses evasives 
et les recriminations du Comte de Pourtales ont laisse a M. Sazonoff une impression 
defavorable. 

Un Conseil des ministres sera tenu demain sous la presidence de 1'Empereur. 
M. Sazonoff garde toute sa moderation : « II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pour- 
rait pre'cipiter la crise. J'estime que, meme si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait 
a Taction contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompre les negociations. » 

Paleologue. 



M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 
a M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne. 



Paris, le 25 juillet 191/1. 

Le Gouvernement russe a donne comme instructions a son representant a Vienne 
de demander au Gouvernement aulrichien une prolongation du delai fixe a la Serbie, 
pour permettre aux Puissances de se faire une opinion sur le dossier que I'Autriche 
a offert de leur communiquer, et en vue d'eviter des consequences regrettables 
pour tous. 

Un refus oppose par l'Autriche-Hongrie a cette demande oterait toute signification 
a la demarche qu'elle a faite aupres des Puissances, en leur communiquant sa Note, et 
la mettrait en contradiction avec la morale internationale. 

Le Gouvernement russe a demande que vous fassiez d'urgence une demarche 
analogue aupres du Comte Berchtold; je vous prie d'appuyer la demande de votre 
Collegue. Le Gouvernement russe a adresse la meme demande a Londres, Rome, 
Berlin et Bucarest. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



Documents diplomatiques. — Gu 



58 



N° 40. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de Fiance a Londres, 

a M. Bienvemj-Martiin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 25 juiildt 191ft- 

SirEd. Grey a recu communication ce matin des instructions qui prescrivenl a I'Am- 
bassadeur de Kussie a Vienne , de detnander la prolongation du delai donne a la Serine 
par la Note autrichienne d'avant-hier. M. Sazonoff demandait que la demarche russe 
flit appuyee par I'Ambassade d'Anglelerre. 

Sir Ed. Grey a tclegraphie a Sir M. de Bunsen de s'exprimer dans le meme sens 
que son collegue russe et de rappeler la communication autrichienne qui lui a ete faite 
hier soir tard par le Comte Mensdorf, communication aux termes de laquelle le 
defaut d'adhesion de la Serbie aux conditions de 1'ultimatum n'entralnerait, des 
aujourd'hui, qu'une rupture diplomatique et non des operations militaires imme- 
diates. 

Sir Ed. Grey en concluait que le temps serait laisse aux Puissances pour intervenir, 
et chercher les moyens de denouer la crise. 

de Fleuriau. 



N° 41. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le a5 juillet j 9 1 ^ . 

Ce matin , le "Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre a demande a M. de Jagow, d'apres les 
ordres de son Gouvernement, siTAllemagne voudrait se joindre a TAnglcterre, a la 
France et a'l'Italie, pour intervenir aupres de l'Autriche et de la Russie afin d'ernpe- 
cher un conflit et, en premier lieu, pour demander'a Vienne une prolongation du 
delai imparti a la Serbie par 1'ultimatum. 

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu'il avait deja, des la 
reception de ^a depeche du Prince Lichnowsky lui faisant part des intentions de 
Sir E. Grey, telegraphie ce matin meme a V Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne a 
Vienne pour qu'il demandat cette prolongation au Gomte Berchtold. Malheureusement 
le Comte Berchtold est a fschl. Au reste, M. de Jagow ne croit pas que cette demande 
soit accueillie. 

Le Charge d'alTaires d'Angleterre s'est egalement enquis aupres de M. de Jagow, 



— 59 — 
comme je L'avais fait hier, si 1'AUemagne n'avait eu. aucune connaissance de la Note 
autrichienne avant quelle fut loncee,. et a regu une reponse si nettement negative 
qu'il ne pourrait insister; mais- il n'a pu s'empecher de s'etonner du blanc-seing, 
donne par 1'AUemagne a i'Autriche. 

M. de Jagow lui ayant repondu que la question etait pour I'Autriche une question 
inlerieure, il a remarque quelle etait devenue au premier chef Internationale. 

Jules Cambon. 



N" 42. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 
a M. le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914. 

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a recu pour instruction de demander au Gouver- 
nemenl aliemand d'insister aupres du Cabinet de Vienne, en vue de faire prolonger 
le delai de 1'ultimatum. 

M. de Jagow ne lui ayant donne rendez-vous qu'a la fin de rapres-midi', c'est-a- 
dire au moment oil 1'ultimatum viendra a echeance, M. Broniewski a envoye d'urgence 
une note ecrite au Secretaire d'Etal, dans laquelle il marque que le retard de la 
communication faite par I'Autriche aux Puissances rend 1'effet de cette communi- 
cation illusoire, puisqu'elle ne leur laisse pas le temps de prendre. connaissance des 
faits allegues, avant 1'expi'ration du delai fixe. II insiste tres vivement sur la necessite' 
de le prolonger, si 1'on n'a pas en vue de creer une grande crise. 

Jules Cambon. 



N° 43. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914- 

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a fait aupres du Secretaire d'Etat la demarche qui 
lui etait prescrite, en vue d'une prolongation du delai de 1'ultimatum; M. de Jagow 
lui a repondu qu'il avait deja transmis une indication de ce genre a Vienne, mais 
qu'il estimait que toutes ces demarches etaient trop tardives. 

M. Broniewski a insiste, en disant que si le delai ne pouvait etre prolonge, les 



— 60 — 
mesures d'execution pouvaient au moins etre retardees, de maniere a permettre aux 
Puissances de s'emplover a eviter un confiit. II a ajoute que la Note autrichienne etait 
coneue dans des termes calcules pour blesser la Serbie et la forcer a la guerre. 

M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une guerre, mais dune 
« execution » dans une affaire locale. 

Le Charge d'affaires a repris, en exprimant le regret que le Gouverneraent allemand 
ne mesurat pas ses responsabilites dans le cas oil des hostilites se produiraient . qui 
pourraient s'etendre au reste de l'Europe : a quoi, M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il se 
refusait a croire a de pareilles consequences. 

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a recueilli comme nioi le bruil que l'Autriche , tout 
en declarant ne vouloir aucune annexion de lerritoire, occuperait des parties de la 
Serbie jusqu'a cequ'elle ait complete satisfaction. « On sait, m'a-t-il dil, ce que signilie 
ce mot satisfaction. ■> Les impressions de M. Broniewski sur les arrieres-pensees de 
1'Allemagne sont tres pes.simistes. 

Jules Cambox. 



N° Mt. 

M Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. BiENVENU-MARTiN,Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Rome, le 2 5 juillet igii. 

L'Ambassadeur de Russie a fait ,i la Consulta la demarche prescrite par M. Sazonoff 
aux representants de la Russie a Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucarest, et qui tendait a 
obtenir de ces dilferents Cabinets qu'ils associent leur action a celle de la Russie a 
Vienne en vue d'obtenir une prolongation du delai impart! a la Serbie. 

En 1'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano, M. Salandra et M. de Martino ont 
repondu qu'ils se mettraient en rapport avec le Ministre des AITaires etrangeres, mais 
que sa reponse ne pourrait leur parvenir que vers six beures, c'est-a-dire trop tard 
pour enlreprendre une demarche a Vienne. 

Barrere. 



M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le 25 juillet igi4. 

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a req;u de son Gouvernement 1'ordre de demander 
un delai pour rultimatum a la Serbie, au moment meme oil le Comle Berchtold 



— 01 — 
parlaitpour Isclil avec ('intention, au dire des joumaux, d'y rester pres de l'Empereur 
jusqu'a la fin de la crise. 

Le Prince Koudachell la neanmoins informe de la. demarche qu'il avait a remplir 
par deuiftelegrammes en clair, lun en cours de route, lautre a destination. II n'en 
attend aucun elTet. 

Le Baron Macchio, Secretaire general du Ministere des AMaires etrangeres, a qui 
le Prince a communique le sens de ses instructions et de sa demarche telegraphique, 
a teinoigne unc froideur glaciale quand son interlocuteur lui a represente que donner 
a juger des griefs avec pieces justificaiives, sans laisser le temps d'etudier le dossier, 
est contraire a la courtoisie internationale; le Baron Macchio a replique que parfois 
1'interet dispense d'etre courlois. 

Le Gouvernement aulrichien est resolu a infliger J la Serbie une humiliation : il 
n'acceptera lintervention d'aucune puissance, jusqu'a ce que le coup ait ete porte et 
recu en pleine face par la Serbie. 

Dumaine. 



N° 46. 

M. Boppe, Ministre de France a Belgrade, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Belgrade, 25 juillet i()i4- 

M. Paolutrh vient de me donner connaissance de la reponse qui sera remise ce 
soir au Ministre d'Autriche. 

Le Gouvernement serbe accepte de pubher demain au Journal offtciel la declaration 
qui lui est demandee; il la communiquera egalement a larmee, par un ordre du 
jour; il dissoudra les societes de defense nationale et toutes aulres associations suscep- 
tibles d'agir contre l'Autriche-IIongrie; il s'engage a modifier la loi sur la presse, a 
renvoyer du service de 1'armee, de 1'instruction publique et des autres administrations, 
tous fonclionnaires dont la participation dans la propagande sera prouvee ; il demande 
seulement que le nom de ces fonclionnaires lui soit communique. 

Quant a la participation dans l'enquete de fonclionnaires autrichiens, il demande 
qu'on lui explique comment elle s'exercerait; il ne pourrait accepter que celle qui 
correspondrait au droit international ou aux relations de bon voisinage. 

II accepte toutes les autres exigences de ('ultimatum et declare que si le Gouver- 
nement austro-hongrois ne sen contente pas, il est pret a s'en remettre a la decision 
du tribunal de La Haye, ou a celle des grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a l'elabo- 
ration de la declaration du 3i mars 1909. 

Boppe. 



N° 47. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienve.nu-Marun, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 15 juiffrt 19 14. 

Pendant tout l'apxes-midi le bruit, a couru avec persistans que la Serbie se sou- 
niertaJL aux exigences autricliiennes; ce sorr les journaux pubhent des supplements 
annonrant la rupture a Belgrade et le depart du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie. 

Ce. bruit vient d'etre confirme au correspondant de I'Agence Havas a la Wilhelm- 
strasse. Des groupes considerables de plusieurs centaines de personnes slalionnenl ict 
devant les bureaux des journaux, el une nombrense manifestation de jeunes gens 
vient de passer sur Pariser-platz en poussant des cris de « hurrah ! » pour 1'Allemagne, 
et en chantant des chants patriotiques ; elle se rend a la Colonne de la Victoire, a 
1'Ambassade d'Autriche, puis a celle d'ltahe. C'est une explosion significative de 
chauvinisme. 

Une personnalite allemande, que j'ai vue ce soir, m'a avoue qu'on avait craint ici 
que la Serbie n'aceeptat en bloc la note autrichienne, en se reservant d'en discuter 
I'application., pour gagner du temps et permettre aux efforts des Puissances de se 
produire utilement avant la rupture. 

Dans les milieux, financiers, on prend deja des mesures pour parer a toute even- 
tualite, cor on n'y apercoit pas le moyen d'eurayer la ense, en presence de L'appui 
determine que donne 1'Allemagne a 1'Autriehe. 

Je ne vois, pour moi, que 1'Anglelerre qui puisse, en Europe, etre ecoutee i 
Berlin. 

Quoi qu'il arrive, Paris, Petersbourg et Londres ne pan-iendront a maintenir dignei 
ment la paix qu en se montranl fermement et absolument unis. 

Jules Caubon. 



M. Domaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Bif.nvem -Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vieone, le 2&juillet 19 1 i. 

On me remet votre telegramme prerisement a 1'heure oil expire le delai imparti a 
la Serbie. D'autre part, je viens de vous fairesavoir dans cpaelles conditions le Charge 
d'affaires de Russie a du executer sa demarche. II semble inutile de 1'appuyer quand 
il n'en est plus temps. 

Dans l'apres-midi, le bruit s'etait repandu que la Serbie avait cede a 1'ultimatum 
tout en ajoutant quelle eu appelait aux Puissances. Mais on assure, au dernier 



- 63 — 
frioment, que le Ministre d'Autriche vieot de quitter precipitamment Belgrade; il 
auraitjuge insuflisante 1'adhesion du Gouvernement serbe aux conditions posees par 
son Gouvernement. 

DUMAINE. 



N° 49. 
Reponse da Gouwnmmcnl serbe a la Note austrd-^honijroise. 

( Comm unique par M. Vssnittli, Ministre de Serbie, le 27 juillet. ) 

Belgrade, le 2 5 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a recu la communication du Gouvernement imperial 
et royal du io/a3 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera tout malen- 
lendu qui menace de comprometlre les lions rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie 
auslro-hongroise et le Royaume dc Serbie. 

Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu taut a 
la tribune de la Skoupchtina nalionale que dans les declarations et les actes des 
representanls responsables de l'Etat , protestations auxquelies coupa court la declaration 
du Gouvernement serbe faite le 1 8/3 1 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis- 
a-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion, et que depuis cc temps, 
autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de 
leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans le but de changer l'etat de choses 
politique et juridique cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine. 

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial 
et royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui concerne un Iivre scolaire, 
representation au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement imperial et royal a rec;u line 
explication entierement satisfaisante. 

La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne des preuves de sa politique pacifique 
et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkainque, et e'est grace a la Serbie ct aux 
sacrilices qu'elle a faits dans l'interet exclusif de la paix europeenne, que cette paix 
a ete preservee. 

Le Gouvernement royal ne ,peut pas elre .rendu responsable des manifestations 
d'un caracteTc.prive telles que les articles des journaux et les agissements des socieles, 
manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordi- 
naire et qui echappent en regie gencrale au controle ofCciel, d'autant moins que le 
Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de questions qui se sont 
preseritecs entre la Serbie et 1'Autriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et 
a reussi, de cette faijon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progress des 
deux pays voisins. 

C'est pourquoi'le Gouvernement royal a ete peniblemerit surpris par les affirma- 
tions d'apres lesquelles des personnes du royaume de Serbie auraient parlieipe a la 
preparation de lattentat commis a Sarajevo. II s'attendait a etre invito a collaborer a 
la reoherche de tout ce qui.se rapporte a ce crime etal etait pret, pour.prouver par 



— 04 — 
ties actes son entiere correction, a agir contre toutes les personnes a 1'egard desquelles 
des communications lui sentient faites. 

Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernemenl 
royal est dispose a remettre anx tribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation 
el a son rang, pour la complicate duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui 
seraient fournies. 

II s'engage specialement a fane publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjiciel en 
date du 1 3/a 6 juiilet I'enonciation suivante : 

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee 
contre l'Autriclie-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire 1'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en der- 
nier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie , 
et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. 

« Le Gouvernement royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes 
aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal, a la 
propagande susmentionnee et fompromis par la les relations de bon voisinage aux- 
quelles le Gouvernement royal s'elait solennellement engage par la declaration du 
1 8/3 1 mars 1 909. 

Le Gouvernemenl, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative dune 
immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autnche-Hongrie 
que ce soit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'averlir formellement les ofliciers, les 
fonclionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec 
la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils. 
agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » 

Cetle enonciation sqra portee a la connaissance de 1'armee royale par un ordre du 
jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le roi par S. A. \\. le prince^ heritier Alexandre, et sera 
publiee dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de 1 annuo 

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage en outre : 

.i" A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une 
disposition dans la loi de l.i presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus 
severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-hongroise, 
ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance generate serait dirigee contre 
1'integrite territoriale de 1'Autriche-Hongrie. 

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire 
introduire dans ['article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les 
publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement , aux termes 
categoriques de I'article 22 de la Constitution , est impossible. 

2° Le gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve et la Note du gouvernement 
imperial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la Societe Norodna Obrana et 
les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de 
ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins le gouvernement royal 
acceptera la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la Societe 
Norodna Obrana et toute autre societe qui agirait contre i'Autriche-Hongrie. 

3° Le gouvernement royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans delai de linstruction 



— 65 — 
publique en Serbie tout ce quisert ou pourrait servira fomenterla propagande contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des fails et 
des preuves de cette propagande. 

l\° Le gouvernement royal accepte du moins d'eloigner du service milifaire ceux 
dont lenquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes diriges conlre 
lintegrite du territoire de la monarchie austro-hongroise ; il attend que le gouverne- 
ment imperial et royal lui communique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces 
officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre. 

5° Le gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du 
sens et de la portee de la demande du gouvernement imperial el royal tendant a ce 
que la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du 
gouvernement imperial et royal. 

Mais il declare qu'il admeltra toute collaboration qui repondrait aux pnncipes du 
droit international et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisi- 
nage. 

6° Le gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une 
enquete contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement, auraient ete meles au 
complol du l 5/28 juinet qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la 
participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-hongroises qui seraient 
delegues a cet effet par le gouvernement imperial et royal, le gouvernement royal 
ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et dela loi sur la 
procedure criminelle. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les 
resultats de 1'instruction en question pourraient etre donnees aux organes austro- 
hongrois. 

7 Le gouvernement royal a fait proceder des le soir merne de la remise de la 
note a 1'arrastation du commandant Voija- Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitcli, 
qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 1 5/28 juin elait employe 
(comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. 
Le gouvernement imperial el royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accou- 
tumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les presomptions de culpabilite, ainsi que 
les preuves eventuelles de culpa-bilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu a ce jour par 
1'enquele a Sarajevo, aux finsd'enquetes ulterieures. 

8° Le gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendrales mesures prises pour empecher 
le trafic illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordon- 
nera tout de suite une enquete et punira severement les fonctionnaires des fron- 
tieres sur la ligne Schabac-Loznica, qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les 
auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 

9 Le gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que 
ces fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont tenus apres 1'attenlat dans des 
interviews et qui, d apres raffirmation du gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete 
hostiles a la Monarchie, des que le gouvernement imperial et royal lui aura commu- 
nique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les 
propos employes ont en effet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet 
Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeeone. 9 



— 66 — 
desquels le gouvernement royal lui-meme aura soin de recueillir dps preuves et con- 
victions. 

i o° Le gouvernement royal informe le gouvernement imperial et royal de l'exe- 
culion des mesure9 comprises dans les points precedents en taut que cela n'a pas etc 
deja fait par la presente note. Aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et 
executee , dans le cas oil le gouvernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satisfait de 
cette reponse, le gouvernement royal serbe, considerant qu'il est de l'interet com- 
mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme toujours, 
occepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit a la decision du 
Tribunal international de La Haye , soit aux grandes Puissances qui ont pris part 
■j 1 elaboration de la declaration que le gouvernement serbe a faite le 1 8/3 1 niar^ 
■9°9- 



67 



CHAPITRE IV 
DE LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES 

(25 JUILLET 19H), 

A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE 

(28 JUILLET 1914) 



69 — 



N° 50. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. I.» 

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil), et a MM. les Am- 
bassadeursde France a Londres, Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Bome. 

Paris, le 26 juillet 1 9i4- 

On peut resunier ainsi les evenements de samedi : refus de l'Aulriche d'acceder a 
la prolongation de delai demandee par la Russie, — depart du Ministre d'Autriche de 
Belgrade apres remise dune reponse a la Serbie, eslimee insuflisante, bien quelle 
eut atteint la limite des concessions jugees possibles, — ordre de mobilisation donne 
en Serbie, dont le Gouvernement s'est retire a Kragoujewatz, oil il est suivi par 
les Ministres de France et de Russie. 

Le Gouvernement italien, a qui la note autrichienne a ete communiquee ven- 
dredi, sans demande d'appui ui meme d'avis, n'apas, en 1'absence du Marquis de 
San Giuliano qui ne rentre que mardi, pu repondre a la suggestion du Gouverne- 
ment russe qui proposait d'insister a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai. II resulte 
d'une confidence de 1'Ambassadeur d'ltalie a M. Paleologue qua Vienne on continue 
a se bercer de l'illusion que la Bussie « ne liendra pas le coup ». II ne faut pas oublier 
que I'ltalie n'est lenue par les engagements de la Triple Alliance que si elle a ete prea- 
lablement consultee. 

De Petersbourg, nous apprenons que M. Sazonoff a conseille a la Serbie de 
demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 25, lenu en pre- 
sence de 1'Empereur, la mobilisation des treize corps d'armee eventuellement destines 
a operer conlre lAutriche a ete envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutcfois 
rendue effective que si lAutriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des amies, et 
seulement apres avis du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a qui le soin incombe de 
fixer la date, liberie lui elant laissee de continuer les negociations meme dans le cas 
oil Belgrade serait occupee. L'opinion russe manifeste 1'impossibilite politique et 
morale pour la Bussie de laisscr ecraser la Serbie. 

A Londres, la demarche allemande a ete faite le a5, dans les memes termes que 
par le Baron de Schoen a Paris. Sir E. Grey a repondu au Prince Lichnovvski que, 
si la guerre venait a eclaler, aucune puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinte- 
resser. II n'apas precise, davantage et a tenu un langage tres reserve au Ministre 
de Serbie. La communication faite le 25 au soir par 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rend 
Sir E. Grey plus oplimisle; puisque la rupture diplomatique ne doit pas entrainer 
des operations militaires immediates, le Secretaire d'Etat veut encore esperer que 
les Puissances auront le temps d'intervenir. 

A Berlin, le langage tenu par le Secretaire d'Elat au Charge d'Affaires de Russie 
est peu salisfaisant el dilaloire; comme celui-ci lui demandait de s'associer a une de- 
marche a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai, il a repondu qu'il avail deja agi dans 
ce sens, maisque c'etait trop tard; a la demande d'oblenir un delai pour prolonger 



— 70 — 
les mesures d'execution, ll a replique qu'il s'agissait dune question interieure et 
non pas d'une guerre mais d'une execution locale. M. de Jagow feint de ne pas 
croire que Paction autrichienne puisse entrainer des consequences generates. 

II se produit une veritable explosion de chauvinisme a Berlin. L'Empereur d'Alle- 
magne revient directement a Kiel. M. Jules Camion eslime que, aux premieres 
mesures militaires de la Russie, 1'AHemagne repondrait immedialement et n'attendrait 
vraisemblablement pas un pretexte pour nous attaquer. 

A Vienne, 1'Ambassadeur de France n'a pas eu le temps de se joindre a la de- 
marche de son collegue russe pour obtenir une prolongation du delai fixe a la 
Serbie; ll ne le regrette pas, celte demarche ayant ete repoussee categoriquement, 
et l'Angleterre n'ayant pas non plus eu le temps de donner des instructions a cet egard 
a son agent. 

Une note de 1'Ambassade d'Anglcterre m'a die remise : elle rend compte de la 
conference de 1'Ambassadeur britannique a Petersbourg avec M. Sazonofl et 
M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey estime que les quatre Puissances non interessees 
devraient insister aupres de la Russie et de I'Autriche pour que leurs armees ne fran- 
chissent pas ta frontiere et donnent le temps a l'Angleterre, a la France, a 1'Allemagne 
et a I'ltalie d'exercer feur mediation. Si rAllemagnc accepte, le Gouvernement anglais 
a des raisons de penser que I'ltalie serait heureuse de s'associer egalement a Paction 
[Ointe de l'Angleterre et de la France: Padhesion de PAUemagne est essentielle, car 
pas plus I'Autriche que la Russie ne lolererait d'autre intervention que d'amis impar- 
liaux ou d'allies. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N" 51. 

M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Rome, le 26 juiilet 1914. 

Un lelegramme de Vienne recn a Pinstant a la Consulta lui fait connaitre que la 
rupture diplomatique est effective entre I'Autriche et la Serbie. et que I'Autriche 
procede a des mesures militaires. 

Le Marquis di San Giuliano, qui est a Fiuggi, ne reviendra i Rome qu'apres- 
demain. 

J'ai eu aujourdhui avec le President du Conseil un interessant entretien sur la 
situation, dont il reconnait toute la gravite. De lensemble de ses propos, j'ai emporte 
1c sentiment que le Gouvernement italien voudrait, en cas de conflit, se tenir en 
dehors et rester dans une attitude d'observation. 

M. Salandra ma dit, a ce propos : « Nous ferons les plus grands efforts pour em- 



_ 71 — 
pecher la paix d'etre rompue : notre situation est un peu analogue a celle de 1'Angle- 
terre. Peut-elre pourrions-nous faire quelque chose dans un sens pacifique avec leS 
Anglais ». M. Salandram'a conlirme que la note autrichienne avait ete communiquee 
a Rome a la derniere heure. 

Barrere. 



N° 52. 

M. Barrere, x\mbassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. L 

Rome, le 20 juilk-t 1914. 

M. Sazonoff a dit hier a FAmbassadeur d'ltalie a Petersbourg que la Russie se 
servirait de tons les moyens diploraatiques pour eviter le conllit et quelle ne renon- 
cait pas a lespoir qu'une mediation pourrait amener 1'Autriche a une attitude moins 
intransigeante ; mais qu'on ne pouvait cependant lui demander de laisser ecraser la 
Serbie. 

Je remarque qrie la majeure partie de l'opinion publique italieime est hostile a 
1'Autriche dans cette grave affaire. 

Barrere. 



N" 53. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 
a M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres. 

Paris, le 26 juillet 191S. 

M. Paleologue m'adresse le tetegramnie suivant : « M. Sazonoff conseille au Gou- 
vernement serbe de solliciter la mediation du Gouvernement britannique. » 

D'accord avec M. Paul Cambon, je pense que le Gouvernement francais ne peut 
qu'exprimer l'espoir de voir le Gouvernement anglais accepter, si une offre de celte 
nature lui etait faite. 

Veuillez vous exprimer dans ce sens aupres du Foreign Office. 

Bienvenu-Martix. 



72 — 



N° 54. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Pefersbourg, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Saint-Pttersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914. 

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres continue avec une louable perseverance a 
rechercher les moyens de faire prevaloir une solution pacifique. « Jusqu'au dernier 
instant, m'a-t-il declare, je me montrerai pret a negocier. » 

C'est dans cet esprit qu'il vient de mander le Comte Szapary pour le convier a une 
« franche et loyale explication ». Article par article, M. Sazonoff a commente devant 
lui l'ultiuiatum auslro-hongrois, en faisant ressortir le caractere injurieux des princi- 
pales clauses. « L'intention qui a inspire ce document, a-t-il dit, est legitime si vous 
n'avez poursuivi d'autre but que de proteger votre territoire contre les menees des 
anarcliisles serbes; mais le procede auquel vous avez eu recours n'cst pas defen- 
dable. » II a conclu : « Reprenez votre ultimatum, modifiez-en la forme, et je vous 
garantis le resultat ». 

L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est monlre toucbe de ce langage; toutefois, 
en attendant des instructions, il reserve 1'opinion de son Gouvernement. Sans se de- 
courager, M. Sazonoff a decide de proposer, des ce soir, au Comte Berchtold 1'ou- 
verture d'une conversation direcle entre Vienne et Petersbourg sur les changements 
a introduire dans 1'ultimalum. 

Cette entremise amicale et officieuse de la Russie entre 1 Autricbe et la Serbic a 
1'avantage d'etre expeditive. Je la crois done preferable a loute autre procedure, et 
de nature a aboutir. 

Paleologue. 



N° 55. 

M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le 26 juillct 1914. 

M. Schebeko est revenu precipitamment d'un voyage en Russie; il ne 1'avait 
entrepris qu'apres l'assurance donnee par le Comte Berchtold que les reclamations 
contre la Serbie seraient des plus acceptables. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Petersbourg avait parle dans le meme sens a 
M. Sazonoff la veille de la remise de la note. Ce procede, tres habituel dans la diplo- 
matic de la Monarchie, et qui a servi egalement au Baron Macchio envers moi, parail 
avoir beaucoup ajoute a l'irritation du Gouvernement russe. 



— 73 — 

M. Schebeko va s'efforcer, cependant, de profiter du delai indispensable a la mo- 
bilisation pour introduire une proposition d'arrangement, qui aura au moins l'avan- 
tage de permettre de mesurer la valeur des declarations pacifiques de 1'AUemagne. 

Pendant que nous en deliberions ce soir, en compagnie de Sir M. de Bunsen, 
celui-ci a reiju des instructions du Foreign Office concernant la demarche a tenter 
par les representants des quatre Puissances moins directement interessees. Je m'at- 
tends done a ce que nous ayons a nous concerter deniain avec le due d'Avarna et 
M. de Tschirsky, lequel se retranchera presque surement derriere le principe de la 
localisation du conflit pour refuser son concours. 

Mon impression est, d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois, quoique 
surpris et peut etre au regret de 1'energie qu'on lui a inspiree, se croira oblige a un 
commencement d'action militaire. 

Dumaine. 



N° 56. 

,M- Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambas- 
sadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, 
Rome. 

Paris, ie 26 juillct 191 li. 

Le resume de la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne ne nous est parvenu qu'avec 
vingt heures de retard. Bien que le Gouvernement serbe eiit cede sur tous les points, 
sauf deux petites reserves, le Ministre d'Autnclie-Hongne a rompu les relations, prou- 
vant ainsi la volonte arretee de son gouvernement de proceder a lexecution de la Serbie. 

D apres un telegramme de M . Jules Cambon , I'Ambassadeur d'Anglet'erre a le sen- 
timent d'un peu de flechissement; comme il faisait observer a M. de Jagow que 
Sir Ed. Grey ne lui demandait pas d'intervenir entre l'Autnche et la Serbie, mais, 
celte question cessant d'etre localisee, d'intervenir avec 1'Angleterre, la France et 
lltalie a Vienne et Petersbourg, le Secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ferait son possible 
pour maintenir la paix. 

Au cours dun entretien de M. Barrere avec le Secretaire general du Minislere des 
Affaires etrangeres italien, celui-ci a indique que le Gouvernement italien n'aurait 
vraisemblablement pas approuve la note autrichienne; mais comme elle ne lui a pas 
ete prealablement communiquee, ilse trouve, de cefait, libere de toute responsabi- 
lite dans la grave initiative prise par 1'Aulriche. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cet apres-midi me faire une communication, 
tendant k Une intervention de la France aupres de la Piussie dans un sens paciRque. 
L'Autriche, m'a-t-il dit, a fait declarer a la Russie qu'elle ne poursuivait ni agrandis- 
sement territorial, ni atteinte a 1'integrile du Royaume de Serbie; sa s?ule intention 
est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite et de faire la police. C'est des decisions de la Russie 
qu'il depend qu'une guerre soil evitee; l'Allemagne se sent solidaire de la France dans 
l'ardent desir que la paix puisse etre .maintenus, ei a le ferme espoir que la France 
Bsera de son influence dans un sens apaisant a Petersbourg. 

DocOME»rs DiPLOMingcES. — Cuerre curopeenne. 10 



— 74 — 

J'ai rt'pondu & cette suggestion que la Russie 6tait moderle', qu'elle n'avait accom- 
pli aucun acte qui put faire douter de sa moderation et que nous etions d'accord avec 
elle pour rechercher la solution pacifique dece conflit. II nous paraiss ait doncqu a titre 
de contre-partie, l'Allemagne devait agir a Vienne, oil 1'efEcacite de son action Etait 
certaine en vue d'eviter des operations militaires tendant a loccupation de la Serbie. 

L'Ambassadeur m'ayant fait remarquer que cela etait inconciliable avec la position 
prise par l'Allemagne « que la question ne regardait que 1'Autriche et la Serbie », je 
iui ai dit que la mediation a Vienne et i Petersbourg pourrait etre le fait des quatre 
aulres Puissances moins interessecs dans la question. 

M. de Schoen se retrancha alors derriere le manque destructions a cet egard, et 
je lui dis que, dans ces conditions, je ne me sentais pas en mesure d'exercer une ac- 
tion seulement a Petersbourg. 

La conversation se termina sur 1'assurance, renouvelee par l'Ambassadeur, des in- 
tentions pacifiques de l'Allemagne, qu'il declarait solidaire, sur ce, point, de la 
France. 

Bienvem-Martin. 



N° 57. 
Note pour le Ministre. 

Dimanche soir, 26 juillet 1914. 

Apres la visite qu'il avait faite au Ministre a 5 heures de 1'apres-midi, le Baron 
de Schoen s'est rendu, ce soira 7 heures, a la Direction politique, pour demander 
qu'en vue d'eviter des commentaires tendancieux des journaux, comme celui de 
YEcho de Paris la veille, et afindebienpreciserle sens des demarches du Gouvernement 
allemand, un bref communique fit donne i la presse sur 1'entrevue de l'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne et du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

M. de Schoen suggera, pour precisersa pensee, les termes suivants, dont le Direc- 
teur politique p. i.prit note sous sadictee: « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne el le Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres ont eu, pendant l'apres-midi, un nouvel entretien, au cours 
duquel ils ont examine, dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarity 
pacilique, les movens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix gene- 
rale. 

Le Directeur politique p. i. repondit aussitot,: « Alors, tout est regie dans 
votre esprit, et vous nous apportez 1'assurance que 1'Autriche accepte la note serbe, 
ou se pretera aux conversations avec les Puissances k cet egard? » L'Ambassadeur ayant 
paru surpris et fait une vive delegation, il lui fut expose que si rien n'etait modifie 
dans 1'attitude negative de l'Allemagne, les termes de la « Note a la presse » suggeree 
etaient excessifs et de nature a donner a I'opinion fran^aise une fausse securile, en 
creant des illusions sur la situation reelle, dont les dangers n'e'taient que trop 
evidents. 

Aux assurances que prodiguait l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne sur fimpression opti- 



— 75 — 
rnisle qu'il eprouvait, le Direeteur politique p. i. repondit en lui demandant s'illui per- 
mettait de lui parler a titre tout personnel et prive, d'liomme a homme, en toute 
liberte, et sans tenir compte de leurs fonctions respectives. Le Baron de Schoen le 
pria de le faire. 

M. Berthelot dit alors que pour tout esprit simple, l'attitude de 1'Allemagne ne 
pouvait s'expliquer, si elle ne tendait pas a la guerre : une analyse purement objective 
des fails et la psychologie des rapports austro-allemands conduisaient logiquement a cette 
conclusion. Devant l'affirmationrepetee que 1'Allemagne ignorait le contenu de la note 
autrichienne, il n'etait plus permis dVlever de doutes sur ce point; etait-il vraisem- 
blable, cependant, que 1'Allemagne se fut rangee, les yeux fermes, a cote de 1'Au- 
triche, dans une pareille aventure? La psychologie de toutes les relations passees de 
Vienne et de Berlin permeltait-elle d'admettre que l'Aulriche eiil pris une position sans 
recul possible, avant d'avoir pese, avec son alliee, tcJutes les consequences de son 
intransigeance? Combien le refus de 1'Allemagne de donner un conseil de mediation 
a Vienne paraissait surprenant, maintenant quelle connaissait le texte extraordinaire 
de la note autrichienne! Quelle responsabilite le Gouvernement allemand prcndrait, 
et queliss suspicions peseraient sur lui, s'il persistait a s'inlerposer entre 1'Autriche et 
les Puissances, apres la soumission pour ainsi dire absolue de la Serbie, et quand le 
moindre conseil donne par lui a Vienne mettrait fin au cauchemar qui pesait sur 
1'Europe! 

La rupture des relations diplomatiques par l'Aulriche, ses menaces de guerre et la 
mobilisation quelle poursuit, donnent une particuhere urgence'a faction pacifica- 
trice de 1'Allemagne , car du jour ou les troupes autrichiennes auraient franchi la 
frontiere serbe, on se tronverait en presence d'un fait qui obligerait sans doute le 
Cabinet de Petersbourg a intervenir et risquerait de dechainer une guerre que 1'Al- 
lemagne declare vouloir eviter. 

M. de Schoen, qui ecoulait en souriant, aflirma de nouveau que 1'Allemagne avait 
ignore le texte de la note autrichienne ( 1 ) et ne l'avait approuvee qu'apressa remise ; elle 
estimail toujours que la Serbie avait besoin d'une lecon assez severe pour qu'elle ne 
put l'oublier, et que 1'Autriche se devait a elle-meme de meltre fin a une situation 
dangereuse et intolerable pour une grande puissance. II declara, d'ailleurs, ne pas 
connaitre le texte de la reponse serbe, et se montra personnellcment surpris qu'elle 
n'eut pas satisfait 1'Autriche, si toutefois elle etail telle qtie les journaux, souvent mal 
informes, la representaient. 

II insista encore sur les intentions paciliques de 1'Allemagne et donna son impres- 
sion sur lefiet que pourraient avoir de bons conseils adresses, par exemple a Vienne, 
par l'Angleterre, sur un ton anneal. Selon lui, 1'Autriche n'etait pas intransigeante; 
ce qu'elle repousse, e'est l'idee d'une mediation formelle, le « spectre » dune confe- 
rence : un mot pacifique venu de Petersbourg , de bonnes paroles dites dun ton con- 

( l ) Voir pifcee n° 2 1 . Leltre du Ministre de France a Munich relalant que le Presidentdu Conseil bavarois 
a dit, le 23 juillet, avoir connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne a la Serbie. 

V. aussi Lime Bleu, la piece n° 95 oil Sir M. de Bunsen, ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne, declare : 
" Quoique je ne puisse pas le verifier, je liens d'une source privee que l'Ambassadeur allemand connaissait 
le texte de t'ultimatutn autrichien a la Serbie avant qu'il ne liit expedie et qu'il l'a telegraphic a I'Erape- 
reur d'AUemagne ; je sais par l'Ambassadeur allemand lui-meme qu'il en approuve chaque ligne. » 



ciliant paries Puissances de la Triple Entente, auraient chance d'etre bien accneillies. 
H ajouta enfin qu'il ne disait pas que l'AUemagne, de son cote, ne donnerait pas 
quelques conseils a Vienne. 

Dans ces conditions, leDirecteur politique declara qu'il demanderait au Ministre 
s'il lui paraissait opporlun de coramuniquer a la presse une courte note de ton 
modere. 



IN 58. 

M. Chevalley, Ministre de France a Christiania, 

a M. Biekvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Christiauia, Ie 26 juillct 1 9 1 i. 

Toute la flotle allemandc en Norvege a recu 1'ordre de prendre la mer. Les auto- 
rites allemandes a Bergen declarent que cost pour rallier directement l'AUemagne. 

Les navires allemands disperses dans les fiords au nord de Bergen rejoindraient 
ceux qui sont aux fnvirons de Stavanger. 

Chevalley. 



N° 59. 

M. d'Ankoville, Charge d'affaires de France a Luxembourg, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Luxembourg, Ie 26 juillct 1914. 

D'apres des renseignements que je viens de receyoir de Thionville, les quatre der- 
nieres classes liberties out ordre de se tcmr a la disposition de la Kommandatur a 
toute heure. 

Sans rtre completement mobilises, les reservistes out interdiction de s'absenter du 
lieu de leur domicile. 

d'Annoville. 



77 — 



N° 60. 



M. Farges, Consul general de France a Bale, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p~i. 

Bale, le 27 juillet 1914. 

Les officiers allemands en vacances dans cetle region ont recu, il y a quatre jours, 
1'ordre de les interrompre pour regagaer 1'AlIemagne. 

D'autre part, j'apprends de deux sources serieuses qu'avis a ete donne aux pro- 
prietaires de voitures automobiles du Grand-Duche de Bade de se preparer a les 
metlre a la disposition des autorites rnilitaires, deux jours apres un nouvet ordre. Le 
secret, sous peine d'amende, a ete recoramande sur cet avis. 

La population baloise est tres inquiete et les facilites bancaires se ressenenL 

Farges. 



N° 61. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minlstre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a M. Jules Cambon, Arabassadeur de France a Berlin, cornmuniaue 
a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les 
Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, 
Rome. 

Paris, le 27 juillet 191/1. 

Les trois demarches de 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Paris semblent caracteris- 
tiques : — le vendredi, il lit une note oil leGouvernementallemandse pose categorique- 
ment enlre l'Autriclie et les Puissances, approuvant I'liltimatum autrichien a la Serbie 
et ajoutant que « l'Allemagne desire ardemment que le condit resle localise, toute 
intervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu de ses alliances, provoquer 
d'incal ulables consequences »; — le second jour, le samedi. I'efFetayant ete. produit et 
lis Puissances ayant, en raison de la surprise, de la brievetedu delai et des risques 
de guerre generate, conseille a la Serbie de ceder, M. de Schoen revient attenuer sa 
demarche, feignant de s'etonner de 1'impression produite et proteste qu'on prete a 
l'Allemagne des intentions qu'elle n'a pas, puisque, dit-il.il n'y a eu ni concert avant, 
ni menace apres; — le troisicmejour, ledimanche. le resultat ayant ete obtenu, puisque 
la Serbie a cede en fait pour ainsi dire a toutes les exigences de i'Aulriche, 1 Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne reparait a deux reprises, pour insisler sur les intentions pacitiques 



— 78 — 
de l'AHemagne et sur son desir ardent dc collaborer au maintien de la paix, apres 
avoir enregistre le succes autnchien, qui clot la premiere phase de la crise. 

La situation a 1'he.ure actuelle reste inquietante, en raison du refus incomprehen- 
sible de 1'Aulriche d'accepter la sournission serbe, de ses operations de mobilisation 
et de'ses menaces d'envahir la Serbie. L'attitude prise depuis le debut, avec 1'appui 
allemand, par le Gouvernement autricbien, son refus d'accepter aucune conversation 
des P uissancesne permettant pas, en pratique, a celles-cid'intervenir utilement aupres 
deluisans 1'intermediaire de 1'Allemagne. Cependant le temps presse, car si I'armee 
autrichienne franchit la frontiere, il sera tres difficile d'enrayer la crise, laRussie ne 
paraissant p-as pouvoir tolerer l'occupation de la Serbie, apres que celle-ci s'e'st en 
realite soumise a la Note autrichienne en lui donnanl loutes satisfactions et garanlies. 
L'AHemagne, du fait meme de la position prise par elle, est qualifiee pour intervenir 
utilement et etre ecoutee a Vienne; si elle ne le fait pas, elle justifie tous les soupcons 
et assume la responsabihle de la guerre. 

Les Puissances, et en particulier la Russie, la France et l'Angleterre ont determine 
par leurs pressants conseils Belgrade a ceder;-eHes ont done remph leur role; main- 
tenant e'est a 1'Allemagne, seule en situation d'etre entendue rapidement a Vienne, 
a donner des conseils a l'Autriche qui a obtenu satisfaction et ne peut, pour un detail 
facile a regler, dechainer la guerre generale. 

C'est dans ces conditions que se presente la proposition faite par le cabinet de Lon- 
dres; M. Sazonoff ayant dit a 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'a la suite de 1'appel dela 
Serbie aux Puissances, la Russie accepteraitde se tenir a lecart. Sir E. Grey a formule 
aupres des Cabinets de Paris, Berlin et Rome, la suggestion suivante : les Ambassa- 
deurs de France, d'AUemagne et d'ltalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher avec 
Sir E. Grey un moyeh de resoudre les diffieultes actuelles, elant er.tendu que pendant 
cette conversation, la Russie, l'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opera- 
tion militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parle de cette suggestion a 1'Ambassadeur d'AUe- 
magne, qui s'y est montre favorable; elle sera egalement bien accueillie a Paris et 
aussi a Rome, selon toute vraisemblance. Ici encore, la parole est a l'AHemagne, 
qui a 1'occasion de temoigner autrement qu'en paroles sa bonne volonte. 

Je vous prie de vous concerter avec votre collegue anglais et d'appuyer aupres du 
Gouvernement allemand sa demarche dans la forme qui vous paraitra opportune. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N° 62'. 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les 
Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, 
Vienne. 

Paris, It' 27 juillet 1 gid- 
Apres sa demarche d'hier tendant a une intervention apaisante de la France a 
Petersbourg, 1'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne etait revenu, ainsi que je vous en ai in- 
forme, a la Direction politique, sous le pretexte qu'il pourrait y avoir interet a com- 



— 79 — 
muniquer a la presse une courte note indiquant le sens pacifiquc et arnica! de la 
conversation ; il avait meme suggere les termes suivants : « L'Ambassadeur et le Mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu, pendant 1'apres-midi , un nouvel entretien au 
cours duquel on a examine, dans 1'esprit le plus arnica! et dans un sentiment de 
solidarity pacifique, los moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix 
gene-rale. » II fut repondu de suite que les termes paraissaient excessifs et de nature 
a donner a {'opinion des illusions sur la situation reelle, que cependant une breve 
note dans le sens indiqu6 , c'est-a-dire'rendant compte d'une conversation oil avaient 
ete examines les moyens employes pour sauvegarder !a paix, pourrait etre donnee 
sije 1'approuvais. 

La note communiquee a ete la suivante : o L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont 
recherche les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix. » Cette 
redaction, volonlairement terne, evitait une solidarity avec l'Allemagne qui pourrait 
etre mal interpretee. 

Ce matin , M. de Schoen a adresse une lettre particuliere au Directeur politique , sous 
le pretexte de resumer son entretien avec le Ministre , et a ajoute : « Notez bien la 
phrase sur la solidarity des sentiments pacifiques. Ce n'est pas une phrase banale, 
mais la sincere expression de la realite. » Le resume joint a la lettre etait ainsi con^u : 
« Le Cabinet de Vienne a fait formellement et officiellement declarer a celui de 
Petersbourg qu'il ne poursuit aucune acquisition territoriale en Serbie et qu'il ne veut 
point porter atleinte a 1'integrite du royaume; sa seule intention est celle d'assurer sa 
tranquillite. En ce moment, la decision, si une guerre europeenne doit eclater, 
depend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement Allemand a la ferme confiance 
que le Gouvernement Francjais, avec lequel il se sait solidaire dans l'ardent desir que 
la paix europeenne puisse etre mainlenue , usera de toute son influence dans un esprit 
apaisant aupres du Cabinet de Petersbourg. » 

Je vous ai fait connaitre la reponse qui avait et6 faite (une demarche franchise a 
Petersbourg s'expliquait mal et devait avoir pour corollaire une d-marche allemande 
a Vienne, ou, a defaut, une mediation, dans les deux capitales, des qualre Puissances 
moins interessees). 

La lettre de M. de Schoen est susceptible de diverses interpretations : la plus vrai- 
semblable est qu'elle tend, comme sa demarche meme, a chercher a compromettre la 
France au regard de la Russie, quitte, en cas d'echec, a rejeter sur la Russie et sur 
la France la responsabitite d'une guerre eventuelle, enfin a masquer, par des assu- 
rances pacifiques non ecoutees.une action militaire de rAutriche'en Serbie, destinee 
a completer le succes autrichien. 

Je vous communique ces renseignements k titre d'information et a toutes fins 
utiles- 

Bienvenu-Mabtin. 



— 80 — 

N° (53. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne ct I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie laissent en- 
tendre qu'ils sont surs que 1'Angleterre garderait la neulralite si un conflit venait i 
eclater. Sir Arlliur Nicolson m'a (Jit que, cependant, le Prince Lichnowski ne pou- 
vait, apre la conversation qu il a eue avec lui aujourd'hui, conserver aucun doute sur 
la liberie qu'enteildait garder le Gouvernement britannique d'inlervenir, au cas oil il 
le jugerait utile. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne n'aura pas manque d'etre frappe de cette declaration, 
mais pour peser sur 1'AHemagne et pour eviter un conflit, il semble' indispensable 
que celle-ci soit amenee a tenir pour certain qu'elle Irouverait 1'Angleterre et la 
Kussie aux cotes de la France. 

de Fleuriau. 



N° U. 

M. Paleolocue, Ambassadeur de France a Sainb-Petersbourg, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Saint-Pelersbourg, 2 7 juillet 191 A. 

M. SazonofT a tenu a lous mes collegues un langage conciliant. 
Malgrc I'cniotion publique, le Gouvernement Russe s'applique et reussit a contenir 
la presse; on a notamment recommande une grand e moderation envers 1'Allemagne. 
Depuis bier, M. Sazonofl n'a recu de Vienne ni de Berlin aucune information. 

Paleologoe. 



N° 65. 

M. Bompard, Ambassadeur de France a Constantinople, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Ther.lpia, le 27juili»t 1914. 

Le conflit auslro-serbe retient I'attention du Gouvernement Ottoman el les Turo 
se rejouissent des epreuves de la Serine, mais on est porle a croire ici en general que 



— 81 — 
ce eonflit restera localise. L'on estinie generalement que, cetle fois encore, la Russie 
ninterviendra pas en faveurde la/ Serbie dons des conditions qui elendraient le conflil 
arme. 

Le sentiment unanime, dans les milieux politiques ottomans, est que l'Autriche, 
avec 1'appui de 1'Allemagne, arrivera a ses fms et quelle fera entrer la Serbie, apres 
la Bulgarie, dans l'orbite de la Triple Alliance. 

Bompard. 



N° 66. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. 

I.ondres, le 27 juillet 191A,. 

Sir Ed. Grey a dil ce matin a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que si 1'Aulriche 
envahissait la Serbie apres la reponse serbe, elle demonlrerait qu'elle ne poursuivail 
pas seulement le reglement des questions mentionnees dans sa note du 2 3 juillet, 
mais qu'elle voulait ecraser un petit Etat. «Alors, a-t-il ajoute, se poserait une 
question europeenne, et il s'ensuivrait une guerre, a laquelle d'aulres Puissances 
seraient amenees a prendre part ». 

L'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne s'affirme par 1'arret de la demobilisation de sa 
flotte. Le Premier Lord de l'Amiraute avail pris discretement cette mesure des 
vendredi, de sa propre initiative; cetle nuit, sir Edward Grey et ses collegues onl 
decide de la publier. Ce resullat est du a l'attitude concilrante de la Serbie et de la 
Russie. 

de Fleuriau. 



N° 67. 

M. Jules Cambois, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, 1c 27 juillet 1914. 

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Secretaire d'Etat de la demarche de 1'Angleterre ten- 
dant 4 ce que 1'Allemagne se joigne aux Cabinets de Londres, Paris et Rome pour 
empecher les hostilites entre Petersbourg et Vienne. 

Documents diplomatiques. — Cuerre europeenne. 1 1 



— 82 — 

Je lui ai fait remarquer que la proposition de sir Edward Grey ouvrail la voie a 
une issue pacifique. M. de Jagow ma repondu qu'il elait dispose a y entrer, mais 
il m'a fait Temarquer que si la Russie mobilisait, I'Allemagne serait obligee de 
mobilise r aussitot, que nous y serions forces egalement et qu'alors le con (lit serait 
presque inevitable. Je lui ai demande si I'Allemagne se croirait engagee a mobiliser 
dans le cas oti la Russie ne mobihserait que sur la frontiere autrichienne ; il m'a dil 
que non et m'a aulorise forraellement a vous faire connaitre cette restric lion. Aussi 
attacherait-il la plus grande importance a ce que les puissances amirs et all iees dc la 
Russie intervinssent aupres d'elle. 

Enfin il a rernarque que si la Russie attaquait I'Autriche, rAllemagne- devraii 
attaquer aussitot de son cole. L'intervention proposee par 1'Angleterre a Petcrsbo urg 
et a Vienne nepourrait done s'exercer a ses yeu\. que si les evenements'ne. se preci- 
pitaient pas. II ne desespere pas dans ce cas quelle puisse reussir. J'ai exprime le 
regret que I'Autriche, par son inlransigeance, cut conduit 1'Europe au pas difficile 
que nuns traversoris, mais j'ai temoigue 1'espoir que 1 intervention aboutirait. 

Jules Cambon. 



N° 68. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, 

a, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrarigeres p. i.. 

Londres, le 27 juillet 1 9 1 i- 

Hier, au cours d'une conversation entre M. SazonolT, M. Paleologue et Sir G. Bu- 
chanan, le Ministre russe aurait dit que la Serbie etait disposee a en appeler au\ 
Puissances, et, qn'en ce cas, son Gouvernement accepterait de se tenir a 1'ecarl. 

Sir Ed. Grey a pris texte de ces paroles pour formuler aupres des Cabinets de 
Paris, de Berlin et dr Rome une proposition dont Sir Francis Bertie saisira Votre 
Exi ill. muc. Les quatre puissances uiterviendraienl dans le conflit , et les Ambassadeurs 
de France, d'AUemagne et d'llalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher, avec 
Sir Ed. Grey, un moyen de resoudre les dillicultes actuelles. 

II serait entendu que, pendant les debals de cette petite conference, la Russie, 
l'Autri:lie et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute operation militaire active. Sir A. Ni- 
coKon a parle de cette suggestion a I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne qui s'y est monlre 
favorable. 

Dt Flevriau. 



— 83 - 



N° 69. 



M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 27 juillet laii. 

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a pas recu d'instructions de son Gouvernement en vue de 
demander la mediation de 1'Angleterre; il est d'ailleurs possible que les telegrammes 
de son Gouvernement soient arreles en route. 

La proposition anglaise d'intervenir a quatre, indiquee dans mon telegramme 
precedent, est d'ailleurs lancee, et me parait devoir etre soutenue en premier lieu. 

de Fleuriau. 



N° 70. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

a M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres. 

Paris, le 27 juillet i 9 1 4 ■ 

L'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre m'a communique la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey ten- 
dant a une action commune de 1'Angleterre, de I'Allemagne, de la France et de 1'Italie 
a Vienne, Belgrade et Pelersbourg pour arreter les operations militaires actives, pen- 
dant que les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'ltalic et de France a Londres examine- 
raient, avec Sir E. Grey, les moyens de trouver une solution aux complications 
presentes. 

J'ai present ce matin a M. Jules Cambon de se concerter avec 1'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre a Berlin, et d'appuyer sa demarche, dans la lorme oil il le jugerait 
opportun. 

Je vous autorise a prendre part a la reunion projete* par Sir E. Grey. Je suis pret 
egalement a donner a nos agents a Vienne, Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions 
dans le sens demande par le Gouvernement anglais. 

Toutefois, j'estime que les chanoes de succes de la proposition de Sir E. Grey 
reposent esseniiellement sur Taction qi>e Berlin serait dispose a exercer a Vienne; 
une demarche de ce cote pour amener la suspension des operations militaires me 
paraitrait vouee a lechec, si 1'influence de I'Allemagne ne s'etait pas exercee au 
prealable. 

J'ai egalement note parmi les observations de M. de Schoen, que le Gouvernement 



— 84 — 
austro-hongrois etait specialement susceptible quand on pronon^ait les termes de 
o mediation », « intervention •,« conference », el plus capable d'admettre des » conseils 
amicaux » et des « conversations ». 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N° 71. 

M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France, a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 27 juillet 191A. 

J'ai fail connaitre a Sir E. Grey votre adhesion a sa proposition de mediation a 
quatre et de conference a Londres. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne a recu les 
instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois des que ses 
collegues francais, allemand 011 ilalien auront ete autorises a faire la meme de- 
marche. 

Le Gouvernement italien a accepte rintervention a quatre en vue de prevenir les 
operations militaires; il consulte le Gouvernement allemand sur la proposition de 
conference et la procedure a suivre a I'egard du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Le 
Gouvernement allemand n'a pas encore repondu. 

de Flectriad. 



W 72. 

M. BARRiRE, Ambassadeur de France a Rome. 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Rome, le 27 juillet io,i4. 

Le Marquis de San Giuliano, est renlre a Rome ce soir et je l'ai vu aussitol apres 
son arrivee. 11 m'a parle du content! de la Note autrichienne et m'a assure formel- 
lement qu'd n'en a eu aucune connaissance prealable. 

II savait bien que cette Note devait avoir un caractere rigoureux et energique ; 
mais il ne s'etait pas doute quelle put prendre une telle forme. Je lui ai demande 
s'il etait vrai qu'il eut fait exprimer a Vienne a ce propos , comme le pretendent 
certains journaux, une approbation de l'aclion autrichienne el 1'assurance que l'ltalie 
remplirait a I'egard de TAulriche ses devoirs d'alliee. « En aucune facon, m'a 
repondu le Ministre : nous n'avons pas ete consultes, on ne nous a rien dit ; nous 
n'avons done eu a faire aucune communication de cette nature a Vienne ■>. 



— 85 — 

Le Marquis de San Giuliano estime que la Serbie aurait agi plus sagement en 
acceptant la note dans son integralile; aujourd'hui encore il estime que ce serait la 
seule chose a faire, etant couvaincu que I'Autnche ne retirera aucune de ses pre- 
tentions, et lesmaintiendra, meme au risque d'amener une conflagration generale; il 
doute que 1'Allemagne soil disposee a se preter a une action aupres de son alliee. II 
constate toulefois que 1'Allemagne tient en ce moment un grand comple de ses 
rapports avec Londres, et il croit que si une Puissance pcut determiner Berlin a une 
action pacifique, c'est 1'Angleterre. 

Quant a 1'Italie, elle continuera a faire tous ses efforts en faveur de la paix. C'est 
a cet effel qu'il a adhere sans hesiter a la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey de r^unir a 
Londres les Ambassadeurs des Puissances, qui ne sont pas directement interessees 
dans le condil austro-serbe. 

Barrere. 



N" 73. 

M. Jule. Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 37 juillet 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Anglelerre , qui est rentre aujourd'hui, a vu le Secretaire d'Etat 
el 1'a enlretenu de la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey. M. de Jagow lui a repondu en 
manifestant toujours son desir de la paix, mais en ajoulant qu'il ne pourrait consentir 
a ce qui ressemblerait a une conference des Puissances; ce serait instituer une espece 
de cour d'arbilrage, dont l'idee ne serait acceptable que si elle etait demandee par 
Vienne et Petersbourg. Le langage de M. de Jagow confirme celui de M. de Schoen 
a Voire Excellence. 

A la verile une demarche des quatre Puissances a Vienne et Petersbourg peut se 
produire par la voie diplomatique, sans prendre la forme d'une conference et est 
susceptible de bien des modalites ; ce qui importerait c'est de manifester a Vienne et 
a Petersbourg le desir commun des quatre Puissances qu'un conflit soil evite. La 
lemporisation permettrait seule d'arriver a 'une issue pacifique des diflicultes pre- 
sentes. 

Jules Cambon. 



N° 74. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a BerJin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914. 

Je me suis entretenu aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat el j'ai appuye aupros 
de lui la demarche que venait de faire Sir E. Goschen. 

M. de Jagow m'a repondu, comme il l'avait fait a 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, 
qu'il ne pouvait accepter la proposition de charger les Ambassadeurs d'ltalie, de 
France et d'Allemagne de chercher avec Sir Ed. Grey les moyens de resoudre les 
difficultes actuelles, parce que ce serait instituer une veritable conference pour 
traiter des affaires de 1'Autriche et de la Russie. 

J'ai replique a M. de Jagow que je regrettais sa reponse, mais que le grand objet 
que Sir Edw. Grey avait en vue depassait une question de forme; que ce qui impor- 
tait c'etait 1'association de 1'Angleterre et de la France avec 1'Allemagne et lltalie 
pour travailler a une ceuvre de paix; que cette association pouvait se manifester par 
des demarches communes a Petersbourg et a Vienne; qu'il m'avait souvent exprime 
son regret de voir les deux groupes d'alKance opposes toujours 1'un a 1'autre en 
Europe; qui! avait la 1'occasion de prouver qu'il y avait un esprit europeen, en mon- 
trant quatre Puissances appartenant aux deux groupes agissant dun common accord, 
pour empecher un conflit. 

M. de Jagow s'est derobe en disant que 1'Allemagne avait des engagements avec 
1'Autriche. Je lui ai fait remarquer que les rapports de l'AUemagne avec Vienne 
n'elaient pas plus etroits que ceux de la France avec la Russie et que c'etait lui-rnerne 
qui mettait dans 1'espece les deux groupes dalliance en opposition. 

Le Secretaire d'Etat m'a dit alors qu'il ne se refusait pas k agir pour ecarter le 
conflil austro-russe , mais qu'il ne pouvait pas intervenir dans le conflit austro-serbe. 
« L'un est la consequence de 1'autre, ai-je dit, et il importe d'empecher quil ne sur- 
o vienne un etat de fait nouveau, de nature a amener une intervention de la Russie. » 

Comme le Secretaire d'Etat persistait a dire qu'il etait oblige de tenir ses eugage- 
menls i.l'egard de 1'Autriche, je lui ai deinande s'd s'etait engage a la suivie partout, 
les yeux bandes, et s'il avait pris connaissance de la reponse de la Serbie a 1'Autriche , 
que le Charge d'affaires de Serbie lui avait remise ce matin. « Je n'en ai pas encore 
« eu le temps, » me dit-il. « Je le regrette. Yous verriez que, sauf sur des points de 
« detail, la Serbie se soumet entierement. II semble done que, puisque I'Autricbe a 
.. oblenu les satisfactions que votre appui lui a procurees, vous pouvez aujourd'hui 
« lui conseiller de s'en contenter ou d'examiner avec la Serbie les termes de la reponse 
« de celle-ci. » 

Comme M. Jagow ne me repondait pas clairement, je lui ai demande si 1'Alle- 
magne voulait la guerre. D a proteste vivement , disant qu'il savait que c'etait 
*na pensee, mais que c'etait tout a fait inexact. « II faut done, ai-je repris, agir en 



— 87 - 
"Consequence. Quand vous lirez la reponse serbe, pesez-en les termes avec voire 
€ conscience, je vous en prie, au nom de 1'humanite, et n'assumez pas personnelle- 
« ment une part de responsabilite dans les catastrophes que vous laissci preparer. • 
M. de Jagow a proleste de nouveau, ajoutanl qu'il etait pret a s'unir a 1'Angleterre 
et a la France dans un elTort commun, mais qu'il fallait trouver a cette intervention 
une forme qu'il put accepter et que les Cabinets clevaient s'entendre a ce sujet. 

« Au reste, a-t-il ajoute, les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg 
« sont entamees et se poursuivent : )'en augure beaucoup de bien et j'espere. » 

Au moment de le quitter, je lui dis que j'avais eu ce matin 1'anpression que 1'heure 
de la detente avait sonne, mais que je voyais bien qu'il n'en etait rien. 11 ma repondu 
que je me trompais; qu'il esperait que les choses etaient en bonne v6ie et abouti- 
raient peut-etre rapidement. Je lui ai deraande d'agir a Vienne pour qu'elles marchent 
vite-, parce qu'il importait de ne pas Iaisser se creer en Russie un de ces courants 
d'opinion qui emportent tout. 

A mon sentiment, il y aurait lieu de demander a Sir E. Grey, qui a du etre avise 
par Sir E. Goschen du refus oppose a sa proposition dans la forme qui lui etait 
donnee, de la renouveler sous une autre forme, de telle fac.on que 1'AUemagne n'ail 
pas de pretexte pour refuser de s'y associer et prenne ses responsabilites aux yeux de 
1'Angleterre. 

Jules Cambon. 



N" 75. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre ties Affaires etrangeres p^ i. 

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de Fiance a Londres, Sain t-Petersbourg , 
Berlin, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, le if juillet 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autnche-Hongrie est venu me voir pour me remettre un me- 
moire, veritable acte daccusation contre la Serbie; il m'a declare, d'ordre de son 
Gouvernement, que la Serbie n'ayant pas repondu d'une maniere satisfaisanle aux 
demandes du Gouvernement imperial, cetui-ci se voit contraint d'employer des 
moyens energiques pour amener la Serbie a donner les satisfactions et guaranties qui 
sont reclamees d'elle. Cest demain que le Gouvernement autricliien prendra les 
mesures a cet eflet. 

J*ai prie TAmbassadeur de me faire connaitre les mesures envisageesparl'Autriche, 
et le Comte Szecsea ma repondu que cela pourrait etre soil un ultimatum, soit une 
declaration de guerre, soit le passage de la frontiere, mais qu'il n'avait aucune indi- 
cation precise sur ce point. 

J'ai alors fait reinarquer 4 l'Auibassadeur que la Serbie avait accepte sur presque 
tous les points les exigences de lAutricue, que la divergence qui subsistail sur 



quelques points pourrait disparailre avec un peu de bonne volonte reciproque, et par 
I'aide des Puissances amies de la paix; en fixant a demain l'execulion de ses resolu- 
tions, l'Autriclie reudait, pour la seconde fois, leur concours presque impossible et 
assumait une lourde responsabilite en risquant de dechainer une guerre, dont on 
ne pourrait mesurer l'extension. 

Je vous communique, a tilre d'information , le memoire que m'a remis le 
Comte Szecsen. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



Annexe. 



Memoirs da'Goavernement auslro-hongrois , remis parte Comte Szeesen 
h M. Bienvenu-Martin le 27 juillet 191b. 

L'agitation serbe, qui s'est donne pour but d'arriver a la separation de la Monarchie aulri- 
ehienne des partis slaves du Sud pour les rattacher a un grand Etat serbe, remonte tres 
loin en arriere. Cette propagande sur le sol serbe, toujours la meme quant a son but final, 
quoique diverse dans ses moyens et intensites, avait atteint son plus baut point lors de la 
crisr de I'anncxion, Rejetant le mantean protecteur du secret , elle s'etait montree alors avec 
toute la franchise de ses tendances et avait montre sous le patronage du Gouvernement 
serbe son intention de realiser ses desseins avec lous les moyens disponibles. 

Tandis que la Presse serbe tout cntiere appelait au combat contre la Monarchie par des 
cris haineux ct en denaturant les faits, il se creait des associations pour encourager a cette 
lutte — meme abstraction faile d'autres moyens de propagande. 

L'association qui est devenue la plus importante est la ■ Narodna Odbrana ». Issue d'un 
comite revolutionnaire qui existait alors, elle fut constitute en Society privee, cependant, 
sous forme d'organisation dependant du Departement des Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade 
par des fonctionnaires serbes militaires et civils. Parmi ces fondateurs, on doit citer notam- 
ment : le general Buzo Jankovic, les anciens ministres Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic 
et Valislav V'alovic, le directeur de 1'Imprimerie nationale Zivojin Dacic, et les anciens capi- 
taines, maintenant commandants, Voja Tankovic et Milan Pribicevic. Cette association 
s'etait impose conime but la creation et 1'organisation de bandes en vue de la guerre esperee 
contre la Monarchie. On trouvera une description saisissante de 1'activile. d'alors de la 
« Narodna Odbrana » , notamment dans les declarations du sujet bosneo-herzegovinien Trifko 
Krstanovic, entendu comme temoin par le conseil de guerre de Sarajevo, qui se trouvait 
alors a Belgrade et qui, avec d'autres sujets de la Monarchie, a ete accepte comme comi- 
tadji par la « Narodna Odbrana". Avec environ cent quarante autres, Krstanovic avait ete 
amene a une ecole creee pour la formation de nouveHes bandes a Cuprija, district de Jago- 
dina, et dirigce par les capitaines Voja Tankosic et Dusan Putnick. 11 n'y avait comme 
maitres dans cette ecole que des officicrs serbes; le general Bozo Jankovic et le capitaine 
Milan Pribicevic donnerent une grande r^gularitc a ces cours d'organisation de bandes, qui 
duraient trois mois. 

Les comitadji y recevaient un enseignement complet du tir, du jet des bombes, des mines, 
de la destruction des chemins de fer, tunnels, ponts et telegraphes. Leur devoir etait, d'apres 



— 89 — 
leurs chefs, de mettre en pratique les connaissances nouvcllement acquises en Bosnie-Her- 
zegovine. 

Par cette action de la « Narodna Odbrana » exercee de la maniere la plus publique et favo- 
risee par le Gouvernement Serbe, a et6 repandue la guerilla des bandes contre la Monar- 
chic. Par la, les sujets de la Monarchic elaient conduits a la Irahison contre leur patrie, et 
amenes systematiquement a pratiquer comme emissaires serbes des attaques secretes contre 
les moyens de defense de leur palrie. 

Cette periode des aspirations agressives s'est terminee avec la declaration faite par le Gou- 
vernement serbe le 3i mars 1909, dans laquelle celui-ci se declarait pret a accepter le 
nouvel etat de choses cree par 1'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine au point de vue du droit 
public, et a promis solennellement vouloir vivre en relations amicales de bon voisinage, 
dans 1'avenir, avec la Monarchie. 

Avec cette declaration, il semblait que dut prendre fin 1'agitadon constituant une source 
permanente de troubles contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et qu'on eut trouve un moyen do, rappro- 
chement arnica! entre la Serbie et la Monarchie. Privee de lappui du Gouvernement serbe, 
et comhatlue par lui conformement a ces engagements, la propagande hostile n'aurait pu 
durer que d'une nianiere occulte, vouee a une prompte destruction. Par contre, les poinls 
de contact exislant entre les partis slaves du Sud de la Monarchie et la Serbie dans le 
domaine de la langue, des races et de la culture auraient du conduire a la realisation d'un 
travail de developpement commun inspire d'amities reciproques et d'interets paralleles. 

Cependant ces espoirs ne se sont pas realises. Les aspirations hostiles a la Monarchie ont 
subsiste, et, sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe qui n'a rien fait pour etouffer cette agi- 
tation , la propagande institute contre, 1'Autriche n'a fait que gagner en etendue et prolondeur. 
La haine contre la Monarchie a ete tenue en haleine et s'est transformee en un sentiment 
irreconciliable. Le peuple serbe, tant par les moyens anciens, mieux adaptes a ia situation, 
que par des methodes plus completes, a ete appele « au combat d'aneantissement ineluc 
table » contre I'Autriche. Systematiquement, des fils secrets ont ele tisses vers les domaines 
slaves du sud de la Monarchie , dont les sujets ont ete incites a la trahison. 

Par-dessus tout, c'est la presse serbe qui n'a cesse d'agir dans cet esprit. 

Pas moins de quatre-vingt un journaux paraissant en Serbie ont du 4tre retires de la circu- 
lation postale jusqu'aujourd'hui, en raison de leur contenu qui tomba sous le coup de la loi 
peuale. II nest guere une loi penale protegeant la personne sacree du Monarque et des 
membres de la famille impenale ou l'integrite de 1 Etat qui n'ait ete violee par les feuilles 
serbes. On trouvera a 1'annexe I quelques-unes des nombreuses preuves donnees par la presse 
dans l'ordre d'idees ci-dessus. 

Sans entrer dans un examen detaille des manieres de voir de l'opinion publique serbe, il 
y a lieu d'observer que la presse n'a cesse de considerer 1'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine, 
malgre la reconnaissance formelle serbe, apres comme avant, comme un 'rapt exerce contre 
la Serbie ayant besoin d'etre repare\ Cette pensee ne revient pas settlement dans les feuilles 
d'opinion avancee, niais aussi dans la «Samuprava» qui tient de si pres a 1'Office des 
Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade, ou elle est exprimee sous une forme a peine envelopp^e 
(voir annexe I1 B ). 

On ne peut pas non plus negliger de considerer comment l'attentat commis le 1 5 juin 
1910a Sarajevo par Bogdan Zerajic contre le Gouverneur de Bosnie-Herzegovine, mailre 
tie camp von Varesanin , a ete loue par la presse. 

On se souvient que Zerajic s'etait tue immediatement apres son acte et avait brule, avant 
de le commettre, tous ses papiers. Pour ces raisons, il n'avait pas ete possible de mettre en 
lumiere pleinement les motifs de cet attentat, on a cependant puconclure d'une piece trouvee 

DOCUMEMS DIPLOUAT1QCEG. — GuClTe europtCIUie. J.J 



— 90 — 
pres de lui qu'il etait partisaD des idees de Kropotkine. Les indices releves ont egalement 
conduit a penser qu'il s'agissait d'un attentat d'un caractere anarchiste. 

C.eci n'empecha pas cepondant la presse serbe de celebrer le criminel comrae mi heros 
national serbe et de louer son acte. Meme, le « Politika s'est eleve conlre l'idee que Zerajic 
fut un anarchiste et 1'a reclame comrae un a heros serbe dont le nom sera repete par tous les 
Serbes avec respect et douleur ». 

Le « Politika > considere la date du 18 aout de la meme annee «jour de naissanco de 
S. M. ImpeViale et Royale » comme une occasion favorable pour parler a nouveau de 
Zerajic « dont le nom sera dans le peuple qoelque chose comme celui d'un saint » et pour 
louer solerrn-llement lattentat en une poesie (annexe n" 1). 

C'e5t ainsi qu'a.ete exploits ce crime n'ayant rien de commun avec les aspirations sur des 
territoires de la Monarchic, pour ie progres de cette idee et que le meurtre a etc rec.onnu 
de la maniere la plus explicite comme un moyen glorieux et dignc d'imitation dans la lutte 
pour la realisation de cette pensee. Cette sanetification du meurtre comme une methode 
pleinement admissible dans la lutte contre la Monarchie revient plus tard dans les feuilles 
parlant de lattentat commis par Jukic contre le Commissaire royal de Cuvaj (annexe 1 E ). 

Ces journaux repandus , non pas seulement en Serbie, mais comme on 1'a vu plus tard 
par des voies secretes bien organisees et par fraudes dans la Monarchie qui ont amene et 
maintenu eveillee dans les grandes masses cette disposition, laqueile a fourni un terrain 
nourricier, favorable pour les meTaits des associations hostiles a la Monarchie. 

Cest la « Narodna Odbrana v qui est devenue le centre de 1'agitation menee par les asso- 
ciations. Les menies personnel qui, au temps de l'annexion, etaieni a sa tete, sent encore 
celles qui la dirigent. On retrouve parmi elles comme organisatetirs e'nergiques et pleins 
d'action les plus violentsopp >s:mts de la Monarchie cites plus haul. Organise'e sur une base 
large et profonde et possedant une hierarchic (voir annexe II « organisation »), la « Narodna 
Odbrana » posseda bientot environ quatre cents adherents, qui rcpandirent une agitation 
tres active. 

En outre , la Narodna s'est mise en association etroite avec la « Federation des Tirenrs » 
(762 societes), 1'association des Sokol « Dusan Silni (2,5oo membres), le Club olympique, 
1' Association des cavaliers « Knez Mihajlo », la Societe des chasseurs et la Ligue de de>elop- 
pement, ainsi que de nombreuses autres associations, qui toutes, conduites et protegees par 
la Narodna, agissaient dans le meme esprit. Se penetrant de plus en plus les unes les autres, 
ces associations parvinrent a une fusion complete, de telle maniere qu'elles ne sont plus 
aujourd'hui que des membres du Corps unique de la Narodna. Ainsi cette derniere a con- 
stituc sur toute la Serbie un reseau tres serre d'agitation et a attire a toutes ses idees tous 
ceux capables de les recevoir. 

Quel est l'esprit de l'action de la Narodna, cest ce que demontre avec une sufTisante 
elarte les publications officielles de cette Societe. 

Dans ses statuts, revetns de l'apparence d'une societe de developpement ne se preoccu- 
pant que du perfectionnement spiritucl et corporel dc la population serbe et de son Tenfor- 
cement materiel, la Narodna devoile dans son organe corporatif (voir annexe II) le vrai et 
unique mobile de son existence, en ce quelle appelle son « programme reorganise ». 

Prccher au peuple serbe notamment «la verite sainje par un travail fanatique et infati- 
gable n sous 1'allegation que la Monarcbie'veut « lui prendre sa liberte et sa langue et meme 
detruire la Serbie »; qu'il est une necessite ineluctable de conduire contre rAutriche-llon- 
grie, son premier et plus grand enrremi, ie o combat de destruction avec fusils et canons » et 
de preparer le peuple a ce combat « par tous les moyens » , pour la liberation des territoires 
soumis, dans lesquels sont sous 1'opprobe et le joug sept millions de freres. Tous les neHbrts 



- 91 — 

pour le deWeloppement » de la Narodna sont au service exclusif de cette idee comnie simple 
moyen potir 1'organisation et leducation du peuple en vue de la lutte pour l'an£anlissement 
prevu. 

C'est dans le meme esprit que fravaillcnt toutes les associations aflilides a la Narodna i 
i'egard desquelles 1'association des "Sokolo de Kragujevac peut servir comme exemple 
(voir annexe HI). 

Comme pour la Narodna, ce sont des officiers, professeurs et agents de 1'Etat qui sont a. 
sa tete. 

Le disco-ins par iequel son President, major Kovacevic, a ouvert 1'assemblee annuelle de 
1 q 1 4 renonc'e totalement a mentionner la gymnastique , ce qui est cependant le but veri- 
table des « Sokol » et ne parle que de la « preparation a la gueiTe » cootre « 1'Ennenni dange- 
reux, sans coeur, odieux et envahissant du Nord » qui enleve a des millions de freres 
serbes leurs liberies et leurs droits et les niaintient dans 1'esclavage et les fers. 

Dans les rapports administratifs de cette association, les developpements tecbniques 
passent totalement a 1'arriere-plan et ne servent que de rubriques pour la connaissance du 
veritable « but de l'.iclivite de l'administration », notanimcnt « la preparation ihi diveloppement 
national et la neccssite dcjorlijtcr la « nation ecrasec « clans I'objectif quelle puisse ainsi mener a. 
bien son "programme nan encore rempli, sa tdche non encore accomplie*, et accomphr cette 
•> grande action qui doit s'accomplir dans I'avenir prochain : la liberation dcsj'reres vivemt aa ielii 
■ dc la Drina qui endurenl le martyre des crucifih ». 

II n'est pas jusqu'au tresorier qui ne fasse servir son rapport financier pour lancer cet 
appel que 1'on doit « clever des faucons » (pi sont en mesure « d'apporter la liberie aux freres 
non encore liberes. » 

De meme que les aspirations au de veloppement dans la Narodna , 1'activite en gymnastique 
des « Sokol » n'est pas le but lui-meme , mais un simple, moyen au service de la meme propa- 
gande menee avec les memes intentions pour ne pas dire avec les memes mots exactement.' 

Lorsque la Narodna appelle au combat d'aneantissement contre la Monarcbie, elle ne| 
s'adresse passeulement au peuple de la Monarcbie, mais a tous les peuples slaves du sud.l 
Pour la Narodna , les territoires slaves du sud de la Monarcbie font partie de « nos terri- 
toires serbes soumis » (voir aussi annexe IV). De meme les sujets slaves du sud de la mo- 
narcbie doivent prendre part a cette « oeuvre nationale »,. de meme cette activite « saine et 
necessaire » doit s'exercer de 1'autre cote de la frontiere serbe et meme sur le sol de la 
monarcbie, la Narodna recberche ses « beros pour la guerre sainte », dont Obilic, 1'assassin 
de Mourad, est cite comme exemple digne d'imitation du sacrifice a la patrie. 

Mais, pour amener les freres «hors de Serbie » a participer au ■ travail d'initiative privee » 
la Narodna entretient une association intime avec les « Freres de ce cote-ci de la frontiere ». 
Comment cette intimite est exercee, c'est ce qui n'est pas dit, sans doute parce que cela 
appartienl a cette partie da ■ travail d'cnscmble » qui « pour des raisons nombreuses ne peut ni 
ne doit etre explique ». 

Combien cette branche de son activite est etendue, c'est ce que montre le fait que non 
seulement le Comite central de la Narodna, mais encore certains de ses comites regionaux, 
possede des sections speciales pour « lesaflaires exterieiires >, 

L activity exterieure de la Narodna et de ses affilies est particulierement variee. 

Celle qui est relativement la moins dangereuse parce que controlable officiellement, con- 
siste en tournees de conferences qu'entrep'rennent les membres influents de la Narodna vers 
les parties sud-ouest de la Monarcbie oil ils parlent dans diverses societes sur des sujets natio- 
naux ou de culture. Ces occasions permettent aux orateurs d'exposer aux cercles les plus 



— 92 — 
releves de leiirs adherents, en paroles plus on moins gazees, comprehensibles pourceux qui 
soul deja au courant, les veritables tendances de [association. 

Parmi ces emissaires, un desplus connus est le Directeur de I'lmprimerie d'Etat Zivojin 
Daciodeja nommt; c'est lui qui, le 8 aoul igog, a lance un appel au peuple serbe, dans 
lequcl il a designe PAutriche comme « 1'enncmi dc la Serbie » et la invite a se preparer au 
combat contre la Monarcliie. A plusieurs reprises, il a entrepris des voyages d'agitation de ce 
genre. A Karlova (en 1912) il a meme abandonne toute prudence et a parle dans le sens dc 
« l'union de tous les Serbes contre 1'ennemi commun ». 

Plus dangereuses sont 1 les relations entretenues par les associations imbues de 1'esprit de 
la Narodna, sous le manteau de la communautc des intercts et de la culture, avec les asso- 
ciations dans la Monarchic; car les envoyes respectifs et les visites corporatives de ces asso- 
ciation-, qui echappent a tout controle, sont utilisees par les Serbes a toules especes de 
machinations contre. la Monarchic 

C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'un envoye de la Narodna a la fete de Sarajevo en sep- 
tembre i 9 1 2 (annexe VI) ne s'est pas gene, pour recruter en secret des adherents bosniaques 
a sa societe. L'envoi d'un representant de l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac a cette fete 
di vail signifier pour les freres de Bosnie : « Nous ne vous avons pas oublies, les ailes de 
faucon de sumadija sont encore puissantes. » Une pensee qui, dans la circulation intime, aura 
trouve sans doute une toute autre expression conforme aux tendances ci-dessus exposees de la 
Narodna (annexe III). Quant aux evenements qui se passent lors des reunions du meme genre 
en Serbie, il est Evident qu'ils echappent a un controle quelconque des autorites Imperiales 
et Royales qui ne possedent a cet egard que des informations confidentielles diflicilement 
oontrolables. En relation avec ces faits il y aurait lieu d'elever des doutes sur la visite des 
etttdiants d'Agram en Serbie (avril 1912) qui ont recu du cote serbe. un accueil olficiel 
presque militaire accompagne meme d'une parade, d'une revue de troupes en leur honneur 
et cela d'une maniere asses suggestive pour que l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac puisse 
dire : « Cet ev^nement signifie le commencement et la clef d'un grand acte qui doit s'aceom- 
plir.dans un evenement rapproche, c'est un germe qui murira lorsque lame du peuple 
sVvanouira jusqu'a ce qu'il n'y ait plus aucune barriere qui ne soit detruite. » 

Ce n'est que recemment tru'il est parvenu a la connaissance des autorites austro-hongroises 
que les associations de Sokol serbes ont reussi k determiner quelques corporations analogues 
de la Monarchic a se mettre avec elles dans un lieu jusqu'a present secret dont le carartere 
nest pas encore completement eclairci; car les constatations a cet egard continucnt a etre 
iilevics. Jusqu'a present ccpendant les renseignements obtenus permettent d'estimer que 
1'on a de'eouvert les ti'aces d'un des moyens par lesquels les tendances subversives des Sokol 
serbes ont detourne et conduit a 1'erreur certains groupes de personnes dans la Monarcliie. 

Cette propagande dans les cercles de plus en plus diflerents parait cependant relegut^c au 
second plan si on lui compare celle du « travail exterieur » qui est conduite par la Narodna et 
ses amis vers une agitation d'hommea bomme. C'est dans ce domaine que se constatent les 
resullats les plus tristes. 

Par ses hommes de confiance et emissaires secrets, elle apporte le poison de la mutinerie 
dans les cercles des gens dage comme dans ceux de la jeunesse irresponsable. 

C'est ainsi par exemple que, detournes par Mian Pribicevitch les anciens officiers deHonved 
V. B. D. K. V. N. et le lieutenant de gendarmerie de Croatie Esclavone V. K. ont abandonne 
le service de 1'armee de la Monarcliie dans les conditions les plus suspectes et se sont tournes 
vers la Serbie; ilsvirent entre temps la plupart de leurs esperances decues ou du nioins en 
partie, et pensent a retourner dans la patrie qu'ils ont trahie. L'agitation inlroduite de Serbie 
dans les ecoles moyennes de Croatie et de Bosnie, est malheureusement si connue qu'elle a a 



— 93 — 
peine besoin d'exemples. Ce qui est moins connu, cest que ceux qui ont ete elimin^s pour 
infraction disciplinaire grave des ecoles croates et bosniaques sont accueillis en Serbie les 
bras ouverls et souvent meme proteges par I'Elat et entretenus comme des adversaires de la 
Monarchic. Les ecoles serbes avec leurs maitres hostiies a 1'Autriche, qui sont en grande 
partie adherents de la Narodna, sont cvidemment des etablissements tout a fait appropries 
pour I'cducation d'adeptes de ce genre. Un cas particulierement notable doit etre cite ici. 
En mars dernier, plusieurs ecoliers des ecoles normales de maitres de Pakrac (Croalie) ont 
etc expuls£s pour raison de greve. lis se sont retournes vers la Serbie oil ils ont obtenu illico 
des positions de maitres d'ecole ou ont ete admis dans des ecoles normales de maitres. Un 
de ces relegues, en relations avec des cercles hostiies a la Monarchie a declare publiqhement 
que lui et ses gens donneraient le conseil, emettraient 1'opinion pendant la duree du sejour 
de 1'arcliiduc heritier en Bosnie, que cette province est une terre serbe. II est particuliere- 
ment a remarquer que le Prefet du cercle serbe de Krajna a accorde a trois de ces etudiants 
si compromis, pendant la duree du sejour de 1'Archiduc Francois-Ferdinand en Bosnie, des 
passeports serbes dans lesquels il les designe faussement comme des sujets serbes, quoiqu'il 
eut du connaitre leur qualite de Croates. Munis de ces passeports, les trois agitateurs ont 
pu gagner la Monarchie sans etre remarques, oil cependant ils ont fini par etre reeonnus 
et arretes. 

Mais ce qui precede ne suffil pas a caracteriser inlegralement lactivite « exterieure » de la 
Narodna. 

Depuis longtemps cleja le Gouvernement imperial et royal a ete inform^ par des infor- 
mations confidentielles que la Narodna a prepare la guerre quelle a desire 1 a 1'encontre de la 
Monarchie par des moyens militaires en ce sens quelle y envoie des emissaires charges a la 
maniere des bandes de tenter, des 1'ouverture des hoslililes, la destruction des moyens de 
transport et d'amener des revokes ou des paniques (voir annexe VII). 

La procedure criminelle intentee en i g i 3 par le Conseil de guerre de Sarajevo contre 
Jovo Jajlicic et consorts pour crimes d'espionnage a amene la confirmation de ces informa- 
tions confidentielles. Comme au temps de sa fondation, aujourd'hui encore, la preparation 
de la guerre par bandes armees, figure encore au programme de la Narodna , auquel est venu 
se joindre en plus toute une activite dans l'ordre de l'espionnage. Cest pour cela que le pro- 
gramme dit « reorganise » de la Narodna est en realite tin programme Hendu. Dune atmo- 
sphere de. haine ainsi exasperee publiquement et secretement, d'une agitation echappant a 
toute responsabilitc pour lesquelles dans la lullc- contre 1'Autriche tous les moyens sont bons 
jusques et y compris, sans en avoir honte, le meurtre vulgaire, devait finalement resulter 
des actes de terrorisme. 

Le 8 juin 1912, le nomine Jukic a tire sur le Commissaire royal a Agram , von Cuvaj , ce 
qui a amene la blessure mortelle du conseiller von Hervvic assis dans la meme voiture; dans 
sa fuite, a tue un policier qui le poursuivait et en a blesse deux autres. 

II est connu par les poursuites que Jukic etait imbu des idees et des plans de la Narodna , 
meme si Jukic se livrait deja depuis quelque temps a des projets d'attentat, ccux-ci n'arri- 
verent cependant a maturite qu'apres qu'il eut fait le 18 a'vril 1912 avec les Etudiants 
d'Agram 1'excursion de Belgrade aux fetes preparees pour honorer ces visiteurs, ce Jukic 
est entre en rapports avec diverses pcrsonnes appartenant aux cercles de la Narodna et avec 
lesquelles il a discut£ de politique. Peu de jours apres, il est revenu a Belgrade et la il a 
recu dun major serbe anc bomhc cl dim camarade un browning, avec lesquels il a execute ('at- 
tentat. La bombe trouvee a Agram provenait, d'apreS les experts, d'un arsenal militaire. 

Le coup de Jukic n'etait pas encore oublie lorsque, le 18 aout 1913, Stephan Dojcic. 
revenu d'Amdrique a Agram, a commis un attentat contre le Commissaire royal baron 



— 94 — 

Skerlecz, attentat resultant des actions organisees par les Serbes parmi les eercles des Slaves 
du Sud vivant en Amerique, et qui etait 1'oeuvre de la propagande extei'ieure de la 
Narodna. 

line brochure du serbe T. Dimitrijevitch imprimee a Chicago, avec ses attaques sans 
mesmvs contrt S. M. lmperiale et Rovale et ses appels aux Serbes de la Monarchic touchant 
leur prochaine « delivranee » les poussant a rentrer en Serbie montre le parallelisme de la 
propagande menee par les Serbes en toute liberte en Amerique , ct de celle menee de Serbie 
dans les domaines de la Monarchie. 

Et de nouveau, a peine un an apres, Agrara etait le theatre d'un nouvel attentat, manqud 
cette fois. 

Le 20 mai igi3, Jacob Schafer a tente, au theatre d'Agram, sur le ban Freiherr von 
Skerlecz, un attentat qui a ete arrete au dernier moment par un policier. L'enquete a mis 
au jour 1'existence d'un complot dont fame etait Rudolf Hercigonja. Des declarations de ce 
dernier et de ses cinq co-inculpes, il resulte que cet attentat aussi avait son origine en 
Serbie. 

Ayant pris part' a une tentative manquee pour mettre en liberte Jukic, Hercigonja s'etait 
sauv£ en Serbie (octobre 1912) oil il frequentait avec son complice Marojan Jakcic, des 
comitadji et des membres de la Narodna. Comme cela est arrive frequemme.nt avec des 
esprits juveniles s'occupant trop tot de questions politiques, ces frequentations ont amene 
les plus mauvais resultats. Hercigonja rentra chez lui avec le dogme preche a Belgrade que 
les pays slaves du sud de la Monarchic doivent en etre separes pour etre reunis au royaume 
serbe. 11 avait en outre ete persuade par I'enseignement recu de ses amis que ce but devait 
etre poursuivi par l'ex^cution d'attentat sur de bauts personnages ayant part a la politique 
de la Monarchie. 

C'est dans cet esprit qu'Hercigonja a Agram a exerce son action sur ses amis et les a 
amenes a ses id£es. Au premier plan de ses projets, etait 1' execution d'un attentat sur Iheri- 
tier du trone. 

Peu de mois auparavant, des poursuites en haute trahiscn avaient ete intentees conlre 
Suka Alginovic. Au cours de ce proces, trois temoins ont declare qu'Alginovic -avait dit 
devant eux avoii- re(;u cent dina de la Narodna et autant dune association secrete d'etudiants 
pour debut de propagande, mais principaleinent pour 1'execution d'un attentat sur larchi- 
duc Francois-Ferdinand. 

Un voit a quel point lagitation criminelle de In Narodna et de ceux qui partagent ses opinions, 
s'est concentree ees derniers temps sur la personne de t'archiduc livritier. 

De toutesces constatntions, on arrive a la conclusion que la Narodna ainsi que les eercles 
hostiles a la Monarchie groupes autour d'elle consideraient depuis pcu le moment venu de 
lane realiser leur enseignement par des actes. 

li est remarquable quelle se contente pour ces actes de donner lincitation et la oil cette 
incitation etait tombee sur un sol fertile de placer les moyens de secours matenels « leur dispo- 
sition, mais quelle a fait reposer tout le role dangereux de cette propagande par le fait, 
uniquement sur la jeunesse de la Monarchie excite'' el deiournee par elle qui doit supporter 
seule le fardeau de ce tl'iste « heroisme ». 

Tous les traits de cette facon de faire se retrouvent dans 1'histoire et 1'origine de 1'attentat 
profondement regrettable du 28 juin. 

Princip et Grabez sont des exemples de cette jeunesse empoisonnee des 1'ecole par les 
pensees de la Narodna. A Belgrade, frequentant les eercles d'dtudiants imbus de ces idees, 
Princip s'esl occupe de plans d'attentat eontre l'Aichiduc heritier contre lequel s'exeroait la 



— 95 — 

haine particulierement aigue des elements hostiles a la monarchie , a l'occasion de son voyage 
dans les pays annexes. 

II se lia d'amitie avec Kabrinovilch qui frequentait les memes cercles et dont les opinions 
radicalement revolutionnaires, d'apres ses propres aveux, 1'amenaient au meme sentiment 
hostile a la Monarchic et a la propagande par le fait. Mais, si soigneusement qu'ait ete pre- 
pare ce compiot, etsi decides qu'aient ete les conjures, cependant lattentat n'aurait jamais 
ete accompli s'il ne setait pas trouve, comme dans le cas Jukic, des gens pour donner aux 
complices les moyens d'executer leur agression , car Princip et Kabrinovitch font expresse- 
ment reconnu, ils manqiiaient autant des armes necessaires que d'argent pour les acheter. 
II est interessant de volt oil les complices se sont procure leurs armes. Milan Prihicevic et 
Zivojin Dacic, ces deux homines principaux de la Narodna sont les premiers auxquels les 
complices se sont adresses dans leur besoin comme a une aide sure sans doute parce qu'il 
etait deja devenu une traduction dans le cercte de ceux qui sont prets a commettre des atten- 
tats qu'il etait possible d'oblenir des representants de la Narodna des instruments de meurtre. 
Le fait aceidcntel que ces deux hommes, au moment critique, ne se trouvaient pas a Bel- 
grade, dejoua sans doute ce projet, cependant Princip et Kabrinovic ne furenl pas embar- 
rasses pour trouver une autre assistance, celle de Milan Ciganovic, un ancien comitadji, 
maintenant fonctionnaire des chemins de fer a Belgrade et membre de la Narodna. Ce der- 
nier et son ami, le major Voja Tankosic deja nomme\ egalement un des chefs de la Narodna 
qui aili en 1908 le chef de 1'ecole des bandes armees de Kuprija (annexe V) apparaissent 
maintenant comme les chefs spirituels du compiot. Ils nleurent qu'une hesitation , legere au 
debut, a savoir si les trois conjures etaient reellement decides a commettre cet acte, hesita- 
tion qui disparut bientot grace a leurs suggestions. Des lors, ils furent prets a fournir toute 
. assistance, Tankosic a procure quatre brownings et des munitions et de largent pour le 
voyage. Six grenades a main provenantde 1'armee serbe constituaient le complement d'arme- 
ment, ce qui nous rappelle le cas Jukic. Preoccupe du succes, Tankosic proeura lenseigne- 
ment du tir, mais Tankosic et Ciganovic se sont preoccupes en outre d'assurer un moyen 
special mm desire d'assurer le secret du compiot. Ils aposterent Zian Kali avec Tindication 
que les deux auteurs, apres lattentat, devaient se tuer, acte'de precaution qui devait leur 
profiter en premiere ligne, carle secret leur enlevait le faible danger qu'ils avaienf assume 
dans cette entreprise. La mart sure pour les viclimes de leur dilourncmenl , la pleine sieuriU pour 
elle-memc , telle est la devise, connue maintenant , de la Narodna. 

Pour rendre possible fexecution de lattentat, il fallait que les armes' et bombes par- 
vinssent en fraude 6t sans etre apercues em Bosnie. La encore, Ciganovic a donne' toute son 
assistance , il present aux conjures une route determinee el leur assure la protection des 
autorites frontieres serbes. La maniere dans laquelle ce voyage decrit par Princip comme 
« mysterieux » a ete organise et execute ne laisse subsister aucun doute qu'il s'agit d'une voie 
secrete bien prepares et deja parcourue souvent en vue de desseins secrets de la Narodna. 
Avec une simplicity et une siiret£ resultant de la seule habitude, les capitaines de la fron- 
tiere a Sabak et Losnika ont prete dans ce but leur oiganisation administrative ; sans difficulte 
s'est eflectue ce transport secret, avec son systeme compiique de guides toujours changeants 
qui, appeles comme par miracle, se trouvaient toujours sur place quand on avail besoin 
d'eux. Sans s'enquerir du but de ce voyage curieux de quelques etudiants trop jeunes, les 
autorites serbes ont laisse sur 1'indication de 1'ancien comitadji et du fonctionnaire subal- 
terne des chemins de fer Ciganovic, jouer cet appareil fonctionnant si facilemenl. lis 
n'avaient d'ailleurs pas besoin de demander, car d'apres les indications recues, il etait clair 
pour eux qu'il s'agissait de remplir de nouveau une mission de la » Narodna ». La vue de 
1'arsenal de bombes et de revolvers arrachait seulement au surveillant Grbie. un sourire bien- 



— 96 — 
veillant d'approbation dormant la preuve complete combien Ton etait habitue sur cette route 
a rencontrer une contrebande de ce genre. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'est charge d'une faute lourde en laissant s'accomplir tout 
cela. 

Tenu a culliver des relations de bon voisinage avec I'Autriehe-Hongrie, il a permis a la 
presse de repandre la haine contre la Monarchie , tolere que des associations elablies sur son 
sol sous la conduite d'ofliciers eleves, de fonctionnaires, de maitres et de juges,"se livrent 
contre la Monarchie a une campagne publique menant ses citoyens aux idees revolution- 
naires, il n'a pas empeche que des homines ayant une part a la direction de son administra- 
tion militaire et civile empoisonnent la conscience publique contre tous les sentiments 
moraux au point que, dans cette lutte, 1'assassinat vulgaire par guet-apens apparaisse comme 
l'arme la plus recommandable. 



N° 75 bis. 

Communique ojjicicnx du bureau de la Presse : 

Vienne, 28 juillet 1914. 

Le Minislre autrichien a Belgrade a presente des son retour a Vienne le texte de 
la reponse serbe. 

Celle reponse est remplie d'un esprit de manque de sincerite : elle laisse appa- 
raitre que le Gouvernement serbe est sans intention serieuse de meltre fin 4 la tole- 
rance coupable grace a laquelle ont etc permises les menees anti-autrichiennes. La 
reponse serbe contient de telles restrictions et limitations, non seulemenl surle prin- 
cipe meme de la demarche auslro-hongroise, mais encore en ce qui concerne les 
revendications exposees par 1'Autriche, que les concessions faites sont sans impor- 
tance. 

En particulier, refus sous pretexte vain, d'accepter la participation des oiganes 
autro-hongrois pour la poursuite des auteurs des attentats residant en territoire 
serbe. 

.De meme la reponse serbe a la demande autrichienne pour mettre fin aux menees 
hostiles de la presse equivaut a un refus. 

La demande relative aux mesures qui devraient etre prises pour, que les associa- 
tions hostiles a I'Autriehe-Hongrie ne puissent, apres leur dissolution, continuer leur 
action sous un autre nom et forme , n'a pas meme ete envisagee. 

Ces revendications conslituant le minimum necessaire au retablissement du calme 
permanent dans le Sud-Est de la Monarchic, la reponse serbe est consideree comme 
insuffisante. 

Le Gouvernement serbe en a conscience d'ailleurs, puisqu'il envisage le reglement 
du conllit par voie d'arbitrage, et que le jour oil sa reponse devait etre remise et 
avant cette remise, il avait ordonne la mobilisation. 



97 — 



N 76. 



M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i. 

A bord de la France, le 28 juillet 191&. 

J'ai recu par Copenhague votre telegramme resumant les faits de samedi, le tele- 
gramme relatant la derniere visite de i'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, celui relatif a la 
mediation que la Russie conseille a la Serbie de demander et aux demarches anglaises 
a Berlin , ainsi que votre telegramme venu ce matin direclement par la tour Eiffel. 

J'approuve pleinement la reponse que vous avez faite au baron de Schoen; la these 
que vous avez soutenue est l'evidence meme : dans la recherche d'une solution 
pacifique du conflit, nous sommes pleinement d'accord avec la Russie, qui n'est pas 
responsable de la situation actuelle, et n'a encore procede a aucune mesure quel- 
conque pouvant eveiller le moindre soupcon; mais il est evident qua titre de contre- 
partie 1'Allemagne ne saurait se refuser a donner des conseils au Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois, dont Taction a ouvert la crise. 

U y a done lieu de continuer a tenir a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne le meme langage. 
Ce conseil est d'ailleurs en harmonie avec la double proposition anglaise menlionnee 
dans votre telegramme. J'approuve entieremenl la combinaison suggeree par sir Edward 
Grey et j'invite directement M. Paul Cambon a le lui faire savoir. II est essentiel que 
1'on sache a Berlin et a Vienne que notre plein concours est acquis aux efforts que 
poursuit le Gouvernement britannique en vue de chercher une solution au conflit 
austro-serbe. L'action des quatre puissances moins interessees ne peut, pour les 
raisons exposees ci-dessus, s'exercer uniquement a Vienne et a Petersbourg. En pro- 
posant de 1'exercer aussi a Belgrade, ce qui veut dire surtout, en fait, entre Vienne et 
Belgrade, sir Edward Grey rentre clans la logique de la situation; et, en n'excluant pas 
Petersbourg, il oflre, d'autre part, a 1'Allemagne, un moyen de se dep^irtir, en toute 
dignite, de la demarche parlaquelle le Gouvernement allemand a fait savoir a Paris 
et a Londres que l'affaire etait envisagee par lui comme purement autro-serbe et de- 
pourvue de caractere general. 

Je vous prie de communiquer le present telegramme a nos representants aupres 
des grandes puissances et a notre Ministre a Belgrade. 

Rene Viviani. 



DOCCMENTS DIPLOMATIQCES. Guerre eurOp£ei 



— 98 — 



N° 77. 



M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i. 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France. 

Paris, 28 juillet 191A. 

Malgre. les assurances donnees, .tant a Berlin qa.a Paris, par les agents aJIemands, du 
desir de leur gouveraement de conicourir aux. efforts pour le maintien de la paix, 
aucune action sincere n'est exercee par eux pour retenir 1'Autriche ; la proposition 
anglaise, qui consiste dans une action des quatre puissances moius interessees poar 
oblenir un arret des operations, militaires a Vienne, Belgrade el Petersboarg, et dans 
une reunion. a Londres des Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne , de Franca et d'ltalie, sous la 
presidence de Sir E. Grey en vue de chercher une solution aux. difnculles austro- 
serbes, rencontre, a Berlin des objections de nature aJa faire echouer. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autrkhe a fait une demarche pour annoncer que son gouverae- 
ment prendrait deraain des mesures energiques pour contraindre la Serbie a lui 
donner les satisfactions et les garanties qu'il exige de cette puissance; le Comte 
Sificsenme s'est pas explique sur ces mesures; la mobilisatioa, a paxtir du 28 juillet, 
parait certaine d'apres notre attache niililaire a Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N" 78. 

M..Biknvbnu-Martin, Mini&tre des Affaires Etrangeres p. L. 
a Londres, Berlin, Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, le 28 juillet 19m. 

J'ai eu de nouveau la visite de 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne ce matin; il m'a dit 
qu'il n'avait pas de communication, pas de proposition officielle a me faire, mais 
qu'il vcnait,,comme la veille, causer de la situation et des moyens a employer pour 
eviter des actes irreparables. Interroge sur les intentions de 1'Autriche, il a declare 
ne pas les connaitre, et ignorer la nature des moyens de coercition qu'elle prepare. 

L'Allemagne, selon le Baron de Sclioen, ne deraande qua agir avec la France pour 
le maintien de la paix. Sur 1'observalion qui lui etait faite qu'un projet de mediation 
des quatre puissances , auquel nous avons adhere , et qui a obtenu 1'assentiment de prin- 
cipe de l'ltalie et de 1'AUemagne, a ete mis en avant par l'Angleterre, l'ambassadeur a 
dit que le Gouvernemem allemand ne demandait en eflet qua s'associer a Paction des 



— 00 — 
puissanees, pourvu que -cette action n'ad'ecle pas la forme d'un arbitrage au d'une 
conference, repousses' par l'Autriche. 

J'ai repondu que si le mot seul arrete le Gouvernement autrichien, le but pent 
etre atteint par d'autres moyens; le Gouvernement allemand est bien place pour 
demander a l'Autriche de laisser aux puissances le temps d'intervenir, de trouver une 
conciliation. 

M. de Schoen m'a fait alors observer qu'il n'a pas destructions et sait seulement 
que 1'Allemagne se refuse a exercer une pression sur l'Autriche, qui ne veut pas de 
conference. 11 reproche aux journaux francais de preter a 1'AUemagne une attitude 
quelle n'a pas, en pretendant qu'elle pousse 1'A.utriche : sans doute elle approuve 
son attitude, mais elle n'a pas connu sa note; elle ne saurait 1'arreter trop brusque- 
menl, car l'Autriche a besoin degaranties contre les' precedes serbes. 

Bienvbsu-Martin. 



iN° 79. 

M. Bienvenu-Martw, Ministre des Affaires etrsngeres p. i. 
a M. Dumaine, Ambassarleur de France a Vienne, 

Paris, le.28 juillet lflid- 

Vous connaissez, par les telegrammes de nos Ambassades, que jevous ai transmis, 
la propobition anglaise de mediation a quatre et de conference a Londres, ainsi que 
noire adhesion a cette suggestion, 1'acceptation conditionnelle de l'ltalie et les reserves 
de Berlin. 

Je vous prie de vous tenir en contact a ce siijet avec votre Collegue d'Angleterre, 
qui a recu les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
de la suggestion anglaise, des que ses trois Collegues auront ete autorises a fane la 
meme demarche; vous vous conformerez a son attitude. 



1N° 80. 

M. Paul Cajibon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. BtEN'YE.NU-lVlARTiN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 28 juillet 1914. 

Sir Ed. Grey a recu hiermes Collegues d'Autriche Hongrie et d'Allemagne. Le pre- 
Tnier a continue a soutenir que la reponse serbe etait inacceptable. Le seeond aitenu 



— 100 — 
uii langage analogue a celui de M. de Schoen a Paris. II a insiste sur. lutilite dune 
action rnoderatrice de 1'Angleterre a Petersbourg. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu que la 
Russie s'etait montree Ires moderee depuis l'ouverture dela crise, notamment dans ses 
conseils au Gouvernement serbe, et qu'd serait tres embarrasse de lui faire des 
recommandations pacifiques. II a ajoute que c'etait a Vienne qu'il convenait d'agir et 
que le concours de 1'Allemagne etait indispensable. 

D'autre part 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Petersbourg a telegraphie que M. Sazo- 
noff avait propose a 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche une conversation sur l'afFaire serbe. 
Celte information a ete confirmee par 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne qui a fait 
savoir qu'un premier entretien entre le Ministre russe des Affaires etrangeres et le 
Comte Szapary avait produit un bon effet au Ballplalz. 

Sir Ed. Grey et Sir A. Nicolson m'ont dit que, si un accord pouvait s'etablir directe- 
ment entre Petersbourg et Vienne, il faudrait s'en feliciter, mais ils ont eleve quelques 
doutes sur le succes de rinkiative de M. Sazonoff. 

Interroge par Sir G. Buchanan sur la convocation eventuelle a Londres d'une 
Conference des Representants de 1'Angleterre, de la France, de 1'Allemagne et de 
1'Italie pour chercher une issue a la situation acluelle, M. Sazonoff a repondu : « qu'il 
avail entame des pourparlers avec 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dans des conditions qu'il 
esperait favorables; que cependant d n'avait pas encore recu de reponse a sa proposi- 
tion d'une revision de la Note serbe par les deux Cabinets. » Si des explications 
directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne sont irrealisables , M. Sazonoff se declare pret a 
accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement 
le conflit. 

II serait, en tous cas, tres desirable que cette negociation directe, a un moment 
ou le moindre retard peut avoir de si serieuses consequences, fut menee de maniere 
a ne pas enlraver faction de Sir Ed. Grey et a ne pas fournir a 1'Autriche un pretexte 
pour se derober a 1'intervention amicale des quatie puissances. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin ayant insiste aupres de M. de Jagow pour 
obtenirune adhesion a la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey, le Ministre alleniand des Affaires 
etrangeres a repondu qu'il convenait d'attendre le resultat de la conversation 
engagee entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Sir Ed. Grey a, en consequence, present a 
Sir Ed. Goschen de suspendre pour le moment ses demarches. Au surplus l'annonce 
que 1'Autriche vient de notifier officiellement sa declaration de guerre a la Serbie 
fait entrer la question dans une nouvelle phase. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 81. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France ;i Berlin, 

a M. Bienvemj-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 28 juillet 1914. 
La conversation que M. Sazonoff a eue avec le Comte Szapary a ete portee a la 
connaissance de M. de Jagow par le Charge d'Affaires de Russie. Le Secretaire d'Etat 



— 101 — 
lui a dit que , conforaienient aux remarques de l'Ambassadeur d'AUeraagne en Russie , 
puisque apres 1'expiralion de l'ultimatum de 1'Autriche le Gouverneraent de Vienne 
ne se refusait pas a causer avec le Gouvernement de Petersbourg, il y avait lieu 
d'esperer que de son cote le Comte Berchtokl pourrait causer avec M. Schebeko et 
qu'une issue pourrait etre trouvee aux diflicultes actuelles. Le Charge d'affaires russe 
voit avec faveur cette disposition des esprits, qui correspond aux desirs de M. de 
Jagow de voir Vienne et Petersbourg s'entendre directement et degager l'Allemagne. 
II y a lieu de se demander seulement si 1'Autriche ne cherche pas a gagner du temps 
pour se preparer. 

J'ai aujourd'hui appuye la demarche de mon Collegue d'Angleterre aupres du 
Secretaire d'Etat. Celui-ci ma repondu comme a Sir Ed. Goschen, qu'il lui etait 
impossible d'accepter l'idee d'une sorte de conference a Londres entre les Ambas- 
sadeurs des quatre Puissances, et qu'il faudrait donner a la suggestion anglaise une 
autre forme, pour quelle put etre realisee. Je lui ai fait valoir le danger d'un retard, 
qui pouvait amener la guerre, et lui ai demande s'il la souhaitait. II a proteste et a 
ajoute que les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg etaienl entamees, et 
que, des maintenant, il en attendait une suite favorable. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et l'Ambassadeur d'llalie sont venus me voir ce 
matin ensemble , pour m'entretenir des conversations qu'ils avaient eues avec M. de 
Jagow bier au sujet de la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey. Le Secretaire d'Etat leur a, 
somme toute, tenu le meme langage qu'a moi : acceptant en principe de s'unir dans 
une demarche commune a 1'Angleterre, a I'ltalie et a nous-memes, mais repoussant 
toute idee de conference. 

Nous avons pense, mes collegues et moi, qu'il n'y avait la qu'une question de 
forme et l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre va suggerer a son Gouvernement de libeller 
autrement sa proposition, qui pourrait prendre le caractere d'une demarche diplo- 
matique a Vienne et a Petersbourg. 

En raison de la repugnance manifestee par M. de Jagow contre toute demarche a 
Vienne , Sir Ed. Grey pourrait le mettre au pied ,du mur, en lui demandant de for- 
muler lui-meme comment pourrait se produire Taction diplomatique des puissances 
pour eviter la guerre. 

Nous devons nous associer a tous les efforts en faveur de la paix compatibles avec 
nos engagements vis-a-vis de notre alliee; mais, pour laisser les responsabilite's oil 
elles sont, il importe d'avoir soin de demander a l'Allemagne de preciser ce qu'elle 
veut. 

Jules Cambo.n. 



— 102 — 



IV 82. 



M. Paleolocde, Ambassadeur de France a Petersbourg, 

a M. BiENVEN.u-MARTW,.Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ,p. i. 

Petersbourg, le 28 juillet 191 4. 

Le Gouvernemert auslro-hongrois n'a pas encore repondu a la proposition Ju 
Gouvernement russo, tendanta l'ouvcrtuie d'unc conversation directe entre Peters- 
bourg et Vienne. 

M. SazonofT a recu cet apres-midi les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Aulriche- 
Hongrie; l'impression qu'il a.gardee de son double entretien est mauvaise.: » Decide- 
ment, tn'a-t-il dit, 1'Autriche ne veul pas causer ». 

A la suite d'une conversation queje viens d'avoir avec mes deux collegues , j'e- 
prouvcla meme impression de pessimisme. 

Paleoxocue. 



N° S3. 

M. Di Maine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Blenvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le 28 juillet 191 i. 

Le Comte Berchtold vient de declarer a Sir M. de Buxtsen que toute intervention 
tendant a la reprise de la discussion entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie, sur la base de la 
reponse serbe, serait inutile, et d'ailleurs trop tardive, la guerre ayant etc cilli. ielle- 
ment declaree a midi. 

L'attitude de mon collegue russe n'a jusqu'a present pas varie : il ne s'agissait pas 
a son avis de localiser le conflit, mais bien de I'empecher. La declaration de guerre 
rendra bien difficile ['engagement 'des pourparlers aquatre, ainsi qu'e'la continu ti in 
des edtretiens directs entre M. Sazonoff et le Comte Szapary. 

On pretexte ici que la formule qui paraissait pouvoir obtenir ['adhesion de l'Alle- 
magne, « mediation entre 1'Autriche et la lltissie », a I'inconvenient d'accuser entre ces 
deux empires un conflit qui n'existe pas, jusqu'a present. 

Parmi les soupcons qu'inspire la soudaine et violente resolution de 1'Autriche, le 
plus inquietant est que 1'Allemagne 1'aurait poussee a l'agression con Ire la Serbie alin 
de pouvoir elle-meme entrer en lulle avec la Russie et la France, dans les circon- 
stances qu'elle suppose devoir Iui etre le plus favorables, et dans des conditions 
dehberees. 

Ddmaine. 



— 103 — 



CHAPITRE V 

DE LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AIITRICHE A LA SERRIE 

(28 Jl'ILLET 1914 

A L'ULTIMATUM DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE 

(31 JU1LLET 1914) 



— 105 — 



N° 84. 



M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Rome, le 29 juillet 1914. 

La Consulta estime que, malgre la declaration de guerre de 1'Autriche & la Serbie , 
il n'y a pas lieu d'interrompre les efforts diplomatiques tendant a la reunion d'une 
Conference & Londres en vue d'une mediation. 

Barrere. 



N° 85. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a Saint-Petersbourg, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, 
Belgrade. 

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914. 

L'attitude austro-alleraande se precise. L'Autriche, inquiete de la propagande 
slave, a saisi 1'occasion de, 1'attentat de Serajevo pour chatier les menees serbes, el 
prendre de ce cote, des garanties qui peuvent, selon que Ton laissera ou non se 
developper les evenements, ne porter que sur le Gouvernement et 1'armee serbes, 
ou devenir territoriales. L'Allemagne s'inlerpose entre son alliee et les autres puis- 
sances, en declarant qu'il s'agit d'une question locale, chatiment d'un crime politique 
dans le passe, garanties certaines pour 1'avenir que les menees anti-autrichiennes 
prendront fin. Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la Russie doit se contenter 
des assurances officielles et formelles donnees par 1'Autriche quelle ne poursuit 
pas d'agrandissement territorial et respectera 1'integrite de la Serbie; dans ces con- 
ditions, c'est de la Russie seide, si elle voulait intervenir dans une question bien 
delimitee, que peut venir un danger de guerre. Dans ces conditions c'est a Peters- 
bourg seulement qu'il faut agir pour le maintien de la paix. 

Ce sophisme, qui dispenserait 1'AUemagne d'intervenir & Vienne, a ete soutenu 
sans succes 4 Paris par M. de Schben, qui a vainement tente de nous entrainer dans 
une action solidaire franco-allemande a Petersbourg; il a ete egalement developpe 
a Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey : en France comme en Angleterre, on a repondu 
que le cabinet de Petersbourg a donne, depuis le debut, les plus grandes preuveS 
de sa moderation, en particulier en s'associant aux puissances pour donner a la 

Documents diplomatiqces. • — Guerre europeenne. 1 4 



— 106 — 
Serbie le conscil de ceder aux exigences de la note autrichienne. La Russie ne menace 
done nullement la paix; e'est a ^ ienne qu'il faut agir, e'est de la que vient le danger, 
du moment qu'on y refuse de se contenter de la soumission presque totale de la 
Serbie a des exigences exorbitantes et qu'on ne veut pas accepter la collaboration des 
puissances pour la discussion des points restant a regler entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, 
et enfm qu'on n'hesile pas devant une declaration de guerre aussi precipitee que la 
note primitive de l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

L'attitude a Berlin, comme a Vienne, reste dilatoire. Dans la premiere capilale, 
tout en protestant du desir allemand de sauvegarder la paix generale par une action 
commune des quatre puissances, on repousse lidee d'une Conference, sans suggerer 
aucun autre moyen et en refusant d'agir positiyement a Vienne. Dans la capitale 
autrichienne, on voudrait amuser Petersbourg par 1'illusion d'une entente pouvant 
resulter lie conversations directes, el Ton agit contre la Serbie. 

Dans ces conditions, il parait essentiel que le cabinet de Petersbourg, dont le 
desir de denouer pacifiquement la ense est manifeste, adhere immediatement a la 
proposition anglaise. Celle-ci .1 besoin d'etre ties appuyee a Berlin pour decider M. de 
Jagow .1 une action reelle sur Vienne, susceptible d'arreter PAutriche et d'empecher 
que son avantage diplomatique se double d'un succes militaire. Le Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois ne manquerail pas en eflet d'en profiler pour imposer a la Serbie, 
suns le Hum elastique de garanties, des conditions qui modifieraient en fail, malgre 
toutes les assurances de desinteressement territorial, le stalut de I'Europe orientate, 
et risqueraient de compromettre gravement, soit des niamtenant, soil dans un avenir 
prochain, la paix generale. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



IN 86. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg , 
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Sainl-PeterslxMirg, le 29 juillet igi4- 

Des maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer a Votre Excellence que le Gouverne- 
ment russe acquiesce a toutes les procedures que la France el 1'Angleterre lui propo- 
seronl pour sauvegarder la paix. Mon collegue d'Angleterre lelegraphie dans le meme 
sens a Londres. 

Paleologue. 



— 107 — 



N° 87. 



M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 191a. 

De mon entretien avec M. Davignon et diverses personnes en mesure d'etre exac- 
tement informees, je rapporte 1'impression suivante : 1'attitude de i'Ailemagne est 
enigmatique et autorise toutes les apprehensions. II parait invraisemblable que le 
Gouvernement auslro-hongrois ait pris une initiative le conduisant, suivant un plan 
precon^u, a une declaration de guerre sans accord prealable avec l'empereur Guil- 
laume. 

Le Gouvernement allemand reste 1'arme au pied, reservant, selon les circon- 
stances, son action pacilique ou guerriere, mais 1'inquietude est telle dans tous les 
milieux qu'une intervention brusque contre nous ne surprendrait ici personne. Mes 
Collegues de Russie et d'Angleterre partagent ce sentiment. 

Le Gouvernement beige prend des dispositions conformes a la declaration que m'a 
faite hier soir M. Davignon que tout sera mis en ceuvre pour la defense de la neu- 
tralite du pays. 

Klobukowski. 



N° 88. 

M. Ronsstn, Consul general de France a Francfort, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Francfort, le 29 juillet 1914. 

Je vous signale d'importants mouvements de troupes hier et cette nuit. Ce matin, 
plusieurs regiments sont arrives en tenue de campagne , notamment par les routes de 
Darmstadt, Cassel et Mayence , qui sont remplies de militaires. Les ponts etchemins de 
fer sont gardes sous pretexte de preparer les manoeuvres d'automne. 

Ronssin. 



108 



N° 89. 

M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Munich, le 29 juillet 1914. 

On m'assure que les moulins d'Dlkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) ont ete invites i cesser de 
livrer a leur clientele ordinaire et a reserver toule leur production pour 1'armee. 

De Strasbourg sont signales des transports de canons automobiles employes pour 
le tir sur aeroplanes et dirigeables. 

Sous pre'texle de modification dans les exercices d'automne, les sous-officiers et 
soldals des regiments d'infanterie bavaroise de Metz, qui etaient en pennission en 
Bavierc a 1'occasion des recolles, ont recu l'ordie bier de renlrer immedialement. 

Allize. 



IV 90. 

M. Dumalne, ambassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Biemvenu-Martin,. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le '29 juillet 19 ih. 

Le Consul de France a Prague me confirme la mobilisation du 8 e corps d'armee 
deja annoncee, et celle de la division de landwehr de ce corps d'armee. Les divisions 
de cavalerie de Galicie mobdisent egalement; des regiments, des divisions de rava- 
lerie de Vienne et de Buda-Pest ont deja ete transported a la fronliere russe. Des 
((invocations de reservistes ont acluellement lieu dans cette region. 

En vue de faire face a toute menace, el peut-etre pour en imposer a Peteisbourg, 
le bruit court que le Gouvernemcnt auslro-hongrois aurail rintcnlion de decider le 
3o juillet (in le 1 01 aout, la mobilisation generate des armees. EnKn le relour de 
1'Empe.reur d'lschl a Vienne est assure pour domain. 

DUMAINE. 



— 109 



N° 91. 



M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, 
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. 

SaintPetersboorg, le 29 juillet 19 li. 

La conversation directe & laquelle le Gouvernement russe avail aniicalement convie 
le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est refusec par celui-ci. 

D'autre part, 1'Etal-Major russe a constate que l'Autriche precipile ses preparatifs 
militaires contre la Russie et aclive sa mobilisation, qui a commence sur la frontiere 
de Galicie. En consequence, 1'ordre de mobilisation sera expedie, cetle nuit, aux treize 
corps d'armee destines & operer eventuellement contre l'Autriche. 

Malgre l'echec de sa proposition, M. Sazonoff accepte 1'idee d'une conference des 
quatre Puissances a Londres; il n'attache d'ailleurs aucune importance au titre officiel 
de cette deliberation et se pretera a toutes les tentatives anglaises en faveur de la 
paix. 

Paleologue. 



IT 92. 

M. Jides Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. 

Berlin, le 29 juillet 1914. 

J'ai demande aujourd'hui au Secretaire d'Etat oil en elait la question des conver- 
sations directes eotre Vienne et Petersbourg, qui lui semblait hier la meilleure pro- 
cedure pour arriver k une detente. U m'a repondu qui Petersbourg les dispositions 
sur ce point etaient bonnes et qu'il avail demande a Vienne d'entrer dans cette voic. 
II allendait la reponse. Le Gouvernement brilannique, apres avoir vu repousser la 
suggestion d'une conference, avait fail connaitre qu'il verrait avec faveur ces conver- 
sations s'ouvrir entre l'Autriche et la Russie et avait demande que 1'Allemagne y 
poussat l'Autriche, ce que le Gouvernement imperial ne manque pas de faire. 

J'ai demande a M. de Jagow s'il avait enfin la reponse de la Serbie a 1'Autriche, ot 
ce qu'il en pensait. II ma repondu qu'il y voyait une base de negocialion possible. 
J'ai repris que e'est justeinent pour cela que je trouvais inexplicable la rupture dc 
l'Autriche apres la reception dun document pared. 

Le Secretaire d'Etat a alors fait remarquer qu'avec les peuples d'Orient on n'avait 
jamais assez, de suretes et que l'Autriche voulait controler l'execution des promesses 



— 110 — 

qui lui etaient faites, controle que la Serine refusait. C'est la aux yeux du Secretaire 
d'Etat, le point capital. J'ai replique a M. de Jagovv que, voulant rester indepen- 
dante, la Serbie devait repousser le controle d'une seule Puissance, mais qu'une 
Commission international ne presenterait pas le meme caractere. Les Etats Balka- 
niques en comptent plus dune , a comuiencer par la Commission finailcrere a Athenes. 
On pourrait par exeoiple, ai-je dit, imaginer, entre autres combinaisons, une Com- 
mission internalionale provisoire chargee de controler l'enquete de police demandee 
par l'Autriche;. il etait clair par cet exemple que la reponse de la Serbie ouvrait la 
porte a des conversations et ne justifiait pas une rupture. 

Tai ensuite demaridc au Secretaire d'Etat si, en dehors des conversations directes 
entre Vienne et Petersbourg, auxquelles Sir Ed. Grey s'etait rallie, il ne pensait pas 
que Taction commune des quatre Puissances pourrait s'exercer par l'intermediaire de 
leurs Ambassadeurs; II ma repondu affirmativement ajoutanl qu'acluellemenl le 
Cabinet de Londres se cont'entait d'appuyer dans le sensdes conversations directes. 

A la fin de lapres-midi, le Chancelier de l'Empire a prie 1'Ambassadeur d'Angle- 
terre de venir le voir. 11 lui a parle de la proposition de Sir E. Grey tendant a la 
reunion d'une Conference; illui a dit qu'il n'avait pas pu accepter une proposition qui 
semblait imposer Pantorite des Puissances a l'Autriche; il a assure mon Collegue de 
son sincere desir de la paix et des efforts qu'il faisait a Vienne, mais il a ajoute que, 
la Russie etait seule la maitresse de maintenir la paix ou de dechainer la guerre. 

Sir Ed. Goschen lui a repondu 'qu'il ne partageait pas son sentiment et que si la 
guerre eclatait, l'Autriche aurait la plus grosse part de responsabilite, car il etait 
inadmissible qu'elle eiit rompu avec la Serbie apres la reponse de celle-ci. 

Sans discuter sur ce point, le Chancelier a dit qu'il poussait autant qu'il le pouvait 
aux conversations directes entre l'Autriche et la Russie; il savait que 1'Angleterre 
voyait cette conversation d'un ceil favorable. II a ajoute que sa propre action serait 
bien difficile a Vienne, s'il etait vrai que la Russie eut mobilise sur la Irontiere au- 
trichienne quatorze corps d'armee. II a prie mon collegue d'appeler sur toutesces 
observations 1'attefttion de Sir Ed. Grey. 

Sir E. Goschen a telegraphie dans ce sens a Londres. 

L'attitude du Chancelier est tres probablement la consequence du dernier entre- 
Iien de Sir Ed. Grey avec le prince Lichnowski. Jusqu'a ces tout derniers jours, on 
s'est flatte ici que 1'Angleterre resterait hors du debat, et 1'impression produite par 
son attitude est provide sur le Gouvernement allemand et sur les financiers et 
hommes d'affaires. 

Jules Cambon. 



— Ill — 

N° 93. 

M. Dumaine, Arubassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres p. i. 

Vienne, le 29 juillet 1 9 1 4- 

L'opinion de mes collegues anglais, russe et italien Concorde avec la mienne con- 
cernant l'impossibilite d'empecher une premiere lutte entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, 
loutes les tentatives pour retarder le choc ayant echoue. 

M. Scliebeko avait demande que les pourparlers engages a Petersbourg entre 
MM. Sazonoff et Szapary fussent poursuivis et rendus plus eflicaces par des pouvoirs 
specialement conferes a celui-ci, le comle Berchtold s'y est nettement oppose. 11 
marquait ainsi que 1'Autriche-Hongrie ne tolere aucune intervention qui 1'empeche- 
rait d'mfliger a la Serbie. un chatiment et une humiliation. 

Le due d'Avarna admet conime Ires vraisemblable que 1'imminence d'une insurrec- 
lion generale de ses sujels Siid-Slaves ait precipite les resolutions de la Monarchic 
11 s'attache encore a 1'espoir qu'apres un premier succes des armees austro-hongroises, 
mais pas [ilustot, une mediation pourrait limiler le conflit. 

DuMAINE. 



IN" 94. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres, p. i. , 

a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, 
Belgrade. 

Paris, le 20 juiiiet 191^. 

Ce matin, la communication suivaute m'a ete faite par l'Ambassadcur d'Allumague 
a titre ofiicieux : le Gouvernement allemand poursuit ses efforts en vue d'amener le 
Gouvemement autrichien a une conversation ainicale qui permettra a ce dernier de 
faire connaitre exactement le but el 1'eitension des operations en Serbie. Le Cabinet 
de Berlin espere recevoir des precisions qui seraient de nature a donner satisfaction 
a la Russie. Les efforts allemands ne sont aucunement entraves par la declaration de 
guerre intervenue. I ne communication semblable sera faite a Petersbourg. 

Au cours dune conversation que j'ai eue ce matin avec le baron de Schoen, 
celui-ci m'a declare que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait les intentions de Vienne. 
Quand Berlin saura iusqu'ou l'Autriche veut aller, on aura une base de discussion, 
qui rendra plus faciles les conversations en vue d'une intervention. 



— 112 — 

Sur mon observation que les operations militaires engagers ne laisseraient peut- 
etre pas le temps de causer, et que le Gouvemement allemand devrait user de son 
influence a Vienne en vue de les retarder, l'ambassadeur m'a repondu que Berlin ne 
pouvait exercer de pression, mais qu'il esperait que les operations ne seraient pas 
poussees tres activement. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



N 95. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., 

a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Constantinople, Rome, 
Belgrade. 

Paris, le 2gjuillet 1914. 

D'ordre de son Gouvemement, M, lswolsky est venu me commuuiquer un tele- 
gramme adresse par M. Sazonoll a Berlin. 11 resulle de cette information que la Russie, 
a la suite de la declaration de guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie. des mesures 
de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande partie de l'armee austro-hongroise, 
enfm du refus du comte Berchtold de continuer les pourparlers entre Vienne et 
Saint-Petersbourg, avail decide la mobilisation dans les arrondissements d'Odessa, 
Kiew, Moscou et Kazan. Kn portant ce fail a la connaissance du Gouvemement alle- 
mand, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Berlin a ete charge d'ajouter que ces precautions 
militaires n'etaient a aucun degre dirigees contre 1'Allemagne, el ne prejugeaient pas 
11011 plus des mesures agressives contre rAulriche-Hongrie ; I'Ambassadeur de Russie 
a Vienne n'etait, d'ailleurs, pas rappele de son poste. 

L Ambassadeurde Russie m'a donne egalement le sensde deux telegrammes adresses 
4 Londres par M. SazonofT : le premier, indiquant que la declaration de guerre a la 
Serbie meltail fin aux conversations du Ministre russe avec I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche, 
demandait a 1'Angletcrre d'exercer aussi rapidement que possibleson action dans le 
sens de la mediation et de l'arrcl immediat des operations de guerre de 1'Autriche 
(dont la continuation donnait le temps a 1'Autriche d'ecraser la Serbie pendant que 
la mediation trainerait); le second communiquait 1'impression gardee par M. Sazonoff 
do ses conversations avec rAmbassadeurallemand, que 1'Allemagne favorise I'intran- 
srgeance de 1'Autriche et n'exerce pas d'action sur elle. Le Ministre russe considere 
I'attilude de 1'Allemagne comme ties inquietante et croil que 1'Angleterre est en meil- 
leure posture que les autres Puissances pour entreprendre des 'demarches a Berlin , 
en vue d'une action sur Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 



— 113 — 



N° 96. 



M. Bahrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres j). i. 

Rome, le 29 juillet 1914. 

Le Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres a ete informe officiellement par l'Ambassadeur 
de Russie que son Gouvernement, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de l'Autriche. 
a laSerbie et des mesures de mobilisation prises d'ores et deja par l'Autriche, avait 
donne 1'ordre de mobiliser dans les districts de Kiew, Odessa, Moscou et Kazan. II 
a ajoute que cette mesure n'avait pas un caractere agressif contre l'AHemagne et que 
l'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'avait pas ete rappele. 

En commentant cette communication, le Marquis de San Giuliano m'a dit que 
malheureusement dans toute cette affaire ia conviction de l'Autriche et celle de 1'Al- 
lemagne avaient ete et etaient encore que la Russie ne marcherait pas. II m'a lu a ce 
propos une depeche de M. Bollati lui rendant compte d'un entretien qu'il avait eu 
aujourd'hui avec M. de Jagow, et 011 ce dernier lui avait encore repete qu'il ne croyait 
pas que la Russie marcherait. II fondait cette croyance sur )e fait que le Gouverne- 
ment russe venait d'envoyer a Berlin un agent pour traiter de certaines questions 
linancieres. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Berlin a dit egalement a son Collegue 
anglais qu'il ne croyait pas a une guerre generate , la Russie n'etanl ni en huroeur ni 
en etat de faire la guerre. 

Le Marquis de San Giuliano nc partage pas du tout cette opinion. II cstime 
que si l'Autriche se conlente d'humilier la Serbie, et d'exiger, en outre de l'ac- 
ceptation de la note, certains avantages materiels qui ne touchent pas a son terri- 
toire, la Russie peut encore trouver matiere a composition avec elle. Mais si l'Au- 
triche veut soil demembrer la Serbie, soit la detrtiire comme Etat indepeudant, 
il considere comme impossible a la Russie de ne pas intervenir militairement. 

Malgre 1'extreme gravite de la situation , le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ne me 
parait pas desesperer de la possibilile dun arrangement. II croit que l'Angleterre peut 
encore exercer beaucoup d'influence a Berlin dans un sens pacifique. II a eu hier 
soir, m'a-tdl dit, une longue conversation avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, 
Sir R. Rodd, pour lui demontrer combien 1'intervention anglaise pourrait etre eCG- 
cace. II m'a dit en terminant : « Si tel est aussi l'avis de voire Gouvernement, il pour- 
rait, de son cote, insister dans ce sens a Londres. » 

BarrAre. 



114 — 



N° 97. 



M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfFaires e^rangeres, 
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. 

Paris, le 29 juiJIet 1914. 

Je vous serais oblige de prier Sir Ed. Grey de bien vouloir reprendre le plus tot 
possible a Berlin, sous la forme qu'il jugera la plus opportune et la plus efficace, sa 
proposition de mediation des quatre Puissances, qui avait obtenu 1'adhesion de 
principe du Gouvernement aliemand. 

Le Gouvernement russe a du, de son cote, faire exprimer directement le meme 
d^sir au Gouvernement anglais; la declaration de guerre de 1'Autriche a la Serbie, ses 
envois de troupes sur la frontiere austro-russe , la mobilisation russe consecutive sur 
la frontiere de Galicie, ont en effet mis fin aux conversations directes austro-russes. 

Les precisions que le Gouvernement aliemand va demander a Vienne , conforme- 
ment a la declaration du baron de Schoen que je vous ai fait connaitre, pour s'infor- 
mer des intentions du Gouvernement aulrichien, permettront aux quatre Puissances 
d'exercer une action utile entre Vienne et Petersbourg pour le maintien de la paix. 

Je vous prie de signaler egalement au Secretaire d'Elat anglais combien U serait 
important qu'il obtint du Gouvernement italien le maintien de son concours le plus 
entier pour sa collaboration a faction des quatre Puissances en faveur de la paix. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 98. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires e^rangeres p. i. 

Londres, le 29 juillet 1914. 

Dans son entretien d'aujourd'hui avec mon collegue d'AUemagne, Sir Ed. Grey a 
fait observer que l'ouverture de M. Sazonoff pour une conversation directe entre la 
Russie et 1'Autriche n'ayant pas ete accueillie a Vienne, il conviendrait d'en revenir a 
sa proposition d'intervenlion amicale des quatre Puissances non directement interessees. 
Cette suggestion a ete acceptee en principe par le Gouvernement Aliemand, mais il a 
fait des objections a 1'idee dune conference ou dune mediation. Le Secretaire d'Etat 
des Affaires etrangeres a invite le Prince Lichnowski a prier son Gouvernement de 



— 115 — 
proposer lui-meme une formule. Quelle quelle soit, si elle permet de maintenir la 
paix, elle sera agreee par l'Angleterre, la France et lltalie. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne a du transjnellre immediatement a Berlin la demande 
de Sir Ed. Grey. En me rendant corapte de cetle conversation, le Secretaire d'Etat 
des Aflaires elrangeres a ajoute que la reponse de I'Allemagne a cette communication , 
ainsi qu'a celle de la Russie relative a la mobilisation de quatre corps d'armee sur la 
frontiere autrichienne, nou-* permettra de nous rendre compte des intentions du 
Gouvernement allemand. Mon collegue d'AlIemagne ayant interroge Sir Ed. Grey 
sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Aflaires 
elrangeres a repondu qu'il n'avait pas a se prononcer quant a present. 

Sir Ed. Grey ne ma pas cache qu'il trouvait la situation lies grave et qu'il gardait 
peu d'espoir dans une solution pacifique. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 99. 

M. Boppe, Ministre de France a Belgrade, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres p. i. 

Belgrade, le 29 juillet 1914. 

Le Prince beritier avait, des la remise de l'ultimatum austro-hongrois, telegraphie 
au Tzar pour demander sa protection. Mon collegue de Russie me conlie qu'H vient 
de communiquer a M. Pacbitch la reponse de Sa Majeste. 

Le Tzar remercie le Prince de s'etre adresse a lui dans une circonstance aussi cri- 
tique ; il declare que toutes les dispositions sont prises pour arriver a une solution 
pacifique du conflit, et donne au Prince l'assurance formelle que, si ce but ne peut 
etrc atteint, la Russie ne se desinleressera jamais du sort de la Serbie. 

Boppe. 



N° 100. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France ;i Sainl-Pelersbourg, 

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres p. i. 

Saint-Petcrsbourg, le 29 juillet 19 ii. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne est venu declarer a M. Sazonofl que si la Russie n'ar- 
rete pas ses preparatifs militaires, l'aruiee allemande recevra 1'ordre de mobibser. 



— 116 — 

M. Sazonoff a repondu que les preparatifs russes sont motives: dun cote, par 
1'intransigeance obstinee de 1'Autriche ; d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps 
austro-hongrois sont deja mobilises. 

Le ton sur lequel le comte de Pourtales s'est acquitte de la notification a decidd 
le Gouvernement russe, cette nuit meme, a ordonner la mobilisation des treize 
corps destines a operer contre 1'Autriche. 

Paleologue. 



N° 101. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
auv Ambassadeurs de France a Sainl-IVtersbourg et Londres. 

Paris, le 3o juillet 191 k 

M. Iswolski est venu cette nuit me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a nolifie a 
M. Sazonoff 'la decision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armees, si 
la Russie ne cesse pas ses preparatifs mililaires. 

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Tsar fait remarquer que ces preparatifs 
n'ont ete commences qua la suite de la mobilisation par 1'Autriche de huit corps 
d'armee et du refus de cette puissance de regler pacifiquement son dilferend avec la 
Serbie. M. Sazonoff declare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hater 
ses armements et envisager I'imminence de la guerre, qu'elle compte sur le secours 
d'alhee de la France et qu'elle considere comme desirable que l'Angleterre se joigne 
sans perdre de temps a la Russie et a la France. 

La France est resolue a remplir toutes les obligations de 1'alliance. 

Elle ne neghgera, d'ailleurs, aucun eflort en vue de la solution du conllit dans 
1'interet de la paix generate. La conversation engagee entre les Puissances moins direc- 
tement interessees permel d'esperer encore que la paix puisse etre preservee; j'estime 
done qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de precaution et de defense aux- 
quelles la Russie croit devoir proceder, elle ne prit immediatement aucune dispo- 
sition qui offrit a 1'Allemagne un pretexte pour une mobilisation lotalc ou partielle 
de ses forces. 

L'Ambassadeur dAllemagne est venu a la fin de l'apres-midi d'hier me parler des 
mesures militaires que prenait le Gouvernement de la Republique en ajoutant que 
la France etait libre d'agir ainsi, mais qu'en Allemagne les preparatifs ne pouvaient 
etre secrets et qu'il ne faudrait pas que lopinion francaise s'alarmat si I'Alleuiagnc s'y 
decidait. 

J'ai repondu que le Gouvernement francais n'avait prls aucune mesure dont ses 



— 117 — 
voisins pussent elre inquiets et que sa volonte de se preLer a toute negociation pour 
le maintien de la paix ne pouvait elre mise en doute. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 102. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3ojuillet 19 1'4> 

M. Sazonoff, a qui j'ai fait connaitre voire desir de voir eviter toute mesure mili- 
taire qui pourrait oQrir a I'AUemagne un pretexte a la mobilisation gt-nerale, m'arepondu 
que juSlement, dans le cours de la nuit derniere, I'Etat-Major avail fait surseoir a des 
mesures de precaution militaire pour eviter toute equivoque. Hier, le Chef d'Etat- 
Major general russe a convoque i'Altache militaire de l'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et lui 
a donne sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation ordonnee ce matin vise exclusive- 
ment l'Autriche. 

Toutefois, dans un enlretien qu'il a eu cet apres-midi avec le comte de Pourtales, 
M. Sazonoff a du se convaincre que l'Allemagne ne veut pas prononcer a Vienne la 
parole decisive qui sauvegarderait la paix. L'empereur Nicolas garde la meme impres- 
sion dun ecliange de telegrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec l'empereur 
Guillaume. 

D'autre part, l'Etat-Major et 1'Amiraute russes ont recu d'inquietants renseigne- 
ments sur les preparatifs de 1'armee et de la marine allemandes. 

En me donnant ces informations, M. Sazonoff a ajoute que le Gouvernement 
russe ne continue pasmoins ses efforts de conciliation. 11 ma repete : « Jusqu'au der- 
nier instant, je negocierai. » 

Paleologle. 



IN" 103. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Saint-Petersbourg, le So^uillet ig'4. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cette nuit insister de nouveau, mais dans 
des termes moins categoriques, aupres de M. Sazonoff pour que la Russie cesse 



— 118 — 
ses preparatifs militaires, en affirmant que l'Autriche ne porterait pas atteinte a 
1'inlegrite territoriale de la Serbie : 

■ Ce n'esl pas seuleruent 1'integrite territoriale de la Serbie que nous devons sau- 
• vegarder, a repondu M. SazonolT, c'est encore son independance el sa souverainete. 
■ Nous ne pouvons pas admettre que la Serbie devienne vassale de l'Autriche. » 

M. S.izonoff a ajoule : ■ L'heure est trop grave pour que je ne vous declare pas 
toute ma pensee. En intervenant a Petersbourg, tandis qu'elle refuse d'intervenir 
a Vienne, rAHemagne ne rherclie qu'a gagner du temps, afin de permeltre a 1'Au- 
triche d'ecraser le petit royaume serin- avant que la Russie n'ait pu le secourir. Mais 
I'empereur Nicolas a un lei desir de conjurer la guerre que je vais vous faire en son 
nom une nouvelle proposition : 

» Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son confiil avec la Serbie a assume le caractere 
d'une question d'interet europeen, se declare prele a eliminer de son ultimatum les 
clauses qui portent atteinte a la souverainete de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser 
toutes mesures militaires. » 

Le comle de Pourtales a promis d'appuyer cette proposition aupres de son Gou- 
vernement. 

Dans la pensee de M. Sazonoll, 1'acceptation de sa proposition par l'Autriche aurait 
pour corollaire logique louverlure dune deliberation des Puissances a Londres. 

Le Gouvernement russe montre, une Ibis encore, par son altitude, qu'il ne neglige 
rien pour enrayer le conllit. 

Paleolocue. 



,N° 104. 

M. Dumaine, Anibassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene Viviani, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres. 

Vieune, le 3o juillet 19 ii- 

Malgre la communication faite lner par 1'Ambassadeur de Russie a plusieurs de.ses 
collegues, dont celui d'Allemagne, an sujet de la mobilisation partielle dans son 
pays, la presse de Vienne setait abslenue den publier la nouvelle. Ce silence impose 
vient de s'expliquer dans un entretien de haute importance entre M. Schebeko el le 
conite Berchtold, qui ont longuement envisage les redoutables difficultes presentes, 
avec une egale bonne volonte d'y adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptables. 

Les preparatifs militaires du cote russe, a explique M. Schebeko, n'ont d'autre but 
que de repondre a ceux de l'Autriche et d'indiquer 1'intention el Les droits du Tzar 
d'emettre son avis dans le reglemenl de la question serbe. Les mesures de mobilisa- 
tion prises en Galicie, a repondu le comte Berchtold, n'impliquent nou plus aucune 
intention agressive et visent seulement a maintenir la situation sur le meme pied. De 



— 119 — 
part'et d'autre on s'appliquera a ce que ces mesures ne soient pas interpretees comtne 
des marques d'hostilite. 

Pour le reglement du conflit austro-serbe , il a ete convenu que les pourparlers 
seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. SazonolT et le comte Szapary; s'ils ont ete 
interrompus c'est par suite dun malentendu, le comte Berchtold croyant que le 
Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie reclamait pour son interlocuteur des pou- 
voirs qui lui permettraient de modifier les terraes de I'ultimatum aulrichien. Le 
comte Szapary sera seulement autorise a discuter quel accommodement serait com- 
patible avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont un souci egal. 

Ce serait done, pour le moment, sous celte forme directe et reduite aux deux 
plus inleressees qu'aurait lieu 1'examen que Sir Ed. Grey proposait de Conner aux 
quatre Puissances non directement interessees. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que 
le Foreign Office approuvera entierement cette nouvelle procedure. Repetant lexpose 
fait par lui au Ballplalz, l'Ambassadeur de Russie a aflirme que son Gouvernement 
tiendra un compte beaucoup plus large qu'on ne le suppose des exigences de la Mo- 
narchic; rien n'a ete neglige par M. Schebeko pour convaincre le comte Berchtold 
de la sincerite du desir de la Russie d'arriver a une entente acceptable pour les 
deux Empires. 

L'entretien s'etait mainlenu dans un ton amical et permettait de croire que toute 
chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue, lorsque la nouvelle de la mobilisation 
allemande est parvenue a Vjenne. 

DlJMAINE. 



N° 105. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Berlin, le 3o juillet igii. 

M. de Jagow m'a telephone a deux heures cpie la nouvelle de la mobilisation alle- 
mande, repandue une beure auparavant, etait fausse, et m'a prie de vous en informer 
d'urgence ; le Gouvernement imperial fait saisir les supplements de journaux qui lan- 
noncaient. Mais ni cette communication ni ces mesures ne diminuent mes apprehen- 
sions au sujet des projets de l'Allemagne. 

H parait certain que le Conseil extraordinaire tenu hier soir a Potsdam avec les 
autorites militaires et sous la presidence de 1'Empereur avait decide la mobilisation, 
ce qui explique la preparation de ['edition speciale du Lokal An:cigcr, mais que sous 
des influences diverses (declaration de I'Angleterre qu'elle reserve son entiere liberie 



— 1-20 — 
d'action, ecbange de telegrammes entre le Tzar et Guillaumc II) Ics graves mesures 
arretees ont ete suspendues. 

Lin des Ambassadeurs avcc lequcl je suis le plus lie a vu, a deux heures, M. Zim- 
mcrmann. D'apresle Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, les autorites militaires pressent beaucoup 
pour que la mobilisation soit decretee, parce que tout retard fait perdre a I'Allemagne 
quelques-uns de ses avantages. Cependant, jusqu'a present on aurait reussi a com- 
baltre la bate de 1'Etat-Major qui, dans la mobilisation, voit la guerre. Quoi qu'il en 
soit, la mobilisation peut etre decidee d'un moment a 1'autre. Je ne sais qui a lance 
dans le Lol.al Anzeiger, journal generalement oflicieux, une nouvelle prematuree de 
nature a soulever les esprils en France. 

J'ai les plus fortes raisons de penser, d'ailleurs, que toutes les mesures de mobi- 
lisation qui peuvent etre realisees avant la publication de 1'ordre general de mobilisa- 
tion sont prises ici, oil 1'on voudrait nous faire publier notre mobilisation les pre- 
miers pour nous en atlribuer la responsabilite. 

Jules Cambon. 



N" 106. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Consed, Ministre des Affaires et range res, 
a M. Paid Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. 

Taris, le 3o juillet igi4- 

Je vous pne de porter a la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignemenls 
suivants touchsnt les preparatifs militaires francais et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra 
que si la France est resolue, ce n'cst pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression. 

Vous atlirerez I'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur la decision prise par le Conseil 
des Mmislres de ce matin : bien que I'Allemagne ait pus ses dispositifs de couverlure 
a quelques centaines de metres de la frontiere, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux 
Vosgcs, et porte ses troupes de couverlure sur leurs positions de combat, nous avons 
retenu nos troupes a 1 o kilometres de la frontiere, en leur interdisant de s'en rappro- 
cher davantage. 

Noire plan, concu dans tin esprit d'olfensive, prevovait pourlant que les positions 
de combat de nos troupes de couverlure seraient aussi rapprochees tjue possible de 
la frontiere. En livranl ainsi une bande du lerritoire sans defense a 1'agression sou- 
dainc de 1'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la Republique tienl .i montrer que la France, 
pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilite de 1'attaque. 

Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux cotes de noire 
frontiere : en France, les permissionnaires n'ont etc rappeles qu'apres que nous avons 
acquis la certitude que I'Allemagne lavait fail depuis cinq jours. 



— 121 — 

En Allemagne, non settlement les troupes en garnison a Metz ont ete poussees 
jusqu'a la frontiere, mais encore elles ont ete renforcees par des elements transposes 
en chemin de fer de garnisons de l'interieur, telles que celles de Treves ou de Cologne. 
Rien d'analogue n'a ete fait en France. 

L'armement des places de la frontiere (deboisements, mise en place de 1'arme- 
ment, construction de batteries, renforcement des reseaux de fil de fer) a ete com- 
mence en Allemagne des le samedi 20; chez nous, il va Petre, la France ne pouvant 
plus se dispenser de prendre les memes mesures. 

Les gares ont ete occupees milttairement en Allemagne le samedi 25, en France 
le manli 28. 

Enlin, en Allemagne, les reservistes, par dizaine de milliers, ont 6te rappeles par 
convocations individuelles, ceux residant a 1'etranger (classes de 1903 a 1 y 1 1) rappe- 
les, les officiers de reserve convoques; a l'interieur, les routes sont barrees, les auto- 
mobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. Cost le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. 
Aucune de ces mesures n'a ete prise en France. 

L'armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bomes frontieres; par deux fois, 
bier, des patrouilles allemandes ont penelre sur notre territoire. Tout le XVF Corps 
de Metz, renforce par une partie dn VIII'" venu de Treves et de Cologne, occupe la 
frontiere de Metz an Luxembourg; le XV" Corps d'armee de Strasbourg a serre sur 
la frontiere. 

Sous menace d'etre fusilles, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ont defense de 
passer la frontiere. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 107. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin , 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires (Hran- 

geres. 

Berlin , le 3o j uillit 191/1. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'a pas recu communication de la reponse de 1' Alle- 
magne a la demande de Sir E. Grey. II m'a dit que Berlin avait consulle Vienne et 
attendait encore l'avis de son allie. 

Mon collegue de Russie vient de me faire connaitre, de son cote, que M. de 
Jagow (auquel le Comte de Pourtales avail communique la formule de conciliation 
suggeree par M. Sazonoff pour une entente austro-russe) venait de lui declarer qu'il 
trouvait cetle proposition iuacceptable pour I'Autriche, marquant ainsi faction nega- 
tive de la diplomatic allemande a Vienne. 

Jules Cambon. 



- 122 — 

N° 10S. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Londres, )e 3o juillet lgii. 

Le Prince Lichnowski n'a pas apporte de reponse a la demande que lui avait 
adressee hier Sir Ed. Grey pour obtenir du Gouvernement allemand une formule 
d'intervention des quatre puissances dans linteret de la pane Mais raon collegue 
d'Allemagne a questionne le Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres sur les prepa- 
ralife rnilitaires de 1'Angleterre. 

Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu qu'ils n'avaient aucun caractere ollensif, mais que , 
dans letat actuel des affaires sur le continent, il etait naturel de prendre quelques 
precautions; qu'en Angleterre, comme en France, on desirait le maintien de la paix, 
et que si, en Angleterre, comme en France, on envisageait des mesures defensives, 
ce n'etait pas dans le but de preparer une agression. 

Les renseignements que Votre Excellence m'a adresses au sujet des mesures mili- 
taires prises par 1'Allemagne sur la frontiere Irancaise m'ont permis de marquer a Sir 
Edward Grey qu'il ne s'agit plus seulement aujourd'hui dun condit d'influence entre 
la Russie et lAutriche-Hongrie; une agression risque d'etre commise qui pourrait 
provoquer une guerre generale. 

Sir Edward Grey a parfaitement compris mon sentiment et, comme moi, il estime 
que le momeDt serait venu d'envisager toutes les hypotheses et de les discuter en 
commun. 

Paul Cambon^ 



N° 109. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Berlin, le 3o juillet 191&. 

Dans l'entrerue que jai eue aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat, j'ai demande a 
M. de Jagow quelle reponse il avait faite a Sir Ed. Grey, qui lui avait demande de 
donner lui-meme la formule de 1'intervention des puissances desinteressees. 



— 123 — 

11 m'a repondu que, « pour gagner du temps », il avait decide d'agir directeruent 
et qui! avait demande a 1'Autriclie de dire sur quel terram on pourrait causer 
avec elle. CetLe reponse a pour effet, sous pretexte d'aller plus vite, d'eliminer l'An- 
gleterre , la France et lltalie et de ronfier a M. de Tchirsky, dont le* sentiments 
pangermanistes et russophobes sont connus, le soin d'amener 1'Autriche a une attitude 
conciliante. 

M. de Jagow m'a parle ensuile de la mobilisation russe sur la froutiere autrichienne; 
il m'a dit que cette mobilisation compromettait le succes de toute intervention aupres 
de 1'Autriche , et que tout dependait de la. 11 a ajoute qu'il craignait que I'Autriche 
ne mobUisat completement a la suite de la mobilisation partielle russe, ce qui pou- 
•vait entrainer par contre-coup la mobilisation lotale russe, et par suite celle de 1A1- 
lemagne. 

J'ai fait remarquer au Secretaire d'Etat qu'il m avail dit lui-meme que l'Allemagne 
ne se considererait comme obligee de mobdiser que si la Russie mobilisait sur les 
frontieres aEemandes et que tel n'etait pas le cas. II m'a repondu que c'etait vrai, 
mais que les cbefs de 1'Arniee insistaient, car tout retard est une perte de forces- 
pour l'armee allemande, et « que les paroles que je rappelais ne constituaient pas, de 
sa part, un engagement ferme ». 

L'impression 'que je rapporte de cet entretien est que les chances de paix ont 
encore decru. 

Jules Cambon. 



N" 110. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AlTaires etran- 
geres. 

Londres, fe3LJuulef 1914. 

Au debut de noire entretien d'aujourd'hui, Sir E. Grey m'a dit que le Prince 
Lichnowski lui avait demande ce matin si l'Angleterre observerait la neutralite dans 
le conflit qui se prepare. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres lui a repondu. 
que, si le conflit devenait general, l'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre et, 
notamment, que si la France y etait impliquee, 1'Angleterre y serait entrainee. 

J'ai inlerroge alors Sir E. Grey sur la deliberation du Cabinet qui avait eu lieu 
ce matin. II m'a repondu qu'apres avoir examine la situation, le Cabinet avait pense 
que pour le moment le Gouvernement britannique ne pouvait nous garantir son inter- 
vention, qu'il avait l'intention de s'entremettre pour obtenir de l'Allemagne et de la 
France lengagement de respecter la neutralite beige, mais- que pour envisage!" une 
intervention il convenait d'atlendre que la situation se developpat. 

J'ai demande a Sir E. Grey si, pour intervenir, le Gouvernement britannique 
altendrait I'envahissement du territoire francais. J'ai insiste sur le fait que les me- 



— 124 — 

sures de|a adoptees sur notre frontiere par PAUemagne revelaient des intentions 
degression prochaine, et que si Ion voulait eviter de voir se renouveler i'erreur de 
l'Europe en 1870, il convenait que l'Angleterre envisage.it des maintenant les con- 
ditions dans lesquelles elle noiis donnerait le concours sur lequel la France comptait. 

Sir E. Grey m'a repondu que l'opinion du Cabinet ne s'etait formee que sur la 
situation actuelle, que cette situation pouvait so modifier et que, dans ce cas, on 
appellerait aussitot le Conseil des Minislres a en deliberer. 

Sir A. Nicolson, quej'ai vu en sortant du Cabinet du Secretaire d'Etat, m'a dit que 
le Conseil se reunirait de nouveau deniain, et, confidentiellement, m'a fait entendre 
que le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires elrangeres ne manquerait pas de reprendre la 
discussion. 

Conformement a vos instructions, j'ai fait le necessaire pour que la lettre auto- 
graphe que M. le President de la Republique adresse a Sa Majeste le Roi d'Angleterre 
soit remise ce soir au Roi. Cette demarche, qui sera certainement communiquee au 
Premier Ministre, des demain matin, sera, je n'en doute pas, prise en serieuse con- 
sideration par le Cabinet britannique. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 111. 
M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg-, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Luxembourg, !e 3 1 juillet 1914. 

Le Ministre d'Etat sort de la Legation, il venait de me dire que les Allemands 
avaient lei me les pouts sur la Moselle de Schengen et de Remich avec des voitures, 
celui de Wormeldange avec des cordes. Sur la Sure, les ponts de Wasserbillig et 
d'Echternach ne son! pas condamnes, mais les Allemands ne laissent plus sortir de 
Prusse ni ble, ni betail, ni automobiles. 

M. Eysi ben m'a prie, et c'est le vrai but de sa visite, de vous demander une decla- 
ration oflicielle assurant que la France respectera en cas de conflit la neulralite du 
Luxembourg. Comme je lui demandais s'il avait recu une declaration analogue du 
Gouvemement allemand, il m'a dit qu'il allait se rendre chez le Ministre d'AUemagne 
pour avoir la meme declaration. 

Post-scriptum. — Jusqu'a present, aucune mesure particuliere n'a ete prise par le 
Gouv ernemenl luxembourgeois. M. Eyschen revient de la Legation d'AUemagne, il 
s'est plaint des mesures de suspicion prises contre un voisin neutre. Le Ministre d'Etat 
a demande au Ministre d'AUemagne une declaration oflicielle de son Gouvemement, 
prenant 1'engagement de respecter la neulralite. M. de Buch lui aurait repondu : 
« Cela va de soi rnais il faudrait que le Gouvemement francais prit le meme enga- 
gement ». 

Mollard. 



— 125 



N° 112. 

M. Rene Vivianj, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeies, 

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, 
Berlin , Vienne et Rome. 

Paris, ie 3i juillet 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre ma remis une note de son Gouvernement demandant 
au Gouvernement francais d'appuyer a Saint-Petersbourg une proposition tendant 
a la solution pacifique du conflit austro-serbe. 

Cette note expose que TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a inform^ Sir Edw. Grey de 
1'intention qu'a son Gouvernement de s'eflbrcer d'agir sur le Gouvernement austro- 
hongrois, apres la prise de Belgrade et 1'occupation des regions voisines de la fron- 
tiere, pour obtenir la promesse de ne pas avancer davantage, pendant que les Puis- 
sances chercheraient a obtenir que la Serbie donnat des satisfactions sullisantes a 
lAulriclie; le territoire occupe serait evacue. une fois qu'elle aurait reeu satisfaction. 

Sir Edw. Grey a fait cette suggestion le 29 juillet et exprime l'espoir que les 
preparatifs militaires seront suspendus de tous cotes. Bien que 1'Ambassadeur de 
Russie a Londres ait informe le Secretaire d'Etat qu'd craint que la condition russe 
(si I'Aulriche, reconnaissanC que son conjlit avcc la Serbie a assume le caracterc d'une 
question d'interct curopcen, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points 
ijui portent atteinle au principe de la souverainele serbe, la Russie s'cngacje a arreter 
tous pre'paratifs militaires).ne puisse etre modifiee, Sir Edw. Grey pense que, si lAu- 
triche arrete son avance apres 1'occupation de Belgrade, le Gouvernement russe 
pourrait accepter de changer sa formule, dans ce sens que les Puissances examineraient 
comment la Serbie donnerait des satisfactions completes a lAutriche sans porter 
atteinle a la souverainele on a 1'independance du Royaume. Dans le cas 011 lAutriche, 
ayant occupe Belgrade et le territoire serbe voisin, se declarerait prete, dans linterct: 
de l'Europe, a cesser d'avancer et a discuter comment 1'on pourrait arriver a un 
arrangement, la Russie pourrait aussi consentir a la discussion et suspendre ses pre- 
paratifs militaires, pourvu que les autres Puissances agissent de Heme. 

Conformemerit a la demande de Sir Edw. Grey, le Gouvernement francais s'esl 
rallie a la suggestion anglaise et a prie dans les termes suivants son Ambassadeur i 
Petersbourg de s'efforcer d'obtenir sans retard 1'assentiment du Gouvernement russe : 

« Je vous prie de faire connaitre d'urgence a M. Sazonoff que la suggestion de Sir 
Ed. Grey ,me par ait fournir une base utile de conversation entre les Puissances ega- 
lement desireuses de travailler a un reglement honorable du conflit auslro-serbe et 
d'ecarter ainsi les dangers qui menacent la paix gerierale. 

« Le plan propose par le Principal Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres, en 
arretant la marche en avant de Farmee autrichienne, et en confiant aux Puissances le 
soin d'examiner comment la Serbie pourrait donner pleine satisfaction a l'Autric'ne 



— 126 — 
sans porter atteinte aux droits souverains et a 1'independance du Royaume, en donnant 
ainsi un moyen a la Russie de suspendre tous preparatifs mililaires, les autres Puis- 
sances devant agir de meme, est de nature a donner egalement satisfaction a la Russie 
et a l'Autriche et a menager a la Serbie une sortie acceptable de la difliculte actuelle. 
« Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considerations qui precedent pour engager ties 
instamment M. Sazonofl a donner sans retard son adhesion a la proposition de 
Sir Ed. Grey doot il a du etre saisi de son cote. » 

Kene ViviANI. 



N" 113. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de Fiance a Sainl-Petersbourg, 

a M. Rene. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AQaires etran- 
geres. 

Saint-Petersbourg, le ii juillel 1914. 

La nouvelle du bonibardement de Belgrade dans la nuit et la matinee d'hier a 
provoque en Russie la plus vive emotion. On ne parvieiit pas a s'expliquer l'altitude 
de l'Autriche, dont les provocations ont constamment suivi, drpuis le debut de la 
crise. les tentatives de conciliation de la Russie et les conversations satisfaisantes 
echangees entre Petersbourg et Vienne. 

Quoi qu'd en soil, desireux de ne rien negliger pour prouver la sincerite de son 
desir de sauvegarder la paix, M. Sazonofl m'informe qu'il a modifie sa formule, a la 
demande de lambassadcur d'Angleterre, de la mamere suivante : 

" Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la man lie de ses troupes sin le lerritoire serbe et 
si , reconnaissant que le conflit auslro-serbe a assume le caractere dune question d'in- 
tercl europeen, elle admel que les grandes Puissam es exuminenl le-- satisfactions que 
la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sans porter atleinte 
a ses droits souverains >'t a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son 
attitude expectanle. » 

Paleologue. 



127 — 



N° 114. 



M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 

a MM. les Ambassadenrs de France, a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, 
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Constantinople. 

Paris, le 3i juillet 191^. 

Les efforts poursuivis jusqu'ici parallelement par l'Angleterre et la Russie, avec le 
concours empresse de la France (acquis d'avance a toute tentative pacifique), en vue 
d'une entente directe entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg ou d'une mediation des 
quatre puissances sous la forme la plus appropnee, se rejoignent aujourdhui : la 
Russie , donnant une nouvelle preuve de sondesir d'entente , s'est empressee de rcpondre 
a la premiere apparence d'ouverture faite par l'Allemagne dcpuis le. debut de la crise 
(sur les conditions auxquelles la Russie arreterait ses preparatifs militaires), en indi- 
quant une formule et la modifiant de suite confoimement a la demande de 1'Angle- 
terre; on devrait done esperer, les pourparlers ayanl repris d'autre part entre les 
ambassadenrs russe et autrichien, que la mediation anglaise viendra achever a Londres 
l'eflort des negociations directes de Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg. 

Toutefois l'attitude constante de l'Allemagne qui, depuis le commencement du 
conflit, tout en protestant sans cesse aupres de chacunc des puissances de ses inten- 
tions pacifiques, a lait echouer en fait, par son attitude ou dilatoire ou negative, 
toutes les tentatives d'accord et n'a pas cesse d'encourager par son ambassadeur l'in- 
transigeance de Vienne; les preparatifs militaires allcmands, commences desle 2 5 juillet 
et poursuivis sans arret depuis; 1'opposition immediate de l'Allemagne a la formuie 
russe, declaree a Berlin inacceptable pour 1'Autricbe avant meme d'avoir consulte 
cette Puissance; enfin toutes les impressions venues de Berlin imposent la conviction 
que l'Allemagne a poursuivi Thumiliation de la Russie, la desagregation de la Triple- 
Entente et, si ces resultats ne pouvaient etre obtenus, la guerre. 

Rene Viviani. 



N" 115. 

M. Dumaine, Amiassadeur de France a Vienne, 

a M. Rene VtviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Vieone, le 3i juillet 1914. 

La mobilisation generale atteignant tous les hommes de 19 4 42 ans a ete decre - 
tee par le Goirvernement auslro-hongrois ce matin a la premiere heure. 

Mon collegue russe estime encore que cette mesure n'est pas neltement en contra- 
diction avec les declarations du Comte Bercbtold d'hier. 

Ddmaine. 



128 - 



N" 116. 

M. .Jules Camcox, Ambassadeurde France a Berlin, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 

geres. 

Berlin, lo 3i juillct 191A. 

M'ayant fait demander, M. de Jagow vient de me dire qu'd avait le grand regret 
de me faire connailre qu'en presence de la mobilisation totale de 1'armee russe, I'AI- 
lemagnc, dans I'inleret de la securite de I'Empire, se voyait obligee de prendre de 
graves mesures de precaution. On a decrete ce qu'on appelle « Rnegsgefahrzustand » 
(l'etat de danger de guerre), qui permet a 1'autorite de proclamer, si elle le juge 
utile, l'etat de siege, de suspendre certains services publics et de ferjner la frontiere. 

En meme temps, on demande a Petersbourg de demobihser, aussi bien du cote 
aulrii bien que du cote allemand, sans quoi l'Allemagne serait obligee de mobiliser 
de son cole. M. de Jagow m'a fait connaitre que M. de Schoen etait charge d'informer 
le Gonvernement francais des resolutions du cabinet de Berlin, et de lui demander 
quelle attitude il pensait adopter. 

Jules Cambox. 



N° 117. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Paleologue, Atnbassadeur de France a Petersbourg. 

Paris, le 3i juillet 191 A. 

Le Gonvernement allemand a decide a midi de prendre toutes les dispositions 
militaires que comporte l'etat dit « etat de danger de guerre ». 

En me communiquant cette decision, ce soir a 7 heures, le Baron de Schoen a 
aioute que le Gouvernement exigeait en meme temps que la Russie demobilise. Si" le 
Gouvernement russe n'a pas donne une reponse satisfaisante dans un delai de douze 
heures, l'Allemagne mobilisera a son tour. 

J'ai repondu a 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n'etais nullement renseigne sur 
une prelendue mobilisation totale de 1'armee et de la (lotte russes, que le Gouver- 
nement allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires quil 
prend des. aujourd'hui. 

Le Baron de Schoen m'a demande en terminant, au nom de son Gouvernement, 
quelle serait, en cas de conflit entre l'Allemagne et la Russie, I'attitnde de la France. 
II m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma reponse demain samedi a une heure. 



— 129 — 

Je n'ai pas I'intention de lui faire une declaration a ce sujet et je me bornerai a 
lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses interets. Le Gouvernement de la R6publique 
ne doit, en effet, compte de ses intentions qu'a son allied. 

Je vous prie de porter immediatement ce qui precede a la connaissance de 
M. Sazonoff. Ainsi que je vous l'ai deja fait connaitre, je ne doute pas que le Gou- 
vernement imperial, dans 1'interet superieur de la paix, n'evite pour sa part tout ce 
qui pourrait rendre inevitable ou precipiter la crise. 

Rene Viviani. 



IN" 118. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, 

a M. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3i juillet 1914. 

En raison de la mobilisation generate de 1'Autriche et des mesures de mobilisation, 
prises secretement, mais d'une maniere continue, par 1'Allemagne depuis six jours, 
1'ordre de mobilisation generale de l'armee russe a ete donne, la Russie ne pouvant, 
sans le plus grave danger, se laisser davantage devancer; en realite, elle ne fait que 
prendre des mesures militaires correspondant a celles prises par 1'Allemagne. 

Pour des raisons strategiques imperieuses, le Gouvernement russe ne pouvait 
plus, sachant que 1'Allemagne s'armait, retarder la conversion de sa mobilisation par- 
tielle en mobilisation generale. 

Paleologue. 



N° 119. 

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxeiles, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Bruxeiles, le 3i juillet 1914. 

L'Agence Havas ayant annonce que I'etat « de danger de guerre » etait decrete en 
Allemagne, j'ai dit k M. Davignon que je pouvais lui donner 1'assurance que le 
Gouvernement de la Republique respecterait la neutralite de la Relgique. 

Oocdments DiPLOMATlQCES, — Guerre europeenae- 1 7 



— 130 — 
Le Minislre ties Affaires elrangeres m'a repondu que le Gouvernement royal avuit 
toujours pease qu'il en serait ainsi et m'a remercie. Le Minislre de Russie et le 
Minislre d'Angleterre, que j'ai vus ensuite, se sont montres tres salisfaits qu'en la 
circonsUucc j aie donne celte assurance, conforme d'ailleurs, m'a ditle Minislre anglais, 
a la declaration de Sir Edw. Grey. 

Klobukowski 



— 131 



CHAPITRE VI 

DECLARATION DE GUERRE 

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (SAMEDI 1 ER AOUT, A 19" 10) 

ET A LA FRANCE (LUNDI 3 AOUT, A 18" 45) 



— 133 — 



N° 120. 



M.Ttehe Viviani, President dn Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg-, 
Berlin, Vienne, Rome. 

Paris, le 1" aoit 191 4. 

Deux demarches ont ete faites hier soir par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche, 1'une 
assez vague a Paris, lautre precise a Petersbourg dans un sens conciliant. 

Le Comte Szecsen est venu me declarer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
avait avise olliciellement la Russie qu'il n'avait aucune ambition territoriale et ne tou- 
chera pas a la souverainete d'Etat de la Serbie; qu'il repudie fgalement toute 
intention d'occuper le sandjak; mais que ces declarations de desinteressement ne 
conservent leur valeur que si la guerre reste localisee a l'Autriche et a la Serbie, une 
guerre europeenne ouvrant des eventualites impossibles a prevoir. L'Ambassadeur 
d'Autriche, en commentant ces declarations, a laisse entendre que, si son Gouverne- 
ment ne pouvait repondre aux questions des Puissances parlant en leur propre nom, 
il pourrait sans doute repondre a la Serbie ou a une Puissance lui demandant ses 
conditions au nom de la Serbie. II ajoutait qu'il y aurait la peut-elre encore une 
possibility. 

A Petersbourg, 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est venu voir M. Sazonoff et lui a de- 
clare que son Gouvernement consentait a entamer une discussion quant au fond 
de ('ultimatum adresse a la Serbie. Le Ministre russe s'est declare satisfait de celte 
declaration et a propose que les pourparlers aient lieu a Londres avec la parti- 
cipation des Puissances. M. Sazonoff a du demander au Gouvernement anglais de 
se charger de la direction de la negociation ; il a indique qu'il serait tres important 
que l'Autriche arretat ses operations en Serbie. 

II resulte de ces fails que l'Autriche se montrerait eniin disposee a un arrangement, 
de meme que le Gouvernement russe est pret a entrer en negociations sur la base 
de la proposition anglaise. 

Malheureusement ces dispositions, qui permettraient d'esperer une solution paci- 
fique, paraissent en fait devoir etre annulees par 1'attitude de I'Allemagne. Cette 
Puissance a en effet pose un ultimatum donnant douze heures au Gouvernement 
russe pour accepter de demobiliser, non seulement du cote allemand, mais aussi du 
cote autrichien; c'est a midi que le delai expire. L'ultimatum ne se justifie pas, 
puisque la Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui implique un arret des pr6- 
paratifs militaires de toutes les Puissances. 

L'altitude de I'Allemagne prouve qu'elle veut la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la 
France. Hier, lorsque M. de Schoen est venu demander au quai d'Orsay quelle atti- 
tude la France comptait prendre en cas de condit russo-allemand, 1'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne, bien qu'il n'y ait directement entre la France et I'Allemagne aucun 
conflit et que nous ayons employe depuis le debut de la crise et employions encore 
^ous nos efforts en vue dune solution pacifique , a ajoute qu'il me priait de presenter 



— 134 — 

au President de la Republique ses hommages et remerciements, et dernandait que 
Ion voulut bien prendre « des dispositions pour sa propre personne » ; nous savons 
egalement qu'il a deja mis en surete les archives de 1'Ambassade. Cette attitude de 
rupture des relations diplornatiques sans conflit direct, et bieu qu'aucune reponse 
negative precise ne lui ait ele faite, est caracterislique de la volonte arretee de l'AHe- 
magne de faire ia guerre a la France. Le defaut de sincerite de ses protestations 
pacifiques est demonlre par la rupture qu'elle impose a 1'Europe, lorsque les uego- 
ciations etaient enfin acceptees par l'Autriche, d'accord avec la Russie. 

Rene VlVUNI. 



N° 121. 

M. Jules C\mbon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Mjnistre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,, le 1" aout 19 li. 

Mon CoHegue de Russie a recu hier soir deux telegrammes de M. Sazonoflf 1'avi- 
sjul que 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Petersbourg avait declare que son Gouverne- 
ment etait pret a disinter avec le Gouvernement russe ia note a la Serbie, meme 
quant an fond; M. SazonofJ lui aurait repondu que ces conversations devraient, a 
sesyeux, avoir lieu a Londres. 

L'ultimalum a la Russie ne peut qu'ecarter les deroiercs chances de paix que ces 
conversations semblaient laisser subsister. On peut so demander si, dans de pareilles 
renditions, 1'acceptation de l'Autriche etait serieuse et n'avait pas pour objet de 
faire pesei la responsabilite du conllit sur la Russie. 

Mon CoHegue d'Angleterre a fail dans la unit un appel pressant aux sentiments 
d'humanilc de M. de Jagovv. Celui-ci lui a repondu que la question etait trop enga- 
ger et qu'il fallait altendre la reponse russe a rultimatum allemand. Or il a dil a sir 
E. Goschen que 1'ulliraatum reeiamait le retrait de Ia mobilisation russe 11011 settle- 
ment du cote de l'Allemagne, inais encore du cote de l'Autriche; mon CoHegue 
anglais sen est vivetnent etonne et lui a declare que ce dernier point scniblait inac- 
ceplable pour la Russie. 

L'ultimalum de l'AHemagne, intcrvenant a . l'lieure precise ou 1'accord semble pres 
de s'etablir entre Vienne et Saint-Pclersbourg, est significatif de sa politique belli— 
queuse. 

Le conllit n'existait en fait qu'entre la l'uisxir et lAiitnche, l'Allemagne n'ayant a 
intervenir que comme aUice de l'Autriche; dans ces conditions, les deux Puissances 
pnncipalement inleressees elant disposees a causer, si 1'AUemagne ne desirait pas la 



— 135 — 
guerre pour son propre comple, il est incomprehensible qu'elle cnvoie un ultima- 
tum a la Russie, au lieu de continuer a travailler, comme toutes les autres Puis- 
sances, a une solution pacifique. 

J. Cambon. 



N° 122. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Berlin, et au Ministre 
de France a Bruxelles. 

Paris, le l"" aout 191^. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, me deman- 
der quelle serait, en cas de conflit avec 1'AUemagne, l'atlitude du Gouvernement 
Franqais vis-a-vis de la Belgique. 

J'ai declare que , comme nous l'avions repele a plusieurs reprises au Gouverne- 
ment Beige, nous entendions respecter sa neutrahte. 

' Ce serait seulement dans le cas oil cette neutrality serait violee par une autre Puis- 
sance que la France, pour remplir ses obligations de Puissance garante, pourrait 
etre amenee a penetrer sur le territoire belee. 

bene Viviani. 



N° 123. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Berlin, le 1" aout igi4- 

L'Ambassadeur dAngleterre a ete charge par son Gouvernement de faire aupres 
du Gouvernement Allemand la meme demarche qui a ete faite aupres de vous au 
sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique. 

M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il prendrait les ordres de FEmpereur et du Chancelier, 
mais qu'il doutail rru'une reponse put etre donnee, car 1'AUemagne ne pouvait ainsi 
decourrir ses projets militaires. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reverra demain M. de 
Jagow dans 1'apres-midi. 

J. Cambon. 



— 13(3 — 

N° 124. 
M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires elran- 
geres. 

Rome, le l" aout 1 g 1 4- 

J'ai ete ce matin a 8 hemes 1/2 chez le Marquis de San Giuliano pour connaitre 
de lui d'une facon precise quelle serait 1'allitude de l'ltalie en presence des actes 
provocateurs de 1'Allemagiie et des suites qu'ils peuvent avoir. 

Le Ministre des AiTaires elrangeres ra'a repondu qu'il avail recu hier soir la visite 
de 1'Ambassadeur d Allemagne. M. de Flotow lui aurait dit que I'Allemagne avait 
demande au Gouvernement Russe de suspendre sa mobilisation et au Gouvernement 
Francois d'indiquer ce qu'il avait I'intention de faire; 1'Allemagne avait donne a la 
France un delai de dix-huit heures et ii la Russie un delai de douze heures pour 
repondre. 

M. de Flotow a demande, a la suite de cette communication, quelles etaient les 
intentions du Gouvernement [talien. 

Le Marquis de San Giuliano a repondu que la guerre entreprise par I'Autriche, 
elant donne surtout les consequences qui pouvaient en sortir d'apres les paroles 
de 1'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne , ayant un caractere agressif ne cadrant pas avec le 
caractere purement defensif de la Triple-Alliance, l'ltalie ne pourrait participer a la 
guerre. 



Barrere. 



IN" 125. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, 

Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. 

Paris, le 1" aout 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est revenu me voir ce matin a 1 1 heures. Apres lui 
avoir rappele tous les efforts poursuivis par la France en vue d'un reglement hono- 
rable du conllit austro-serbe et de la difficulte qui s'en est suivie entre I'Autriche et 
la Russie, je lai mis au courant des pourparlers continues depuis hier : 

i° Proposition transactionnelle anglaise prevoyant, entre autres, de la part de la 
Russie, la suspension des preparatifs militaires, a condition que les aulres Puissances 
en fassent autant; adhesion de la Russie a cette proposition; 

2° Communications du Gouvernement Autrichien declarant ne vouloir ni s'agrandir 
en Serbie, ni meme penetrer dans le sandjak et se disant pret a discuter a Londres 
avec les aulres Puissances \efond meme de la question austro-serbe. 

J'ai mis en regard Pattitude de rAllemagne qui, abaudonnanl tout pourparler, 
posait a la Russie un ultimatum au moment meme oil cette Puissance vient d'accepter 
la formule anglaise (qui implique 1'arret des preparatifs militaires de tous les pays 
ayant mobilise) et envisageait comrne imminente une rupture diplomatique avec la 
France. 



_ 137 — 

Le Baron de Schoen m'a repondu qu'il ignorait les developpements survenus dans 
cette question depuis vingt-qualre heures. qu'il y avait peul-etre la une « lueur 
d'espoir » pour unaccommodement, qu'il n'avait recu aucune nouvelle communication 
de son Gouvernemcnt et qu'il allait s'informer. II a de nouveau proteste de son sin- 
cere desir de joindre ses efforts a ceux de la France pour arriver a la solution du 
cODflit. J'ai insiste sur la grave responsabilite qu'a'ssumeraif le Gouvernement Imperial 
si, dans de pareilles circonstances, il prenait des initiatives non justifiees et de nature 
a compromettre irremediabtement la paix. 

Le Baron de Schoen n'a plus fail allusion a son depart immediat et ne m'a plus- 
demande de.repondre a sa question concernant 1'altitude de la France en cas de 
conflit auslro-russe. II s'est borne a dire de hii-meme qu'elle n'etait pas douteuse. 

II ne convient a aucun degre d'exagerer les possibiKtes qui peuvent resulter de ma 
conversation avec 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, car, de son cote, le Gouvernement 
Imperial continue les plus dangereux preparatifs sur notre frontiere. II ne faut pas les 
negliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler a un arrangement. La 
France, de son cote, procede a toutes les mesures militaires propres a la garantir 
contre une avance trop grande des preparatifs militaires allemands. Elle estime que 
ses tentatives de conciliation n'auront de chances d'aboutir que dans la mesure ou 
on la sentira prete et resolue, si la lutte lui est imposee. 

Rene Viviani. 



N" 126. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris, le l" aout 1914. 

Sir Edward Grey m'a dit que, dans le Conseii de ce matin, le Cabinet avait de 
nouveau envisage la situation. L'Allemagne ayant reclame de l'Angleterre une decla- 
ration de neutralite et ne layant pas obtenue, le Gouvernement britannique demeu- 
rait maitre de son action et celle-ci pourrait se manifester dans differentes hypotheses. 

En premier lieu, la neutralite beige importe beaucoup a l'Angleterre. La France a 
renouvele immedialement 1'engagement de la respecter. L'Allemagne a declare « n'etre 
pas en etat de repondre ». Sir Edward Grey saisira le Cabinet de cette reponse et 
demandera ['automation de dire lundi a la Chambre des Communes que le Gouver- 
nement britannique nc permettra pas une violation de la neutralite beige. 

En second lieu, les escadres anglaises sont mobilisees el Sir Edward Grey propo- 
sera a ses collegues de declarer qu'elles s'opposeront au passage du Detroit par les 
escadres allemandes ou, si elles venaient a le passer, 4 toute demonstration sur les 
cotes franchises. Le Conseii de lundi traitera ces deux questions; j'ai fait remarquer 
au Principal Secretaire d'Etat que si, d'ici la , quelque incident venait a se produire, 
il ne fallait pas se laisser surprendre et qu'il conviendrait de songer a intervenir a 
temps. 

Paul Cambon. 

Documents diplomatiqces. — Guerre europeenne. 18 



— 138 — 



N" 127. 



M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. 

Paris, le i" aoilt 1914. 



Nous sommes avisos par plusieurs voies que le Gouverneroent allemand et le 
Gouvernement aulrichien essaient en ce moment d'impressionner l'Angleterre en lui 
faisant croire que la Vesponsabilite de la guerre, si elle eclate, incombera a la Russie. 
On fait effort pour . obtenir la neutrality de l'Angleterre en denaturant la verite". 

La France n'a cesse de doiiner, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, des conseils de 
moderation a Petersbourg; ces conseils ont ete ecoutes. 

Des le debut, M. Sazonoff a fait pression sur la Serbie pour qu'elle acceptal 
toutes celles des clauses de 1'ultimalum qui etaient compalibles avec sa souverainete. 

II a ensuite engage avec l'Autriche unc conversation directe qui etait un nouveau 
temoignage de son esprit de conciliation. II a enfin accept^ de laisser les puissances 
les moins interessees recbercher les moyens d'apaiser le conflit. 

Conformement au desir qui lui a ete exprime par Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazo- 
noff a consenti a modifier la premiere formule qu'il avait presentee et il en a redige 
une seconde qui ne s'eloigne pas sensiblement des declarations qui ont ete faites hier 
a M. de Margerie par le comte Szecsen. Ce dernier affirrne que l'Autriche n'a 
aucune intention d'acquisition territoriale et quelle ne vent pas toucher a la souve- 
rainete de la Serbie. II ajoute expressement que l'Autriche n'a aucune visee sur le 
Sandjak de Novi-Bazar. 

II semblerait done que 1'accord fut facile a etablir entre la suggestion de Sir 
Edward Grey, la formule de M. SazonofT et les declarations de l'Autriche. 

La France est resolue a poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec l'Angleterre, la realisation 
de cet accord. 

Mais pendant que Ton negociait et que la Russie montrait dans la negociation une 
bonne volonte incontestable, l'Autriche a, la premiere , pi'ocede a une mobilisation 
generate. 

La Russia s'est vue lorcee de 1'imher pour ne pas se trouver en etat d'inferiorite, 
mais elle est toujours restee prete a negocier. 

Je n'ai pas hesoin de repeter -que, quant a nous, nous continuerons a travailler, 
avec l'Angleterre, au succes de ces pourparlers. 

Mais lattitude de 1'Allemagne nous a mis dans 1'obligation absolue de prendre au- 
jourd'hui le di'cret de mobilisation. 

Bien avant la mobilisation russe, des mercredi dernier, ainsi que je vous l'ai dejS 
telegraphic, M.de Schoenm'avait ajinonce la publication prochaine du « Kriegsgefahr- 



— 139 — 
zustand ». Cette mesure a ete prise par I'AUemagne et, a 1'abri de ce paravent, elle a 
immediatement commence sa mobilisation proprement dite. 

Aujourd'hui M. Paleologue a telegraphie que le Comte de Pourtales avait an-! 
nonce au Gouvernement russe la mobilisation allemande. 

Des renseignements parvenus au Ministere de la Guerre confirment que cette 
mobilisation est eflectivement en pleine execution. 

Notre decrct de mobilisation est done une mesure essentielle de preservation. Le 
Gouvernement I'a accompagnee d'une proclamation signee du President de la Re- 
publique et de tous les Ministres, et dans laquelle il explique que la mobilisation 
nest pas la guerre, qu'en 1'etat actuel e'est pour la France le meilleur moyen de 
sauvegarder la paix, et que le Gouvernement de la Republique multipliera ses efforts 
pour faire aboutir les negociations. 

Veuillez transmettre d'urgence toutes ces indications a Sir Edward Grey et lui 
marquer que nous avons obei constamment a la preoccupation de ne commettre 
aucun acte de provocation. 

Je suis persuade que, au cas oii la guerre, eclaterait, 1'opinion anglaise verrait 
clairement de quel cote vient 1'agression , et qu'elle saisirait les raisons si fortes que 
nous avons donnees 4 Sir Edward Grey pour reclamer une intervention armee de 
I'Angleterre dans 1'interet de Tavenirde 1'equilibre europeen. 

Rene Viviani. 



K 128. 

M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, 

a M. Ren6 Viviami, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran- 
geres. 

Luxembourg, te l" aout igi4. 

Le Ministre d'Etat me cbarge de demander, au Gouvernement francais une assu- 
rance de neutrality semblable a celle qui a ete donnee a la Belgique. M. Eyschen m'a 
declare qu'a present, du fait que e'est le Ministre de France a Bruxelles qui a fait la 
declaration en question au President du Conseil du Gouvernement beige, il a pense 
que la meme procedure conviendrait le mieux vis-a-vis du Grand-Duche. 

C'est pourquoi il s'est abstenu de faire la demande directement au Gouvernement 
de la Republique. Comme la Cbambre des deputes se reunit lundi , M. Eyschen 
desire etre en possession de la reponse a cette date; une demarche analogue est faite 
en meme temps aupres du Ministre d'Alleniagne a Luxemljourg. 

MoLLiai). 



— 140 — 



N° 129. 



M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg. 

Paris, le 1" aout 1914. 

Veuillez declarer au President du Conseil que, conformernent au traits' de Londres 
de 1867, le Gouvernement de la Republique entend respecter la neutralite du 
Grand-Duche du Luxembourg, comme il la demontre par son altitude. 

La violation de cette neutralite par l'Allemagne serait toutefois de nature a obliger 
la France a s'inspirer desormais, a cet egard, du souci de sa defense et de ses 
interets. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 130. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin. 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Berlin, lc i"aout 1914. 

On dislribue dans les rues de Berlin des editions speciales desjournaux annoncant 
que la mobilisation generate de l'armee et de la flotte est ordonnee etque le i er jour 
de la mobilisation est le dimancbe 2 aout. 

Jules Cambon. 



IN" 131. 

M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Luxembourg, ie 2 aout 1914. 

J'ai l'houneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence les tails suivants. 
Diraanche 2 aout de grand matin les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations 
qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal a l'heure actuelle, out penetre 
sur le territoire Luxembourgeois par les ponts de VVasserbillig el de Remich, se 



— 141 — 
dirigeant specialement vers le Sud du pays, et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale 
du Grand-Duche ; un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des mu- 
nitions ont ete achemines par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg 
ou Ton s'attend a les voir arriver d'un instant a l'autre. 

Ces faits impliauent des actes manifeslement contraires a la neutrality du Grand- 
Duche, garantie par le traite de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement Luxembour- 
geois n'a pas manque de protester energiquement contre cette agression aupres des 
representants de Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne a Luxembourg ; une protesta- 
tion idenlique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les 
Affaires elrangeres a Berlin. 

Le Minislre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, 
Eyschen, 



N° 132. 

M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 



Luxembourg, le 2 aout 1914. 

Le Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, vient de recevoir, par I'interme- 
diaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un telegramme du 
Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann Hollvveg, disant que les mesures militaires 
prises par 1'AUemagne en Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre ce 
pays, mais sont unicmement des mesures destinees a assurer contre 1'atlaque 6ven- 
tuelle dune armee fran^aise lexploitation des voies ferrees aflermees a l'Empire. 
Le Luxembourg recevra une complete indemuite pour les dommages eventuels. 

Mollard. 



— 142 — 

IN" 133. 
JVote remise par l 'Ambassadeur ctAUemagne., 

Paris, le 2 aout igii. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allernagne vient d'etre charge et s'empresse de faire savoir air 
Ministere des Affaires etrangeres que les mesures mililaires prises par l'Allemagne 
dans le Grand-Uuche de Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acle d'hostilite. EUes 
doivent etre considerees comme des mesures purement preventives prises pour la 
protection des chemins de fer qui, par suite des traites existant entre l'Allemagne e» 
le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, se trouvent sous 1'administration allemande. 



N° .134. 

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-PEtersbourg, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. 

Pilersbourg, le 1 aout 191/1. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a remis a M. Sazonoff, hier, a 7 h. 10 du soir, la 
declaration de guerre de son Gouvernement; il quittera Petersbourg aujourd'hui. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie n'a recu aucune instruction de son gouverne- 
ment pour la declaration de guerre. 

Paleologue. 



r 135. 

M. Rene Vivuni, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres , 
a MM. les Representants de la France a l'&ranger. 

Paris, le 2 aout 1914. 

L'Ambassadeur de Russie me fait connaitre que l'Allemagne vient de declarer la 
guerre a la Russie, malgre les negociations en cours, et au moment oil 1'Autriche- 
Honcrie acceptait de discuter avec les- puissances le fond meme de son conflit avec 
[la Serbie. 

Rene VrviANi. 



133 — 



N° 136. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres, 
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P6tersbourg, 
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. 

Paris, le 2 aoAt roii. 

Le territoire fran^ais a ete viole ce matin par les troupes allemandes a Cirey et 
pres de Longwy. EUes marcbent sur le fort qui porte ce dernier nom. D'autre part, 
le poste douanier de Delle a ete assailli par une double fusillade. Enfm, les troupes 
allemandes ont viole ce matin aussi le territoire neutre du Luxembourg. 

Vous utiliserez ces renseignements sans retard pour faire constater comment le 
Gouvernement Allemand se livre contre la France a des actes de guerre sans provo- 
cation de notre part, ni declaration de guerre prealable, alors que nous avons 
scrupuleusement respecte la zone de dix kilometres que nous avons maintenue meme 
depuis la mobilisation, entre nos troupes et la frontiere. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 137. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Londres, le 2 aout 1914. 

A Tissue du Conseil des Miriistres tenu ce matin, Sir Edward Grey m'a fait la d6- 
claration suivante : 

«Je.suis autorise a donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande penfelre dans la 
Mauche ou traverse la mer du Nord afin d'entreprendre des operations de guerre 
contie la cote fran^aise ou la marine marchande francaise, la flotte britannique don- 
nera toute la protection en son pouvoir. 

« Cette assurance est naturellement donnee sous la reserve que la politique du 
Gouvernement de Sa Majesle sera approuvee par le Parlement britannique et ne doit 



— 144 — 
pas etre consid^ree comme obligeant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste a agir jusqu'a 
ce que I'eventualite ri-dessus mentionnee dune action de la (lotte alleniande se soit 
produite ». 

Me parlant ensuite de la neutrality de la Belgique et de telle du Luxembourg, le 
Principal Secretaire d'litat m'a rappele que la Convention de 1867 relative au Grand- 
Ducbe diflerait du Traite relatif a la Belgique en ce hens que I'Angleterre etait tenue 

de faire respecter cette derniere convention wir le concours des autres Puiss ;es 

garantes, tandis que, pour- le Luxembourg, toutes les Puissances garantes devaient 
agir de concert. 

La sauvegarde de la neutrality beige est consideree ici comme si importante que 
I'Angleterre envisagerait sa violation par I'Allemagne comme un casus belli. C'est la 
un interet proprement anglais, et on ne peut douter que le Gouvernement brilan- 
nique, fidele aux traditions de sa politique, ne le fasse prevaloir, meme si le monde 
des affaires, oil 1'influence allemande poursuit des efforts tenaces, prelendait exercer 
une pression pour empecher le Gouvernement de ^'engager contre I'Allemagne. 

Paul CuiuoN. 



N° 138. 

M. ReneVivtANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. 

Paris, le 2 aoiit 19 14- 

Je prends note des indications contenues dans vos telegrammes des 27, 3o, 
3 1 juillet.et 1" aoiit et dans celui que vous m'avez adresse aujourd'hui. 

Kn communiquaut aux Chambres la declaration meme que vous a faite Sir Edward 
Grey el dont votre dernier telegramme me donne le texte, j'ajouterai que nous avons 
obtenu la de la Grande-Bretagne un premier concours dont la valeur nous est pre- 
cieuse. 

Je me propose, en outre, d'indiquer que lassistance de la Grande-Bretagne a l'in- 
tention de donner a la France en vue de proteger les cotes de France ou la marine 
marchande fran^aise s'appliquerait de telle facjon que notre marine de guerre fut 
egalement soutenue par la (lotte anglaise, en cas de conllit Iranco-allemand , dans 
1'Atlantique, comme dans la mer du Nord et dans la Manche. Je noterais, en outre, 
que les ports anglais ne pourraient pas servir de points de ravitaillement a la llotte 
allemande. 

Rene Viviani. 



145 



IN" 139. 



M. Rene Vivi.vni, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Jules Cambon, Anibassadeur de France a Berlin. 

Paris, le 2 aoiit igi4- 

Les troupes allemandes ayanl aujourd'hui viole la frontiere de 1'Est sur plusieurs 
points, je vous prie de protester sans retard par 6crit aupres du Gouverneraent alle- 
mand. Vous youdrez bien vous inspirer de la note suivante que, dans 1'incertitude 
des communications entre Paris et Berlin, j'ai adresse directement a 1'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne : 

« Les autorit^s administratives et militaires franchises de la region de l'Est viennent 
de signaler plusieurs faits que j'ai charge 1'Ambassadeur de la Republique a Berlin 
de porter a la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial. 

' L'un s'est produit a Delle, dans la region de Belfort : a deux reprises, le poste de 
douaniers francais statioone dans cette localite a ele 1'objet d'une fusillade de la 
part dun detachement de soldats allemands. Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles alle- 
mandes du 5 r chasseurs a cheval ont franchi la frontiere dans la matinee d'aujourd'hui 
et p6n£tre jusqu'aux villages de Joncherey et Baron a plus de l o kilometres de la 
frontiere. L'officier qui commandait la premiere a brule la cervelle a un soldat 
francais. Les cavaliers allemands ont emmene des chevaux que le maire francais de 
Suarce etait en train de reunir et ont force les habitants de la commune a conduire 
les dits chevaux. 

« L'Ambassadeur de la Republique a Berlin a ete charge de protester formellement 
aupres du Gouvernement Imperial contre des faits qui constituent une violation 
caracterisee de la frontiere par des troupes allemandes en amies et que rien ne Justine 
dans 1'etat actuel. Le Gouvernement de la Republique ne peut que laisser au Gou- 
vernement Imperial 1'entiere responsabilite de ces actes ». 

Rene VlvuNl. 



N° 140. 

M. Marcelin Pellet, Ministre de France a La Haye, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

La Haye, le 3 aotil lgid. 

Le Ministre d'Allemagne s'est rendu hier chez le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
pour lui expliquer la necessite oii s'etait trouvee 1'Allemagne, a-t-il dit, de violer la 

DoctmEras diplqmatiqces. — ■ Guerre europeenne. if) 



— 146 — 
neutrality du Luxembourg, ajoutant qu'il aurait aujourd'hui une nouvelle commu- 
nication a lui faire. En effet,ce matin, il a annonce l'entree des troupes allemandes en 
Belgique pour eviter, a-t-il declare, une occupation de ce pays par la France. 



Pellet. 



N° 141. 

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxellesj 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

BruxeUes, le 3 aout 1914. 

Le Ministre d'Allemagne a reniis hier soir au Gouvemement beige un ultimatum 
oil il est dit que son Gouvernement, ayantappris que les Francois se preparaient a des 
operations dans les regions de Givet et de Namur, se voyait dans I'obligation de prendre 
desmesures dont la premiere etait d'inviter le Gouvernement beige a lui faire savoir, 
dans les sept heures, s'il etait dispose a lui faciliter en Belgique les operations mili- 
taires contre la France. En cas de refus, le sort des armes d^ciderait. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi a repondu que les renseignements sur les mouvements 
francais lui paraissaient inexacts en raison des assurances formelles, toutes recentes 
encore, donnees par la France; que la Belgique qui, depuis sa constitution, s'est pre- 
occupee d'assurer la sauvegarde de sa dignite et de ses interets et a consacre tous ses 
efforts au developpement pacifique du progres, proteste hautement contre toute violation 
de son territoire, d'ou qu'elle vienne, ct que, dans cette eventuality, elle saura 
defendre energiquement sa neutralite, garar.tie par les puissances et notauiment par le 
Roi de Prusse. 

Klobukowski. 



N° 142. 

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxeiles, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Bruxeiles, le 3 aout io,i4.. 

A I'assurance que je lui donnais que, si la Belgique faisait appel a la garantie des 
Puissances, contre la violation de sa neutralite par 1'AUemagne, la France W-pondrait 
imm^diatement a son appel, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repondu : 



— 147 — 
« C'est bien sincerement que nous remercions le Gouvememeut de la Repu- 
blique de 1'appui^ eventuel qu'U pourrait nous ofl'rir, mais dans la circonstance 
actuelle, nous ne faisons pas appel a la garantie des Puissances. Ulterieurement le 
Gouvernement du Roi appreciera ce qu'il y a lieu de faire ». 



N° 143. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Vivian i» President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Londres , le 3 aout i 9 1 i . 

Sir Ed. Grey m'a autorisd a vous faire savoir que vous pourriez declarer au Parle- 
ment qu'il ferait aux Communes des declarations sur l'attitude actuelle du Gouver- 
nement Britannique et que la principale de ces declarations serait la suivante : 

« Dans le cas oil 1'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la Mer 
du Nord pour doubler les iles britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les cotes franchises 
ou la marine de guerre francaise et d'inquieter la marine marchande francaise, 
1'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour prefer a la marine francaise son entiere protec- 
tion, en sorte que des ce moment I'Angleterre et 1'Allemagne seraient en etat de 
guerre. » 

Sir Ed. Grey m'a fait observer que la mention d'une operation par la Mer du Nord 
impliquait la protection contre une demonstration dans 1'Ocean Atlantique. 

La declaration concernant Intervention de la ffotte anglaise doit etre considered 
comme liant le Gouvernement britannique. Sir E. Grey m'en a donne 1'assurance et 
a ajoute que le Gouvernement fran<iais etait par la meme en mesure den donner con- 
naissance aux Chambres. 

A mon retour a 1'Ambassade, j'ai eu connaissance de votre communication tele- 
phonique relative a lultimatum allemand adresse a la Belgique. J'en ai fait part 
immediatement a Sir Ed. Grey. 

Paul Cambon,. 



lY 144. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ajxibassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres, le 3 aout 1914. 

Au moment ou Sir Ed. Grey partait ce matin pourle Conseil, -mon collegue alle- 
jnand, qui l'avait deja vu hier, est venu le prier avec insistance de lui dire que la 

•9j 



— 148 — 
neutrality de l'Angleterre ne dependait pas du respect de "la neutrality beige. 
Sir Ed. Grey s'est refuse a toute conversation a ce sujet. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a adresse a la presse un communique disant que si 
l'Angleterre restait neutre, 1'Allemagne renoncerait a toute operation navale et ne se 
servirait pas des cotes beiges conime point d'appui. Je fais repondre que le respect 
des cotes n'est pas le respect de la neutralite du territoire, et que 1'ultimatum alle- 
mand est deja une violation de cette neutralite. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 145. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Vivian i, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Londres, le 3 aout 191/I. 

Sir E. Grey a fait la declaration relative a 1'intervention de la flotte anglaise; il a 
precise, en raison des evenements, celle qui! comptait faire au sujet de la neutralite 
beige; et la lecture d'une lettre du Hoi Albert demandant 1'appui de l'Angleterre a 
vivement emu 1'Assemblee. 

La Chambre voters ce soir les credits demandes; des a present son appui est 
acquis a la politique du Gouvernement et elle suit 1'opinion publique, qui se pro- 
nonce de plus en plus en noire faveur. 

Paul Cambon. 



N° 146. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. 

Paris, le 3 aoilt io,i4. 

II me revient que 1' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne aurait declare au Foreign Office que 
bier matin quatre-vingts officiers francos en uniforme prussien auraient essaye da 
traverser la frontiere allemande dans douze automobiles a VValbeck a 1'ouest de Gel- 
dern.et quececi constituait une Ires serieuse violation de la neutralite de fa part de la 
France. 

Veuillez dementir d'urgence cette nouvelle de pure invention et altiier 1'attention 
du Foreign Office sur la campagne allemande de fausses nouvelles qui commence. 

Rene Viviani. 



- 149 — 



N" 147. 



Lettre remise par I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a M. Ren£ Viviam , President du 
Conseil, Mimstre des Affaires e'trangeres, au cours de son audience de depart, 
lc3 aout 1914, a 18 h. 45. 

Monsieur le President, 

Les autorites administratives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain 
nombre d'actes d'hostilite caractensee commis sur le territoire allemand par des avia- 
teurs militaires franc,ais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement viole la neutra- 
lity de la Belgique survolant le. territoire de ce pays; l'un a essaye de detruire des 
constructions pres de Wesel, d'aulres ont ete aper^us sur la region de I'Eiflel, un 
autre a jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg. 

Je suis charge, et j'ai 1'honneur de faire connaitre a Votre Excellence qu'en pre- 
sence de ces agressions, 1'Empire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec la 
France, du fait de cette derniere Puissance. 

J'ai en meme temps 1'honneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence que 
les autorites allemandes retiendront les navires marchands francais dans des ports 
allemands, mais qu'elles les relacheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la reci- 
procite complete est assuree. 

Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, il ne me reste plus qu'a prier Votre 
Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures 
qu'elle jugera utiles pour assurer mon retour en AUemagne avec le personnel de 
1'Ambassade, ainsi quavec le personnel de la Legation de Baviere et du Consulat 
general d'AUemagne a Paris. 

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, l'expression de ma tres haute conside- 
ration. 

Siene : SCHOEN. 



N° 148. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a MM. les Representants de la France a 1'etranger. 

Paris le 3 aout 191 4. 

L'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a demands ses passeports et part ce soir avec le per- 
sonnel de 1'Ambassade et du Consulat general d'AUemagne, et de la Legation de 
Baviere. Le Baron de Schoen a donne pour pretexte la constatation par les autorites 
administratives et militaires allemandes d'actes d'hostilite qui auraient ete commis 



— 150 — 
sur territoire allemand par des aviateurs militaires francais accuses d'avoir survole le 
territoire de 1'empire et jete des bombes; l'ambassadeur ajoute que des aviateurs 
auraient egalement viola la neutrality de la Belgique en survolant son territoire. « En 
presence de ces agressions, dit la lettre de M. de Schoen, 1'Empire allemand se 
considere en etat de guerre avec la France du fait de cette derniere puissance ». 

J'ai formellement conteste les allegations inexactes de l'ambassadeur et, de mon 
cote, j'ai rappele que des hier, je lui avais adresse une note protestant contre les 
violations caractensees de la frontiere francaise commises depuis deux jours par des 
detachements de troupes allemandes. 

Rene Viviani. 



N° 149. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin., 

( Telegramme communique aux Reprisentants de la France a I'etranger.) 

Paris, le 3 aoiit 1914. 

Je vous invite a demander vos passeports et a quitter immediatement Berlin avec 
le personnel de 1'ambassade en laissant la charge des interets francais et la garde des 
' archives a l'ambassadeur d'Espagne. Je vous prie de protester en meme temps par 
ecrit contre la violation de la neutralite du Luxembourg par les troupes allemandes 
signalee par le premier ministre luxembourgeois, contre 1'ultimatum adresse au 
gouvernement beige par le Ministre d'Allemagne a Bruxelles pour lui imposer la 
violation de la neutralite de la Belgique et exiger de celle-ci quelle lui facilite sur 
territoire beige les operations militaires contre la France; enfin contre la fausse alle- 
gation dun pretendu projel d'invasion de ces deux pays par les armees francaises, 
par lequel il a essaye dejustilier letat de guerre qu'il declare exister desormais entre 
1'Allemagne et la France. 

Rene Viviani. 



Pi 150, 

M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich. 

Paris le 3 a> nit 1 9 1 h ■ 
Veuillez faire connaitre au Gouvernement royal bavarois que vous avez re^u pour 
instruction de conformer votre attitude 4 celle de 1'Ambassadeur de la Republique a 
'Berlin et de quitter Munich, 

Rene Viviani. 



151 — 



N° 151. 



M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
a MM. les Representants de la France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg. 
Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, La Haye, Copen- 
hague, Christiania, Stokholm, Bucarest, Athenes, Belgrade. 

Paris, le 3 aout 191 U. 

J'apprends de source officielle beige que les troupes allemandes out viole le terri- 
toire beige a Gemmerich dans la region de Verviers. 

Rene Vivuni. 



N° 152. 

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Consed, Ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 

Le Chef de Cabinet du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres me remet une lettre par 
laquelle le « Gouvernement du Roi declare etre fermement decide a resister par tous 
les moyens en son pouvoir a 1'agression de l'Allemagne. La Belgique fait appel a 
l'Angleterre , la France et la Russie pour cooperer comme garantes a la defense de 
son territoire. 

k II y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resisler aux mesures 
de force, employees par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique, et en meme temps de 
garantir le maintien de l'independance et de 1'integrite de la Belgique dans l'avenir. 

• La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer qu'elle assurera la defense des 
places fortes. » 

KiOBUKOWStl. 



— 152 — 

N° 153. 

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 

geres. 

Londres, le 4 aout 191.4. 

Sir Edw. Grey m'a prie de venir le voir a 1'instant pour me dire que le premier 
Ministre declarerait aujourd'hui a la Chambre des Communes que 1'Allemagne avail, 
ele invitee a retirer son ultimatum a la Belgique et a donner sa reponse a 1'Angleterre 

ce soir avant minuit. 

Paul Cambon. 



N" 154. 

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a BruxeHes, 

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- 

geres. 

BruxeHes, le 4 aout 1911. 

Le Ministre d'Allemagne informe ce matin le Ministere des Affaires elrangeres 
beige que, par suite du refus du Gouverment beige, le Gouvernement imperial se 
voit force d'executer, par la force des armes, les mesures de securite indispensables 
vis-a-vis des menaces franchises. 

Klobukowski. 



155. 

M. Bapst, Ministre de France a Copenhague, 

a M. Doumergue, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Copenhague, 6 aoiit 191 4- 

L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin me prie de communiquer a votre Excellence 
le telegramme suivant : 

J'ai ele dirige par le Gouvernement allemand sur le Danemark. Je viens d'arriver 
a Copenbague. Tout le personnel de l'Ambassade et le Cbarge d'affaires de Russie a 
Darmstadt avec sa famille, m'accompagnaient. On a use de tels precedes a notre 
egard que je crois. utile d'en faire le rapport complet a Votre Excellence par le 
lelegraphe. 

Lundi matin, 3 aoiit, apres que j'avais, conformement a vos instructions, adresse 
a M. de Jagow une protestation contre les actes d'agression commis sur le territoire 



— 153 — 
francais par les troupes allemandes, le Secretaire d'Etat vint me voir. M. de Jagow 
venait se plaindre d'actes d'agression qu'il pretendait avoir ete commis en AUemagne, 
a Nuremberg et a Coblentz notamment, par des aviateurs francais qui, selon lui, 
« seraient venus de Belgique ». — Je repondis que je n'avais pas la moindre donnee 
sur les faits dont il voulait faire etat et dont l'invraisemblanee me paraissait evidente; 
je lui demandai a mon tour s'il avait pris connaissance de la Note que je lui avais 
adressee au sujet de 1'envahissement de notre territoire par des detachements de 
l'armee allemande. — Comme le Secretaire d'Etat me disait n'avoir pas encore lu 
cette Note, je lui en donnai connaissance. J'appelai son attention sur l'acte commis 
par l'olTicier commandant un de ces detachements qui s'etait avance jusqu'au village 
frantjais de Joncherey, a 10 kilometres a l'interieur de nos frontieres, et avait briile 
la cervelle a un soldat francais qu'il y avait rencontre. Apres avoir qualifie cet acte, 
j'ajoutai : — « Vous reconnaitrez qu'en aucune hypothese il ne saurait etre compare 
a un vol d'aeroplane sur territoire etranger, accompli par des particuliers animes de 
cet esprit d'audace individuelle qui distingue les aviateurs. 

Un acte d'agression commis sur le territoire d'un voisin par des detachements de 
troupes regulieres commandes par desofficiers presente une gravite toute autre. » 

M. de Jagow me declara qu'il ignorait les fails dont je lui parlais et il conclut 
qu'il etait difficile qu'il ne s'en produisit pas de cette nature lorsque deux armees, 
remplies des sentiments qui animaient nos troupes, se trouvaient face a face de 
chaque cote de la frontiere. 

A ce moment, les atlroupements qui se trouvaient sur la Parezer Platz, devant 
1'Ambassade el que nous apercevions a travels la fenetre entr'ouverte de mon cabinet , 
pousserent des cris contre la France. Je demandai au Secretaire d'Etat quand tout 
cela fmirait. 

« Le Gouvernement n'a pas encore pris de decision, me repondit M. de Jagow. II 
est probable que M. de Schoen recevra aujourd'hi 1'ordre de demander ses passe- 
ports, et ensuite, vous recevrez les votres ». — Le Secretaire d'Etat m'assura que du 
reste je n'avais aucune preoccupation a avoir au sujet de mon depart et que toutes 
les convenances seraient observees a mon egard ainsi qu'a 1'egard de mon personnel. 
Nous ne devions plus nous voir et nous primes conge lun de 1'autre, apres un entre- 
tien qui avait ete courtois et qui ne pouvait me faire prevoir ce que Ton me reser- 
vait. 

Avant de quitter M. de Jagow, je lui avais exprime le desir de faire une visite 
personnelle au Chancelier, puisque ce serait la dermere fois que j'aurais 1'occasion 
de le voir. 

M. de Jagow me repondit qu'il ne m'engageait pas a donner suite a cette intention, 
car cette entrevue ne servirait a rien et ne pourrait etre que penible. 

A 6 heures du soir, M. de Langwerlh m'a apporte mes passeports. II refusa au 
nom de son Gouvernement d'acceder au desir que je lui exprimais de me laisser par' 
tir par la Hollande ou la Belgique. II me proposa de partir soit par Copenhague, bien 
qu'il ne put m'assurer le libre passage de la mer, soit par la Suisse, via Constance. 

J'acceplai cette derniere voie; M. de Langwerth m'ayant demande de partir le plus 
tot possible, il fut convenu, en raison de la necessite oil j'etais de m'entendre avec 

Doci;mhms DiPLOMiTiQCES. — Guerre europeenne. 20 



— 154 — 
TAmbassadeur d'Espagne, qui prend nosinterets en main, que je quitterais I'Ambas- 
sade le lendemain mardi l\ aoiit, a io heures du soir. 

Line iieure apres le depart de M. de Langvverth, a 7 heures, M. de Lancken, ancien 
Conseiller d'Ambassade a Paris, vint me dire de la part du Ministere des Affaires 
etratigeres, d'inviter le personnel de mon Ambassade a tie plus prendre ses repas dans 
les restaurants. Cette consigne etait si slricte que le lendemain mardi j'eus besoin de 
recourir a lautorite de la Wilhelmstrasse pour que 1'hotel Bristol nous envoyat nos 
repas a 1'Ambassade. 

Le meme soir, lundi a 1 1 heures, M. de Langvverth revint m'apprendre que son 
Gouvernement me refusait le retour par la Suisse sous le pretexte qu'il faudrait trois 
jours et trois nuits pour me conduire a Constance. II m'annonca que je serais dirige 
sur Vienne. Je ne consentis a ce changemenl que sous reserve et dans la nuit j'ecrivis 
a M. de Langwerth la lettre suivante :, 

« Berlin, 3 aodt 1914. 
M. le Baron, 

« Je reflechis a la route dont vous etes venu me parler ce soir pour me faire rentrer 
dans mon pays. Vous me proposez de passer par Vienne. Je suis expose a me trouver 
retenu dans cette ville, sinon du fait du Gouvernement autricliien, du moins du fait 
des circonstances de sa mobilisation, qui lui cree des dilhcultes analogues a celles de 
1'AHemagne pour la circulation des trains. 

■ Dans ces conditions, je crois devoir reclamer du Gouvernement allemand lengage- 
ment d'honneur que le Gouvernement autricliien me dirigera sur la Suisse et que le 
Gouvernement suisse ne fermera ni a moi, ni aux personnes qui m'accompagnent, sa 
frontiere qu'on me dit justement fermee aux et'rangers. 

" Je ne puis done accepter la proposition que vousm'avez faite que si j'ai les suretes 
que je reclame et si je suis assure de ne pas etre retenu quelques mois hors de mon 
pays. . 

Jules Cambon. 

En reponse a cette lettre, le lendemain matin, mardi 4 aout, M. de Langwerth me 
donna par ecrit Insurance que les autorites autrichiennes et suisses avaient reru les 
communications necessaires. 

En meme temps, on arretait chez lui, dans son lit, M. Miladowski , attache an 
Consulat de Berlin, ainsi (jue d'antres Frani;ais. M. Miladowski, pour qui 11 n passe- 
port diplomatique avail ete demande, put etre relache an bout de lx heures. 

Je me preparais a partir pour Vienne, quand, a /( heures 45, M. de Langwerth 
revint m'annoncer que je devrais partir avec les personnes m'accompagnant a 
1 o heures du soir, mais que je serais conduit en Danemark. Devant celte exigence 
nouvelle, je demandai si 1'on me mettrait dans une forteresse, au cas oil je ne 1'accep- 
terais pas. M. de Langvverth me repondit simplement qu'il reviendrait chercher la 
reponse dans une demi-heure. Je ne voulais pas donner au Gouvernement allemand 
le pretexte de dire que je m'etais refuse a sortir d'Allemagne. Je declarai done a M. de 
Langwerth. lorsqu'il revint, que je me soumetlrais a l'ordre qui m'etait donne, mais 
1 que je protestais ». 



— 155 — 
J'ecrivis aussitot a M. de Jagow la leltre, dont la copiesuit : 

• Berlin, 4 aoilt 1914. 
« Monsieur le Secretaire d'Etat, 

• Votre Excellence m'avait dit a plusieurs reprises que le Gouvemement imperial, 
conformement aux usages de la courtoisie intemationale , me faciliterait mon retour 
dans rr.on pays et me donnerait tous les moyens d'y rentrer rapidement. 

« Cependant hier, apres m'avoir refuse 1'acces de la Belgique et de la Hollande, 
M. le baron de Langwerth m'a informe que je passerais par la Suisse via Constance. 
Dans la nuit, j'ai ete avisS que ]e serais envoye en Autriche, pays qui prend part du 
cote de 1'Allemagne a la presente guerre. Comme j'ignorais les intentions de 1' Au- 
triche a mon egard, puisque sur son sol je ne suis qu'un simple particulier, j'ai ecrit 
au baron de Langwerth que je demandais au Gouvemement imperial 1'engagement 
que les autorites imperiales et royales autrichiennes me donneraient toutes les faci- 
lites possibles pour continuer ma route, et que la Suisse ne se fermerait pas devant 
moi. M. de Langwerth a bien voulu me repondre par ecrit que je pouvais etre assure 
d'un voyage facile et que les autorites autrichiennes feraient tout le necessaire. 

« II est pres de 5 heures et le baron de Langwerth vient de m'annoncer que je serai 
dirige sur le Danemark. Etant donne les evenements, je ne suis pas assure de trou- 
ver un batiinent pour me transporter en Angleterre, et c'est cette consideration qui 
m'avait fait ecarter cette proposition, d'accord avec M. de Langwerth. 

"Enreahte, on ne me laisse aucuneliberte, et on me traite presque en prisonnier, 
Je suis oblige de me soumettre, n'ayant aucun moyen d'obtenir qu'il soit tenu 
compte des regies de la courtoisie intemationale a mon egard, maisje liens a protes- 
ter entre les mains de Votre Excellence contre lafacon dont je suis traite. 

Jules Cambon. 

Pendant qu'on portait ma leltre, j'elais avis6 que le voyage ne s'effectuerait pas 
direclement, mais par la voie du Schleswig. A 10 heures du soir, je quiltais 1'Am- 
bassade, avec mon personnel, au milieu d'un grand concours de police a pied et a 
cheval. 

A la gare, un employe inferieur du Ministire des Affaires Etrangeres representait 
seul celte administration. 

Le voyage s'est effectufi avec une lenteur extreme. Nous avons mis plus de vingt- 
quatre heures pour gagner la frontiere. II a semble qua chaque station on attendait 
des ordres pour repartir. J'etais accompagne du major von Rheinbaben, du regi- 
ment Alexandre de la Garde, et d'un fonctionnaire de la police. Aux environs du 
canal de Kiel, la troupe a envahi nos wagons. On a fait fermer les fenetres et les 
rideaux des voitures; chacun de nous a du se tenir isolement dans son compartiment 
avec defense de se lever el de toucher a ses sacs de voyage. Dans le couloir des 
wagons, devant la porte de chacun de nos compartiments maintenue ouverte, se 
tenait un soldat, le revolver au poing et le doigt sur la gachette. Le charge d'affaires 
de Russie, les femmes, les enfants, tout le monde a ete soumis au meme traitement. 

A la derniere station allemande, vers i i heures du soir, le major von Rheinbaben 



— 156 — 
est venu prendre conge de moi. Je lui ai rerais, pour M. de Jagow, la lettrc [ni 
suit : 

• Mercredi soir, 5 aout 1914. 
> MoNSIEtR LF. SECRETAIRE d'EtAT, 

•< Hier, avant de quitter Berlin, j'ai proteste par ecrit aupres de Votre Excellence 
contre les changements successifs de direction qui m'ont ete imposes par le Gouver- 
nement imperial, pour sortir d'Allemagne. 

"Aujourd'hui, lors du passage du train qui m'emportait au-dessus du canal de 
Kiel, on a voulu visiter tous nos bagages, comme si nous pouvions cacher quelque 
instrument de destruction. Grace a lintervention dn major von Kheinbaben, cet 
affront nous a etc epargne. 

« Mais on a fait plus. 

« On nous a oblige de rester chacun dans nos compartiments, dont les fenetres et 
les rideaux elaient fermes. Pendant ce temps, dans le couloir des voitures, a la porte 
de chaque compartiment et faisanl face a chacun de nous, se tenait un soldat, le 
revolver a la main, le doigt sur la gachette, durant pros dune demi-heure. 

« Je crois devoir protester contre cette menace de violences a l'egard de l'Ambassa- 
deur de la Republique et du personnel de son Ambassade, violences que rien n'avait 
pu seulement me faire pressentir. J'avais 1'honneur d'ecrire hier a Votre Excellence 
que j'etais traite presque en prisonnier. Aujourd'hui, rest en prisonnier dangereux 
que j'ai ete traite. Je dois noter que, dans le cours du voyage qui, depuis Berlin 
jusqu'au Danemaik, a pris vingt-quatre heures, aucun repas n'a ete prepare , 111 fourni 
a moi, non plus qu'aux personnes reconduites avec rnoi jusqu'a la frontiere. 

Jules Cambon. 

Je croyais tout termine, lorsque peu apres le major von Rheinbaben vint, un pen 
confus, m'annoncer que le train ne poursuivrait pas jusqu'a la frontiere danoise si je 
ne payais pas le prix de ce train. Je m'etonnai qu'on ne me 1'eut pas fait payer a 
Berlin et, qu'en tout cas, on ne m'eut pas prevenu. Je proposai de payer par un 
cheque sur une des plus grandes banques de Berlin ; cette facilite me fut refusee. 
Avec le concours de mes compagnons, je pus reunir en or la somme qui m'elait 
demandee immediatement et qui s'elevait a 3,Gii marks 75, soit a environ 
5,ooo francs au taux actuel du change (1). 

Apres ce dernier incident, je crus devoir demander a M. de Rheinbaben sa parole 
d'olhcier et de gentilhomme qu'on allait me conduire jusqu'a la frontiere danoise. II 
me la donna etj'exigeai quel'hommede police qui etait avec nous novsaccompagnat. 

Nous arrivames ainsi a la premiere station danoise oil le Gouvernement danois 
avait fait preparer un train pour nous conduire a Copenhague. 

On m'assure que mon collegue d'Angleterre et le Ministre de Belgique, bien qu'ils 
aient quitte Berlin apres moi, sont partis directement pour la Hollande. Je suis frapp^- 
de cette difference de traitement. Et comme le Danemark et la Norvege sont remplis 
en ce moment d'espions, si je reussis a m'embarquer en Norvege, on crarnt que je 
ne sois arrete en mer, avec les officiers qui m'accompagnent. 

(1) UlterieuremeDt la somme ainsi demandee a M. Jutes Cambon a ete reversee a 1'Ambassadeur d'Es- 
pagoe a Berlin pour £tre remboursee a. l'Ambassadeur de France. 



— 157 — 
Je ne veux pas terminer celte depeche saiis signaler a votre Excellence le devour- 
ment et fenergie dont tout le personnel de 1'Ambassade n'a pas cesse de faire preuve 
pendant la duree de cette crise; je serais heureux qu'il lui fut tenu compte des ser- 
vices rendus a cette occasion an Gouvernement de la Republique, en particular par 
les Secretaires de 1'Ambassade ainsi que par l'Attache militaire et l'Attache naval. 

Jules Cambon. 



IS" 156. 

M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, 

a M. Doumergue. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Paris, le 4 aoiit 1914. 

Le Ministre d'Etat est venu mardi matin l\ aoiit, vers huit heures et demie, a la 
Legation pour me notifier que les autorites militaires allemandes exigeaient mon 
depart. Sur ma reponse que je ne cederais que devant la force, M. Eyschen me dit 
qu'il counaissait mes sentiments a ce sujet et que c'etait precisement pour cela qu'il 
etait venu lui-meme me faire cette communication qui lui coutait beaucoup , car 
c'etait effeclivement devant la force qu'il me priait de parlir. 11 ajouta qu'il allait 
m'en apporter la preuve ecrite. 

Je ne cachai pas a M. Eyschen la tristesse et 1'inquietude que j'avais de laisser mes 
compatriotes sans defense et lui demandai de vouloir bien se charger de leur pro- 
tection, ce qu'il accepta. 

Au moment de partir, il me remit la lettre ci-jointe (annexe I), qui est la reponse 
du Gouvernement luxembourgeois a la declaration que j'avais faite la veille au soir, 
selon les instructions telegraphiques de M. Viviani. 

Vers dix heures, le Ministre d'Etat vint de nouveau a la Legation et me laissa, 
avec un mot de lui, une copic certifiee de la lettre que lui avait adressee le Ministre 
d'Allemagne au sujet de mon depart du Luxembourg (annexes II et III). 

II me dit egalement qu'il avait fait connaitre a M. von Buch que le Gouvernement 
luxembourgeois serait charge de la protection des Francois et aurait la garde de la 
Legation et de la Chancellerie. Cette nouvelle ne parut pas plaire a mon collegue 
d'Allemagne, qui conseillaa M. Eyschen de m'inciler a confier ce soin au Ministre de 
Belgique. J expliquai au Ministre d'Etat que la situation etait particuliere. Etant 
accredite aupres de S, A. R. la Grande-Duchesse et mon pays n'etant pas en etat de 
guerre avec le Luxembourg, il etait, dans ces conditions, tout indique que ce tut le 
Gouvernement luxembourgeois qui assurat la sauvegarde de mes, compatriotes. 
M. Eyschen n'insista pas et accepta de nouveau la mission que je lui confiai. 

Le Ministre d'Etat me demanda alorsde vouloir bien partir sans bruit, alin d'eviter 
des manifestations qui ne manqueraient pas, me dit-il, d'amener des represailles vis- 
a-vis des Francois de la part des autorites militaires allemandes. Je lui repondis que 
j'altachais trop de'prix a la securite de mes compatriotes pour la compromeltre et 
qu'il n'avait rien 4 craindre. 



— 158 — 

Mon depart, qu'on exigeait le plus tot possible, Put fixe a 2 heures, il fut egale- 
ment entendu que je partirais dans mon automobile. Pour le sauf-conduit, M. Evsrhen 
me dit que le Ministre d'Allemagne etait actuellement au quartier general allemand 
pour le demander et qu'il aurait soin de me le faire lenir en temps utile. 

A 2 heures un quart, M. le Ministre d'Etat , accompagne de M. Henrion, Conseiller 
du Gouvernement, vint me faire ses adieux et recevoir les clefs de la Legation et 
cellos de la Chancellci i :. 

II me fit connaitre que les ordres avaient ete donnes pour mon fibre passage el 
que je devais gagner A- Ion par la route de Merle, la route de Mamers et la route 
d'Ailun. 11 ajouta qu'un officier allemand m'attendrait route de. Merle pour preceder 
ma voiture. 

Je quittai alors la Legation el me rendis a Arlon par 1'itineraire fixe, mais je ne 
rencontrai personne. 

Votre Excellence voudra bien trOuver ci-contre (annexe IV) le texte de la lettre que 
j'ai remise a M. le Ministre d'Etat avant de quitter mon poste. 

MoLLARD. 



Annexe I. 



M. Evschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, 

a M. Mollard, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre plenipotentiaire de France a 
Luxembourg. 

Luxembourg, le h aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
Par sa communication vcrbale d'hier soir, Votre Excellence a eu la haute obbgeance de 
porter a ma connaissance que, conformement au trailc de Londres de 1867, le Gouverne- 
ment de la Republique entendait respecter la neutrality du Grand-Duche. de Luxembourg, 
comme il l'avait montre par son attitude, mais que la violation de cette neutrality par l'Alle- 
magne. etait toutefois de nature a obliger la France a s'inspirer desormais a cet egard du 
souci de sa defense et de ses interests. 

Vous me peimettrez de constater, Monsieur le Ministre, que la decision du Gouverne- 
ment de la Republique est uniquement basee sur le fait d'une tierce Puissance dont, certes, 
le Grand-Duche n'est pas responsable. 

Les droits du Luxembourg doivent done rester intacts. 

L'Empire allemand a formellement declare que seule une occupation temporaire du 
Luxembourg entrait dans ses intentions. 

J'aime a croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la Republique n'aura p;« 
de peine a constater avec moi que de tout temps et en toutes circonstances, le Grand-Duche 
a pleinement et loyalement rempli toutes les obligations generalement quelconques qui lui 
incombaient en vertu du traitede 1867. 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Le Ministre d'Etat. 

President du Gouvernement, 

EvSCHEN. 



— 159 



Annexe If. 



Lettre particuliere adressee par M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouverne- 
nient, 

a M. Mollard, Ministre de France ft Luxembourg. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Tout a 1'heure, j'ai eu le tres vif regret de vous faire connaitre les intentions du General 
von Fuchs au sujet de votre sejour a Luxembourg. 

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, j'avais demande une constatation par £crit de 
la decision prise a ce sujet par 1'autorite militaire. 

Ci-joint copie d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir a {'instant de la part du Ministre 
d'Allemagne. 

II m'a ete assure que, dans l'execution de la mesure, on ne manquera d'avoir tous les 
[egards dus ft votre quality etft votre personne. 

Veuillez recevoir {'expression reiteree de tous mes regTets et de mes sentiments les meil- 
fleurs. 

EYSCHEN. 



Annexe III. 



A Son Excellence le Ministre d'Etat, M. le D r Eyschen. 



J'ai l'honneur, conformement aux instructions de Son Excellence M. le general Fuclis, 
de vous prier de vouloir bien inviter le Ministre de France, M. Mollard, a quitter aussitot 
que possible le Luxembourg et a se rendre en France; autrcment les autorites militaires 
allemandes se trouveraient dans la penible obligation de placer M. Mollard sous la surveillance 
d'une escorte militaire et en cas extreme de proceder a son arrestation. 

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agreer a cette occasion l'assurance de ma consi- 
deration la plus distinguee. 

von Bdch. 



100 — 



Annexe IV. 



M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, 

a Son Excellence M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement de 
Luxembourg. 

Luxembourg, le 4 -tout 1 q 1 4 - 
Monsieur le Ministre . 

Je viens de recevoir votre communication el m'incline devant la force. 

Avant de quitter le Luxembourg, j'ai \<- ilr\,,ii de me preoccuper du sort et de la securite 
de mes eompalriolcs. Connaissant l'csprit do justice et d'equite. du Gouvernement luxem- 
bourgeois, j'ai 1'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de les prendre sous sa haute protection 
et de \.iller a la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens. 

Je demanderai egalement a Voire Excellence d'assurer la garde de l'lioiel de la Legation 
et des bureaux de la Chanceilerie. 

Je serais (res oblige a Votre Excellence dc vouloir bien fairc agreer a S. A. R. Madame la 
Grande-Duchesse rhommage de mon profond respect et toutes mes excuses de n'avoir pu 
aller le lui exprimer moi-meme. 

En vous remerciant. Monsieur le Ministre, de toutes les marques de sympathic que vous 
m'avez donnees, je vous prie d'agreer la nouvellf assurance de ma haute consideration. 

Armand Molhrd. 



V 157. 

Notification dv Gouvernement francais 
aux Representants des Puissances a Paris., 

Le Gouvernement imperial allemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir 
la frontiere et se livrer sur le terriloire francais a divers actes de meurtre et de 
pillage; apres avoir viole la neutrality du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, au mepris des 
stipulations de la Convention de Londres du i i mai i 867 et de la Convention V de 
la Haye du 1 8 octobre 1 907, sur les droits ct devoirs des puissances et des personnes en 
cas'de gncrre sur terrc (articles I el II), conventions signees de lui; apres avoir adresse 
un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgiq'ue tendant a exiger le passage des 
forces allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Traites du 19 avril 1839, 
egalement signes de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Have 

A declare la guerre a la France le 3 aot'it 1 9 1 h , a 18 heures 45. 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit, dans ces conditions, oblige, dc son 

le , de rccourir a la force des amies. 



— 161 — 

II a, en consequence, l'honneur de (aire savoir, par la presente, au Gouvernement 

de que letat de guerre exrste entre la France et l'Allemagne a dater du 3 aout 

191^, 1 8 h. 45. 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique proteste aupres de toutes les nations civilisees 
et specialement aupres des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traites sus 
rappeles, contre la violation par l'Empire allemand de ses engagements interna- 
tionaux; ll fait toutes reserves quant aux represailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener a 
exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnee. 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique qui entend observer les principes du droit des 
gens, se conformera, durant les hostilites et sous r&erve de reciprocite, aux disposi- 
tions des Conventions internationales signees par la France, concernant le droit de la 
guerre sur terre et sur mer. 

La presente notification, faite en conformite de ('article 2 de la 11I C Convention de 
La Haye du 1 8 octobre 1907, relative a l'ouverture des hostilites, et remise a . . . . . 

A Paris, le./i aoiit 1 9 1 4 , a 1 1\ heures. 



N" 158. 

Message de M. Poincare, President de la Republique, 
a la seance extraordinaire du Parlcment, le k aout 19lb. 

{Journal ofiiciel llu 5 aout iqi4.) 

\La Chambre e conic , debout, la lecture du message.) 

t Messieurs les Deputes, 

« La France vient d'etre 1'objet d'une agression brutale et premeditee, qui est un 
insolent defi au droit des gens. Avant qu'une declaration de guerre nous eut encore 
ete adressee, avant memo que 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne eut demande ses passe- 
ports, noire territoire a ete viole. L'Empire d'AUemagne n'a fait hier soir que donner 
tardivement le nom veritable a un etat de fait qu'il avail deja cree. 

« Depuis plus de quarante ans, les Francois, dans un sincere amour de fa paix, ont 
refoule au fond de leur cceur le desir des reparations legitimes. 

«Ils ont donne au monde l'e\emple d'une grande nation qui, definitivement 
relevee de la defaite par la volonte, la patience et le travail, n'a use de sa force re- 
nouvelee et rajeunie que dans linteret du progres et pour le bieu de l'humanite. 

« Depuis que 1' ultimatum de l'Autriche a ouvert une crise menaCsante pour 1'Europe 
enliere, la France s'est attachee a suivre et a recommander partout une politique de 
prudence, de sagesse et de moderation. 

« On ne peut lui imputer aucun acte, aucun geste, aucun mot qui n'ait ete paci- 
fique et conciliant. 

« A 1'heure des premiers combats, elle a le droit de se rendre solennellement cette 

Doccmests diplomatioces. — Guerre europ^enne. a i 



— 162 — 
justice, qu'elle a fait, jusqu'au dernier moment, des ell'orts supremes pour conjurer 
la guerre qui vient d'eclater et dont TEmpire d'AUemagne supportera, devant l'his- 
toire, 1'ecrasante responsabilite. (Applaudisscmcnts unanimes ct repetes.) 

« Au lendemain meme du jour oil nos allies et nous, nous exprimions publique- 
iient I'esperance de voir se poursuivre pacifiquement les negociations engagees sous 
les auspices du Cabinet de Londres, 1'Allemagne a declare subitement la guerre a la 
Russie, pile a envahi le territoire du Luxembourg, elle a outrageusement insulte 
la noble nation beige (Vifs applaudissemenls unanimes), notre voisiue et noire amie, 
et elle a essaye de nous surprendre traitreusement en pleine conversation diploma- 
tique. (Nomeaax applaudisscmcnts unanimes et repetes.) 

« Mais la France veillait. Aussi attentive que pacifique, elle s'etait preparee; et nos 
ennemis vont rencontrer sur lour chemin nos vaillantes troupes de couverture, qui 
sont a leurs postes de bataille et a 1'abri desquelles s'achevera melhodiquement la 
mobilisation de toutes nos forces nationales. 

« Notre belle et courageuse armee, que la France accompagne aujourd'hui de sa 
pensee maternelle [Vifs applaudisscmcnts), s'est levee toute fremissante pour de- 
fendre l'honneur du drapeou et le sol de la patrie. (Applaudisscmcnts unanimes et 
repetes. ) 

« Le President de la Republique, inlerprete de funanimite du pays, exprime a nos 
troupes de lerre et de mer l'admiration el la confiance de tous les Francais. [Vifs 
applaudissemenls prolonges.) 

« Etroitement unie en un meme sentiment , la Nation perseverera dans le sang-froid 
dont elle a donne, depuis 1'ouverture de la crise, la preuve quotidienne. Elle saura, 
comme toujours, concilier les plus genereux elans et les ardeurs les plus enthou- 
siastes avec cette maitrise de soi qvii est le signe des energies durables et la meilleure 
garantie de la victoire. (Applaudissements.) 

« Dans la guerre qui s'engage, la France aura pour elle le Droit, dont les peuples, 
non plus que les individus, ne sauraient impunement meconnaitre lelernelle puis- 
sance morale. (Vifs applaudisscmcnts unanimes.) 

a Elle sera heroiquement defendue par tous ses Gls, dont rien ne brisera devant 
lennemi l'union sacree et qui sont ajourd'bui fraternellement assembles dans une 
meme indignation contre l'agresseur et dans une meme foi patriotique. ( Vifs applau- 
dissemenls prolonges et cris de : vive la France.) 

« Eile est iidelement secondee par la Russie, son alliee (Vifs applaudissements una- 
nimes) ; elle est soutenue par la loyale amitie de l'Angleterre. ( Vifs applaudissements 
unanimes.) 

» Et deja de tous les points du monde civilise viennent a elle les sympathies et les 
voeux. Car elle represente aujourd'bui, une fois de plus, devant l'univers, la liberie, 
la justice et la raison. (Vifs applaudissemenls repetes.) 

« Haut les coeurs et vive la France! (Applaudissements unanimes ct prolonges. ) » 

Raymond Poincare. 



163 



N 159. 

Discoubs prononce par M. Bene Viviani, President da Conseil, 
a la Chambre des Deputes le U aoiit 191U. 

{Journal officiel du 5 aout 1914.) 

M. Rene Viviani, President da Conseil. Messieurs, l'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a 
quilte hier Paris, apres nous avoir notifie fetal de guerre. 

Le Gouvernement doit au Parlcrnent le recit veridirrue des evenements qui, en 
moins de dix jours, out dechaine la guerre europeenne et oblige la France pacifique 
et forte a defendre sa frontiere contre une agression dont la soudamete calculee sou- 
ligne l'odieuse injustice. 

Cette agression, que rien n'excuse et qui a commence avant qu'aucune declaration 
de. guerre nous Petit notiliee, est le dernier acte d'un plan dont j'entends affirmer, 
devant notre democratie et devanl 1'opinion civilisee, lorigine et le but. 

A la suite du crime abominable qui a coute la vie a l'archiduc heritier d'Autriehe- 
Ilongrie et a la duchesse de Hohenberg, des difDcultes se sont elevees entre le cabi- 
net de Vienne et le cabinet de Belgrade. 

La plupart des puissances n'en ont ete qu'officieusement informees jusqu'au ven- 
dredi il\ juillet, date a laquelle les ambassadeurs d'Autricbe-Hongrie leur ont rcmis 
une circulaire que la presse a publiee. 

Cette circulaire avait pour objet d'expliquer et de justifier un ultimatum adresse 
la veille au soir a la Serbie par le Ministre d'Autricbe-Hongrie a Belgrade. 

Cet ultimatum, en affirmant la complicite de nombreux sujets et associations 
serbes dans le crime de Serajevo, insinuait que les aulorites officielles serbes elles- 
memes n'y etaient pas etrangeres. II exigeail pour le saniedi 2 5 juillet a six heures 
du soir, une reponse de la Serbie. 

Les satisfactions exigees, ou du moins plusieurs d'entre elles, portaient indiscuta- 
blement atteinte aux droits d'un Etat souverain. Malgre leur caractere excessif, la 
Serbie, le 20 juillet, declara s'y soumetlre, presque saus aucune reserve. 

A cette soumission, qui constituait pour l'Autricbe-Hongrie un succes, pour la paix 
europeenne une garantie, les conseils de la France, de la Russie et de la Grande-Bre- 
tagne, adresses a Belgrade, des la premiere beure, n'etaient pas etrangers. 

Ces conseils avaient d'autant plus de valeur que les exigences austro-hongroises 
avaient ete dissimulees aux chancelleries de la Triple Entente a qui, dans les trois 
semaines precedentes, le Gouvernement austro-bongrois avait donne a plusieurs re- 
prises l'assurance que ses revindications seraient extremement moderees. 

C'est done avec un juste etonnement que les cabinets de Paris, de Samt-Peters- 
bourg et de Londres apprirent le 26 juillet que le ministre d'Autriche a Belgrade, 
apres un examen de quelques minutes, avait declare unacceptable la reponse serbe et 
rompu les relations diplomatiques. 

Cet etonnement s'aggravait de ce fait que, des le vendredi 24, l'ambassadeur 
d'AUemagne elail venu lire au ministre fran^ais des affaires etrangeres une note ver- 



— 164 — 
bale affirmant que le conflil auslro-serbe de\ail demeurer localise, sans intervention 
des grandes puissances, faute de quoi on en pouvait redouter des "consequences 
incalculables^. Line demarche analogue fut faite le samedi 25 a Londres et a Saint- 
Petersbourg. 

Est-d besoin, messieurs, de vous signaler combien les termes mena^ants employes 
par l'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Paris conlrastaient avec les sentiments conciliants 
dont les puissances de la Triple Entente venaient de fournir la preuve par les conseils 
de soumission qu'elles avaient donnes a la Serbie? 

Neanmoins, sans nous arreter au caractere anormal de la demarche allemande, 
nous ayons, d'accord avec nos allies el nos amis, immedialement engage une action 
de conciliation en invitant l'Allemagne a s'y associer. 

Nous avons eu, des la premiere heure, le regret de constater que nos dispositions 
et nos efforts ne rencontraient a Berlin aucun echo. 

Non seulement l'Allemagne ne paraissait nullemenl disposee a donner a l'Autriche- 
Hongrie les conseils amicaux que sa situation 1'autorisait a formuler, mais, des ce 
moment, et pl.us encore dans les jours suivants, elle semblait s'interposer entre le 
cabinet de Vienne et les propositions transactionnelles emanant des autres puissances. 

Le mardi 28 juillet, 1'Autriche-Hongrie declara la guerre a la Serbie. Cette decla- 
ration de guerre aggravant, a trois jours de distance, l'etat de choses cree 
par la rupture des relations diplomaliques , permeltait de croire a une volonte refle- 
chie de guerre, a un programme systematique tendant a 1'asservissement de la Serbie. 

Ainsi so trouvait mis en cause, non seulement l'independauce d'un peuple vail- 
lant, mais l'equilibre des Balkans, inscrit dans [e traite de Bucarest de 191.1, et con- 
sacre par 1'adhesion morale de toutes les grandes puissances. 

Cependant, a la suggestion du Gouvernemenl Bntannique, toujours attache de la 
fac;on la plus ferme au maintien de la paix europeenne, les negociations se poursui- 
vaient on, plus exactement, les Puissances de la Triple Entente essayaient de les 
poursuivre. 

De ce desir commun est sortie la proposition dune action a qualre. Angletcrre, 
France, Allemagne, Italie, destinee, en assurant ii I'Autriche toutes les satisfactions 
legitimes, a menager un reglement equitable du conflit. 

Le mercredi 21), le Gouvernement Husse, constatant lechec persistant de ces ten- 
tatives, et en presence de la mobilisation et de la declaration do guerre autrichiennes, 
redoutant pour la Serbie un ecrasement militaire, decida, a litre preventif, la mobi- 
lisation des troupes de quatre arrondisssements militaires, e'est-a-dire des formations 
echelonnees le long de la frontiere auslro-hongroise exclusivemenl. 

Ce faisant, il prenait soin d'aviser le Gouvernemenl allemand <|ue cette 'mesure , 
lunilee et sans caractere offensil a legard de I ' \ui.rii |ie, n'elait, a aucun degrt, 
dirigee contre l'Allemagne. 

Ujus une conversation a\ec l'ambassadeui de Kussie, a Berlin, le Secretaire d'Elat 
allemand aux affaires elrangeres ne faisait point ditficulte de le reconnaitre. 

Par contre, tout ce que tentait la Grande-Bretagne, avec 1'adhesion de la hiissie 
el I apjiui de la France, pour etablir le contact entre I'Autriche et la Serbie sous le 



— 165 — 
patronage moral de I'Europe, se lieurlait, a Berlin, a un parti pris negatif dont les 
depeches diplomatiques fournissenl la preuve peremptoire. 

C'etail la une situation troublante et qui rendait vraisemblable l'existence a Berlin 
de certaines arriere-pensees. Quelques heures apres, ces hypotheses et ces craintes 
devaient se transformer en certitudes. 

En effet, 1' attitude negative de 1'Allemagne faisail place trente-six heures plus tard 
a des initiatives justement alarmanles : le 3 1 juillet, 1'Allemagne, en proclamant l'etat 
de « danger de guerre », coupait les communications entre elle et le reste de I'Europe 
et se donnait toute liberie de poursuivre contre la France, dans un secret absolu, 
des preparatifs militaires que rien, vous l'avez vu, ne pouvait juslilier. 

Depuis plusieurs jours deja, et dans des conditions difficiles a expliquer, 1'Alle- 
magne avait prepare le passage de son armee du pied de paix au pied de guerre. 

Des le 25 juillet au matin, c'est-a-dire avant meme 1'expiralion du delai assigne a 
la Serbie par l'Autriche, elle avait consigne les garnisons d'Alsace-Lorraine. Le meme 
jour, elle avait mis en etat d'armement les ouvrages proches de la frontiere. Le 26, 
elle avait prescrit aux chemins de fer les mesures preparatoires de la concentration. 
Le 27, elle avait effectue les requisitions et mis en place ses troupes de couverlure. 
Le 28, les appels individuels de reservistes avaient commence et les elements eloigner 
de la frontiere en avaient ete rapproches. 

Toutes ces mesures, poursuivies avec une methode implaccable, pouvaient-elles 
nous laisser des doutes sur les intentions de I'AUeniagneP 

Telle etait fa situation, lorsque, le 3i juillet au soir, le Gouvernement alleuiand, 
qui depuis le 2/1, n'avail parlicipe par aucun acte positif aux efforts concihants de la 
Triple Entente, adressa au Gouvernement russe un ultimatum, sous pretexte que la 
Bussie avait ordonne la mobilisation generate de ses armees, et d exigea dans un 
delai de dou/.e heures 1'arret de cette mobilisation. 

Cette exigence, d'autant plus blessante dans la forme que, quelques heures plus 
tot, 1'empereur Nicolas II, dans un geste de conliance spontanee, avait demande a 
1'empereur d'Allemagne sa mediation, se produisait au moment oil, a la demande de 
1'Angleterre et au sii de 1'Allemagne, le Gouvernement russe acceptait une formule 
de nature a preparer un reglement amiable du conflil austro-serbe et des diflicultes 
austro-russes par 1'arret simultane des operations et preparatifs militaires. 

Le meme jour, cette demarche inamicale a l'egard de la Bussie se doublait d'actes 
nettement hosliles a l'egard de la France : rupture des communications par routes, 
voies ferrees, lelegraphes et telephones, saisie des locomotives fran^aisesa leur arri- 
vee a la frontiere, placement de mitrailleuses au milieu de la voie ferree (|ui avait 
ete coupee, concentration de troupes a cette frontiere. 

Des ce moment, il ne nous etait plus permis de croire a la sincerite des declarations 
pacifiques que le representant de 1'Allemagne conlinuait a nous prodiguer. (Mou- 
vemcnt. ) 

Nous savions qu'a 1'abri de l'etat de "danger de guerre • proclame, 1'Allemagne 
mobilisait. 

Nous apprenions ([ue six classes de reservistes avaient ete appelees et que les trans- 
ports de concentration se poursuivaient pour des corps d'armee meme stationnes a 
une notable distance de la frontiere. 



— 166 — 

A mesure que ces evenements se deroulaient, le Gouvernement, attentif et vigi- 
lant, prenait de jour en jour, et meme d'heure en heure, les mesures de sauvegarde 
qu'imposait la situation; la mobilisation generale de nos armees de terre et de mer 
etait ordonnee. 

Le meme soir, aseptheures trente, 1'Allemagne, sans s'arreter ai'acceptation parle 
cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg de la proposition anglaise que j'ai rappelee plus haul, 
declarait la guerre a la Russie. 

Le lendemain, dimancbe 2 aout, sans egard a l'extreme moderation de la France, 
en contradiction avec les declarations pacifiques de 1'ambassadeur d'Aliemagne a 
Paris, au mepris des regies du droit international, les troupes allemandes franchis- 
saient en trois points difjferents notre frontiere. 

En meme temps, en violation du traile de l 867, qui a garanti avec la signature, de 
la Prusse la neutralite du Luxembourg, elles envabissaient le territoire du Grand- 
Duche, motivant ainsi la protestation du Gouvernement luxembourgeois. 

Enlin la neutralite de la Belgique meme etait menacee : le ministre d'Aliemagne 
remettait le 2 aout au soir au Gouvernement beige un ultimatum 1'invitant a faciliter 
en Belgique les operations militaires contre la France, sous le pretexte mensonger 
que la neutralite beige etait menacee par nous; le Gouvernement beige s'y refusa, 
declarant quil etait resolu a defendre energiquement sa neutralite, respectee par la 
France et garantie par les traites, en particulier par le roi de Prusse. (Applaudissements 
ananimcs ct prolonrjh.) 

Depuis lors, messieurs, les agressions se sont renouvelees, multipliees et accen- 
tuees. Sur plus de quinze points notre frontiere a etc violee. Des coups de fusil ont 
etc tires contre nos soldatset nos douaniers. II y aeudesmorts et des blesses. Hier, un 
aviateur mibtaire allemand a lance trois bombes sur Luneville. 

L'Ambassadeur dAUemagne, a qui nous avons communique cesfaits, ainsi qu'a 
toutes les grandes Puissances, ne les a pas dementis el n'en a pas exprime de regrets. 
Par contre, ll est venu bier soir me demander ses passeports et nous nolifier l'etat de 
guerre, en arguant, contre toute verite, d'actes d'boslilite commis par des aviateurs 
francais en territoire allemand dans la region de 1'EilTel et meme sur le chemin de 
fe r pres de Carlsruhe et pies de Nuremberg. V oici la leltre qu'il m'a remise a ce sujet : 

« Monsieur le President, 

« Les autontes administralives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain 
nombre d'actes d'boslilite caracterisee commis sur territoire allemand par des avia- 
teurs militaires francais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement viole la neutra- 
lite de la Belgique survolanl le territoire de ce pa)s. L'un a essaye de detruire des 
constructions pres de Wesel, d'autrcs ont etc- apercais sur la region de 1'Eiffel, un 
autre ■< jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe el de Nuremberg. 

« Je suis charge et j'ai l'lionneur de faire connaitre a Votre Excellence qu'eu pre- 
sence de ces agressions, 1'Empire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec la 
Fram e du fail de cclte derniere Puissance. 

« J'ai en meme temps 1'honneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence 
que les aulorites allemandes retiendront les unices marchands francais dans des purls 



— 167 — 
allcrnand>, mais qu'elles les relacheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la recipro- 
city complete est assuree. 

« Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, U ne me reste plus qu'a prier Voire 
Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passepork et de prendre les mesures 
qu'elle jugeralt utiles pour assurer mon retour en Allemagne *avec le personnel de 
1'ambassade ainsi qu'avec le personnel de la Legation de Baviere et du Consulat ge- 
neral'd'Allemagne 4 Paris. 

o Veuillez agreer, monsieur le president, 1'expression de ma tres haute considera- 
tion. 

■ Signe : Schoen. » 

Ai-je hesoin, messieurs, d'insister sur I'absurdite de ces prctextes que Ton vou- 
drait presenter comme des griefs? A aucun moment, aucun avialeur francais n'a 
penetre en Belgique, aucun aviateur francais n'a commis, ni en Baviere, ni dans 
aucune autre parlie de l'Allemagne, aucun acle d'hostilite. L'opinion europeenne a 
deja fait justice de ces inventions miserables. ( Vifs applaudissemenls nnanimes.) 

Contre ces attaques qui violent toutes les lois de l'equile et toutes les regies du 
droit public, nous avons, des maintenant, pris toutes les dispositions necessaires; 
l'execution s'en poursuit avec une rigoureuse methode et un absolu sang-froid. 

La mobilisation de l'armee russe se continue egalement .avec une energie remar- 
quable et un enlhousiasme sans restriction. (La Chambrc enticre se leve. — Applau- 
dissemenls unanimes et prolonged.) 

L'armee beige, mobilisee a 2.5o,ooo hommes, se dispose a defendre avec une 
magnifique ardeur la neutrality et I'independance de son pavs. (Nouveaax applaudis- 
scments vifs el unanimes. ) 

La flotte anglaise est mobilisee tout entiere et 1'ordre a ele donne de mobibser 
l'armee de lerre. (Tous les deputes se levcnt et applaudisscnt lonrjuemcnt.) 

Des 1912, des pourparlers avaient eu lieu entre les Etats-Majors anglais et fran- 
cais, termines par un echange de lettres entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul Cambon. 
Le Secretaire d'Elat aux aflaires elrangeres a donne, bier soir, a la Chambre des 
communes, communication des lettres echangees, et je vais avoir fhonneur, d'accord 
avec le Gouvernement britannique, de porter a votre connaissance le contenu de ce» 
deux documents : 



FOREIGN OFFICE. 

Umdres.le 25 oovembre 1911. 

0M0N CHER AmB\SSADETTR, 

« A differentes reprises, aueoursdesdernieres annees, les Etats-Majors militaires et 
navals de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ont echange leur vues. II a toujours k\& 
entendu que ces echanges de vues ne portent pas atteinte a la liberie de 1'un et 1'autre 
Gouvernement de decider a n'irjnporte quel moment dans 1'avenir s'il doit ou non sou- 
tenir 1'autre avec ses forces arraees. Nous avons admis que des echanges de vues entre 



— 168 — 
techniciens ne constituent pas et ne doivent pas etre regardes comme constituant 
un engagement qui oblige l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement a intervenir dans une 
eventualite qui ne s'est pas encore presentee et qui peut ne jamais naitre. Par 
exemple, la repartition actuelle des flottes franchises et anglaises ne repose pas sur 
un engagement de coilaborer en temps de guerre. 

a Vous avez cependant fait remarquer que si l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement avait 
de graves raisons de redouter une attaque de la part d'une tierce puissance sans 
aucune provocation, il pourrait etre essentiel de savoir si, dans cette circonstance , il 
pourrait compter sur 1 assistance militaire de l'autre puissance. 

« J'accepte que si l'un ou l'autre gouvernement a de graves raisons de craindre 
une attaque sans provocation de la part dune tierce puissance, ou tout autre evene- 
ment menac;ant pour la paix generate , ce gouvernement devrait examiner immedia- 
tement aver, l'autre s'ils ne doivent pas agir tous deux ensemble pour empecber 
l'agression et maintenir la paix et, dans ce cas, recbercher les mesures qu'ils seraient 
disposes a prendre en commun. Si ces mesures comportaient une action militaire, 
les plans des Etats-Majors generaux seraient aussitot pris en consideration et les deux 
Gouvernements decideraienl alors la suite qu'il conviendrait de leur donner. 

« Sincerement voire, 

« Sitrne : E. Grey. » 



A cette lettre, a la date du 23 novembre 1912, notre ambassadeur, M. Paul Cam- 
bon, repondait : 

• Londres, ie 23 novembre 1912. 

Cher Sir Edward, 

• Par \otre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, dans 
ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires el navales de la France et de la Grande- 
Bretagne s'etaient consultees de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujoursete entendu que 
ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberie, pour cbaque Gouvernement, de 
decider dans 1'avenir s'ils se preleraient lun l'autre le coneours de leurs forces 
armies; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spccialistes n'etaient et ne 
devaient pas etre considerees comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements 
a agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou 
l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'apprehender une attaque 
nun provoquee de la part d'une tierce puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir 
sil pourrait compter sur l'assistance annee de l'autre. 

« Votre lettre repond a cette observation et je suis autorise a vous declarer que, 
dans le cas oil l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'apprehender 
soil l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque evdnement menacant pour la paix 
gem 1 ile, ce Gouvernement examinerait immedialement avec l'autre si les deux Gou- 
vernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prevenir l'agression ou de S3uvegarder 
la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements delibercraient sur les mesures qu'ils 
seraient disposes a prendre en commun ; si cos mesures comportaient une action, les 



— 169 — 
deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitot en consideration les plans de leurs etats- 
majors et decideraient alors de la suite qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans. 
<■ Sincerement a vous. 

< Signe : P. Cambon. » 

A la Chambre des Communes, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a parle 
de la France, aux applaudissements des deputes, dans des termes eleves et chaleu- 
reux, et son langage a deja profondement retenti dans tous les cceurs fran^ais. (Vifs 
applaudissemenls unanimes.) Je tiens, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique, a 
remercier, du baut de la tribune, le Gouvernement anglais de la cordialite de ses 
paroles et le Parlement francais s'associera a ce sentiment. ( Nouveaux applaudissemenls 
prolonges et unanimes. 

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux AlTaires etrangeres a fait, notamment, la declaration sui- 
vante : 

« Dans le cas oil l'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la mer 
du Nord pour doubler les lles-Brilanniques dans le but d'atlaquer les cotes francaises 
ou la marine de guerre francaise, et d'inquieter la marine marchande francaise, l'es- 
cadre anglaise interviendrait pour prefer a la marine francaise son entiere protec- 
tion, de sorte que, des ce moment, 1'Angleterre et 1'Allemagne seraient en etat de 
guerre. « (Applaudissemenls repi'les el prolonges.) 

Des maintenant, la flotte anglaise couvre done nos cotes du Nord et de 1'Ouest 
contre line agression allemande. 

Messieurs, voila les fails. Je crois que, dans leur rigoureux enchainement, ils suf- 
fisent a justifier les actes du Gouvernement de la Republique. Je veux cependant de 
ce recit degager la conclusion, donner son veritable sens a l'agression inouie dont la 
France est victime. 

Les vainqueurs de 1870 ont eu, vous le savez, a diverses reprises, le desir de re- 
doubler les coups qu'ils nous avaient portes. En 1875, la guerre destinie a achever 
la France vaincue n'a ete empecbee que par 1'inlervention des deux Puissances a qui 
devaient nous unir plus lard les liens de 1'alliance et de i'amitie [Applaudissemenls 
unanimes), par 1'intervention de la Russie et par celle de la Grande-Bretagne. (Tous 
les deputes se livcnt el applaudissenl longuement.) 

Depuis lors, la Republique francaise, par la restauration des forces nationales el 
la conclusion d'accords diplomatiques invariablement pratiques, a reussi a se liberer 
du joug qu'au sein meme de la paix, Bismarck avait su faire peser sur 1'Europe. 

Elle a retabli l'equilibre europeen, garant de la liberte et de la dignite de cbacun. 

Messieurs, je ne sais si j-; ne m'abuse, mais ilm'apparait que cette oeuvre de repa- 
ration pacifique, d'affrancliissemenl et de dignite definitivemenl scellee en 190/t et 
1907 avec le concours genial du roi Edouard VII d'Angleterre et du gouvernement 
de laCouronne [Vifs applaudissemenls), e'est cela que lempire allemand veut delruire 
aujourd'liui par un audacieux coup de force., 

L'Allemagne n'a rien a nous reprocber. 

Nous avons consenti a la paix un sacrifice sans precedent en portant un demi- 
Doccments diplom,ti(.'Ues'. — Cuerre curopeciiRC. 22 



— 170 — 
siecle silencieux a nos (lanes ia blessure ouverte par elle. ( Vifs applaudissemcnts una- 
nimcs.) 

Nous en avons consenli d'aulres dans tous les debats que, depuis i 904, la diplo- 
ma! ie imperiale a systematiquement pr.ovoqu.es soit au Maroc, soit ailleurs, aussi 
bien en 1905 qu'en 190G, en igoS qu'en 1911. 

La Russie, elle aussi, a fait preuve d'une grande moderation lors des evenements 
de 1908, comme danslacrise actuelle. 

Elle a observe la meme moderation, et la TripleJEntente avec elle quand, dans la 
crise orientale de 1 9 1 2 , 1'Aatriche et l'AUemagne ont formule, soit contre la Serbie, 
soit contre la Gre.ce des exigences, discutables pourtant, levenement la prouve. 

Imitiles sacrifices, steriles transactions, vains efforts, puisqu'aujourd'hui, en 
pleine action de conciliation, nous sommes, uos allies et nous, altaque.s par surprise. 
I \pplaudissemenls prolonged.) 

Nul ne peut croire de bonne foi que nous sommes les agresseurs. Vainement Ion 
veul troubler les principes sacres de droit et de liberie qui regissent les nations 
comme les individus : lltalie, dans la claire conscience du genie latin, nous a notifie 
qu'elle entendait garder la neutrality. ( Tons les deputes se levent cl applaudissent lon- 
gucment.) 

Cette decision a rencontre dans toute la France 1'echo de la joie la plus sincere. Je 
ni'i'ii Mils fait 1'interprete aupres du ebarge d'affaires d'ltalie en lui disant combien je 
mi- felicitais que les deux sceurs latines, qui ont meme origme et meme ideal, un 
passe de gloire commun, ne se trouvent pas opposees. (Nouveaux applaudissemenls.) 

Ce qu'on attaque , messieurs, nous le declarons tres haut, c'esl cette independance, 
cetle (lignite, cette securite que la Triple Entente a reconquises dans l'equilibre au 
service de la paix. 

Ce qu'on attaque. ce sont les. liberies de 1'Europe, dont la France, ses alliees et 
ses amis sont fiers d'etre les defenseurs. ( I ifs applaudissemenls.) 

Ces liberies, nous allons les defendre, car ce sont elles qui sont en cause et tout le 
reste n'a ete que pretextes. 

La France, in|ustement provoquee, n'a pas voulu la guerre, elle a tout fait pour 
la conjurer. Puisqu'on la lui impose, elle se defendra contre l'AUemagne et contre 
toute puissance qui, n'ayant pas encore fait connaitre son sentiment, prendrait part 
aux cotes de celte dcraiere au conilit enlre les deux pays. ( Tous les deputes se levent ct 
applaudissent. ) 

Un peuple libre et fort qui soutient un ideal seculaire et s'unit tout entier pour la 
sauvegarde de son existence ; one democratic qui a su discipliner son effort militaire 
et n'a pas craint, Ian passe, den alourdir le poids pour repondre aux armements 
voisins; une nation armee luttant pour sa vie propre et pour lindependance de l'Eu- 
rope, voilii le spectacle que nous nous honorons d'oflrir aux temoins de cette lutte 
formidable qui, depuis quelques jours, se prepare dans le calme le plus metbodique. 
Nous sommes sans reprocbes. Nous serous sans peur. ( Tous les deputes se levent et ap- 
ploudissent lom/uement.) 

La France a prouve souvent dans des conditions moins favorables, qu'elle est le 



— 171 — 
plus redoutable adversaire quand elle se bat, comme c'est le cas aujourd'Iiui, pour la 
liberie et pour le droit. (Applaadisscmenls.) 

En vous soumetlant nos acles, a vous. Messieurs, qui etes uos |uges, nous avons 
pour porter le poids de notre lourde responsabilite, le reconfort d'une conscience 
sans trouble et la certitude du devoir accompli. ( Tons les deputes sc levent el ap- 
ptaudisscnt longuemenl. ) 

Rene Viviani. . 



— 173 



CHAPITRE VII 

DECLARATION DE LA TRIPLE ENTENTE 

(4 SEPTEMBRE 1914) 



175 — 



DECLARATION. 



M. Delcasse, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 

a MM. les Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France a 1'etranger. 

Paris, lc !\ septembre igii 

La declaration suivante a ete signee ce matin au Foreign Office . a Londres. 

« Les soussignes, dument aulonses par leurs gouvernements respectifs font la 
declaration suivante : 

«Les Gouvernements britannique, francais et russe s'engagent mutuellenient a ne 
pas conclure de paix. separee au cours de la presente guerre. 

«Les trois gouvernements conviennent que, lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les 
termes de la paix, aucune des Puissances alliees ne pourra poser des conditions de 
paix sans accord prealable avec chacun des auties allies. » 

Signe : Paul Cambon. 

Comte Benckendorfe. 
Edward Gi;e\. 

Cette declaration sera publiee aujourd'hui. 

Delcasse 



177 — 



ANNEXES 



EXTRAITS 

DU "LIVRE BLEU" (ANGLAIS), DU "LIVRE GRIS" (BELGE), 
DU "LIVRE BLANC" (ALLEMAND), DU "LIVRE ORANGE" (RUSSE) 



Documents diflqmatiqijes. — Gu 



179 



Annexe I. 



Extraits du « Livre bleu >t relatifs a la position prise par le Gouvernement anglais a l'egard 
de la Russie, de l'Allemagne et de la France pendant les pourparlers qui ont pricedev 
la guerre. 



N" 6. 

Sir G. Buchanan, Ambassadeur de Grande-Brelagne a Sairit-Petersbourg, 
a Sir Edward Grey. 

Saint-Petersbourg, 24 juillet 19 14- 

J'ai recu ce matin un message telephonique de M. SazonoDTm'informant que le texle de 
['ultimatum autrichien venait de lui parvenir. 

Son Excellence ajoula qu'une reponse etait exig<5e dans les quarante-huit heures et ilrme 
pria de venir le trouver a l'Ambassade de France pour discuter 1'affaire. car la d-marche 
autrichienne voulait dire clairement que la guerre etait imminente. 

Le Minislre des Affaires etrangeres dit que la conduite de l'Autriche etait tout a la fois 
provocanle et immorale; elle n'aurait jamais agi ainsi a moins que l'Allemagne n'ait ile 
prealablement consultee; quelques-unes de ses demandes etaient tout a fait impossibles a 
accepter. II esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne manquerait pas de proclamer 
sa solidarite avec la Russie et la Franco. 

L'Ambassadeur de France me donna a entendre que la France remplirait, si cela devenait 
necessaire, toutes les obligations que lui imposait son alliance avec la Russie, outre quelle 
seconderait fortement la Russie dans toutes les negociations diplomatiques. 

J'ai dit que je vous telegrapbierais un rapport complet de ce que leurs Excellences- 
venaient de me dire. Je ne pouvais pas, naturellement, parler au nom du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste; mais, personnellement, je ne voyais aucune raison de s'attendre a une declara- 
tion de solidarity de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste qui cntrainerait un engagement 
absolu de sa part de soutenir la Russie et la France par la force des armes. Les interet's 
directs de la Grande-Bretagne en Serbie etaient nuls , et une guerre en favour de ce pays ne 
serait jamais sanctionnee par l'opinion publique de la Grande-Bretagne. A ceci, M. Sazonoff 
r^pondit qu'il ne fallait pas que nous oubliiohs que la question generale europienne etait 
impliquee, la question de la Serbie n'en formant qu'une partie et que la Grande-Bretagne 
ne pourrait pas en fait se degager des problemes maintenant en jeu. 

En reponse a ces remarques, j'ai fait observer que je comprenais, de ce qu'il disait, que 
Son Excellence proposal t que la Grande-Bretagne se joignit a une communication qui serait' 
faite a rAutriche a 1'effet qu'une intervention active par elle dans les affaires interieures de la 
.Serbie ne pourrait pas elre tolepee. Mais supposant que l'Autriche, neanmoins, allait avoir 
recours a des mesures mililaires contre la Serbie malgrie nos representations, etait-ce ('inten- 
tion du Gouvernement russe de declarer de suite la guerre a l'Autriche ? 

M. Sazonoff dit que lui-m6me pensait que tout au moins la mobilisation russe devait etre 
faite, mais qu'il y avait un Conseil des Ministres cet apres-midi pour examiner la question 
dans toute son etendue. Un autre Conseil , preside par 1'Empereur, serait tenu probablement 
demain , quand une decision serait prise. 

j3. 



— 180 — 

J'ai dit qu'il me paraissait que le point important eHait de persuader 1'Autriehe d'etendre 
la limite de temps, et que la premiere chose a faire e^ait de faire peser sur I'Autriche une 
influence ayant ce but en vue. L'Ambassadeur de France, cependant, croyait que, ou 
I'Autriche avait decide d'agir de suite ou elle bluffait. Dans n'importe quel cas, notre seule 
chance d'eviter la guerre <;tait d'adopter une attitude ferme et unie. 11 ne pensait pas qu'il y 
avait le tomps de donner suite a ma proposition. La-dessus, j'ai dit qu'il me semblait desi- 
rable pour nous de connaitre exactement jusqu'a quel point la Serbie serait disposee a aller 
pour accepter les demandes formulees par 1'Autriche dans sa note. M. Sazonoffre'pondit qu'il 
fallait d'abord qu'il consultat ses collegues a ce sujet, mais que, sans doute, quelques-unes 
des demandes de I'Autriche pourraicnt etre acceptees par la Serbie. 

L'Ambassadeur de France et M. Sa/.onoff continuerent tous deux a me pressor pour une 
declaration de solidarity complete ilu Gouvernement de Sa Majeste avec les Gouvernements 
francais et russe, et j'ai, en consequence, dit qu'il me semblait possible que vous voudriez, 
peut-etre, consentir a faire de fortes representations aux deux Gouvernements allemand et 
autrichien , faisant valoir aupres d'eux qu'une attaque sur la Serbie par I'Autriche mettrait en 
danger la pais entiere de 1'Europe. Peut-etre pourriez-vous trouver-moyen de leur dire qu'uhe 
telle action de la part de I'Autriche amenerait probablement une intervention russe, qui 
impliquerait la France et 1'Allemagne, et qu'il serait difficile a la Grande-Bretagne de rester 
a 1'ecart si la guerre devenait generate. M. SazonolT repondit que tot ou tard nous serions 
entraines a la guerre si elle eclatait; nous aurions rendu la guerre plus probable si, des le 
debut , nous ne faisions pas cause commune avec son pays et avec la France; en tout cas, il 
esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste exprimerait une forte reprobation de la deci- 
sion prise par I'Autriche. 

G. Buchanan. 



N° 87. 
Sir Edward Grey, 

a Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris. 

Foreign Oflice, 29 juillet lgid. 
Monsieur, 

Apres avoir expose a M. Cambon aujourd'hui combien la situation me paraissait grave, je 
lui ai declare quej'avais 1'intentionde dire a 1'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui qu'il ne fal- 
lait pas qu'il se laissat aller, a raison du ton amical de nos conversatious, a un sentiment de 
fausse certitude que nous resterions a 1'ecart si tous les efforts pour conserver la paix , que nous 
faisions actuellement en commun avec 1'Allemagne, echouaient. 

Mais j'ai continue en disant ii M. Cambon que je trouvais necessaire de liii dire aussi que 
1'opinion publique ici envisageait la difficulte actuelle d'un point de vue tout a fait different 
de celui qu'on avait adople pendant la difficulte au sujet du Maroc il y a quelques annees. 
Dans le cas du Maroc, it s'agissait d'un, conllit dans lequel la France etait la principale inte- 
ressee et ou il paraissait que 1'Allemagne , dans un effort pour ecraser la France , lui cherchait 
querelle a 1'occasion dune question qui formait l'objet d'une convention speciale entre la 
France et nous-memes. Dans le oas acluel, ie djJTereild entre I'Autriche et la Serbie n'etaitpas 



— 181 — 

nn cas ou nous nous senlions appeles o joucr un role actif. Meme si la question arrivait a se 
poser entre I'Autriche et la Russie , nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a y jouer un role. Ce 
serait alors une question de suprematie entre le Teuton et le Slave dans les Balkans et notre 
id(!e avail toujours eli d'eviler d'etre entraines dans une guerre pour une question balka- 
nique. 

Si l'Allemagne se trouvait entrainee dans la lutte et si par suite la France y etait a son tour 
impliquee, nous n'avions pas decide ce que nous ferions. Ce serait un cas que nous aurions 
a examiner. La France aurait &le alors enlrainee dans une querelle qui n'6tait pas la sienne, 
mais dans laquelle, par suite de son alliance, son honneur et ses interets 1'obligeaient a s'en j 
gager. Nous etions libres d'engagements et nous aurions a decider ce que les interets britan- 
niques exigeaient que nous fissions. J'estimais qu'il etait necessaire de dire cela, parce que, 
com me il le savait, nous prenions touies les precautions au sujet de noire Flotte, et que j'dtais 
sur le point d'avertir le Prince Lichnowski de ne pas compter que nous restions a 1'ecart; mais 
il ne serait pas jusle que je laisse M. Cambon s'egarer jusqu'ii supposer que ceci voulait dire 
que nous avions decide ce que nous ferions dans une eventuality, qui comme je 1'esperais 
encore, pouvait ne pas se presenter. 

M. Cambon ni'a dit que j'avais expose la situation tres clairement. II comprenait que je 
voulais dire que dans une querelle balkanique et dans une lutte pour la suprematie entre le 
TeDton et le Slave, nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a intervenir; mais que si d'autres 
questions surgissaient et si la France et 1'Allemagne se trouvaient impliquees de telle sorteque 
la question de l'hcgemonie en Europe se posat, nous d^ciderions alors ce qu'il nous serait ne- 
cessaire de faire. 11 a paru tout a fait prepare a cette declaration et n'y fit aucune objec- 
tion. 

L'Ambassadeur de France ajouta que 1'opinion francaise etait ealme mais decidee. II s'at- 
tendait a ce que 1'Allemagne demandat que la France restat neutre pendant que 1'Allemagne 
atlaquerait la Russie. Cetle assurance naturellement la France ne pouvait pas la donner;elle 
^tait obligee a aider la Russie si la Russie 6tait attaquee. 

E. Grey. 



N° 88. 
Sir Edward Grey, 

a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. 

Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914. 
MonsieoR , 

Apres avoir cause cet apres-midi avec l'Ambassadeurallemand au sujet de la situation eu- 
ropeenne , j'ai dit que je desirais lui dire, dune facon tout a fait particuliere et amicale, 
quelque chose, que j'avais dans 1'esprit. La situation etait tres grave. Tant qu'elle se limitait 
aux questions actuellement posees, nous n'avions aucune intention d'intervenir. Mais si 1'Al- 
lemagne s'y trouvait engagee et ensuite la France, la question pourrait £tre si vaste qu'elle 
impliquerait tous les interets enropi5ens; et je ne voulais pas qu'il fut trompe par le ton ami- 
cal de notre conversation — lequel persisterait, comme je l'esperais — jusqu'a croire que 
nous resterions a 1'icart. 



— 182 — 

II a dit qu'il comprenail parfaitement, mais il a demande si je voulais dire que nous inter - 
viendrions dans certaines circonstances. 

Je repondis que je ne desirais pas dire cela, ni quoi que ce fut qui ressemblat a une me- 
nace ou a un essai d'exercer une pression en declarant que, si les choses allaient plus tnal, 
nous interviendrions. II ne serait pas question de notre intervention si 1'Allemagne n etail pas 
impliquee, ou m erne si la France n'etait pas impliquee; mais nous savions fort bien que si 
la question devenait telle que nous croyions que les intiWts britanniques exigeaient notre in- 
tervention, il faudrait que nous inttrvenions imm£diatement, et que la decision fut tres ra- 
pide, exactement comme les decisions des autres puissances auraient a 1'etre. J'esperais que 
le ton amical de nos conversations continuerait comme a present, et queje pourrais conser- 
verdes rapports aussi etroits avecle Gouvernement allemand en travaillant pour la puix. Mais 
si nous echouions dans nos efforts pour conserver la paix, et si la question s'elargissait de fa- 
con a impliquer pour ainsi diretous les interets europeens, je ne voulais pas etre expose a 
aucun reproche de sa part, que le ton amical de toutes nos conversations lavait egare, lui 
ou son gouvernemenl, a supposer que nous n'agirions pas au reproche que s'il n'avait pas 
Hi ainsi egare\ le cours des eVenements aurait pu etre different. 

L'Ambassadeur allemand n'a fait aucune objection a ce que j'ai dit, au contraire, il m'a 
dit que cela s'accordait avec ce qu'il avail deja fait savoir a Berlin comme sa maniere per- 
sonnels d'envisager la situation. 



N° 99. 

Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, a Paris, 
a Sir Edward Grey. 

Paris, 3o juillet 1914. 

Le President de la Republique me fait savoir que le Gouvernement russe a ete inform^ 
par le Gouvernement allemand que 1'Allemagne mobiliserait a moins que la Russie n'arretat 
sa mobilisation. Mais un rapport supplemental recu depuis de Saint-Petersbourg declare 
que le communique allemand avail ete modifie et prenait maintenant la forme d'une 
demande d'information a quelles conditions la Russie consentirait a demobiliser. La rfponse 
donnee est qu'elle consent ale faire a la condition que l'Aulriche-Hongrie donne 1'assurance 
quelle respectera la souverainete de la Serbie et soumettra certaines demandes formulees 
dans la noleautrichienne, et non accepti5es par la Serbie a une discussion internationale. 

Le President est d'avis que ces conditions ne seront pas acceptees par 1'Autriche; il est 
convaincu que la paix entre les Puissances est entre les mains de la Grande-Bretagne. Si le 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste annoncjiit que 1'Angleterre viendrait en aide a la France, dans 
le cas d'un conflit entre la France et 1'Allemagne, resultant des differences actuelles entre 
1'Autriche et la Serbie, il n'y aurait pas de guerre, car 1'Allemagne modifierait aussitot son 
attitude. 

Je luiaiexpliqudcombien il serait difficile au Gouvernement deSa Majeste de faire une telle 
declaration, mais il m'a repondu qu'il maintenait que cela serait dans linteret de la paix. 
La France, disait-il, est pacifique. EUe ne desire pas la guerre et tout ce qu'elle a fait jusqu'a 
present est de se preparer pour une mobilisation afin de ne pas etre prise au depourvu. Le 
Gouvernement fran$ais tiendra le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste au courant de tout ce qui se 



- 183 — 
fera dans ce sens. On a des renseignenients serieux que les troupes allemandes sont concen- 
trees dans les environs, de Thionville et de Meti, pretes a la guerre. S'il y avait une guerre 
generate sur le continent, 1'Angleterre y serait entrainee pour ia protection de ses inte>6ls 
vitaux. Une declaration des a present de son intention de soutenir la France, dont c'est le 
desir que la paix soit maintenue, empecherait presque certainement 1'Allemagne de partir 
en guerre. 

F. Bertie. 



N° 119. 
Sir Ed. Grey, 

a Sir Francis Bertie; Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne , a Paris. 

Foreign-Office , 3i juillet 1914. 

Monsieur, 

M. Cambon s'est refere aujourd'hui a un telegramme qui avait £te montre ce matin a 
Sir Arthur Nicolson qui provenait de 1'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin et qui disait que 
1'incertitude concernant notre intervention etait l'element encourageant a Berlin et que, si 
nous voulions seulement nous declarer definitivement du cote de la Russie et de la France, 
cela deciderait l'attitude allemande en faveur de la paix. 

J'ai dit qu'il etait tout a fait injuste de supposer que nous avions laisse 1'Allemagne sous 
1'impression que nous n'interviendrons pas. J'avais refuse des ouvertures pour promettre que 
nous resterions neulres. Non seulement j'avais refus£ de dire que nous resterions neutres, 
mais j'avais et^ ce matin jusqu'a dire a 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que, si la France et 
1'Allemagne se trouvaient engagers dans une guerre, nous y serions entraines. Cela, bien 
entendu, n'elait pas la meme chose que de prendre un engagement avec la France, et j'ai 
dit cela a M. Cambon, seulement pour montrer que nous n'avions pas laisse 1'Allemagne 
sous 1'impression que nous resterions a l'ecart. 

M. Cambon ma alors demande ma reponse a ce qu'il avait dit hier. 

J'ai dit que nous etions arrives a la conclusion, dans le Cabinet d'aujourd'hui, que nous 
ne pouvions donner aucun gage en ce moment. Bien que nous ayons a exposer notre poli- 
tique devant le Parlement, nous ne pouvions pas engager le Parlement d'avance. Jusqu'a 
present, nous ne ressentions pas, et l'opinion publique ne ressentait pas,.qu'aucun traite ni 
obligation de ce pays fussent engages. Des developpements ulterieurs pourraient modifier 
cette situation et obliger le Gouvernement et le Parlement a considerer qu'une intervention 
etait justifiee. La protection de la neutralite de la Belgique pourrait etre, je ne dirai pas un 
decisif, mais un important facteur, dans la determination de notre attitude. Que nous pro- 
posions au Parlement d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir dans une guerre, le Parlement 
desirerait savoir comment nous etions places a l'egard de la neutralite de la Belgique , et il se 
pourrait que je demande et a la France et a 1'Allemagne si chacune etait disposee a prendre 
1'engagement qu'elLe ne serait pas la premiere a violer la neutrality de la Belgique. 

M. Cambon a renouvel£ la question pour savoir si nous seconderions la France au casoii 
1'Allemagne 1'attaquerait. 

J'ai dit que je pouvais seulement m'en tenir a la reponse et que, au point oil les choses en 
sont en ce moment, nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement. 

M. Cambon a fait valoir que 1'Allemagne avait, depuis le commencement, rejeti les pro- 



— 184 — 

positions qui auraient peut-etre amene la paix. II ne pouvait pas etre dans 1'interet de 1'An- 
gleterre que la France soit ecrasee par 1'Allemagne, nous serions alors dans une position 
tres amoindrie vis-a-vis de 1'Allemagne. En 1870, nous avions commis une grande faute en 
permettant un accroissement enorme de la force allemande, et nous repeterions maintenant 
cette faute. II ma demande si je ne pouvais pas soumettre a nouveau cette question au 
Cabinet. 

J'ai dit que le Cabinet serait certainemeot convoque aussitot qu'il y aurait de nouveaux 
developpements, mais quant a present, la seule reponse que je pouvais donner etait que 
nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement definitif. 

E. Grey. 



IN° 148. 
Sir Edward Gbet 

a Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris. 

Foreign Office, 2 aoiit 191 It. 

Apres le Conseil de Cabinet de ce matin, j'ai remis a M. Cambon la note suivante : 

■1 Je suis autorise a donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande pinetre dans le Pas-de- 
Calais ou dans la mer du Nord pour entreprendre des boslilites contre les cotes ou les 
bateaux francais, la flotte anglaise donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir. 

u Cette assurance est naturellement soumise a 1'approbation du Parlement et ne doit pas 
etre consideree comme engageant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste jusqu'a ce qu'une telle 
action se produise de la part de la flotte allemande. » 

J'ai fait remarquer que nous avions des questions extremement graves et delicates a consi- 
derer et que le Gouvernement ne pouvait s'engager a declarer la guerre a 1'Allemagne si la 
guerre eclatait demain entre la France et 1'Allemagne, mais qu'il etait essentiel que le Gou- 
vernement francais, donl la flotte etait depuis longtemps concentree dans la Mediterranee, 
sut quelles dispositions prendre, la cdte septentrionale elant enlierement sans defense. II 
nous a done paru necessaire de lui donner cette assurance. Cela ne nous engage pas a 
declarer la guerre a 1'Allemagne, a moins que la llotle allemande n'agisse comme il est 
indique ci-dessus, mais cela donne a la France une securite qui lui permcttra de regler la 
disposition de sa flotte mediterraneenne. 

M. Cambon m'a interroge au sujet de la violation du Luxembourg. Je lui ai fait part de 
la doctrine etablie sur ce point en 1 867 par lord Derby et lord Clarendon. 

II m'a demande ce que nous dirions en cas de violation de la neulralite beige. J'ai repondu 
que cetait la une affaire beaucoup plus imporlante et que nous examinions ipiclle declaration 
nous ferions demain a ce suji't au Parlement, e'est-a-dire si nous declarerionsque la violation 
de la neulralite beige est un casus belli. Je lui ai rapporte ce qui avait ete dit sur ce point a 
1'Ambassadeur allemand. 

E. Gi\ev. 



185 



Annexe n° II. 



Extraits du n Livre bleu » relatifs aux propositions f aites par le Gouvernement allera and 
au Gouvernement anglais pour obtenir la neutralite de l'Angleterre. 



N° 85. 



Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin, 
a Sir Edward Grey. 

Berlin, 29 juillet 1914. 

On m'a prie d'aller voir le Chancelier ce soir. Son Excellence venait de rentrer de 
Potsdam. 

II me dit que , si la Russie attaquait 1'Autriclie , il craignait qu'une conflagration europe'enne 
ne devint inevitable, etant donnees les obligations qu'imposait a l'AUemagne son alliance avec 
I'Autriche, malgre les eflorts qui) ne cessait de faire pour le maintien de la paix. 

Ceci dit, il continua la conversation en oflrant une forte enchcie pour s'assurer la neutra- 
lity britannique. II me dit que, selon sa conception du principe essential de la politique bri- 
tannique, la Grande-Bretagne ne jaraai a nil' a lecart de facon a laisser 

ecraser la France dans un conflit qui pourrait avoir lieu. La , cependant , n'etait pas le but 
de l'AUemagne. Si la neutralite de la Grande-Bretagne etait assuree, son Gouvernement rece- 
vrait toutes les assurances que le Gouvernement imperial n'avait pour but aucune acqui in 
territoriale aux frais de la France, en supposant que la guerre s'ensuivit et quelle se t . . ..mat 
a 1'avantage de l'AUemagne. 

J'ai pose a Son Excellence une question au sujet des colonies francaises. II me repondit 
qu'il ne pouvait s'engager d'une maniere semblable a cet egard, 

Pour la Hollande, Son Excellence me dit que, tant que les adversaires de l'AUemagne res- 
pecti raient ('integrite' et la neutralite des Pays-Bas, l'AUemagne serait prete a assurer le 
Gouvernement de Sa Majcste quelle en ferait autant. 

Les operations que l'AUemagne pourrait se trouver dans la necessite d'entreprendre en 
Belgique dependraient de ce que ferait la France ; apres la guerre , 1'integrite de la Bel- 
gique serait respectee, si ce pays nese rangeait pas contre l'AUemagne. 

En terminant, Son Excellence me declara que, depuis le jour oil il devint Chancelier, il 
avait eu pour but, ainsi que vous le saviez, d'arriver a une entente avec l'Angleterre; il espe- 
rait que ces assurances pourraient devenir la base de 1'entente qui lui tenait tant a cceur. 
II pensait a une entente generate de neutralite entre 1'Allemagne et l'Angleterre ; et , quoi- 
qu'il flit encore trop tot pour en discuter les details , i'assurance de la neutralite britannique 
dans le conflit que pourrait peut-etre provoquer la crise actuelle lui permettrait d'entrevoir 
)a realisation de son desir. 

Son Excellence m'ayant demands mon opinion en ce qui concerne la maniere dont vous 
Documents diplouatiqdes. — Guerre europeenne. a4 



— 186 — 

envisageriez sa demande, je lui repondis qua mon avis il £tait peu probable que, dans les 
circonstances acluelles, vous fussiez dispose a vous engager dune facon quelconque et que 
vous desireriez garder une entiere liberte d'action. 

E. Goschen. 



N° 101. 
Sir Edward Grey, 

a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. 

Foreign Office, 3o juillet 19 14. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne peut pas accueiilir un seul instant la proposition du 
Chancelier de s'engager a rester neutre dans de telles conditions. Ce qu'il nous demande, en 
elTet , c'est de nous engager a rester a l'e"cart , en attendant qu'on saisit des colonies francaises 
et que la France fut battue, pourvu que l'Allemagne ne prenne pas de territoire francais, 
exception faite des colonies. 

Au point de vue materiel, une telle proposition est inacceptable, car la France, sans 
qu'on lui enlevat de territoire en Europe, pourrait etre £crasee au point de perdre sa posi- 
tion de grande puissance et de se trouver desormais subordonnee a la politique allemande. 
En general , tout ceci a part , ce serait une honte pour nous que de passer ce marchS avec 
l'Allemagne aux dtpens de la France, une honte de laquelle la boane renommee de ce pays 
ne se remettrait jamais. 

Le Chancelier nous demande en outre de marc'n.inder toutes les obligations ou interets 
que nous pouvons avoir dans la neutralite de la Bel^ique. Nous ne saurions en aucune facon 
accueiilir ce marche non plus. 

Ceci dit, il n'est pas necessaire d'examiner si la perspective d'une convention generale de 
neutralite dans 1'avenir entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne offrirait des avantages positifs sulri- 
sants pour nous d6dommager de nous £tre lie les mains aujourd'hui. Nous devons conserver 
notre entiere liberty d'agir comme les circonstancss nous paraitront lexiger en eas dun deve- 
loppement defavorable et regrettable de la crise actuelle, tel que le Chancelier le prevoit. 

Jevous prie de parler au Chancelier dans le sens susindique' et d'ajouter tres serieusement 
que la seule facon de maintenir les bonnes relations entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne est 
qu'elles continuent a eqoperer au maintien de la paix de 1'Europe. Si nous obtenons ce 
resultat, les relations mutuelles de l'Allemagne et de l'Angleterre seront, j'en snis convaincu, 
ameliorates et renforcees ipso facto. A cet elTet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste travaillera 
dans ce sens avec un bon vouloir et une sincerite entiers. 

Et j'ajouterai ceci : Si Ion peut conserver la paix de f Europe et traverser sans accident la 
crise actuelle, mon effort personnel sera de prendre 1'initiative d'un arrangement auquel 
l'Allemagne puisse souscrire et par lequel elle pourra etre assume qu' aucune politique agres- 
sive ou hostile ne sera poursuivie contre elle ou ses allies par la France , la Russie et nous- 
infimes, soit ensemble, soit se'pare^ment. J'ai desirf ceci et travaille dans ce sens autant que 
je lai pu pendant la derniere crise balkanique, et, comme l'Allemagne avait un but sem- 
blable, nos relations se sont sensiblement ameliorfes. Cette id£e a et^ jusqu'aujourd'hui 
trop utopique pour faire 1'objet de propositions definies, mais si la crise actuelle, beaucoup 
plus aigue que toutes celles par lesquelles 1'Europe a passS depuis plusieurs generations , est 



— 187 — 
traversee sans accident, j'ai l'espoir que le soulagement et la reaction qui suivront rendront 
possible un rapprochement plus precis entre les Puissances qu'il n'a £te possible jusqu'au- 
jourd'hui. 

E. Grev. 



N° 123. 
Sir Edward Gret, 

a Sir Goschen', Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berhn. 

Foreign Office, i™ aout 1914. 
Monsieur, 

J'ai dit a 1'Ambassadeur allemand aujourdliui qae la re'ponse du Gouvernement alle- 
mand au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique etait tres regrettable, car cette neutralite 
affecte l'opuiion publique en Angleterre. Si 1'Allemagne pouvait donner les memes assurances 
que la France, cela contribuerait d'une manierc appreciable a diminuer ici 1'inquietude et 
la tension generates. D'autre part, si 1'un des Belligerants violait la neutralite de la Belgique 
pendant que l'autre la respectait, il serait tres difficile de contenir le sentiment public en 
Angleterre. J'ai dit que nousavions discute cette question auConseil de Cabinet et que, etant 
autorise a faire cette declaration, je lui remettais une note a cet effet. 

II me demanda si, au cas ou 1'Allemagne promettrait de ne pas violer la neutrality beige, 
nous nous engagerions a rester neutres. 

J'ai repondu que je ne pouvais pas faire de promesses, que nos mains etaient encore 
libres et que nous etions en voie de considerer quelle serait notre attitude. Tout ce que je 
pouvais dire, cest que noire attitude serait en grande partie dictee par ['opinion publique 
en Angleterre, pour qui la neutralite beige avait une grande importance. Je ne pensais pas 
pouvoir donner une assurance de neutralite sous cette seule condition. 

L'Ambassadeur me pressa de formuler les conditions moyennant lesquelles nous garde- 
rions la neutralite. 11 suggeVa meme que 1'Allemagne pourrait garantir 1'integrite de la France 
et de ses colonies. 

J'ai repondu que j'etais oblige de refuser definitivement toute promesse de rester neutre 
dans de telles conditions et que je ne pouvais que repe'ter qu'il nous fallait garder les mains 
libres. 

E. Grev. 



Annexe n° II bis. 

Tentatives allemandes pour obtenir, sous le couvert d'un cc malentendu » , la garantie par 
l'Angleterre de la neutrality de la France dans une guerre germano-russe. 

(Publication offieieuse de la Gazette de I'AlIemagne da Nord, 50 aout 191 4.) 



N° 1. 



Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AIIemagne a Londres, 

a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg , Chancelier de I'Empire d'AIIemagne. 

Londres, 3i juillet 191/1. 

Sir Edward Grey vient de m'appeler au telephone et m'a demands si je pensais pouvoir 
declarer que nous n'attaquerions pas la France si la France restait neutre dans une guerre 
germano-russe. J'ai dit que je pensais pouvoir assumer la responsabilite de cette declaration. 



N° 2. 



Telegramme de I'Empereur Guillaume aa Ftoi George V. 

Berlin, 1" aoiit 191a. 

Je viens de recevoir la communication de votre Gouvernement m'oflrant la neutralite de 
la France avec la garantie de la Grande-Bretagne. A cette odre etait liee la question de 
savoir si, a cette condition, I'AlIemagne n'attaquerait pas la France. Pour des raisons 
techniques, ma mobilisation, qui a etc ordonnee cet apres-midi sur les deux fronts, Est et 
Ouest, doit s'accomplir selon les preparatifs commences. 

Des contre-ordres ne peuvent etre donnes et votre telegramme est malheureusement venu 
trop tard. Mais si la France ofTre sa neutralite, qui sera alors garantie par la flotte et l'armee 
anglaises, je m'abstiendrai d'attaquer la France et j'emploierai mes troupes ailleurs. Je sou- 
haite crue la France ne montre aucune nervosite. Les troupes, sur ma frontiere, sont en ce 
moment arretees par ordres telegraphiques et tel£phoniques, dans leur marche en avant au 
dela de la frontiere franchise. 

Guillaume. 



— 189 



N° 



M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de 1'Empire, 

a M. le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres. 

Berlin, 1" aoiit iai4. 

L'AIlemagne est prete a acquiescer aux propositions anglaiscs si TAngleterre garantit avec 
ses forces militaires et navales la neutrality francaise dans le conQit russo-allemand. La 
mobilisation allemande s'est eflectuee aujourd'hui , en riponse aux provocations russes, et 
avant 1'arrivee des propositions anglaises. Par consequent, noire concentration a la frontiere 
francaise ne peut etre modifiee. Nous garantissons d'ailleurs que, d'ici au lundi 3 auut, a 
sept heures du soir, la frontiere francaise ne sera pas franchie si l'assentiment de l'Angleterro 
nous est parvenu a ce moment. 

Bethmann-Hollweg. 



Telegramme dn Roi George V a I'Emperear Guillaume. 

Londres, 1" aoiit 1914. 

En reponse a votre telegramme qui vient de me parvenir, je pense qu'il s'est produit un 
malentendu a propos de la suggestion qui aurait ete iaite au cours dune conversation ami- 
cale entre le prince Lichnowsky et Sir Edward Grey, ou its discutaient comment un conllit 
arme entre i'AIlemagne et la France pourrait etre retards jusqu'a ce qu'on ait trouve' un 
moyen d'entente entre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et la Hussie. Sir Edward Grey verra le prince 
Lichnowsky demain matin pour determiner qui! y a bien eu malentendu de la part de ce 
dernier. 

George. 



N° 5. 

Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne aLoDdres, 

a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de 1'Empire d'AUemagne. 

Londres, 2 aout 191/1. 

Les suggestions de Sir Edward Grey, basees sur le disir de garder la neutrality , de la part 
de TAngleterre, ont ete faites sans accord prealable avec la France et ont H6, depuis, aban- 
donees comme futiles. 

Lichnowsky. 



— 190 — 



Annexe HI. 



Extrai ts du " Livre Bleu » relatifs au refus de l'Angleterre d'admettre le point de vuc 
allemand dans la question de la violation de la neutralite beige. 



N° 153. 
Sir Edward Grey, 

a Sir E. Goschen, Atubassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. 

Foreign Office, 4 aoOt 1914. 

Le Roi des Beiges a adresse un appei a S. M. le Roi en vue d'une intervention diploma- 
tique en faveur de la Belgique dans les termes suivants : 

■1 Me rappelant les nombreuses preuves d'amitie de Votre Majesty et de son predecesseur, 
ainsi que l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870 et le temoignage d'amitie que vous venez 
de nous donner encore, jc fais un supreme appel a 1'intervention diplomatique du Gouver- 
nement de Votre Majeste pour la sauvegarde de 1'integrite de la Belgique. » 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est egalement informe que le Gouvernement allemand a 
remis au Gouvernement beige une note proposant une neutralite amicale permettant le libre 
passage en territoire beige et s'engageant a maintenir I'independance du royaume et de ses 
possessions a la conclusion de la paix; au cas contraire, la Belgique serait traitee en ennemie. 
Une reponse est exigee dans un delai maximum de douze heures. 

Nous apprenons aussi que la Belgique a oppose un refus formel a ce quelle considere 
comme une violation flagrante de la loi des nations. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est oblige de protester contre cette violation d'un traite 
que 1'Allemagne a signe aussi bien que nous-memes; il lui faut des assurances que la demande 
faite a la Belgique ne sera pas suivie d'ellet et que sa neutrabte sera respectee par 1'Alle- 
magne. Vous demanderez une reponse immediate. 

E. Grev. 



N° 155. 
Sir Edward Grey, 

a Sir F Villiers, Ministre de Grande-Bretagne a Bruxelles. 

Foreign Office, 4 aout 191 4. 

Informez le Gouvernement beige que , si 1'Allemagne exerce une pression sur lui pour le 
faire se departir de la neutralite, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste s'attendra a ce que la Bel- 
gique rtsiste par tous les moyens en son pouvoir; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1'ai.dera 
a resister; que, dans ce cas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est pret a s'unir k la Russie et a 
la France, s'il y a lieu, pour offrir immediatement au Gouvernement beige une action 
commune pour resister a 1'emploi par 1'Allemagne de la force contre la Belgique et una 
garantie pour le maintien de son integrite et de son independance dans 1'avenir. 

E. Grky. 



— 191 — 



IV 157. 



Le Secretaire cTEtat aux Affaires etrangeres d'Allemagne, 

au Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres (communique par 
1'Ambassade allemande, 4 aout). 

Berlin, 4 aoflt iai4. 

Priere de dissiper taut soupcon qui pourrait subsister dans 1'esprit du Gouvernement bri- 
tannique au sujet de nos intentions. 

Repetez positivement i'assurance formelle que, meme en cas de conflit arme avec la Bel 
gique, 1'Allemagne ne s'annexera du territoire beige sous aucun pretexte. 

La sincerite de cette declaration est prouvee par notre engagement solennel a 1'egard de la 
Hollande de respecter strictement sa neutralite. II est evident que nons nc pourrions annexer 
proftablement du territoire beige sans noas agrandir en meme temps aux dipens de la Hollande. 

Faites bien coniprendre a Sir Edward Grey que 1'armee allemande ne saurait s'exposer a 
une attaque francaise par la Belgique, attaque qui a ete envisagee selon des informations 
absolument sfires. 

L'Allemagne est done obligee de ne pas tenir compte de' la neutralite beige: e'est pour elle 
une question de vie ou de mort de prevenir favance de 1 armee francaise. 

Jagow. 



N° 159. 
Sir Edward Gret, 

a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. 

Foreign Office, 4 aout 1914. 

Nous apprenons que 1'AJlemagne a adresse une note au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
beige , declarant que le Gouvernement allemand serait oblige de mettre a execution , au besoiii 
par la force des armes, des mesures considerees comme iudispensables. 

Nous sommes egalement informes que le territoire beige a ete viole a Gemmerich. 

Dans ces conditions et etant donne crue I'AUemagne a refuse de nous donner au sujet de 
la Belgique les memes assurances que celles que nous a donnees la France la semaine der- 
mere en reponse a notre demande faite simultanement a Berlin et a Paris, il nous faut 
reiterer cette demande et exiger une reponse satisfaisante, ainsi qua mon telegramme de ce 
matin, qui devra etre recue avant minuil ce soir. 

Sinon, vous demanderez vos passeports et vous declarerez que le Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste sevoit oblige de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neu- 
trality de la Belgique et le respect d'un traite auquel 1'Allemagne a souscrit autant que 
nous memes. 

E. Grey. 



_ 192 - 



N° 160. 



Sir E. Goschen, 

A Sir Edward Grey. 

MoNSIEUB , 



Londres, 8 aout 191 4. 



Conform^ment aux instructions contenues dans votre telegramme du 4 couranl, je sqjs 
a!16 voir cet apres-midi le Secretaire d'Etat et lui ai demands, au nora du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste britannique, si le Gouvernement imperial s'absliendrait de violer la neutrality 
de la Belgique. 

M. de Jagow a repliqui tout de suite qu'il Mail fiche d'avoir a dire que sa reponse de- 
vaitetre : « Non », elant donne que, puisque les troupes allemandes avaient franchi la fron- 
tiere ce matin, la neutrality de la Belgique se trouvait d'ores et deja violee. 

M, de Jagow s'est e^endu a nouveau sur les raisons qui avaient oblige le Gouvernement 
imperial A prendre cette mesure : c'est a savoir qu'il leur 1. ill.nl p^netrer en France par la 
yoie la plus rapide et la plus facile, de manure A prendre une bonne avance dans leurs 
operations et s'efforcer de frapper quelque coup decisif le plus tot possible. C'esl pour nous, 
a-t-il dit, une question de vie ou de mort, car, si nous avions passe par la route plus au 
Sud, nous n'aurionspu, vu le petit nombre de cbemins et la force des forteresses, espe>er 
passer sans rencontrer une opposition formidable, impliquant une grosse peile de temps. 
Cette peite de temps aurait ili autant do temps gagne par les Russes pour amener leurs 
troupes sur la fronliere allemande. Agir avec rapidite, voila, a-l-il ajoute, le maUre-atout de 
I'Allemagne; celui de la Russie est d'avoir d'inepuisables ressources en soldats. 

J'ai fait remarquer A M. de Jagow que ce fait accompli, la violation de ia frontiere beige , 
rendait, comme il le comprenait facilement, la situation excessiveinent grave, etje lui ai 
demands s'il n'etait pas temps encore de faire un pas en arriere et d'eviter la possibilite de 
consequences que lui et moi deplorerions. II a repondu que, pour les raisons qu'il m'avait 
donnees, il (5tait mnintenant impossible au Gouvernement allemand de faire un pas en 
arriere. 

Au cours de l'apres-midi, j'ai recu votre nouveau tejegrammede la memedate, et, ob6is- 
sant aux instructions y contenues, me suis rendu a nouveau au Ministere imperial des 
Affaires etrangeres, ou j'ai informe le Secretaire d'Etat qua moins que le Gouvernement 
imperial put donner ce soir avant minuitl'assurance de ne pas pousser plus loin sa violation 
de la frontiere beige et d'arr6ler sa marche, j'avais recu des instructions pour demander 
mes passeports et pour informer [le. Gouvernement imperial que le Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste britannique prendrait toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neutra- 
lise de la Belgique et l'observation d'un trait4 auquel I'Allemagne etait autant partie que 
lui-meme. 

M. de Jagow a repondu qu'A son grand regret il nepouvait donner auc.une reponse autre 
que celle qu'il m'avait donnie plus tot dans la journSe, c'est A savoir que la se"curite de 
1'Empire rendait absolument necessaire la marche des troupes imperiales A travers la Bel- 
gique. J'ai remis a Son Excellence un resumS t'crit de votre telegramme et, en faisant 
remarquer que vous indiquiez minuil comme l'heure A laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste britannique s'attendrait A une rfponse, lui ai demande si, vu les consequences 
ierribles qui suivraienl necessairement, il ne serait pas possible, m£me au dernier moment , 



— 193 — 

au Gouvernement imperial de reviser sa reponse. II m'a repondu que quand bien mgme le 
temps accords serait de vingt-quatre heures ou davantage, il fallait que sa reponse restat 
la meme. J'ai dit que dans ce cas j'aurais a demander mes passeports. 

L'entrevue dont il s'agit a eu lieu vers sept heures. Au cours d'un Lrel entretien qui la 
suivit, M. de Jagow a exprime son poignant regret de voir s'ecrouler toute sa politique et 
celle du Chancelier, qui a ete de devenir amis avec la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite, par 
elle, de se rapprocher de la France. Je lui ai dit que cetle terminaison soudaine de mon 
travail a Berlin etait pour moi aussi nne cause de profond regret et de deconvenue; mais 
qu'il lui fallait bien comprendre que dans les circonstances et vu nos engagements, il eut 
ete tout a fait impossible au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique d'agir autrement 
qu'il n'avait fait. 

J'ai dit ensuite que j'etais d<5sireux d'aller faire visite au Chancelier, car ce serait peut-etre 
ia derniere fois que j'aurais 1'occasion de le voir. II m'a pric5 de le faire. J'ai trouve' le 
Chancelier ties agite\ Son Excellence a commence' tout de suite une harangue qui a dure 
environ vingt minutes. II a dit que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
britannique etait terrible au dernier point; juste pour un mot — « neutrality », un mot dont 
en temps de guerre on n'a si souvent tenu aucun compte, — juste pour un chiffon de 
papier la Grande-Bretagne allait faire la guerre a une nation a elle apparentie, qui ne 
desirait rien tant que d'etre son amie. Tous ses efforts en ce Sens ont, a-t-il continue^ eli 
rendus inutiles par cette derniere et terrible mesure; la politique a laquelle, commeje le 
savais, il s'etait voue depuis son arrivee au pouvoir, etait tombee comme un chateau de 
cartes. 11 s'est eerie que ce que nous avons fait est inconcevable; e'est comme frapperpar 
derriere un homme au moment ou il defend sa vie contre deux assaillants. II tient la 
Grande-Brelagnepour responsable de tous les terribles tenements qui pourrontse produire. 
J'ai protests avec force contre cette declaration et ai dit que, de meme que lui-meme et 
M. de Jagow desiraient me faire comprendre que pourdes raisons strategiques, e'etait pour 
1'Allemagne une affaire de vie ou de mort d'avancer a travers la Belgique et de violer la 
neutrality de celte derniere, de meme je desirais qu'il comprit que e'etait pour ainsi dire 
une affaire de « vie ou de mort » pour 1'honneur de ia Grande-Bretagne que de tenir 1'en- 
gagement solennel pris par elle de faire en cas d'attaque tout son possible pour defendre la 
neulralite de la Belgique. II est, ai-je insisle, tout simplement nfeessaire de tenir ce pacte 
solennel, sans quoi quelle confiance n'importe qui pourrait-il avoir a 1'avenir dans les en- 
gagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne? 

Le Chancelier a repris : « Mais a quel prix ce pacte oura-t-il ili tenu? Le Gouvernement 
britannique y a-t-il songe? » J'ai insinue i Son Excellence, avec toute la clarte qui me fut 
possible, que la crainte des consequences ne pouvait guere etre considered comme une excuse 
pour la rupture d'engagements solennels; mais Son Excellence etait dans un tel etat d'exci- 
tation, il etait si evidemment demonte par la nouvelle de notre action et si peu dispose a 
entendre raison que je m'abstins de jeter de 1'huile sur le feu en argumentant davantage. 
Comme je prenais conge de lui , il a dit que le coup que la Grande-Bretagne portait a 
1'Allemagne en s'unissant a ses ennemis etait d'aulant plus violent que presque jusqu'au 
dernier moment lui et son Gouvernement avaient travaille avec nous et appuye nos efforts 
en vue du maintien de la paix entre 1'Autriche et la Russie. Je repondis que e'etait bien ce 
qu'il y avait de tragique que de voir deux nations tomber en garde precisement au moment 
ou les rapports entre elles se trouvaient plus amicaux et plus cordiaux qu'ils ne 1'avaient 
et4 depuis des annees. J'ai ajoute que, par malheur, nonobstant nos efforts pour sauvegarder 
la paix entre la Russie et 1'Aulriche, la guerre s'etait propagee et nous avait mis face a face 
avec une position qu'il nous etait impossible d'esquiver si nous tenions nos engagements, 
Documents diplomatiqles. — Guerre europeennc. 25 



— 194 — 

situation qui malheureusemenl impliquait separation davec nos aociens collaborateurs. Jai 
termini en disant qu'il n'aurait point de dilBculte a coraprendre que personne ne le regret- 
tait plus que moi-meme. 

Apres cette entrevue plutot penible, je suis renlri a I'Ambassade et ai redige un compte 
rendu telpgraphique de ce qui s'etait passe. Ge t^legramme a ete remis au bureau de teJ6- 
graphe central de Berlin, un peu avant 9 heures du soir. 11 a ete accepte par ledit bureau, 
mais semble n'avoir jamais eliS transmis. 

Vers 9 heures et demie du soir, le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, M. de Zimmermann, est venu 
me voir. Apres avoir exprime son profond regret que les rapports officiels et personnels, si 
cordiaux entre nous, fussent sur le point de cesser, il me demanda inciderument si la 
demande de mes passeports 6quivaudrail a une declaration de guerre. Je lui ai dit qu'une 
personne faisant aussi notoirement que lui autorite en rnatiere de droit international devait 
savoir aussi bien ou inieux que moi quelle etail la coutume en pared cas. Jai ajoute qu'il y 
avail des exemples nombreux ou la rupture des rapports diplomatiques n'avait point M 
suivie de guerre; mais que dans le cas actuel il avait sans doute vu d'apres mes instructions , 
dont j'avais donnS un resume par ecrit aM. de Jagow, que le. Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
britannique s'altendait a une reponse a une question definie ce soir avant minuit et qu'a 
defaut de reponse satisfaisante ledit Gouvernement se verrait force de prendre les mesures 
necessities par ses engagements. M. de Zimmermann declara que cela etait, de fait, une 
declaration de guerre, 6tant donn6 qu'il £tait de toute impossibility pour le Gouvernement 
Imperial de donner les assurances requises ni ce soir, ni aucun autre soir. 

E. Goscben. 



— 195 — 



Annexe IV. 



Ext raits du iildvre Gri s» indiquant les conditio ns dans lesquelles l'AIlemagne 
a viole la neutrality beige. 



N" 2. 



Lettbe adressce par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangcres , 
aux Ministres du. Roi a Paris, Berlin, Vienne , Londrcs el Sainl-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le ih juillet 1914- 

Monsieor le Ministre, 

Le Gouverncment du Roi s'est demands si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait 
pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une 
communication destinee a leur conlirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs internationaux 
que iui imposenl les traites au cas 011 une guerre viendrait a eclater aux frontieres de la 
Belgique. 

II a ete. amcne a la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait premaluree a l'heure 
presente mais que les evenements pourraient se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps 
de (aire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses repr&enlants a 
letranger. 

Dans cette situation , j'ai propose au Roi et a mes coIJegues du Cabinet , qui se sont rallies 
a ma maniere de voir, de vous donncr, des a present, des indications precises sur la 
demarche que vous auriez a faire si l'eventualite d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait 
plus menacante. 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non datee, dont vous aurez a donner 
lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres si les circonstances exigent 
cette communication. 

Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir. 

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a l'heure on la mobilisation de l'armee beige sera 
decretee, si, contrairement a notre sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, 
nos renseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Davignon. 



Annexe ad n° 2. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La situation international est grave; l'eventualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne 
pent etre ecartee des preoccupations du Gouvernement du Roi. 

La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui 



— 196 — 

Lmposent les traites du 19 avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera in^branlablement a les remplir, 
quelles que soient les circonstances. 

Les dispositions amicaies des Puissances a son egard ont ete affirmees si souvent que la Belgique 
a la conGance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atleinte si des hostilites venaient a se 
produire a ses frontieres. 

Toutes les mesures necessaires pour assurer i'observation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas moins 
ete prises par le Gouvernenient du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les positions 
strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutrality. Les forts 
d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en etat de defense. 

II est a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesures. Elles 
n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales; 
elles ne sont et n'ont pu etre inspirees, cela va de soi, ni par !e dessein de prendre part a une 
lutte armee des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de defianorenvers aucune d'elles. 

Me conformant aux ordres recus, j'ai l'bonneur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie de la 
declaration du Gouvernenient du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre sct^. 

Une communication identique a ete' faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutrality beige. 

Je saisis, etc. 



N° 8. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires c'trangeres, aux Ministres da 
Roi a Berlin, Paris, Londres , Vienne, Saint - Petersbourg , Rome, La Haye, 
Luxembourg. 

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement du Roi a decide de mettre l'armee sur le pied de paix renforci. 

Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune facon conlondue avec la mobilisation. 

A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire, la Belgique tout entiere constitue en quelque 
sorte une zone frontiere. Son armee, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une 
classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce, ses divisions d'armee et sa 
division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de trois classes ont des effectifs analogues a ceux |des 
corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances voisines. 

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de repondre aux questions qui pourraient vous 
etre posees. 

Veuillez agreer, etc, 

Davignon. 



N° 9. 



Lettre adresse'e par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires clrangeres, aur Ministres da 
Roi a Berlin, Paris et Londres. 

Bruxelles, le 3i juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

M. le Ministre de France etant venu me montrer un telegramme de 1'Agence Havas, 
decretant 1'etat de guerre en Allemagne, m'a dit : « Je profile de cette occasion pour vous 



— 197 — 
declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes franchises n'aura lieu en Belgique, meme si des 
forces importantes Staient massees sur les frontieres de voire pays. La France ne veut pas 
avoir la responsabiliti$ d'accomplir, vis-a-vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilite. Des 
instructions dans ce sens seront donnees aux autorites franchises. » 

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer 
que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats 
voisins mettraient a lenir leurs engagements a notre egard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de 
croire que 1'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera identique a celle du Gouvernement 
de la Republique fran9aise. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Davignon. 



N° 11. 



LettAe adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires e'trangires , aax Ministres da 
Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. 

Brnxelles, le 3i juillet lQl/i. 

Monsieur le Ministbe , 

Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demands a me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication 
suivante, qu'il souhaitait etre a meme de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la 
possibility d'une guerre europeenne, sir Edward Grey a demande aux Gouvernements fran- 
cais et allemand, separeuient, si chacun d'eux etait pret a respecter la neutralite de la Bel- 
gique pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la viole. 

o Vu les traites qui existent, je suis charge d'informer le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique fera 
tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutralite et quelle desire et s'attend a ce que les autres 
Puissances lobservent et la maintiennenl. » 

Je me suis empresse de remercier Sir Francis Vilbers de cette communication que le 
Gouvernement beige apprecie particulierement et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne et les 
autres nations garantes de notre independance pouvaient gtre assurees que nous ne neglige- 
rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralite, et que nous etions convaincus que les 
autres Puissances, vu les exoellents rapports d'amitie et de confiance, que nous avions tou- 
jours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutralite. 

Je n'ai pas manque d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, considerablement developp<5es a 
la suite de notre reorganisation recente, £taient a meme de nous permettre de nous defendre 
ftiergiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire. 

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi , Sir Francis m'a paru un pen surpris de la rapidite 
avec laquelle nous avions decide' la mobilisation de notre armee. J'ai fait remarquer que les 
Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolution identique avant nous et que d'autre. part la date recente 
de notre nouveau regime militaire et les mesures transitoires que nous avions du decider a 
cette occasion nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants 
devaient voir dans cette resolution le d^sir de manifester notre profonde volonte de main- 
tenir nous-memes notre neutrality. 



— 198 — 
Sir Francis ra'a paru satisfait de ma response et m'a annonc£ que son Gouvernement 
atlendait cette reponse pour continuer les negociations avec la France et l'Allemagne, nego- 
ciations dont la conclusion me serait communiques. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Davignon. 



N° 12. 



Letthe adrcssee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires elrangeres, aux Ministres da 
Hoi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. 

Bruxelles, le 3i juillet ioi4. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secretaire general de mon departement a 
eue avec M. de Bulow, d a explique au Ministre d'AUeniagne la portee des mesures mili- 
tants que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles etaieht une consequence de notre volonte 
d'accomplir nos obligations Internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune faqon une atti- 
tude de defiance envers nos voisins. 

Le Secretaire general a demande ensuite au Ministre d'AUeniagne s'il avait connaissance 
de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur, M. de Flotow, et de la reponse que 
le Chancelier de l'Empire avait charge celui-ci de lui faire. 

Au cours de la poiemique soulevee en 1911 par le depot du projet hollandais concernant 
les fortifications de Flessingue, certains joumau.x avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre franco- 
allemande, notre neutrality serait violee par l'Allemagne. 

Le departement des Affaires Etrangeres avait suggere l'idee qu'une declaration faite au 
Parieuient allemand a 1'occasion dun debat sur la politique etrangere serait de nature a 
apaijer 1'opinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des rela- 
tions des deux pays. 

M. de Bethman-Holweg lit repondre qu'il avait ete ties sensible aux sentiments qui avaient 
inspire notre demarclie. II declarait que l'Allemagne n'avait pas (intention de violer notre 
neutrality, maisilestiniait qu'en laisant publiquement une declaration, l'Allemagne allaibli- 
rait sa situation milhaire vis-a-vis de ia France qui, rassuree du cote du Nord, porterait 
toutes ses forces du cote de l'Est. 

Le baron vender Der Fist, ponrsuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections 
qu'avaient failed M. de Bethman-Holweg a la declaration publique suggerte et il rappela que 
depuis lors en igi3, M. de Jagow avait fait, a la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des 
declarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique. 

M. de Bulow repondit qu'il etait au courant de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'd 
etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a cette epoque n'avaient pas change. 

Veuillez agreer, etc 

Davignon. 



199 — 



Annexe au N° 12. 

Lettre adirssc'e par le Ministre da Roi a Berlin a M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Berlin Ie2 mai 191 3 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honncur de vous, faire connaitre, d'apres I'officieuse Norddentsche Allgemeine Zeilung, les 
declarations faites au cours de la seance du 29 avril de la Commission du budget du Reichstag , 
par le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement a la neu- 
tralite de la Belgique. 

u Un membre du parti social-democrate dit : « En Belgique on voit avec apprehension s'approcher 

• une guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que I'Allemagne ne respectera pas la neutralite de la 
« Belgique ■. 

• M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres r^pondit : la neutralite de la Belgique 
nest determiuee par des conventions Internationales et l'Allernagne est decidee a respecter ces con- 
« ventions. 

■ Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre membre du parti social-democrate. M. de Jagow 
"observa qu'il n'avait nen a ajouter aux paroles claiies qu'il avait prononcees relativement aux rela- 
n tions de I'Allemagne avec la Belgique. 

« A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti social-democrate, M. de Heeringen , 

• Ministre de la Guerre, repondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun role dans la justification du projet de 
"reorganisation militaire alleniand; celui-ci se trouve justiGe par la situation en Orient. L'Alle- 
« magne ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralite beige est garantie par les traites internationaux «. 

« Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parle de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fil remarquer 
a nouveau que sa declaration concernant la Belgique etait suffisamment claire. ■ 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Baron Bevens. 



N° 13. 



TitEGKAMUE adresse par le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre da Roi a Londres, a 

M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Londres, 1" aout 1914. 

L'Angleterre a demands separement a La France et a I'Allemagne si elies respecteraient le 
territoire de la Belgique dans le cas oil leur adversaire ne La violerait pas. On attend la 
reponse allemande. La France a accepte. 



N° 14. 



TAlegrammb adresse par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi, a Berlin, a M. Davignon, 

Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Berlin, 1" aout 191 4. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a ete charge de demander au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
si, en cas de guerre, I'Allemagne respecterait la neutralite de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait 
dit qu'il ne peut pas repondre a cette question. 



— 200 — 



N° 15. 

Lettrb adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangires, aux Ministres du Roi 
a Berlin, Paris el Londres. 

Bruxelles, 1" aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Misistbe, 

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France ma fait verbalement !a com- 
munication suivante : 

« Je suis autorise' a declarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la 
B£publique, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours declare^ respectera la neutrality de la Belgique. Dans 
I'hypothese 06 cette neutrality ne serait pas respectee par une autre puissance, le Gouver- 
nement francais, pour assurer sa propre defense, pourrait etre araeni a modifier son atti- 
tude •. 

J'ai remerci6 son Excellence et ai ajout£ que, de notre cote\ nous avions pris sans aucun 
retard toutes les mesurcs voulues pour faire respecter notre independance et nos frontieres. 

Veuillez agr£er, etc . . . 

Davignon. 



IT 19. 



Lettre. adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires c'trangeres , aux Ministres da Roi 
a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne el Saint-Pctersboarg. 

Bruxelles, le 2 aout 191(1. 

MoNSlEOR LE MlNISTRE, 

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Bassompierre le Ministre d'Allemagne, qu'un 
communique de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France, a la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait 
la declaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait laite le 1™ aout. Rencontrant M. de Bulow, 
ce dernier m'a remercid de cette attention et a ajoute' que, jusqu'a present, il n'avait pas et6 
charge de nous faire une communication officielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinion 
personnelle sur la securite avec laquelle nous avions le droit de consid£rer nos voisins de 
I'Est. J'ai immedialement repondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de* 
ceux-ci, intentions indiquees dans les multiples entretiens anteneurs, ne nous permettait pas 
de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-a-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant a ajouter 
que nous altacherions le plus grand prix a etre en possession d'une declaration formelle 
dont la nation prendrait connaissance avec joie et reconnaissance. 

Veuillez agr£er, etc. . . 

Davignon. 



201 



1N° 20. 

Note remise le 2 aovU, a 19 heures, par M. de Below Saleske, Minislre d'Allemagne, 
a M. Davitjnun, Minislre des Affaires elrangires. 

Bruxelles, 2 aoiit 19 id. 

Le Gouvernement allemand a recu des nouvelles sures d'apres lesquelles ies forces fran- 
chises auraient 1'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne 
laissent aucun doute sur 1'intention de la France de marcher sur 1'Allemagne par le terri- 
toire beige. Le Gouvernement imperial allemand ne peut s'empecher de craindre que la 
Belgique, malgre sa meilleure volonte\ ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours 
une marche francaise dun si grand developpement. Dans ce fait, on trouve ( une certitude 
suffisante dune menace dirigee contre 1'Allemagne. 

C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation pour 1'Allemagne de pr£venir cette attaque de 
1'ennemi. 

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tres vivement que la Belgique regardat comme 
un acte d'hostilitd contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de 1'Allemagne 1'obligent de 
violer de son cote le, territoire beige. 

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu , le Gouvernement allemand declare ce qui suit : 

I. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilite contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique 
consent, dans la guerre qui va commencer, a prendre une attitude de neutrality amicale vis- 
a-vis de 1'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son cote s'engage, au moment de la 
paix , a garanlir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. 

II. L'Allemagne s'engage, sous la condition enoncee, a evacuer le territoire beige aussitot 
la paix conclue. 

III. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, 1'Allemagne est prete, d'accord avec les 
autorit£s du Gouvernement beige a acheter contre argent comptant lout ce qui est necessaire 
a ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en Belgique. 

IV. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une fa^on hostile contre les troupes allemandes et parti- 
culierement fait des difficult^ a leur marche en avant par une opposition de fortifications 
de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes , de chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages 
d'art, 1'Allemagne sera obligee de conside>er la Belgique en ennemie. 

Dans ce cas, 1'Alleniagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-a-vis du royaume, mais elle 
laissera le reglement ulteneur des rapports des deux £tats Vun vis-a-vis de 1' autre 4 la 
decision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a 1'espoir justified que cette eventuality ne 
se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige saura prendre les mesures appropri^es pour 
l'empecher de se produire. Dans ce cas, les relations d'amitie qui unisseut les deux Etats 
voisins deviendront plus etroites et durables. 



Documents diplomatiqubs. — Guerre europeenfte. 



— 202 — 



N° 22. 



Note remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. de Below Saleske, 
Minislre d'AUemagne. 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 19 id (7 heures du matin). 

Par sa note du 1 aout 1 9 1 4 , le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaitre que d'apres des 
nouvelles sures , les forces francaises auraient 1'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet 
et Namur, et que la Belgique , malgre sa meilleure volonte, ne serait pas en etat de repousser 
sans secours une marche en avant des troupes francaises. 

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans 1'obligalion de prevenir cette attaque et de 
violer le territoire beige. Dans ces conditions, 1'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du 
Roi de prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix a 
garantir 1'integrite du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. La note ajoute 
que si \.\ Belgique fait des difficultes a la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, 1'Alle- 
magne sera obligee de la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement ulterieur des 
deux Etats 1'un vis-a-vis de 1'autre a la decision des armes. 

Cette note a provoquc chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux etonne- 
ment. 

Les intentions quelle attribue a la France sont en contradiction avec les declarations for- 
melles qui nous ont £te faites le 1" aout, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique. 

D'ailleurs si contrairement a noire attente une violation de la neutrality beige venait a etre 
commise par la France, la Belgique remplirait tons ses devoirs international^ et son armee 
opposerait a 1'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance. 

Les traites de i83g confirmes par les traites de 1870 consacrent findependance et la 
neutrality de la Belgique «>us la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse. 

La Belgique a toujours ete fidele a ses obligations Internationales; elles a accompli ses 
devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialitf- ; elle n'a neglig£ aucun effort pour maintenif 
ou faire respecter sa neutrality. 

L'atteinte a son independance dont la menace du Gouvernement constituerait une fla- 
grante violation du droit des gens. Aucun iriteret strategique ne justifie la violation du 
droit. 

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait 
1'honneur de la nation en meme temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de 1'Europe. 

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans dans la civi- 
lisation du monde , il se refuse a croire que findependance de la Belgique ne puisse etre 
conserved qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutrality. 

Si cetespoir etait deru,le Gouvernement beige est fermement decide a repousser par tous 
les tnoyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte a son droit. 

Davignon. 



— 203 — 



N° 27. 



Lettkb adressee par M. de- Below Saleske, Ministre d'AUemagm, a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires etrangcres. (L'original est en francais). 

Bruxelles, le i aout 1914 (6 heuresdu matin). 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai et& charge et j'ai 1'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que par suite du refus oppose 1 
par le Gouvernement de Sa MajestS le Roi aux propositions bien intentionn^es que lui avait 
soumises le Gouvernement imperial, celui-ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, forcS d'executer 
— au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de securite expos£es comme indispen-r 
sables vis-a-vis des menaces francaises. 

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre , les assurances de ma haute consideration. 

von Below. 



N° 28. 



Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, a M. Davignon, Ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres. 

firuxellcs, le A aout xy iA. 

Je suis charge' d'informer le Gouvernement beige que si 1'Allemagne exerce une pression 
dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner son r61e de pays neutre, le Gouvernement 
de Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la Belgique r£siste par tous les moyens 
possibles. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty britannique, dans ce cas, est pr£t a se joindre i la Russie 
et a la France, si la Belgique le desire, pour onrir au Gouvernement beige, sans delai, une 
action commune, qui aurait comme but de resister aax mesures de force employees par 
1'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps d'ofirir une garantie pom - maintenir l'in- 
dependance et 1'integrite de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. 

Sir Francis H. Villiers. 



N° 30. 



Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etranghes, aax Minislres 
du Roi a Londres et a Paris. 

Broxelles, le 1 aout 1914. 

L'Etat-Major fait savoir que le territoire national a hi viole a Gemmenich. 

Davignon. 



204 



N" 31. 



Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etranyeres , a M. de Below 
Saleske, Ministre a" Altemagne. 

Bruxelles, le h aoiit 19 ii. 

MoNSIEHR LE MiNISTRE , 

J'at 1'honneur de faire savoir a Votrc Excellence, que des aujourd'hui le Gouvernement du 
Boi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations 
ollicielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeports qui sont necessaires 
a son depart et a celui du personnel de la Legation. 

Je saisis, etc. 

Davignon. 



N° 35. 



Lettre adressee par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M. I)avitjnon, Ministre des 
Affaires etranycres. 

Berlin, a aoiit 1 9 1 4. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ni I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro- 
nonce aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de 1'Empire et relative a 
1'odieuse violation de notre neutr: !.'> ; 

« Nous nous trouvons en etat <it legitime defense et la necessite ne connait pas de lois. 

» Nos troupes ont occupe Luxembourg et out, peuteire, deia penetre en Belgique. Cela 
est en contradiction avec les prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, declare 
a Bruxelles quelle elait resolue a respecter la neutrality de la Belgique aussi longtemps que 
l'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prole pour envahir la 
Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous, pas. Une attaque francaise sur notre flanc 
dans la region du Rhin inferieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons ele. 
forced de passer outre aux protestations justifies des Gouvernements Luxembourgeois et 
Beige. L'injustice que nous commetlons de cette facon, nous la reparerons des que notre 
but militaire sera alteint. 

« A celui qui est menace au point oil nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme, 
il n'est permis que de songer ou moyen de se degager; nous nous trouvons cote a cote avec 
VAutriche. » 

II est a remarquer que M. de Bethmann-Hollweg reconnait, sans le moindre detour, que 
1'Allemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire beige et quelle commet 
une injustice a notre egard. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Baron Beyens. 



205 



N° 39. 



Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Rai a Londres a M. Davignon, Minislre des 
Affaires e'lrangeres. 

Londres, 4 aoyt 191/1. 

L'Angleterre a somme' ce matin 1'Allemagne de respecter la neutrality beige. L'ultimatum 
dit que, vu la note adressee par 1'Allemagne a la Belgique, menacant cette derniere de la 
force des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes; vu la violation du territoire beige 
a Gemmenich; vu le fait que 1'Allemagne a refuse de donner a 1'Angleterre la meme-assu- 
rance que celle donnee la semaine derniere par la France, 1'Angleterre doit demander a 
nouveau une reponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutrality beige et d'un traite 
,dont 1'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-meme. L'ultimatum expire a minuit. 

En consequence de l'ultimatum de 1'Angleterre a 1'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise 
que je vous ai transmise par telegramme est annulee pour le moment. 

Comte de Lalwng. 



V 40. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Minislre* de 
Grande-Bretagne , de Frame el de Russie. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 191 4. 
Monsieuk leA'Iinistre, 

Le Gouvernement Beige a le regret de devoir annoncer a Voire Excellence que, ce 
matin, les forces armies de 1'Allemagne ont p£netre stir le territoire beige, en violation des 
engagements qui ont ete pris par traite. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a r&ister par tous les moyens en son 
pouvoir. 

La Belgique 'fait appel a 1'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour coope>er, comme 
garantes , a la defense de son territoire. 

II y aurait une action concerted et commune ayant pour but de register aux mesures de 
force employees par 1'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le main- 
tien de lind^pendance et de I'lntegrite de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. 

La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer quelle assumera la deTense des places 
fortes. 

Je saisis, etc 

Davignon. 



— 206 



l\° 41. 



Telegramme adresse par le Minislrc da Roi a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des 
Affaires etrange'res. 

Londres, 5 aout iqi4- 

L'Allemagne ayant rejete les propositions anglaises, I'Angleterre lui a declare que letat de 
guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heures. 

Corate de Lalaing. 



N° 44. 



Lettke adrcssce par M- Davignon , Minis/re ties Affaires etrange'res , am Chefs de mis- 
sion dans tous les pays enirelenanl avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques. 

Bruxelles, le 5 aout 191 4. 

MONSIEDR LE MlHISTRE, 

Par le traite du 18 avril 1M9, la Prusse, la France, I'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie 
se sont declarces garantes du Iraite conclu le nicme jour entre S. M. le roi des Beiges et 
S. M. le roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traite porte : « La Belgique forniera un Elat indt'pendant et 
perpetuellement neutre ». La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a 
accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartiality, elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour 
maintenir et faire respecter sa neutrality. 

Aussi est-ce avec une penible emotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les 
forces armies de L'Allemagne . puissance garante de notre neutrality ont p^netre sur le terri- 
toire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont ete pris par traite. 

II est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation contre un attentat au droit des gens 
qu'aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son 
pouvoir l'atteinte portee a sa neutrality et il rappelle qu'en vertu de 1'article 10 de la Con- 
vention dc La Haye de 1 907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des per- 
sonnes neutres [en cas de guerre sur terre ne peut etre considere comme un acte hostile 
le fait, par une puissance neutre, de repousser meme par la force les atteintes a sa neu- 
trality. 

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence audience au Ministre des Affaires etrangerec et 
donner lecture a Son Excellence de la presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si ['au- 
dience ne pouvait vous etre immediatement accordee, vous ferez par ecrit la communica- 
tion dont it s'agit. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Davignon. 



— 207 — 



N° 48. 



Communication faile le 5 aonl par Sir Francis Villiers, Minislre d"Angl'lerre, 
a M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires clrangeres. 

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement Beige que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
britannique considere Taction commune dans le but de resister a 1'Allemagne comme etant 
en vigueur et justifiee par le traite de 1 83a. 



N° 52. 



Lettre adressee par M. Davignon. Ministre des Affaires clrangeres, aux Ministres du 
Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Pelersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 5 aoiit 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les Minislres de France et de Russie ont fait ce 
matin une demarche aupres de moi pour me faire connaitre la volont<5 de leurs Gouverne- 
ments de repondre a notre appel et de cooperer avec l'Angleterre a la defense de notre 
territoire. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

Davignon. 



N° 60. 



Telegramme adressc par le Ministre du Roi a La Haye a M. Davignon, Minislre des 
Affaires clrangeres. 

La Haye, le 9 aout 1.914. 

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a prie de vous transmettre les informations suivantes 
parce que le Ministre d'Amerique a Bruxelles s'y refuse. 

La forteresse de Liege a £te prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- 
ment Allemand regrette tres profondement, que par suite de 1'attitude du Gouvernement 
Beige contre 1'Allemagne , on en est arrive^ a des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient 
pas en ennemie en Belgique, e'est seulement par la force des evenements quelle a du, a 
cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en 
Belgique et d'occuper Liege comme point d'appui pour ses operations militaires ulterieures. 
Apres que 1'armee beige a, par sa resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite, main- 
tenu l'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement Allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le Gou- 
vernement Beige deviter a la Belgique les horreurs ulterieures de la guerre. Le Gouverne- 
ment est pret a tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec son conflit avec 



— 208 — 
la France. L'AHemagne assure encore solenneliement quelle n'a pas l'intention de s'appro- 
prier le territoire beige et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prete 
a evacuer la Belgique aussitot que 1'etat de guerre le lui permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie son collegue de se charger de cette tentative de 
mediation. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a accepte sans enlhousiasme cette mission. 
Je mVn suis charge pour lui faire plaisir. 

Baron Fallon. 



N° 71. 



Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a M. le baron 
Fallon, Ministre dti Rot a La Haye. 

Bruxelles, le 12 aout 1914. 

Priere de remettre le telegramme suivant au Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres : « La propo- 
sition que nous fait le Gouvernement Allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait et£ for- 
mulee dans 1'ullimatum du 1 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut 
que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aoiit sa neutralite 
a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete ported sur son territoire et que les garants de 
sa neutrality ont iojalement et immediatement repondua son appel. » 

Davignon. 



— 209 — 
Annexe V. 

Telegrammes £chang<!s entre l'Empereur Guillaume II et l'Empereur Nicolas II. 
(Ext raits du Livre Blauc allemaud) 



I 

L'Empereur Guillaume 

a l'Empereur Nicolas. 

28 juillet 1914 (10 h. 45 du soir.) 

C'est avec la plus vive inquietude que j'ai appris 1'impression qua produite dans ton Em- 
pire, la marche en avant de I'Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. L'agitation sans scrupule 
qui se poursuit depuis des annees en Serbie, a conduit au monstrueux attentat dont 1'Ar- 
chiduc Francois-Ferdinand a ete la victime. L'iStat d'esprit qui a amene les Serbes a assassiner 
leur propre roi et son epouse regne encore dans ce pays. Sans doute conviendras-tu avec 
moi que tous deux, toi aussi bien que moi, nous avons, comme tous !es souverains, un 
interet commun a insister pour que caux qui sont moralement responsables de ce terrible 
meurtre recoivent le chatiment qu'ils mentent. 

D'autre part, je ne me dissimule aucunement combien il est difficile pour toi et ton Gou- 
vernement de resister aux manifestations de 1'opinion publique. En souvenir de la cordiale 
amitiii qui nous lie tous deux etroitement depuis longtemps, j'use de touts mon influence 
pour decider I'Autriche-rlongrie a en venir a une entente loyale et satisfaisante avec la Russie. 
Je compte bien que tu me secourras dans mes efforts tendant a ecarter lout;s les dilficultes 
qui pourraient encore s'elever. 

Ton ami et cousin tres sincere et devoue 

Gl'ILLABME. 



L'Empereur Nicolas 

a l'Empereur Guillaume. 

Palais de Peterhof, le 29 juillet 1914 (1 heure apres-midi.) 

Je suis heureux que tu sois rentre en AHemagne. En ce moment si grave, je te prie 
instamment de venir a mon aide. Une guerre honteuse a <5te declaree a une faible nation ; je 
partage entierement l'indignation, qui est immense en Russie. 

Je prevois que ties prochainement je ne pourrai plus longtemps resister a la pression qui 
est exercee sur moi et que je serai forc£ de prendre des mesures qui conduiront a la guerre. 

Pour prevenir le malheur que serait une guerre europfenne, je te prie, au nom do 
notre vieille amitie, de faire tout ce qui te sera possible pour empecher ton alliee d'allei 
trop loin. 

Nicolas 



DocoMfEKTS djplomatiqobs. — Guerre europ&n 



- 210 — 



m 

29 jufllet 1914 (6 ti. 3o du soir.) 
L'Empcreur Guili.aume 

a i'Ernpercjr Nicolas. 

J'ai reeu ion telegramme el partage ton desir de maintenir la paix. 

Cependant, je ne puis, ainsi que je le disais dans mon premier telegramme, considerer I 1 
marche en avant de I'Autriche-Hongrie comme « une guerre honteuse ». L'Autriche-Hongri; 
sail par experience qu'on ne peut absolument pas se Tier aux prornesses de la Serbie tanl 
qu'elles n'existent que sur le papier. 

A mon avis, la conduite de 1'Antriche-Hongrie doit etre considerCe comme une tentative 
d'obtenir toute garantie que les prornesses de la Serbie seront executees aussi en fait. La 
declaration du cabinet autrichien rae fortifie dans mon opinion que rAutriche-Hongrie ne 
vise a aucune acquisition terriloriale au detriment de la Serbie. 

Je pense done qu'il est tres possible a la Russie de persdverer, en presence de la guerre 
austro-serbe, dans son role de spectatrice, sans entrainer 1'Europe dans la guerre la plus 
eifroyabie quelle ait jamais vue. 

Je crois ipi'une entente directe entre ton Gouvernement et Vienne est possible et desirable 
attendu que, comme je te l'ai deja telegraphic, mon Gouvernement essaie de toutes ses forces 
de !a favoriser. 

Naturellement des mesures militaires de la Russie, que rAutriche-Hongrie pourrait con- 
siderer comme une menace , hateraient une calamite que tous detrx nous cherchons a eviter, 
et rendrait egalement impossible ma mission de mediateur que j'ai acceptee avec empres- 
sement lorsque tu as fait appel a mon amitie et a mon aide. 

Guillacme. 



IV 

L'Empereur Gdillattme 

a 1'Empereur Nicolas. 

3o juillet 1914(1 heure du matin. ) 

Mon Ambassadeur a &l£ charge d'appeler 1'attention de ton Gouvernement sur les dangers 
et les graves consequences d'une mobilisation ; c est ce que je t'avais dit dans mon dernier 
telegramme. 

L'Autriehe-Hongrie n'a mobilise que centre la Serbie et seulement une partie de son 
ann^e. Si la Russie, comme e'est le cas d'apres ton telegramme et la communication de ton 
Gouvernement, mobilise contre I'Autriche-Hongrie , la mission de mediateur que tu mas 
amicalement confiee et que j'ai acceptee sur ton instante priere, sera compromise sinon 
rendue impossible. 

Tout le poids de la decision a prendre pese actuellement sur tes epaules, qui auront a 
supporter la responsabilite de la guerre ou de la paix. 

Guillaumi. 



— 211 — 



L'Empereur Nicolas 

4 l'Empereur Guillaume. 

Peterhof, le 3o juillet igi/i ( i h. 20 apres-midi.) 

Je te reroercie cordialement de ta prompte reponse. Jenvoie aujourd'hni soir Taticheff 
avec me6 instructions. Les decisions militaires qui sont nrises inaintenant en vigueur, ont deja 
ete prises il y a cinq jours a titre de defense contre les preparatifs de 1'Autriche. 

J'espere de tout mon coeur que ces mesures n'influeront en rien sur ton role de mediateur 
que j'apprecie grandement. Nous avons besoin de ton intervention energique aupres de 
1'Autriche, afin quelle arrive a une entente avec nous. 

Nicolas., 



VI 

L'Empereur Nicolas 

a l'Empereur Guuxadme. 

3i juillet 1914. 

Je te remercie de tout coeur de ton intention , qui iaisse percer une lueur d'espoir que 
tout se terminera encore a 1'amiable. Techniquement, il est impossible de suspendre nos 
preparatifs militaires qui ont ete necessites par la mobilisation de 1'Autriche. 

Nous sommes loin de desirer la guerre; aussi longtemps que dureront les pourparlers 
avec 1'Autriche, au sujet de la Serbie, mes troupes ne se livreront a aucun acte de provoca- 
tion. Je ten donne ma parole d honneur. 

J'ai confiance absolue dans la grace divine et souhaite la reussite de ton intervention a 
Vienne pour le bien de nos pays et la paia de 1'Europe. 

Bien cordialement a toi. 

Nicolas. 



VII 



L'Empereur Guillaume 

a l'Empereur Nicolas. 



3i juillet igii (2 heures apres<nidi). 



Sur ton appel a mon amitid et ta priere de te venir en aide , j'ai entrepris une action 
mediatrice entre ton Gouvernement et le Gouvernement austro hongrois. 

Pendant que cette action etait encore en cours, tes troupes ont eti mobiiisees contre mon 
altiee 1'Autriche Hongrie-, a la suite de quoi, ainsi que je te l'ai deja fait savoir, mon inter- 
vention est devenue presque illusoire. Malgre cela, jel'a'i continue*. 

Je recois a l'instant des nouvelles dignes de foi toucbant de serieux preparatifs de guerre 
egalement sur ma frontiere orientale. Ayant a repondre de la security de mon Empire, je 
me vois force de prendre les memes mesures defensives. 



— 212 — 

Je suis alii' josqu'a ['extreme limite du possible dans mes efforts pour maintenir la paix. 
Ce n'est pas moi qui supporterai la responsabilile de l'affreux desastre qui menace mainte- 
nant toul le monde civilise. 

En ce moment encore il ne tient qua toi de I'empecher. Personne ne menace l'honneur 
et la puissance de la Russie, qui eut bien pu attendre le resultat de mon intervention. 
L'amitie pour toi et ton royaume, qui m'a ete transmise par mon Grand-Pere a son lit de 
mort, est toujours sacree pour moi, et j'ai &li fidele a la Russie lorsqu'elle s'est trouvfe 
dans le malheur, nolamment dans ta derniere guerre. Maintenant encore la paix de 1'Europe 
peut etre maintenue par toi, si la Russie se decide a suspendre ses mesures militaires qui 
menacent 1 Allemagneet l'Autriche. 

Gdilladme. 



VIII 



L'Empereur Nicolas 

■i 1'Empereur Guill.ume. 



l" aoiit 1914 (2 lieures apres-midi 



J'ai recu ton telegramme, je comprends que tu sois oblige de mobilise!*, maisje voudrais 
a\oir de toi la meme garantie que je t'ai donnee, a savoir que ces mesures ne signifient pas 
la guerre et que nous poursuivrons nos negociations pour le bien de nos deux pays et la 
paix generate si ch£re a nos coeurs. 

Notre longue amitie eprouvee doit, avec 1'aide de Dieu, reussir a empecher ces effusions 
de sang. J'altends avec conliance une reponse de toi. 

Nicolas. 



K 

L'Empereur Guillaume 

a 1'Empereur Nicolas. 



Berlin, 1" aoiit 1914. 



Je te remercie de ton telegramme; j'ai indique hier a ton Gouvernement le seul moyen 
par lequel la guerre pouvait encore etre evitee. 

Bien que j'eusse demande une reponse pour midi. aucun telegramme de mon Ambassa- 
deur contenant une reponse de ton Gouvernement ne m'esl encore parvenu. J'ai done ete 
contraint de mobilise!* mon arm£e. 

Une reponse immediate, claire et non Equivoque, de ton Gouvernement est le seul 
moyen de conjurer une calamite incommensurable. Jusqu'a ce que je recoive cette reponse, 
il m'est impossible, a mon vif regret, d'aborder le sujet de ton telegramme. Je dois te de- 
mander categoriquement de donner sans retard 1'ordre a tes troupes de ne porter en aucun 
cas la moindre atteinte a nos frontieres. 

Gdilladme. 



— 213 — 



Annexe VI. 

Extraits du uldvre orangeu relatifs a la declaration de guerre de 1'Allemagne a la Russie. 



N° 76. 



Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Saint-Pe'tersbourg , le 1" aout 191 U, 
a 7 h. 10 da soir. 

Le Gouvernement imperial s'est effort des les debuts de la crise de la mener a une solu- 
tion pacifique. Se rendant a un desir (|ui lui en avait et£ exprime par Sa Majeste 1'Empereur 
de Russie, Sa Majeste 1'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'aecord avec l'Angleterre, s'^tait applique a 
accomplir un r61e mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Petersbourg , 
lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resuitat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses 
forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun presage 
militaire de la part de 1'Allemagne , ('Empire allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis dun danger grave 
et imminent. Si le Gouvernement imperial eut manque de parer a ce peril, il aurait com- 
promis la securite et 1'existence meme de 1'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement 
allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur de Toutes 
les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de 
faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a) 1 ' 1 cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce 
refus (cette attitude) que son action elait dirigee contre 1'Allemagne, j'ai I'honneur, d'ordre 
de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir .< Votre Excellence ce qui suit : 

Sa Majesty 1'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de (Empire, relevant le defi, se 
considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. 

Saint-Petersbourg, le ig juillet/i" aout iQii. 

F. PotJRTALES. 



N° 77. 



Communique da Minislre des Affaires elrangeres concernant les evenements des dermers 
jours. 

Le 2 aout 19 1£. 

Un expose defigurant les evenements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse etran- 
gere, le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres croit de son devoir de publier 1'apercu suivant des 
pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvise. 

t 1 ' Les mots places enlre parentheses se trouvent dans l'original. II taut supposer que deux vafiantes 
avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur elles ont ele inserts toutes les deux dans la note. 



— 214 — 

Le io-:>3 juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta an Ministre 
President serbe une note oil le Gouvernement serbe etait accuse d'avoir favoris£ le mouve- 
ment panserbe qui avait abouli a I'assassinat de 1'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. En conse- 
quence I'Autriche-Hongric demandait au Gouvernement serbe non seulement de condamner 
sous line forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de 
I'Aulriclie-Hongrie, une serie de mesures tendant a la decouverte du coniplot, a la punition 
des sujetsserbes y ayant participe et a la prevention dans 1'avcnir de tout attentat sur le sol 
du Royaume. Un del ni de quarante-huit heures fut five' au Gouvernement serbe pour la 
reponse a [a susdite note. 

Le Gouvernement imperial , auquel I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Saint-Petersboui'g 
avait communique le textcdela note dix-sept heures apressa remise a Belgrade, ayant priscon- 
naissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parnii elles etaient 
inexecutables quant au fond, tandis que d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompa- 
tible avec la dignite d'un etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la 
dignite de la Serbie, contenue dans ees demandes, ainsi que la tendance de I'Autriche- 
Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans les Balkans demontree par ces memes exigences, 
le Gouvernement russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a l'Autriclie-Hongrie qu'il 
serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro- 
hongroise. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne crut pas possible de consentir a une discussion 
de la note. L action moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ne fut non plus couronneo 
de succes. 

Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut montree prete a donner satisfaction .i 
1'Auh iche dans une mesure qui depassat les previsions non seulement de la Russie , mils aussi 
des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe 
insuffisante et quitta cette vilie. 

Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par I'Autriche, la Russie 
avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de tester indiuerente , sans se 
refuser toutefois a employer tous sis efforts pour trouver une issue pacilique qui fut accep- 
table pour l'Autriche et nien.ige.it son amour-propre de grande puissance. En meme temps 
la Russie etablit fermemenl quelle admettail une solution pacilique de la question seulement 
dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie comme Etat 
independant. Malheureusement tous les efforts deployes par le Gouvernement imperial dans 
cetle direction resterent sans elTet. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, apres s'etre dernbe 
ii toute intervention conciliatricc des Puissances dans son condit avec la Serbie, proceda a 
la mobilisation, declara officiellement la guerre a la Serbie, et le jour suivant, Belgrade fut 
bombardee. Le manifeste qui a accompagne la declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la 
Serbie d'avoir prepare et execute le crime de Sarajevo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de 
droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un Etat attira a la Serbie par son inanite 
evidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la societe europeenne. 

A la suite de cette inaniere d'agir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, malgre la declara- 
tion de la Russie quelle ne pourrait resler indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouverne- 
ment imperial jugea necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de 
Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle decision s'imposait parce que depuis la 
date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement serbe et les premieres 
demarches de la, Russie cinq jours s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne 
n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts paciiiques; au contraire la mobili- 
sation de la moiu£ de l'armee austro-hongroise avait ete decretee. 

Le GouvernemeDt allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui 



— 215 — 

fut en meme temps explique qu'elles n'etaient que la consequence des armemenls autri- 
chiens et nullement dingoes contre I'AHemagne. En mtlme temps, le Gouvernement impe- 
rial declara que la Russie etait pretc a continucr les pourparlers en vue dune solution paci- 
fique du conflit, soit par la voie de negotiations direcles avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soil, en 
auivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des- quatre 
grandes Puissances non interessdes directeinent , voire 1'Angleterre , la France, i'AHemagne 
et l'ltalie. 

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie £choua egalement. L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un 
echange de vues ulteVieur avec nous , et le Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a 
la Conference des Puissances projetee. 

Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la pnix. Repondant a la 
question de I'AHemagne, a quelles conditions nous consentirions encore a suspendre nos 
armemenls, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la recon- 
naissance par I'Autiiche-IIongrie que la question austro-serbe avail revetu le caractere dune 
question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance quelle consentait a ne pas 
insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. 

La proposition de la Russie fut juge> par I'AHemagne inacceptable pour 1'Autriche-Hon- 
grie. Simultan^ment on recut a Saint-Petersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la 
mobilisation generals par l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En memo temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoire serbe et Belgrade fut bom- 
bardee derechef. 

L'insucces do nos propositions nous obligea d'elargir les mesures de precautions mili- 
tates. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adress£ une question a ce sujet, il lui fut repondu que la 
Russie etait foreee de commencer ses armements pour se premunir contre toutes eVentua- 
litfe. 

Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de 
rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter 
tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posees par 
nous. 

Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement allemand, le 1 8/3 1 juillet, 
adressa au Gouvernement russe la demande d'avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a 
midi du ig juillet/i" aout, en menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobili- 
sation generate. 

Le lendemain, 19 juillet/i" aout, 1'Ambassadeur d'AHemagne transmit au Ministre des 
Affaires etrangeres, au nom de son Gouvernement, la declaration de guerre. 

Sazonoff. 



N° 78. 
Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 

aux Reprresentants de S. M. i'Empereur k i etranger. 
[telegrmmie.) 

Saint-Petersbourg, le 20 juillet/2 aoiit 1914. 
11 est absolument clair que I'AHemagne s'efforce des a present de rejeter sur nous la res- 
ponsabilite' de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a Me provoquee par l'enorme responsabilite 



— 216 — 
que nous aurions assumee, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un 
moment ou 1'Autriche , se bornant a des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, bombardait 
Belgrade et proc^dait a une mobilisation generate. 

Sa Majeste I'Empereur s'etait engagee visa-vis de 1'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole a 
n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apres 
une telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de f amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Alle- 
magne ne pouvait ni n'avait le droit de douter de notre declaration, que nous accepterions 
avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite et 1'independance de la Serbie. Une 
autre issue, tout en etant completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite aurait cer- 
tainement ebranle l'equilibre europien, en assurant l'hegemonie de 1'Allemagne. Ce carac- 
tere europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le pretexte qui 
la cr^e. Par sa decision de nous declarer la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les 
negociations entre les Puissances, 1'Allemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. 

Sazonoff. 



iDent ftyxift unh HhenftMe 
)wn Hxie$mmbxu<fy. 



Sim 28. 3uui b. 3. ifi bet ojlerotcb^fcb/ungatifdje Jfjronfotger drj^etjog' 
ftranj gerbinnnb unb fcinc ©einat)liii, bie gerjogin Bon JSoljeuberg butd) 9ieco(Bcf 
fdmffe bed fliitglicbd etncr fetbifdjcn 33erfd)Worerbanbe niebcrgefttcdt worbcn. ©ie Uutet- 
fuelling bed S5et6ted)en3 burrf) bic ojietreidjifd) ungarifd)en 53et)6rbcn (;at ergeben, bafs bad 
fioniplott gegen baS Cebcn bed ISrjrjctjog-'Jbjonfolgctd in Sktgrab untcr 9Jlitwirfung 
amtlicfict ferbifoVr Sperfonen Borbereitet unb geforbtrt, mit SBaffen au8 ben ftaatlicf>cn > 
fetbifdicn ©epotd aiidgefiibtt wurbc. <E>ies lierbvcdjcn ntufite bet ganjen jiciliftctten 
SBcIt bie Slugen offucn, uidjt nut iibet bie gegen ben SBeftanb unb bie ^ntegrital 
bet bftetrcid)ijdvungatifd)cn SSlottotdjte geriditcten 3'tcte bet fetbifdjcn Spofitif, fonbern 
aud) iibet bie Betbredjcrifdjcn OTittct, bie bic gtojjfet6ifd)e p:opaganba in Sctbicn 
jur lhteid)ung biefev %\de anjuwenben fid) nid)t fd)eute. ©a8 Snbjicl biefet 
'Politic' War bic attmat)lid)e SReBofationierung unb fdjtiefjlidje Cosircnnimg 
bet fubofUidjcn ©ebietdteile bei bfteraid)tfdj<ungarifd)eti SJtonatdjie unb it)re 
Ccreiniguug mit Serbien. Sin biefet SNid)tung bet ferbifdjen <Polittf baben bie 
wicbcfljoltcu uub feietKdjen Grttamngen, in benen Setbien Ojtcrteidj'Ungarn gtgen- 
iibet bie Slbtcljr uon bicfev 'Politif unb bic ipflegc gutct nadjbarlicijet S3cjier)ungen 
getobt tjat, nidit bad gcringfic gtanbert. 3 um brirten 5KaIe im £aufe bet Icfjteti 
fedjd 3at)w f u ') vt ©«6itn auf biefe SEBeife Guropa on ben SJanb eincd Seitlriegd. 
£d founte bied nut tun, meit e8 fid) bei feinen 33ejrrebungen buvd) SRufjlaub gcftii|t 
gtaubte. Die ruffifebe ipotttif war bote nad) ben butd) bic tiirfifebe SReBolution 
(jcrbeigcfiitjrtcn Ereigniffen beS 3 fl § te = 1908 barau gegangen, einen gcgen ben SBeftanb 
bet liitfei geridjteten 33unb bet Satfanjlaaten untct fcincm s }3atrcnat 511 begtunben. 
©icier Salfaubunb, bem ed im 3 a § te 1911 fl'' 1 "^; k' e Sutfei ficgteid) cud bem 
grbfjtcn 'Jeil itiret curopdifd)en Scfijwngcn ju oerbrdngen, brad) iibet bet ^tage bet 
SBeutcoevtctlung in ftd) jufammen. Die ruffifdic 'Dolitif ticjj fid) butd) bicfen QJii^- 
etfolg nid)t abfdnctfcn. 3 n 0£l ' 3 oce 0Et tufjifeben ©taatdindnncr fottte cin ncuct 
Satfanbunb untct tuffifd)em Spottottot tittfrcljcn, beffen ©pi|c fid) nid)t mel)t 
gegen bie aud bem Saltan Berirdngte Stftfei, fonbetn gegen ben SBeftanb bet 
6fterreid)ifd)ungatifd)en 9)fonaid)ie ridjtete. ©ie 3bce war, bafi Serbien gegen bie 
auf Soften bet Sonaumouardjie gefjeube GinBetleibung SodnienS unb ber gerjego- 
Wina bie im legtcu Saltanfticg etwotbenen 3;eite ?J(a}cboniend an Sutgatien a6/ 
trcten foUte. 3 U biefcm 23ci)ufe follte Butgaticn burd) 3ft>(icrung miitbe gcmad)t, 
iHumdnicn butd) cine init >5ilfe ,"Hanfreid)d untcruomnicnc 'Ptopaganba an iRufjtanb 
gefettct, Setbien auf Sodnien unb bie SctjegoftHua gewiefen wctben. 

Untet bicfen llmftdnbcn mufjtc fiftctteid) fid) fagen, bafj ed webet mit bet' 
TOutbe nod) mit bet Selbftci Ejaltung bet SJlonardjie oeteiubat wdte, bem iteiben 
jenfeitd bet ©tenjc nod) Idnget tatcntod jujufcijen. Die t. unb f. SRegictung be- 
nad)tid)tigte und Bon biefet Sluffaifung unb etbat uufctc 2lnfid)t. Slud Bollem 5etjcn 

V 



fonntcn ivir unfcrcm Sunbcsigcnoffen unfcr GinBerfianbniS mit feincr Ginfd)a|ung 
ber Sadiioge gcbcu unb ifjm Berfidjern, bof; cine Slftion, bic cr fur notiocnbig 
Ijieltc, inn bcr gegen ben SJcftanb ber ItJonarcfiie geridjteten SSeroeguug 
in ©erbien rin Gnbc ju uiadicn, Unfere Bitligung finben rourbe. SJBir luaicii 
unS [)icvbci moid bcmujjt, bafj ein ettnaigcS EriegcrifdjeS SSorgeljen Ofterrcidj-Ungarus 
gegen ©erbien Siiifjlanb auf ben *P£an bringen unb 11113 liiranit unferer 5>nnbcS- 
BfUcbt cntfprcdicnb in oinrn Rrieg oermicfetn fbnnte. 5Cir fonntcn abcr in bcr Gr- 
fenntniS bcr Bitalen Jntcreffcn Oftcrrcid) Uiig.iriis, bic oiif bem Spic(e ftanben, unfcrcm 
8unbe§genoffcn locbcr ju ciner mit fciucv SBurbe nicl)t ju Bereinbarenben Wacbgicbigfcit 
ratcn nod) aud) ibm uufcrcu Seiftnnb in bicfem fdt)rDeven SJloment Berfagen. SBit fonntcn 
bic» urn fo memger, a!3 and) unfere ^ntereffen burd) bic cinbauernbe fcrbifdje 5Bu§(> 
arbcit auf ba3 cinpfinblirbftc bebrobt roatcn. fflenn c3 ben ©erben mit SRufjtonbS 
unb granfreidjS Sitfe nodi Kinger geftattet gcblicbcn marc, ben Seftanb bcr 9cad)6m> 
monarchic ju gefaljrbcn, fo roiirbc bic3 ben nlliual)lid)cn Sufammenbrudj Cftctreidjs 
unb cine Unterroerfung be? gefamten ©(amentumS untcr rnf fifcficm ©jeBter jur falgc 
(jaben, tooburd) bie ©teltung bcr gennanifeben Piaffe in 93citte(europa nnhaltbar 
hjflrbe. Gin moralifd) gcfcbmaditcs, burd) bag SSorbringcn bc« ruffifcr)en SpanflaroiSmug ju> 
fammenbrcdjenheg Dfterrcidj marc fur uns (ein StinbcSgcnoffe tneb^r, mit bem mir redjnen 
fonntcn, unb auf ben loir 11113 Bertaffen fonntcn, mie roil cs angcfid)t3 bcr immcr 
brotyenber roerbenben 5altung unferer oftlidjcn imb roefilidjen Scadjbnrn muffen. 
Sir licficn babcr Dftcrreidj obllig frcic §anb in feincr '-lltion gegen ©erbien. Sir 
l)aben an ben Borbereitungen ba;u nidjt teilgenommeu. 

Oftcrreidj uuiblte ten 5Ceg, in ciner Scote bcr ferbifdjett SRcgierung au3fubrlid) 
ben burd) bie llntcrfudjung bcS 3Jcorbc« bon ©arajeroo feftgeftcttten unmittclbaren 
3ufammcn[)iing jmifeben bem ?})orbc unb bcr Don bcr ferbifrfjen Sicgicning niri.t uur 
gebulbcten, fonbern unterflugteii grojjferbifdjen SBeroegung barjutegen unb fon ibr cine 
BoQftanbige Jlbftcttung bicfesS JreibcnS foloie S3cftrafung bev ©djulbigcn ju forbcrn. 
©leidjjeitig oerlaugtc Ofterreid) Uugarn als ©arautie fur bie Durdjfiiljruug bc§ 33crfaljren§ 
'ieiluabnie feincr Organc an bcr !luteifud)ung auf (cibifduiu ©cbict unb befiuitioe 
Sluflofung bcr gegen Ofterreidj-Ungam louljlcnbcn grofjferbifctjen S3creine. Tic f. u. t. 
SRegitrung ftclltc cine Tviift Don 48 ©tunben jur bebingunggfofen Jlnuafjmc iljrcr 
^orbcrungen. 'Pie fcibifcbc SJegicrung [)at eiiien 'Jag nad) Ubcvrcidumg ber 
Bfierretd)ifd)'ungarifd)eit ?)otc bie 3)lo6i[ifation begonncn. 81(8 nadi Slblauf bcr 
grift bic jcibifd)e SRegicrung cine Stntmort evtcilte, bie jioar in einigen 'Punften 
bic Siinfcfie Ofterrcid) Ungarn3 erfudte, im rcefentlidjen abcr tcut(id) ba8 Seftreben 
erfcniun licjt, bind) Sjerfdjleppung unb ncue S3er§anb(ungen ficb ben gcrcditcn 
tjorberungen bcr OTonarcfjie ju entjicljen, brad) bicfe bic biplonuitifdicn 2?ejicf)ungcn 
511 ©erbien 06, olinc fid) auf teeitere Scrlianbliingcn einjulaffen obcr fid) 
Bon fcrbifdicn Serfidjcningen l)in[)altcn ju laffen, bcrcn SDert eg gcuugfam — ju 
feinem ©djaben — tcunt. 

S5on bicfem Slngenblicf an befanb fid) frftevreid) tatfad)licb im firtegSjlijranbt 
mit ©crbien, ben cS bann nod) burd) bic offijiedc Sricg^erflarung Bom 28. b.3J!t3. 
offcutlid) protlainierte. 

Com erften Slnfang bes Sconfliftg an fjaben loir auf bem.ctanbpimft geftanben, 
bafj ti fid) tiierbci 11m cine ^lugclegenfieit Ofiencid)3 tjanbclte, bic eg affein mit 



— 5 — 

©erbicn jum HuStrag ju btingcn fjnben njiitbc. ©it l)abm bnb/t imfct gaiijc? 
53cfttebcn batauf gctiditct, ben ficicg ju (ofalijieren unb bie anbeten Sftadjtc bauon 
ju iiberjeugen, bap Ojlerreidj Ungarn in bcred)tigtet Scoftocljt unb butd) bie Bcrbaltnijfe 
gejloungen fid) jum Slppcll nn bie SBaffen [jabe entfcfyliejjcn muffen. TOit [jaben nod)- 
briirflieb beu ©tanbpunft tterttctcn, bnjj fcin fiulttnfiaat bag Jterfjt (jabe, in bicfem 
fiampf gegen Uiifultut unb politifdje SSerbtedjennoral Oflcrrcirfj in ben Sinn ju 
fallen unb bie ©ctben ihrct gevedjtcn ©trafe ju entjicfyen. 3" bicfem Sinue fjaben 
wit uufetc S?cttvctct im Slusfanb iufh'uicvt ^ 

©leidijcitig tcilte bie 6fterrcia)ifdj Ungarifdje SRegicnmg bcr SRuffifdjen mit, bafj. 
bet pon it)t bci ©erbien unteroominene ©djtitt lebiglid) cine befenfiuc SRajjregel gegen- 
iibet ben [ctbifrf)cn ffiuljlevcicn jum giclc t)abe, baf; abet Oftetteidv llngatii uotge- 
btungen ©atanticn fiir ciu irciictcii ftcuubfd)aft[id)csS SSettjaltcn Sctbicnii ber 
SRonaidjie gegeniibet Dctlangc. G£ liege Cftctteidj4Iugarn ganjlicb, fern, ctioa einc 
SSerfdjiebung bet SRadjtBet^dttnijfe auf bem Saltan (jetbeijufubrcn. Sluf unfete fit- 
Elatung, baf! bie ©cutfdic SRegietung bie Cofalijierung bcS fionfliftS toiinfefye unb ct- 
fltcbc, icutbe fonjol)! Don bet graiijofifdjoi ali bet Englifdjen SRegietung einc 5Bit> 
fung in bem gleidn-n ©innc jugefagt. ©icfen Seflvcbungcn getang cS inbcffeii 
nidjt, cine Cinmifdjung SRnjjianbS in bie bjlencidnfd^fevbifdjc Sluscinaubctfefumg 311 
Bcvbiiibetn. 

Die 3?ujfifd)c SJcgietuug ctlicft am 24. 3uli cin amtfidjeii ftommunique, mo- 
nad) SRujjianb uuntbglicb in bem fevbifdi bfieneidiifdicn fiouftitt inbiffetcnt blcibcn 
fbnntc. £a;S gtcidjc ctftattc bet rufjifdie SBtinifier bc3 SluStoavtigen, Sett 
©affononi, bem fiaifettidjen Sotfdjafter ©tafen ^outtateg, Sim Dtadjmittng 
beg 26. 3 U K 'iff' ^> c f. U. f Sicgictung abetmale; butd) i()tcn S3otfd)aftct 
©t. ^Petersburg cttlatcn, Daji Oflcttcid) Ungatn fcinctlci EroberungSplane t)ab 
nub nut cnMid) an feinen ©tenjen 3!uf)c (jaben ivotle. 3m Caufe bc3 glcidicn 
Sages! gelangtcn inbes betcitij bie ctjlcn 5JJclbuugtn iibet ruffifcbe Sftobidnacfnmgcn . 
nad) SBcttin. 9}odj am 2fi. abenbd ftutben bie Saifctlidjen Sotfdjaftct in Bonbon, 
<PariS unb Petersburg angemiefen, Dei bcu SKcgierungen Gnglanbtf, granfrcicbj unb s&j *^» 
3lu|faiib8 enctgifd) auf bie ©efab)t biefct tufpfdjen 3J!o6i(i|ietunjen Ijiiijulucifcn. ^tyti 
3eadibcm Ofletteidj-Ungatn Diupliinb offijicll crfldtt (ja6e, bafi c3 feinen tertitotialen ^ 

©ewiun in ©etbicu anfltcbe, liege bie Sntfd)eibung ubct ben SSeltfvicbcu au8- 
fdilicfilid) in "PetetSbutg. Scod) am glcidjcu Sage mutbe bet fiaifctlief)e S3otfd)aftct' 
in St. 'PetetiSbutg angewiefen, bet 9?u|'ftfd)cn SRegierung ju ettlaten: 

SBorbereitenbe militatifcbc Stafiiiabmen SiufilanbS wetben 11118 ju 
©egenmaptegclu jmingen, bie in bet fflobilifietuug bet Sltmcc beftctjen 
nuiffen. ©ie SDlobilifictung abcr bebcutet ben fiticg. ©a un3 gtanfteirtjB 
Ccrpfliditungcu gegeniibet 9{u§(anb betannt fmb, imitbe bicfc TDto6i(i- 
fietung gegen SRufjtanb unb granttcid) juglcid) getidjtet fcin. 2Bir 
fonncn nid)t annebmen, baft Siujjlanb cincu foId)en cutopaifeben Sticg 
entfeifctn wiH. Ca Cjtcrteid} ■ Ungam ben Sejlaub bcS fetbifeben 
fi6nigteicf)S nic£)t antaftcn wi[[, ftnb mir bet Slnfidit, bajj SKujjtanb einc 
abwattenbe ©teffung eiuncfjmen fann. ©en SBunfdj Slufilanb*, ben 
SScfianb -btsi fevbifdjen fibnigtcicb,^ nid)t in S ta g e ftcttcn ju laffcn, wetben 
toit urn fo cfjcr untetftii^cn ibnnen, al8 Oftettcicfj-Ungatn bicfen 33c]tanb 

2 




_ 6 — 

got nidjt in fUagc fleUt. Eg loiri (cidjt fein, im nxiteten Serlauf bet 

Slngctegen^cit bit Sofia finer Betftanbtgang ju finbeu. 

?lm 27. 3"[i crftarte bcr ruffifcbe ttric;ismiiuftcr ©fudjomlinoro bcm beutfdjen 

5Mitatattad)t' cb,rciitt>ortlid), bajj nod) fciuc SDtobiimadjungBotbte crgaugcu fci. G8 

nnirben Icbi.ilidi SJorbereitungiSmafu'cgeln getroffcn, fein 9Pfetb nusgcljobcn, fcin SHe- 

feroift eingcjogen. 2Benn Oftetrcidviltigani bic fcrbifdjc @rctt;c ubcrfd)rcitc, roiitbcn bie 

auf oftetteich getidjteten SBMiUdtbejitfe SVieio, Obeffa, 9Jto3fau, Rafan mobUijiert. Untet 

fcincn Umftduben bic an bcr bcutfnjcn Jront Itegenbcn : 'Petersburg, ffiilna unb 

ffiatfdmu. Sluf bic i^ragc bes SJcUitorflttac^eg, 311 rocId)cm ~,\vcdc bic SRobil- 

x v niadnmg gegen feficrrcid) Ungatn crfolgc, aiitroortete bcr tuffifdje Kriegsminiftcr mit 54dife[> 

rf^< jucfen unb bcm SiimieiiS auf bic Dipfomaten 15er SBtititdtattacfye bejetdjnere batauf 

bic 9Hobifmad)uiigsinflfjnaI)tMn gegen Dftctteid) Ungatn a(8 audi fut rcutfcblanb bodift 

bebroblid). 3" ben batauf fotgenben Jagcn fotgten fid) bic 9cadjticf)tcn fiber ruffifdje 

SRobiiijietungen in fcbnellcm iempo. Untcr bicfen roarcn and) 9tiidiricrjtcn 

fibet SJorbetcitungcn nn ber beutfeben ©rcnjc, fo bic Serfjdugung bes ftriegs- 

ju|tanbe3 iiber fiorono unb bcr Slbmatfdj bcr ffiarfdjauet ©arnifon, SSetftatfung bet 

©atnifon Slfejanbtowo. Sim 27. ^u'li ttafen bic ttjten 9Mbungen ubet Botbetettenbe 

Sftajjnaljmcn and; gtonfteidjs cin. ©08 14. JfotpS brad) bic SianbBet ab unb 

fetjrtc in bic ©atnifon jurticf. 

^njvoifdicn fmb mir bemfibt geblicbcn, burcfi iiadibtiirflicbfrc Giiinnrtung auf 
bic fiabinette cine Sofalijictung be-.? SonftiftB burebjufeften. 

Sim 2f>. ij'ittc ©ir Gbuwb ©teB, ben Sotfdjfag gemadjt, bic riffcrenjen 

jloifdjcn Ofterrcid)-Ungarn unb ©erbien cincr untcr feinem 53otfi$ tagenben .VU'iifcrenj 

bcr 53otfd)aftcr Deutfd)(aiibs, granftcidjg unb 3tali«n§ ju untcrbrcitcn. 3" biefcm 

S3orfd)lag b/ibcn mit crtUirt, voir fonnten una, fo fehr nur fciuc 'Jctibenj billigten, 

A. nn cincr berartigen fionfctciij nid)t bctciligcn, ba mir Cjtcrreicb in fcinct Sluseinanber* 

$/' fcjjung mit ©crbicn nidjt oor cin curopai|\lfe3 ©cricbt jitictcn fonnten. 

gtanfteidj bat bein iiorfd)lag ©it Gbmarb Steps jugeftimmt, ct ift jebod) 
fd)licf}lid) baran gefdjeitert, baft Dftettcid) fid) it/m gegenub'cr, loie Porausjufctjen, afa 
icbncnb uerbiclt. 

©etrcu unfcrcin ©runbfafe, bajj cine 33cmiirtclungsattiou fid) nidit nuf ben (ebig-' 

lid) cine oftetteidjifeb/ungatifdje Slngcfegenljcit batftcllenben ofletteicbifdj-fetbifdjen Son- 

flitt, foubciu nut auf bas 53ett;dltui8 ^mifdicu Oftetreid)-!Ingatn unb SRujjlanb bejicben 

foniite, ()abcu loir unfere 93emul)iingen fottgefegt, eineSBetftdnbigung ,ioifcbcn bicfen bciben 

SWdrfjten bcibctiiifiibrcn. Sir baku una abet aucb 6ereitgefiinben, mid) Jlblebnung 

bcr Sonfeteiijibee cincn locitcrcii Sotfdjlag ©it Sbroatb ©reus mid) JtUcu 311 uber^ 

mittdn, inbem cr antegt, Oftetteidj^Ungatn inoditc pdj eutfdjliejjcn, entmeber bic ferbifdje 

s «j. Slntwott abi geuiigenb ju bettadjtcn obct abet al^ ©tunbiage fut roeitere Btfptea^ungen. 

t^p^ t)ic Cftcrrcid)ifcb'ungarifd;c Stegictung bat unter roller 5Biitbigung uufcrcr »etmitte(nben 

N «, 'Jatigtcit ju bicfem S3otfcb,(ag bemctft, boji er nad) Gioffnuiig bcr geinbfcligfcitcn 

•0X ju (pat Eomme 

'JroUbcm baben loir unfete SletmittelungSBetfucbe bis }uiti Suficrftcn fortgefc^t 
unb babcu in 'ffiicn gcratcn, jebes mit bcr ffiiirbe bcr ^louardiic Beteinbate Snt- 
gegcutommen 311 jcigen. Pcibet fmb aHe bicfe 'Bctmittetuiigsaftioiien Don ben taiLi- 



_ 7 — 

tdrifdjcn Sorbeteitungcii 9iujj(aub§ unb grnnfrcidiS ubtitjoU roorbcn. Sim 29. 3"1 
tjat bie Siuffifdic JUcgierung in Scrlin amtlidj uiitgcteitt, bap fie lucr SlrmcebeiitEe 
mobilificrt f)abc. ©leidijcitig trafcn recitcrc 'Sletbuugen fiber fd)itcd fortfdjrcitcube 
mi[itdrifa)e Sorbcrcitnngen ^rantm^S ju ffiaffcr unb 311 ftinbc cin. fin bcmfclbcn 3&ge 
Ejattc bet ftaifcrlid)c SJotfdjaftet in ^eterSbutg elne Untcrrcbuug init bem ruffifrijeu 
SRiniftn bc3 JluSindrtigcn, fiber bic cr teiegrap()ifd) bai golgcnbe bericfjtetc: 

»<Det SlJinifict Bcrfmbtc mid) ju iiberteben, bap id) bci mciuer 9?egicrung bie 
Jeitnafjme an eiuer Ronoctfatioii }U oiercn bcfiiriuortcn [oiltc, urn TOittet au3- 
finbig ju mad)cn, auf frcunbfdjiiftlidjcm "ffiege f>(letrcid)'Ungani ju bctucgen, bie- 
jenigen gorbcrungen aufjugeben, bie bie SouBcrdnitrit ©erbieng antaftcu. 3d) l) a & e j 
inbem id) iebiglid) bie ffiiebergabe bet llntettebung jufagtc, mid) auf ben ©tanb- 
punft gefleilt, bap mir, nad)bem Si'uplnnb fid) ju bem Der()angnigDoUen ©djrittc bet 
SJlobitmadjung cntfdjloffeu [)abe, jebet ©ebanfenaufitaufd) Ijieruber fer)t fd)roierig, fecnu 
nid)t unmSgfidp etfdjeinc. SaS SKuptanb jejjt Don unsi 6(lervcid)'Ungavn gcgciiiiber 
Bertange, fci bagfeibe, was CfterreidyUngarn ©erbicn gegeniiber Dorgctuorfcn luerbe: einen 
Giugriff in ©ouBcrdnitdt3rcd)tc, Ofterrcicb/Ungatn fjabe Bcrfprod)en, burd) Grddrung 

.fcinca territoriaicn ^cgintcrcfjcments SRueffidjt auf ruffifebe 3nt«effen ju netjmen, eiit 
gropcS Sugefidubnis fcitensi cincg friegfiifjrenben ©laatea. 9)tan folltc be^^alB bic 
"Doppefmonardjic itjrc 2lngc(egcnr)cit mit ©ev6ien attein regcln (affen. G3 roerbe 
bcim griebensfdjiup immct nod) 3eit (cin, auf ©djonung bcr ferbifdjen SouBerdnitdt 
juriidjufommen. 

©eljr ernft b,abe id) fjinjugcfiigt, bap augenbiicflirf) bie ganjc aufttoferbifdje 

-2lugc(cgenf)cit bet ©cfaijr ciner eurnpdifdjen Ronflagratitm gegeniiber in ben i&inter- 
grunb trete, unb fjabe mir atte SJciilje gegeben, bem SJiinijler bie ©rope biefcr ©cfaljr 

Dot Slugcn ju fiiljren. 

Gs loar nidjt moglid), ©afonoro Don bem ©ebanfen abjubringen, bag ©er&icn 
Bon SJuplanb je^t nid)t im ©tid) gclaffen raerben burfe«. 

GbenfaHs am 29. beridjtete bcr Sliiitdrattacbe in Petersburg tetegrapljifdj. 
iiber cine Untcrrcbung mit bem ©cncralftabscbcf bet ruffifd)eu 3lrmce: 

• 'tier ®enera((lab8d)cf Ejat mid) ju fid) bitten [affen unb mir etoffnet, bap et 
■Bon ©einer Siajcftdt foeben fomme. Gr fci com fi'rieggminifter bcauftragt (Botben, 
mir uod)mat§ ju beftatigen, eg fei attc3 fo gebticben, ioie es mir Bor jnjct Sagen 
ber OTinifter mitgctcilt [)abc. Gr bot mir fdjriftlidic Sefidtigung an unb gab mit 
fein Gijrenlrort in feicrlidjftcr 3 orm i Da 6 nirgenbs cine SDlobitmadjung, b. f). Sin' 
jietiung tined eiiijigcn 2)}anne8 ober ?Pfcrbc3 bii jur ©tunbe, 'A Ul)r nad)> 
mittagg, erfolgt fci. Gr tonne fid) bafiir fur bie gufunft nidjt Dcrburgen, abcr 
root)! nad)briidlid)ft bc|tiitigen, bap in ben ^ronten, bic auf unfere ©renjen ge- 
ridjtet feinen, Bon ©ciner 95Jaje|tat fcine iDcobiUjterung genjiinfd)t roiirbe. Gj 
finb abcr tjier iiber erfolgte Gitijiel)ting oon SJcferoiften in perfd)icbentn ieilen 
be8 iRcid)3, aud) in fflarfdjau unb in SBilna, Bielfacbc 9Jad)rid)ten eingegangen. 3^ 
Ijabe bc§t)alb bem ©eneral oorgc^atten, bap id) burd) bie mit Bon ifrni gemadjten, 
Groffnungen cor cin Stdtfci gejtcilt fei. 3luf DffijicrSparole erttiberte .cr mit jcbod). 
bap foidje 5cad)rid)ten unrid)tig feiettj e* moge ^ie unb ba aHenfatU cin falfdjet 
SHatm ootliegen. 



_ s _ 






3dj mujj bag ©efBtddj in 'Jlnbetradjt bet pofiticen, jafjlteidjeh, fiber ctfolgt» 
(Sinjief)uiigeil Dorliegenben 91ud)riditcn als eincn SBerfudj bctradjtcn, un3 fiber ben 
Umfang bet bisljerigcn 93}ajjuaf)men iitejufiitjrcn • 

ra bic jRufpfdje SRegievung auf bie terfdjiebenen SInfragen fiber bic ©runbe 
iljtcr brplicnbcn Saltung bc8 bfteren bnrauf (unities, baft 6ftraeie6/Ungarn nod) fcinc 
Konterfation in ^Petersburg begonnen t)abe, cr[)iclt bet ofterreidpifdj-ungartfdje 25otfd)qfter 
in speterSBntg am 29. juli auf unfete Sluregung bic SBetfung, mit Vicrrn ©affonoio 
bic Sonuerfntion ju beginnen ©raf ©japan; iff ermddjtigt rootben, bic burdj ben 
Seginn bes firiegSjujtanbtS aderbingS iiLu-iEjoftc SJott an ©ctbicn bcin tuffifdjen 
SJrintjlet gegeiifiber ju ertdutern unb jebe Jlnrcgung entgegenjunetymen, bic ton 
ruffifdjei gcitc au3 nod) roeitcr crfolgeu f elite, fotoie mit ©affonoro nttc bitctt bie 
, ojlcrtcicbidj'tujfifdien Sejieljungen tangierenben gragen jii befprcdjen. 

©d)u(tcr an ©adulter mit Englanb r)abcn wir uuausgcfcijt an bet 33ermitte- 
tungSaftion fottgearbcitet unb jcbcn Borfdjlag in ®icn unterftujjt, ton bem wir bie 
3Jtoglid)teit cinec frieblidjen t'bfuug bes .ftonflifts cvf)cffen ju fbiiuen glaubtcn. 
SBir Ijaben nod) am 30. cineii englifd)en Sotfdjfag nadj ICicti roeitergegeben, bet 
als Sap bet 3Setf)anblungen aufftettte, Oflcireid)-llngatn folic uad) crfolgtem @in- 
matfd) in ©erbien bott (cine Sebingungen bittictcn. SBit mufjten annetnnen, bafj 
9!u[jlanb bicfc 3?aji3 afjepticten rourbe. 

ffidljteub in bet 3cit torn 29. b\i 31.3"'! biefe unfete Semutjungen urn 
55crniittclung, Bon bet cnglifdicii Diplomatic untcrfrujit, mit fteigenbet SringlidjEeit 
fortgeffiE)rt wutben, Eamen immci ctneute unb fid) tjattfenbe SJlelbungen iiber ruffifdje 
MobilifierungSmafjnafjmen. ituppcnanfammlungcn an bet oftpteufufdien ©tciijc, bie 
Stofjdngung bes KriegSjujranbeS fiber fdmtlidje roid)tige'n <pid£c bet ruffifdjen SSBcfi- 
grenje iiefsen fcinen Ju'ciicl ir.eiu' baran, bafj bic tufjifebe 9J?obilifieruiig and) gegen 
una in tollcm ©ange roar, rodfjrenb gleiebjeitig unfetem SSertrctct in SpeterSButg 
adc bcrartigen SDlajjregeln erneut et)tenitbttlidi abgeleugnct tourben. 9Jod) clic 
bie SCicner Slntwort auf ben (ejjten cnglifcb beutfdjen innmittelmigsoorfdilag, beffeu 
Scnbcnj unb ©runblage in Petersburg befannt gewefen fein mufjte,. in Berlin 
eintrefftn ronntc, otbuctc SRujjfonb bie adgemeine SDlobitmadjung an. 3" *> cn o' c 'Acn 
Sagcn fanb jroifdjen ©eiuct SRajejtdt bem Scaifer unb Svbnig unb bem 3 aven 
DtifofauS cin 'Jelegranimmcdifcl fiatr, in bem ©eine SSajejidt ben %axtn auf ben 
broiifnbcn ^[)araftet bet ruffifdien SJJobilmadjung unb bie gottbaucr fciuet cigencu 
tetmittclubcn Satigfeit aufmcilfam madjte. 

Jim 31. 3 ul ' tid)tetc bet 3 av an ©tine SKajefifit ben .ftaifct folgcnbe* 
Setcgramm: 

•>3d) banfc Dir ton fierjen fiit Tciuc Bermittlung, bie cine Soffnung aufleucbttn 
lafjt, ba(j bod) nod) adeS ftieblidi enben tbnnte. ISs ift tcdjnijd) unmbglid), unfere 
militdtifd)cn SJorbereitungen ciuiuflcllcn, bic bind) 6(lerreid)8 9Sobilifictung notitcnbig 
gemotben fuib. 5Bit fi n b itcit baton cntfetnt, eincn ftrieg ju wunfeben. .©olange 
roie bie 'Cctbanblungcn mit Oftctrcid) iibct ©ctbicn anbauern, tterben meine Sruppen 
fcinc Ejetauefotbcrnbe Jlttion uutcincf)mcu. ~}d) gebe ?it mcin feictlidie? 'Bott batauf. 
3d) tcrttaue mit allet Sraft auf ©otte§ ©nabe unb boffc auf ben ISrfolg Deinet 
SCetmittlung in Sicu fiit bic ©oljlfaljtt unfetct Canber unb ben grieben SutopaS. 

©ein Vix b,n$[\d) etgebener 
91ico(au3.« 



— 9 — 

9ftit biefcm Sctegtamm bti ^am\ frcujtc fid) folgenbcS cbenfa(I>3 qui 31. 3»i' 
urn 2 lll)t p. m. abgtfanbteS Sctegramm Seiner SJJnjejlat id SaiftvS: 

»3luf 'rcincn Sipped an ^tcinc greunbfdjaft unb ©einc v 8ittc urn Mciuc ©life 
babe icb, cine SSermittctungSaftion jtBifcfjcn ©cinct unb bcr 6jlcrrcid)ifd)-l.lngarifd)Oi 
SRegwnmg aufgenommen. SBatjrenb bicfe Slfticu im fflaugc war, fiub IVinc Snippet! 
gegen ba3 mil Bcrbunbete Oflcvvcid) Uugatn mobilipcrt Worben, njobnvd), \vk 3d) T>ir 
fdjon mitgeteiit Ijabe, SJlcinc SSermittclung beinalje illuforifd) gemad)t loorben iff. 
Srojibem babe 3* fie fovrgefefct. Olunmeljr crfyalte 3 r 6 jitBerlnffige Jiadjvidjten fiber 
ernfle RriegSBotBereitungcn audi an S&einet Dfltidjeii ©renje. Vic SSerantroortimg 
fur bic ©idicrljcit SJJeiueS SReidjeS jtmngt OTid) ju befenfiocn ©cgenmafjregeln. 3d) 
bin mil 3Rcineii Semtifjungen mn bic Erfjattung beS SJeltfriebenS bis an bic aufjerfie 
©renje bc3 mbg(id)cn gegangen 9Udjt 3d) trage bic SerauttBortung fiiv ba3 Unljcif, 
bag je|t bcr ganjen jiBilijierten Sclt broljt. 9}od) in biefcm Slugcn&litfc licgt e3 in 
Deincr §anb, cs abjuroenben. Sliemanb bebrob,t bic Gbre unb SJtadjt SliitfdanbG, 
ba3 root)! auf ben Sifolg SJleinet S3ermitteiung biittc marten fonueu. ©ie "Mir 
Don SDleinem ©rojjBater auf bent Sotcnbctte uberfommene ftreunbfd)aft fur Did) 
unb ©ein iReid) ifl 2>lir immer tyeitig gewefen, unb 3^) f) abe frcu J" JRujjtanb 
geftanben, menu e3 in fdjrocrcr 8cbrangni§ rrar, befonberti in fciucm ichten 
Sriege. ©et, griebe GurcpaS fann Don ©ir nod) jejjt crl)itltcn roerben, loenn !Hufj- 
(anb fid) entfdjttejjt, bic militdrifdjen SDlajjnaljmen einjiificHcn, bic Deutfd)(anb unb 
Ofierrcidj'Ungarn bebrot)cn. « 

91od) cbc bic« Mcgramm fcine S3eftimmung crrcidjte, teat bic BereitS am 53or- 
mittag bcSfelben SagcS angcorbnetc, offenfidjtlich gegen un3 geriditete, SRobitipcmng 
ber gefamten tufjifdicn Strcitfrdftc in rollcm ©angc. ©a$ Sclcgramm beS 3 llren 
abcr trar uin 2 Ubr nadjmittagS aufgegeben. 

9tad) Sefanntteetben bcr rufjifdtcu ©cfamtmobilifation in Scrlin erljiclt am ^ 
9lad)intttag besj 31. 3 11 " ^ ct Saiferlidje SSotfcBafter in ^3ttcr8biivg ben Sefcljl, bcr x 
SRufftfdjtn Siegierung 311 eroffnen, Beutfdjtanb l)abc alS ©cgcnmnBt'cgci gegen bic ad- 
gemcinc SJlobitifietung bcr ruffifdicn ?lrmee unb giottc ben Hrieggjujiaiib berhinbet, 
bem bic SRobilifation folgen miiffc, irenn SRufjtaub nicbt binncn 12 'Stunbcn fcinc 
militdrifdjen ?)uipiiat)ineu gegen ©eutfdjtanb unb C'jicri'cidj-lliigarn cinficlle unb Peutfd)- 
lanb bacon in SenntniS fchc. 

®(cid)jcitig trurbc bcr 5raifcrlid)e S^ptfdjaftcr in ?Pari8 angewiefcii, con bcr 
granjbfifcbcn iKcgicrung binncn 18 Stunbcn cine Grfldruug }u Bcrlangcn, ob fte in ^ft, 
einem ruffifd) bcutfd)cn Stricgc neutral biciben tnoQc. 

©ic SRufjifdje Siegicrung [;at burcb iijrc bic ©id)cv[)cit bct< 9Jcid)8 gcfdljrbenbc 
9Ro6i(ntad)itng bic miibfamc S3etmttte(ung8arbeit ber curopdifdien StaatStanjlcicn furj 
Bor bem Grfoigc jcrfd)(agen. "Die 2J!obilifierungSniaf;rcgcIn, iiber bercu Grnft bcr 
9iuffifd)cn Sicgicrung son Slnfang an fcine 3 l0C 'f E ' gelajfcn nourben, in fficrbinbung 
ttiit ifjrcr fortgefejttcn vH'tciignung jcigen flar, bafj SRuJIanb ben S«ieg hjolite. 

©et S^aifcrlidjc Sotfdjaftex in Petersburg i)at bic i[)m aufgetragene Slittciiung 
an 5Evrn Safonom am 31. 3 11 '' um 12 Ub^r nad)t3 gemadjt. 

Giuc Slntivort ber iKuffifdien Kcgicruug (jierauf t)at un* nic crrcidjt. 

2 Stunbcn uad) Jlbtflttf bcr in bicfer SDlittcilung gcftcdtcn ^riil t)at ber 3?t 
an <2einc 2J}ajeftdt ben Saifer tclegrapljiert: 

3 



— 10 — 

• 3d) §a&e 'Mil Jelcgtamm etfyaltcn, id> uctficljc, baft ©u gejroungcn bift, 
mobil ju marf)cn, abet id) mbcbtc ton ©it bicfclbe ©atantie l)aben, bie id) ©it ge- 
geben fjnbe, ndtitlicf), bap bicfc ?)taftuabmcn nid)t Krieg bcbcutcn unb bafj luit fovt- 
fasten rociben, ju ocrfjnnbeln, jum yScik unferet bcibcn i'anbct unb bea attgemeinen 
jltiebcna, bcr iinfercn §crjen fo tcucr tjl. Unferet langbcroaljrtcu greunbfdjafi muft 
ea mit ©ottee yilfc gclingeii, Stutoergiejjen ju r>crl)inbcrn. ©ringcnb cuoarie id) 
' poll SJerttauen ©eine Slntroort - 

vucrauf t)at Seine SJlajeflat bcr ffaifer geantroortet: 

-3d) banfc ©it fur 3>iit 'Selegtamin, id) l)abe ©einct SHegierung geftetn 
ben SBeg angegeben, burdi ben allein nod) bcr Sricg rcrmieben rocrben fann. 06- 
rooljl id) um cine Slntroott flit beute mittag crfudjt f)atte, bat midi bis jejjt nod) fein 
2clegramm SReinea 33otfd)nfters mit einec Jlntroort ©einct iRcgictung erteid)t. 3d) 
bin babct gejiuungeii icorben, meine Slrmee ju mobilifierem Gtne fofortige flare unb 
unmijjBetftanblidje Slntroott Ccincr Ilicgicrung ijl bet cinjige 5Bcg, um enblofca Slcnb 
ju Dermeibcn. His id) bieje Slntwort crbaltcn babe, bin id) ju meiiiet Sjettubnia nidjt 
in bet Cage, nuf ben ©egenftanb ©einca SetegrammB einjugeljen. 3d) mu ft au f ba& 
ernflefte oon ©ir ccrlangen, baft ©u unDerjugiidj ©ciuen Jtuppen ben syefctjt gibft, 
untct fcincn Umftdnbcn aud) nut bie leifeftc Serlcjjuug unferet ©tenjen ju begel)en..i 

©a bie SKujjlanb geftellte gtift Dctfttidien mat, ob)ne baft tine Slntroort 
auf unfete Jlnfrage cingegangen mare, f)at Seine SSlajeftdt bet Saifet unb Sonig 
am 1. Stuguft um 5 Ubr p. m. bie 5Ttobilmadning bea gefamteu beutfd)en Seerea 
unb bet fiaiferlidjen 3Jtarine befol)len. ©et Saifetlid)e 53otfd)aftcr in *Petetsbutg 
[)atte injroifeben ben Sluftrag erlialten, faQ8 bie Stuffifdje SRegicrung innetb)alb ker 
. il)t geftellten jjrifl feinc beftiebigenbe Slntroort ertcilen rourbe, ifjt ju erflarcn, baft 
Wit nad) Jlblebnung unfetet ,lorb<rung una ala im finegajuflanb befinblid) betracbtcn. 
@t)c jebod) cine SJtelbung iiber bic Jluafiibrung biefea Jluftragea cinlicf, iibetfdjtittcn 
ruffifd)e Jruppcn, unb jroar fd)on am Dtadjmittag be8 l.Sluguft, atfo bcafelben 9Jad)> 
mittage, an bem ba« cben ctnjiibnte Jclegtamm bea 3 are n abgefanbt Irat, unfete 
©tenje unb tudten auf beiitfdicm ©cbict Dot. 

JSiermit bat SKuftlanb ben ictieg gegen una begonuen. 

3njlt>ifd)cn t»atte bet fiaifetlidje 5?otfd)aftet in *Patia bie ifim befoljlcne 21n- 
ftagc an baa ftanjofifrfje fiabinctt am 31. 3 U I> um 7 Ufjt nadjmittaga gcflcHt. 

©et ftanjofifdjc OTinifietptafibent ^at batauf am 1. Sluguft um 1 U^t nadj- 
mittaga einc jiroibeutige unb uubefticbigenbe Slntroott etteilt, bic ubct bie @teDung< 
nabme 3 vi,n f rc id)a fein flatea SMtb gibt, ba et fid) batauf befdjvanfte, ju etftaten, 
gtanfteid) routbe baa tun, roaa feine 3 nf t rf ff cn t^m. geboten., ®enigc ©tunben 
batauf, um 5 Utjt nadjmittaga, routbe bie Sftobilijietung bet gefamtcn ftaiijbfifdjen 
Sltmec unb glotte angeotbnet. 

Sim OTotgcn bea nad)jlen 'Jagea etoffnete gtanheid) bie geinbfeUgfeitett.', 

Slbgefd)loffen am 2. Slugufl mittags. 



— 11 _ 



HorWeutfcbe H\l$emeine 3dtung. 

25. 3uli 1914. 

t)tc Hotc Ofterrci&'Ungame cm SerbUn. 

33erlin, beu 24. 3uli. 

<Der oftcrreic^ifc£)-uiigaiifcf>c ©efanbtc in Selgrab ubetreicfjfe gefJttn abenb 
6 Ut;r ber ferbiftf)cn SRegierung eine 5Jerbalnote mit ben gorberungen bet 
oflerreicijif^'tingnrifctien iRcgierung. • jn ber Diotc mitb bie Slnttuort BiS 
©onnabcnb, ben 25. 3 u( >/ *> Ufjr abenbg, Bcrlangt. — ©ie i)at folgenben 
SBotttaut: 

Sim 31. SRdrj 1909 bat bev ftontglicb ©erbifebe ©efanbte am Wiener gofe 
im Stufttage feinct SRegierung bet ftaifcvlicfycii unb ftoniglirfjen iRcgierung folgeube 
Grfldrung abgegeben: »©erbien ancrfennt, bafs eg buret; bie in S3o8nicn gefdjaffene 
Jatfarfje in feinen iRccfjten nicbt beriit)rt rourbe, unb bajj c8 jitf) bemgemdf) ben Gnt' 
fdjliefjungen anpaffen ttnrb, roclcfyc bie 5Jcdcf/te in bejug auf Slrtifel 25 beg SSerlinet 
33ertragg treffen rcerben. 3 n ^ em ©tvbicn ben SKatfdjldgen ber ©rofjmdcbte golge 
leiftct, vcrBfttcbtct eg fief), bie ftaltung beg 'Protefteg unb beg Sffiiberftanbeg, bie eg 
rjinftrbtlicti ber Slnnejton feit Bergangenem Dftobcr eingenommen t)at, aufjugeben, unb 
Bcrbflict;tct fief; fcrner, bie SRicfitung feiner gegeulodrtigen s Dolitif gegeniiber Oftcrrcicb- 
Ungurn ju anbern unb funftigljin mit biefem leftcrcn auf bem ^ufte freunbnacf)bat< 
lict/er S3ejiel)ungen ju leben. 

Die ©cfcfjirbte ber le|ten 3 a ^ re nun > u "b iugbefonbere ber frbmerjlicljcn 
Ereignijfe beg 28. 3 un '/ t)a6en bag t!orf)anbcn[ein eiucr fuboerfiBen 33eroegung in 
©erbicn einriefen, beren 3W $ if 1 / Mn &*t o fretrcicr)tf cf) ■ uitgattf cben OTonarcijic ge- 
roiffe J.eile iijxei ©ebietg logjutretmen. Diefe Scrocgung, bie unter ben Wugen ber 
fcrbifdjen SRegicrung cntftanb, b,at in ber golge jenfeitg beg ©ebietg beg Kbnigreidjg 
buret) ?lfte beg 3;ctrorismu8, buret; cine 9ieit;e Ben Slttcntaten unb buret; 9Rorbe 
Jlugbrucf gefunben. 

SEeit cutfernt, bie in ber Srfldrung Bom. 31. SStdtj 1909 entljaltenen formcllen 
3Jercflia)tuiigei\ ju crfullcn, t)at bie ttbniglicf; ©etBifet)e SRegicrung nicf)tg getan, um 
biefe Seroegung ju unterbrucfen. ©ic bulbete bag Bcr6rect;crifcr;e Jreiben ber Ber- 
fdjiebenen gegen bie SBionarcfjic gerid)teten s Bcreine unb Sereinigungen, bie jiigtllofe 
©Bradjc ber ?ref[c, bie 'Berljerrlicbung ber Urt)eber Bon Jlttentaten, bie Jeilnafjme 
Bon Offijieren unb Seamtcn an fuboerfmen Umrrieben, fte bulbete eine ungefunbe 
"ProBaganba im bffcntlicfyen Unterridjt unb bulbete fctjlieflicf; aHe SRanifefktionen, 
roe(cf;e bie ferbiftt)e SeBolterung jum ©ajje gegen bie SDlonardjie unb jut Setadjtung 
itjrer @inriet)tungcn Bcrleiten tonnten. 

<Diefe Dulbung, ber jict; bie Soniglict; ©erbifd)e iRegictung ftfiulbig mat^te, 
t)at nott; in jenem OTomcnt angebauert, in bem bie Steigniffe beg 28. 3 un > bet 
ganjen Sclt bie grauenb;aften golgen foldjet ©ulbung jeigten. 



Gs* erbtlit ous ben SluSfagen unb ©ejlcmbniffen btr Btrbrcefitrifebcn Urljebtr 
bc3 SlttentatS Bom 2S. 3uni, bajs ber SSlotb Bon tScrajcluo in SMgrab austgtbtcft 
itrnrbt, biif, bit SWorbet bit ffiaffen unb Somben, mit benen fit ausgtftattet rcaren, 
Bon ferbifdjen Offijiereu unb Scamtcn crbitltcn, bit btr SRarobna Obbrana ongt' 
tjbrtcn, unb bafi fd)liejj[itf) bie SBefbrbeiung btu iierbrcdjer unb btttn SBafjen nnrf) 
83o8iiien Bon (citenben fovbifdjen ©tenjDrganen Bcranftalttt unb bura)gefut)rt nnirbe. 

■Jit angeffitjtten gvgebniffe ber Uiilcrfudjung gtftattcn cS bev t. unb f SRc- 
gietung uicbt, nod) [anger bie &altung juiBartenbcr Cangmut ju bcobaebtcn, bie fie 
tin"* \ibre jenen Jtcibereieii gegeniibet eingenommen t)atte, bit ibren SJiittelpunft 
in SMgrab Ijnbcn unb Bon ba auf bit ©efciete bet SDJonardjie ubertragen lotrbtn. 
©iefe Grgebniffc (egen ber f. unb f. SRegierung Bieluicbr bit Spfiidjt auf, llmtriebcn 
tin Gnbe ju bcrcitcn, bit cine bcftaiibige S3ebroI)ung fur bie SRulje ber OTonarefjie bilben. 

Urn biefen ^lofif 511 erreidjen, ficfjt fief) bie E. unb f. SRegierung gejtoungen, 
Bon ber ferbifdjen SRegierung cine offijiette Strfidjtrung ju Bcrlangen, bnf) 
fie bie gegen Ofierrcid) Utigarn gcricbtett Sptopaganba Btrurtcitt, ba8 
t)cif;t bie ©efamrljeit btr SBeftrcbungcn, bcren Gnbjicl a ift, Bon ber SBionardiie 
©ebictc [oSjufofeii, bie ibr augehbicu, unb baf; fie fid) BcrBf lidjttt, biefc Ber- 
brerf)erifd)c unb terroriftifd)t *proBagauba mit nllcn SJlitteln ju unter> 
briiden. 

Urn bitfeu 33erpf[id)tungcn cinen feicr(id)en Stjarafter ju geben, mirb bie 
fioniglid) Scrbifdjc SRegierung auf ber crficn eeite ibrts offtjitHtu Organs Bom 
26./13. 3u(' nadjfotgenbe ErMarung Btvbffentlidicn : 

-Tie S?6niglid) ©erbifctje SRegierung oerurtcitt bit gegen Oflerretcb/Mngarn 
gerictjtete SPropaganba, bafj bcif;t bie ©efamttjei't jencv 33e|tre6ungen, bercn 3't' '* 
ifi, Bon btr 6fierrcid)ifd) ungarifcb)en SJeonardiic ©ebiete (oSjutrennen, bit if»r angt> 
(ibven, unb fit btbautvt aufridjiigfl bit graucnljaftcn gotgen bitftr oerbtedjertfdjen 
Sanblungen, 

i ric fioniglid) Serbifdje SRegierung bebauett, bafj fcrbifdit Cffijitrc unb Statute 
an ber oorgenaunten Spropaganba teilgcnommcn unb baimt bit fvcunbnadjbarlieben 
SSejieljungcn gefa^tbet Oaten, bit 311 pflegcn fub bie ftbniglidje SRegierung burd) iljre 
Erffarung Bom 31. SKarj 1909 feicrliebft Berpflid)tet t)atte 

Tic Sibniglidje SRegierung, bie jeben ©ebanfen obcr \c^m 33erfudj eintr Gin' 
mifdjung in bit Wcfebid'c btr SStinoIjntv ion;! imintr eiut'5 icilej &jterreid) UngaraS 
ini|6illigt unb juriicEtBcifr, eradjtet ti fur it)re Spftidjt, bit Ofpjtere unb Seamten 
unb bie gefamtc SeBblferung bc8 fionigreid)3 gunj auSbrucflidj aufmerffam ju 
madjeu, baf, fie funftig^in mit fiu^erftet ©ttenge gegen jene *ptrfontu oorgctjen 
wirb, bit fid) berartiger ©anblungen fdmlbig matficn fodtcii, fianblungcn, btntn 
Dorjubeugcn unb bit ju untcrbrudtn fie altc Slnftrcngungtu nuidicn mitb.« 

Biefe GrfKrung roitb gteidjjeitig jut Svtnntnia ber Roniglidjen ?lrmee bind) 
eintn iageSbcftf)! ©einct OTajtftdt be8 SonigS gtbraebt unb in bem offijicden Organ 
ber 5lrmet Berbifeiitlidit mtrben. 

Tie Roniglidj Serbifdje SRegierung Berpflidjtet fid) iibtrbitS, 

1. jebe ^Publication 311 uutctbriidtu, bit 311111 yaft unb jut SSeradjtung ber 
3)Ionard)ie aufreijt unb bertn aOgemcine Senbtnj gegen bie tervitoriale 3nttgritdt 
btr [tbteren gtridjttt ift, 



— 13 — 

2. fofort mit facv Jluffofnug bcs SSereinS »9cnrobnn Obbrmin. l)orjiijc[)cn ; bcffcn 
gefamtc Spropagonbamittel ju fonfiijjicren unb in bcrfctbcn Sfficifc gcgen bic nnbcrcii 
33ereinc unb Scrcinigungen in ©erbien eiiljufrijreitcn, bic fid) mit bov 'Propngnnbn, 
gcgen Cjlcrvoirb llnjiirn befdjaftigen Tic Kbniglitbc Wcgicrung loirb bit nbtigcn 
SJlafiregeln tveffen , bnmit bic aufgcloftcn SScrcine nidjt etloa iljre Satigfeit nntcv 
onbcrem Stamen ober in anberev gorin fortfejjen, 

3. ol)nc Scrjug nuS bcm offcntl ichcn Untciridit in ©erbien, fovoo[)[ lonl beu 
Bet)rtdrper alii and) bie 5?et)rmittc[ betrifft, allcs ju befeitigen, mass baju bicnt obcr 
bicncn fonnte, bie *Propagauba gcgen Ofierreicb/Ungarn ju itaQren, 

4. auS bcm Siilitarbienft unb bev Bcvloaltung im aUgemciucu afle Offijicre 
unb Seamte 311 entferncu, bic bcr fSropaganbn gcgen Oftcrrcid) Ungarn fdjulbig finb, 
unb bcrcn 9(amcn nntcv SJlitlciluug bes gcgen fie uorlicgcubcn J91ateri<il§ bet ftbnig- 
lid)cn Sicgierung befanntjugeben, fid} bic f. unb t. SRegicrung Dorbetjalt, 

5. einjuroiHigcn, bnjj in ©erbien Organc bet f. unb I'. SHcgiermtg, bci ber 
llntcrbrficfung bcr gcgen bic tcrritovinlc ^ntcgrittit bet SDconarcljie gevidjtctcn fub« 
ferfiueu Setocgung mitioirfen, 

6. eine gcridjtlidie llntcrfud)uug gcgen jene Jcifncbincr beg fiomplottg bont 
28. ^unt cinjutcitcn, bic (id) auf fcrbifdtcm Scrritorium befinben. 

Son bet t. u f. Stegierung rjicrju beicgievtc Orgnue werbcu an beu bejiig- 
lidjen Grfjebungcn tcilncbmcn, 

7. mit ntlet 8efd)[eunigung bic Serljaftung bcS ?)<ajor3 33ojn Slantfofic unb 
eincS geroifjen SRilan Eiganocic, ferbifdjen StaabJbcauiteu, Ootjuneljmm, locldjc burd) 
bie Grgebitiffc bet Llntcvfud)ung fompromittiert finb, 

8. butet) tttitffcuuc SKafjnaljmen bic '2cilnal)mc ber ferbifcf)cn S3er)orben on bein 
Ginfdirnuggclu Bon ffiaffen unb Gipiofiofbipcrn fiber bic ©vcuje 311 I'crbiubern, 

jene Organc bcS ©rcnjbicnftcS »on Sdjabal; unb Cojuica, bie ben ltvl)ebcui 
beS 33crbrcd)cn3 0011 ©crajemo bci bem Ubcrtritt iiber bic ©renje bel)il|lid) toaren, 
auS bcm 'Tienfic ju cntlaffen unb fircnge 311 beftrafen, 

9. ber f. u. f. fficgicrung JUijtliirungcii 311 gcben iibct bie uid)t ju red)t» 
(fettigenben Sufjerungen Ijober fetbifdjer gunftiondte in ©erbien unb bcm SluStanbe, 
bie ifjrct ofpjictlen ©tettung ungcad)tct nid)t gcj&gert baben, fid) nod) bcm Slttentat 
»om 28. 3" 1 " t" 3 u ' ct,, ' c ">8 '" feinblid)er 5Beife gegcu Oftcrteid) Ungarn ausjufprccben, 

10. bic t. u. t. 9icgicrung ob)nc SScrjug 0011 bet Dutdjfurjrung ber in ben 
oorigeu 'Puntten jufammengefajjten 3Rajjnar)rnen ju oerftdnbigen. 

"Die i. u. f Sicgierung crroartet bie Slntiooii bet ftoniglidkn SKegietmtg 
fpatcfkns bis; Sonnabenb, ben 25. b. IWtS., um 6 Uf)r nadimittaga. 

Eine Slcmoite iiber bie Ergcbnifje bcr Untcvfucbung con ©erajetto, fotoeit fie 
fid) auf bic in < ]3untt 7 unb 8 genannten gunftionare bejic[)cn, ift biefcr s llote bei- 
gcfd)[offen. 

Bcilage. £>ie bci bem ©erid)t in ©erajcioo gcgen ben ©abvilo ^3riucip unb 
©enoffen loegen beS am 28. 3uni b. 3- begangencn 3Rcud)clmotbcii bcjicbungswcifc 
recgen iKitfd)u[b b)ieran an[)angige ©trafunterfudjung l)at bisljer ju folgenbcn geft- 
fteduugen gcfiitjrt: 

1. Xcr ^(an, ben (Srs^eijog granj gerbinanb roaljrenb fciueS ?lufcnt()a[te« 
in ©crajewo 511 cvmorbcu, tontbe in Selgrab Bon ©abriio 'Princip, 9!cbeIjfo ©abvinoric, 



— 14 — 

eincm geroiffen N 5iilan GiganoBic unb "Jriffp ©rabej imtet 53eit)ilfe bc$ WajorsS 33oja 
ianttoftc au3geb,ecft. 

2. jT'ic fcd)3 Sombeii unb Bier Stoioningpiftolen, beren fid) bie Sirtjrcdjer al§ 
SBetfjeuge bcbicutcn, rourbem bcm Ptincip, ©abtinoBic unb ©raBej in SSclgrab Don 
cincm geroiffen SMati EiganoBic unb bcm SJiajot 53oja Sanffofie Betfctjafft unb iibergcbcn. 

3. Tic Sombcn fmb vuinbgranatcn, bic bem Saffenbcpot bet fcrbifdicn Jlrmee 
in firaaujeoac ciitflamnicn 

4 Urn bus ©elingeu bcS ?lttentnt§ ju fid)ern, unferroieg SJlilan ISiganoBic bca 
9ptincip, bcu ©abtinoBic unb ©rabcj in bev ©ciiibljabung bcr ©ranatcn unb gab in 
einera 'i.'atbc neben bcm ©cr/iejjfetbe Don lopfdjtbet bem ^Srincip unb ©raBej Unter- 
ridjt im Sctjicjjcit init SBroroningpiftolen. 

5. II in bcm T'riunp, ©abtinoBic unb ©rnbci ben Qbetgaiig fiber bic boSnifdj- 
[jeijegonnnifrfje ©tenje unb bic Sinfdjmuggehing ibrer SBaffen ju ermogtidjen, rourbe 
cin gnnjc3 gcbcimcc. Jran^povtfnflein butdj EiganoBic organifiert Per Gintritt bcr 
Scrbredier fnmt ilircn Waffcn nadi 58o3nien unb bcr oetjegotoiua rourbe oon ben 
©renjljauptieuten Bon Sdtiibah (!lv\ibc SPopoBic) unb Cojiiicn foroie Bon ben 3°Q' 
oraancn SRubiBoj ©tbic Bon Cojnica mit v 3cibilfc mer)teret anberer 'pcrfoncn burdv 
gcful)rt. 

Hor^cutfcbc Mlgemeine 3eitim<j. 

•>». 3nJi I»14. 

©fkiTrictvilnctani unb bic fcrbififrc Xlotc. 

Si en, 27. ;}uli. Tic 91ote bcr Sonigltdj ©erbifd)cn SRegietung oom 12./25. 3uli 
1914 [autct in bcutfdicr iibcrfckuua, tote folgt: 

Die ffbniglidje SRegietung l)<it bic SJlitteilung bcr f. unb t. fRegiening Bom 
10. b. 511 er()nUcn unb i(l u6erjeugt, baft ilvrc Slntroort jebes! SRifJBerfranbniS jerfttcucn 
roirb, ba3 bic (reunbuadUnirlicbcii SSejieljungen jroifdjen bcr 6ftcrrcirf)ifdjcn 2)(onatd)ie 
unb bem Konigteidj ©erbien ju flbren brot)t 

Die fibiiig[icr)e iRegiming i(l firb, beroufjt, bafj bcr grofien 91adibarmonard)ie 
gegcuuber bci fcincm Slntaf) jene <Proteftc ctneucrt rourben, bic fcincricit foluol)! in 
bcr ©tupfdjtina a(s aud) in Gtflarungcn unb ioaiiMungcn bcr Berantmottlidjen 2?er- 
trctcr bes ©taateS jiim ?lu3brud gebrad)t rourbcu unb bic butdj bic Grfldtuug bcr 
(erbifdjen SRegierung Bom 18. 9Jlaq 1909 i()ieu 8lbfd)(ujj gefunben tjaben, foroie 
inciter, bap fcit jener 3"t rocbet oon ben Pcrfd)icbcncn cinanber folgenben SRegierungen 
bei) RonigteidjS nod) Bon bcren Organen bcr Scrfud) iintcrnommen rourbe, ben in 
SBoSnicu unb bet ScrjegotBina gefdiafjcncu politifcben unb tedjtfidjen 3"ftanb ju anbetn. 
Die fioniglidje SRegietung flellt fcfl, bap bie f. unb f. 9tegierung in bicfer iHicbtnng 
fcincrlci BorfleOwtg erboben [jat, abgefeb^cu Bon bcm ,la[lc cinca i'cb^tbudjcS, l)i"fid)t- 
lid) bejfcii bic f. unb f. SRegietung cine BoUfotnmcn bcfricbigcnbc Jlufflarung erfialten 
tjat. ©erbien bat ir>a[)renb ber Daucr ber SJalfanfrife in ja^lteidjen fallen Scmeifc 
fur feine pajipftifrbe unb gcmdfjigtc 'Politit geliefett, unb c^ if! nut Scrbicn unb ben 
Cpferu, bic e8 au«fd)liefilid) im 3ntcrcffc beS curopaifrben ^riebenS gcbradjt b,at, ju 
banfen, rcenn bicfer gricbe crtjaltcn gcblicbcn ijl. 



— 15 — 

Dqjii bemctrt bie OftcttcicbifdjUngarifdje Segictiinjp 

■Die Sconig(id) @etbifd)e Si'egietung befefytantt fid) bavanf, fc|rjufk[Ien,_bajj fctE 
^Ibgabe bet Eiflotung »om 18. 9}}dtj 1909 ppn fcitcn bet ®ctbifd)cn SNegictiliig) 
unb U;ver Orgnnc fcin SSerfudj jut fliibevung bet Stclluug 2?o8iitc«8 uiib bet »3 el 'j c- ' 
gotpina imtcrnoinmcn murbe. 

Samit Beifdjicbf fie in bchmfit ipiilfiivlidjct Wcifc bic ©rmiMagcn unfetet 
<Dematd)C, ba (pit nid)t bie S3eb,auptuug aufgcflcQt l)abcn, bajj fie unb il)te Dvganr 
in bicfet SRidjtung offijiett itgenb cttpag mitctnommcn fatten. 

Unfct ©raBamcii gcljt picimcljt bdhin, bafj fie eg ttojj bev in bet jitiertcn. 
Slpte ubcrnommenen S3crpflidjtungcn untettajfen t)at, bic gegen bie tettitotiate 3 nte- 
gtitrit be* SKonardjie geriditcte Serocgung ju unterbriicfen. 

5^vc SJctpflitbtiing beftanb a(fp batin, bio gnnjc SRidjtung ibrct 'Politif ju 
dnbetn unb jut ofierreidjifdj ungarifdjen tOlonotcbit in cin fteunbii.-ai/batlid)cg Set- 
Jldltnig ju ttctcn, nid)t blcfs bic Sugeljptigfeit 5?o8nicng jut SWonatdjic pffijicd nidjt 
anjutafteir. 

■Die 9cete Serbieng fdtjtt bann fort: 

©ie fionigficfjc iRcgietung famt nidjt flit Sufjetungen ptifiaten (Iljaraftcrg Bet- 
antlpott(id) gemadjt (nerben, mic eg 3 c ' run 3*> art 'f e ' U1,D ^' e fricblicfie Sltbeit uon 
®efc(lfd)aftcn finb, Slufjeiungen, bic fajl in alien Cdnbem ganj gclpbfynlicfye 6t- 
fdjcrhuiigen fmb, unb bie fid) im aQgcmcincn bet ftaatlid)cn fipnttoUe cntjiet)cn.. 
Dicg urn fo ipeniget, alg bie Sbuiglidic SRegietung bci bet Cbfung einct ganjen Sieilje 
Ben 3tagcn, bie jlpifd)en <£etbicn unb Qfietteicb/Ungatn aufgctaudjt (paten, grofje^ 
Gnrgegenfpmmeu bclpiefcn hat, lpobutd) eg ibt geluugcn ifi, beten gtijftctcn "Jeil 
jugunften beg gottfdjtitts bet bciben Scadjbatlanbei ju lofen. 

Slnintrfung bet f. unb f SJcgictung: 
<Dic SBeljauptung bet Sbnig(id) Sctbifdjen SRegietung, bafj bic Sinjjerungen bet; 
HBtcffe unb bie idtigfeit uon SSereinen ptioatcn Sljaraftei Ijaben unb fid) bet ftaat- 
litbcn fiontrotte cntjieljcn, flci)t in Bolicm SBiberfprudje j« ben Einticbtungcn mobetnet 
©taatcn, fcllifl bet ftei[)ett(id)fien SRidjtung auf bem Ocbicte beg <Ptcfj- unb 5Scteing- 
Tccftt§, bag cinen pffcntlidj-rcditlidicn (Sbataftet f)cit unb 'Ptcffe fplrie SSetetne bet 
fiaat(id)cn Sluffidjt unierftellt. Ubrigeng fcljcn aud) bie fcrbifd)cn Ginrid)tungcn cine 
folcbc Jluffid)t pot. r>et gegen bie Seibifdjc SHegierung erbobene BoriDiirf gct/t cben 
baijin, biifj fie eg gcmjlid) untetlaffen l)nt, i[)te 'Pteffe unb iljre iCcteiue ju bcauf- 
fidjtigen, beten SBitfung im momucijicteinblidjen ©inue fie tanntc. 

©ie 9}pte SctbienS fat)tt fott: 
die Sbnig[id)c Sicgictung mat best)al6 butd) bic 25c()auptuugcn, bap ?lngcl)Ptige 
©etbicnS an bet Sorbereitung beg in Sctajemo sctiibtcn SlttentatS teiigenpinmcn' 
(fatten, fdjmctjlid) ubettafebt. Sic ^atte etreattet, jut 5)!itipitfung bci ben 9!acb- 
fptfajungen ubct bicfeg Sctbtccbcn eingciaben 511 loetbcn, unb war bctcit, um ib,te 
BoQtommcne Stottctttjcit buret) laten ju bcipcifen, gegen alle ^Jetfonen Botjugeb^en,: 
()infid)tlid) wcldjct it)t 5)(ittcilungcn jugcfpinmcn ipatcn. 

Slnmctfung bet f. unb f. SRegietung: 
"Dicfe S3e&auptuiig ift uiuid)tig. ®ie @etbifd)e Siegietung n?at ubet ben gegen 
ganj beflimmte s Peifonen beficbenben "Setbacbt genau untcttid)tet unb nid)t nut in 



— 16 — 

bcr Page, fonbern and) nadj Ujrcn iuterncn ©tfejjtii ncrpflid)tet ; ganj fpontan Crr- 
b,ebungcn einjuteiten. Sic tjat in bicfer SRid)tung geir ni<f)ts untetnommen 
5totc <S c r E> i c n S : 

©en SBunfdjen bet f. imb E. SRegierung entfprcdjcnb ift bic ftoniglid)e 
SRegicruug forait tacit, bem ©etidjt otjne SRud'firfjt auf ©tetlung unb SRang jcben 
fcrbifrficn iSt.iat3iiiigel)6rigen ju fibetgeben, fiir beffen Seilnarjme an bem Cscrajcrooet 
S8etbrcd)en itji Seroeife gcliefcrt wetben fotltcn. ©ic t>crpflicE>tct fid) insbefonbete 
fluf bcr crflcn ©cite beg SlmttMattS com 13/26 Juli fotgenbe tinuntiation ju 
Betbffcnriicben : ©ic Konigiid) Setbifdje SRegietung octurteilt jebe SPtopaganba, bie 
gegen 6fierteid)-llngntn getidjtet fcin folltc, b b bie ©efatntfjeit bcr Scftrcbungcn, 
bic in letter Ginie auj bic Poiireifjung einjetner ©cbictc Don bcr oflcrrcirfiifd)- 
ungatifdjen SJionatdjie abjieitn, unb (ic bebauett auftidjtig bic rrautigen gotgen 
bicfer Uerbted)erifd)en SDtadjenfdjaften 

Slnmetfung bcr f. unb f. SRegietung: 

Unfcrc gorbetung liiutctc. -Tic ffouiglid) Setbifdje SKegierung Bcnuteili ore 
gegen OftcrrcirfvUugarn gerirbtctc ^propaganba. . . « 

Tic con bcr Sonigiid) Setbifdjen SRegietung Botgenommene tfinbetung bet 
Bon im3 geforberten Etftatung roill fagen, bafj einc fotdjc gegen fifterteidj-ilngatn 
getidjtete <ptopagrmba ntd)t beficljt, obcr baji it)r eine fo[rf)e nictjt befannt ift. ©iefe 
gonnei ift unaufticfcjttg unb bintcthaltig, ba fid) bic Setbifdje SRegietung bamit fiir 
fpatcr bic Slii§flud)t tefevBiert, fie tjatte bic berjeit beftcrjenbe v Propaganba buret; bicfe 
Etflaruug nidit beSaBouicrt unb nicbt als monatdjiefeinblidj anetfannt, njotau§ (ic 
inciter abieiten ib'iinfc, bafj fie jut Untetbtucfwig cincr bcr jehigen <propaganba 
gleidjen iiicbt Betpflidjtet fci. 

9totc SetbieuiS: 

©ic Sbnigtidje SRegierung bebauett, bafj laut bcr SSRitteilung bcr f unb f. 
fficgierung geluiffe fetbifd)e Qffijiere unb gunftionate an bcr cben genonnteii %im- 
paganba mirgenritft, unb bajj bicfc bamit bic fteunbnadjbatlidjen SJejietjungen ge- 
fabrbct fatten, ju bcrcu Scobadjtung fid) bic Konigtidje SRegietung burdj bie 
Etfiatung Bom 31. SJlatj 1909 feiettidj Berpflirbtet batte. 

Tic SRegierung . . . .* glcid)Iautcnb mil bem gefotbevten Jejte. 
Slnmerfung ber f. unb f. SRegietung: 

<Die fen un8 geforbertc gotmulierung lautetc -Pie R6nigtid)e SRegietung 
bebauett, bajs fcrbifdic Cfpjierc unb gunftionate . . mitgemitft fyaben . . . « 

?lud) mit bicfet gotmuiietung unb bem roeiteven Seifaj} -laut bcr Siit- 
teitung ber t. unb f. SRcgierung • Berfotgt bic eStbifdjc SRegietung ben bctcitS oben 
augebeutctcii S^ff/ fid) f"i' bic gufunft freic iocinb ju Barren. 
SRote ©etbienS: 

©ie R6nig[id)e SRegietung ocrpfliebtct fid) wcitcr 

1. Slnldfjtid) bcS naebftcn otbnunggmafjigen Pufammcntritts ber ©tupfdjtina 
in bag SfJtefjgefeJ cine 5<eflimmung ciniufrbattcn, monad) bie Stufreijung jinn 5affe 
unb jut SBetadjtung gegen bic SBionatd)ie fotoie jebe SpuBfifation frtengflcnS beftraft 
roiirbe, bercn allgcineine 5;cnbenj gegen bie territoriatc 3 nf( '3 r < tl i' : 6fletteid)-Ungatn8 
gcrid)tct ift. 



— 17 — 

<Sie Berpffidjtet fieri, nn(ajj(idj bet bemndd)ft etfotgenben SRcoifton bet 33ct- 
faffung in ben Slrtifel XXII bes 33erf<iffimg§gefe|}e3 einen 3"f a t ( aufjiinefynen, bet 
tic ftonfigfation bcrartiger 5pu6Iifationen gejlattet, tvaS nad) ben flatcn Scfliminungcn 
be3 ?lrtife[8 XXII bet Stonjtitution betjeit unmbglid) ijl, 

?lnmerfung bet E. tmb f. JRegierung: 

Sit fatten geforbert: 

»1." 3 coe 'Publifation ;,u unterbruefen, bie 311m 5affe unb jut SBetacfetung* 
bet SDloncvcdjie aufrcijt unb bctcn Scnbenj gegen bie territoriatc 3 n f e 3 r '^' oet 
3J{onard)ie getiebtet i|t.« 

2Bit wolltcn olfo bie ffierpfliebtung ©etBienS bcrbcifufjreu, bafiit ju forgen, 
bafi bevattige 5Prejjangriff( in §tnfunft uiiteubleiben; roir roiinfefyten alfo einen be- 
flimmten Grfolg auf bicfem ©ebietc ficbergeftcu't 311 roiffen. 

®tatt bejjen bictet uni ©etbien bie Grlaffung gereiffer ©efege an, mcldje a(8 
'fflittel }U biefem Grfolge bienen fou>n, unb jWflr: 

a) Gin ©cfcfe, roomit bie ftnglief)en monaidiiefeinblieben prejjemfjetungen fub< 
jeftio befttaft roerben foden, was umi gang gleicbgiiltig ift, um fo mer)r, nl8 befanntet" 
majieu bie fubjeftioe Cerfofgung Bon Sptefbeliften aufjerfi feften mbglicft ijt, unb bei 
einet entfpiecbenb Iar.en 8et)anb[ung cities foldjen ©cfekcel Quel) bie rocnigen S>dHe 
bicfer 51 tt nirbt nir Seflrafung fommen wiirben; alfo ein 33orfd)Iag, ber unfetet 
[Jorberung in feinct 5Beife entgegenfommt, baljet una niefjt bie getingflc ©atautie fur 
bcu I'ou unS geirmufchtcn Grfolg bictet ; 

b) ein 9lae§trag3gefe|j ju Slrtifel XXII bet fionfiitution, bafi bie Koufigfation 
geftattct roilrbe — ein 53orfd)lag, bet un3 gleidjfattg. nid)t beftiebigen faun, ba bet 
SSejlanb einei* foldjen ©cfe|e§ in Serbicn umi nidjtii niift, fonbetn nut bie 3kt- 
pflid)tung bet 9?egictung, eg and) anjumenben, roa8 uns! abet nidjt oetfprocben mitb. 

©iefc 53orfd)ldge finb alfo t>oflfommen unbeftiebigenb — btcs um fo meb)t, 
al§ fie auef) in bet SKicfytung cbafm finb, baf uns uid)t gefagt mitb, innetljalb rocldjer 
^rifi biefe ©efehe erlaffen ttnirben, nub bafi im galle ber Slblebnung bet ©efejjcS- 
Botlagen buret) bie ©fupfd)tina — con ber ccentuettcn ©emiffion ber SRegittung ab- 
gcfcb)en — alleS bcim alien bliebe. 

9Jote SerbieuS: 
2. ©ie Sxegierung befif>t feincrlci Scrceifc bafiir unb aueb bie 5lote ber f. 
unb f. iRcgicrung liefevt il)r feinc fold)cn, bafs ber Serein »9iarobna Obbrana- unb 
anbere dbnliebe ©efellfdjaften 6iS jum tjeutigen 'Jagc buret) cineS it)rcr Sftitglicbcr 
itgeubmeld)e Betbrcd)etifrf)en yvinblungcn biefet SItt begangen t)dtten. 9fict)t(Sbefioroenigct 
mirb bie Hbniglid)e SRegierung bie g° trcl:un 3 ^ Er '■ llnb '■ Scgierung annebmen 
unb bie ®cfcllfet)aft r3!arobna Obbtana* foioie febe ©efellfdjaft, bie gegen 6|lcrrcid)- 
Ungarn roirfen follte, auflofen. 

Jtumerfung ber t. unb f. SHegierung: 
©ie monaref)iefeinblid)e s 5topaganba ber »5iarobna Obbrana« unb ber it)t 
afplierten 33ercine crfullt in iscrbicn ba§ ganje bffentlicbe V'cben, ei ift baf)er eine 
ganj unjuldffige WtfeiBc, roenn bie fetbifd)e 9(egietung betjauptet, bafj itjt bariiber 
nid)t3 befannt iji. 

5 



— 18 — 

©anj abgefc^cn batjon ift bie Don ung aufgefteltte gotberung nidjt jut ©anje 
etfutlt, ba roit ubttbieS tierlangt t)aben. 

bie ( Propaganbamittel bicfer ©efeOfdjaften ju fonpSjieren j 
bie Stcubilbung bcr aufgcloften ©cfclljdviftcu uuter anberem Stamen unb 
in nnbevet ©cftalt ju Dettjinbern. 
3n biefen beiben 9tid)tungen fdjmeigt bas Selgraber Sabinctt boQfommen, fo 
bajj unS aud) butd) bie gcgebene tjalbe 3 u f a 8 c IC ' ue ©arantie bafut gebotcn ift, bafj 
bem "Jreiben bcr monatd)icfeinbtid)cn Jlffojiationen, iniSbcfonbcrc bet »9larobna 
Obbrami«, burd; bevcn Sluflofung bepnitio ein Enbe bctcitet ware. 

Stote <3erbien3: 

3. lue ftoniglid) ©etbifdie SRegietung tmpflicbtct fid) obuc 33etjug aui bem 
offentlidjen Unterritbt in Setbien aHeS auBjufd)etben, l»«8 bie gcgen Cftcrteidvllngarn 
gcridjtetc ^ropaganba foibcvn fonnte, faQg ir)r bie t. unb f. SRegietung tatfad)lid)e 
SBeroeife fitr biefe ^ropaganba liefert. 

Slumetfung bet t. unb f. SRegietung: 
Stud) in biefcm galte betlangt bie fetbifdje Stegietung etft 3?ett>eifc bafiit, 
bafj im bffcntlidicn llnterrid)te ©ctbicnS cine monard)iefcinblid)c s Jkopaganba getrieben 
roirb, roiii)icnb fie bod) roiffen mufj, bajj bie bei ben ferbifrficn t3rf)ulcn eingcfiitjrten 
ftljrbudjer in biefct SRid)tung ju beanftanbenben istoff cntbalteu, unb bafj ein gtojjet 
$eit ber ferbifd)cn t'e^tet im S'ager bet »5tatobna Dbbraua« unb bet iljt affUicttcn 
Siereine fteljt. 

UbtigenS ()at bie ©etbifdje SRegierung aud) filet einen Jed unfetet rsurberungen 
nidjt fo crfiillt, mic mil e3 Oetlangt f)aben, inbem fie in intern Jegte ben con un3 
genjunfebten Beifajj -foroofjl mas ben Sefjrfotpet, als aud) mas bie t'et)rmittt[ aiv 
6efangt«, mcglicfi, — ein Scifafc, rcelcr/er ganj flat jcigt, mo bie monarducfeinbfiebe 
S)3topaganba in bev ferbifdjen ©d)ule ju fudjen ift. 

5totc ©ctbienS: 

4. 25ie ftbniglidic SRegietung ift audi Bereit, jene Ofpjiete unb SScamten au3 
bem 5Mitdt< unb girjitbienji ju cntlaffen, t)iiifid)tlid) mcUter butd) geriditlitbe Unter- 
fuctiung feftgeftcQt roitb, baft fie fid) .vianbfungen gegen bie tettitotiale Jntegtitat 
bet 9Jlonard)ie baben jufrfnilbcn tommen laffen; fie erraartct, bafj ifyr bie f. unb f. 
SRegienmg jmerfa Einleitung bc<S SBetfafjtenS bie Stamen bicfer Off\(ietc unb Scamtcn 
unb bie Jatfadien mittcilt, »eld)e benfelben jut Caft gelcgt metben. 

Slnmcttung bet f. unb t. Stcgietung: 
3nbem bie ftoniglid) ©eibi[d)e ERegietung bie S u f a 8 e Dcr Entloffung bet ftag- 
tirben Offijiete unb Beamten aus bem SJtititat- unb 3ibilbienji an ben Umftanb 
fniipft, bafj biefe ^crfoncu burd) ein ©eridjtgocrfaljrcn fdjulbig befunben metben, fd)tantt 
fie it)te 3 u f a 3 e au f i tne 3^n c c ' n i ' n btntn biefen ^Serfonen ein frtafgcfejilid) ju 
ab,nbenbc8 Iielitt jur Vaft liegt. ©a mir abet bie Gntfcnuing jener Offijicrc unb 
53camtcn oertaugcu, bie monard)icfcinblid)c s J3ropaganba betreiben, toa§ ja im adgemeinen 
in ©crbicn tein gcrid)tlid) ftrafbarcr Satbeftanb ift, er[d)cincn unfete gorbetungen 
aud) in biefem *Punfte nid)t erfullt. 



— 19 — 

SRote ber $6niglid) ©etbifdjen SRegietung: 

5. ©ie fi6nig[id)e SRegietung muf) befennen, baf) fie fidj iibet bm ©inn unb 
bit ^.raglrcite jcncS 3kge[)reniS ber f. unb f. SRegierung nidjt Bollc SRcdicnfcbaft 
gcbcn farm, mcldicS bobbin gcf>t, bajj bie Sbniglid) ©etbifcbe SRegietung fid) Berpflidjten 
foQ, auf it)ten ©ejiieten bic SSKtnritfung Don Drganen bet f. f. SRegietung juju« 
[ajfeit, bod) ertlatt fie, bag (ie jebe SSlitrcitfung anjuncfjmen bevcit ware, wcidje ben 
©tunbfajjcn bc3 336lfetredjt3 unb beS ©ttafptojcffcS foreic ben fieunbnadjbatlidjcn 
33cjie()ungen entfptcdjen toiitbc. 

Slnmcifung bet f. unb f. SRegietung: 
S?it biefct Stage Ijat bag aUgetneine BoHettedjt ebenfolBcnig ttnai ju tun 
loie ba3 ©trafprojejjtedjt: Gii tjaubelt fid) urn cine Jlngctcgtiibcit rein (laatspolijei- 
lidjei SRalut, bie im SBege einer befoubeten S3crciubatung ju [ofen ift. ©ie DlefetBe 
©ctbicnS ift bnfjet unBerftanblid) unb irate bet iljtet Bagen allgemeinen gorm gecignet, 
ju umiberbriidbatcn ©djhnetigfeiten 6ei 3lbfd)[ufj bcii 311 trejfenben SlbfommcnS 
ju fiitjten. 

SRote bet jtbnigiid) ©etbifdjen SRegietung: 

6. ©it Sijniglicbe SRegietung [jiilt t$ fclbftBctfiiinblid) fill ibre spflicfjt, gegen 
atte jene Spcrfunen cine Untctfudjung einjuleiten, bie an bem ftomplott Bom 
15./28. 3 l "ii betciiigt waten obet bcteiligt gewefeu fein folien unb bie fid) auf 
itjteni ©ebietc befinben. 2Ba3 bic Sffiitnurfun'g Bon tjierju fpejied betegietten Otganen 
bet f. unb f. SRegietung an bicfet Untetfudjung anbeiangt, fo fann fie cine foldje 
nicbt annchmen, ba bic3 cine SBcrichung bet SOetfaffung unb bc3 StrafptojefjgefejjeS 
rcate. ©ocfi Eonnte ben ijfletteidjifcfj ungavifd)cii Otganen in einjcdien gotten SSJittciiung 
Bon ben (Sigebniffcn ber Untctfudjung gemndjt merben. 

Slnmerfuug ber f. unb f. SRegietung: 
Unfet SSettangen mat ganj fiat unb nid)t mijijubcutcn. ©it begctjtten 

1. Ginleitung cinct geridjtlicbcn Untctfudjung gcgen bic ^eilneijmct beg SompiottS, 

2. 'Jeidiaijmc Bon t. unb f. Otganen an ben Inctauf bcjiiglidjcn Gvljebungcn 
(SRcd)etdjc im ©egenfajj ju enquete judiciaire), 3. cS ift uug uidjt bcigcfaUcn, 
{. unb f. Otgane an bctu fcrbifdjen ©etid)t»octfa()ten tcilneljmcn ju (ajfen: ©ie 
fodtcn nur an ben polijei(i<§en SBotertjebungen mitiuitfen, nxtdjc baef SStatetiat fiit 
bie Untetfudjung tjer&eijufdjafjcn unb fidicijufiellen batten. 

SBenn bie ©etbifdje SRegietung un8 tjiet mifjpcrftcEjt, fo tut fie bicsS bcioujU, 
benn bet Untetfdjitb jloifdjcn enquete judiciaire unb ben cinfad)en SRed)evd)en mufj 
it)t getaufig fein. 

©a fie fid) jebct fionttode besS einjutcitenben SBetfatjrenS ju eittjietjen tminfdjtc. 
ba3 bei torrettet ©utd)fut)tung l)bd)|l unctlruufdjtc Grgebniffe fiit fie (iefevit triitbe, 
unb ba fit fcine §anbbabe bcft|t, in plaufibier SSSeife bit SBitwitfung uufetct 
Otgane an bem polijcilidjen 23ctfat)rcn abju(cf)iicn (Slnaiogien fiit fold)e polijcilidjcn 
3ntctoentioncu beftctjen in gro^et SKenge), Ijat fie fid) auf eiiien Statibpuuft begeben, 
bet i()ttt ?lblebnung ben ©d)ein bet S3ered)tigung gcbcn unb unferem Bcttangen btn 
©tempcl bet UnevfuUbattett aufbriiden foil. 



— 20 — 

SRotc ber ©crbifdjen SRegierung: 

7. 'Die fioniglidie SRegierung f>at nod) cm ?lbcnb bti $agcS, an bem ifjr tie 
SRote jufam, bie S3rtjjaftwig bei SSlajorS BoiSlar ^Janfofic Bcrfiigt. 53?aS aber ben 
3Ri(an Giganooic anbclaugt, bcr cm Jlngc[)6riger bet oftcrreicbifdi ungatifdjen 3Ron« 
archie ift, unb bcr b\i jiim 15. 3"ni (afg Slfpiraut) bei bcr Eifen6afjnbireftio.n be- 
bienftet loar, fo fomttc bicfer bi6f)cr nid)t auSgeforfcbt toerfeen, n>esl)alb ein ©teefbrief 
gegen ifjii crlaffcn ttmrbe. 

"Die f. unb f. SRegierung ttiirb gebcten, jroeefs* ©urdjfufjrung ber Untcrfud)ung 
fobalb a[$ mogtidj bie bcftcbcnbcn SBerbadjtSgtunbe unb bie bei bcr Untcrfudiuug in 
©crajetoo gcfammeltcn ©d)U(boen>etfe in bcr bcjcidjnctcn ^orm befanntjugeben. 

Slnmcrfung ber f. unb f. SRegierung: 
©iefc Slntroort i(l fjintcrlu'iltig. Giganouic ging taut bcr bon unS Beranlafiten 
SRacbforfcbuug bvei 'Jagc uad) bem Jlttentat, aI3 befannt unirbc, biijj GiganoBic an 
bem Somplottc beteiligt war, auf llrlaub unb begab fief) im Jluftrog bcr Spotijei- 
prafeftur in SSclgrab mid) SRibari. G8 ift alfo jiincicfjfi unticfjtig, bafi Siganooic fcftott 
flm 15./28. 3 un ' mli > ccm ferbifdjen ©taatSbienft fd)icb. Joierju fommt, bafi ber 
'Polijeiprafcft Don Setgrab, ber bie Jlbrcifc bes GiganoBic fcibft ocranlajit S)at unb 
bcr iruijjtc, too bicfer ftd) auffjielt, in eiucm 3 n ' ct biem erf'larte, cin SRann namenS 
SSiilan Siganooic criftieic in SBetgrab nid}t. 

SRotc bcr ©cvbifd)cu SRegierung: 

8. Die ©erbifdic SRegierung ivirb bie bcflcbcnben 9Rafjnar)men gcgcn bie Kilter- 
btiicfung bc3 ©djmuggefnS Bon ffiaffen unb (SjpfofiBftoffen Berfdjarfen unb crmcitmi. 

G3 ift fclbftDcrftiinblirb, bafi fie fofort cine Uiitcrfucbuiig einteiten unb jene 
Seainten bcS ©venjbienftes in bcr Vinic ©abae-vojuica ftreng beftvafeu n?itb, bie 
iljrc 'Pflicbt Berleht unb bie Urtjebcr bes SBcrbicdicnS bie ©renje [jaben libcvfrfivciteu laffen. 

9i Tic Sbniglidje SRegierung ift gem bcrcit, Grtlaruiigcii iibcv bie Suftcrungen 
jii geben, rocicbe it)re SSeamten in €crbicn unb im SluSfanb nadi bem Attentat in 
^ntenncirsj gemadjt Ijaim uitb bie uarb bcr iBe£)auphing bcr t unb t. SRegierung 
bcr Monarchic fcinbfdig loaren, fobalb bie t. unb t SRegierung bie Stellen bicfer 
Slu3fufjtungen bejeidjnet unb bewiefen baben n>ivb, bay bicfc Siufjetungen Don ben 
bctvcffcnbcn gunftionaren tatfad)licb gcmad)t loorben finb. ?ic Koniajidjc Slicgicrung 
mirb fcibft ©orge trogen, bie nbtigen Sewcife unb Ubcifulirungeunittcl l)tctfur ju 
fammcln. 

Stnmcrfung bcr t unb t SRegierung: 

Tcv Soniglid) ecibifd)cn JRegterung miiffen bie Bejiiglidjcn 3 nicrr, i e,pg 3 an 3 
geuau Bcfanni feiu ffienn fie Don ber t unb f. SRegierung ocrlaugr, bap biefe 
ihr alterlci I^etaiU iibcr bicfc ^ntcnnelos liefcrc unb fid) cine fbrmlicbe Untcrfudpung 
tjicviibcr oorbctjiilt, jeigt fie, bafj fie aud) bie gorbemng uid)t ernftlid) crfiiQcn Will. 

Oiotc ber ©erbifd)cn SRegierung: 
10. ®ie Sbniglidie SRegierung reirb, fofcrn bieS nidjt febcut in bicfer DJotc 
gcjAchcu ift, bie f. unb t. SRegierung Bon bcr Durd)fuf)tung bcr in ben »orflct)cnbcn 
^Puntten cutljaltencn SSJafnatjmen in ScnntniS fe|en, fobalb cine bicfer SOtafjrcgcln 
.angcotbnet unb burcbgcfuljrt wirb. 



- 21 — 

<£)ie fioniglidj Setbifdje JJegiening giaubt, bajj c8 im gemeinfamen 3nteteffe 
flegt, bie Cofung bicfer ?lngelegenl)eit nicht ju ubetftutjeu unb i|1 ballet, falls fict> 
bie f. unb f. Siegictung butdj biefc Slntmoit niif>t fiit befticbigt etad)ten foHte, 
rcic immer bcveit, cine frieblidje Cbfung anjimefymen, fei e§ butdj Uberttagung bet 
Giitfdjeibung biefcr gtage an bai 3 ntern(lt ' Dliale ©eti<f)t im Saag, fei ti butd) 
Uberiaffuug bet Gntfcbcibung an bie ©tofsmadjte, wctcfje an ber ?lu8atbcituug bet 
Bon bet <Setbifd)en Siegietung am 18/31. SJcatj 1909 abgegebcuen Gtflatung mit- 
gewitft Ijaben. — ©d)Iufj bet 9cote. 



2tu0 t>em 6fterrdct>ifc^«unctartf4>cn UTCatcrial. 

SSSien, 27. 3uti. <Da8 in bet 6ftctteid)ifd)'Ungatifrf)en giffutatnote an bie 
aueswattigen Sotfdjaften in 5tnge(egenljeit beg fetbifd)en fionjliftg enoaljnte ©offiet 
toitb b,eute Betoffentiidjt. 

3n biefem Sftemoite roitb batauf fjingeroiefen, bag bie Bon ©etbien au3- 
gegangene S3en>egung, bie fid) jum gitle gefe&t Ijat, bie fiiblidjcn Seite £>ftetteid)- 
UngatnS Bon bet 9J}onavd)ie [oSjuieifjen, urn fte mit ©etbien ju einet ftaatlidjen 
Ginljeit ju Bctbinbcn, weit juturfgreift. ©iefe in ifjten Gnbjicicn flct? gieidjbieibenbe 
unb nut in i()tcn 2J!ittein unb an Jntenptat n>ed)fe(nbe 'ptopaganba evteidjte jut 
gcit bet SinnejionSftife i()ten £>6ljepunft unb ttat bamaU offeu mit iljten Senbenjen 
Ijetoot. 2Bdl)tcnb etnerfeitS bie gefamte fctbifrfje 'Pteffe jum Kambfe gegen bie 
93?onatd)ie aitfrief , bilbctcn fid) — Bon anbeten <PtoBaganbamitte(n abgefefjen — 
?lfjojiationen, bie bicfe Sdmpfe Botbeteitetcn, untet bencn bie Jcatobna Obbtana 
an SBebeutung Ijeioonagte 9Iu8 eincm teoolutionaten Somitec l)ctBotgegangen, ton- 
(lituictte fid) biefe Bom SJefgtabet JluStoattigen ?lmte Bollig a&b/ingigc Otganifation 
untet Ceitung Bon StaatSniaimerti unb Offijieten, batuntet bem ©enetat 3 an f" D 'C 
unb bem eljemaligen 5!}iniftct 3 B(11U>U ' C - 5' ut § ^"jot Dja 'Janfooic unb 'SlUm 
<Piibiieoic gelJDtcn ju biefen ©tiiubetn. ©icfet 2}ctein [jatte fid) bie Sitbung unb 
Sluistufluiig Bon greifdiaten fiit ben bcoovfteljenben Ktieg gegen bie 6ft eneid)ifd)-unga- 
tifd)e 3?onatd)ie jum 3icie gefeft. 3" " ,,tr ^em Slemoitc augcfiigten ?lnlage witb 
tin ?lu8jug au3 bem Bom 3 En t ra t a u3fd)uffc bet 9tatobna Obbtana IjcrauiSgegebeiten 
S3etein8otgane gleidjen SlamenS Betoffcntlidjt, lootin in ineijtcten Slttifclti bie 5;atig- 
fcit uub 3i E ' e bicfeS SeteinS auafubjlid) batgetegt wetben. 68 [jeifjt barin, bafj 
ju bet Sauptaufgabe bet Jtavobne Obbtana bie SSctbinbung mit iljten naljen unb 
fetnevcu Stubetn jenfeits bet ©reiije uub unfeten iibtigen gijunben in bet SBelt getjoten. 

£>ftetteid) ift al8 etflct unb gtofjtct ^cinb 6ejeid)net. SBie bie 
91atobna Obbtana bie StotiBcnbigfeit bca JtampfeS mit fefleneld) ptebigt, ptebigt fte 
eine tjeilige ©ab^tb^eit unfetet natioualcn Cage. 'SaS Sd)hif)faBite[ entb^att einen 
Jlpelt an bie iHegietung unb ba3 Bolt Setbien§, fid) mit alien SUittetn fiit ben 
ffamBf Botjubeteiten, ben bie Slnneyon Botaugejeigt b^at. 

DaS SRemoite fajilbett nad) einet JiuSfage cincS oon bet 9Jatobna Obbtana 
augeiBotbenen fiomitat|"d)i8 bie bamaiige JAtigfeit bet 91atobna Obbtana, 
bie eine boh jvoei SauBtleuteu, batuntet "JantoBic, gcicitete ©d)u(e jut 2lu3- 
bilbung Bon Sanben untctijiclt, ©cb,ulen, lBeld)e Bon ©cnetal 3' ln f'" , ic unb Bon 

6 



_ 22 — 

Sauptmann Wilan <PribiceBic rcgelmajjig infpijiert rnutben. SOeitet rourbeit bie 
&omitatfcb / i§ im Sdmjjcn imb Sombcnroerfcn, im OTineniegen, Sprengen 
Don Gifen batjnbtiidcu ufro. unterriridct. Sladj ber feierlicficn Grflatung bcv Set&i- 
fcf)cu SRegietung Bom ^aijrc 1909 fdjicn aucfj bae5 Gubc bicfer Organifation ge- 
fommcii ju fcin. Oiefe Grroartungen babcn fief; abet nirbt nur nid)t cvjiillt, fonbern 
bie 'Propaganba rcurbe bind) bic fcrbifcfjc *Pteffe fottgefejjt. -Dag SJtemoire fiiljtt 
a!3 Seifpiel bit Sltt unb SBeife an, roie ba§ attentat gegcn ben bcsnifcfjcn Canbe3- 
dief Satefanin publijiflifcb, Betroettet auube, inbem bet Sliteniatcr a(8 ferbifajer 
Siationatljelb gefeiert unb feinc Sat Bctbcnlidit wutbe. Tuefe SBIdticr rourbcn nid)t 
nur in iSerbien Bcrbrcitet, fonbcrn iiud) auf reofdorgamjicrtcn ©t^lcidjmegcn in bie 
SRonntdjie eingefdjmuggelt. 

Unter bet gleidjcu Ceitung rote bci ihret ©tunbung routbe bic SRarobna Obbtana 
neucrlitb ber Jenttalpuntt einet SIgitation, iBclcber ber 2d)ujenbu»b mit 
702 SJcrcinen, cin iSofolbunb mit 3500 Scitgtiebetn unb Bctfdjicbenc 
anbere Scteine anger)6rten. 

5m ftlcibe cineS SuitutUeteing auftrctenb, bem nut bie gciftigc unb bie 
fbrpetlidie Gnhoidelung ber SJeBolfctung ©erbieuS foroie beren matcticilc fitdftigung 
am s3crjcn ticgt, cnttjiillt bie Siatobna Obbrana it)r roar)refi reorgamficrtcS s Hro- 
gramm in Borjitiertcm SluSjug nuS it)tem BereinSotgan, in rocld)cm » bie tjcilige 
3Bar)rt)eit« geprcbigt ruirb, bajj ti cine unerlajjticfje SJotwenbigfeit ift, gegen 
Ofierreid), fcinen crjicn grofstcn geinb, biefen SlusrottiingSfampf mit 
©eroeljt unb ffanone ju ful)rcn, unb ba<S 23o[f mit alien SMttetn auf ben 
fiampf Borjubereiten, jut 'Befrciung ber untetrootfenen ©ebicte, in bencn Biele 
OTitltonen untcrjorbrer Btiibet fdmiaddcn. Oic in bcm SDlemotte jitierteil Sluftufe 
unb Steben ar)nlid)en G6arattcrel beleiicbtcii bic Bielfeitige auSreartige Sotigfeit bet 
9larobna Obbrana unb ib,ret affiliettcn Scteine, bie in SBotttagSteifen, in bet SeiU 
narjme an ,"\c|tcu ton bolnifdien SJeteinen, bci bcncn offcn SJlitgliebet fur bic 
cnralmte fcvbifdie Beteinigung gcrootben routben, bcfteljt. ©egenroattig ift nocb, bie 
llntctfudjung bariiber im §uge, bafj bic ©ofelnercinc Serbicns anatoge SBeteinigungen 
ber SJlonatdjie bcftimmtcn, fid) mit it)ncii in einem biet)cr gchcim gebaltcncn Set- 
banbc ju Beteinigen. SDurct) SOettraueniSmannet unb SUiffionate nnirbe bie ?luf' 
iBiegetung in bic Srcife Grtnadifcncr unb ber urteilslofcn 3 ll S clltl gebradit. ©o 
wurben Bon !9(ilan ^ribkcroitfd) cfjcmaiigc 5onBebofpjiere unb cin ©cnbarmcric- 
Icutnant jtiin Setlaffen bed s7ieeregbienfic8 in ber 3)!onard)ie unter bcbenflidjen Urn- 
ftanben Bcrleitet. 3 n ^ cn ©dfiden ber Scijrerbilbung^anfialten irutbc einc mcit' 
ge(;enbe Slgitation entiBictett. Der geiBiinfd}tc Krieg gegcn bic 3)Jouard)ie rourbe 
liiilitdri(d) audi infofetti Botbetcitct, ali ferbifd)c Gmipre im 3aKc bci Jluc-brud}? 
ber geinbfetigfeiten mit ber 3"fliuuini Bon 2tan§portmittcln ufro., ber Slnfadjung 
bou SHeBotten unb ^ianifen betraut miirbcn. Sltlel bie3 roirb in einer befonbetcu 
5?cdagc bclcgt. 

DaS SJlemoite fdjilbcrt ferner ben 3"fainment)ang jroifdicn biefet Satigtcit 
ber Slatobna Obbrana unb ben afpliierten Organifationen mit ben Slttentaten ftuyn 
ben Stbniglidicu Hommiffdr in Slgtam EuBaj im 3'di I'd 12, bcm Slttentat Bon 
©ojtic in Slgtam 1913 gegcn Sfcrlecj unb bem mijsgludten Jittentat Se^afetS am 
20. Wai im Slgtamet 2t)cater. S§ Berbreitet fia) tjietauf iiber ben Sulammcn^ang 



— 23 — 

bcfj JlttcntatS auf ben Sljtonfolget unb bef f en ©emab)Hn, ubet bie ?W, 
tnie fid) bie ^nngen f* on in bet ®d)ule an bem ©ebanfen ber 9Jatobna Obbtana 
tjetgijtetcn uub rcie fidj bie Slttcntntcr mit §ilfe tion ^vibireioic unb ©acif bie 
ffieitjcuge ju bem Jltteutiit oeifdjafftcn, roobei inebefonbete bie !Rolle bc8 SBJajorii 
Sanfojic bargelcgt nurb, ber bie 5)corbh>affcn licferte, roie aucb bie SJodc eineS 
gemiffen liiganooic, etneS gemefeuen Koiuitatfd)i unb jeju'gen Scamten bet ferbifdjen 
©fciibaljnbirettion SBclgtab, bet fd)on lS)0i) ali %6g,l\na, bet !Baubcnfd)uIe bet 
bamaligcn 9}arobna Obbtana auftaud)te. Qernct firb bie ?ht batgelegt, lr>ic Somben 
unb ©affen unbemevEt nad) SoSnien cingefdjmiiggclt routben, bie feinen 3 a,e 'fet 
eariiber Idjjt, bafj bie3 ein root)! oorbcrcitetet unb fur bie gc[)cimni8t>oUen ^nxde 
bet 9larobna oft begangener Sd)leid)rocg Wax. 

Sine Heilage enttjdtt einen SluiSjug aui ben Slften beg fiteUgctidjtg in ©erajcroo 
uber bie llntcrfud)iing beS ?lttcntatd gegen ben IStjljcrjog $tanj Qctbinaub unb 
bejfen ©emafiliu. ©anad) fmb Tuincip, Sabtinooic, ©rabej, Etupilomc unb ^apoDtc 
geflanbig, in ©emeinfetyaft mit bem fliid)tigen OTc^inebbafic ein Honlplott jut 
Stmotbung bc£ Stjljerjogii gebilbct uub ifm ju biefcm 3 Wft f c aufgclauctt ju Ijabcn. 
Eabrinooic ifl geflanbig, bie Sombc gcluorfen uub fflabtilo <]3tinup bass Slttentai mit bet 
SBtorcmingptftole au§gefub,tt ju E)abcu. S^cibc inter gabeu ju, bei bet Berubung bet iat 
bie Jlbfidjt beS ?)cotbci$ get)abt flu Ijabcn. T)k lcfitctcu ieile bet Slnlagc cvt)nlten nxitcte 
Slngaben bet Sefd)ulbigtcn Dor bem Untctfiid)ung3tid)tct iibct 6ntftel)ung be8 fiomplotto - , 
yetfitnft bet 2?omben, roeldjc fabtifmafjig Ijctgeftellt rourben, fiir militdtifdje gwecfe 
beftimmt toaten unb it)rer Otigiualpactung nad) aui bem fctbifd)eu SPaffenlaget aui 
firagujeoac (lammten. Gublia) gibt bie Scilagc Sluafunft ubet ben iranSport bet btci 
Slttentatet unb bet SBaffen Don ©erbien nad) SoSnien. ?lug bem roeitcten 3eugeuptotofoH 
etgibt fid), bafs ein Jlngeljbriger bet 9?!onard)ie einige iagc Dot bem ?lttentat bem 
oftetteidjifdiuugatifdjen fionfufat in Selgmb^MbuiigponbcrStomutungerftattcnrcolIte, 
bafj ein >JMan jutSBetu6ung be8?lttcntat3 gegen ben Grjljeijog rodt)renb beffen 5lnrocfenljeit 
in SoSnien beftche. iHefer Sftann foil nun butd) Seigraber 'Polijeiotganc, meld)e 
if)n unmittelbat cot Setreten beg Sonfutate au8 nidjttgen ©tutiben octljaftcten, an 
bet (St|tattung bet SMbung t>etb,inbett rootben fein. 5Beitet ge()e aui bem 3 tu 3 c|1- 
ptotofoll b,et»ot, boji bie betteffenben 'Polijeiotgnne con bem geplantcn attentat 
SenutiiiS gefyabt flatten. 1)a biefe Jlngaben nodi md)t nacb,geptiift fmb, fann 
iibet beteu i£tid)l)altigfeit Botlaufig nod) fein Utteit abgegeben roetben. 3" oet 
Spoilage jinn Wemoite b)ei^t ciS: iBot bem GmpfangSfaot beg fetbifd)cn S'UiegS' 
minifteriumS befinben fid) nn bet 5Banb Diet nHegorifcb,e Silbet, »on bencn btei 
5)atfteHungen fetbifdjet fitieflSetfolge fmb, wdljtenb i>ai oicttc bie 23ttn)itfiid)ung 
bet monottfiiefeinblidicn Jeubenjen ©etbicn8 Uetfinnbilbtidit. flbet einct t'anbfd)aft, 
bie tettS ©ebitge (Sognicn), teil8 Gbene (©flbungatn), batftellt, gef)t bie 3 0ta i M' 
SSotgentote bet fetbifdtcn 6offn«ngcn, auf. 3" 1 23otbctgninbe ftel)t eine beroaffnete 
Jraucngcftalt, auf betcn ©*ilbc bie 9)ainen allct »nodj ju befreienben 93toBinjen«: 
S?o8nicn, s^etjegolcina, ffioiwobina, ©ntmien, Talmatien uf». fleljen. 



aCittaflc lb. 



®er 5!cidj3fauj(er an bie ftaifcvlitr/en Sotfdjafter in *Patt§, Ponbon, St. fcferS' 
Burg com 23. 3uli 1914: 

©ie SBeto ffentf i c^wngen bcr Oflevrcirf>ifcf) ungarifcfjcii SRegievung uber bit llmftanbc, 
untcr bcncu ba8 Slttentdt auf ben bjtcrrcid)ifd«'n -Unonfolgcr unb feinc ©emflljtin 
jlattgcfiinbcn t)at, cntljulicn off en bit S'^i ^k fid) bie gvofifevbifdje "Propaganba 
gefekt Ijot, unb bie Wittel, boveu fie jicf) jut S3erroitE(i<§ung bcrfelben bebicnt. s 3lud> 
inujfcii bind) bit befannt gegebcnen iatfad>en bic lelUen 3 ll,c if e ' barubet fdmnnbcn, 
iaf) ba8 SlftionSjenttum bcr SScjtvcbiingcn, bic auf 2o8l6fung bcr fiibflamifcbeu <Pvo- 
uinjcn Bon bcv 6[ierreid)ifc6/lingdrifdjen SRonatcfyie unb bercu 93eteinigung mit bcm 
'Jevbifdieu Mmgreirt) l)inau8(aufen, in Belgrab ju furhcu iff, unb bovt jum minbcftcn 
jnit bcv Memiivciij von Slngetyotigen bcr SRegietung unb Slrmec fcinc Jdtigfcit cntfaltct. 

©ie fcrbifdtcn ivcibcveicn get)en auf cine lamic !Keibc Bon ^aljren jururf. 3 n 
6cfonbcv« matfantct gorm trat bcr grojifcrbtfdje 6§auBini8inu8 voatjrcnb bcr Bo8- 
inifeben Hrifis in bic Srfdjeinung. Niir bcr iBcitgebenbcn Sclb[U>el)errfd)img, unb 
SRfifjiguug bcr Oftcvvcicbitdvungavifcben SRcgicruug unb bcm energifctyen Ginfdncitcn 
tcr ©rojjmadjte Wat e8 jiijufrijreiBen, locnu bic 5ptot>ofationen' f nxltfjcn oficrrcirb- 
JIngarn in bicfev 3eit Bon fcitcn SetBien? auSgefejst roar, nid)t 511m ftonftifte 
fiiljvtcn. ©ic '^uficherung fiinftigcu S8or)[Btrr)a[ten§, bic bic ©erbifd)c SRegietung 
bama(8 gegeben bat, hat fie nirf)t cingchalten. llnter ben Slugen, jum minbeften 
untcr fiittfdjroeigenbcr fnlbung beS amtlicbcn Scrbieng, (jat bic grofsfcrbifebe 'Pro. 
Baganba injroifd)cn fovtgcfefet an Slu8betynung unb 3 n ' c "fitat jugenommen j auf iljr 
j?onto ijt bai jiingfte Berbrcdjeu ju fchen, beffen gdbcu nari) Selgrab fiit)rcn. 68 
ijnt fid) in unjtBeibeutiget ffieife Eunbgetan, bafi csS rocber mit bcr 'ffiiirbc nod) mit 
5>er SelBftertjaltung bcr bjierreidjifer) ■iiiigarifcbcii 3JJonard)ie BereinB.at fcin toiirbe, bcm 
CJvciben jenfeitel bcv ©renje nod) [finger tatenloS juiufchcn, bur* ba8 bic ©idjetfjeit 
unb bic j'degvkiit i()rcr (Scbictc bancrub bebvoht roivb 5ei bicfev Sadjtage fonnen 
ba8 S3otger)en fonrie bic jforberungen bcv C|lenciif>ifdwuuiarifdien SRegietung unr a!8 
geredjifettigt angefe^en roctben. 'Jvohbcm fdjliefjt bie .vmUuuii, bic bic offentlidic 
SReinung foroot)! a!8 audj bic SRegietung in ©crbien in (ejjtct p;cit eingenommen [jat, 
bic Sefurdjtung nidjt an?, bafi bic ®evbifd)c SRegietung e8 abichncn mirb, bicfeu 
gorberuugcu 111 cntfpvcdicii, unb baji fie fid) ju cinev pvoBofatovifrhcn 5attung 
Oftcrreidj Ungnrn iicgemibcv liinveificn [apt. (Js iviivbc bcr r|terrcid)ifd)ungavifd)cn 
SRcgierung, mill fie nicbt auf iljvc SteHung aU Wvofjmad)t enbgiiltig 53erjid)t lei|1eu r 
uid)t6 anbcrcS librigblciben, altf il)re gotberungen bet bcv Scvbifdjen SRegietung bind) 
ciiicu ftavtcn Druct unb nbtigenfallS untcr bcv Ergtcifung militavifdicv ?1}ajjnahincu 
burt^jufefeen, luobei ibr tie 35Jat)( bcr Witlcl iibcrlajfeu blcibcu mufj. 

S». ufto bcehve id) mid) ju erfiidjcu, fid) in tiovfteljcnbem ©tune (bein bcv- 
^eitigen SBcvtretct be« gcttn JSioiani) (Sir Gbiuarb Wren) (Serrn Safanow) gcgciv 
iibcv au«jiifbrcd)cn unb bubci inSBefonbere bcr Jlnfdjauuug nnri)bnidlicb Jliicibrnrf ju 
Bcvlcihcn, ba^ ci fid; in ber Borlicgcnbcn gvage urn cine Icbiglicl) Jioifdjcn Cftcvvciet;- 



— 25 — 

Ifttgatn unb ©crbien jum 2lu§trag ju bringcnbe SIngetegenrjett rjanbete, bit nuf t)ie 
bciben bitcft Screiligtcii ju bcfriirdnfcn bag etnftc ^cftteben bcr ??Kicf)te fein miiffe. 
ffiit tounfdjen bringenb bic GofalijUrung tti ftonflittS, rocit jcbet! Gingrcifcn eincr 
oiibcrtii Stact)i infotge bet Berfdjiebenerl SBunbni^oetpfliditungen unabfebbatc Sonfequcnjcn, 
Had) fid) jierjtn lourbe. 

Gincm gefdlligcii te[cgrapt)ifd)cn 3?etid)t uber ben Sevfauf 3') rcr Unteivebunj 
roetbe id) mit 3ntcreffc entgcgenfeljcn. 



aCntaae 2. 



3Der &cid>0fan?Ur an £>ic 23un£>csrco(icrungcn. 



»crtraulidi! Sctlin, bm 28. 3uti 1914. 

Guer pp. reoHcn bcr iRcgicrting, bei bet Sic begfaubigt finb, fotgenbc SDftt* 
tettung madjen: 

SlngefidjtS bet Satfadjen, bic bic fificrrcicbifdj.Ungarifcf/e JNcgicnmg in iljret 
91otc an bic ©erbifdje SRcgierung befanntgegebcu bat, mnffen bic [ehtcn 'Jnxifcl barubct 
fdjtoinben, bap bag attentat, bem bet bficrrcidjifch ungarifebe Stvtonfoiger unb feiuc 
©ema()[in jum Dpfet gcfaHen finb, in ©erbien jum minbcflen mit bet KonntBenj. 
Don Slngttjbrigcn bcr ©ctbifdjen SKegierung unb Slnnce Borbereitct motben ift. GiS ift 
ein probuft bet grojjfer6ifd)en Scjttebungen, bic feit einct !Kei()e Ben ^ifjteu cine 
Quelle bauetnbet Seuiivufjigungen fiit bic Dftccrcid)i[d)>Ungatifd)e ?5ionard)ie unb fur 
ganj Europa geroorben finb. 

3« befonbcrS matfantcr %oxm trat bcr groftferbifebe EbatlbiniSmuS iDat)tenb 
bet boamfdicn ftrifiS in bie Grfdjcinuug. Slur bet iDcitgcl)cnbcn ©elbfl6eljerrfd)ung 
nub SRafjigung bet Oftetreicbifcb Ungarifcben SKcgicrung unb bem cnctgifdicn 6in> 
fd)teiten bet ©rofiinadjte roar e3 }Ujufd)reiben, menu bie ^JroBotatioueii, mcldjcn 
Cflctrcid) Uiigatn in biefct 3 f 't Bon feitcn ©erbienii ausgefeht rear, nid)t jum Son- 
fliftc fuljitcn. ric 3ufid)crung Cunftigen ffioljiBerljaiteng, bic bic ©erbifrfjc SRcgierung 
bamalii gegeben (jat, bat fie nidjt eingcfjaltcu. Unter ben 5lugcn, jum minbcflen 
untct ftiUfdjtveigenber 'Dulbung beei amtlidjen ©erbiens*, 6,at bic grojjferbifdje "Propa- 
ganba in;roifd)eu fortgcfc|t an Sluabcljnung unb ^I'cufitdt jugenonvmen. GsS roiirbc 
rocbet mit bet IPiitbe nod) mit it)tem 9iccbt auf ©clbflerljaltung Bereinbat fein, 
rootlte bic cftctrcidiifd) Ungarifdjc Svegierung bem Sreibcu jcufeitg bcr ©ren^e nod) 
(angct tatentoS jufeben, burd) ba3 bie ©id)ctbcit unb bic 3"tegtitat i()tet ©cbicte 
bauernb bebtoljt roirb. S?ci bicfet ©ad)Iage iniiffcn ba3 33orger)en foroic bic gorbe- 
tungen bet Qfterceidjtfdj Ungatifdjcn Dicgicrung a\i getcdjtfettigt augcfeljen roetben. 

7 



— 26 — 

(Die Slntwort bet ©erbifdjen SHegierung anf bit gotbetungen, tocldjc bic Ofter< 
rcidiifdvungaufdic Kcgicrung am 23. b. 9)lt8. butd) itjrcn Skrtreter in 23clgtab .bat 
ftcUen (iijjcn, Iaftt inbeffen ctfenuen, baft bit maftgebenben Tsattorcn in ©ctbicn nidjt 
gefonnen fiub, Hire 6i8b,erige 'Politif unb ngitatorifcr)e 'Jatigfeit aufjugeben. <Der 
Ofierreidjifdj-Ungnrifrijcn Slegierung roirb bemnadj, mid fie nid)t auf tljre Stcdung 
nlS ©toftinadjt enbguitig SBerjidjt Iciftcn, nidjtS anbereS iibrig blcibcn, als ifjx-e gotbC' 
tungen burdi cineu ftarfen THurf unb nBtigenfaOte untcr bcr Ergreifung mititarifdjer 
SRafjnaljmen burdjjufejsen. 

Einjetne tujfifdie Stimmen bctradjten cs aii fclbftiicifidnblidics Nccbt imb ali 
bie ?lufga6e StufjtanbS, in bem Sonflifte jtoifdjen Ofterreid) -litigant unb ©erbien aEtio 
fiit ©erbien 'Pattet ju etgtctfen. ^iir bit an3 ftneirt foldjen ©djritte SRufjlanbB 
refultierenbe europdifdje Conflagration glaubt bic 9!owoje TOrcmja fogar ©eutfdjlanb 
Beranttoortlid) madjen ju biitfen, fofettt ei nid)t Cftcneidi-lliigavu jum 9iad)geben 
Beranlajjt. Die rufjifdje *Picffc ftcllt hjctmit bic SSet^altniffe auf bcu Hopf. 9tid)t 
Ofterreid) Ungavn I;at ben fionflift mit ©erbien b/erBorgerufeu, fonbetn ©erbien ift 
ti gewefen, ba§ bind) cine ffrupellofe Segunftigung grojjferbifdjer Slfpirationen aud) 
in Jcilcn bet 6ftcrrcidjifd)=ungarifd)cn 3)tonaid)ie bicfe fclbfl in ibvee Ggiftcitj ge- 
fdljrbet unb guftdnbe gefdjaffeu hat, bic fdjlieftliefc) in bet ftci>cll)aftcn Jut Bott 
©crajemo iljrcn 2lu8btud gefuubcu Ijaben. SBenn SRufjlanb in bicfcin Konflitte fiit 
©erbien cinttcicn ju ntiiffen gtaubt, fo ift baa an fid) getoijj ein gute8 Sfledjt. 68 
mufi pel) abet baritber flat fein, baft e8 bamtt bie fctbifdien Seftrebungen auf Untcr- 
(jofjlung bet SjiftenjBebingungen bet bfterreidjifeb/ungarifdjen ©onardiic jii ben feinigen 
mnri)t, unb bafi c8 allciu bie SDerantmortung bafiit ttdgt, tocnu au8 bem Sfterrcidiifdj' 
feibifdicn S>inbcl, ben allt iibrigen ®ro|jnidd)te ju tofatificren wiiufdicn, ein curopd- 
ifd)ct firieg cutftctjt. "Diefe SSerantwortung 9tuftlaub8 liegt flat jutagc unb wiegt 
urn fo frliwcrcr, at8 ©raf Serdjtolb Siufttanb ofpjiefl etttdtt l) llt ; C <S beabfidjtige 
weber fetbifebe ©cbiet8tei(e ju ctmctben nod) bcu 58eftanb bc3 fctbifdien KonigreidjS 
(liijutafien, fonbetn tootle tebiglid) *liul)e nor bcu fcinc Gjiftenj gefdtjibenbcn fctbifdien 
lltntricbeu Ijabcn. 

Tie Salhtng bet fiaifctlid)cn iliegictung in bicfet ,"s rti 9 e i|t bcutlidi oovge- 
jcidinct. ©ie Bon ben Spauftanrifteii gcgcu Cftcttcicfillngatn betricbene Stgitation 
ctfitcbt in ibtcm Enbjiet, mitlcls bet 3ttttuinmerung bet Tonauinouatd)ie bie 
Sprengung obet Sdjtoddjung bes rtcibunbes unb in ibtct gotgetoitfnng cine Biittigc 
JJfotietung bc8 ©eutfdjen ili'eidjs. llnfct eigenfteS 3 ntctt fi c ru f ""^ bemnad) an 
bie ^citc 6ftctreid)'Ungarn8. Tie s Pflidit, Guropa menu ivgenb miiglid) »ot eincm 
altgemtincn Stiege ju bcu'aljtcu, n>ci|t uni gleidijcitig batauf bin, biejeuigen Se- 
ftrcbungen ju untetftiijcn, bie auf bie Gofalifietung be8 ifoiiflitt-5 binjiclcn, gctteu 
ben Jlviditlinicn betjenigen "Pclilif, bic wit fcit nunmel)t 44 ~\al)xtn im 3"'" c Fl c 
bet ?luftcditetl)altung be8 cutopdifdicn gtieben? mit t^tfolg burdjgeffl^tt Ijabcn. 
©oUtt inbeS toiebev titboffen butdi ein Singreifen SRufttanbS bev SStanMicib cine 
Ettoeiteruug eifaljien, fo miitben mit gettcu uuferet SunbcSpftic^t mit bet ganjen 
3Bad)t beg SReid)8 bic 9Jad)6armonntd)ie ju uutctftii^cu Ijabcn. 91ur gejtoungen 
toetben wit jum ©diwette gteifen, bann abet in bem tuliigcu Scwufttfein, baft wit 
au bem Llnljcit tciue ©diulb ttagen, bas ein i\ticg ubet Suto'pai Bolter btiugen inuftte. 



— 27 — 

GTeleoframm fces jKaiferlidvn 25otfd>aftere in tOim 
an ben Xeid>efamler vom 24. Ouli 1914. 

©rof Serdjtotb tjat ()cute ben 9tuffifd)en ©efefjaftstrager ju fid) gebcten, urn 
iljm ciugefycnb nub freunbfd)aft(id) ben ©tnnbpimft Oftcueicb/Ungani'j ©crbicn gegen^ 
iiber auiieinanbeiiiifchcii Wad) Siefapitulienmg bev l)iftorifd)en Gntluicfehmg bcr 
tefctcn 3 a b re bctonte cr, bajj bic SBionardjie n icE> t baraii benfe, ©erbien gegeniiber 
crobevnb aufjutrtten. Qftertetd) Ungarn reevbe fciu fcrbifdjes Scnitoiium beaufurua)cn. 
S3 tjaltc fttitft batan f eft, baft bcr ©cbritt nut cine befiuiti»c 5VajjrcgcI gegeniiber 
ben fcrbifcr/eu SJSuljfeteien jinn 3'dc l)a6e. Dcotgcbrungen muffe dftcrreidi-Uiigam ©arantien 
fiiv cin iceitcres frciiitbfcf>af tUct)td 23erl)a[ten ©er&icnS ber 9J!onard)ie gcgemiber Oct' 
(angcii. 68 [iege it)m fern, einc 33crfcf)icbitng ber 9Jtacr)tDerI)altiuj|'e im Saltan t)er< 
bcifub,reu 311 ureHen. ©cr Wcfcbdftstragcr, bcr nod) fcinc ®eifungcn an3 ^Petersburg 
f;atte, tjat bic ?lu8fut)uuigen bcS 5Dcint|rer8 ad referendum genommen mit bcr 
3ufage, fie fofort ©afanore ju unterbreiten. 



3tiilaqe 4. 

Celearamm be& Kaiferlicben 25otfd>afrers in Petersburg 
an ben Xeid)0?an?ler vom 24. 3uli 1914. 

©en ^nfyalt bc3 6rln[feS 502 tjabe id) focben in einer langcn Untcrrcbung 
init ©afanoro cingcr)enb oertoertet. 5>cr SRinifiet erging fid) gcgen Oftei'reid) Ungarn 
in mafjtofen Jlntlagen unb rear ferjr erregt 5luf baei beftimmtcfte erttdrtc cr: baf} 
tie fevbifd) bflcvrcidiifd)c Differenj jroifdjen ben SBeteiligten allcin auSgetragen recrbc, 
tonne SRufjtanb nnmbglid; jutaffen. 



gintoge 5. 

t)ev 2CaiferlieJ>c 23offd>aftcr in Petersburg 
an ben Xeid;6fan?ler. 

£elegramm t>om 26. 3uli 1914. 

©er &ftcrrcid)ifayilngarifd)c Sotfd)after i)attc l)entc nad)mi(tag cine langcre 
Unterrebung mit ©afanore. Scibe Bctciligte batten, reic fie mir naditjcr fagtcn, 
eincn befricbigenben Ginbrncf. 'Die Sterfidjerung bcS SotfdjafteiiS, baf! ffterrcid)' 
Ungarn tcinc Groberung8pl<ine t)abc unb nur cnMid) an fciucu ©renjen !l!ul)e Bnlten 
roolle, b)at ben 5)!inifter [idjtficr; bcrnt)igt. 



— 28 — 

Cclcgrattim c-es "&aifevli<fym 23otfd>afteri5 in Petersburg 
on ben 3\eid>sfan?lcr vom 25. 3ulx 1914. 

3)le(bung fiit ©. 9fi. eon ©cneral eon Cycling. 3 m KraSnoefager toutben 
kute bie $ruppenu6ungen ploMirb abgebroctyen, nnb bic SKcgtmcntcv fcljren in if>rc 
©atnifoncn fofort jutucf. Tic 2Jlanb»er jinb abgcfagt ttorben. Tic StiegSft^fllet 
murben hcutc fliitt im loerbfi ju Ofpjimn befbrbevt. liber ba? 33orgcfjcn Cflcrrcictya 
fjerrfdjt im 5<uiptquartier grofje Slufregung. 3* a & e & e " Giittrucf, baft nlfc 53or- 
bereitungeii fur bic SSlobilmac^ung gegen Cjlcvreicf) gctrojfm ivcrbcn. 



3(nlagc 7. 

{Teleatamm c<es Kaiferlioben 23otfcbafrers in Petersburg 
an ben Xeid>0famler r>om 2(5. Juli J 91 4. 

©er OTilitdrottarljr' bittct urn fibcrmittetung nad)|teljcnbcr 2Mbung on ben 
©encralftab : 

3ri) t)nlte eS fiir firmer, bag fiiv Sicro unb Obejfa bic SJlobitmadjung bcfo()tcn 
roorben ift. S3ti 5Qarfe$au unb SJloSfau ift bic3 fraglirf) unb 6et ben anbeven roofjt 
norb nicbt ber Jnlt. 

iMnlaflc 8. 

<Teleejrainm free "Kaiferlid>en Uonfulaf0t>ert»efers in 
2Coumo an &en Ketdxsratnler vom 27. jtali 1914. 

Ju Sorono SriegSjujranb cvfldvt. 



Ccleanimm c»ee Kaiferlidpen <6efanc<fen in 23ern 
an ben Xetd>efamler vom 27. duli 1914. 

Grfatjic jtiuedaffig, bojj fraiij6pfcb,e3 XIV. J?orp3 Slanbwr nbbwa). 



Mnlqge 10. 

£ele#ramm bes Xricbsran^lers an ben KaiferUcfcen 
23orfcbafter in £onfcon. 

ZJringcnb. 26. Jul i 1914. 

0|terreidvUngarn [)at in Petersburg offijiclt unb feierlid) ertlart, bag ti 
feinen tcrritorialen ©eroinn in Serbien 6ea6fict>tigt, ben Scftanb be3 fii>nigrcid)8 
nic^t antafien, fonbern nur 3!u[)c fctjajfen rootle. 9cad) l)ier eingegangenen 9<ad)- 
ridjten ftcl)t in SJujjlanb Ginberufung meljrerer 9ieferDiften-3ar;rgange unmittelbar 
bcBor, mat! eiuer 9ftobilificrung aucf) gegen un3 gleidjfommen roiirbe. ffienn fid) biefe 
9hd)ric6tcn oeroatjvljeitcn, fo roerben roir gegen unfern SBunfcb, ju ©egenmafjregeln 
gejioungcn. Slud) rjetite nod) get)t unfet ©treben bab,in, ben Sonflift ju lotalificren 
unb ben curo)>aifd)en grieben ju err)alten. ffiir bitten bat)er in biefem Sinne in 
^Petersburg mit aHem 9(ad)brucf ju roirfen. 



gtnlttflC 10a. 

£Vle<jramm be& Xeicberan^lers an box Kaiferlidxn 
23orfd>after in Paris. X>om 26. Ouli 1914. 

31iid)bem Cfierreid)-Ungarn !Ku|lanb offijicH ertlart b,at, bag eiS teinen territorialcn 
©eroinn beabfidjtigc, ben SScfranb beg SonigreidjS nid)t antaftcn rootle, liegt bic 
Gntfdjeibung, ob cin europdifdjer .ftrieg eutfleljen fott, nur bei iRufilanb, bag bie 
gefamte S3erantroortung ju tragen fiat. SBir oertrauen auf ftrantreicf), mit bem mir 
un3 in bem 2Bnnfd)C urn bie Grtjaltung bcS europaifd)en ^ricbenij einS roiffen, 
bag eS in Petersburg jcinen Ginflufs in berurjigenbem £inne gettenb madjen roirb. 



3tnfqflc 10 b. 

^Tdccjramm bce> Xeicbsfan^lers an ben "Kaifevlicfyen 
23offd>aftt'r tn Petersburg vom 26. Juli 1914. 

9!ad)bem Ofterrcid) fein tcrritorialeS ©caintereffement feierlid) ertlart b)at, 
rul)t bie Beranttoortung fiir cine enentuclle ©totung bet! europaifdien gticbens 
burd) eine rtifjifdjc ^nterocntion "Kein auf ^lufilmib. SBir Oertrauen immer nod) 
barauf, H\\ SJufjlanb leinc @d)ritte unternefymen tuirb, bie ben europaifdjen gricbcii 
etnjilid) gefaljrben roiirben. 



-JlnlrtflC 11. 

telegramm bee "Eaiferlicben 23otfcbaffcr0 in Petersburg 
an ben Xei4>efanjlcr vom 27. 3ult 1914. 

5t!ilitdrattad)e mclbct iiber ©cfprtic^ mit ®rieg3mini|tcr: 

©afanoro tmbe bicfen tektereu gebeten, mid) tiber t>ic Cage aufjutfoten. Ser 
fiiicgSininifler I)at mil fcin GE)renroott bornuf gcgeben, bafj nod) feinc SDiibilinadjungg. 
otbte ergangen fci. S.i itnitben Icbiglid) oorlaufig Sorbereitungsmafittaljnitii getvoffen, 
abcr c3 fci fcin 9iefert>i|t eingejogen unb fcin Spferb ou8gef)o6en. 2Benn Ofteraid) 
bic ferbifd)c ©tenje iibcrfdjreitcn locrbc, fo toerben bicjenigen Mitatbejirfe, bie nuf 
Oftetreirb, gcvidjtct finb, Hicm, Obcffa, SDloSfou, fiafan, mobilijicrt toerben. "Dicjenigcn 
an bcr beutfdjen 3ront ; 3Bar|"d)au f ffiilna, ^Petersburg untcr fcincn Umfianben. SJlan 
uninfdic ben grieben mit Deutfdjtanb brtngenb. Sluf mcine Jrage imd) bent ^mit 
ber 9Jcobi(mar$ung gegen Ojterreid) erfotgte 5ld)[c(juden, unb eg tourbe ouf bic ®iplo- 
matic (jingetoiefen. 3* f a 9 tf bem 3Jcini|tei, bafj man bic frcunb|'d)aftlid)cn Slbjidjtert 
bet un3 tourbige, aber aud) bie altein gegen Oftcrrcid) gcrid)tete 3)}obilmad)ung als 
fctjr bcbrotilid) anfetjen merbe. 



atwiaflc 13. 

Cdegramm bee Keiebetanylere an ben Kaifcrlicben 
25otfdxifter in tonbon vom 27. 3uli 19J4. 

Son eincm S3orfdjtag Sir Gbrcarb ©rcn't), eittc fionferenj in Bonbon ju oieren 
abjufjalten, ift l)icr bidder nid)tS befannt. G8 ift fur uttd unmoglid), unferen SSunbeS- 
genp(|en in feinet SluSeinanberfefjung mit Serbicn not cin euiopjifrtics ©erid)t ju 
jiet)cn. Unfevc SermitteumgStatigfeit nuijt ftct> auf bie ©efaijr eincs Dfterreidiifd}. 
mf[ifd)en fionfliftes bcfdirdnfen. 



3( illume i:t. 

Celcoframm bee Keicbefamlere an ben "Kaiferlicfyen 
25otfcbafter in Conbon vom 25. 3uli 1914. 

Die oon ©ir Ebtoarb ©rci) jwifdjen bftcvvcid)ifd) ■ ferbifebem unb ojierreidt/ifd)' 
riiffififjem fionflitte gemad)te Untevfd)cibung tvifjt pollfommen ju. SBir tooden cben- 
foroenig lvic Snglanb un3 in erfteren einmifdjen, unb naaj toie uor oertreten air ben 



— 31 — 

Stanbpunft, tufj bicfe 3 rn 3 c baburrf) lofnlifiett blciben miifi, bnjj alle ?)!5d)te fid) 
bcr Ginmifduing entbaltcn. Gs ijt besl)<ilb unfete bvingenbc fioffiiung, biifi Siujjlnnb 
fief) cincs jcben attitten Giugtip enllj.iltcn limb, iin Seroujjtffin feinet SBern»tn>Dttuiig 
unb bee GrnftcS bet Situation. 5Cit fiub, falls tin 6ftctteid)ifd)-riif(ifd)ct ©trcit 
entftcljen fofltc, bctcit, BorBetjaltlidj inifcrcr beEannteu SunbniSppidjtcn, jroifefyen !)iu[j' 
lanb unb Cflerteidj mit ben anbeven ©tojjtndd)ten jufommen cine Skrmittlung cm- 
tteten ju laffen. 



"itiilitflc 14. 

Cclecrramm ^ce Xcic^sfan^lcrs an ben JKaifcrlicbcn 
23otfcbafrcr in Petersburg t>om 28. 3uli 1914. 

SSSit bemiiljen uns unausgefcht, SDicu ju oetanlaffcn, in 'Petersburg ^intd unb 
llmfang bes 6f[errcid)ifd)cn Sorgebens in ©etbien in einet unaujedjtbatcn unb Bojfcnt- 
lid) Siujjlanb befriebigenben JCcife flatjulcgen. £>ietan dnbett aud) bie iiijroifdjen cr- 
folgtc SriegsctEldtung nid)ts. 



3tiitnfle 15. 

Telegvamm bee> Keicbsran^lers an ben 2faifcrlicben 
23otfd>afrcr in Condon vom 27. Juli 1914. 

3Bit Ijabcn bie Setmittelungsaftion in SQJien in bem Bon ©it Gbroatb ©ten, 
ge)t>unfd)tcn Sinne fofott cingeleitet. ilbetbieS t)aben mit ©taf 8ctd)tolb and) ben 
2Bunfd) be3 yevtn ©afanott) auf biteftc 5lusfprad)e mit ®ien mitgeteilt. 



31ntage 16. 

{Telegramm bes Kaifcrlidvn 23offcbaffcr0 in 5Pien an 
bm Xcicbsfan?ler vom 28. 3uli J 9! 4. 

©raf Sctdjtolb bittct mid), Gucrer Gjjellciij fetneit Betbinblidjen TuinE fur 
SJJitteiiung bee englifdjcn 4>evmitte[ungsnetfd)laga ju fagen. Gt bemertt jcbod) baju, 
bafj nnd) Gtbffuuug bet geinbfeligfeiten fcitens ©etbiens unb nad) bet injwifdjeo 
erfolgten fttiegsevElatung et ben ©djtitt Guglaubs aid Bcrfpatct anfeljcn miiffe. 



— 32 — 

{Tcligramm fcce Xcicberan^ers an ^ctt tKaifcrlicben 
25otfcbafrer in Paris t>om 29. Ouli. 

£>ie ung liber ftanjbfifd)e ^ticgSoorbcteitungen jugctjenben 9iad)iid)ten mcb^rcn 
(let) foil ©tunbe ju ©tunbe. 3$ Site bicS bei bcr granjofijcben SHegietnng jut 
©pracbe ju bringen unb fie eiubringlid)ft batauf bjnjiitceifen, baff un8 berartige 
SRajjiiafmun ju ©rt)u^maj)rege[u jlinngcn roiitben. 5Dir roiitben fitiegttgefafjr profla- 
mieren miiffen, unb roenrt bici aud) nod) fcine Ginbcrufungen unb nod) nidjt 
SJtobUifierung bebcute, fo roiirbe baburcb, immetljin bie ©pannung erl)Sf)t toeiben. 
Sir fyofften fovtgcfe^t nocf> auf Erfjattuug bc3 3vieben8. 



Tekgxamm bee ^1?ilitarba>oUmdcbricjren in St. Peters* 
buroj an B. 1TI. ben Haifa r»om 30. 3uli. 

©eflern fagte mit gurfl 'Jtoubeffi, nacfjbem er riernniajjt fjatte, ba§ Guet 
SJlajefiat Jeiegramm on ftaifet 9lifoIaud fofott ubcrmittelt itmtbe: ©ottlob, bap eiu 
^elegramm 3') r e3 RolfwB gefommen iff. Gr fagte mit nun foebcu, ba3 Jelegramm 
Ejdttc auf ben ftaifer tiefen Ginbrucf gemadjt, abet ba bie Wobitifieruug gegen 
Oftcrreict) bereits befofjlen getoefen unb ©afonoto Seine Sftajeftiit u»ot)[ baDoii fiber- 
jeugt tjeitte, bafj ciS vitttjt me^r moglid) fei, juriirfjitroeidjen, fo tonne Seine SKajeftat 
Icibet nid)t3 mebr dnbetn. 3^ f a il' c ") m barauf, bie ©d)ulb an ben uuabfebbaren 
golgen trage bie fvii[)jeitige 9Jlobi(ifietung gegen bus) bocf) nut in cinen lofalen Srieg 
mit ©crbien oerioitfcltc Ofterreitb/Ungarn, beim <Deutfd)(anb8 Slntwort batauf fei wotjl 
flat unb bie iierantioortung fiele auf SRufjtanb, hxlrbcei Dfierreicb/lhtgarnS gujitfyerung, 
bafj eg tcttitotiale Grmcrbungen in ©evbicn in fcinct 2Bcife bcabfid)tige, ignoriert 
l)abe. £)|tetrcid)-Ungatn E>a6e gegen ©crbien unb nidjt gegen SRujjtanb mobilifiert, 
unb jum fofortigen Gingreifen fei fein ffltuub fiit SKufjfanb. 3^ f u 3 ie ^ eg torittten 
fjinju, bafi man in Tieutfcblanb bie SRebensatt iWnjjIanbS »roir fonnen unfete Stfibet 
in ©etbien nia)t im Sticf; (afjen •< nad) bem futrfitbatcu l!crbred)t'n von Scrajeroo 
nid)t me()t »er|M)e [}<h fagte ifim fdiliefilid), er inbge, hjenn ©eutfrtjlaubs ©tteitmadjt 
mobilifiett locrbe, fid) nidjt wunbern. 



gfnfaflc 19. 

Celecjramm bes Xetcbefan^lers an fcen Haifetlidpen 
23otfcbaftcr in Xom t>om 31. 3uli 1914. 

gottgefejjt ift Bon ung jiinfrficti Stujjlanb unb 6jretrcic6/Ungatn fomoljt butd) 
biteften Depefdjenlr'edjfet Seiner Sftajeftat bc3 KaifetS mit ©einet 5)?ajejtat bein given 
als and) im Seneljmen mit ©it Cbroatb ©vet) oermittclt ttovben. ©utd) bie Sftobili- 
jictung SRufjIanbS (inb jcborft nlle unfete S?emu[)ungen fc E»r etfcljwctt, lBcnn nid)t 
unmbgticfi, gemadit. 'Jro| bevubigeubet S3er[u§erungen ttifft SJufjIanb alien uu8 ju- 
gegangeiieu Starfjrirljtcn jufolge fo lveitge[)enbc SJiajinaljmen audi gegen unii, ba(i bie 
Page immcc bebioI)lid)et roirb. 



3tnt<»fle 30. 



I. Seine TITajcflat an ben 3aren. 

28. 3u(i 10-45 p.m. 

SDJit ber gtofiten 58euntul)igung [)6te id) Don bem Sinbruct, ben Oftetteidj'Ungatng 
S3orge!)cn gegen ©crbien in ©einem 9(eid)e Ijetuottuft. ©ic fftupeltofe Agitation, 
bie feit 3 llr ) ven '" Setbien gettieben movben ift, Ijat jn bem emboteuben SBerbtcdjen 
gefii()vt, beffen Dpfer Erjljetjog granj ?i ero ' nall ' ) geworben ifl. ©ct ®cijt, bcr 
bie ©etben ifjren eigenen Sbnig nnb feinc ©emafjlin morben [iejj, l)ertfd)t t)eutc 
nod) in jencm t'anbe. Stoeifelloii »r>irfl ©n mit mit baiin ubevcinftimmen, baji toil 
beibe, ©u nnb id) fomoljt, al8 atie SouDetane ein geineinfamei! 3 n ^ re il c baton 
rjaben, batauf ju 6efteE)cn, bajj nOe biejenigen, bie fiit ben fdjeujjlid)en SJtorb mo- 
ta(ifd) Detailttuottlidj (inb, iljre betbiente (Strafe eticiben. 

SlnbeterfeitS iibctfetje id) feineBtuegS, trie fdjmierig e3 fiit ©id) unb ©eine 
SRegietung ift, ben ©tiomungen bet bffentlicbcn SJlcinung entgegenjuheten. Gingebcnf 
bet [)etjlid)en gteunbfcrjaft, bie un8 beibc (eit (anger 3 c 't "lit feftem Sanb »et= 
Binbet, fche id) baljet meinen ganjen Einftujj ein, urn Oftetteicb/Uugain baju ju beftimmen, 
tine offene nnb beftiebigenbe Betftanbigung mit Stufifalib anjuftrc&en. 3$ ^offe jit- 
»crfid)tlid), ba§ ©u mid) in mcincn Semufjungeit, alle ©djiuicrigfeiten, bie nod) ent< 
fte()cn tbnnen, ju befeitigen, untetftiijjen roitft. 

©ein fc[)t aufvid)tiget nnb crgebenet gteunb unb S3ettet 

gej. 5Bilb;elm. 



— 34 — 

II. Der 3ar an Seine tffajeftat. 

<PcterSb>ff- Calais, 20. 3uti 1 p. m. 
3cf) Bin erfteut, bajj ©u juriicf in ©cntfd)[anb Bift. 3 11 bicfem fo ernftcn 
Jlugenblirf bittc id) <Dicf> inftiinbig ink ju t)elfeii. Gin fdimSblidjer ftrieg ift nn 
cin fdm\id)cg Canb cvflait morben, bic Gntrufiung bictiibcv, bic id) Dodig tcile, i(l 
in Siufilanb ungefjeuet. 3$ f cl ) e &onu8, t>a§ id) fer)r Balb bcra ©turf, bev anf 
mid; au8geii6t luirb, nid)t inc[)r metbe u>iberftct)en fbnncn unb gejtoungen fein mcrbe, 
Sftajjrcgetn jii ngveifen, bic jum Rriege f u Ejren incrben. Urn cincni Unghlcf, reie ti 
rin eutopaifdjei firieg fein hnitbe, Dorjubeugcn, bittc id) ©id) im Jiamen iinfcrct 
nltcn greunbfd)f)ft, alle§ ©it mbglictje ju tun, urn ©cinen BiinbeSgcnoffcn bauon 
jiitiictju^aUcn, JU locit ju get)eu. 

gcj. JHfolaua. 



3(ntafte as. 

III. Seine BTajelfaf an ^en 3aren. 

29. >li 0.30 p.m. 
3d) [)nbc ©cin $e(egramm erfynttcu unb teite ©cincn ffiunfd) nnd) 6rr)altung 
lt$ 3ricben3. 3 cbcrt ) f ann id) — te't iff) ©it in niciucm crftcn Jetegtamm fagte 
— Ofterreicb/itngarna SBotgefjen nid)t ali i>fd)mac)lid)en fivicg* bctrad)tcn. 6ftcrteid)- 
Ungarn ivcifs mis Grfaljtiing, ba(j @er6ien§ SSetfptedjungen, train fie nut auf bem 
Ropier ftcfjen, ganjfid) unjuberlaffig jinb. SWeinet Jlnfidjt nadi ift 6ftctteid)<Unga,rn§ 
53otgcf)en ali tin Berfud) 3a Betrad)tcn, Dollc ©arantie baiiiv ju crb.ilten, bap ©«6ien8 
S3erfpred)ungen and) ivirflid) in bic Stat umgefejjt metben. j" &< e f et Slnficfit luerbe 
id) beftcirft bind) bic Grflciriing Ui bfteneicbifrben fiabinettS, bag Oftetteidj-Ungatn 
fcine tcnitotialen GroBcrungeu auf .ftoftcn ©etbien§ BcaBfidjtige. 3 d ) mtme batjet, 
bofi e3 fut i)!ufi(anb butdjauS moglirt) ift, bem rifterteirf)ifd)'fet6ifd)en Ktieg gcgcufibet 
in b:t SRode bc3 3ufdjaiicre? 311 »cil)arrcn, ol)nc Eutopct in ben fd)redlid)ficn fivicg 
t)incinjiijiec)tn, ben <:$ jcmalS cvtebt l)at. 3* gfauBe, bafi cine birette Serftdnbigung 
jn>ifd)en Deinet SRegietung unb SBien mSglid) unb n>unfd)en8metl ift, cine SSetftdnbi' 
gung, bic — ivie id) ©ir fd)on te(egtapt)ierte — meine SRegietung mit aftcn 
ftrdftcn ju forbetn Bcmul)t ift. SRaturlid) luiivbcn inititStifdje SJkfjnatjmen Shift- 
[anb§, iDc(d)c feftetreidj-Ungatn nisi ©tot)ung auffaffen Ebimtc, ein UngfucE 6efd)[eunigen, 
bad iL'iv Beibe 311 I'cvmcibcn toiinfdjen, unb miirben and) meine ©tetiung afS Bet- 
mittlcr, bic id) — auf ©cincn Sipped on meine Jjveunbfdjiift nub §itfe — beteit' 
nullig angenommen fjiibe, unteigrabcn. 

gcj ©itticlin. 



jgwloge 33. 

IV. Seine ^TajefMt an fcen 3arcn. 

30. 3uti 1 a. m. 
SDieiu ¥otfdiaftet ift nngefticfen, ©cine iRegietung auf bie ©efabjen unb 
frfiiuetcn fionfequetijcn einet 2)?obilifation fjinjuttxifciij bas! gfeic^e [)n6e id) T5it in 
mcinem lejjtcn Seicgtaimn gefagt. fefterteidi-Ungatn hat mir gegen Setbien mobiii- 
fictt, unb jWar nut eincn %nl feiliet Slnnec. SBcnn SRufilanb, roie e§ je|}t nadj 
■Deiner unb ©einet Megietung OTittciiung bet %a& iff, gcgen fiftctteicb/Ungatn inobii 
madjt, fo ttmb bic SScrmittfcrrodc, mit bet ©u mid) in freunbfefjafttirfter ®eife 
betvauteft nnb bit id) auf ©eine auSbtudiidjc SSittc augenommen ()nbe, gefafytbet, 
roenn nid)t uumbglid) gemadjt. ©ie ganje ©d)tBete btv Gntfd)eibung tub,t jejjt auf 
©eincn ©cfyultctn, fie fyaben bie SSctantioottung fiit Sticg obct 3™°™ 3" ttagen. 

gej. 5Billjc[ni 

3tn(ac|c 23 a. 

V. Der 3ar an Seine "Xdajeftdt. 

^etethof, ben 30. 3u(i 1914, 1>> 20 p.m. 

3d) banfe ©it Bon Joetjen fur ©eine tafd)e Jlntioott. 3 C ^ entfenbe (jeute 
Slbcnb Satifljeff mit 3"ftuftion. ©ic jcgt in fitaft ttetenben militavifdjen SJlafj- 
nabmen finb fdjon boi 5 Jagen bcfdilofjcn tBOvben, unb jloat aug ©tiinbeii bet Set- 
ttibigung gcgen bic 33orbmitungen Oftcncid)8. 3$ ^ ff c Bon 9 an 3 cm S e tj en / bajj 
bicfc SRajjnaljmen in tciner 5Ceife ©cine ©tedimg a(3 Setmittiet bccinfluffcn rcetben, 
bie 3^) f c f) r ') ot fy anfdjtagc. 2Bit btaucben ©eincn flatten ©tud auf Sfteneid), 
bamit ci ju cinct Sctftiinbigung mit un3 fommt. 

9lico[au3. 



-jlnlnnc 24. 

Celearamm Z»c& Xeicbefan^rs an ben Kaifcrlicbcn 
23otfcbafter in pdersbura vom 31. Juli 19J4. iDrino5<m&. 

2to| nod) fd)ioc6enbet SJeimittefangSBetljanblungen unb obtt>of)l wit felbft 
bii jut ©tunbe (einertci 9ftobiImad)ung3majiuaf)mcu gettoffen fjaben, f)at 9?ufjianb 
ganje Jltmce unb Jliottc, alfo aud) gegen unS, mobilifiert. ©utd) bicfc tuffifdjcn 
SJlnjjnafymen finb wit gtjloungen tuorben, jut ©idjerung bc3 Sicidjg bie btol)cnbc 
StiegSgefa^r auBjufptedjen, bie nod) nicbt 2Jiobitifictung bebcutet. ©ie 5ftobiIijierung 
mufj abet fotgcu, fails nid)t SJufjlanb binnen jwblf Stunbcn jebc SticgsSmafjnahme 
gegen unS unb Oftctteidj-Ungatn einjlcdt unb un3 Ijictubet beftimmte Gttlatung 
abgibt. SMtte bie3 fofott ©ertn ©ajonow mittciien unb ©tunbe bet Sftitteilung 
btat)ten. 



— 36 — 

Mwtnflc as. 

Cclcgramm be& Xricbsfanjlcrs an ben Kaif<?rltd>en 
23orfcbaftcr in Parts t»om 31. Ouli 1914. 2)rino(cn&. 

SRujjianb [)at tvo^ unfcrcr nod) fcbvoebenbcn BermitteiungiSaftion unb obroobl 
h>it felbft fcinerlei SJlobiImadc)ung8majjnaf)men getroffen bcibcn, 5)lobi[jrmcr/utig fciner 
gefaintcn Jlrmee unb ftiotte, alfo audj gegeu un§, Dcrfiigt. 5Bir babcn bamuf 
brobcnbcu SriegSjufranb erftatt, bcm SJlobiimadjung folgen mu[i, fads' uid)t JRuglanb 
6innen 12 Stunben altc firiegSmajjnaljmen gegcn un3 unb Ofterrcicb cinftetle. Die 
SStobilmadjung bcbcutct unticrineiblid) ftricg Sitte fraiij6|ifd)e SKegicrung friigcn, 
ob fie in einem ruffifcbbeutfcbcn Sricgc neutral bleiben roiU. 5lntroott mufi binnen 
18 iStunbcn crfoigen. ©ofort ©tunbe bcr geftcltten Mnftage brazen, ©rofjtc Sile 
ge6otcn. 



iintafte 26. 

Teiegvamm bce> Xcicbefan^lers an ^en Kaiferlicben 

23otfcbaffcr in Petersburg t>om I. 2(ugufr 12 52 p. m. 

iDringcni*. 

ftalli* bic Siuffifdic SRegierung fcinc befricbigenbe 5lnt»ort auf unfttt ftorbennig 
crteilt, \o tuoden (Sucre Erellciij ibr l)cute nad)mittag§ 5 Uljr (mitte[europdifd)e 3 e 't) 
folgenbc Grfiatung uberreidjen: 

Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise do 
la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avait 
ete expriine par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur 
d'Allemagne d'accord avee l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un rdle 
mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la 
Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite 
de ses forces de terre et de mer. 

A la suite de eette mesure menaeante motivee par aucun preparatif 
militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, I'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis 
d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial cut manque 
de parer a ce peril il aurait eompromis la seeurite et l'existence meme de 
l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de 
s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Russies 
en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse 
de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce refus, que son action 



— 37 — 

etait dirigee contre l'AHemagne, j'ai 1'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne- 
ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: 

Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire 
releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. 

Sitte Singang unb 3cttputift bet SluSfuljrung biefer Jnftruftion nad) tuffifd)cr 
3eit bringcnb brafyten. 

SSirtc 3^" ^Pdffe fotbcvn" unb ©d)uj unb ©efdjaftc Slmcvifamfd)et Sotfdjaft 
ubctgeben. 



£degramm be& ICaifcrticbcn "&otfd?aftev& in parte an 
den Xcichef angler pom J. 2tuguft 1 il^r 5 XlTin. nm. 

Sluf meinc roiebctfjoitc 6e(limmte ftragc, °& Jtanfteid) im ^atfe eincS beutfd)- 
ruffifrfjcn fitiegeS neutral BlciBc, evflSrte bcr 3)liui|1erpra(ibent mir, bajj Qtaufreid) 
ba8 tun tocrbc, lvag fcine 3 ntorc (T etl ^ m gcf>6tcn. 



Bdliii, grbnidt In brt WiidjBbru 



[Croion Copyright Reserved. 

GREAT BRITAIN 

AND THE 

EUROPEAN CRISIS. 



CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS 
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN 
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 




LONDON : 

FEINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 

Bt HAZELL, WATSON & VINEY, Ld., London and Aylesbury, 

Printers by Appointment to His Majesty the King. 



To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 

WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Fetter Lane, E.C., and 

54, St. Mary Street Cardiff ; or 

H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch). 23, Fsrth Street, Edinburgh • or 

B. PONSONBY, Ltd , 11G, Grafton Street, Dublin; 

or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, 

the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad, of 

T. FISHER UNW1N, London, W.C. 

1914. 

Price One Penny. 



CONTENTS. 



Introductory Narrative of Events 

Table of Contents of Correspondence laid before 
Parliament 

List of Principal Persons mentioned in the Corre- 
spondence, showing their official positions 

Part I. — Correspondence laid before Parliament 
Part II. — Speeches in the House of Commons : — 

(1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 

(2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 

(3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) 

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1911) 

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) 



XXVI. 

1 

89 
97 

97 
98 



INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 



(1.1 

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the 
Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, 
the 28th, he visitod Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress 
through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While 
passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both 
the Archduke and Duchess were killed. 

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout 
Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. 
Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support 
her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to 
take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. 

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, 
that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the 
responsibdity for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have 
encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in 
these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had 
swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection 
against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating 
in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when 
Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation 
should not " detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan 
over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly pro- 
claimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the 
annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of 
cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian 
nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government 
protested to tho Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the 
feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, 
coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, 
nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension 
she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising 
to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, 
however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-115 
— successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial 
expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. 

(2.) 

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept 
Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a 
feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its 
exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. 

But the dangers to European peaco which it involved were immediately 
evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb 
riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of tho Serb party in 
tho Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries 
of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. 
The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled lan- 
guage, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs 

a2 



that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, hy tho 
Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government 1 
knew that the peace might he disturbed. 

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested 
Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would 
reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public 
opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the inten- 
tions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The 
Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British 
and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to 
make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria 
and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question 
of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 
Sth July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific 
speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of 
the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at 
Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the 
Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian 
ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated 
in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious 
turn of events was necessary or even probable. 

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. 
It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known 
that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands com- 
patible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the 
opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was 
that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that 
Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which 
had apparently led to it, and which was -said to have originated in part on Ser- 
vian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. 
He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian 
Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual 
evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made 
the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-marth'l 
had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The 
Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Govern- 
ment to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi- 
gations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins 
implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian 
Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that 
one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem- 
bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Ser- 
vian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian 
courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before 
Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against 
Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th 
July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon 
some case that would be known ; hut, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had 
founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. 

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could 
be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was 
nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element 
which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she 
would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite 
recently assured that no new secret .'lenient had been introduced into the former, 
and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that 
tin 1 latter had remained unchanged so tar as we were concerned. Russia's 
interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of tho 
" Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan 
State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace, to that 
policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 
29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia 



was to be humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It 
was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburgh, but 
of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian 
people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as 
Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, 
"a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were, the facts of 
the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and 
retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the 
product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. 

(3.) 

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On 
the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade 
and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed 
towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was 
hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and 
literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the 
Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation 
of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified 
men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation 
of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of 
these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the 
front page of tho " Official Journal " a prescribed statement, which amounted 
to i. full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A 
very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of 
the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent 
nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. 

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between 
Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the 
whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and 
ponder. At tho outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the 
British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. 

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular 
movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the 
Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no 
interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and pro- 
gressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently 
used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the 
Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a 
State, tho acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence 
of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia 
did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two Govern- 
ments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, 
consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title 
to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on 
the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute 
affected the interests of Russia, then tho peace of Europe was at stake; and, 
from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that ho did not seo 
how Russia, interested as sho was in Servia, could take any but a most serious 
view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe 
must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said 
to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of 
forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take 
on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this 
spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European erisis. 

(4.) 

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ulti- 
matum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that 
"there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately 
expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was 
handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He 



confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for delibera- 
tion, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence 
Servia. 

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was 
to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; 
officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and 
said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone 
desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassa- 
dors in St. Pctersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, 
and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French 
Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be in- 
evitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian 
Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the 
Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called 
out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was 
a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, 
and with surprise had come universal alarm. 

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. 
Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great 
Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to 
join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was 
to " pass on " the message to Vienna. 

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of con- 
ciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; 
Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia 
became threatening." 

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were 
instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. 

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had 
expired ; and after all Servia did uot need advice. On the afternoon of 
Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an 
acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays 
necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject 
to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to 
the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. 
The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted 
— had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at 
Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that 
a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on 
his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. 
In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left 
Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. 

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey 
an hour or two before it was delivered. lie immediately expressed to Germany 
the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented 
itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through 
the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may bo 
guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador 
directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and 
that her concessions were all a sham. 

(5.) 

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one cpjestion 
before Europe— how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? 
It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop 
short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked 
it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the 
popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro- 
fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from 
Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of 



violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselve3 that they would he swept 
from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. 
Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition 
against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that sho 
would have to intervene if Servia were attacked ; but she promised Austria 
on the 27th that sho would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the 
Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria 
to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, 
saying it was too late. Sho declared war on Servia on tho 28th. Russia 
ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. 

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, 
and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss tho best means 
towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted ; Russia said she- 
was ready to stand aside, ; but Germany refused. She did not like what sho 
called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations 
between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have 
seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by tho Austrian declaration 
of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment 
for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss tlie 
Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what 
Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. 
Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had 
originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way sho would 
consent to work for a settlement. 

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, tho 29th July. 
Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops 
were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming 
from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed 
unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, 
was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had 
said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make 
representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the 
evening of the 28th tho German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador 
that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. On the strength 
of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in 
London on tho 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accord- 
ance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Govern- 
ment, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form 
he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he 
said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought 
possible if only Germany would press the button in tho interests of peace." 
The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock ori the evening of the 29th. 

(6.) 

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About 
midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's. Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He 
had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided 
Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from Franco but her colonies. 
He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invado Belgium, 
but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory woul i be taken 
from her. 

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, hut he added an exhortation 
and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the 
only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would 
prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly 
welcome a future agreement with her whereby the wholo weight of the two 
nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. 

For the next .two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, so"mo 
initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. 
But from the British point of view the faco of Europe henceforward was 
changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on tho 
frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in tho 



Vlli 

relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia 
had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal 
development ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had 
seemed no insuperable difliculty in keeping the peace; it was only a question 
of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But 
now a new filement of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now know 
that Geirnany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The 
independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one 
of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and 
tho nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern 
Euiope. Tf it was made impossible for a Oreat Power to invade them, war 
would become increasingly diikcult and dangerous. With the growth of the 
idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality 
of Belgium had been devised 8s a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, 
it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, 
and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of 
Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear 
out the main rivet of that peace. 

Germany's position must lie understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obliga- 
tions in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supremo 
military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be 
one of life and death ^Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, 
France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do> 
The neutrality of Belgium bad not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to 
prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in 
order to prevent the war now threatened The British Government, therefore, 
on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an 
engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for 
an engagement to uphold it. France gave the nocessarv engagement the same 
day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Hence- 
forward there could be no doitbt of German de-signs. 

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and 
Austria. On the '3tlt.li Germany bad suggested to Austria that she should stop 
as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Bate on tho same night Russia 
offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the 
conflict with Servia bad become a question of general European interest, and 
would eliminate from her ultimatum tho points whioh involved a violation of 
the sovereignty of Servis. As tho result of tins offer, Russia was able to inform 
His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria bad at last agreed to do 
the very thing she bad refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to 
discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British 
Government to assume the direction of theso discussions. For a few hours 
there seemed to be a hope of peace. 

(7.) 

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an 
ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation 
within twelve hours. F.very allowance must be made for the natural nervous- 
ness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisa- 
tion is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information 
in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the 
timo proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation 
was not publicly proclaimed in Germany -till the next day, the 1st August. 
France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State 
refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Ger- 
many, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should bo received, and in the 
afternoon tho Gorman Ambassador at St. Petersburgh presented a declaration 
of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain 
that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross 
tho frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from 
her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early 
on Sunday morning, tho 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a 
small independent State whose neutrality had heen guaranteed by all the Powers 



with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. 
War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. 

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Govern- 
ment failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now 
remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly 
set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, 
which are contained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed 
here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia 
first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise 
of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined 
to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained 
that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose 
influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the. knowledge 
that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He 
refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of 
force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, 
and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and 
to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a 
European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, 
but to Germany we gave three times— on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 
1st August— a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our atti- 
tude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium. 

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, 
the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as' follows: "In this solemn hour 
I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." 
It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true state- 
ment of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the 
other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the 
response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the 
peace of Europe. 

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. 

* See Part II. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

OF 

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 



NOTE. 



(1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467]. 

(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445]. 

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596]. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



To Sir H. Rumbold 



Sir H. Rumbold ... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de Bunsen 



Communicated by 
Austro- Hungarian 
Ambassador 

To Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan . 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



German Ambassador 



To Sir F. Bertie .. 



To Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 



To Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 20 



Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes that Austria-Hungary 
will publish her case against Servia before taking 
any action, and thus facilitate Russia counselling 
moderation at Belgrade 

Attitude of German Government. Secretary of State 
prefers not to interfere, and considers that Austria- 
Hungary has shown great forbearance towards 
Servia in the past 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador' re- 
specting note to be sent to Servian Government. 
Objections urged to insertion of time-limit. Dangers 
of European conflagration 

Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia 



Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Conversation with 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey de- 
precates Austrian demands as inconsistent with 
maintenance of Servian independent sovereignty ... 



Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs respecting results of M. Poincare's visit to 
St. Pctersburgh. Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
French Ambassador urged that His Majesty's 
Government should proclaim solidarity with them. 
Former hoped in any case His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would express strong reprobation of Austro- 
Hungarian action 

Views of Russian Charge d'Affaires on situation as 
expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 

Servian Prime Minister hopes ^ that His Majesty's 
Government will use influence in moderating Austro- 
Hungarian demands 

Views of German Government on situation. . German 
Government defend attitude of Austria-Hungary 
towards Servia, and consider matter concerns those 
States alone 

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of mediation 
by the four Powers 

Conversation with German Ambassador, who justified 
Austin-Hungarian action and demands, and urged 
localisation of conflict. Question of using influence 
at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in favour of modera- 
tion. Ambassador says Servian reply must not be 
a rrcro negativo 

Suggests lines of Servian reply to Austria-Hungary. 
To consult with Russian and French colleagues as 
to giving advice to Servian Government. Favour- 
able reply should be given on as many points as 
possible 



TAELB OF CONTENTS. 




Communicated by 
Russian Ambassa- 
dor 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir H. Rumbold ... 
(Telegraphic! 



19 


Sir 


R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


20 


Sir 


M. de Bunse-n ... 
(Telegraphic) 


21 


Mr 


Crackanthorpe 
(Telegraphic) 


22 




(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic' 



To Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914 
July 25 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna instruoted to request 
extension of time-limit allowed to Servia, and to 
urge that Austria-Hungary should inform Powers 
of basis of accusations against Servia. Recommends 
similar instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador ... 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that step 
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum. Austro- 
Hungarian Government did not threaten actual mili- 
tary operations. To inform Minister for Foreign 
Affairs , 

French Government have given Servia advice similar 
to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see 
No. 12) 

Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests 
that moderating advice be given at Vienna as well 
as at Belgrade 

Russian Government consider, that, in view of early 
expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel modera- 
tion at Belgrade Russia prepared to stand aside if 
mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs urges that Great Britain should 
act with France and Russia. Situation will be des- 
perate unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary 

Gorman Secretary of Stato admits intention of Austria- 
Hungary to take military action against Servia. 
His Excellency considers crisis might be localised. 
He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of 
Austro-Hungarian note 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria- 
Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional 
acceptance of her note 

Austro-Hungarian press comments snow that Servian 
surrender is neither expected nor desired. Austro- 
Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing un- 
conditional acceptance of note by 6 P.M. to-day 

Brief summary of projected Servian reply 



Russian and French representatives still without in- 
structions. In view of this and of proposed con- 
ciliatory Servian reply ho has abstained from 
advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia 
has already urged utmost moderation on Servian 
Government 

Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Govern- 
ment has left for Nish with diplomatio representa- 
tives 

Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude 
of His Majesty's Government. Latter cannot do 
more, but are anxious to .prevent war. Suggests 
that four other Powers should mediate at Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia 
mobilise. German co-operation essential 

Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
questionfor mediation between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it 

Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking 
for an extension of time limit of ultimatum to 
Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases 
her demands. He should support his Russian 

colleague 



TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
Sir H. Rumbold 
Sir G. Buchanan 

fNil-1 

To Sir R. Rodd ... 



To Mr. 
thorpe 



Crackan- 



Sir M. do Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic] 



Sir H. Rumbold ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 

„ Sir H. Rumbold 

„ Sir R. Rodd ... 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



Sir R. Rodd 



Communicated by 

Servian Minister 



Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 25 



Has informed German Ambassador of projected Ser- 
vian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that 
Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive 
it favourably ... ... 

Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made 
to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excel- 
lency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided 

Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready 
to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- 
Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to 
abandon certain political ideals 

Servian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded 
as imminent ... 

Reports conversation with German Ambassador. 
Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ... 

Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German 
Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia 
will not move unless Servian territory is annexed ... 

German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on 
to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of His 
Majesty's Government that they will take favourable 
view of Servian reply. German Government cannot 
go beyond this • 

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for 
conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will 
be instructed accordingly 

To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will 
agree to a conference in London, and to ask that 
French, German, and Italian representatives at 
Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade should 
urge on respective Governments that, pending deci- 
sion, all activo military operations should be sus- 
pended 

It is important to know if Fiance will agree to sug- 
gestion that the four Powers should urge moderation 
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh 

Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their 
prestige is involved 

Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ... 



Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian 
Government will not press for moro time. Russia 
cannot possibly remain indifferent if Scrvia is 
attacked 

Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined 
on war with Scrvia 

French Government accept proposals respecting con- 
ference. Necessary instructions sent to French repre- 
sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. 
Petersburgh 

German Secretary of State is opposed to British pro- 
posal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange 
of views between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Ger- 
many's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. 
Secretary of State more hopeful 



TABLE Of CONTENTS. 



Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de Bunsen 

To Sir R. Rodd ... 

Sir M. de Bunsen ... 
Sir F. Bertie 

French Ambassador 



Communicated by 
Russian Ambassa- 
dor 



Sir G. Buchanan ; .. 
(Telegraphic) 



1014. 
July 27 



Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs* conversation 
with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note 
to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that 
Entente Powers should present solid front to 
Germany 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to 
propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh 

German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires 
to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter 
works for peace. _ Germany should urge moderation 
at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for dis- 
cussion 

Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. 
Question whether Russia would take action if 
Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian 
territory 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. 
Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards 
Servian reply, which seems already to involvo deep 
humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept 
assembled, but this is no moro than proof of anxiety 
felt in country 

Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in 
proposal for conference. His Excellency will recom- 
mend to German Government that Austria-Hun- 
gary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military 
operations pending conference 

Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against 
Servia ... 

French Government agree to proposals of His 
Majesty's Government for conference between the 
four Powers in London 

French Government in favour of British proposal for 
conference, and are ready to send instructions 
accordingly 

Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Govern- 
ment are in favour of British proposal for confer- 
ence, failing commencement of direct Austro-Rus- 
sian conversations 

Communicates telegram received from Russian Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Govern- 
ment appear to havo taken no measures to induce 
Austria Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia- 
and suggesting His Majesty's Government approach- 
ing the German Government. Key of the situation 
really at Berlin 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his 
influence at Belgrado to induco Servia to give, satis- 
faction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity 
must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be re- 
spected. He has proposed direct conversations with 
Austria, _ but would bo perfectly ready to stand 
aside if idea of conference accepted 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




1914. 
Bunsen ... July -7 
(Telegraphic) 



R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 



tTelegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



E. Goschcn 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunser 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Ttiegraphi. 



(Telegraphy 



Mr. Crack.antharpe .. 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraph! 



To Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic: 



(Telegraphi 



Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador 
and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localiso 
war. Russia will restrain Scrvia as long as possible, 
in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Am- 
bassador urged that conversations should be con- 
tinued at St. Petersburgh 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs* views as to con- 
ference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of 
Scrvia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on 
recommendation of four Powers 

Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. 
Grey's observations to German Ambassador will 
tend towards peace ... 

Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His 
Maji sty's Government. Gorman Ambassador has 
informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria- 
Hungary would respect integrity of Scrvia, but gave 
no assurance, respecting her independence ... ... 

Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of Stato has 
used similar language to' French and Italian Ambas- 
sadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking 
that German Government object only to form of 
proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr von 
Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines 
of cooperation 

Minister for Foreign Affairs .states that Austria cannot 
delay proceedings against Scrvia, and would decline 
any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing 
could now prevent conflict 

Conversai ion with Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, who says that war will bo declared 
to-day, and that no mediation could bo accepted. 
Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first 
and quarrel with Scrvia second 

Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar 
instructions to Berlin and Vienna 

Informs of conversation between Servian Charge 
d' Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Scrvia might still accept whole Austrian note if 
certain explanations were given her. Such explana- 
tions should bo given to the Powers, who should 
then advise Servia to accept without conditions ... 

Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govern- 
ment pending result of offorts for peaceful solution 

Declaration of 



by Austria-Hungary against 



Refers to No. 45. Proposed conference would not 
I . i rati I .it private and informal discussion 
to find a settlement. Agrees that direct con- 
versations between St. Petcrsbufgh and Vienna 
would be preferable 

Ready to propose that German Secretary of State 
-V ill ; ; < st method of mediation by four Powers. 
Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro- 
Russian conversations is seen 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Subject. 



1914 
To Sir G. Buchanan July 28 
(Telegraphic) 



70 Communicated by 
Count Bencken 
dorff 



Sir E. Gosehen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunsen .. 
(Telegraphic] 



(Telegraphic] 



Sir E. Gosehen 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Gosehen... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



M. de Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of 
direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires fur- 
ther as to proposed action at Belgrade 

Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Rus- 
sian Government will announce partial mobilisation 
on the 29th July; that. Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna has not been recalled ; and that mediation 
by His Majesty's Government is most urgent 

Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex- 
pressed anxiety to work in concert with England. 
Reasons for German refusal to support proposed con- 
ference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no 
longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion 
at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir 
E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see 
No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia 
would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador 
that Germany should use her influence at Vienna ... 

Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia 



Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian 
Government have declined Russian Government's 
suggestion of direct discussion between Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador con- 
siders conference in London of less interested Powers 
the only solution 

Chancellor states it is too late to act on British sug- 
gestion that Servian reply might form basis of dis- 
cussion. German Government had informed Aus- 
trian Government that they quite Understood that 
latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that 
demands on Servia should be carried out in their 
entirety. Austrian Government had been advised 
to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive 
object .. 

German Secretary of State states that any appearance 
of pressing moderation on Austria would probably 
precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by 
reports of military measures in Russia and Franco 

Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chan- 
cellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the 
peace of Europe. This country will continue to make 
every effort in that direction 

Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communi- 
cated substanee of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. 
As Austria has definitely declined direct conversa- 
tions. Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to 
German Ambassador return to idea of conference. 
Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian 
proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador 
says his Government are continuing to exert friendly 
influence at Vienna 

French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps 
can now be taken to stop war with Servia. _ Italian 
Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet 
if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding 
engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian terri- 
tory or destroy independence of Servia 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Sir R. Rode! 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Beaumont 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackonthorpo 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen.. 
(Telegraphic' 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. RocTd 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir E. Goschen.. 



1914. 
July 29 



Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that 
German Secretary of State might propose formula, 
and that this might be concomitant with direct 
Austro-Russian conversations 

Understands that Austria will not accept any form 
of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin 
and Vienna 

Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably 
beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of 
Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian 
army from Mussulman population in Servia 

Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey 
his thanks for statement in the House of Commons 
on the 27th July 

German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endea- 
vouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His 
Majesty's Government urge that Germany should 
suggest some method by which the four Powers 
could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia 

German Secretary of State offers that in return for 
British neutrality German Government would give 
every assurance that they would mako no territorial 
acquisitions at the expense of France. He was 
.unable to give similar assurance as regards French 
colonics. If neutrality of Holland were respected by 
Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assur- 
ances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Bel- 
gium depend on action of France, but at end of war 
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not 
sided against Germany 

In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for 
further discussions on basis of Servian note. His 
utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna 
to prevent or moderate any further Austrian 
demands on Servia 

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. 
Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador 
that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily 
stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other 
hand, the present case is different from that of 
ico a few yens back, and if France becomes 
involved His Majesty's Government, who are free 
from engagements, will have to deride on their 
attitude in the light of British interests 

Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro- 
Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct 
conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg!! 
impossible, it is most important, in the event of 
German Chancellor failing in his efforts at media- 
tion, that Germany should propose some method 
of co-operation between the four Powers 

Has warned German ^ Ambassador of possibility of 
British intervention in certain .eventualities 

Has communicated to German Ambassador text of 
Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see 
Nos. 61- and 81). Discussion of question of mediation 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




To Sir M. de Biinsen 



To Sir R. Rodd 



Communicated by 
Count Bencken- 
dorff 



Sir M. de Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
who attempted to justify attitude of his Government 
in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining 
satisfaction from Servia 

Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Govern- 
ment suggest that German objections to mediation 
might bo met by some change in procedure 

Communicates telegraphic correspondence between 
himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro- 
Hungarian Government have been urged by 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate 
towards Servia ; (2) negotiations with German 
Government through Russian Ambassador at 
Berlin ; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline 
direct conversations with Russian Government 

In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable 
steps may be taken unless Germany with the other 
three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambas- 
sador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious 
engagement takes place before agreement is reached. 
Reports interviews between the Russian and French 
Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ... 

Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could 
not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in mea- 
sures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav 
provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme 
anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German 
Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian 
note was probably known beforehand 

Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia 
had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat 
meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian 
conversations being continued at St. Petersburg)!. 
Russian Ambassador more hopeful 

German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs that his Government would 
guarantee that Austria should respect Servian 
tegrity. Russia could not, however, agree to 
salage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions 
subject to which Russia would stop military pre- 
parations 

German Government .have asked Austrian Govern 
menfc whether they would accept mediation on basis 
of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and 
issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's 
Government induco Russia to agree to above basis 
for a,n arrangement? German Secretary of State 
says that Russian mobilisation has increased diffi- 
culties of situation. German Government have 
mado no special military preparations 

Conversation with President of the Republic regard- 
ing German communication to St. Petersburgh as 
to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demo- 
bilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect 
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain point, in 
the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace 
depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. 
Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to 
support Franco would prevent Germany going to 
war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Rorld 
(Telegraphic) 



E. Goschen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir K. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914 

July 30 



German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany Could 
prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands 
if Servia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ... 

Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot 
entertain German proposals to sccuro British neu- 
trality. For many reasons suoh a bargain with Ger- 
many at tho expense of Franco would be a disgraco 
to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot 
bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian 
neutrality. His Majesty's Government must pre- 
serve full freedom of action. Best way of main- 
taining good relations with Great Britain is for 
Germany to work with her for the preservation 
of peace 

Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must 
not count on Great Britain standing aside in all 
circumstances ■ 

German Ambassador states that German Government 
would adviso Austria not to advance beyond Bel- 
grade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged 
Scrvia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate 
Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. 
Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (seo No. 97) in order 
to meet existing situation 

To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram 
to Sir G. Buchanan (seo No 103). Trusts that 
French Ambassador at St. Potersburgh will be nbic 
to induce Russian Government not to precipi- 
tate a crisis 

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting atti- 
tude of Great Britain in event of conflict between 
Franco and Germany ; encloses copies of notes ex- 
changed with French Ambassador in 1912, and dis- 
cmsi s their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow 

Austria has declined to continue direct conversations 
with Russia. Germany believed to be more dis- 
posed to gjvo conciliatory advice at Vienna owing 
to likelihood of British support for Russia and 
France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in 
favour of working with His Majesty's Government 
even if idea of discussions between four Powers 
is impossible 

Has asked German Secretary of State if he can sug- 
gest any course of action. Latter replied that he' 
was in communication with Vienna to save time. 
Chancellor was ''pressing the button" at Vienna 
to utmost of his power, and feared ho had perhaps 
gone too far 

German Chancellor states that owing to Russian 
mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These 
proceedings had come just when the Czar had ap- 
pealed to the Emperor and when the latter was 
about to mediate at Vienna 

Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His 
Majesty's Government to his appeal for British 
neutrality (see No. 101). Chancellor desires time 
to reflect on it 

German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian con- 
versations have been resumed at Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh. German Ambassador Iras asked that 
Russia should suspend military preparations in mean- 
while. Has informed his Excellency that His 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



To Sir E. Gosehen... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Gosehen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie .. 

„ Sir E. Gosehen.. 

(Telegraphic 

To Sir F. Villiers .. 
[Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic! 



121 Sir E. Gosehen 

(Telegraphic^ 



July 31 



Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this 
unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops 
into Servia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of 
conversations 

If settlement cannot bo reached by direct Austro- 
Kussian conversations, suggests that four Powers 
should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Aus- 
trian demands from Servia, provided latter's 
sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has in- 
formed German Ambassador that if Austria and Ger- 
many could bring forward any fair proposal, His 
Majesty's Government would support it strongly 
at Paris and St. Petersburgh 

German Government are about to proclaim "Kriegs- 
gefahr," to bo followed by immediate mobilisation. 
Germany preparing for all emergencies 

Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to 
Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. 
Germany also making military preparations. Russia 
cannot allow Germany to get a start 

Enquires whether France and Germany will engage 
to respect neutrality of Belgium 



To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E. 
Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to 
maintain her neutrality 

French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's 
Government cannot undertake definite pledge to 
intervene in war, but that situation will be recon- 
sidered in presence of any new development 

Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German 
Ambassador demands answer from French Govern- 
ment by 1 r.M. to-morrow as to French attitude ... 

Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was 
not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary re- 
sents Russian intervention on behalf of Servia. Rus- 
sian Ambassador states that his Government have 
advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands 
so far as compatible with independence 

Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's 
Government had given German Government the 
impression that they would remain neutral. His 
Majesty's Government could not, however, at the 
present moment give France any pledge, though fur- 
ther developments might justify intervention 

New formula proposed by Russian Government. Rus- 
sian Government will maintain waiting attitude if 
Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and 
to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfac- 
tion to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary with- 
out prejudice to her independence. Czar has under- 
taken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier 
so long as conversation with Austria continues 

German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts 
to maintain peace, but cannot consider any pro- 
posal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented 
by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Sir E. Goschen 

iTelegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen... 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunsen .. 
(Telegraphic 



Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 



Luxemburg Ministei 
of State 



To Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphio) 



(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 
(Telegraphic 



134 Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



1914 

July 31 



Aug. 1 



July 31 



Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of 
State cannot reply to British request until he has 
consulted Emperor and Chancellor. " Ho doubts, 
however, whether German Government can give 
any answer. German Government alleges commis- 
sion of hostile acts by Belgium 

Conversation with German Ambassador respecting tho 
possible effect on British public opinion of any 
violation of tho neutrality of Belgium. Any pro- 
mise that His Majesty's Government should stand 
aside definitely refused ... i 

GermaD ultimatum to Russia. French Government 
anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's 
Government 

Neutrality of Belgium (see No 114). French Govern- 
ment are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium 
unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of 
violation at tho hands of another Power 

German Ambassador has been informed that French 
Government fail to understand reason for German 
communication respecting attitude of France in the 
event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117) Ger- 
man Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in the evening 

Mpbilisation of Austrian army and fleet 



Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115 Belgium ex- 
pects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, 
which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her 
power , 

German Government have informed Luxemburg that 
tho German military measures in that countiy 
do not constitute a hostile act. but are only to insure 
against attack from France 

British merchnnt ships hove been detained at Ham- 
burg To request immediate release Points out 
deplorable effect on British public opinion if deten- 
tion continued 

Russian Government report readiness of Austria to 
discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation 
not open to objections raised in regard to original 
Russian formula (see No 971 Hopes that German 
Government may be able to make use of Russian 
communication in order to avoid tension 

Russia consents to British formula for basis of media- 
tion (see No. 103) 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian 
Government that Austro-Hungarian Government 
are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum 
to Servia. Russian Government hope that these 
discussions will take place in London with partici- 
pation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's 
Government will assume direction of them, 

Conversation with President of Republic. German 
Government are trying to saddle Russia with the 
responsibility for present situation. President jus- 
tifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobi- 
lising, so France must also. French troops are kept 
10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made 
incursions into French territory. French Govern- 
ment do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



To Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de Bimscn 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunse.n 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschcn 

(Telegraphic) 



(Tejegraphic) 
(Telegraphic) 



Has received reliable information that Austria-Hun- 
gary has informed German Government that she 
would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation 
between Austria-Hungary and Scrvia. Military 
action would continue against Scrvia for present, 
but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian 
counter measures would cease. He should inform 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 

General mobilisation in Franco ordered owing to Gor- 
man military measures. French troops have left a 
zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ... 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance 
that Austrian? will respect territorial integrity 
cf Scrvia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has 
not "banged the door" on further conversations 
with Russia 

Conversation with German Secretary of State. Ger- 
man Government have ordered mobilisation. Ab- 
sence of reply to German ultimatum must be re- 
garded as creating a stato of war. Russian Govern- 
ment will be so informed 

Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German 
and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar 
and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that- 
Austrian domination of Scrvia would vitally affect 
Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts 
to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment and German preparations have forced Rus- 
sian Government to order mobilisation, and mobi- 
lisation of Germany has created desperate situation. 
M. Sazouof would adhere to formula contained in 
No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before 
the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia 
commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration 
in the Balkans 

French Mini-tor for War has impressed on British 
military attache that only way of securing peace 
was for Great Britain to take military action. Minis- 
tor cf War maintains that France has, by with- 
drawing from frontier, given proof of her desiro to 
abstain from any provocative act 

Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Ex- 
cellency thinks that German Government desired 
war from tho first. Explains nature of Russian 
mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention 
of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak 
earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain 

General mobilisation of German army and navy 

Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of 
State has promised to send orders to rolease steamers 
without delay 

German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain 
Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany 
and Russia arc in a stato of war 



TABLE OP CONTENTS. 



E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 

Luxemburg Minister 
of Slate 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goachen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschein 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir E. Gosr-hen 

(Telegraphic) 



151 Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Villiers 



To Sir E Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 

Communicated by 
German Ambassa- 
dor 

(Telegraphic) 

Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 

Aug. 2 



Subject. 



Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained 
in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour 
to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention 
was that mines were being laid and other pre- 
cautions taken 

Belgian Government confirms report that German 
force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 

Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory aro 
manifestly contrary to tho neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. 
Protest has been made to the German representa- 
tives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary 
of State 

Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting 
protection by British fleet of French coasts or ship- 
ping subject to consent of Parliament. Question 
of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect 
of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ... 

Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by 
force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. 
Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's 
Government trust that order already sent for release 
of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see 
No. 1«) 



Detent i 
infon; 



n of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No 
ation available 



French Government have offered five army corps to 
Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply 
that whilst sincerely grateful they do not- propose 
to appeal to tho guarantee of the Powers, and will 
decide later on their action 

Communication of French Ambassador to effect that 
Italy docs not consider casus feedcris has arisen ... 

Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have 
been informed that German Government have pro- 
posed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free 
passage through Belgian territory, and of German 
threat, in case of refusal. Belgian Government have 
declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance 
from German Government that they will not pro- 
ceed with threat or violate Belgian territory 

Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian 
reply. German Government have threatened to carry 
out their proposals by force 

To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's 
Government expect that thoy will resist attempt to 
infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Govern- 
ment prepared to join with Russia and France in 
assisting Belgian Government to resist German 
aggression and to guarantee independence and in- 
tegrity in future years 



To deman 
detained 



immediate 
German ports 



release of British ships 



Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian 
territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian 
neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ... 



4 German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liego 
summoned to surrender 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



To Six E. Goach«n... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 
Sir M. de Bunaan 



1914. 
Aug. 4 



8 
Sept. 1 



Subject. 



Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless 
German Government prepared to give assurance by 
12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium, His 
Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and 
to say that His Majesty's Government feci bound 
to take, all steps in their power to uphold then- 
treaty obligations 

Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records depar- 
ture from Berlin and journey to England 

Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment at Vienna, and incidents upon rupture of 
diplomatic negotiations. Reports departure from 
Vienna upon declaration of war 



LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR- 
RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. 



GREAT BRITAIN. 

Secretary of Slate for Foreign Affairs 
Permanent Under Secretary of Slate for 

Foreign Affairs 
French Ambassador ... . . 
Russian Ambassador ... 



German Ambassador . 

Austro-llungarian Ambassador 
Belgian Minister 
Servian Minister 

FRANCE. 

Pn si-dent of the Ilcpublio 

President of the Council and Minister fur 

Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for 

Foreign Affairs 
British Ambassador ... 
Russian Ambassador ... 
German Ambassador ... 
Austrian Ambassador 

RUSSIA. 

Minister for Foreign. Affairs' 

British Ambassador ... 

French Ambassador 

German Ambassador ... 
Austro-llu ngarian Ambassador 

GERMANY. 

Imperial Chancellor 

Secretary of St ite 
Undersecretary of State 

British Ambassxd •>■ 



Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir A. Nicolson. 

Monsieur Paul Cambon. 

Count Benckendori'f. 

Monsieur de Etter (Counsellor of 

Embassy-). 
Prince Lichnowsky. 
Count Mcusdorff. 
Count Lalaing. 
Monsieur Boschkovitch. 



Monsieur Poincare. 

MoDsieur Viviani. 

Monsieur Bienvenu. Martin. 
Sir Francis Bertie. 
Monsieur Isvolsky. 
Baron von Schoen. 
Count Scczsen. 



Monsieur Sazonof. 
Sir George Buchanan. 
Monsieur PaU'ologue. 
Count Pourtalcs. 
Count SzapSry. 



.. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. 

.. Ilerr von Jagow. 

.. 11' rr von Ziinmermann. 

Sir Edward Gosclien. 

Sir Horace Eumbold (Counsellor 
Embassy). 
.. Monsieur Swerbeiev. 
.. "Monsieur Jules Cambon. 
.. Count Szogycny. 



Russian Ambassador ... 

French Ambassador ... 
Austro-linngarian A mbassador 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ... Count Berchtold. 
Under Secretaries of State for Foreign f Baron Macohio. 

Affairs I Count Forgach 

British Ambassador Sir Maurice de Bunsen. 

French Ambissador Monsieur Dumaine. 

Russian A mbas ador ... ... ... ... Monsieur Sohebeko. 

German Ambassador Herr von Tschirscky. 

ITALY. 

Mnisterfor Foreign Affairs... 
British Ambassador 

BELGIUM. 

British Minister 

SERYIA. 

Prime Minister 

British dlinistcr 

Austro-IIungarian Minister 



Marquis di San Giuliano. 
Sir Kennell Rodd. 



Sir Francis Villiers. 



... Monsieur Pashitch. 
... Mr. des Graz. 

Mr. Crackantkorpe {First Secretary). 
-,. Baron Giesl. 



PART I. 

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 



No. 1. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir IT. Runibold, British Charge d? Affaires at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. 

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what 
was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. 

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some 
Step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. 

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count 
Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had 
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that 
it should be cleared up. 

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing 
if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. 

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do 
anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against 
Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. 

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed tha't they would act 
upon some case that would be known. 

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel 
moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand 
within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce 
for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things 
over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that 
any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. 

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 

I am, <fcc, 

E. GREY. 
* Austro-Huugarian Minister for Foreign AlTairs. 

No. 2. 

Sir H. Rwmbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, to 

Sir Echvard Grey. — (Received July 22.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. 

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming 
Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the 
conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this 
step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that 
question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and 
that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between 
those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Govern- 
ment on the matter. Ho had, however, on several occasions, in conversation 
with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro- 
Servian relations should be put on a proper footing. 

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude 
adopted towards Servia by Austria bad, in his opinion, been one of great 
forbearance. 



No. 3. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. 

Count * Mensdorff* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow 
morning to let me have ollicially the communication that he understood was 
being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what 
the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all 
be set out in the paper that he would give mo to-morrow, it is unnecessary 
to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the com- 
plicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. 

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make 
any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me 
probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at 
first sight. 

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be 
something in the nature of, a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an 
ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time- 
limit might inflamo opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by 
giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement 
and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was 
no time-dimit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that 
a time-limit could always bo introduced afterwards ; that if the demands w r ere 
made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might 
be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian 
case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government 
would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply 
from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last 
resort, after other means had been tried and failed. 

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since 
the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her 
own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said 
in a noto that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with 
Austria ; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation 
the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary 
for Austria to protect herself. 

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff 
had told mo this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful 
consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been 
expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but 
also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me 
that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh 
should uso it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the 
amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how 
reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that 
Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible 
consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great 
Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, Franco, Russia, and Germany — were 
engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so 
vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would 
be accompanied or followed by a complete collapso of European credit and 
industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state 
of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in 
the war, many things might be completely swept away. 

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible con- 
sequences of the present situation, but ho said that all would depend upon 
Russia. 

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just 
as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, 
ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if 
there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance 
to discuss them directly with each other. 

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would he possible, but he was 
under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very 
favourable recently. I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 



No. 4. 



Coimt Berchlold, Austria/a Minister for 
Aust/riam Ambassador in London.— 
July 24, 1914.) 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de 
ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre 
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note 
suivante au Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie : 

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de 
Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son 
Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal la declaration sui- 
vante :— 

" ' La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a 
pas ete atteinto dans ses droits 
par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie- 
Herzegovine et qu'elle se confor- 
mera par consequent a telle de- 
cision que les Puissances prendront 
par rapport a l'article 25 du Traite de 
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des 
Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage 
des a present a abandonner l'attitude 
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle 
a observee a l'egard de l'annexion de- 
puis l'automne dernier, et elle s'en- 
gage, en outre, a changer le cours de 
sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche- 
Hongrie pour vivre desormais aveo 
cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon 
voisinage.' 

"Or, l'histoire des dernieres annees, 
et notamment les evenements dou- 
loureux du 28 juin, ont demontre 
l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement 
subversif dont le but est de detacher 
de la Monarchic austro-hongroise cer- 
taines parties de ses territoires. Ce 
mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les 
yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est 
arrive a se manifester au dela du terri- 
toire du royaume par des actes de ter- 
roisme, par line serie d'attentats et 
par des meurtres. 

" Lc Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin 
de satisfaire aux engagements formels 
contemns dans la declaration du 31 
mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour sup-' 
primer ce mouvement: il a tolere 
I'aetivite criminelle des differentes 
societes et affiliations dirigees contre 
la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la 
presse, la glorification des auteurs 
d'attentats, la participation d'officiers 
et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse- 



Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, 
—{Commwnicated by Count Mensdorff, 

(Translation.) 

The Austro-Hungarian Government 
felt compelled to address the following 
note to the Servian Government on 
the 23rd July, through the medium of 
the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bel- 
grade : — 

"On the 31st March, 1909, the 
Servian Minister in Vienna, on the in- 
structions of the Servian Government, 
made the following declaration to the 
Imperial and Royal Government : — 

" ' Servia recognises that the fait 
accompli regarding Bosnia has not 
affected her rights, and consequently 
she will conform to the decisions that 
the Powers may take in conformity 
with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. 
In deference to the advice of the Great 
Powers, Servia undertakes to re- 
nounce from now onwards the attitude 
of protest and opposition which she 
has adopted with regard to the annexa- 
tion since last autumn. She under- 
takes, moreover, to modify the direc- 
tion of her policy with regard to 
Austria-Hungary and to live in future 
on good neighbourly terms with the 
latter.' 

"The history of recent years, and in 
particular the painful events of the 
28th June last, have shown the exist- 
ence of a subversive movement with 
the object of detaching a part of the 
territories of Austria-Hungary from 
the Monarchy. The movement, which 
had its birth under the eye of the 
Servian Government, has gone so far 
as to make itself manifest on both 
sides of the Servian frontier in the 
shape of acts of terrorism and a series 
of outrages and murders. 

" Far from carrying out the formal 
undertakings contained in the declara- 
tion of the 31st March, 1909, the 
Royal Servian Government has done 
nothing to repress these movements. 
It has permitted the criminal machina- 
tions of various societies and associa- 
tions directed against the Monarchy, 
and has tolerated unrestrained lan- 
guage on the part of the press, the 
glorification of the perpetrators ot 



merits subversifs, une propaganda trial- 
saine dans l'instruction publique, tolere 
enfin toutes les manifestations qui 
pouvaient induire la population serbe 
a la haine do la Monarehie et au mepris 
de ses institutions. 



"Cette tolerance coupable du Gou- 
vernement Royal do Serbie n'avait pas 
cesse au moment oil les evenements du 
28 juin dernier en ont demontre au 
monde entier les consequences funestes. 

''II resulte des depositions et aveus 
des auteurs criminels de I'attentat fin 
28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a 
ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et 
explosifs dont les meurtriers se trou- 
vaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes 
par des officiers et fonctionnaires 
serbes faisant partie de la ' Narodna 
Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en 
Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes 
a ete organise et effectue par des chefs 
du service-frontiere serbe. 

" Les resultats nientionnes de l'in- 
struction ne permettent pas au Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal de pour- 
suivre plus longtemps l'attitude de 
longanimite expcetative qu'il avait 
observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis 
des agissements concentres a Belgrade 
et propages de la sur les territoires de 
la Monarehie; ces resultats lui im- 
posent au eontraire le devoir de mettre 
fin a des menees qui forment une 
menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillite 
de la Monarchic 

" C'cst pour atteindre ce but quo le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se 
voit oblige de demander au Gouverne- 
ment serbe l'enonciation offieielle qu'il 
condamne la propagande dirigee contre 
la Monarehie austro-hongroise, e'est- 
a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui 
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de 
la Monarchic des territoires qui en 
font partie, et qu'il s'engage a sup- 
primer, par tons les moyens, cette pro- 
pagande criminelle et terroriste. 

"Afin de donner un caractere solen- 
nel a cot engagement, le Gouverne- 
ment Royal de Serbie fera publier a la 
premiere page du ' Journal officiel ' en 
date du 13/26 juillet l'enonciation sui- 
vante :— 

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee 
contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire 
l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent 
en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri- 
toires qui en font.partie, et il deplore 



outrages, and the participation _ot 
officers and functionaries in subversive 
agitation. It has permitted an 'un- 
wholesome propaganda in public in* 
struction, in short, it has permitted all 
manifestations of a nature to incito 
the Servian population to hatred of the 
Monarchy and contempt of its institu- 
tions. 

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal 
Servian Government had not ceased at 
the moment when the events of the 
28th June last proved its fatal conse- 
quences to the whole world. 

"It results from the depositions and 
confessions of the criminal perpetra- 
tors of the outrage of the 28th June 
that the Serajevo assassinations were 
planned in Belgrade ; that the arms 
and explosives with which the mur- 
derers were provided had been given 
to them by Servian officers and func- 
tionaries belonging to the Narodna 
Odbrana; and finally, that the passage 
into Bosnia of the criminals and their 
arms was organised and effected by the 
chiefs of the Servian frontier service. 

"The above-mentioned results of the 
magisterial investigation do not permit 
the Austro-Himgarian Government to 
pursue any longer the attitude of ex- 
pectant forbearance which they have 
maintained for years in face of the 
machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 
thence propagated in the territories of 
the Monarchy. The results, on the 
contrary, impose on them the duty of 
putting an end to the intrigues which 
form a perpetual menace to the tran- 
quillity of the Monarchy. 

"To achieve this end the Imperial 
and Royal Government see themselves 
compelled to demand from the Royal 
Servian Government a formal assurance 
that they condemn this dangerous propa- 
ganda against the Monarchy ; in other 
words, the whole series of tendencies, 
the ultimate aim of which is to detach 
from the Monarchy territories belong- 
ing to it, and that they undertake to 
suppress by every means this criminal 
and terrorist propaganda. 

" In order to give a formal character 
to this undertaking the Royal Servian 
Government shall publish on the front 
page of their 'Official Journal ' of the 
13 20 July the following declaration :— 



" ' The Royal Government of Servia 
condemn the propaganda directed 
against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the 
general tendency of which the final aim 
is to detach from the Austro-Huh- 
garian Monarchy territories belonging 
to it, and they sincerely deplore the 



Bincerement les consequences funestcs 
de ces agissements criminels. 

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal regrette 
que des oHiciers et fonctionnaires 
serbes aient participe -a la propagande 
susmentionnee et compromis par la les 
relations de bon voisinage auqucl le 
Gouvernement Ro3'al s'etait solcnnellc- 
ment engage par sa declaration du 31 
mars, 1909. 

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui des- 
approuvc et repudie toute idee ou ten- 
tative d'immixtion dans les destinecs 
des habitants de quelque partie de 
1'Autriclie-Hongrie que ce soit, con- 
sidere de son devoir d'avertir formelle- 
ment les officiers, les fonctionnaires et 
toute la population du royaume que 
dorenavant il procedera avec la der- 
niere rigueur contre les personnes qui 
se rendraient coupables de pareils 
agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts 
a prevenir et a reprimer.' 

" Cette enonciation sera portee simul- 
tanement a la connaissance de l'Armee 
Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa 
Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le 
' Bulletin officiel ' de l'armee. 

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'en- 
gage en outre : 

" 1° a supprimer toute publication 
qui excite a la baine et au mepris de 
la Monarchic et dont la tendance 
generale est dirigee contre son inte- 
grite territoriale ; 

"2° a dissoudre immediatement la 
soeiete dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' a con- 
fisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, 
et a proceder de la meme maniere 
contre les autres societes et affiliations 
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propa- 
gande contre la Monarchic austro-hon- 
groise; le Gouvernement Royal pren- 
dra les mesures necessaires pour que les 
societes dissoutes ne puissent pas con- 
tinuer leur activite sous un autre nom 
et sous une autre forme ; 

"3° a eliminer sans delai de Instruc- 
tion publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui 
concerne le corps enseignant que les 
moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert 
ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propa- 
gande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie; 

"4° a eloigner du service militaire 
et de l'administration en general tous 
les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables 
de la propagande contre la Monarchic 
austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal se reserve de 
communiquer les noms et les faits au 
Gouvernement Royal ; 



fatal consequences of these criminal 
proceedings. 

" ' The Royal Government regret that 
Servian officers and functionaries parti- 
cipated in the above-mentioned propa- 
ganda and thus compromised the good 
neighbourly relations to which the 
Royal Government were solemnly 
pledged by their declaration of the 31st 
March, 1909. 

" ' The Royal Government, who dis- 
approve and repudiate all idea of inter- 
fering or attempting to interfere witli 
the destinies of the inhabitants of any 
part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
consider it their duty formally to warn 
officers and functionaries, and the 
whole population of the kingdom, that 
henceforward they will proceed with 
the utmost rigour against persons who 
may be guilty of such machinations, 
which they will use all their efforts to 
anticipate and suppress.' 

"This declaration shall simulta- 
neously be communicated to the Royal 
army as an order of the day by His 
Majesty the King and shall be pub- 
lished in the 'Official Bulletin' of the 
Army. 

"The Royal Servian Government 
further undertake: 

"1. To suppress any _ publication 
which incites to hatred and contempt 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the general tendency of which is 
directed against its territorial in- 
tegrity ; 

"2. To dissolve immediately the 
society styled ' Narodna Odbrana,' to 
confiscate all its means of propaganda, 
and to proceed in the same manner 
against other societies and their 
branches in Servia which engage in 
propaganda against the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. The Royal Govern- 
ment shall take the necessary measures 
to prevent the societies dissolved from 
continuing their activity under another 
name and form ; 

"3. To eliminate without delay from 
public instruction in Servia, both as 
regards the teaching body and also as 
regards the methods of instruction, 
everything that serves, or might serve, 
to foment the propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary ; 

"4. To remove from the military 
service, and from the administration 
in general, all officers and function- 
aries guilty of propaganda against the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose 
names and deeds the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government reserve to them- 
selves the right of communicating to 
the Royal Government ; 



"5° a accepter la collaboration en 
Serbie des organes du Gouvernemcnt 
Imperial et Royal dans la suppression 
du mouvement subversif dirige contre 
l'integrite tci ritoriale de la Monarehie ; 

"6° a oiivrir imc enquote judiciaire 
contre les partisans du complot du 28 
juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ; 

" des organes, delegues par le Gou- 
vernement Imperial ct Royal, pren- 
dront part aux rechcrches y relatives ; 

" 7° a proeeder d'urgence a l'arresta- 
tion du Commandant Voija Tankosie et 
du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de 
l'litat serbe, couipromis par les resul- 
tats de l'instruction de Sarajevo; 



"8° a empecher, par des mesures 
efficaces, le concours des autorites 
serbes dans le tratie illicite d'armes et 
d'explosifs a travers la f rontiere ; 

"a licencier et punir severement les 
fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de 
Schabatz et de Loinica coupables 
d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de 
Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage 
do la frontiere ; 

"9° a donner au Gouvernement Im- 
perial ct Royal des explications sur les 
propos injustifiables de hauts fonetipn- 
naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a 
l'etranger, qui, malgre leur position 
officielle, n'ont pas hesite apri's l'atten- 
tat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des 
interviews d'une maniere hostile en- 
vers la Monarchic austro-hongroise; 
enfin 

"10° d'avcrtir, sans retard, le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal de l'exe- 
cution des mesures comprises dans les 
points precedents. 

" Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
attend la reponse du Gouvernement 
Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 
25 de ce mois, a heures du soir. 

" Un memoire concernant les resul- 
tats de rinstruction de Sarajevo a 
l'egard des ionctionnaires mentionnes 
aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette 
note." 

J'ai 1'honncur d'inviter votre Excel- 
lence de vouloir porter le contenu de 
■cette note a la eonnaissance du Gou- 
vernement ' aupres duquel vous etes 
accredite, en accompagnant cette com- 
munication du commentaire que voici : 

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement 
Royal serbo a adresse a l'Autrichc- 
Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est 
reproduit ci-dessus. 

Le lendemain meme de cette declara- 
tion la Serbie s'est engagee dans nne 
politique tendant a inspirer des idees 



"5. To accept the collaboration in 
Servia of representatives of the Austro- 
Hunganan Government for the sup- 
pression of the subversive movement 
directed against the territorial in- 
tegrity of the Monarchy ; 

"6. To take judicial proceedings 
against accessories to the plot of tho 
28th June who are on Servian terri- 
tory ; delegates of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government will take part in 
the investigation relating thereto ; 

" 7. To proceed without delay to 
the arrest of. Major Voija Tankositch 
and of the individual named Milan 
Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, 
who have been compromised by the 
results of the magisterial enquiry at 
Serajevo ; 

"8. To prevent by effective measures 
the co-operation of the Servian autho- 
rities in the illicit traffic in arms and 
explosives across the frontier, to dis- 
miss and punish severely the officials 
of the frontier service at Schabatz and 
Loinica guilty of having assisted the 
perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by 
facilitating their passage across tho 
frontier ; 

"9. To furnish the Imperial and 
Royal Government witli explanations 
regarding the unjustifiable utterances 
of high Servian officials, both in Servia 
and abroad, who, notwithstanding 
their official position, have not hesi- 
tated since the crime of the 28th Juno 
to express themselves in interviews in 
terms of hostility to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government; and, finally, 

"10. To notify the Imperial and 
Royal Government without delay of 
the execution of the measures com- 
prised under the preceding heads. 

"The Aiistro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment expect the reply of the Royal 
Government at the latest by G o'clock 
on Saturday evening, the 25th July. 

"A memorandum dealing with the 
results of the magisterial enquiry at 
Serajevo with regard to the officials 
mentioned nnder heads (7) and (8) is 
attached to this note." 

I have the Jbonour to request your 
Excellency to bring tho contents of 
this note to the knowledge of tho 
Government to which you are 
accredited, accompanying your com- 
munication with the following obser- 
vations : — 

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal 
Servian Government addressed to 
Austria-Hungary the declaration of 
which the text is reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declara- 
tion Servia embarked on a policy of 
instilling revolutionary ideas into tho 



subversives aux ressortissants serbes de 
la Monarchic austro-hongroise et a pre- 
parer ainsi la separation des territoires 
austro - hongrois, limitrophes a la 
Serbie. 

La Serbie devint'le foyer d'uno agi- 
tation criminello. 

Des societes et affiliations ne tar- 
dferent pas a se former qui, soit ouver- 
tement, soit clandestinement, etaient 
destinees a creer des desordres sur le 
territoiro austro-hongrois. Ces societes 
et affiliations comptent parmi leurs 
membres des generaux et des diplo- 
niates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des 
juges, bref les sommites du monde 
officiel et inofficiel du royaume. 

Lo journalisms serbe est presque en- 
tiercment an service de cetto propa- 
gande, dirigee contrc l'Autriche-Hon- 
grie, et pas un jour ue passe sans quo 
les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent 
leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris 
de la Monarchic voisine ou a des atten- 
tats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement 
contro sa surete et son integrite. 

Un grand nombre d'agents est appele 
a soutenir par tons les moyens l'agita- 
tioncontre 1'Autriche-HoHgrie et a cor- 
rompro dans les provinces limitrophes 
la jeunesse de ces pays. 

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens 
serbes, esprit dont les annales du 
royaumo portent les sanglantes em- 
preintes, a subi une recrudescence de- 
puis la derniere crise balkanique ; des 
individus ayant fait partie des bandes 
jusque-la oecupees en Macedoine sont 
venus so mettre a la disposition de la 
propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

En presence de ces agissements, 
auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est ex- 
posee depuis des annees, le Gouverne- 
ment de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir 
prendre la moindre mesure. C'est 
ainsi quo lo Gouvernement serbe a 
manque au devoir que lui imposait la 
declaration solennelle du 31 mars, 
1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en 
contradiction avec la volonte de 
l'Enrope et avec l'engagement qu'il 
tivait pris vis-a-vis de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal a l'egard de l'atti- 
tude provocatrice de la Serbie etait 
inspiree du desinteressement territorial 
do la Monarchic austro-hongroise et de 
l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe 
finira.it tout de meme par apprecier a 
sa juste valenr 1'amitie de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie. En observant une attitudo 
bienveillante pour les interets poli- 
tiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal esperait que le 



Serb subjects of tho Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and so preparing for the 
separation of the Austro-Hungarian 
territory on the Servian frontier. 

Servia became tho centre • of a 
criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation 
of societies and groups, whose objeel 
either avowed or secret, was the 
creation of disorders on Austro-Hun- 
garian territory. These societies and 
groups count among their members 
generals and diplomatists, Government 
officials and judges — in short, men at 
tho top of official and unofficial society 
in tho kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely 
at the service of this propaganda, 
which is directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary, and not a day passes without 
tho organs of the Servian press stirring 
up their readers to hatred or contempt 
for tho neighbouring Monarchy, or to 
outrages directed more or less openly 
against its security and integrity. 

A largo number of agents are em- 
ployed in carrying on. by every means 
tho agitation against Austria-Hungary 
and corrupting the youth in tho fron- 
tier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there 
has been a recrudescence of the spirit 
of conspiracy inherent in Servian 
politicians, which has left such san- 
guinary imprints on the history of the 
kingdom ; individuals belonging for- 
merly to bands employed in Macedonia 
have come to place themselves at the 
disposal of the terrorist propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary. 

In the presence of these doings, to 
which Austria-Hungary has been ex- 
posed for years, tho Servian Govern- 
ment have not thought it incumbent 
on them to take tho slightest step. 
Tho Servian Government have thus 
failed in the duty imposed on them by 
the solemn declaration of tho 31st 
March, 1909, and acted in opposition 
to the will of Europe and the under- 
taking given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and 
Royal Government in the face of the 
provocative attitude of Servia was in- 
spired by the territorial disinterested- 
ness of the Austro-Hungnn'an Mon- 
archy and the hope that the Servian 
Government would end in spite of 
everything by appreciating Austria- 
Hungary's friendship at its true value. 
By observing a benevolent attitude to- 
wards the political interests of Servia, 
the Imperial and Royal Government 



royaume se deciderait finalement a 
suivre de son cote une ligne de con- 
duite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie 
s attendait surtout a une pareille evo- 
lution dans les idees politiqnes en 
Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements 
de l'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal rendit possible, par une 
attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, 
l'agrandissement si considerable de la 
Serbie. 

Cette bienveillance manifestee par 
l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'egard de l'Etat 
voisin n'a cependant aucunernent mo- 
difie les precedes du royaume, qui a 
continue a tolerer sur son territoiro 
line propagande, dont les funestes con- 
sequences se sont manifestoes au 
monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour 
oil l'heritier presomptif de la Monarcbie 
et son illustre epouse devinrent les vic- 
times d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cet etat de choses le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du 
se decider a entreprendre de nou- 
velles et pressantes demarches a Bel- 
grade afin d'amener le Gouvernement 
serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- 
diaire menacant la surete et l'integrite 
de la Monarchic austro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette 
demarche il Be trouve en plein accord 
avec les sentiments de toutes les 
nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- 
mettre que le regicide devint une arme 
dont on puisse 6e servir impunement 
dans la lutte politique, et que la 
pais puropeenne fut continuellement 
troublee par les agissements partant 
de Belgrade. 

C'est a l'appui do i e qui precede que 
le Gouvernement Imperial efc Royal 
tient a la disposition du Gouvernement 
Royal de Grande-Bretagne un .' i » 
elucidant les menees serbes et les rap- 
ports cxistant entre ces menees et le 
meurtre du 28 juin. 

Une comnuuiication identique est 
' > aus reprcsentants Imperiaux 
.: Royaux anpres des autres Puis- 
sances signataires. 

Vous etes autorise de laisser une 
copie de cette depeehe entre les mains 
de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. 

Vienne, h 24 juilkt, 1914. 



hoped that the kingdom would finally 
decide to follow an analogous line of 
conduct on its own side. In particu- 
lar, Austria-Hungary expected a de- 
velopment of this kind in the political 
ideas of Servia, when, after the events 
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal 
Government, by its disinterested and 
ungrudging attitude, made such a con- 
siderable aggrandisement of Servia 
possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hun- 
gary showed towards the neighbouring 
State had no restraining effect on the 
proceedings of the kingdom, which 
continued to tolerate on its territory 
a propaganda of which the fatal con- 
sequences were demonstrated to the 
whole world on tho 28th June last, 
when the Heir Presumptive to the 
Monarchy and his illustrious consort 
fell victims to a plot hatched at Bel- 
grade. 

In the presence of this state of 
things the Imperial and Royal 
Government have felt compelled to 
take new and urgent steps at Belgrade 
with a view to inducing the Servian 
Government to stop the incendiary 
movement that is threatening the 
security and integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment are convinced that in taking this 
step they will find themselves in full 
agreement with the sentiments of all 
civilised nations, who cannot permit 
regicide to become a weapon that can 
he employed with impunity in political 
strife, and the pence of Europe to be 
continually disturbed by movements 
emanating from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial 
and Royal Government hold at tho 
disposal of the British Government a 
elucidating the Servian in- 
trigues, and the connection between 
these intrigues and the murder of the 
28th June. 

An identical communication has been 
addressed to the Imperial and Royal 
representatives accredited to the other 
signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy 
of this despatch in the hands of tho 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, Jvbj 24, 1914. 



Annexe. 

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par 

le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo 

Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat 

et de complicite y relative— crime com- 



Anxex. 

The criminal enquiry opened by the 

Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo 

Princip and his accessories in and 

before the act of assassination com- 



mis par eux le 28 juin dernier— a jus- 
qu'ici abouti aux constations sui- 
vantes : 

1°. Le complot ayant pour but 
d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sara- 
jevo, de l'Archiduo Francois-Ferd.i- 
nand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo 
Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic le 
noil) me Milan Ciganovic et Trifko 
Grabez, avec le coneours du comman- 
dant Voija Tankosid. 

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pis- 
tolets Browning avec munition, moyen- 
nant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont com- 
mis l'attentat, furent livres a Bel- 
grade a Princip, Cabrinovic. et Grabez 
par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le 
commandant Voija Tankosic. 

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades a 
la main provenant du depot d'armes do 
l'armee serbe a Kragujevac 

-1°. Pour assurer la reussite de l'at- 
tentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, 
Cabrinovic et Grabez la manierc de- se 
servir des grenades et donna, dans un 
foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, 
des lecons de tir avec pistolets Brown- 
ing a Princip et Grabez. 

5°. Pour re'ndre possible a Princip, 
Cabrinovio et Grabez de passer la fron- 
tiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y in- 
troduiro clandestinement leur contre- 
bande d'armes, un systeme de trans- 
port secret fut organise par Ciganovic. 

D'apres cette organisation l'intro- 
duction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des 
malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut 
operee par les capitaines-frontieres de 
Chabac (Bade Popovic) et de Loznica 
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj 
Grbic de Loznica avec le coneours de 
divers particuliers. 



mitted by them on the 28th June last 
has up to the present led to the follow- 
ing conclusions: — 

1. The plot, having as its object the 
assassination of the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand at the time of his visit to 
Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by 
Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, 
one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko 
Grabez, with the assistance of Com- 
mander Voija Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and the four 
Browning pistols and ammunition 
with which the guilty parties com- 
mitted the act were delivered to 
Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez, by 
the man Milan Ciganovic and Com- 
mander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-grenades 
coming from the arms depot of the 
Servian Army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to ensure the success of 
the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, 
Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the 
bombs, and gave lessons ia firing 
Browning pistols to Princip rfnd 
Grabez in a forest near the sbooting 
ground at Topschider. 

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, 
and Grabez to cross the frontier of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in 
their contraband of arms secretly, a 
secret system of transport was orga- 
nised by Ciganovic. 

By this arrangement the introduc- 
tion into Bosnia-Herzegovina of crimi- 
nals and their arms was effected by 
the officials controlling the frontiers at 
Chabac (Bade Popovic) and Loznica, 
as well as by the customs officer 
Budivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the 
assistance of various individuals. 



No. 5. 

Sit Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bwisen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons 
leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.* 

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I Temarked that it seemed 
to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at 
that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder 
of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in 
the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same 
time 1 had never before seen one State address to another independent State 
a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly 
consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it 
were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be 
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the 
frontiers of Servia. 

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself 
with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of 
Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the 
concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above 
were not made in order to d merits 

* Austro-Hungarian Ambu ndon. B 2 



10 

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views 
with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could bo 
done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. 

Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have 
arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; 
Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks 
had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was 
essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. 

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could 
have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian 
reply had been dictated by Austria, who had -not been content to limit herself 
to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its 
presentation./ 

* AusUo-Hmigarian Ambassador in London. 



No. 6. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — [Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. 

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that 
ithe text of the Austrian ultimatum had just -reached him 

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, 
i and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as 
Austrian step clearly meant that war" was imminent. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provoca- 
tive and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany 
had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of 
acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to 
proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all 
the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides 
supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies 
had just said to.me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's 
Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of 
solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional 
engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. 
Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country 
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof 
replied that we must not forget that the general European question was 
involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great 
Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue 

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said 
that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making 
a communication tp Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in 
the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria 
nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite 
of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forth- 
with to declare war on Austria ? 

M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would 
at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held 
this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be 
held, probably to-morrow, at which the Empercr would preside, when a decision 
■would be come to 

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria 
to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence 
to bear on Austria with that ond in view ; French Ambassador, however, 
thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she 
was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for 
us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to 
carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to mo desirable 
that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the 
* Russian Minister for Foreign .Affairs. 



11 

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must 
first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the 
Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. 

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a 
declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French 
and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible 
■that you might perhaps be willing tfo make strong representations to both 
German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by 
Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you 
might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria 
would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and 
Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the 
war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or 
later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war 
more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country 
and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would 
express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. 

. President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach 
France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as 
though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. 

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even 
if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong 
stand. 

No. 7. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador 
that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia 
indifferent. _ 

Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note 
was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and 
that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Bel- 
grade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m.. to-morrow. 
His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at 
stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the 
country. Ho did not think that objections to what had been done could be 
raised by any Power. 

No. 8. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to 

Sir Edivard Grey. — {Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. 

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian 
Government, who earnestly trust that His M a J es ty's Government may see their 
way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. 

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Primo Minister, who returned 
early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly 
very anxious as to developments that may arise. 

No. 9. 
Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24,-1914. 
The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the 
circumstances under which tile assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive 
and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the 
Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise 
Jhem. ' The facts now made known must also do away with the last dqubts 



12 

that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards 
the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found 
in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members 
of Government and army. 

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially 
marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the 
Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and 
moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic inter- 
ference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria- 
Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good 
conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time 
has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of 
official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in 
extension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the 
threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it 
would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of 
this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the 
integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circum- 
stances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, 
the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have 
recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Govern- 
ment might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves 
to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish . definitely to abandon 
Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain 
the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong 
pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means 
having to be left to them. 

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the 
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that tho Great Powers ought seriously to 
endeavour to reserve it to thoso two immediately concerned. The Imperial 
Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every 
interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, 
be followed by incalculable consequences. 

No. 10. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Basis. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, 
which I had received this morning, and of the comment 1 had made to Count 
Mensdorflt upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to 
see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to 
exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambas- 
sador that, of course, if tho presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not 
lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about 
it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to 
me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, 
in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. 
I would say that I thought the only" chance of any mediating or moderating 
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, 
who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of 
peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, 
he had no doubt that bis Government would be glad to join in it; but he 
pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had 
expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, 
Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept 
* French Ambassador in London, 
t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



lo- 

the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to 
take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once tho 
Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. 

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh 
until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. 
I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, 
it would bo possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, 
arid Russia also to stop hers,, pending mediation. But it would be essential 
for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participato 
in it. 

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved 
against Servia. Tho important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. 
Tho best chance of tins being accepted wouki be that Germany should proposo 
it to the other Powers. 

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. 

He replied that it was so. 

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on tho 
subject. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

No. 11. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir /I. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German 
Government about' the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German 
Government is making tho same communication to tho Powers. 

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble 
between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet 
from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would 
take of the situation. I reminded tho German Ambassador that some d$ys 
ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavotir 
to exerciso moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in 
view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness 
of the time allowed, and tho wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt 
quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power 
could exercii* influence alone. 

Tho only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being 
effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, 
should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour 
of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becom- 
ing threatening. 

Tho immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into 
Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help 
Servia ; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military 
action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this 
direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at 
Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State. 

Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the 
time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of 
Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that 
a negative reply must m no case be returned by Servia; a reply favourable 
on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate 
action might be afforded to Austria. 

:: ' German Ambassador in London. 

No. 12. 
Sir Edward Grey to Jlr. Croc!,"', tin ,■/>;■. British Cha ye a" Affaires at 
Btl grade. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however 
subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of. the Archduke at 



14 

Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought 
to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply 
to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. 

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit 
expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her de- 
mands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and 
replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. 

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will- 
express their views, bat T cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than 
I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what 
is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian. Governments. You should 
therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my 
views are, as. expressed above, to Servian Government. 

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate 
military action. 



Note communicated by Rust 

M. Sazonof telegraphic an Charge 
d'Affaires de Russie a Vionne en date 
du 11 (24) juillet, 1914: 

"La communication du Gouverne- 
ment austro-hongrois aux Puissances 
le lendemain de la presentation de 
('ultimatum a Belgrade ne laissp aux 
Puissances qu'un dJlai tout a fait m- 
suffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il 
soit d'utile pour 1'aplanissenient des 
complications surgics. 

"Pour prevenir les consequences in- 
calculables et egalement uefastes pour 
toutes les Puissances qui peuvent 
suivre le mode d'aetion du Gouverne- 
ment austro-hongrois, i! nous parait 
indispensable qu'avant tout le delai 
donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit 
prolonge. L'Autfiche-Hongrie. se de- 
clarant disposee a informer les Puis- 
sances des donnees de lenquete sur 
lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal base ses accusations, devrait 
leur donner egalement le temps de s'en 
rendre compte. 

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se eon- 
vainquaient du bien-fonde de certames 
des exigences autrichiennes, elles se 
trouveraient en mesure de faire par- 
venir an Gouvernement serbe des con- 
seils en consequence. 

" Un refus de prolonger le terme de 
1'ultimatum priverait de toute portee 
la demarche du Gouvernement austro- 
hongrois aupres des Puissances et se 
trouvcrait en contradiction avec les 
bases memo des relations interna- 
tionales. 

" Le Prince Koudachef est charge de 
communiquer ce qui precede au Cabi- 
net de Vienne." 

M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste britanniquc ad- 



iiin Ambassador. July 25. 
(Translation.) 

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the 
Russian Charge d Affaires at Vienna 
on the 11th i24th* Ii.lv. 1914 ■ 

The communication made by 
Austria-Hungary to the Powers the 
day after the presentation of the 
ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period 
to the Powers which is quite insuffi- 
cient to enable them to take any steps 
which might help to smooth away the 
difficulties that have arisen. 

"In order to present the conse- 
quences, equally incalculable and fatal 
to all the Powers, which may result 
from the course of action followed by 
the Austro-Hunganan Government, it 
seems to us to be above all essential 
that the period allowed for the 
Servian reply should be extended. 
Austria- Hungary. having declared 
her readiness to inform the Powers of 
the results of the enquiry upon 
which the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment base their accusations, should 
eqia'ly allow them sufficient time to 
study them. 

" In this case, if the Powers were 
convinced that certain of the Austrian 
demands were well founded, they 
would be in a position to offer advice 
to the Servian Government. 

"A refusal to prolong the term of 
the ultimatum would render nugatory 
the proposals made by the Austro- 
Hnngarian Government to the Powers, 
and would be in contradiction to the 
very bases of international felations. 

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to 
communicate the above to the Cabinet 
at Vienna.'' 

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic 
Majesty's Government will adhere to 



15 

herera au point <le vue expose, et il the point of view set forth above, and 

exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his 

voudra bier> munir l'Ambassadeur way to furnish similar instructions to 

d'Angleterre a Vienne d'instructions the British Ambassador at Vienna, 
con formes. 

No. 14. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

Austrian Ambassador has been 'authorised to explain to me that the step 
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit, 
and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit 
the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and 
begin military preparations, not operations. 

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same informa- 
tion at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. 

No. 15. 
Sir P. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(RicJved-July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government 
have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government con- 
tained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian 
Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram 
to Belgrade of yesterday.t 

* See No. 14. t See No. 12. 

No. 16. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that 
moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. Ho hopes 
that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be 
sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian 
Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia 
if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. 



No. 17. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Irei/. — -(Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) .St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. 

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated 
to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this 
afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassa- 
dor suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your 
telegr.am of yesterday to Belgrade. t 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the 
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the 
information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the 
latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too 
late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as 
you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no inde- 
pendent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had 
been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa- 
* See No. 14. + See No. 12. 



16 

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event/ 
of the- Austriaus attacking Servia,' the. Servian Qovernment would abandon 
Belgrade, and withdraws their forces into the interior, while they would at the 
tamo time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour 
of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an 
international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which 
reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but 
to the Powers. 

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to 
stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, 
and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit 
the question to arbitration. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war 
by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, 
his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she 
would take fio action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in 
reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status 
quo in the Balkan?, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not 
believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude .was decided by 
ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no 
war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the 
end be dragged into war. 

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna 
to better purpose as friend who, if her eounsels of moderation were disregarded, 
might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself 
Russia's ally at. once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was 
convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. 

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with 
more mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably 
declare war at once. His Excellency replied that E.ussia could not allow 
Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, 
tnd. if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of 
war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, 
but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as 
desperate. 

No. 18. 
Sir 11. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received, July 25.) 
(Telegraphic) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on. 

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning 
from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German 
Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
your suggestion foi an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency 
about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Borchtoldt is at 
Ischl, and Secretary oi State thought that in these circumstances there would 
be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State 
said tli at he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but 
he admitted quite freely that Atistro-Hungarian Government wished to give 
the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also 
admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro- 
Hungarian demands. 

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that 
Count JBerchtold had sent tor Russian representative at Vienna and had told 
him that Austria-Hungary bad no intention of seizing Servian territory. This 
step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. 
I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against 
Servia. Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said 
he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I 
said thai * ! i tms from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very 
reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He 

* Sec No. 11. t A'^tro Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



17 

said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing 
Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to 
prevent sueh a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became 
threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four 
Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg!!. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much' 
to be desired as a diplomatic document. 1 J • ■ repeated very earnestly that, 
though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, 
be had in fact had no such knowledge. 

No. 19. 
Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Romp, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 25, 1914. 

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the 
suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria 
and Servia become menacing. 

In his opinion Austria will only he restrained by the unconditional accept- 
ance by tho Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information 
that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. ■ 

No. 20. 
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender' 
of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced 
that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff pf legation 
failing unconditional acceptance of note at C p.m. to-day. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally 
to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 

No. 21. 

Mr. Cracl-anthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 

Sir Edward Grey. — (Recdved July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) • Belgrade. Jvly 25, 1914. 

The Council of Ministprs is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian 
note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that 
it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a 
measure as is possible. 

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: — 

The Servian Government consent to the publication oi.a declaration in the 
''Official Gazette." Tho ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian 
Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of 
enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in 
accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute 
those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already 
arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to 
suppress the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government 
'want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction 
offered in the Servian reply. 

No. 22. 

Mr, Crackanthorpe, British Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade, to 

Sir Edward Grey.— {Rj'cemed July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con- 
stantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. '. 

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in 



18 

mow of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I 
nave up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. 

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already 
urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. 

No. 23. 

Mr. Cracl-anthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 

!iir Edward Grey. — [Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. 

The Government nave left for Nish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on 
Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul ia 
remaining in charge of the archives. 

* The Servian Parliament. 

No. 24. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 
St. Fctersburyh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude 
cf His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported 
in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the 
Government. 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our 
going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the 
development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious 
to prevent it. 

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche 
makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria 
will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of 
peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian 
and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the 
four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Pctersburgh to try and arrange matters. 
If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves 
should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. 

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia 
or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends 
of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. 

* See No. 6. 



No. 25. 
Sir Eduiard Grey to Sir H. Bumbold, British Charye'd' Affaires at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the 
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time. limit would be to break 
off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military 
operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it inter- 
posed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which 
1 had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon 
be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance 
of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and 
ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to 
cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between 
them. 

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign 
Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had 
no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note 
to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. 
Prince Lio'jiiowsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation 

German Ambassador in London. 



19 

between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.^ 
He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. 

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title; to inter- 
vene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as 
between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we 
must all take a hand 

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and 
Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany woidd be essential to any 
diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Govern- 
ment were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, 
and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if tho 
German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Govern- 
ment that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. 



No. 2G. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Jivmsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram 
which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with 
instructions to communicate it tc the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: — 

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are 
prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are 
threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government 
will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness 
to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on 
Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished 
in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some 
of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to 
advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were 
indisposed to piolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against 
international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to tho 
Powers of any practical meaning." 

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian 
colleague. 

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has 
been a relief to hear that the steps, which the Austrian Government were 
taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to 
military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the 
Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, 
they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by 
Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. 



No. 27. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir II. 
Rmnbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, 
British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. 

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian 
reply contained in Mr. Craekanthorpe's telegram of to-day." I have said that, 
if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope 
tho German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government 
to take a favourable view of it. 

* See No. 21. 



No. 28. 
[Nil.] 



20 

No. 29. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. liodd, British Ambassador at Rome. J 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador came to we me to-day. I told him in general terms 
what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. 

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. Ho made no secret of 
the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

No. 30. 
Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crac.'cant'torpe, British Charge d 'Affaires at 
Belgrade. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson* 
on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. 

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They 
were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so 
long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of 
the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and 
secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or 
organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite 
ready to take the necessary steps "to give satisfaction ; but if Austria trans- 
ported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, 
being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must 
abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit 
to such dictation. 

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian 
subjects — Bosniaks ; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian 
authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had des'ied to expel him, 
but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected 
him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. 

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitcht his opinion on the 
whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though 
it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the 
Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 
* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
+ Servian Minister in London. 

No. 31. 
Sir M. de Bans-.n, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.~— 
(Received July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satis- 
factory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought 
to be imminent. 

No. 32. 
,S7r M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — i 
(Received July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Rus^a will keep 
quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to 
indict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed 
by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government 
might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred 
nationality, he said that everything depended on tiie personality of the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure 
of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in 
Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister 



21 

For Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to 
take a step which wourd probably result in many frontier questions in which 
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian 
questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a 
condition for facing a war. 

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other 
Powers by the tone of Austro-Huugarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. 
One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, 
if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, 
however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively 
in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she 
required ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign 
countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over 
Servia, acting as if she made, any such claim. As for Germany she knew very 
well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday 
to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the 
Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. Ho asked whether I 
had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been 
made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically 
every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that 
Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that 
they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary 
by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and 
retirement of Government from Belgrade. 

No. 33. 
Sir II. Rambold, British Charge cV Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 2G.) 
(Telegraphic.) 'Berlin, July 26, 1914. 

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that 
Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. 
They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite- 
ment. Under-Secretary of Stato likewise told me that German Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory 
Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion 
that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. 

No. 34. 
Sir U. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German 
Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hunganan 
Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply 
if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.* 
Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communi- 
cation to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves 
to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way 
to going beyond this. 

* See No. 21. 



No. 30. 
Sir R. Rvdd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
R ceivi d July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 20, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and 
will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.' 

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that 
Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration 
of war. 



22 

No. 36. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 'British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. 

Rumbold, British Gharg'e d'Affuires at Berlin, and Sir R. Boeld, British 

Ambassador at Rome. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here 
to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet 
here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which 
would prevent complications? You should ask -Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the 
notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at 
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersbu rgh should be authorised to request that all 
active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference. 



No. 37. 
Sir Edward Grey In Sir F. Bertie, British J. t6, m lor it Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 

Berlin telegram of 25th July.'" 

It is important to know il France will agree to suggested action by the four 
Powers if necessary. 

Sec No. 18. 



No. 38. 
Sir B. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Ore//. — 
(Received July 27.) 
g; r> Borne, July 23, 1914. 

I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the 
terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary- 
General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the 
view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austr.o- 
Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after 
the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans lias occasioned, 
to score a definite success. 

I have, Ac. 

RENXELL RODD 



No. 39. 

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — {Communicated 

by the Servian Minister, July 27.) 

(Translation.) 
Le Gouvernomcnt Royal serbe a The Royal Servian Government 

rccu la communication du Gouverne- have received the communication of 
ment Imperial et Royal du *10 do re the Imperial and Royal Government 
mois et il est persuade que sa reponse of the 10th instant,' and are con- 
eloignera tout malentendu qui menace vinced that their reply will remove 
,i.. gater les bons rapports de voisinage any misunderstanding which may 
cntre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et threaten to impair the good neigh- 
le Royaume de Serbie. hourly relation-, between the Austro- 

Hungarian Monarchy and the King- 
dom (if Servia. 
Lo Gouvernement Royal conscient Conscious of the fact that the pro- 

qu< les protestations qui out apparu tests which were made both from the 
tant do la tribune de la Skoupchtina tribune of the national Skuptehinat 
nationale que dans les declarations et. and in the declarations ami actions of 
le.s aetes des representants rcspon- the responsible representatives of the 
sables de l'fitat, protestations qui State — protests which were cut short 
i'urent coupees court par les declara- by the declarations made by the 
lions du Gouvernement serbe, faites le Servian Government on the 18th* 
"18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renou- March, 1909 — have not been renewed 
* Old style. t The Servian Parliament. 



2:-! 



velees vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchie 
voisine en aucune occasion et que, de- 
piiis ce temps, autant de la part des 
Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont 
succede que de la part de leurs or- 
ganes, aucune tentative n'a ete faitc 
dans le but de changer l'etat de choses 
politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et 
Hcrzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal 
constate que sous CO rapport le Gou- 
vcrr.eincnt Imperial et Royal n'a fait 
aucune representation, sauf en ce qui 
concerno mi livre scolaire, et an sujet 
de laquelle le Gouverncment Imperial 
ct Royal a 1-090 line explication en- 
tierenient satisfaisantc. La Serbie a 
de nombreuses fois donne des preuves 
de sa politique .pacifiquo et moderee 
pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, 
ei c'i it grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice 
qu'ello a fait dans l'interet exclusif de 
la pais europeenne que cette paix a 
etc pieservee. Le Gouvernement Royal 
no pent pas etre rendu respousable 
pour les manifestations d'un caractere 
prive, telles que les articles des jour- 
naux et le travail paisible des societes, 
manifestations qui se produisent dans 
prcsque tons !es pays comme une chose 
ordinaire et qui echappent, en regie 
generate, au controls oificiel, d'autant 
moins que le Gouverncment Royal, lors 
de la solution de toute une serie de 
questions qui se sont presentees entre 
la Serbie et l'Autrielie-Hongrie, a 
montre une grande prevenance et a re- 
ussi, de cette facon, a en regler le plus 
grand nombre au profit du progres des 
deux pays voisins. 

Cost pourquoi lo Gouvernement 
Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les 
affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des per- 
sonnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient 
partieipe a la preparation de l'attentat 
commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce 
qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re- 
cherche dc tout ce qui se rapporte a ce 
crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver 
son entiere collection, a agir contre 
toutes les personnes a l'egard des- 
quelles des communications lui seraient 
faites, se rendant done au desir du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est 
dispose a rernettre au Tribunal tout 
sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation 
et a son rang, pour la complicite du- 
quel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des 
preuves lui seraient fournies, et spe- 
cialement, il s'engage a l'aire publier a 
la premiere page du "Journal ofnciel " 
en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'enonciation 
suirante : 



"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 



on any occasion as regards the great 
neighbouring Monarchy, and that no 
attempt has been made since that 
time, either by the successive Royal 
Governments or by their organs, to 
change the political and legal state of 
affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, the Royal Government draw 
attention to the fact that in this con- 
nection the Imperial and Royal 
Government have made no representa- 
tion except one concerning a school 
book, and that on that occasion the 
Imperial and Royal Government re- 
ceived an entirely satisfactory explana- 
tion.- Servia has several times given 
proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it 
is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice 
that she has made in the exclusive 
interest of European peace that that 
peace has been preserved. The Royal 
Government cannot be held responsible 
for manifestations of a private charac- 
ter, such as articles in the press and 
the peaceable work of societies — mani- 
festations which take place in nearly 
all countries in the ordinary course of 
events, and which, as a general rule, 
escape official control. The Royal 
Government are all the less respon- 
sible, in view of the fact that at the 
time of the solution of a series of ques- 
tions which arose between Servia and 
Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a 
great readiness to oblige, and thus 
succeeded in settling the majority of 
these questions to the advantage of 
the two neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Govern- 
ment have been pained and surprised 
at the statements, according to which 
members of the Kingdom of Servia are 
supposed to have participated in the 
preparations for the crime committed 
at Serajevo ; the Royal Government 
expected to be invited to collaborate in 
an investigation of all that concerns 
this crime, and they were ready, in 
order to prove the entire correctness 
of their attitude, to take measures 
against any persons concerning whom 
representations were made to them. 
Failing in, therefore, with the desiro 
of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, they are prepared to hand over 
for trial any Servian subject, without 
regard to his situation or rank, of 
whose complicity in the crime of Sera- 
jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more 
especially they undertake to cause to 
be published on the first page of the 
"Journal officiel," on the date of the 
13th (26th) July, the following declara- 
tion ■ — 

"The Royal Government of Servia 



21 



condamne toute propagande qui serait 
dirigee eontre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est- 
a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui 
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri- 
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore 
sincerement les consequences funestes 
de ccs agissements eriminels. Le Gou- 
vernement Royal regrette que certains 
officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient 
participe, d'apres la communication du 
Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a la 
propagande susmentionnee, et compro- 
mis par la les relations de bon voisi- 
nage auxquelles le Gouvernement 
Royal serbe etait solennellemcnt en- 
gage par sa declaration du 31 mars, 
1909,* qui desapprouve et repudie 
toute idee ou tentative d'une immix- 
tion dans les destinees des habitants de 
quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie 
que se soit, considere de son devoir 
d'avertir formellement les officiers et 
fonctionnaires et toute la population 
du royaume que, dorenavant il proce- 
dera avec la derniere rigueur centre les 
personnes qui se rendraient coupablea 
de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra 
tons ses efforts a prevenir et a re- 
primer." 

Cette enonciation sera portee a la 
connaissance de l'armee Royale par mi 
ordre du jour, an com de Sa Majeste 
le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le 
Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera 
publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel 
de l'armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en 
outre : 

1. D'introduire dans la premiere con- 
vocation reguliere de la Skoupchtinat 
line disposition dans la loi de la presse, 
par laquelle sera punie de la maniere 
la plus severe ia provocation a la liaine 
et au mepris de la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise, ainsi que eontre toute publi- 
cation dont la tendance generate serait 
dirigee eontre l'integrite territoriale de 
l'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors 
de la revision do la Constitution, qui 
est prochaine, a faire introduce clans 
l'article 22 de la Constitution un 
aniendement de telle sorte que les 
publications ci-dessus puissent etre 
confisquees, ce qui actuellement aux 
termes categoriques de l'article 22 de 
la Constitution est impossible. 

2. Le Gouvernement ne po^sede au- 
cune preuve et la note du Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal ne lui en four- 
nit non plus aucune que la societe 



condemn all propaganda which may be 
directed against Austria-Hungary, 
that is to say, all such tendencies as 
aim at ultimately detaching from tho 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- 
tories which form part thereof, and 
they sincerely deplore the baneful 
consequences of these criminal move- 
ments. The Royal Government regret 
that, according to the communication 
from the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, certain Servian officers and 
officials should have taken part in the 
above-mentioned propaganda, and thus 
compromised the good neighbourly re- 
lations to which the Royal Servian 
Government was solemnly engaged by 
the declaration of the 31st March, 
1909,* which declaration disapproves 
and repudiates all idea or attempt at 
interference with the destiny of tho 
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of 
Austria-Hungary, and they consider it 
their duty formally to warn the 
officers, officials, and entire population 
of the kingdom that henceforth they 
will take the most rigorous steps 
against all such persons as are guilty of 
such acts, to prevent and to repress 
which they will use their utmost 
endeavour.'' 

This declaration will bo brought to 
tho knowledge of the Royal Army in 
an order of the day, in the name of 
His Majesty the King, by his Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince Alex- 
ander, and will be published in the 
next official army bulletin. 

The Royal Government further 
undertake : — 

1. To introduce at the first regular 
convocation of tho Skuptchinat a 
provision into the press law providing 
for the most severe punishment of in- 
citement to hatred or contempt of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for 
taking action against any publication 
the general tendency of which is 
directed against the territorial in- 
tegrity of Austria-Hungary. The 
Government engage at the approach- 
ing revision of the Constitution to 
cause an amendment to be introduced 
into article 22 of the Constitution of 
such a nature that such publication 
may be confiscated, a proceeding at 
present impossible under the categori- 
cal terms of article 22 of the Constitu- 
tion. 

2. The Government possess no 
proof, nor does the note of the Im- 
perial and Royal Government furnish 
them with any, that the "Narodna 



XL- 



style. 



t Tli. 



in Parliament. 



25 



"Narodna Odbrana " et autres societes 
similaircs aient commis, jusqu'a ce jour 
quelques actes criminels de ce genre, 
par le fait d'un do lenrs membrcs. 
Neanmoins, )e Gouvornonient Royal 
acceptera la domando du Gouveine- 
ment Imperial et Royal et dissoudra 
la societe "Nnrodun Odbrana " et toute 
autre societe qui agirnit centre 
l'Autricho-Hongrie. 

3. Le Gouvomcmont Royal serbe 
s'engngo a eliminor sans delais de l'in- 
stniction publique en Serine tout co 
qui sort on pourrait sorvir a fomenter 
la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hon- 
grie, q 11 and le Gouveinement Imperial 
et Royal lui fournira des faits et des 
preuves de cette propagande. 

4. Le Gouveinement Royal accepte 
de memo a eloigner du service mili- 
tairo ceux pour qui l'cnquete judi- 
ciairc aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables 
d'aetes diriges contre l'integrite du 
territoire de la Monarchic austro-hon- 
groise, et il attend que le Gouveine- 
ment Imperial et Royal lui com- 
munique ulterieureinent les noms et les 
faits do cos officiers et fonctionnaires 
aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'en- 
suivre. 

5. Le Gouveinement Royal doit 
avouer qu'il ne se rend pas claircment 
compto du sens et de la -portee de la 
demande du Gouveinement Imperial et 
Royal que la Serine s'engage a accepter 
sur son territoire la collaboration des 
organes du Gouveinement Imperial et 
Royal, niais il declare qu'il admettra la 
collaboration qui repondrait aux. prin- 
cipes du droit international et a la 
procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons 
rapports de voisinagc. 

G. Le Gouveinement Royal, tela va 
de soi, considerc de son devoir d'ouvrir 
une enquete contre tons ceux qui sont 
on qui, event uellemont, auraient o'te 
meles an complot du 13* juin, et qui 
se trouveraient sur le territoire du 
royaume. Quant a la participation a, 
cette enquete des agents on autorites 
austro-hongrois qui seraient deiegues a 
cot effet par le Gouvernenient Imperial 
ot Royal, le Gouveinement Royal ne 
pent pas 1'acceptcr. car ce serait une 
violation de I.: Constitution et de la loi 
sur la procedure criminelle; cependant 
dans des cas concrets des communica- 
tions sur les resultats de l'instruction 



Odbrana " and other similar societies 
have committed up to the present any 
criminal act of this nature through the 
proceedings of any of their members. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Government 
will accept the demand of the Imperial 
and Royal Government, and will dis- 
solve the " Narodna Odbrana " Society 
and every other society which may bo 
directing its efforts against Austria- 
Hungary. 

3. The Royal Servian Government 
undertake to remove without delay 
troni their public educational estab- 
lishments in Servia all that serves or 
could serve to foment propaganda, 
against Austria-Hungary, whenever 
the Imperial and Royal Government 
furnish them with facts and proofs of 
this propaganda. 

4. The Royal Government also 
agree to remove from military service 
all such persons as the judicial enquiry 
may have proved to be guilty of acts 
directed against the integrity of the 
territory of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and they expect the Im- 
perial and Royal Government to com- 
municate to them at a later date the 
names and the acts of these officers 
and officials for the purposes of the 
proceedings which are to be taken 
against them. 

•5. The Royal Government must 
confess that they do not clearly grasp 
the meaning or the scope of the de- 
mand made by the Imperial and Royal 
Government that Servia shall under- 
take to accept the collaboration of the 
organs of the Imperial and Royal 
Government upon their territory, but 
they declare that they will admit such 
collaboration as agrees with the prin- 
ciple of international law, with crimi- 
nal procedure, and with good neigh- 
bourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the 
Royal Government consider it their 
duty to open an enquiry against all 
such persons as are, or eventually may 
be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* 
June, and who happen to be within the 
territory of the kingdom. ' As regards 
the participation in this enquiry of 
Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- 
ties appointed for this purpose by the 
Imperial and Royal Government, the 
Royal Government cannot accept such 
an arrangement, as it would be a viola- 
tion of the Constitution and of the 
law. of criminal procedure; neverthe- 
less, in concrete cases communications 



26 



en question pourraient etre dennees 
aux agents austro-hongrois. 

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait 
proceder, des le soir menie de la remise 
de la note, a l'arrestation du Com- 
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant 
a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de 
la Monarchic austro-hongroiso et qui 
jusqu'au 15* juin etait employe 
(comme aspirant) a la direction des 
chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore 
etre arrete. 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est 
prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme ac- 
coutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot 
possible, les presomptions de culpabilite 
ainsi que les preuves eventuellos de 
leur culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies 
jusqu'a ce jour par 1'enquete a Sara- 
jevo, aux fins d'enq"eto ulterieure, 

8. Le Gouvernement serbe- renfor- 
cora et etendra les mesures prises pour 
empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et 
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II 
va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une 
onquete et punira severement ies fonc- 
tionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne 
Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a 
leurs devoirs et loisso passer les au- 
teurs du crime de Sarajevo. 

0. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera 
vofontiers des explications sut ■ les 
propos que ses fouctionnaires, tant en 
Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont eu apres 
l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, 
d'apres 1'affirruation du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal, ont ete hostiles 
envers la Monarclrie, des que le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura 
communique les passages en question de 
ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre 
que les propos employes ont, en effet, 
ete teuus par lesdits Idnctionnaires, 
quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui- 
meme aura soiu de rccueillir des 
preuves et convictions. 

10. Le Gouvernement Royal infor- 
mera le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal de I'execution des mesures com- 
prises dans les points precedents en 
tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par 
la presente note, aussitot que chaque 
mesure aura ete ordonnee et executae. 

Dans le cas oil lo Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal ne serait pas salisfait 
de cctte reponse, le Gouvernemeut 
serbe, eonside'rant qu'il est de l'in- 
teret commun de ne pas precipiter la 
solution de cette question, est pret 
comme toujours d'accepter line en- 



as to the results of the investigation 
in question might be given to the 
Austro-Hungarian agents. 

7. The Royal Government pro- 
ceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to arrest -Com- 
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. As re- 
gards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a 
subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the 15th* 
June was employed (on probation) by 
the directorate of railways, it has not 
yet been possible to arrest him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government 
are requested to be so good as to 
supply as soon as possible, in the cus- 
tomary form, the presumptive evi- 
dence of guilt, as well as the eventual 
proofs of guilt which have been col- 
lected up to the present, at the enquiry 
at Serajevo for the purposes of the 
later enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will 
reinforce and extend the measures 
which have been taken for preventing 
the illicit traffic of arms and explosives 
across the froutier. It goes without 
saying that they will immediately 
order an enquiry and will severely 
punish the frontier officials on the 
Scbabatz-Loznitza line who have failed 
in their duty and allowed the authors 
of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal • Government will 
gladly give explanations of the re- 
marks made by their officials, whether 
in Servia or abroad, in interviews 
after the crime which accordiug to 
the statement of the Imperial and 
Roval Government were hostile to- 
wards the Monarchy, as soon as the 
Imperial and Royal Government have 
communicated to them the passages in 
question in these remarks, and as soon 
as they have shown that the remarks 
were actually made by the said officials, 
although the Royal Government will 
itself take steps to collect evidence 
and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will in- 
form the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment of the execution of the measures 
comprised under the above heads, in 
so far as this has cot already been 
done by the present note, as Soon as 
each measure has been ordered and 
carried out 

If the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment are not satisfied with this reply, 
the Servian Government, considering 
that it is not to the common interest to 
precipitate the solution of this ques- 
tion, are ready, as always, to accept a 
pacific understanding, either by refer- 



* Old Stylo. 



27 

tente pacifique, soit en reinet'tant cette ring this question to the decision of 

question a la decision du Tribunal iu- the International Tribunal of The 

ternational de La Haye, soit aux Hague, or to the Great Powers which 

Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a took part in the drawing up of tho 

l'elaboration de la declaration que le declaration made by the Servian 

Gouvcrnement serbo a faite lo 18 (31) Government on the 18th (31st) March, 

mars, 1909. 1909. 

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914. Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 

No. 40. 
Sir M. dc Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Receive I July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hun- 
garian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia 
to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in tho 
sense of your telegram of tho 25th instant* (last paragraph). 

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived, 
I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed 
great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They 
doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party 
entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute 
would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. 
Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the 
request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. 
They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken. 
* See No. 26. t See No. 36. 

No. 41. 
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVK had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great 
Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note 
was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider 
their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment 
has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals 
of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with 
Servia, and its postponement or prevention "would undoubtedly be a great 
disappointment. 

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express 
to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's 
Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency 
whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. 

No. 42. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— 

(Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. 

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted 
by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there 
this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent 
to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague 
as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. 
Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at 
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersbmgh, but until it is known that the Germans 
have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of tho 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British 
Ambassadors to do so. 

* Nos. 56 and 37. 



No. 43. 
Sit E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 26th July.* 

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically 
amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called 
together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore 
fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the 
maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do 
with arbitration, hut meant that representatives of the. four nations not 
directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a. dangerous 
situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed 
was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. 
Petersburg!] showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoft 
to exchange views with Count Berchtold.J He thought that this method of 
procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before 
doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the 
Austrian and Russian Governments 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet 
Austiia was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Ger- 
many latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by 
"mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south,' 
Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would 
have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that 
it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would there- 
fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news- from St. Petersburgh had caused 
him to take more hopeful view cf the general situation. 

* See No. 36. 

t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

X Austro-Hungarian Mini&t<?T for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 44. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersbvrgh. July 27, 1914. 

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday 
with tho Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features 
of the recent action taktfn by .the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs poinied out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's 
motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be 
accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were 
reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put 
into immsdiate_ execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian 
laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent 
State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, 
in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In 
order, however, to put an end to tne present tension, he thought that England 
and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambas- 
sador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government. 

On fells Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had 
correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation 
with him, which I rcpor.ed in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that 
you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was 
mistaken if ho believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our 
telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well) 
as with Rusr-ia and Franco if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their 
attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce 
her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the 
capa itv of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must 
not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. 

* Sec No.' 6. 



29 

In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer 
mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed 
to cross the frontier even when it was issued. 

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue, of 
the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could bo taken, and 
the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete 
her military preparations if it was deferred too long. 

No. 45. 
Sir 67. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Pelersburgli, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh; July 27, 1914. 

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported 
in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed 
that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the 
subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

* Sco No. 44. 

No. 46. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclien, British Ambassador at Berlin: 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in 
principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, 
of -course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also 
been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise 
the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. 

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been 
expected to meet tho Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has him- 
self said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could 
hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have 
gono as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at 
Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now 
required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and 
marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all 
costs, being rceklesj of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply 
should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German 
Government should urge this at Vienna. 

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the 
situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany 
assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to 
the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. 
Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between 
Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be 
the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace 
I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was 
at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. 

No. 47. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

SEE my telegram ot to-day to Sir E. Gosclien.* 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian 
circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His 
Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. 

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders 
we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at 
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian 
Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything 
more than diplomatic action was promised. 

We bear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Riiisia will 

* Sco No. 46. 



30 

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I 
pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd it we were to appear more 
Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian 
Governments. 

No. 48. 
Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bimstsn, BrUish Ambassador at Vienna. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July '21, 1914. 

COUNT MENSDORFF" told me by instruction to-day that the Serviaa 
Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government 
were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital 
Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her 
subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier 
territories and their final disruption from tho Austrian Monarchy. Very 
reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to 
take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of 
enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the 
Austrian Government had lor many years endeavoured to find a way to get on 
with their turbulent neighbour, (hough tins had been made very difficult for 
them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had 
made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda 
had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. 
We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the 
moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees 
for the definite suppression of tho Servian aspirations and for tho security of 
peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable 
means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last 
appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their 
action, which had no sort o! aggressive tendency, could not be represented 
otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would 
serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an 
clement of general unrest such as she had been for tho last ten years. The high 
sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame 
the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, 
and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy bad forced 
upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian 
national prosperity. Finally, tho Austrian Government,- confiding in their 
amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a 
fight that was forced on them, and on our as^stanco in localising tho fight, if 
necessary. 

Count Mensdorff added on Ins own account that, • as long as Servia was 
confronted with Turkey. Austria never took very severe measures because oi 
her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now 
that Servia had doubled her territory and population -without any Austrian 
interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self- 
defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. Ho reiterated that Austria 
had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against 
Servian territory. 

I said that 1 could not understand the construction put by the Austrian 
Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance 
of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning 
about that reply. 

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem t" 
he satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing— the co-operation of 
Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice 
the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. 

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, 
even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without 
risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia an 1 
at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good ; but, if not, the consequences 
would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an 
expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be 
expected in St. Petcrsburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, 

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



31 

and now, when Hu6sia found that there was increased tension, the situation 
wouid become increasingly serious. Already the eftect on Europe was ouo of 
anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had 
felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at 
this moment, and there was no menace in what wo had done about our fleet ; 
but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible 
for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of 
the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already 
involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country 
undergo, and it was very disappointing to mo that the. reply was treated by 
the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 



No. 49. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
Sir, Foreign Office., July 27, 1914. 

TliE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* tn-day that tire Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference 
of four to be held in London. 

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to 
suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis 
di San Giulianot would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German 
Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be 
followed at Vienna. 

I am, <fce. 

E. GREY. 
* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
+ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 

No. 50. 

Sir M. de Bunssn, British Ambassador at Vienna., to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July 31.) 

Sir, Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro 
Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. 
I have, Ac. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

Enclosure in No. 60. 
Copy of Note verbule, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

(Translation. ) 

POUR mettre fin aux menees sub- IN order to bring to an end the 

vcrsives partant de Belgrade et diri- subversive intrigues angina-ting from 

gees rontre l'integnte territoriale de Belgrade and aimed at the territorial 

la Monarchic austro-hongrnise, l<? Gou- integrity of the iostro-Hunganan 

vernement Imperial »t Ruv-d a fnit par- Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal 

yehir a la date du 23 juillot, 1914. au Government has delivered to the 

Gouvcrnement Royal de Serine uue Royal Servian Government a note, 

note dans laquelle se trnuvait forniulee dated Inly 23, 1914, in which a series 

une serie de demandes pour I'aecepta- ol demands were formulated, for the 

tion desquelles un delai de qua ran te- acceptance of which o delay of forty- 

bmt heures a ete aecorde au Gouverne- eight hours has been granted to the 

ment Royal. Le Gouvcrnement Royal Royal Government. The Royal Servian 

de Serbie n'avant pas repondn a cette Government not having answered this 

note d'une maniere satisfaisante, le note in a satisfactory manner, the 

Gonverneniciit Imperial et Royal se Imperial and Royal Government are 
trouve dans la necessity de pourvoir lui- themselves compelled to see to the 

nieme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et safeguarding of their rights and in- 

interets et de rccourir a cct effet a la te.rests, and, with this object, to have 

force des amies. recourse to force of arms. 

L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient Austria-Hungary, who has just ad- 



32 



d'adresser a la Scrbie une declara- 
tion formelle conformemcnt a l'article 
l cr do la convention du 18 octobre, 
1907, relative a l'ouverturo des hos- 
tilites, .se considore des lors en etat de 
guerre avec la Scrbie. 

En portant co qui precede a la con- 
naissanco do l'Ambassade Royale de 
Grande-Bretagne le Ministers des 
Affaires Etrangeres a rhonneur de 
declarer que 1'Autiiche-Hongrie so 
conformcra au cours des hostilites, sous 
la reserve d'un procede analogue de la 
part do la Serbie, aux stipulations des 
conventions de La Hayo du 18 octobre, 
10H7, ainsi qu'a celles de la Declaration 
de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909. 

L'Ambassade est price de vouloir bien 
communiquer, d'urgence, la presente 
notification a son Gouvernement. 



dressed to Servia a formal declaration, 
in conformity with article 1 of tbe con- 
vention of the 18th October, 1907, rela- 
tive to the opening of hostilities, con- 
siders herself henceforward in a state 
ol war with Servia. 

In bringing tho above to notice of 
His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has tho 
honour to declare that Austria- 
Hungary will act during the hostilities 
in conformity with the terms of the 
Conventions of The Hague of tho 18th 
October, 1907, as also with those of 
the Declaration of London of the 28th 
February, 1909, provided an analogous 
procedure is adopted by Servia. 

The embassy is requested to be so 
good as to communicate the present 
notification as soon as possible to the' 
British Government. 



No. 51. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sk' Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 
Sir, Paris, July 27, 191-1. 

1 HAVE tho honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from 
the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to bo taken to prevent an 
outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

I have, &c. 

FRANCIS BERTIE. 



Enclosure 
Note communicated to Mr I''. 

PAR une note en dato du '25 de co 
mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre a fait connaitre au Gou- 
vernement de la Republiquo que, 
d'apres Sir Edward Grey, la seulo 
manicre d'assurer, si e'etait possible, 
la maintien de la paix dans lo cas oil 
les rapports entro la Russie et l'Au- 
tricho deviendraient plus tendus serait 
une demarche commune a Vienno et a 
Saint-Petcrsbourg des represcntants 
de l'Angletcrre, do la France, do 
l'Allemagne et do 1'Italie en Autricbo 
et en Russie; et il a exprinic 1 lo desir 
do savoir si le Gouvernement de la Re- 
publique etait dispose a accucillir 
favorablement cette suggestion. 

Lo Ministre des Affaires Elrai;. 
gores par interim a l'hcnneur de fairo 
connaitre a son Excellence Sir Francis 
Bertie qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon* 
a se concertcr avPe l'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre en Allcmagnc et il ap- 
pnyer la demarche qu'ils jugeront op- 
portuno de fairo auprcs du Cabinet do 
Berlin, 

Lo Gouvernement de la Repiiblique 



in No. 51. 

Bertie hi/ M. Bienvenu-Mart'ui. 

(Translation.') 
IN a note of tho 25th of this month, 
his Excellency tho British Ambassador 
informed tho Government of the 
Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's 
opinion, tho only possible way of 
assuring the maintenance of pcaco in 
caso of the relations between Russia 
and Austria becoming moro strained 
would be if the representatives of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy in Austria and Russia were to 
take joint action at Vienna and at| 
St. Petersluirgli ; and he expressed the 
wish to know if tho Government ofl 
tho Republic were disposed to welcome 
such a suggestion. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
ad interim has the honour to inform 
bis Excellency Sir F. Bertie that be 
has requested M. Jules Cambon* to 
concert with the British Ambassador 
in Germany and to support any repre- 
sentation which they may consider it 
advisable to make to tho licrliu 
Cabinet. 

In accordance with the desire cx- 



French Ambassador, in Berlin. 



33 



a, d'autre part, conformement au desir 
expriine par le Gouvernement britan- 
nique et que son Excellence Sir Francis 
Bertie lui a transmis par uue note en 
date du 26 de ce niois, autorise M. 
Paul Cambon* a prendre part a la re- 
union proposee par Sir Edward Grey 
poi:r recliercber avee lui et les Ambas- 
sadeurs d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a 
Londres, les moyens de resoudro les 
difficultes actuelles. 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique 
est pret egalement a donncr aux 
agents francais aPetersbourg, a Vienne 
et a Belgrade des instructions pour 
qu'ils obtiennent des Gouverneraents 
russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir 
de toute operation militaire active en 
attendant les resultats de cette confer- 
ence. II estime toutefois que les 
chances de sueces de la proposition de 
Sir Edward Grey reposent essentielle- 
mont sur Taction que Berlin serait dis- 
posed a Vienne [sic]. Une demarche 
aupres du Gouvernement austro-hon- 
grois pour amener la suspension des 
operations militaires parait vouee a 
l'eehec si l'influeuce de l'Allemagne ne 
s'est pas exercee an prealable sur le 
Cabinet de Vienno. 

Le Garde des Sceaux, President du 
Conseil et .Ministre des Affaires £tran- 
geres par interim, saisit cette occasion 
de,renouveler, &c. 

Paris, k 27 juilkt, 1914. 



pressed by the British Government 
and conveyed to thein by Sir F. Bertie 
in his noto of the 20th of this month, 
the Government of~the Republic have 
also authorised M. i'aul Cambon* to 
take part in the conference which Sir 
E. Grey has proposed with a view to 
discovering in consultation with him- 
self and the German and Italian 
Ambassadors in London a means of 
settling the present difficulties. 

The Government of the Republic 
is likewise ready to instruct the French 
representatives at St. Petersburgh, 
Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the 
Russian, Austrian, and Servian Gov- 
ernments to abstain from all active 
military operations pending the results 
of this conference. He considers, how- 
ever, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's 
proposal being successful depends 
essentially on the action which the 
Berlin Government would be willing 
to take at Vienna. Representations 
made to the Austrian-Hungarian 
Government for the purpose of bring- 
ing about a suspension of military 
operations would seem bound to fail 
unless the German Government do not 
beforehand exercise their influence on 
the Vienna Cabinet. 

Tho President of the Council ad, 
interim takes the opportunity, &c. 



Paris, July 27, 1914. 



French Ambassador in London. 



No. 52. 
Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914. 

(Translation.) 



LE Gouvernement de la Republique 
accepte la proposition de Sir Edward 
Grey relative a une intervention do la 
Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de 
rAllemagne et de l'ltalie en vue d'evi- 
ter les operations militaires actives sill- 
ies frontieres autnehiennes, russes et 
Berbes; il a autorise M. P. Cambon* a 
prendre part aux deliberations de la 
reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a 
Londres. 

L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a 
recu pour instructions, apres s'etre 
eoncerte avec rAmbassadeur d'Angle- 
terre a Berlin, d'appuyer la demarche 
de ce dernier dans la forme et la 
mesure qui seraient jugees opportunes. 



THE Government of the Republic 
accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in 
regard to intervention by Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy: 
with a view to avoiding active mili- 
tary operations on the frontiers of 
Austria, Russia, and Servia ; and they 
have authorised M. P. Cambon* to 
take part in the deliberations of the 
four representatives at the meeting 
which is to be held in London. 

The French Ambassador in Berlin 
has received instructions to consult 
first the' British Ambassador in Berlin, 
and then to support the action taken 
by the latter in such manner and 
degree as may be considered appro- 
priate. 



M. Vivianit est pret a envoyer aux M. Vivianit is ready to send to the 

representants francais a Vienne, Saint- representatives of France in Vienna, 
* French Ambassador in London. 
+ French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



31 



Petcrsbourg et Belgrade des instruc- 
tions- dans le sens suggere par le Gou- 
verncment britannique. 

Ambassade de France, Londrcs, 
le 27 juillct, 1914. 



St. Peterslmrgh, and Belgrade instruc- 
tions in the sense suggested by the 
British Government. 

French Embassy, July 27, 1914. 



M. Saxonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to fount Benchendorff, 
Russian Ambassador in London. — [Communicated by Count Benchendorff, 
July 28.) 

Saint-Petcrsbourg, 
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est 
venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile 
quo l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de 
convoquer a Londres une conference 
des representants de l'Angleterre, la 
France, l'Allemagno et l'ltalie, pour 
etudier une issue a la situation 
actuelle. 

J'ai repondu a, l'Ambassadeur que 
j'ai entame des pourparlers avec l'Am- 
bassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en con- 
ditions que j'espere favorables. Pour- 
tant je n'ai pas encore recu de reponse 
a la proposition que j'ai faite d'uno re- 
vision de la note entre les deux 
Cabinets. 

Si des explications directes avec le 
Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient ir- 
realisables, je suis pret a accepter la 
proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de 
nature a resoudre favorablement le 
confiit. 

Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des 
aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pour- 
rait surgir de la reponso donneo par lo 
Ministre de la Justice francais a l'Am- 
bassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des 
conseils de moderation a dormer au 
Cabinet Imperial. 



(Translation.) 

St. Petersburgh, 
(Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador came to 
ascertain whether we think it desirable 
that Great Britain should take the 
initiative in convoking a conference in 
London of the representatives of 
England, France, Germany, and Italy 
to examine the possibility of a way out 
of the present situation. 

I replied to the Ambassador that I 
have begun conversations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under 
conditions which, I hope, may be 
favourable. I havo not, however, rei 
ceived as yet any reply to the proposal 
made by me for revising the noto be- 
tween the two Cabinets. 

If direct explanations with the 
Vienna Cabinet were to prove impos- 
sible, I am ready to accept the British 
proposal, or any other proposal of a 
kind that would bring about a 
favourable solution of the conflict. 

I wish, however, to put an end from 
this day forth to a misunderstanding, 
which might ariso from the answer 
given by the French Minister of 
Justice to the German Ambassador, 
regardmg counsels of moderation to be' 
given to the Imperial Cabinet. 



No. 54. 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign. Affairs, to C'oivnt Benchendorff, 

(Communicated by Count Benchendorff, 



Russian Ambassador in London. 
July 28, 1914.) 

Saint-Petersbourg, 
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne confirment mon impres- 
sion quo l'Allemagne est plutot favor- 
able a l'intransigeanco de l'Autriche. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pil 
arreter tout le developpement de la 
crise, parait n'exercer aucune action 
sur son alliee. 

L'Ambassadeur trouve insufnsante la 
reponse de la Serine. 



(Translation.) 

St. Petersburgh, 
(Telegraphic.) Jvhj 15 (28), 1914. 

MY interviews with the German 
Ambassador confirm my impression 
that Germany is, if anything, in 
favour of the uncompromising attitudo 
adopted by Austria. 

The Berlin Cabinet, who could havo 
prevented the whole of this crisis 
developing, appear to bo exerting no, 
influence on their ally. 

Tha Ambassador considers that the 
Servian reply is insufficient. 



35 

Cette attitude allemande est tout This attitude of the German Govern- 

particulierement alarmante. . meat is most alarming. 

II me semble que mieux que toute It seems to me that England is in 

|autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en a better position than any other Power 

mesure de tenter encore d'agir a to make another attempt at Berlin to 

Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement induce the German Government to 

allemand a Taction neeessaire. C'est take the necessary action. There is no 

a Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve doubt that the key of the situation is 

la clef de la situation. to be found at Berlin. 

No. 55. 
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. 

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more 
optimistic. 

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian 
Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her 
territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State 
respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know 
whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had pro- 
posed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers 
throughout the conversations that would ensue. 

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia 
in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. 

I asked. if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the 
four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially 
of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference 
he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The 
German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal 
opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria- 
Hungary. 

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers 
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep 
in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. 
* See No. 44. 

No. 56. 
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with 
Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told 
him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted 
with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public 
opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it 
would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way 
again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the 
annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done 
before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would 
now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in 
which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said 
that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discus- 
sions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his 
Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long 
as possiblo, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained 
should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. Ho had just heard of a 
satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had 
agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly 
reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to 



36 

the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria- 
Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that 
the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg!! should be furnished with full 
powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly 
asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit 
this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 57. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 27, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be 
willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, 
but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact 
of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possi- 
bility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, 
but. he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will Be satisfied, 
and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, 
Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety 
on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would 
enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary 
alone. 

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably 
impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no 
opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both ■before and 
after communication of the note, end again to-day, that Austrian Government 
have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from 
Servia. 

No. 58. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.- — 
(Received July 28.) 
(Tolegraphic.) Pons, July 28, 1914. 

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this after- 
noon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded 
in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July. 

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms 
■what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observa- 
tions to tho German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of 
peace. 

* Sc-o No. 46. 

No. 59. 
Sir F. Berti", British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic. ) p or ; S] j uhj 28> 1D14 . 

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of vour 
conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of 
yesterday* to St. Petersburgh. 

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossi- 
bility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " solidaires " with 
Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condi- 
tion is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an 
attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German 
and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. 

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity 
Of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, 
he gave no assurance. 

* See No. 47. 



37 

No. 60. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

{Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported 
in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting 
your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, 
and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all 
of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of 
general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he 
can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could 
be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us. 

* See No. 43. 

No. 61. 

Sir M. da Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike pro- 
ceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotia- 
tions on basis of Servian reply. 

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent 
conflict. 



No. 62. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affair3 to-day in the sense of your tele- 
gram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said 
that, as mentioned in your speech, t which he had just read to me, you had 
hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested 
might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would 
accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added 
that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands 
of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion 
during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian 
Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Baid quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of 
Servian note ; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific 
character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted 
as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter 
that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. 
I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now bo 
arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the 
peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the 
course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from 
his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints 
which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas 
Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first 
instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question 
would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in 
■mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those 
impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no 
longer be postponed. 

» See No. 46. 

+ "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. 



33 

No. 63. 
Sir R. Eodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Svr Edward Grey.-— 
(Recewid July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.') Borne, Juhj 28, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.* 

I have communicated substance, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, 
immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. 
* See No. 27. 

No. 64. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rone, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, Juhj 28, 1914. 

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following 
to you : — 

In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d' Affaires had said he 
thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian 
agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might 
still accept the whole Austrian note. 

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to 
Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then 
advise Servia to accept without conditions. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long 
official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inade- 
quate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation 
— such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propa- 
ganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in 
facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge 
d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was 
to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia 
was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that 
ground might be cleared here. 

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian 
declaration. 

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate 
beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point 
or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany 
had been given to Italian Ambassador. 

No. 65. 
Mr. Grackantkorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Ed/uiard Grey. — (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, Juhj 28, 1914. 

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending 
efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. 

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant- 
vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. 

No. 66. 
Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria. 

No. 07. 
iS'tV Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Btrlim. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Juhj 28, 1914. 

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my 
idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, 
» See No. 43. 



39 

but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could bo 
mada tor a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not 
previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom 
the mediating Powers could easily ' keep in touch through their respective 
allies. 

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between 
Austria and iiussia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree 
that it is the most preferable method of all. 

I understand *'iat the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed 
a friendly exchange of views to "the Austrian GoVernmerlt, and, if the latter 
accepts, ft will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. 

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the 
German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversa- 
tion recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.* 

* See No. 46. 

No. 68. 

Sir Edward Grey le Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle, of mediation between 
Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, ,1 am ready to propose 
that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this 
principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we 
see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. 

No. 69. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) « Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views 
between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram 
of the 27th July.* 

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, 
but I. am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do.' Could he not first mention in 
an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such 
scheme? It might then take more concrete shape. 

* See No. 55. 



No. 70. 

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Amhasmior in 

London, July 29, 1914. 

(1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated 
July 28, 1914. 

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the 
Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation- in the 
military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform 
German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive inten- 
tion against Germany. 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. 

(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff." 
The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to .the idea of direct 
communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in 
order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations 
of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. 

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters 
to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. 

* Russian Ambassador in London. 



40 

No. 71. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
(Receiaed Jidy 29.) ■ 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this 
evening. He said that he wished me to tell .von that he was most anxious that 
Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, 
as they had done successfully in the last European crisis... He had not been 
able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great 
Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such 
a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an " Areopagus " 
consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two 
remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not 
be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. 
You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and 
"St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly 
with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions 
would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true 
which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army 
corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would 
be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his 
power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, 
who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, 
and if war were to result, Russia would' be entirely responsible. I ventured 
to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my 
mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any 
caso-bfl'ered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility 
would test with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian 
note/fut that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel 
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to 
do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to 
do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers 
must be avoided " were his last words. 

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, 
as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that 
opinion is shared byvrnany people here. 



No. 72. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey.- ^Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.; St. Vctcrsburgh, July 28, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank yon tor the language 
you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to 
Berlin, substance of which I communicated tu his Excellency. lie took a 
pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news 
from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. 1 said it was important 
that wo should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked 
him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian 
Ambassador had, 1 understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's 
integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averts 
ins a European war would be welcomed "by His Majesty's Government. In reply 
In- Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied 
with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that 
order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria 
crossed Servian frontier 

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating 
counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had 
'not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now 
in bis turn use his restraining influence. I made it cleai to his Excellency 
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if 
Servia were attacked by Austria. 

* See No. #>. 



41 

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no 
instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors 
are still waiting for their final instructions. 



No. 73. 
Sir M. de, Bunatn, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE received note vcrbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating 
that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a 
satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to 
provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to 
force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration 
according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening 
of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. 
Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of 
Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 2Gth 
February, 1009 

* See No. 4. 



No. 74. 
*SV M. de Hansen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic. ) Vienna, July 28, Vjll. 

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's 
suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The 
suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian 
conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be 
authorised accordingly. 

The Russiau Amoassador thinks that a conference in London of the less 
interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of 
preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will 
acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not 
actually 'come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned. 



No. 7.j. 

,Sir E. Gosc/ten, British Ambassa/or at Berlin, to Sir Edward Gre>i. — 

(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, u ho told me that 
he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had 
at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too 
rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the 
Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on 
receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained 
that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian 
reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without 
some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands 
made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in 
view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities 
which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive 
object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government 
already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. 

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, 
to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he honed, 
eliminate all possible misunderstandings. 

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. 

From the fact that he had gone so far in tlio matter of giving advise at 



Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise- that he was sincerely 
doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications. 

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the 
confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should 
know he was doing his hest to support your efforts in the cause of general 
peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated. 

No. 7G. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that 
he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to 
Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause 
them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now 
happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that 
Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of 
war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain 
military measures, winch he did not specify, being taken in France. He subse- 
quently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him 
that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government 
had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German 
Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French 
colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it 
seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her 
military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested 
Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing 
graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy 
of consideration, as ho replied that would be a different matter from conference 
proposed by you. 

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Govern- 
ment that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. 

No. 77. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclten, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office-, July 29, 1914. 

I .MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram 
of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as 
heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we 
all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going 
so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to 
his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe 
* Sc« No. 75. 

JMo. 78. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir EdVoari 

Grey. — (Received July 2 9.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day. 

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to 
Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, 
and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German 
Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had 
already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he 
explained, would only be directed against Austria. 

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation 

botween Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said 

he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. 

He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, 

* See No. 67. 



43 

to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of 
four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the 
three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the -Austrian 
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France 
and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such 
conversations took. No time was to be lost,, and the only way to avert war 
was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors 
cither collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could bo 
induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank 
and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their 
efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the 
British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government. 

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in 
Rome telegram of the 27th July,* which 1 mentioned to him, were carried out. 
Ir/ reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the 
four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia ; he could not, he said, be 
more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations 
would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the 
ultimatum. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram 
of the 28th instantt was one of secondary importance. Under altered cir- 
cumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German 
Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his 
Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear 
that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses 
to his own Government the same language as he did to mo to-day He accused 
the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisa- 
tion, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, 
that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that 
Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service 
to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now 
declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she 
knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for 
Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in 
earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would 
have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing 
frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before 
mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous 
situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile ail work together 
* See No. 57. t Seo No. 69. 



No. 79 

Sir J/ tie liunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey 

{Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

'1HERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with 
Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by 
the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, 
and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with 
me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into 
a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made :it St 
Petcrsburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence 
of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks thai 
Russia might bo induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Amba - 
sadu is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do. 



44 

No. 80. 
Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 29, 1914. 

IN your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was 
reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in 
contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instantt from Berlin. 

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that 
German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 
27th July,t but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to 
urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the 
idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secre- 
tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the 
door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails 
to- have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be con- 
comitant with such direct communication. 

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Govern- 
ment would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken 
every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Govern- 
ment must lend their co-operation in this. 

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe 
that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for 
good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act 
with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect. 

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would 
till advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should 
continue to exchange views. 

* Sec No. 46. + See No. 43. 



No. 81. 
Sir Edicard Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.* 

It is impossible for mo to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I 
understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not 
accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have 
heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of 
mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad 
if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there. 

* See No. 64. 



No. 82. 
Mr. Beaumont, British Charge" d' Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward 

<;r,y.— (L : .e<ii\d July ill.) 

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914. 

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably 
beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered 
this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of 
tlie deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and 
of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman 
population discontented with Servian rule. 



45 

No. 83. 

Mr Crackanlhorpe, British Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nis/i, July 29, 1914. 

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression 
of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant 
in the House of Commons 



No. 84. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E Gcschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office. July 29, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by tho German Chancellor 
to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh, and ho hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to 
be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a 
satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and extension of Austrian pro- 
ceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived 
at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I 
would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my 
information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined 
the suggestion of tho Russian Government that the Austrian' Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. 
Tho press correspondents at St, Petersburgh had been told that Russian 
Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they 
were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if 
necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, con- 
sultation or discussion, or even conversations a quatrc in London too formal 
a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method 
by which tho influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent 
war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole 
idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation 
by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In 
fact mediation was ready to como into operation by any method that Germany 
thought possible if only Germany would "press the button " in the interests of 
peace. 



No. 85. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had 
just returned from Potsdam. 

He said that should Austria bo attacked by Russia a European conflagra- 
tion might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as 
Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. Ho then 
proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said 
that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which 
governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow 
France to be crushed rn any conflict there might be. That, however, was not 
the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Grert 
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the Dritish Govern- 
ment that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at 
tho expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might 
ensno. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that 
he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards 
Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries 
respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready 
to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that die would do likewise. 



40 

It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be 
forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity- 
would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor 
the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an 
understanding with England ; he trusted that these assurances might form 
the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind 
a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it 
was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an 
assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might 
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. 

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal 
to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you 
would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion 
that you would desire to retain full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated 
the contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his 
best thanks to you. 

* See No. 77. 



No. 86. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

.(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further 
discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day 
by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes 
for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate 
any further demands on Servia. 



No. 87. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
Sir, 

AFTER telling M. Cambon* to-day how grave tho situation seemed to be, 
I told him that 1 meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must 
not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false 
security that wo should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, 
which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went 
on to say to M. Cambon* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that 
public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different 
point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years 
ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was 
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt 
to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the 
subject of a special agreement between Franco and us. In the present case 
the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called 
to take, a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and 
Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be 
a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in 
the Balkans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war 
over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became 
involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case 
that wo should havo to consider. France would then have been drawn into 
a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour 
and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and 
we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought 
it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions 
with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowskvt not 

* "French Ambassador in London, 
t German Ambassador in London. 



47 

to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let 
M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what 
to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He 
understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy 
between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene ; should other 
issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the 
question bocame one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what 
it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announce- 
ment, and made no criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand 
from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. 
This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help 
Russia if Russia was attacked. 

I am, <Src., 

E. GREY. 



No. 88. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
Sir, 

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I 
had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. 
I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that 
the Austrian. declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversa- 
tions between Russia and Austria. I said thai the hope built upon those 
direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared 
to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of media- 
tion in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. If ho succeeded, well and good. If not, 
it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had 
suggested to the Germau Ambassador this morning, and propose some method 
by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace 
of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while 
desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations 
against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only 
drag on matters, and give Austria timo to crush Servia. It was, of course, too 
late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short 
time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation 
of some Servian territory. But! even then it might be possible to bring some 
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the 
occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated 
that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to 
mediate between her and Russia. 

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin 
what I had said to him this morning. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 
* Russian Ambassador in London. 



No. 89. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914 
Sir, 

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the 
European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and 
friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave 
While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no 
thought of interfering in -it. But if Germany became involved in it' and 
then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European 
interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our 



48 

conversation— which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should 
stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that 
we should, under "certain circumstances, intervene? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like 
a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became 
worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening 
if Germany was not involved, or even it France was not involved. But we 
knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British 
interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision 
would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. 
I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at 
present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German 
Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep 
the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European 
interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly 
tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing 
that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been 
so misled, the course of things might have been different. 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said ; indeed, 
he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his 
view of the situation. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 

No. 90. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, 
as recorded in my telegram of the '29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the 
Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd'st telegram of the 28th July! and of 
my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete 
acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But 
there appeared, from what the Marquis di San GiulianoH had said, to be a 
method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have -any say in the matter, 
they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter 
Vould give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the 
leasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for 
information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discus- 
sion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between 
Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia 
to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length 
she pleased. That would not bo mediation, it would, simply be 
putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German 
Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could 
not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great 
Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating 
Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation 
of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria 
might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia. 

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian terri- 
tory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal 
Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal 
State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans. 

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impos- 
sible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently 
were taking precautions. 

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found 
of preserving the peace of Europe. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 

* See No. 8t. t British Ambassador in Rome. * See No. 64. 

If Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



49 

No. 91. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bun-sen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
Sir, Fore gn Of/ice, July 29, 1914. 

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memo- 
randum, which he proposed to leave, and winch he said gave an account of 
the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary 
the Austrian action was. 

I said that 1 did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between 
Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of 
Europe The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for 
Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European 
peace was at stake. 

Count Mensdorjf* said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria 
could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and 
again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of 
territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her 
interests were safeguarded. 

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the 
independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a 
sort of vassal State. 

Count Mensdorff* deprecated this. 

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian 
action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, 
before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the 
Austrian sphere of influence. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 
* Austro-Htingarian Ambassador in London. 



No. 92. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. liodd, British Ambassador at Borne. 
Sir.^ Fore gn Office, July 29, 1914. 

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the 
Marquis di San G-uliano* suggesting that the German objections to the media- 
tion of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, 
might be removed by some change in the form of procedure. 

1 said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Govern- 
ment to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation 
between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in 
principle, could be applied. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 
* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 93. 

Teleyrams communicated by Count Benckindorff", Russian Ambassador in 

London, July 30, 1914. 



(I.) 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sqzonof* 

Vicnne, (Translation.) 

le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) 

J'AI entretenu aiijourd'hui leComte I SPOKE to Count Berehtoldt 
Berchtoldt dans le sens des instruc- to-day in the sense of your Excellency's 
tions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis instructions. I brought to his notice, 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

+ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



no 



observer, en termes les plus amicaux, 
combicn il etait desirable tie trouver 
mio solution qui, en consolidant les 
bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie 
et la Russie, donnerait a la Monarchic 
austro-hongroise des garanties se'rieuses 
pour ses rapports futurs avec la 
Serbie. 

J'nttirais l'atteniion tin Comto 
Bevchtold* sur tons les dangers pour la 
paix do l'Europe, qu'entrainerait un 
conflit arme entrc l'Autriche-Hongrie 
et la Serbie. 

Le Comte Berchtold* me repondit 
qu'il so rendait parfaitement compte 
d\i serieux do la situation et ties avan- 
tages d'une franche explication avec 
le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. II 
me dit quo d'un autre cote lc Gou- 
vernement austro-hongrois, qui ne 
s'etait decide quo ties mal volontiers 
aux mesures energiques qu'il avait 
prises contrc la Serbie, ne pouvait plus 
ni rcculer, ni entrer en discussion au- 
cunc des termes de la note austro- 
hongroise. 

Le Comte Berchtold* ajouta que la 
crise etait devenue si aigue, et que l'ex- 
citation tie l'opinion publique avait at- 
teint tel degre, quo le Gouvernement, 
le Toulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consen- 
tir; d'autant moins, me dit-il, quo la 
reponse meme de la Serbie donne la 
preuve tin manque de sincerite de ses 
promesscs pour l'avenir. 



in the most friendly manner, how de- 
sirable it was to find a solution which, 
while consolidating good relations be- 
tween Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
would give to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy genuine guarantees for its 
future relations with Servia. 

I drew Count Bcrchtold's* atten- 
tion to all the dangers to the peace of 
Europe which would be involved by an 
armed conflict between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Servia. 

Count Berchtold' replied that he was 
well aware of the gravity of the situa- 
tion and of the advantages of a frank 
explanation with the St. Petcrsburgh 
Cabinet. He told me that, on tho 
other band, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, who had only decided 
much against their will on the ener- 
getic measures which they had taken 
against Servia, could no longer recede, 
nor enter into any discussion about tho 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. 

Count Berchtold* added that the 
crisis had become so acute, and that 
public opinion had risen to such a pitch 
of excitement, that the Government, 
even if they wished it, could no longer 
consent to such a course. This was 
all the more impossible, he said, inas- 
much as the Servian reply itself fur- 
nished proof of the insincerity of 
Servia's nromises for the future. 



° Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 



(2.) 



M. Saxonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, 
Russian Ambassador in London. 

St. Pctersburgh, 

July 16 (29), 1914. 



Saint-Fctcrsbourg, 
le 16 (29) juilkt, 1914. 
(Tolegraphique.) 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagrie rn'in- 
forme, au nom du Chancelier, que 
l'Allemagne n'a pas cesse d'exereer a 
Vienne line influence moderatrice et 
qu'elle eontinuera cette action meme 
apres la declaration de guerre. 
Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait aucunc 
nouvelle que les armees autrichiennes 
aient f ranch] la frontiere serbe. J'ai 
prie l'Ambassadeur de transmcttre au 
Chancelier mes remerciements pour la 
teneur amicale de cette communica- 
tion. Jo l'ai informs des mesures mili- 
taires prises par la Russie, dont au- 
cune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre 
TAUemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne pre- 
jugeaient pas non plus des mesures 
agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, 



(Telegraphic.) 

THE German Ambassador informs 
me, in the name of the Chancellor, that 
Germany .has not ceased to exercise a 
moderating influence at Vienna, and 
that she will continue to do so even 
after the declaration of war. Up to 
this morning there had been no news 
that the Austrian army has crossed 
the Servian frontier. I have begged 
the Ambassador to express my thanks 
to the Chancellor for the friendly 
tenour of this communication. I have 
informed him of the military measures 
taken by Russia, none of which, I told 
him, were directed against Germany; 
I added that neither should they be 
taken as aggressive measures against 
Austria-Hungary, their explanation 



51 



ces mesures s'expliquant pur la mobili- 
sation de la plus grande partie de 
l'armee austro-hongroise. 

L'Ambassadeur so prononcant en 
frfveur d'explications directes avec lc 
Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je repon- 
dis quo j'y etais tout dispose, pour pen 
que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin 
dont il parlait trouvent echo a Vienne. 



En memo temps je signalais quo nous 
etions tout disposes a accepter le projet 
dune conference des quatre Puis- 
sances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, 
1'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas en- 
tierement. 

Jo dis que, dans mon opinion, le 
meilleur moyen pour mettre a profit 
tons les moyens propres a prodiure unc 
solution pacifique, consisterait en unc 
action parallele des pourparlers d'une 
conference a quatre de 1'Allemagne, de 
la France, de l'Angleterre et de 
l'ltalie et d'un contact direct entre 
l'Autricbe-Hongrie et la Russie, a 
I'instar a peu pies de ce qui avait eu 
lieu aux moments les plus critiques de 
la criso de Fan dernier. 

Je dis a l'Ambassadeur qu'apres les 
concessions faites par la Serbie. un ter- 
rain de compromis pour les questions 
restees ouvertes ne serait pas tres diffi- 
cile, a trouver, a condition toutefois de 
quelque bonne volonte de la part de 
i'Autriche et a condition que toutes les 
Puissances uscnt de toute leur in- 
fluence dans un sens de conciliation. 



being the mobilisation of the greater 
part of the Austro-Hungarian army. 

The Ambassador said that he was in 
favour of direct explanations between 
the Austrian Government and our- 
selves, and I replied that I, too, was 
quite willing, provided that the advice 
of the German Government, to which 
he had referred, found an echo at 
Vienna. 

I said at the same time that wo wero 
quite ready to accept the proposal for 
a conference of the four Powers, a pro- 
posal with which, apparently, Ger- 
many was not in entire sympathy. 

I told him that, in my opinion, the 
best manner of turning to account the 
most suitable methods of finding a 
peaceful solution would be by arrang- 
ing for parallel discussions to be car- 
ried on by a conference of the four 
Powers— Germany, Franco, England, 
and Italy — and by a direct exchange 
of views between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia on much tho same lines as 
occurred during the most critical 
moments of last year's crisis. 

I told the Ambassador that, after 
the concessions which had been made 
by Servia, it should not be very diffi- 
cult to find a compromise to settle the 
other questions which remained out- 
standing, provided that Austria 
showed some good-will and that all the 
Powers used their entire influence in 
the direction of conciliation. 



(3.) 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, 

Russian Ambassador in London. 



Sa int-Pctersboitrg , 
lc 16 (29) juillet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon 
telegramme precedent, je n'avais pas 



St. Petersburgh, 
July 16 (29), 1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

AT the time of my interview with 
the German Ambassador, dealt with, 
in my preceding telegram, I had not 



encore recti le telegramme du 15 (28) yet received M. Schebeko's* telegram 



juillet de M. Schebeko 

Le contonu de ce telegramme consti- 
tue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de 
proceder a un echange d'idees direct 
avec le Gouvernement Imperial. 

Des lors, il ne nous resce plus qvt'a 
nous en remettre entierement a\\ Gou- 
vernement britannique pour l'initia- 
tive des demarches qtril jiigera- utile 
de provoquer. 



of the 15th (28th) July. 

The contents of this telegram con- 
stitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet 
to agree to a direct exchange of views 
witli the Imperial Government. 

From now on, nothing remains for 
us to do but to rely entirely on the 
British Government to take the initia- 
tive m any steps which they may 
consider advisable. 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 



Xo. 94. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 30. ) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out opera- 
tions on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian 
Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat 
late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I 
believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the 
Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless 
mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in 
concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro- 
Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken 
in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that 
Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and 
French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed 
the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that 
it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the 
present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade 
to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favour- 
able spirit; if approached in a proper .manner, he thought she would probably 
go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been 
completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settle- 
ment. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which 
opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought 
that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three 
other Powers. 

I gather from what. Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid 
of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public 
opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet 
Austrian demands on Servia. 



Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received Jxdy 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by 
Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted 
regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Govern- 
ment are taking it. Ho says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia 
will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is com- 
pelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from 
tho continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory. 

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at 
Vionna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. 

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme 
anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to 
plead the cause" of peace with entire sincerity. 

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that tho 
German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatumito Servia before 
it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from 
tho German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it. 

No. 96. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey 

{Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this 
afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his 



53 

interviow with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite 
friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had 
mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not 
be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions 
similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had 
no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, although he 
did not say that they could be resumed on the basis ot the Servian reply. 

On the. whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to 
make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that 
Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that some- 
thing may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. 



No. 97. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. 

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this 
morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday 
afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian 
integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this 
might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become, an Austrian va"ssal, just as, 
in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would 
be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. 

M. Sazonof* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian 
Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against 
Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. 

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was 
inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof* to mako some suggestion which he 
could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof* accord- 
ingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of 
which following is translation: — 

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character 
of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her 
ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia 
engages to stop all military preparations." 

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal 
is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excite- 
ment here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, 
Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she 
can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general 
mobilisation. 

• Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 98. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

SECRETARY, of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince 
Lichnowsky's* telegram recording his last conversation with you ho asked 
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept media- 
tion on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point 
and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but 
he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as 
Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably 
find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed 
in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading 
her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of 

* Gorman Ambassador in London. 



54 

aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may 
be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view 
of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken 
in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been 
officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ajnbassador yesterday- 
Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. 
Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and 
when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted 
this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram* received from Prince Lidhnowskyt 
last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly 
with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty 
with which you had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last 
night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have 
spoken to me in the way he had done. 

* See No. 102. t German Amba^.ador in London. 

No. 99. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
[Ree iced July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Pom, July 30, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have 
been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her 
mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received 
from St. Petersburg!!, states that the German communication had been modi- 
fied, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would 
consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on 
condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the 
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, 
which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion. 

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. 
He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great 
Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to 
the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a 
result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be 
no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. 

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government 
to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would 
be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire 
war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisa- 
tion so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His 
Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be dune in that way. 
They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round 
Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Con- 
tinent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital 
interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire 
it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany 
from going to war. 

No. 100. 
Sir R. liodd, British Ambassador at Home, to Sir Edward Ore;/. — 
(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, Juhi 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would 
be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia 
could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the 
occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. 

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might 
be d<:vised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views. 
I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 



55 

No. 101. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 29th July.* 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's 
proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies 
are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French 
territory as distinct from the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for Fiance, 
without further' territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed 
as to lose her position as a. Great Power, and become subordinate to German 
policy. , 

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the 
good name of this country would never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation 
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not 
entertain that bargain either. 

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of 
a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered 
positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We. 
must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require 
in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as 
the Chancellor contemplates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most 
earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England 
and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the 
peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany 
and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that 
object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and 
good-will. 

And I will say this : If the pence of Europe can be preserved, and the present 
crisis safely passed, my own . ndeavour will be to promote some arrangement 
to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by 
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and 
worked for it. as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, German^ 
having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has 
hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this 
present crisis, mi much more acute than any that Europe has gone through 
lor generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction 
which will folio. v may make possible some more definite rapprochement between 
the Powers than lias bi en possible hitherto. 

• Sec No. 35. 

\o. 102. 
Sir Edward Grey ! > Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Fo.eign Office, July 30, 1914. 

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky* that Germany must not count upon 
our standing aside in all circumstances. Tins is doubtless the substance of the 
telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference 
is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.t 
German Ambassador in London. 1 Sea No. 98. 

No. 103. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bach man, British Ambassalor at St. Petsrsbuiyh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would 
endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in 
region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured 



to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. 
Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. 
I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can 
be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further 
military preparations on all sides. 

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* 
as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July.t and fears it cannot be modified ; 
but if Austrian advanco were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that 
the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without 
impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. 

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, 
declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance 
and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia 
would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military prepara- 
tions, provided that other Powers did the same. 

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest 
if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. 
You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. + See No. 97. 



No. 104. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir 
G. Buchanan* of to-day, + and say that I know that he has been urging Russia 
not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last sugges- 
"tion at St. Petersburgh. 

« British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. t Sea No. 103. 



Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him 
two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously 
threatened, -we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for 
convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's 
reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened 
than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would 
intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circum- 
stances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression 
by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, 
showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and moro 
on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He 
anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that/ 
France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage 
to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither 
of these things could France admit. 

I said that the Cabinet v, as to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see 
him again to-morrow afternoon. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 
* French Ambassador in London. 



Enclosure 1 in No. 105. 

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. 

My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 

" FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and 
military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood 



C7 

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to 
decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. 
We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to 
be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in 
a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment 
is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become 
essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed 
assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unpro- 
voked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general 
peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- 
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, 
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these 
measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once bo 
taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect 
should be given to them. 

Yours, &c, 

E. GREY. 



Enclosure 2 in No. 105. 



M. Camhon, French Ambassador 

L' Ambassadc de France, 
Londrrs, 
cc 23 novembre, 1912. 
Cher Sir Edward, 

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 
novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, 
dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites 
militaires et navales de la France et de 
la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient consul- 
tecs de temps en temps ; qu'il avait tou- 
jours ete entendu quo ces consulta- 
tions ne restreignaient pas la liberte, 
pour chaque Gouvernement, do decider 
dans l'avenir s'ils se preteraient Pun 
l'autre le concours de leurs forces 
armees; -que, de part et d'autre, 
ces consultations entre specialist! s 
n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre eon- 
siderees comme des engagements obli- 
geant nos Gouvernements a agir dans 
certains cas; que cependant je vous 
avais fait observer que, si l'un on 
l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait 
de graves raisons d'apprehender line 
attaque non provoquee de la part d'une 
tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essen- 
tiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur 
l'assistance armee de l'autre. 

Votre lettre repond a cette observa- 
tion, et je suis autorise a vous declarer 
que, dans le cas oil l'un de nos deux 
Gouvernements aurait rai motif grave 
d'ariprehender soit l'agression d'une 
tierce puissance, soit quelque evene- 
ment menacant pour la paix generale, 
ce Gouvernement examinerait immedia- 
tement avec l'autre si les deux Gou- 
vernements doivent agir de concert en 
vue de prevenir l'agression ou de 
sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les 



in London, to Sir Edward Grey. 
(Translation.) 
Trench Embassy, London, 
November 23, 1912. 
Dear Sir Edward, 

YOU reminded me in your letter of 
yesterday, 22nd November, that during 
the last few years the military and 
naval authorities of France and Great 
Britain had consulted with each other 
from time to time ; that it had always 
been understood that these consulta- 
tions should not restrict the liberty of 
either Government to decide in the 
future whether they should lend each 
other the support of their armed 
forces ; that, on either side, these con- 
sultations between experts were not 
and should not be considered as 
engagements binding our Governments 
to take action in certain eventuali- 
ties ; that, however, I had remarked 
to you that, if one or other of the two 
Governments had grave reasons to fear 
an unprovoked attack on the part of a 
third Power, it would become essential 
to know whether it could count on the 
armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and 
I am authorised to state that, in tho 
event of one of our two Governments 
having grave reasons to fear either an 
act of aggression from a third Power, 
or some event threatening the general 
peace, that Government would imme- 
diately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments 
should act together in order to prevent 
the act of aggression or preserve peace. 
If so, the two Governments would de- 



58 



deux Gouvernements delibereraient sur 
les mesures^qu'ils seraient disposes a 
prendre en commun ; si ces mesures 
comportaient une action, les deux Gou- 
vernements prendraient nussitot en 
consideration les plans de leurs etats 
majors et decidcraiont alors de la suite 
qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans 
Votre sincerement devoue, 

PAUL CAMBON. 



liberate as to the measures which they 
would be prepared to take in common.; 
if those measures involved action, the 
two Governments would take into im- 
mediate consideration the plans of 
their general staffs and would then de- 
cide as to the effect to be given to 
those plans. 

Yours, dfcc, 

PAUL CAMBON. 



French Minister for t 



Enclosure 3 in No. 105. 
vreign Affairs to M. Camion, French Ambassador 
in London- 

(Translation.) 
THE German Army had its advance- 
posts on our frontiers yesterday; 
German patrols twice penetrated on 
to our territory. Our advance-posts 
are withdrawn to a distance of 10 
kilom. from the frontier. The local 
population is protesting against being 
thus abandoned to the attack of the 
enemy's army, but the Government 
wishes to make it clear to public 
opinion and to the British Government 
that in no case will France be the 
aggressor. The whole 16th corps from 
Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th 
from Treves and Cologne, is occupying 
the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg 
side. The 15th army corps from 
Strassburg lias closed up on the frontier. 
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are 
prevented by the threat of being shot 
from crossing the frontier. Reservists 
have been called back to Germany by- 
tens of thousands. This is the last stage 
before mobilisation, whereas we have 
not called back a single reservist. 

As you see, Germany has done so. 
I would add that all my information 
goes to show that the German prepara- 
tions began on Saturday,* the very 
day on which the Austrian note was 
handed in. 

These facts, added to t>hose contained 
in my telegram of yesterday, will 
enable you to prove to the British 
Government the pacific intentions of 
the one party and the aggressive in- 
tentions of the other. 



L'AKMtE allemande a tes avant- 
postes sur ;:os bornos-frontieres, hier ; 
par deux fois des patrouilles alle- 
mandcs ont penetre sur not're terri- 
toire. Nos avant-postes sont en re- 
traite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la fron- 
tiere. Lcs populations ainsi abandon- 
ees a 1'attaque de l'armee adverse 
protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient 
a montrer a l'opinion publique et au 
Gouvernement britannique que l'agres- 
seur tie sera en aucun cas la France. 
Tout le 16 c Corps de Metz renforce par 
line partie du 8° venu de Treves et de 
Cologne occupe la frontiere do Metz au 
Luxembourg. Le 15" Corps d'Armee 
de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. 
Sous menace d'etre fusilles les Al- 
saciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ne 
peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des 
reservistes par dizaines de milliers 
sont rappeles en Allemagne; e'est le 
dernier stade avant la mobilisation : 
or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reser- 
viste'. 

Comrae vous le voyez, l'Alleinagne 
l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos in- 
formations concordent pour montrer 
que les preparatifs allemands ont com- 
mence samedi,* le jour meme de la 
remise de la note autrichienne. 

Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus 
dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous per- 
mettent de faire la preuve au Gou- 
vernement britannique de la volonte 
pacifique de l'un et des intention:, 
agressives de I'antre. 

Sic: in original. Tlio actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum 
et, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was <!.r«l Saturday, July 25, and 



i ir.n-!v to the hitter da 



it that refer? 



is intended. 



No. 10G. 
Sir I!. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey, — 
(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 30, 1914. 

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this 
evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct 



50 

exchange of views with the Russian Government. But lie had reason to be- 
lieve that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to 
Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, 
and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. 

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask 
the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views 
between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would 
consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria 
to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a 
guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex 
territory. It would bo useless to ask for anything less than was contained 
in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that 
might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain 
from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of 
these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still 
time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour 
of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea 
of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. 



No. 107. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 
[Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Govern- 
ment to the communication* which you made to them through the German 
Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which 
the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia, and 
Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer 
yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as tc 
whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the 
Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- 
municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked tho Austro-Hungarian 
Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been 
returned. 

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing tho button" 
as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone 
so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated 
rather than otherwise. 

* See No. 84. 



No. 108. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received. July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and modera- 
tion at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation 
against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at 
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at tho Ball- 
platz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was 
being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns is tho case, military 
measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would 
be impossible for him to remain quiet. Ho wished to tell me that it was quite 
possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government 
would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of going 
to have an audience with tho Emperor. 

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo- 
German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to tho 
Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when 
the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. 



60 

No. 109. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassa lor at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received, July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin* July 31, 1914. 

I HEAD to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for 
British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of 
yesterday.* liis Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian 
measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, 
that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let, 
him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he 
would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full 
of grave matters that he could not bo certain of remembering al) its points. I 
therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that 
it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not a.s an official 
document. 

His Excellency agreed. 

* Sec No. 101. 



No. 110. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by 
the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between 
the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The 
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg!) has also been instructed that he 
ma}' converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should 
give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss sug- 
gestions and any questions directly affecting A ustro- Russian relations. If the 
Russian Government object to the Anstrians mobilising eight army corps, 
it might, be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 
Servians. 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to 
show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. 

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being 
resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope lie will encourage 
them. 

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I 
did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were 
put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. 



No. 111. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

1 iiOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria 
and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto 
has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of 
Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. 
it has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution 
being found by Viciiiia and St. Petersburgh, Germanj' might sound Vienna, 
and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible 
for the fear disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would under- 
take to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands ou Servia, provided 
that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian 
territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her 
willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers 
that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of 
rvian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course 
iuspend further military operations or preparations. 

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 



61 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any 
reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria 
were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would 
be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and- 
Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept 
it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the conse- 
quences ; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became 
involved .we should be drawn in. 

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to 
proposal above. 

No. 112. 

Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edwurd Grey. — 
[Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31,-1914. 

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from 
their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being 
mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "* will be proclaimed at once 
by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian 
general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. 
His Excellencyadded in explanation, that "Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking 
of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a 
foreign country. 

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to 
put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must 
certainly prepare for all emergencies 

I asked him whether he could not still put pressuro on the authorities at 
Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show 
themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied 
that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that 
he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. 
* "Imminence of War." 



No. 113. 
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — [Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) , St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. 

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. 

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian 
Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to 
intervention of Powers, and that she. is r.ioving troops against Russia as well 
as against Servia. 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military 
preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 



No. 114. 

Sir Edward, Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, an-1 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of 
mobilisation in- Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, 
in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government aro 
prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power 
violates it. 

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It 
is important to have an early answer. 



62 

No. 115. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villisrs, British Minister at Brussels. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French 
and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. 

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain 
to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other 
Powers to uphold and observe. 

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. 



No. HO. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.* 

Nobody here feels that in this dispute,' so far as it has yet gone, British 
treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it 
was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly 
involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute 
which is not hers. 

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor 
in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so 
told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to 
reconsider this decision. 

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the 
present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly 
there is a new development. 

* See No. 99. 



Sir F.' Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

AT 7 o'clock this evening I wnn sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact 
that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, 
German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the 
Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. 

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total 
mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within 
twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply 
with German demand. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and 
enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. 

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is 
going to call at the Ministry for Foreigu Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. 
in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will 
adopt in the circumstances. 

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any 
general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. 



No. 118. 

Sir if. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although 
Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, 
the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform yuu 
that mobilisation was not to bo regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either 
side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emper.or of Russia and 
the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister tor Foreign Affairs. A 
general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my 
expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must 
do something, in his opinion, to secure ber position. As regards Russian 
intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise 
such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of 
the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian 
Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views 
of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier lino. Although 
he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, 
I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the 
present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian 
Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation. 

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere 
unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the 
present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, us 
regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to. them as 
far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency 
is exerting himself strongly iti the interests of peace. 



No. 119. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

M. CAMBON* referred to-day to a telegram that had heen shown to Sn 
Arthur Nicolson+ this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying 
that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which 
was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare 
definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude 
in favour of peace. 

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under 
the impression that we would not intervene. 1 had refused overtures to promise 
that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that 
we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morjnng as to say to the 
German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war. we 
should be drawn into it. That, of course, wue not the same thing as taking 
an engagement to France, and I told M. Carohon ol it only to show that we 
had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. 

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. 

I'said that we had come to the couclus-on, in the Cabinet to-day. that we 
could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put 
our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Dp 
to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that 
any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further develop- 
ments might alter this situation and cause the Government .and Parliament to 
take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality 
of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in 
determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene 
or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood 
with regard to the neutrality of Belgium; and "it might be that I should ask 

* French Ambassador in London. 

t British Under Secretary of Stale for Foreign Affairs. 



64 

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engage- 
ment that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. 

M. Gumboil repeated his question whether we would help Trance ii Germany 
made an attack on her. 

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone 
at present, we could not take any engagement. 

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals 
that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that 
France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished 
position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in 
allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be 
repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question 
to the Cabinet again. 

I said that, the Cabinet, would certainly be summoned as soon as there was 
some new development, but at the present moment the only -answer I could 
give was that wo could not undertake any definite engagement. 

I am, etc., 

E. GREY. 



No. 120. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petcrsburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — (Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petcrsburgh, July 31, 1Q14. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and 
asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best 
calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* 
with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.f He trusted it would 
meet with your approval : — 

"Si l'Autricho consentira a arreter marche des se.s troupes sur le territoire 
serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit aiistro-serbe a assume lo caractere d'une 
question d'inU'ret europcen, elle admct que les Grandes Puissances examinent 
la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait aceorder an Gouvernement d'Autriche- 
Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte ii ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son 
independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expcctante."J 

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor 
by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor 
Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for 
the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then 
proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggres- 
sive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long 
as conversation with Austria continued. His Imperial Majesty undertook that 
not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however, of course 
impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already 
in progress. 

M. Sazonofi) said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a 
peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, 
where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that 
you would see your way to agreeing to this. 

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude, to His Majesty's 
Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely 
due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, 
and the Rnssian pecple would never forget the firm attitude adopted by 
Great Britain. 

* See No. 103. f See No. 97 

J Translation.— "If Austria will agree to check the advance, of her troops on 
Servian territory ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has 
assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look 
into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hnngariaa 
Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, 
Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." 

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



65 

No. 121. 
>St> E. Gosclien, British Ambassador at JBerlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

'YOUR telegram of 31st July.* 

I spent an hour witn Secretary of State .urging him most earnestly to 
accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terriblo catastrophe 
of a European war. 

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and 
appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impos- 
sible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had 
received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this com- 
munication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, 
unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that 
she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and 
Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult 
for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south 'as well. He 
replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation 
was only directed against Austria. 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he 

thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration', and 

in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but ho 

repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had 

-sent in their answer to the German demand. 

Ho again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the 
Emperor of Russia, ana the German Foreign Office had even up till last night 
been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and tele- 
graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising 
nature — but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything. 
* See No. 111. 



No. 122. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 
(Received August 1 ) 
(Telegraphicl Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st, July to 
Sir F. Bertie.* 

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that ho must consult the 
Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. 1 gathered from 
what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose 
a certain amount of their plan cf campaign in the event ol war ensuing, 
and ho was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer 
at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. 

It appears from what ho said that German Government consider that 
certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance 
of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed 
under an embargo already. 

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, 
hut the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. 

In speaking to. mo to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany 
would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French 
Government. 



No. 123. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German 
Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very 
* See No. 122. 



GG 

great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. 
If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had 
been given by Franco it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and 
tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality 
of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be ex- 
tremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had 
been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was -authorised 
to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium 
neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we wero 
considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude, 
would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality 
of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think 
that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions 
on which we would remain neutrai. He even suggested that the integrity of 
France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral 
on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. 

I am, Ac, 

E. GREY. 



No. 124. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received August 1.) 

^Telegraphic.) Tan's-, .7«7t/ 31, 1914. 

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent 
a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received 
me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council was being held. 
Ho took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality 
of Belgium which you instructed me to make. 

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German 
Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobili- 
sation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious 
as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs 
an answer may bo made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment 
possible. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is 
packing up. 

« S.-e No. 114. 



No. 125. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
(Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, .Tuhj 31, 1914. 

MY immediately preceding telegram.* 

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as 
follows:— 

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and 
lid only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality 
t! at France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence 
of her own security, to act. otherwise. This assurance has been given several 
timi President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, 
and the French- Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance 
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. 

" See No. 124. 



67 

No. 126. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1 ) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1014. 

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the 
German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the 
reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was 
pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not 
been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that 
the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. 
It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the 
fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government 
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh 
requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at 
issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made 
a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested 
an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations 
and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in- 
formed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary 
proceeding. 

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated 
that lie had packed up. 



No. 127. 



Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1 ) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. 



No. 128. 

Sir F. VUliers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received August 1 .) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

BELGIAN neutrality. 

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted 
upon. 

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold 
her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. 
In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of 
the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were 
in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between 
Bolgium and her neighbours were excellent, and thero was no reason to suspect 
their intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against 
emergencies. 

* Seo No. 115. 



No. 129. 
Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received Augttst 2.) 

(Translation.) 
Luxembourg, 2aout, 1914. Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) 

MINISTRE d'Etat du Luxembourg The Luxemburg Minister of State, 

Eyschen vient de recovoir par l'inter- Eyshen, has just received through the 
mediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de 
Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor 
gramme du Chancelier de l'Empire of the German Empire, Bethmann- 



6S 

allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant Hollweg, to the effect that the military 

que les mesures militaires a Luxem- measures taken in Luxemburg do not 

bourg in? constituent pas un aete hos- constitute a hostile act against Luxem- 

tile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont burg, but are only intended to insure 

uniquement des mesures destint'es a against a possible attack of a French 

assurer contre attaque cventuelle d'une army. Full compensation will be paid 

armee franchise. L'exploitation des to Luxemburg for any damage caused 

voies ferries affermees a l'Enipire by using the railways which are leased 

Luxembourg recevra complete indem- to the Empire. 
nite pour dommages eventuels. 



No. 130. 
Sir Ed /card Grey to Sir E Gosclicn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Avgu.it 1, 1914. 

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained 
steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant- 
ships. 

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been 
ordered. 

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that 
they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion 
here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on 
their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, 
and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any 
step which would make the situation between us impossible. 



X... 131. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Am T rtss:idor at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Officr. August 1, 101-1. 

I STILL believe that it might bo possible to secure peace if only a little 
respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. 

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria 
to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of media- 
tion which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which 
Russia originally suggested. 

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready 
to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use 
of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. 
Hi> Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may 
precipitate matters. 



No. 132. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosc'ten, Britis 7 : Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Fore'rjn Office, August 1, 1014. 

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Bcnckendorfft of the 
Slst July communicated to me to-day: — ■ 
(Urgent.) 
"Formiile amendee conformement a la proposition anglaise : 'Si Autriche 
consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire scrbe et si, recon- 
naissant que h- conflit austio serbc a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet 
purop in, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que. 
la Seibie pourrait aceorder an Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter 

* Russian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, 
t Russian Ambassador in London. 



69 

attointe a ses droits d'L'tat souverain et a son indupendance, la Russio s' engage 
a conserver son attitude expectant©.' "* 
(Above communicated to all -the Powers.) 

* TitAXSLATiON. — " Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If 
Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising 
that the Austro-Scrvian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European 
interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia 
can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights 
as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " 



No. 133. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

M. DE ETTER- came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram 
from M. Sazonof, t dated the 31st July, which are as follows: — 

"The Austro-Hungnrian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Govern- 
ment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof 
replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis- 
cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great 
Powers. 

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction 
of these discussions. The whole of Europe would bo thankful to them. It 
would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally 
to -her military action on Servian. territory." 

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

"* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London, 
t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 134. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received A utjuit 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, Augiist 1, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government 
were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a 
decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of 
Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although the measures which 
the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisa- 
tion, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will 
become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours 
behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French 
troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 
10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, 
■whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French 
frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, 
the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa- 
tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that 
French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the 
preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible 
to avoid war. 



No. 135. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliablo source that Austrian 
Government have informed German Government that though the situation has 
been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of 
the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favour- 
ably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of 



this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against 
Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would 
urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed 
against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive 
military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by 
Russian mobilisation. 

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the con- 
sideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop 
mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably 
the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian 
Government. 



No. 136. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, Avgust 1, 1914. 

MINISTER of War informed military attache this afternoon that orders 
had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This 
been me necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system 
of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes^ Three classes 
are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining 
three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is 
mobilisation under another name. 

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps 
on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore 
of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been 
left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will 
not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained 
that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes. 
* "State of war." 



No. 137. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

I SAW the Austro-Hungaj-ian Ambassador this morning. He supplied 
mo with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram 
bis Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government to impair the, sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial 
aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to 
inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that thcTe was no truth in the 
report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary 
intended to occupy the sanjak. 

Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed 
me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at 
.St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold.t and gave me the substance. 

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he 
sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in 
St. Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all 
further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count 
Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance 
which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither 
an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory 
was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. 

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this tele- 
gram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh 
had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. 

* Austro-Hungairian Ambassador in London. 

t Austro-Hungarian Ministor for Foreign Affaire. 



71 

No. 138. 
Sir E. Goscluen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—r 
{Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of to-day.* 

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary 
of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was 
between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's 
ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss 
matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me 
only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a 
peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss 
was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised 
against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from 
answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany 
to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily 
imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months 
without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed 
and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire, forbade that 
Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts 
of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial 
Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia 
had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the 
German representative at St. Petersburgk had been instructed within a certain 
time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must 
regard their refusal to an answer as ereating a state of war. 

* Sa« No. 131. 



No. 139. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg]/, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received A%ujast 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Pctersburgh, August 1, 1914. 

' MY telegram of 31st July.* 

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the 
German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No 
progress whatever was made. 

In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassa- 
dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to 
deflect' the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Seryia. 
In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these 
relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were 
perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at this 
moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the 
status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent 
State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the 
abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was 
a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question 
could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impos- 
sible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually 
unfortified town, to bombardment. 

M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning 
of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that 
during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government 
that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. 
It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia 
as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germanv would be to Great Britain. 
It was. in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria 
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that sho 
could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. 
* See No. 120. 
t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



72 

Similarly the policy of Germany had been aa equivocal and double-faced policy, 
and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not 
know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her 
intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the 
moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was 
unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the 
former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had 
reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof* 
was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. 
No suggestion held out to him had been refused. Ho had accepted the pro- 
posal tor a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for 
direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria- 
Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive 
replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government 
to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate 
situation. 

M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my 
telegram of 31st July,t had been forwarded by the Russian Government to 
Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the 
frontier was crossed by German troops. i In no case would Russia begin hos- 
tilities first. 

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agree- 
ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised 
on their own sides of the frontier,' as Russia has expressed her readiness to 
do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
t See No. 120. 

No. 140. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
(Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as 
he said he wished to keep him, informed of the situation. He laid great stress 
on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the 
French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by 
peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act. 



No. 141. 

Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This after- 
noon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been 
informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that 
Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield 
to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Ger- 
many would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too 
expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says 
that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that 
Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. 
There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than 
there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian 
Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity 
and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. 
He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight 
concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with 
his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the 



73 

first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. 
The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also 
desired war from the first. 

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, 
and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis- of mediation from any quarter 
are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. 
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with 
the approval of Germany. 

No. 112. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

[Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy 
and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. 

No. 143. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1,' 1914. 

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. 

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on. 

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has 
promised to send orders at once to allow steamers^to proceed without delay. 

* See No. 130. 



No. 144. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambussador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 

(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian 
troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. 

No. 14o. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914 

MY telegram of 1st August.* 

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to al!o<v 
British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must 
be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other 
foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines 
were being laid and other precautions being taken. 

* See No. 143. 

No. 14G. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 
has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. 

d2 



7-1 



No. 147. 



Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) 

(Translation.) 
Luxemburg, 
(Telegraphic.) August 2, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to bring to 
your Excellency's notice the following 
facts :— 



Luxembourg, h 2anut, 1914. 
iTelegraphiquc.) 

J'AI rhonncur do porter a la con- 
naissanec do votrc Excellence les faits 
suivants 

Dimanehe, 2 aout, do grand matin, 
les troupes allcmandes, d'apres les in- 
formations qui sont parvenues au Gou- 
vernement Grand ducal a l'hcurc ac- 
tucllc, out penctre sur le territoire 
luxembourgcois par lis ponts de Was- 
serbillig et de Remieh, so dirigcant 
spccialemcnt vers le sud du pays et mis 
la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du 
Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de 
trains blindes avec des troupes et des 
munitions ont etc achemines par la 
voie de chemin de fcr dc Wasserbillig a 
Luxembourg, oil Ton s'attend do les 
voir arriver. D'un instant a l'autrc, 
ccs faits impliqucnt des actes mani- 
festement contraire a la neutrality du 
Grand Duche garantie par le Traite de 
Londrcs do 1SG7 Le Gouvernement 
luxembourgcois n'a pas manque de 
protester energiquement contre cette 
agression aupres des representants de 
Sa Majesto l'Empereur d'Allemagnc a 
Luxembourg. Cue protestation iden- 
tique va etre transmise telegraphique- 
ment au Secretaire d'Etat pour les 
Affaires Etrangeros a Berlin. 



On Sunday, the 2nd August, very 
early, the German troops, according to 
the information which has up to now 
reached the Grand Ducal Government, 
penetrated into Luxemburg territory 
by the bridges of Wasserbillig and 
Remieh, and proceeded particularly 
towards the south and in the direction 
of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand 
Duchy. A certain number of armoured 
trains with troops and ammunition 
have been sent along the railway line 
from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, 
where their arrival is expected. These 
occurrences constitute acts which are 
manifestly contrary to the neutrality 
of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by 
the Treaty of London of 1867. The 
Luxemburg Government have not 
failed to address an energetic protest 
against this aggression to the represen- 
tatives of His Majesty the German 
Emperor at Luxemburg. An identi- 
cal protest will be sent by telegraph to 
the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs at Berlin. 



No. 148. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Puns. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memo- 
randum :— i 

"I a in authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into 
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its 
yow or, 

"Tins assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding 
His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of 
action by the German fleet takes plai 

I pointed out that we had very largo questions and most difficult issues to 
consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to 
declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and 
Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose 
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know bow to make 
their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore 
thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to 
war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it 
did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of 
her own Mediterranean fleet. 

51. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the 
* French Ambassador in London. 



.75 

doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 18C7. 
He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter ; we were considering 
what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether 
we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him 
what had. been said to the German Ambassador on this point. 

No. 149. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Aurjust 2, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 1st August.* 

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was eompulsorily unloaded from the 
British steamship "Sappho " at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears 
'to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. 

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my tele- 
gram of 1st August,t I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to 
Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of 
their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified. 

* See No. 143. t See No. 130. 



No. 150. 

Sir E. Gosc/ien, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
(fteceived August 3.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August, 3, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 2nd August* : Detention of British ships at Hamburg. 
No information available. 

* See- No. 149. 



No. 151. 
Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edivard Grey. — 
{Received Avgmt 3.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attache the 
support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply 
has been sent to-day : — 

" We are Sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual 
support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal 
to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the 
action which they may think it necessary to take." 



No. 152. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Sir, . Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. 

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communi- 
cation : — 

'In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ulti- 
matums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to 
what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano"' replied: — 

" ' The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might 
result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive 
object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of 
the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' " 

In making this communication, M. Cambont was instructed to lay stress 

* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
t French Ambassador in London. 



76 

upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive b;it an 
ive war, and that, for this reason, the casus foederis under the terms of 
the Triple Alliance did not arise. 

I am, &c, 

E. GREY. 



No. 153. 
Sir Edicard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King 
for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms: — 

"Kemcmbering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that 
of your pre deci ssor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof 
of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the 
diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the 
lntegiry of Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government 
have delivered to the Belgian Government a. note proposing friendly neutrality 
cntniTng free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain 
the independence and integrity of t lie kingdom and its possessions at the con- 
clusion o! peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. 
An answer was requested within twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant 
violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a 
treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must 
request an ass, nance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be pro- 
ceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should 
ask for an immediate reply. 



No. 154. 
Sir F. ViUiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received August 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels. August 4, 1914. 

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned 
proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government the latter will, deeply 
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the 
measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. 



No. 155. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. ViUiers, British Minister at Brussels. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

\OU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them 
by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His 
Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that 
His Majesty's Government in tins event are prepared to join Russia and France, 
if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for 
the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee 
to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. 

No. 156. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the 
detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This 



77 

action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in 
direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your 
Excellency by the Imperial' Chancellor. You should demand the immediate 
release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. 



No. 157. 

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowshy, German Ambassador in 
London. — (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) ^ Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British 
Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal 
assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, 
under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this 
declaration is borne out by fact that wo solemnly pledged our word to Holland 
strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably 
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial 
acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that 
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which 
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany 
had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of 
life or death to prevent French advance. 



No. 158. 
Sir F. Villkrs, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward, Grey. — 
{Received August 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

MILITARY attache has been informed at War Office that German troops 
have entered Belgian territory, and that Liege has been summoned to 
surrender by small party of Germans who, however, wero repulsed. 



No. 159. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

AVE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if 
necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 

Wo aro also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at 
Gcmmcnich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to 
give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply 
to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that 
request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this 
morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you aro instructed 
to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound 
to take all step's in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. 
* See No. 153. 



No. 160. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir, London, Augusts, 1914. 

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 
4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, 
in tho name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government 

* See No. 153. 



78 

would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Heir von Jagow* at once 
replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be " No," as, in conse- 
quence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian 
neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow .again went into the 
reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, 
namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest 
way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour 
to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and 
death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could 
not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the 
fortrosses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great 
loss of time. This loss ot time would have meant time gained by the Russians 
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was 
the great German asset, while that, of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation 
of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation 
exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw 
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. 
He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for 
them to draw back. 

During the afternoon I received your further" telegram of the same date.t 
and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded 
to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless 
the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night 
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier 
and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and 
inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have 
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other 
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that tho 
safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops 
should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of 
your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time 
when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, 
in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it wcro not 
possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. 
He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his 
answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my 
passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversa- 
tion which ensued Herr von Jagow* expressed his poignant regret at the 
crumbling of his entire pol ; cy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to 
make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer 
to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also 
a matter of deep regret and disappointment, hut that he must understand that 
under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, H's Majesty's Govern- 
ment could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, 
perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing hjm. He begged 
me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once 
began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the 
step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a 
wor d — " neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded— 
just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a k : nchcd 
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts 
in that direction had been rendered useless by this Inst terrible step, and the 
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office 
had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; 
it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against 
two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events 
that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said 
that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* wished me to understand 
that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to 

* German Secretary of State. 
+ See No. 159. 



79 

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, bo I would wish 
him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and death " for 
the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do 
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact 
simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements 
given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what 
price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought 
of that? " I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of conse- 
quences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engage- 
ments, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news 
of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding 
fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow 
of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up 
to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and 
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said 
that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just 
at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and 
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts 
to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had 
brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, 
we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation 
from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one 
regretted this more than I. 

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew 
up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at 
the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that 
office, but apparently never despatched.* 

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, 
came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official 
and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually 
whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said 
that such an authority on international law as he was known to bo must know 
as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were 
many cases where diplomatio relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, 
war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instruc- 
tions, of which I had given Herr von Jagowt a written summary, that His 
Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 1.2 o'clock 
that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced 
to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr ZimmermannJ said 
that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could 
not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. 

In the meantime, after Herr ZimmermannJ left me, a flying sheet, issued 
by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had 
declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the 
assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's 
Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy 
was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. 
We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, 
but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- 
room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting 
unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happen- 
ing. Herr von Jagowt at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate 
force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the 
.street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct 
unpleasantness occurred. 

After order had been restored Herr von Jagowt came to see me and expressed 
his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. Ho said that the behaviour 
of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to 
express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that 
the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by tho 
Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether ho 
thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly 

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 

•f German Secretary of State. 

J German Under-Secretary of State. 



80 

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that 
only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, 
as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract 
all' iilum and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential ' Tage- 
blatt,' " which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calcula- 
tions. He had heard rumours that the mob bad been excited to violence by 
gestures me.de and missiles thrown from the embassy, but be felt sure that 
that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no founda- 
tion whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes 
which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry 
impression of Berlin manners m moments of excitement. In fact, no apology 
could have been more full and complete. 

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His 
Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: — 

" The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret 
lor the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you 
will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respect- 
ing the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old 
allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he 
has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but 
that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself 
of those titles." 

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner 
of its delivery. 

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this 
trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Heir von Jagow* and the 
officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same 
morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day 
demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with 
me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said 
that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to 
that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the 
former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed 
to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no 
repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions 
would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have 
a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. 
He also brought me a charming letter from Heir von Jagow couched in the 
most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time 
allowed. 

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong 
force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while 
the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. 
Wo there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted 
out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us 
at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that 
all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. 
A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier 
and was excoi dingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which 
thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; 
but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures 
we bad really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch 
frontier. 

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like 
to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of 
my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they 
worked nighl and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the 
cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attach, s. secretaries, 
and the two young .attaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve with 
often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring 
for advice and assistance. I was proud- to have such a staff to work with, and 
feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often 
exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheer- 
fully gave to me. 

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by 
* German Secretary of Slate. 



SI 

my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting 
and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving 
the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could 
help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. 
He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some per- 
sonal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in 
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection 
of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and 
able hands. I have, &c. 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 
* American Ambassador in Berlin. 

No. 161. 
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
Sir, Loudon. September 1, 1914. 

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the 
outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than 
record their pi ogress by telegraph.. I propose now to add a few comments. 

The delivery at Belgrade on the 2ord July of the Austrian note to Servia 
was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von 
Tschii'jcky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words 
of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil On 
the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews 
with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Aflairs, 
by whom ho was left under the impression that the words of warning he had 
been instructed to s,>eak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been 
unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to 
contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. 
At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was 
at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be pub- 
lished in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- 
Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same 
day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the 
time we were speaking. 

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was pre- 
paring that he actuallv left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 
20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him 
to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna. Ambassador of tho 
allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh 
complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence 
of Count Berchtoldt during this critical time. In mv-t of fact his Excellency 
was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by 
Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source 
that I received on the ICth Julv the fore"ast of what was about to happen 
which I telegraphed to you the following dav. It is true that during all this 
time tho " None Freie Prcsse " and other leading Viennee newspapers were 
using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia The official 
'■ Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, 
the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink- 
from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. 

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common 
consent it was at once stvled an uWmatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia 
was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was 
at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, Ih-ro 
was a niom-nt of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, 
and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had 
been rejected and tint Baron Gies't had broken off relations at Belgrade 
Vienna burst into a frerrzv of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and 
singing patriotic songs till the smMI hours of the morning. 

The demonstrations were perfe-tly orderlv. oonriniiig for the most part of 
organised processions through the principal streets end ; nij ur> at the Ministry 
of War One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against tho 
* German Ambassador at Vienna, 
i Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
X Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 



82 

Russian 'Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the 
approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of 
the people, at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities 
of ill- Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, 
and there can lie no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian 
statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense. 
an I it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably 
in pcrLions cf the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much 
di appointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during 
the annexation crisis in 1903 and again in connection with the recent Balkan 
war. Count Borchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the 
Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press 
clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated 
Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the 
alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation 
at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few 
a emed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans 
must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause 
of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any 
country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or 
prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had 
arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajcvo. The conviction 
had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that 
Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, 
influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort 
should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the 
acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of 
the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and 
intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this 
cour-c the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable 
consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and 
declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against 
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and 
Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The 
fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the pre- 
servation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.t 
On the 28th July I saw Count Bcrchtold and urged as strongly as I could that 
the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commonst 
on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful 
settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a tele- 
graphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far ; Austria 
was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the confer- 
ence which you had suggested should take place between the less interested 
Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which 
must be. settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. 
I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that 
hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to 
European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with 
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed 
out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her 
policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily 
from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way 
the two countries might easily drift apart. 

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the 
question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to 
intervene after receiving bis assurance that Austria sought no territorial 
aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa- 
tion that, thoneh he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the 
settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London 
during the Balkan crisis, he had never bad much belief in the permanency 
of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, 
inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves pro- 
foundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour 
* Au tro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
+ "'Miscelkncot;s. No. 6 (1911)." 
J Sec Hansard, Vol. -65, No. 107, columns 931-935. 



83 

throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination 
of the Austi'o-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia. 

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour 
to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr 
von Tsc'hirscky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French 
and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and 
I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro- 
Hungarian Government. 1 was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, 
the Russian Ambassador, of Irs own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. 
M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian 
Govornment to furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St. 
Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place 
between the latter and M. Sazonof.+ Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, 
but two days later (3Uth July), though in the meantime Russia had partially 
mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly 
friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations 
at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Ger- 
many was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the 
latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was 
informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szapary* had at last conceded the main 
point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof* that Austria would consent to 
submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible 
with the maintenance ol Servian independence. M. Sazouof.I M. Schebekoll 
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from 
the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that 
she herself had at this point good hopes of a peacelul issue is shown by the 
communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorfi,^ to the 
effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off 
the conversations." M. Schebekoll to the end was working hard for peace. 
He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, § and he 
informed mo that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,++ had responded in the 
same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would 
hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by 
negotiation, and M Schebekoll repeatedly told me he wa» prepared to accept 
any reasonable compromise. 

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut 
short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct 
conflict between Germany and Russia, Germany intervened on the 31st July 
by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ulti- 
matums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany 
declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the Srd August. 
A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the 
greatest calamities in history. 

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M Rrhehekol! had been 
instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against 
her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the Gtfi 
August when Count BerchtoldS informed the foreign i is-inns at Vienna that 
"the Austro-f Inngarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed 
to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of 
Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced 
hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war 
with Russia." 

M. Schebekoll left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to fie 
conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be ab'e to proceed to his 
own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later 
I found him at Berne. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the 
previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that 

* German Ambassador in Vienna. 

t Ai'stro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 

J Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affaire. 

II Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 

IT Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 

- S( e N 137 

tt Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State ior Foreign Affairs. 



84 

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully 
cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received 
from Count Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were 
being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a 
further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had 
no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none 
were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a 
way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two 
( i ncnts were made by Count' Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to 
him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French 
Amba: ;ador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but 
his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by 
the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of 
the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a 
revolution, and that the President oi the Republic had been assassinated. 

British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by 
pei ill editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract 
of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's 
speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as 
the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the 
great events of these days transpired. The " Ncue Freie Presse " was violently 
The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little 
or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the 
violation of Belgium neutrality had bit His Majesty's Government no alterna- 
tive but to take part in the war. 

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, hut scarcely 
mentioned in the newspapers. 

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive year instruction of the 
previous daj preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, 
but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war 
with 1! d Fi ince, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make 

any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You 
staled at tin ;ami time that His .Majesty's Government of course expected 
Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by 
diplomatic usage. 

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your 
a of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count 
- li.t at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture 
. i -Mi-red -between Fiance and Austria, on the ground that Austria had 
declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that 
Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a 
din ,-t menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France 
in (Ins way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in con- 
clusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist 
] -i ,i pen 1 hi 1 « o countries from midnight of the 12th August . 

Alter seeing Mr. Penfleld, the United States Ambassador, who accepted 
immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would 
take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the 
unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with .Air. Theo Russell, 
lior of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* 
c-eived me at midday. 1 delivered my message, for which his Excellency did 
not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count 
Mensdorfft had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His 
Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves 
He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good 
friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria 
did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations 
with that country had been broken off. I explained in a. few words how cir- 
cumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided use- 
less argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration 
the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and 

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
i A'JiiTo-Hungariao Ambassador in London. 



85 

other places throughout the country. I had- already had some correspondence 
with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and 
promised to see what could be done to got thorn away when the stress of 
mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till 
then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being 
left by mo at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He pre- 
sumed a similar privilege would not lie refused in England if desired on behalf 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with 
sincere regret, having received from the clay of my arrival in Vienna, not quite 
nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his 
Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects 
to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that 
His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and 
strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. 

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed 
the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the 
arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course 
of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take 
leave of Lady de Bunson at the embassy. We loft the railway station by special 
train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count 
Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. x The 
journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We 
readied Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. 
At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on 
the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was 
caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample 
measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide 
us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had 
desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable con- 
ditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of 
consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my 
own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeaf anil 
efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss 
Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation 
during our journey from the frontier to Borne, and, after three days' stay there, 
on to Geneva, at which place wo found that every provision had been made by 
the French Government, or the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy 
conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd 
August, 

I have, &c, 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 



PART II. 



SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 



(1) 


Sii 
Sii 


(3) 


Mi 


(4) 


Mi 


(5) 


Mi 



Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 
Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 
Asquith (August. 4, 1914) 
Asquith (August 5, 1914) 
Asquith (August G, 1914) .... 



Pago 


89 


97 


97 


98 


... ... 98 



PART II. 

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 

(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
AUGUST 3, 1914. 

Last week I staled that we were working for peace not only for this 
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly 
that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state 
of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia 
and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other. 

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would 
like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our 
attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under 
what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming 
to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have 
consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, 
to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always 
done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are con- 
cerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through- 
out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co- 
operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace 
in tin' Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in 
adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion 
before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace 
was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather 
than accentuate differences rapidly. 

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; 
because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition — at any 
rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to 
an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the 
result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally 
are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment 
on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in 
favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because 
I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the 
point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free 
•from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. 

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last 
week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published 
I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how 
strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace Were, and that 
they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at 
work which operated against peace. 

I com? first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the 
House — and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once — that 
if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons 
and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British 
attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should 
spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into 
that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will 
deal with that point to clear the ground first. 

There have hern in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and 
what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple 
Entente was not an alliance — it was a diplomatic group. The House will 
remember that in 1903 there was a crisis — also a Balkan crisis — originating in 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. 
Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit 
wa; planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being 
a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, 1 did not consider that public opinion in this 
country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic 



90 

support. Moro was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was 
never promised. 

In tins present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of 
anything more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more 
than diplomatic support. Now 1 must make this question of obligation clear 
to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was 
the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great 
difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, 
and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a 
week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office — was asked tho 
question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and 
Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise 
nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole- 
hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my 
opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco — a 
question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country 
and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of 
that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public 
opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. 

I gavn no promise, but I expessed that opinion during the crisis, as far as 
I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the 
German Ambassador at the time. 1 made no promise, and I used no threats; 
but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by tho Frencli 
Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 
"If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, 
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed 
support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to givo 
that, support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some 
conversations have already taken place between naval and military exports." 
There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to 
take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed 
heween military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict 
in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would 
give that support when the time arose. 

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in 
prospect; I had to take tho responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. 
It could not be summoned. An answer bad to be given. I consulted Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, tho Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember, 
Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present 
Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the 
most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that 
it left tho hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact 
that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later 
on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing (eased lo 
be of importance — hut later on it. was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. 

The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout, that 1 
took precisely the same line that had been taken in 190B. But subsequently, 
in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that 
we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in 
the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were 
not binding .upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of 
November. 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will 
now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms 
in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will 
be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between 
military and naval experts, they were n .t binding engagements upon the 
Governments : — 

" My dear Ambassador, 

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and 
military experts have consulted togpther. It has always been 
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to 
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation 
between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage- 
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency 
that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 



91 

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 
" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might 
becomo essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon 
the armed assistance of the other. 
" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened 
tho general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggres- 
sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would 
be prepared to take in common." 
Lord Charles lieresford. — What is the date of that? . 

Sir E. Guy. — The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for 
the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear 
that what the Prime .Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly 
justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line 
should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the 
Government remained perfectly free, and o fortiori, the House of Commons 
remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view 
of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of 
Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, 
and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do 
not construe, anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic 
relations with other Powers in thjs matter as restricting the freedom of the 
Government to decido what attitude they should take now, or restrict the 
freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be. 

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the 
present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In 
tho Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France— 
a dispute which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it 
seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and 
France, and published to tho whole world, in which we engaged to give France 
diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic 
support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to 
stand with France diplomatically in that question. 

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with 
regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we 
had a special agreement with France ; it has not originated with anything 
which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between 
Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no 
Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute 
with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. 
They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite 
alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that 
obligation of honour cannot apply in the same wa-y to us. We are not parties 
to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that 
alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground 
with regard to the question of obligation. 

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years 
we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the 
feeling in the House— and my own feeling— for I spoke on the subject, I think, 
when the late Government made their agreement with France — the warm and 
cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had per- 
petual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember 
saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at 
work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how 
far that friendship entails obligation— it has been a friendship between tho 
nations and ratified by the nations — how far that entails an obligation, let every 
man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of 
the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish 
to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they 
should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may 
judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my 
own feeling in the matter. 

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western 



02 

coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concen- 
trated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used 
to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has 
given them a senso of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. 

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the 
Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the 
feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. 
My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which Franco had not 
sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English 
Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended roasts of France, we 
could not stand aside, and see this going'on practically within sight of our eyes, 
with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. 1 believe that 
would bo the feeling ol this country. There are times when one feels that if 
those circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling ivhich would spread 
with irresistible force throughout the laud. 

But 1 also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point 
of view of British interests, and it is on that that 1 am going to base and justify 
what I ai. presently going to .say to the House. If we say nothing at this 
moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean ? If she 
leai it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her 
northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German 
fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases iu a war which is a war ot life 
and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet 
is withdrawn from the .Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European 
conflagration j can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of 
it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, 
.saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this con- 
Bict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; 
and let us assume that the consequences— which are already tremendous in what 
has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace— in fact, equally 
whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come 
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in 
defence of vital British interests, wo should go to war; and let us assume — which 
is quite possibli — that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand, sho 
considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a 
defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences 
which are not yet foreseen ami which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own 
interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when wo 
are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight — what then will 
be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical 
moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes 
in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. 

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any parti- 
cular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. 
What will be our position then ? We have not kept a fleet in the .Mediterranean 
which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Medi- 
terranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships 
to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our nega- 
tive attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from 
I lie point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled 
to know— and to know at once— whether or not in the event of attack upon her 
unprotected northern and western coasts she could dopend upon British sup- 
port. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday 
afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement: — 

" 1 am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into 
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile opera- 
tions against the French coasts or shipping, the British licet will give 
all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of cour.se, subject 
to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of 
Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Govern- 
ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by tho 
German fleet takes place." 
I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as 
entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take 
■<■:. ie sivc action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly 
from hour to hour. Fresh news conies in, and I cannot give this in any very formal 



93 

way; but I understand that the German Government would bo prepared, if we 
would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack 
the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came 
to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there 
is the more serious consideration — becoming more serious every hour — there is 
the question of the neutrality of Belgium. 

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in 
regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a 
treaty with a history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was 
war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium 
arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck 
gave an assurance to Belgium that — confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in. 
writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty 
in existence — that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would 
bo respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition 
in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights. 

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the 
British Government were Lord Granville in the .House of Lords and Mr. 
Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, 
used these words. He said : — 

•' We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that 
we could not think this country was bound cither morally or inter- 
nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance 
of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had 
some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to .it, 
though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a 
course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to 
adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the 
country's honour or to the country's interests." 
Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later: — 

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor 
would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the 
nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to sub- 
scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what 
plainly amounts to an assertion, tiiat the simple fact of the existence 
of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether 
of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when 
the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authori- 
ties upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, 
such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge 
took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable 
view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an 
existing guarantee in force is, of -necessity, an important fact, and 
a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full 
and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, 
the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the 
common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any 
Power whatever." 
The treaty is an old treaty — 1839— and that was the view taken of it in 1870. 
It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for 
Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who 
guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, 
as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less 
serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than 
was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. 

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When 
mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important 
element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. 
I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to 
say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German 
Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French 
Government this reply :— 

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Pow< r 



91 

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the 
necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act other- 
wise. This assurance has been given several times. The President 
ot the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the 
French -Minister at Brussels lias spontaneously renewed the assurance 
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." 
From the German Government the reply was: — 

" The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an 
answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.'' 
Sir Edward Goschen, to whom 1 had said it was important to have an answer 
Soon, said ho hoped the answer would not bo too long delayed. The German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that 
he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might 
give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of dis- 
closing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at 
the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following 
reply from Sir Francis Villiers: — 

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and. uphold her 
neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so 
informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the viola- 
tion of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a posi- 
tion to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium 
and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their 
intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against 
emergencies." 

It now appears from the news I have received to-day — which has come quite 
recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate 
form — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object 
of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition 
that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. 
Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, 
I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give 
the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were 
sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given 
that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content 
us. We replied that wo could not bargain away whatever interests or obliga- 
tions we had in Belgian neutrality. 

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following 
telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — King 
George: — 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and 
that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 
18"0, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your 
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
Diplomatic intervention took place last week cm our' part. What can 
diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the 
independence— and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is 
compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the 
situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her 
neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States 
in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they 
should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, 
no! SO much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter- 
fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of 
those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its 
neutrality and no .action be taken to resent it, .at the end of the war, whatever 
the integrity may he, the independence will he gone. 

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought 
about the independence of Belgium. It "ill be found in "Hansard," volume 
203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the 
context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any 
difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:- 

" We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider 
than that which we may have in the literal operation of the 
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under- 



95 

the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it. is with 
influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpe- 
tration of the direst crime tiiat ever stained the pages of history, 
and thus become participators in the sin." 

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an 
ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, 
whatever may have been otiered to her in return, her independence is gone 
if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will 
follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider 
what may no at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, 
beaten to her knees, loses, her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to 
the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not 
anticipate, because 1 am sure that France has the power to defend herself 
with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often — 
still, if that weie to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating 
influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Glad- 
stones words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common 
interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power? 

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, 
and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it 
intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point 
of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of 
honour aud interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever 
material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in 
fate of tho respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a 
great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at 
the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, 
which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to 
protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more 
than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. 

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are 
in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because 
the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. 
Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies, 
all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the 
trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are 
parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that 
at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be 
in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what 
had happoned in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of 
Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war— falling under 
the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position 
would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put 
the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure 
of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at 
present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its 
utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are 
undisputed. 

t have read to the Houso the only engagements that we have yet taken 
definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to 
say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expedi- 
tionary armed force out of tho country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken 
place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no 
engagement, because I feel that— in the ease of a European conflagration such 
as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other 
parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown 
factors— we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make 
of sending an expeditionary force out of tho country until we know how wo 
stand. One thing I would say. 

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The 
general feeling throughout Ireland— and I would like this to bo clearly under- 
stood abroad— does not make the Irish question a consideration which w-e feel 
we have now to take into account. I have -told the House how far we-have at 
present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and 
I have put to the Hoi:sc and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition 
of the neutrality of Belgium. 

What other policv is there before the Housp ? There is but one way in which 



9G 

the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside 
this war, and that would he that it should immediately issue a proclamation of 
unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment 
to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. Wo 
have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any uncon- 
ditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satis- 
factory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the t/5e of all the force's 
in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will havo nothing what- 
ever to do with this matter" under no conditions— the Belgian treaty obliga- 
tions, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British 
interests, and what may happen In France from our failure to support France — 
il we were to say that all those thing;, mattered nothing, were as nothing, and 
to say we would stand aside, wo should, 1 believe, sacrifice our respect and good 
name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious 
and grave economic consequences. 

iUy object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place 
before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after 
what I have said, and after the information, incomplete a.s it is, that I havo 
given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must he prepared, and wo 
arc prepared, for the consequence ol having to use all the strength we have 
at any moment — we know not how soon— to defend ourselves and to take our 
part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have 
announced no intending aggressive a< tio'n on our part, no final decision to resort 
to force at a i oment's noti know the whole of the case, that the uso 

of it may I"' forced upon us. A : far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, 
we are ready. 1 believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First 
Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the 
efficiency of those forci .vi roil vci u n highei marl; than they a ro to-day, and 
never was there a time win n i e iv: n ore ju titled in tho power of the 

navy to protect mr comm : < ■ and to proti ct our shores. The thought is with 

us always of the suffering and miser} en ■ 1, from which no country in Europe 

will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. Tho 
amount of harm that can he done by an encmj trad i infinitesimal, 

compared with the amount of harm that must he done by th momic con- 

: on the Continent. 

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding 
wdiat to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to 
the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which 
we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face 
that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will 
face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last 
moment. How hard, how persistently, and hov i i we strove for peace 

last week tho Hon: e will see from tin 1 papers that will be before it. 

But that is over, as far : the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now 
face to faci with a. situation and all the i i which it may yet have to 
unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at largo in pro- 
ceeding to whatei r ' n i [U uo may be and whatever measures may be 

forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe 
the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time 
to realise the i aie. It perhaps is still thinking ol tl b tween Austria 

and Scrvia, and no( the complications of thi matter which have gi iwn out of 
Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany wo know arc 
at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany 
is to support, is yet at war with Russia. Wo know that a good deal has been 
happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambas- 
sador has left Paris. 

Tho situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards tho con- 
dition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I 
wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, 
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before 
the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, 
to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises 
what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending 
dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the 
House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, 
but by tho determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of tho 
whole country. 



97 

(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS. AUGUST 3, 1914. 



German? and Belgium. 
I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which 
was not in niy possession when 1 made my statement this afternoon. It is 
information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to 
the following effect — 

"Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to 
Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian terri- 
tory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom 
and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of 
refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours 
was fixed for the reply The Belgians have answered that an attack 
on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of 
nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacri- 
fice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is 
firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means." 
Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into 
grave consideration the information which it has received I make no further 
comment upon it 

(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 

COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914. 
Mr Bono:- Law —I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any 
statement that he can now make to the House? 

The Prime Minister (Mr Auxuith).— In conformity with the statement of 
policy made here by my right lion friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a 
telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. 
It was to this effect — 

" The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King 
for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's 
Government are also informed that the German Government has 
delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly 
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and 
promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the king- 
dom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in 
case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy An answer was 
requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium 
has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of 
nations His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
tins violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common 
« ith themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand 
marie upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her 
neutrality will be respected by Germany You should ask for an 
immediate reply.'' 
We received this morning from oui Minister at Brussels the following 
telegram — 

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government 
have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the 
Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be 
compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
considered indispensable in view of the French menaces." 
Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — we received from the 
Belgian Legation here m London the following telegram — 

'General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich 
(near Aix-la-Chapelle)." 
Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has pene- 
trate! still further into Belgian territory We also received this morning from 
the Go' man Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign 
Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms- — 
"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British 
Government with regard to our intention; by repeating most posi- 



98 

tivcly formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with 
Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian 
territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that 
we solemnly pledged our word to Holland .strictly to respect her 
neutrality. It is obvious that we cotdd not profitably annex Belgic 
territory withou.t making at the same time territorial acquisitions 
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that 
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, 
which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- 
tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, 
it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French 
advance." 
I hare to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot 
regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. Wo have, in reply 
ti it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that 
they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was 
given to us and to Belgium by France last week. Wo have asked that a reply 
to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this jnoming — 
which I have read to the House — should be given before midnight. 



(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914. 
Mr. Ttrmar Lnw. — May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information 
lie can give us to-day? 

The Prime Minister. — Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 
7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed 
between Germany and ourselves. 

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram: — 
"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs" 
—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs — 

" a note of which the following is a literal translation : — 
" ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Govern- 
ment that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into 
Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty. 
" ' Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their 

power. 
"'Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co- 

c. pel ate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory. 
" ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of 
resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Bel- 
gium, and at the sarno time of guarding the maintenance for future 
of the independence and integrity of Belgium. 
" ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that- she will assume defence 
ol her fortified places.' " 
We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the follow- 
ing telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at 
Bi lis els — 

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the 

French military attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and 

contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending tho results 

of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders 

have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to 

regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier." 

This is all the information I am at the moment ablo to give to the House. 

but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee ,,f 

Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000/. 



(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, AUGUST ti. 1914. 
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum. not exceeding 
£100,000 000, he granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parlia- 
ment, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending 
March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the 



99 

country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food 
supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business com- 
munications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or other- 
wise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the 
existence of a state of war " 

The Prune Minister (Mr Asquitli) — In asking the House to agree to the 
resolution which Mr Speaker has just read from the Chair. I do not propose, 
because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again 
which was coveicd by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary two or three 
nights ago He stated— and I do not think any of the statements he made are 
capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon 
which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's 
Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with 
what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power 
But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which 
are now in the hands ot hon Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how 
unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to 
have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe 
an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which 
occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the 
acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend 
that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers 
are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, 
unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, 
and I will add posterity and history, will accord to- him what is, after all, the 
best tribute that can be paid to any statesman : that, never derogating for 
an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he 
has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest 
interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the 
hands of hon Members show something more than that. They show what were 
the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that 
not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will 
read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which 
passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The 
terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the com- 
munication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 
20th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for 
a moment. After referring to the state of things ns between Austria and 
Russia. Sir Edward Goschen goes on — 

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neu- 
trality He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the 
main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain 
would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict 
there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Ger- 
many aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were cer- 
tain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that 

the Imperial Government " 

Let the House observe these words — 

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should 
they prove victorious in any war that might ensue." 
Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question : — 

" I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies " 

What are the French colonics? They mean every part of the dominions and 
possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe— 

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that 
respect." 
Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and 
almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:— 
"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Ger- 
many's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the 
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government 
an assurance that she would do likewise." 
Then we come to Belgium :— 

"It depended upon the action of Franco what operations Germany might 
be forced to enter : upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, 
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against 
Germany." 

* Sec Part II, No. 85, page 64. 



100 

Lot the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to 
Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality, but in 
regard to Belgium, there was no mention ot neutrality at all, nothing but an 
assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would 
be respected. Then His Excellency added : — 

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to 
bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these 

assurances " 

the assurances I have read out to the House — 

"might form the basis of that understanding which ho so much 
desired." 
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House.- I do so, not with the 
object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling 
against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the 
British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In 
the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France— they were not 
made a party to these communications— we should have given, if we had assented 
to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, 
the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What 
did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in 
these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of 
her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have 
given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, with- 
out her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our 
obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country 
has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed 
by the King of Belgium, and 1 do not envy Hie man who can read that appeal 
with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What 
would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec- 
tacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to 
get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obliga- 
tions? What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing more; a promise 
as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed 
— I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record— given by a Power 
which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treatv 
and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, 
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we 
should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I 
am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my 
right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more 
salient passages. This document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week 
ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British 
people. My right hon. friend says:— 

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- 
cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on 
such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany 
docs not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From 

the material point of view " 

My right lion, friend, as he always does, used very temperate language: — 

"such a proposal is unacceptable, for Fiance, without further terri- 
tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose 
her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German 
policy." 
That is the material aspc-t. But he proceeded: — 

"Altogether, apart from that, it would he a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from 
which the good name of this country would never recover. The 
Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation 
or interest we have as regard-, the neutrality of Belgium. We could 
not entertain that bargain either." 
He then says :— 

"We must preserve our full freedom io act, as circumstances may seem 
to us to require." 
And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate: — 

"You should . . , add most earnestly that the one way of main- 
taining the good relations between England and Germany is that 

Sec Part II, No. 101, page 77. 



101 

they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of 
Europe. . . . For that object tnis Government will work in that 
way with all sincerity and good will. 
If the peace cf Europe can lie preserved and the present crisis safely 
passed, my own endeavour will 1 be to promote some arrangement to 
which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that 
no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her 
allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I 

have desired this and worked for it" 

Til© statement was never more true— 

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany 

having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. 

The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of 

definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute 

than any that Europe has gone through for generations, bo safely 

passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow 

may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the 

Powers than has been possible hitherto." 

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing 

language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to 

appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can 

anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great 

provocation — and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we 

might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer — 

can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, 

who had already earned the title — and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace 

Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that 

beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do 

so on behalf of this country — I speak not foi a party, I speak for the country 

as a whole — that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for 

peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? 

Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible 

incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and 

especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There 

is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying 

perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass 

through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that 

time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, 

even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the 

moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to 

posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we 

took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility 

which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to 

keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the 

result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — we have, nevertheless, thought 

it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House 

may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will 

believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause. 

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the 
first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it 
had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, 
would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which 
no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are 
fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material 
force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the develop- 
ment of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that, small nation- 
alities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good' faith, by the 
arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any 
nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest 
history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that 
it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish 
interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of 
which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only 
of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge 
this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let lis now make sure that 
all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of 
which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object 
mav be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee— to 
make the very unusual demand upon it— to give the Government a Vote of 
Credit of 100,000,000?. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not 
wish it. into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple- 



102 

mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that 
connection. There is a much highei point of view than that. If it were neces- 
sary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to 
adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to tho 
temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do 
call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the 
past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military opera- 
tions, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confi- 
dence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this 
money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not 
only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, 
promote the continuance of trade ; industry, business, and communications — 
whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise — for the 
relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of 
a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to 
extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. 
It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for 
it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of tho 
House. I think it would be a great pity— in fact, a great disaster— if, in a 
crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision— provision far 
more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the 
old days — for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure 
which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must 
entail on any one of them. 

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War — a position 
which I held until this morning — for a Supplementary Estimate for men for 
the Army. Perhaps the. Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on 
that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for 
War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in 
th'e-minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that tho condition of 
things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an 
end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case ; in fact, 
I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the 
spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in 
the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that 
office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair 
to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should 
divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that tho 
First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments 
and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should 
give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army 
in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and 
administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit 
and patriotism that everyono would expect from him, at my request stepped 
into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His 
association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose 
must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political 
opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public 
call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the 
most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confi- 
dence of all parties and all opinions. 

I am asking on his behalf for the Armv, power to increase the number of 
men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no - less than 
500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are 
encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the 
necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send 
us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions,' 
spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their 
possibilities, both in men and in monev, every help they can afford to the 
Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, 
while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from 
the outlving members of her family. 

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. 
In all that I have said. I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our 
rase or in my general descriotion of the provision we think it necessary to make, 
beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not mv purpose — it is not the purpose 
of any patriotic man — to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite inter- 
national animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great 
duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that 
Parliament and the country will enable us to do it. 



UAZELl, WATSON 




MINISTERS DBS AFFAIRES ETRANIiERES. 



RECUEIL 

U IIGUIENTS DIPLOMATIQUE^. 



Negotiations ajant precede la guerre. 



"/a Juillet - 24 6 J „*' 1914- 



Petrograde. 

Imprimerie de 1' Etat. 

1914. 



J6 1. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Belgrade, le «•/„ Juillet 1914. 

(TOSgramme). 

Le Ministre d'Autricbe vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du 
soir, au Ministre des Finances Pa tchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une 
note ultimative de son Gouvernement f ixant un d61ai de 48 heures pour 
I'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbaleraent 
que pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee int6gralement dans 
un d61ai de 48 heures, il avait 1'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le 
personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se 
trouvent en tournee electorate ont 6te* rappeles et sont attendus a 
Belgrade domain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a 
communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie 
et declare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les 
demandes de l'Autriche 

(Sign6) Strand tman. 



JV° 2. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Belgrade, le •%, Juillet 1914. 

(TCWgramme). 

Textedela note qui a et6 transmis" aujnnrd'hui par le Ministre 
d'Autriche-Hongrie au gouvernement Serbe: 

Le 31 Mara 1909 le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre 

de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Let R.la declaration suivante: 

La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas 6te atteinte dans ses droits 

par le fait accompli cr66 en Bosnie Herzegovine et qu'elle se conforraera 

— 3 — 



pnr consequent a telle decision que les Puissances preudront par 
rapport a Particle 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux Conseils 
des Grandes Puissances. laSerbie s'engagedes a present a. abandonnei 
Pattitude de protestation et opposition qu'elle a observee h regard 
de l'nnnexion depuis Pautomne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, 
a changer le cours de sa politique actuclle envers PAutriche-Hongrie 
pour vi\Te desormais avec ccttedernierc sur le pied d'un bon voisinage*. 

Or, Phistoire des dcrnieres annees, et notamment les evenements 
douloureux du 28 Juin, ont demontre Pexistence en Serbie d'un 
mouveraent subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchic 
Austro-HongToise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement 
qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement Serbe est arrive a 
se manifester au dela du territoire du Royaume par des actes de terro- 
risme, par une serie d'attentats et par des nieurtres. 

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe. loin de satisfaire aux engagements 
formels eontenus dans la declaration du 31 Mars 1909, n'a rien fait 
pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a tolere Pactivite criminelle des 
differentes socieies et affiliations dirigees centre la Monarchic, le 
langage effrenede la presse, la glorification des auteurs de Pattentat, 
la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements 
subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans P instruction publique, 
tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la popula- 
tion serbe a la haine de la Monarchic et au ruepris de ses institutions. 

Cette tolerance eoupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 
n'avait pas cesse. au moment ou les evenements du 28 Juin dernier en 
ont demontr£ au ninnde entier les consequences funestes: 

II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de Patten- 
tat du 28 Juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a et£ trame a Belgrade, 
que les amies et explosifs dont les meurtri?rs se trouvaient etre munis, 
leur ont ete donn6s par des offieiers et fonctionnaires Serbes faisant 
partie de la «Narodna Odbrana» et enfin que le passage en Bosnie 
des criminels et de leurs amies a 6te organise et effectue par des chefs 
du scrviee-frontiere serbe. 

Les resultats mentionnes de Pinstruction ne permettent pas 
au Gouvernement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps Pattitude 
de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observe pendant des annees 
vis-a-vis deg agissements concentres a Belgrade et propag^s de la sur 
les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats lui imjiosent au contraire 



le devoir tie mettre fin a des menees qui furiuent une menace perpe- 
tuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic. 

Cost pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernenient I. et R. se voit 
oblige de demander au Gouvernenient Serbe l'cinonciation officielle 
(|u'il condamne la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchie Austro- 
Hongroise, c'est a dire, l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en 
dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font 
partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les inoyens, cette pro- 
pagande criminelle et terroriste. 

Afin de donner un earactere solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvcr- 
nement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du journal 
officiel en date du 26/13 Juillet l'enonciation suivante: 

«Le Gouvernenient Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande 
dirigee contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est a diiv l'ensemble des ten- 
dances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie Austro- 
Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement 
les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. 

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonction- 
naires serbes aient participe" a la propagande susmentionnee et com- 
promis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernenient 
1 Royal s'etait solennellement engage par sa declaration du 31 Mars 1909. 

Le Gouvernement Royal, qui dfisapprouve et r6pudie toute ide> 
ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinies des habitants de 
quelque partie de 1'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son 
devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la 
population du Royaume que dorfnavant il procedera avec la der- 
niere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de parti Is 
agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et 
a reprimep). 

Cette enonciation sera portee simultanenient a la connaissance 
de l'Armee Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste" le Roi et sera 
publiee dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre: 

1) a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris 
de la Monarchie et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son 
integrity territoriale, 

2) a dissoudre imniediatement la sociele" dite «Karodna Odbrana». 
a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et & proceder de la meme 



inauiere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui 
s'adonncnta la propaganda contre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise; lc 
Gouvernement Royal prendra les inesures necessaires pour que les 
societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous uji 
autre noin et sous une autre forme, 

3) a eliminer sans d61ai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, 
tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc- 
tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagandc 
contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, 

4) a eloigner du service militaire et de radministration en gen6- 
ral tous les officiors et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande 
contre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et 
R. se reserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement 
Royal, 

5) a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gou- 
vernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif 
dirige contre Tintegrit^ territoriale de la Monarchic 

6) a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du com' 
plot du 28 Juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; 

des organes delegues par le Gouvernement I. et R. prendront 
part aux recherches y relatives; 

7) a proceder d'urgence a l'arrestation du commandant Voija 
Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de l'etat Serbe, 
compromis par les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo, 

8) a empecher, par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorit^s 
Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron- 
tiere, 

a licencier et punir severeraent les fonctionnaires du service 
fruntieredeSchabatzetde Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs 
du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere, 

9) a donner au Gouvernement I. et R. des explications sur les 
prupos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie 
qu'a retranger qui, malgr^ Icurs positions officielles, n'ont pas h^site 
apres 1 'attentat du 28 Juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une 
nianiere hostile envers la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise, enfin, 

lOjd'avertir sans retard le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'execution 
Jcs mesures comprises dans les points precedents. 

— 6 — 



Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la response du Gouvernement 
Royal au plus tard ju6qu'au Samidi 25 do ee mois, a. 6 heures du soir. 

Un mSmoirc concernant les r&ultate de l'instruction de Sarajevo 
a regard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est ann6x6 
k cette note», 

(Signe) Strandtman. 



A"? 3. 

Note Verbal e transinlse personiielleiueut par 1'Ambas- 

sadeur d'Autricbe-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre 

des Affaires Etrangeres le u / u Juillet 1914 a 10 heures 

du matin. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la neces- 
sity de remettre le Jeudi 10 /s 3 du mois courant, par Tentreniise du 
Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouver- 
nement Royal de Serbie: 

(Suit le texte de la note). 

Voir document A° 2. 



JV? 4. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au (barge d'affaires en 

Autricbe-Hougrie. 

St.-Petersbourg, le »/„ Juillet 1914. 
(Tel^granime). 

Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie ce qui suit. 

La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puis- 
sances le lendemain de la presentation de l'ultimatum a Belgrade 
ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un d61ai tout-a-fait insuffisant 
pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour 1'aplanissement 
des complications surgies. Pour prevenir les consequences incal- 

- 7 - 



culables et egalemcut nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui 
|H'uvent suivre le mode d'aetion du Gouvernement austro- 
nongrois, il nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai 
donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche- 
Hongrie se declarant dispose* a informer les Puissances des 
donnees de l'enquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Roval base ses accusations, devrait leur donner egalement 
le temps de s'en rendre compte. En ce cas, si les Puissances 
se convainquaient du bienlonde de certaines des exigences 
autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir 
au Gouvernement Serbe des conseils en consequence. Un refus 
de proloiiger le terme de Taltimatuiii priverait de toute portee 
la demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres des Puis- 
sances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases memes 
des relations internationales. 

Communique a bmdres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



N° 5. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Represent ants de 

Sa Majeste rEmpereiir en Angleterre, en Alleniagne, en 

Italie et en France. 

St.-Petersbourg, le "/,, Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

Me refere a men telegramme a Koudachew d'aujnurd'hui; nous 
psperons que le Gouvernement aupres duquel Vous etes accredit^ 
partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Rcpre- 
sentant a Vienne de se prononccr dans le meme sens. 

Communique a Belgrade. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



J£6. 

Telegranmie de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de 
Serbie a Sa Majeste 1'Empereur. 

Belgrade, le u / ti Juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a reniis hier soir au Gouver- 
nement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Conseiente 
de ses devoirs internationaux. la Serbie des les premiers jours de l'ho- 
rible crime a dexlar^qu'ellelecondamnaitetqu'elleetaitpreteaonvrir 
uneenquetesursonterritoire si la complicity de certains de ses sujets 
etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites Austrc- 
hongroises. Cepcndant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro- 
hongroise sont inutilenient humiliantes pour la Serbie et incom- 
patibles avec sadignitecomme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- 
mandesurun ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans 
l'officiel et un ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous reprimerion? 
I'esprit hostile contre 1'Autriehe en nous faisant a nous menies des 
reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides. — 
On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hon- 
grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notrts a l'instruction et pour 
surveiller lexecution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. 
Nous avons rec;u un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de 
quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hotigrie quittera Belgrade. Nous 
sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont 
compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant. ainsi que celles 
dont 1'acception nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; touted 
les personnes dont la participition a l'attentat sera deninntree seront 
severement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pour- 
raient etre executees SDns des changements de notre legislation, ce qui 
exige du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous pouvons 
etreattaques apres l'expiration du delai par l'annce austro-hongroise 
qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. II nous est imposible de nous de- 
fendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le 
plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Majeste qui 
s'est manifested tant de fois a notre egard nous fait esperer ferme- 
inent que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son genereux 
coeur slave. 

-5 - 2 



En ces moments difficiles J'interprete les sentiments du peuple 
serbe qui supplie Yotre Majeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort 
du Royaume de Serbie. 

(SignS) Alexandre. 



jNs 7. 
Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 

Etraugeres. 

Berlin, le »»/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T6l£gramme). 

Tous les journaux du matin, menie ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent 
I'lmpossibilitS pour la Serbie d'aeeepter les conditions posees, 
accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton Snergique adopte par 
1'Autriehe. L'offieieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulierement agressif; 
il qualifie de superflus les recours 6ventuels de la Serbie k St. Peters- 
bourg, h Paris, a Athenes et a Buearest, et termine en disant que le 
peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la 
situation dans la p£ninsule Balcanique va enfin s'exlaircir. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 



JV? 8. 

Le Charg* d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaire* 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le »/», Juillet 1914. 

(TiKgramme). 

La copiedela note officiellement remise a Belgrade a 6t6 commu- 
niques par 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvernement Francais. 
Plus tard 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visits le Ministre et 
lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autri- 
chiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, 
1'Autriche serait obligee de recourir a. une pression et, en cas 

- 10 - 



de besoin, a des inesures militaires; la communication se termi- 
nait par la remarquc qu'4 l'avis de l'AUemagne cette question 
devrait etre r6solue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie 
et qu'il Stait de l'inteiet des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire 
en l'abandonnant aux Parties inteiessees. Le Gerant du Departe- 
ment Politique, qui assistait a I'entretien, demanda a PAmbassa- 
deur s'il fallait considerer Taction autrichienne comme 
un ultimatum — en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas ou la Ssrbie 
ne se soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, 
les hostility Gtaient inevitables? L'ambassadeur e>ita une 
reponse directe en alleguant l'absence d 'instructions. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



JV? 9. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre <les Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Belgrade, le n / S4 Juillet 1914. 

(TOUgramme). 

Pachitch est rentre a Belgrade. II a Pintention de 
donner dans le delai fixe, c'est a dire demain Samedi a 6 heures 
du soir, une reponse a PAutriche indiquant les points accep- 
tables et inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui meme aux 
Puissances la priere de dSfendre Pindependance de la Serbie. 
Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inevitable— nous 
ferons la guerre. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 



M 10. 
Communique du Gouvernemeut Imperial 

St. -Petersburg, le »*/„ Juillet 1914. 

Les derniers evenements et l'envoi par PAutriche- Hongrie 
d'un ultimatum a la Serbie prSoecupent le Gouvernement Imp6- 

- 11 - 



rial au plus liaut degre. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement 
Involution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laigser 
la Russie indifferente. 



fls 11. 



Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Miiiistre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

Vienne, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T614gramme). 

Le comte Berchtold se trouve a Ischl. Vu l'impossibilit^ 
d'y arriver a temps, je lui ai telegraphic notre proposition 
de prolonger le d£lai de 1'ultimatum et l'ai rep6t6e verbale- 
ment au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la commu- 
niquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, mais a ajout6 
qu'jl pouvait pr^dire avec assurance un refus categorique. 

(Sign6) Koudachew. 



JV? 12. 



Lc Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des 
Affaires Etraiigeres. 

Vienne. le ■*/« Juillet 1914. 

(T61£gramme). 

Suite a mon telegramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de 
Macchio la response negative du Gouveniement Austro-Hongrois 
& notre proposition de prolonger le d61ai de la note. 

(Sign6) Koudachew. 



•i. 12 - 



X° 13. 

Lc Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Miuistre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Belgrade, le «%» JuiHet 1914. 
(Telegramme). 

Rec.u avec retard le 14—27 Juillet 1914. 

Je transmets la rGponse que le President du Conseil des Mi- 
nistres Serbe a remis au ministre Austro-Hongrois k Belgrade 
aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du d£lai de rultimatum. 

«Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a recu la communication du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal du "/« de ce mois et il est persuade 
que sa response 61oignera tout malentendu qui menace de gater les bons 
rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro hongroise et le 
Royaume de Serbie. 

Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont 
apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les 
declarations et les actes des repr&entants responsables de l'Etat, pro- 
testations qui furent couples court par la declaration du Gouver- 
nement Serbe en date du I8 Ai Mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelSes 
vis-i-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, 
depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui 
se sont suceede" que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a 
et6 faite dans le but de changer 1'eHat de choses politique et juri- 
dique cr£e" en Bosnie et Herzegovine. Le Gouvememeut Royal constate 
que sous ce rapport le gouvernement J. et R. n'a fait aucune rep- 
resentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de 
laquelle le gouvernement Imperial et Royal a re<ja une explicatiou 
entierement satisfaisante. 

La Serbie a, de nombreuses fois, donne" des preuves de 6a 
politique pacifique et modere> pendant la dure> de la crise balca- 
nique, et c'est grace k la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans 
l'interet exclusif de la paix europ6enne, que cette paix a 6t6 
pr&erv6e. 

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas etre rendu responsable des 
manifestations d'un caractere priv6 telles que les articles des jouxnaux 

- 13 - 



et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent 
dans presque tons les pays conune une chose ordinaire et qui echap- 
pent, en regie generate, au controle officiel, d'antant moins que le 
Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de 
questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie, 
a montr6 une grande prevenance et a reussi, de cette facon, a en regler 
le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a et6 peniblement surpris 
par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des personnes du royaume 
de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation de l'attentat commis 
k Sarajevo. 11 s'attendait a etre invito a collaborer a la recherche 
de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime et il 6tait pret, pour prouver 
par des actes son cntiere correction, k agir contre toutes les personnes 
a Kegard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites. 

Se rendant done au d6sir du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, 
le Gouvernement Royal est disposed a remettre aux tribunaux tout 
sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation et a son rang, pour la complicity 
duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient 
fournies. 

11 s'engage specialement a faire publier a la premiere page du 
Journal officiel en date du 13—26 juillet, l'enonciation suivante: 

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie eondamne toute propagande 
qui serait dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, e'est-i-dire l'ensemble 
des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu k detacher de la Monarchic 
Austro-Hongroisedes territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sin- 
cerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. 

«Le GouverneniPiit Royal regrette que certains officiers et fon- 
etioiinaires serbes aient participS, d'apres la communication du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, a la propagande susmentionnee 
et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le 
Gouvernement Royal s'Stait solennellement engag6 par sa declaration 
du 18/31 mars 1909. 

«Le Gouvernement Royal, qui desapprouve etrepudie toute id6e ou 
tentative d*une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque 
partie de rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu'il est de son 
devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute 
la population du royaume que dorenavant il proc6dera avec la der- 

- 14 - 



mere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables do 
pareils agissements, qu'il mcttra tous ses efforts a prtvenir et a 
re-primer*. 

Cette 6nonciation sera portee alaconnaissance de l'armee Koyale 
par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le 
Prince he>itier Alexandre, et sera publie* dans le prochain Bulletin 
officiel de l'armec. 

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage ep outre: 

1) A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la 
Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle 
sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et 
au mepris de la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise, ainsi que contre toute 
publication dont la tendance, g&ierale serait dirigSe contre Tinte- 
grit6 territoriale de rAutriche-Hongrie. 

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est pro- 
chaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un 
amendement, de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent 
etre coniisquees, ce qui, actuellemcnt. aux termes eategoriques de 
l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible. 

2) Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve, et la note da 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aueune, 
que la SoeiSte Narodna Obrana et les autres societes similaires aient 
commis jusqu'a ce jour quclque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait 
d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins,le Gouvernement Royal acceptera 
la demande du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra la So- 
ci6te Narodna Obrana et toute autre societe. qui agirait contre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie. 

3) Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage a eliminer sans d^lai 
de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait ser- 
vir a fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hougrie, quand le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves 
de cette propagande. 

4) Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme d'6Ioigner du service 
militaire ceux pour qui Tcnquete judiciaire aura prouv6 qu'ils sont 
coupables d'actcs diriges contre l'integrit6 du territo^re de la Monarchic 
Austro-Hongroise; il attend que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
lui communique ulterieurement les nouis et les faits de ces officiers 
et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit $'ensuivre. 

- 15 - 



5) Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas claire- 
ment comptedu sens et de la portSe de la demande du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal tendant a ce que la Serine s'engage a accepter sur 
son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal. 

Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui rSpondrait 
aux prineipcs du droit international et a- la procedure criminelle, 
ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage. 

6) Le Gouvernement Royal,, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir 
d'ouvrir une enquete contre tous eeux qui sont ou qui, e>entuellement, 
auraient 6t6 melees au complot du 15 juin et qui se trouveraient sur 
le territoire du royaunie. Quant a la participation a cette enquete 
des agints des autoriti&s austro-hongroises qui seraient d616gu6s a 
cet effet par le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouvernement 
Royal ne peut pas l'accepter,carceseraitune violation de la Constitu- 
tion ot de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cependant, dan3 des 
cas concrets, des communications sur les r£sultats de 1'instruction 
en question pourraient etre donne>s aux organes austro-hongrois. 

7) Le Gouvernement Royal a fait p roceder des le soir meme de 
la remise de la note a 1'arrestation du commandant Voija Tankositeh. 
Quant a Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie Austro- 
Hongroiseet qui jusqu'au 15 juin 6tait employe (eomme aspirant) 
a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est prie" de vouloir bien, dans la 
forme accoutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les preemptions 
de culpability, ainsi que les preuves Gventuelles de culpability qui 
ont et6 recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par l'enquete a Sarajevo, aux fins 
d'enquetes ultexieures. 

8) Le Gouvernement Serbe renforcera et etendra les mesures 
prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers 
la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquete 
et punira s6verement les fonctionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne 
Schabatz-Loznica, qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les 
auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 

9) Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur 
les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont 
tenus aprgs l'attcntat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres l'affirmationdu 
Gouvernement I. et R., ont 6t6hostilesenversla Monarchie, des que le 

- 16 - 



Gouvernement I. et R. lui aura communique les passages en ques- 
tion de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos 
employes out en effet ete tenus par les dits fonctionnaires, quoi- 
que le Gouvernement Royal lui meme aura soin de recueillir des 
preuves et convictions. 

10) Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal de ['execution desmesures comprises dans les points prece- 
dents, en tant que cela n'apasete" deja fait par la presente note,aussitot 
que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee. Dans le cas ou le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal neseraitpas satisfaitdecette reponse, 
le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet com- 
mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme 
toujours, a accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette que- 
stion, soit a la decision du tribunal international de la Haye, soit 
aux Grandes Puissances qui out pris part a Telaboration de 
la declaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 Mars 
1909». 

(Signei Strandtman. 



.Ni 14. 



Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagiie au Ministre des affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le '=,„ Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

Ai recu Votre t616grarame du "/« Juillet. Ai communique 
son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. II me dit que le 
Gouvernement Anglais l'a egalement pri6 de conseiller a Vienne la 
prolongation du d£lai de l'ulti malum; il a communique cette d-marche 
teiegraphiquement a Vierme, il va en faire autant pour notre d-- 
marche, mais il craint qu'a la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti 
.pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses telegrammes ne restent 
sans resultats: il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportunit§ pour 
l'Autriche de c6der au dernier moment et il se demande si cela ne 
pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai repondu 
qu'une grande Puissance eomrae l'Autriche pourrait ceder sans porter 



atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes 
eependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. Meme lors- 
que je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir 4 Vienne pour eviter 
la possibility de consequences rcdoutables, le Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres repondait chaque fois negativement. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 



N° 15. 



Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le 'V, 5 Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

Ai recu le t61egramme du "/»» Juillet concernant la prolonga- 
tion du delai de l'ultimatura autrichien et ai fait la communication 
prescrite. Le Reprtsentant de France a- Vienne a 6t6 muni d'instruc- 
tions conformes. 

(Sign6) Sevastopoulo. 



J* 16. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres, le "/,» Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

Recu t&egramnie du 11 Juillet. Grey a prcscrit a. 1'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Angleterre h Vienne d'appuyer notre d-marche concernant 
la prolongation du d£lai de l'ultimatum. II ra'a dit en meme temps 
que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche ii&it venu le voir et avait explique" 
qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer k la note autrichienne le caractere 
d'un ultimatum;il faudrait la consider comme une d-marche qui, en cas 
d'absencede rtponseouen cas de reponse insufiisante au terme fix6,aurait 
comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart imm&liat 

- 18 - 



de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant 
lc commencement immSdiat des hostilites.— Grey a ajoute' qu' a 
la suite de cette explication il a indique a PAmbassadeur d'Angle- 
tcrre a Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la 
question de la prolongation du delai de Pultimatum, celle de Parret 
des hostility pourrait peut r etrc servir de base a la discussion. 

(Signe) Benckendorif. 



M 17. 



Le v Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a 
Londres. 

St.-Petersbourg, le »/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T£16gramme). 

Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, 
pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions 
confonnes, nous comptons que PAngleterre ne tardera pas de 
se ranger nettement du cot6 de la Russie et de la France, 
en vue de maintenir Pequilibre europSen, en faveur duquel 
elle est intervenue constamment dans le passS et qui serait 
sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de PAutriche. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



J* 18. 



Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le "A, Juillet 1914. 

II nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle 
repandue par quelques journaux d'apres laquelle la demarche 
du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait 6t£ 
faite a Pinstigation de PAllemagne est absolument fausse. Le 
Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de 
la note Autrichicnne avant qu'elle ait 6t6 remise et n'a exercS 

- 19 - * 



aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est a tort qu'on attribue 
a 1'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire. 

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l'Autriche 
les revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne 
contre la Serbie. 

Avant tout elle desire comme elle l'a d£ja declare" des le 
commencement du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste 
localise. 



J\» 19. 



Le Charge d'afflaire en France au Ministre des affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

Me refere a mon telegramme du "/ 2I Juillet. 

Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a public, sous une forme 
pas entierement exacte, les declarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attri- 
buent a cette demarche le caraetere d'une menace. L'Ambassa- 
deur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne parces divulgations, a visite 
aujourd'hui le Gerant du D6partement Politique pour lui 
dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caraetere de 
menace qu'on lew attribue. II a declare" que l'Autriche avait 
presents sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin, 
mais que cependant 1'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de 
l'Autriche et que certainement «la fleche une fois partie» (ce sont la 
ses propres paroles), 1'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que 
par ses devoirs ,d'alliee. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



- 20 - 



J6 20. 

L'ambassadeur en Anglcterre au Hinistre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(ra^gramme). 

Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemague lui a declare 
que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas 6t6 informe du 
texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement 
la d-marche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demands eu meme 
temps si 1' Anglcterre pouvait consentir a agir k St.-P6tersbourg 
dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a rtpondu que cela 6tait 
completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant que 
les complications n'existaient qu'entrc l'Autriche et la 
Serbie, les int6rets Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirecte- 
ment, mais qu'il devait prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne 
aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce mo- 
ment on se trouverait en presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient 
interessees toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se reservait pour 
ce cas une complete liberie d'action. 

(Sign6) Benckendorff. 



Jfc 21. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Belgrade le »/„ Juillet 1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 
Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe 
a 1'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'infonner, a 6V 2 du 
soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu au delai 
fixe" une reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel 
de la Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich pour le "/ S7 Juil- 
let. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce 
soir pour la meme ville. 

(Signe) Strandman. 

- 21 - 



JTj 22. 

L'Ambassadeur en Anglctetre au Miuistre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres le 'Vas Juillet 1914. 

(Til^gramme). 

Grey a dit a l'Ambassadeur d'Alleruagne qu'a. son avis la 
mobilisation autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la 
Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aign d'une guerre generate et 
qu'il ne vovait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en 
presence des mobilisations autrichienne etrusse, rAllemagne, la France, 
l'ltalie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immediate 
et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce 
plan necessitait avant tout l'agreinent de l'AIlemagne et l'engage- 
ment de cette Puissance de ne pas inobiliser. En consequence il a 
adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une question a ce sujet. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 



m 23. 

Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 

Italic 

St. Petersbourg, le "/so Juillet 1914. 

(Tel£gramme). 

L'ltalie pourraitjouer un role detout premier ordre en faveur du 
maintien de la paix, enexercant l'influence necessaire sur l'Autriche 
et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car 
ce dernier ne saurait etre localise. II est desirable que vous expri- 
miez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas 
venir en aide a la Serbie. 

(Sign6) Sazonow. 



JV? 24. 

Le^Gerant du Consulat a Prague an Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Prague, le ,3 / 46 Juillet 1914. 

(TiUgramme). 

La mobilisation a ete decrelee. 

(Signe) Kazansl<v. 



JS 25. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a PAmbassadeur en 
Autriche Hongrie. 

St. Petersbourg, le n / i0 Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

J'ai eu aujouid'hui un long entretien sur un ton amieal avec 
l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avee lui les 
10 demandes adfessSesa la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'a part la forme 
peu habile sous laquelle elles sent presentees, quelques unes parmielles 
sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas ou le gouverneraent 
Serbe d^clarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exeniple, les points 1 
et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un remaniement des lois serbes 
sur la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentemeht de la 
Scoupchtina pourrait etre difficilement obtenu; quant a l'execution des 
points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses 
et meme faire naitre le danger d'aetes de terrorisme diriges contre 
les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait 
entrer dans les vues de TAutriclie. En ce qui regarde les autres points. 
il me semble,qu'avec certains changements dans les details, il ne serait 
pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y 
contenues Gtaient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes. 

Dans l'interet le la conservation de la paix qui. aux dires de 
Szapary, est precieuse a 1' Autriche au meme degre qu'a toutes les 
Puissances, il serait necessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une 

- 23 - 



fin a la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait 
tres desirable, que FAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fut autorise 
d'entrer avec moi dans un echange de vues prive aux fins d'un rema- 
niement en commuu de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 
'%3 Juillet. Ce procede perraettrait peut etre de trouver une formule 
qui fut .acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction 
a l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une expli- 
cation prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce teJegramme avec le 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Communique aux Ambassadeurs 
en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italic. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



X° 26. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a FAmbassadeur en 
Allemagne. 

St. Petersbourg, le l3 /se Juillet. 

(Telegrarume). 

Veuillez comrauniquer lecontenude nion telegramme a Vienne 
d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui 
exprimer l'espoir, que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller 
a Vienne d'aller au devant de notrc proposition. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

X° 27. 

Le Charge d'AtTaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le ,3 / iC Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

h' Directeur du Departement Politique m'informe, que lors de 
la communication qu'il a faite al'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu 
de la reponse serbe a rultimatum, FAmbassadeur n'a pas cache son 

- 24 - 



etonneinent de ce quelle rTait pas donne satisfaction a Giesl. L'at- 
titude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du 
Departement Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



J* 28. 



Le Charge d'Attaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le n / iC Juillet 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

Aujourd'hui TAmbassadeur d"Allemagne a de nouveau rendu 
visite au Gerantdu Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait les 
declarations suivantes: 

«L'Autriehe a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des 
acquisitions territoriales et qu"elle ne menace pas Tintegrite de la 
Serbie. Sou but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par 
consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. L'Alle- 
mague se sent solidaire avec la France dans le d£sir ardent de 
conserver la paix et espere fermement que la France usera de son 
influence a Petersbourg dans un sens modeiateur». Le Ministre fit 
observer que l'Allemagne pourrait de son cote entreprendre des 
demarches analogues a Vienne, surtout en presence de Fesprit de 
conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. LAmbassadeur repondit 
que cela n'etait pas possible, vu la resolution prise de nepass"immiscer 
dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre 
Puissances — l'Augleterre, PAllemagne, I'ltalie et la France — ne pott- 
vaient pas entreprendre des demarches a St.-P6tersbourg et a Vienne, 
puisque Paffaire se reduisait en somme A un conflit entre la Russie 
et PAutriche. L'Ambassadeur allegua Pabsence d'instructions. 
Fiualement le Ministre refusa d'adherer a la proposition allemande. 

(.Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



-25- 



3d 29. 

Le Charge d'AU'aiies en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Utrangeres. 

Paris, le ,3 /, 6 Juillet 1914. 

(Telegrarame). 

Le Directeur du D6parteinent Politique a declare^ qu'a son avis 
personnel, les demarches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour 
but d'intimider la France et d'amener sou intervention &St-P6ters- 
bourg. 

(Sign6) Sevastopoulo. 



M 30. 

Le Cliarse d'Affaircs en Allemagne an Ministre des Affai- 
res Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le «/« 6 Juillet 1914. 

(■Rlfgranimp). 

Apres la reception a Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation 
de 1'armee autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, c6mpos6e, 
auxdiresdesjournaux.enpartie d elements autricbiens, se livra a une 
serie de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure 
avanceV de la soiree les manifestants se masserent a plusieurs reprises 
devant le palais de l'Ambassade Imperiale en poussant des cris hostiles 
a la Russie; la police etait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 



-26 - 



JVt 31. 

L'Ambassadeur en Aiigleterre au Ministrc des Affaires 
Etraugeres. 

Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(TOegramme). 

Ai regu votre t&egramine du 13—26 Juillet. Prie me tSlegraphier 
si , a Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accor- 
dent avec le projet de Grey concernant la mediation des 4 Gouverne- 
ments. Ayant appris del'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre&St.-P6tersbourg 
que Vous 6tiez dispose a accepter cette combinaison, Grey a decide 
de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir 
a Berlin, a Paris et a^Rome. 

iSigne) Benckendorff. 



Jl? 32. 

Le Ministie des Affaires Etraugeres aux Ambassadeurs en 
France et eu Augleterre. 

St.-Petersbourg, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'infonner si nous 
jugeons utile que 1'Angleterre prenne Pinitiative de convoquer a 
Londres une conference des reprtsentants de PAngleterre, la France, 
PAllemagne et PItalie, pour itudier une issue a la situation actuelle. 

J'ai repondu k PAmbassadeur que Pai entame des pourpar- 
lers avec PAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que 
j'espere favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore recu de reponse a 
la proposition que j'ai taite d'une revision de la note entre les 
deux Cabinets, 

-2?- 



Si des explications directcs avec le Cabinet de Vienne se 
trouvaient irrfrdisablcs, jo suis pret a. accepter la proposition 
anglaise ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le 
eonflit. 

(Signe) Sazunuw. 



N 33. 

Lc Ministre des Altai res Etranjjeres anx Ainhassadenrs en 

France, en Angleterre, en Alleiuagne, en Autriche-lloiigric 

et en Italie. 

St.-Petersbourg, le "A, Juillet 1914. 

(T61egramnic). 

Ai pris connaissance de la response transniise par lc Gouverncment 
Serbe au Baron Giessl. Elle depasse toutes nos previsions par sa mode- 
ration et son desir de dormer la plus complete satisfaction a l'Autrichc. 
Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient etre encore les demandes de 
TAutriche, araoins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un pretexte 
pour une guerre avec la Serbie. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



.N? 34. 

Lc Charge d'Att'aires en France an Ministre des AtTaires 
Etransjeres. 

Paris, le ««/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T^leKramme). 

1,'Ambassadour d'Allemagne a confere aujourd'hui de nouveau 
longuement sur la situation avec lc Directeur du Departement Poli- 
tique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insists sur l'exclusion de toute 
possibility d'une mediation ou d'une conference. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



— 2S 



M 35. 

l/Ambassjideiir en Fiance au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, Ie m /m Juillet 1914. 
(T^legramme). 
Ai coniM avec le Gerant du Ministere ties Affaires Etrangeres, 
on presence dc Berthelot, immediatement apres mon retour a Paris. 
Tons les deux m'ont eonfirme les details concernant les demarches de 
l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiques 
dans ses telegrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Sehoen a eonfirme par 
ecrit sa declaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a declare a la Kussie 
qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas a l'lntegrito 
de la Serbie. Son unique but. est d'assurer sa propre tranquil- 
lite. 2) Par consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. 
3) L'Allemagne et la France, completement solidaires dans l'ardent 
desir de ne pas ronipre la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un 
sens moderateur. Le Baron de Sehoen a specialement souligne l'ex- 
pression de la solidarity entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'apres la 
conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les d-marches susditesde l'Al- 
lemagne ont jtour but evident de desunir la Russie et la France, 
d'entramcrleGouverncmentFrancaisdans la voie des representations 
a St.-Petersbourg et de comproniettre ainsi notre allie a nos yeux; 
enfhi, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilite non siu-TAlle- 
niagne, qui employe soi disant tons ses efforts pour le maintien de 
la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France. 

(Signe) iswolsky. 

JV? 36. 

L'Anibassadeur en France an Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le '%, Juillet 1U14. 
(TWgramme). 
II ressort de vos telegrammes du ,3 /is Juillet que vous ne con- 
naissiez pas encore la reponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le telegramme 
par lequel cette nouvelle m'a et6 communiquee de Belgrade a et6 

— 29 — 



egalcment en route pendant 20 heures. Le t616gramme du Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres Francais expediS avant hier, au triple tarif, 
a onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre d-- 
marche n'est parvenu a sa destination qu'a 6 heures. II n'y a aucun 
doute que ce t&egramme n'ait 6t6 retenu intentionnellcment par 
le t&egraphe au trie hi en. 

(SignS) Iswolsky. 



te 37. 



L'Ambassadeur en France an Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T61£gramme). 

D'ordre de son Gouverneraent, 1' Ambassadeur d'Autriche a com- 
munique au Ge>ant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres que la re- 
ponse de la Serbie a ete jugee insuffisante a Vienne et que demain, 
inardi , 1' Autriche proc6derait a des «actions energiques* dont le but serai t 
de forcer la Serbie de Iui donner les garanties nScessaires. Le Ministre 
avant demand^ en quoi consisteraient ces actions, 1' Ambassadeur 
repondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts a ce sujet, mais 
qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la frontiere serbe, d'un ultima- 
tum et meme d'une declaration de guerre. 

(Signe) bwolsky. 



M 38. 

*.e Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(TdlSgramme).' 

J'ai pri6 le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'appuyer a Vienne 
votre proposition tendant a autoriser Szapary d'61aborer, parlavoie 
d'un ^change de vues prive avec Vous, unc redaction des demandes 

— 30 - 



austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a rgpondu 
qu'il etait au courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis 
de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avail commence" cette 
conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. D telegraphiera 
dans ce sens k 1'AEibassadeur d'Allsmagne k Vienne. Je l'ai prie" 
de conseiller d'une facon plus pressante a Vienne de s'engager dans 
cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a repondu qu'il ne pouvait pas 
conseiller a l'Autriche de cider. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 



jY» 39. 

Le Charge d'AHaii < ,s eu Alleinagiie au Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le "/« JuiUet 1914., 

(T616gramme). 

Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 
ce dernier avait recu celle de rAmbassadeur de France qui avait tente" de 
lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative k une action en favour 
de la paix, action qui serait exercee simultanfrnent a St.-P6tersbourg 
eta Vienne par rAngleterre, rAllemagne, 1'Italie et la France. Cambon 
a propose" que ces Puissances donnent a Vienne un conseil dans les 
termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la 
situation de l'heure actuelle*. En adoptant cette formule voi!6e on 
6viterait de mentionner la n6cessite de s'abstenir d'une invasion de 
la Serbie. Jagow a oppose a cette proposition un refus categorique, 
et oela malgre" les instances de l'Ambassadetfr qui a fait valoir, comme un 
bon cote de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances 
grace auquel on 6vitait l'opposition de PAlliance k l'Entente, ce dont 
s'6tait si souvent plaint Jagow lui meme. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 



— 31 — 



J6 40. 

Telegrainme de Sa Majeste Impcriale rEmpereur a Son 

Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 

l % J uillet 1914. 

Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment 
particulierenieut difficile ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui 
M'aniinent a Son egard et stir Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple 
serbe. 

Ma plus serieuse attention est attirSe par la situation actuelle 
et Mon Gouvernements'applique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les pre- 
sentes difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouver- 
nement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negligeant rien 
pour arriver a une solution qui permette de prevenir les horreurs 
d'une nonvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite de la Serbie. 

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, 
tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre Notre plus 
sincere desir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre assuree 
qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se desinteressera du sort de la Serbie. 

(Signe) Nicolas. 



A» 41. 



L'Anibassadeui' en Autriclie-Hougrie an Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

Vienne le '«/„ juillet 1914. 

(Tel^gramme). 

Le Ministredes Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un entre- 
tien prolonge, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en 
termes tout a fait amicaux, attire son attention sur l'impression defa- 
vorablc qu'a produite en Russie la presentation par l'Autriche a la 
Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque etat 
independant, bien que petit. J'ai ajoute que ce proc6de, qui pour- 
rait ame.ner des complications les moins desirables, a provoque en Rus- 
sie une profonde surprise et une reprobation generale. II faut sup- 

- 32 — 



poser que l'Autriche, sous l'influencc des assurances du Represen- 
tant Allemand k Vienne, lequel pendant toute cctte erise a jou6 un 
role d'instigateur, a compt6 sur la probability do la localisation de 
son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibility de porter a cette der- 
nierc impunement un coup grave. La declaration du Gouvernement 
Imperial concernant l'impossibilit£ pour la Russie de rester indif- 
ferente en presence d'un tel precede" a provoqne ici une grande impres- 
sion. 

(Sign6) Sch6b6ko. 



JVs 42. 

L'Ainbassadeur en Angleterrc au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangtres. 

Londres, le »/„ Juillet 1914. 
(Teltgramme). 

Grey vient de repondre a l'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne, qui efalt 
vemi le questionner sur la possibility d'ime action a St.-Petersbourg, 
que cette action devrait se produire a Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin 
serait le mieux qualifie pour l'exercer. Grey afaitobserverenmeme temps 
que la reponse serbe k la note autrichienne d£passait par sa moderation 
ct son esprit de conciliation tout ce k quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a 
ajoutS qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseill6 k Belgrade de 
donner une reponse moder6e et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait 
servir de base a une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question. 

Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si 1'Autriche malgre cette 
reponse commenQait les hostilites, elle prouverait son intention 
d'aneantir la Serbie. La question placed sur ce terrain produirait une 
situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient im- 
pliquSes toutes les Puissances. 

Grey a enfin declare que le Gouvernement Anglais etait bien 
sincerement dispose k collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand taut 
qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas 
contraire l'Angleterre se r&ervait une pleine liberty (Taction. 

(Sign6) Benckendorff. 
— 33 — 5 



J* 43. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etraiigeres a rAiiibassadeur en 
Angleterre. 

St.-Peiersbourg, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T61£gramme). 

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon 
impression que l'Alleiuague est plutot favorable a Pintransigeance 
de PAutriche. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le d6velop- 
pement de la erise, parait n'exereer aucune action sur son alliee. 

L'ainbassadeur trouve insuffisante la reponse de la Serbie. 

Cette attitude allemande est tout partieulieremcnt alarmante. 

11 me senible que mieux que toute autre Puissance PAngleterre 
serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir a. Berlin pour engager le 
Gouvernement Allemand a Taction neeessaire. C'est a Berlin qu'iudu- 
bitablement se trouve la clef de la situation. 

(Sign6) Sazonow. 



JS» 44. 

Le Consul general a Fiume an Ministrc des Affaires Kf ran- 
Seres. 

Fiume le ,s / i8 Juillet 19J4. 

(T£16gramme). 

L'etat de siege a ct6 proclame. en Slavonic, on Croatie et k Fiume et 
en meme temps les reservistes de toutes les categories ontetfc mobilises. 



(Signe) Salviati. 



3* - 



M45. 

L'AmbaSsadeur en Autiiche-!loii£rie an Minis! re deS AITai- 
ivs Etrangeros. 

Vieiinele IS / i8 Juillct 1914. 

(Tfldgramme). 

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens 
dos instructions de Votre Excellence. Jo lui fis observer, en termes 
lcs plus amieaux, combien il 6tait desirable de trouver une solu- 
tion qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre 1'Autriche-Hongrie 
et la Russie, donnerait h la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise des garan- 
ties sexicuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie. 

J'attirais l'attcntion du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers 
pour la paix de l'Europe qu'entrainerait un conflit arm6 entre 
1'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. 

Le Comte Berchtold me repondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement 
oompte du serieux de la situation et des avantages d'une 
tranche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. II me 
dit que d'un autre cote le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, qui 
ne s'etait decide que tres mal volontiers aux mesures ener- 
giques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plusni reculer, ni 
entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la, note Austro-Hongroise. 

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise etait devenue si aigue, 
et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degr6 t 
que le Gouvernement, le voulait il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, 
d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la reponse meme de la Serbie donne 
la preuve du manque de sineente de ses promesses pour l'avcnir. 

(Signe) Schebeko. 

K° 40. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagiie an Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le »/.. JuiUet 1914. 
(TWgramme). 
Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publie le texte de la note respon- 
sive serbe qui lui avait ete communique. Jusqu'a ce moment 

- 36 — 



»ette note n'a pnru in extenso dans aucun des journaux loeaux; 
qui selon toute Evidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans 
leurs colonnos, se rendant compte de l'effot calmant que cette 
publication produirait sur les lecteurs Allcinands. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 



Jfc 47. 

L'Ambassadeur en Aiitridse-Hcmgrie au Minislre des Altai- 
res Etrangeres. 

Vienne, le l5 / l8 Juillet, 1914. 

(T61egramme). 

Le decret sur la mobilisation generate a etc signe. 

(Signe) Schebeko. 



X° 48. 



Le Minislre des Affaires Etrangeres a TAinbassatleur a 
Loud res. 

St.-Petersbourg, le l5 / i8 Juillet, 1914. 

(Telfgramme). 

En presence des hostilites entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la 
Serbie il est neeessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence 
uue action mediatrice et que Taction militaire de 1'Autrichc 
contre la Serbie soit immediatement suspendue. Autrement la 
mediation ne servira que de pretexte pour tirer en longueur 
la solution de la question et donnera entre temps a l'Autriche 
la possibility d'eeraser eompletement la Serbie et d'occuper 
une situation dominante dans les Balcans. 

Communique a Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome. 

(Signed) Sazonow. 



— 36 — 



As 49. 

Lc Miuistrc des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'Affaircs 
en Alleinague. 

St.-Petersbourg, lc ie /, 9 Juillet, 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nora du Chanee- 
lier, que l'AUemagne n'a pas cesse" d'exercer a Vienne une influence 
moderatrice et qu'elle continuera cette action meme apres la 
declaration de guerre. Jusqu'a. ce matin il n'y avait aucune nou- 
velle que les armies autrichiennes aient franchi la frontiere 
Serbe. J'ai pri6 rAmbassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes 
remerciments pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je 
l'ai inform^ des mesures militaries prises par la Eussie, dont au- 
cune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre l'AUemagne; j'ajoutais 
qu'elles ne prSjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation 
de- la plus grande partie de l'armee austro-hongroise. 
L'ambassadeur se prononcant en faveur d'explieations directes entre 
le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je repondis que j'y etais tout 
dispose, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il 
parlait trouvent 6cho k Vienne. 

En meme temps je signaiais que nous 6tions tout disposes a 
accepter le projet d'une conference des quatre Puissances, un projet 
auquel, paraissait-il, l'AUemagne ne syrapathisait pas entierement. 

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre 
k profit tous" les moyens propres a produire une solution pacifique 
consisterait en une action parallels des pourparlers d'une conference 
a. quatre de l'AUemagne, de la France, de TAngleterre et de 1'Ita- 
lie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, a 
l'instar a. peu pres de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus 
critiques de la crise de l'an dernier. 

Je dis k rAmbassadeur qu'apres les concessions faites par la 
Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions resides ou- 
vertea ne serait pas tres difficile a trouver, a condition toutefois de 

- 37 — 



quelque bonne voloute de la part do 1'Autriche ct a condition que 
toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de 
conciliation. 

Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, en France, en 
Autriehe-Hongrie et en Italic 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



JV? 50. 

Le Minis! re des Affaires Etrangeres aux. Ambassadeurs en 
Augleterre et eu France. 

St.-Petersbourg, le ie / M Juillet 1914. 

(T61£gramme). 

Lors de mon entretien avec I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont 
traite mon telegramme precedent, je n'avais pas encore recu le 
telegramme du ,s / iS Juillet de M. Schebeko. 

Le contenu de ce telegramme constitue un refus du Cabinet 
de Vienne de proceder a un echange d'idees direct avec le Gouver- 
nement Imperial. 

Des lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'a nous en remettrc entiere- 
ment au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des demarches 
qu'il jugera utile de provoquer. 

Communique a Vienne, Rome et Berlin. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



J* 51. 



Le Charge d 'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 18 /,, Juillet 1914. 
(T61£gramme). 

Sur ma question s'il avait une reponse de Vienne relativement 
a Votre proposition de pourparlers prives a St.-Petersbourg, le Secre- 
taire d'Etat a repondu negativement. 

— 38 — 



II declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout 
ouvertement. Parlant a. Cambon, il a meme ajout£ qu'en cas d'une 
pression trop evidente l'Autriche se haterait de mettre l'Allemagne 
en presence d'un fait accompli. 

Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a fecu aujourd'hui un telegramme 
de Pourtales d'ou il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vousetes 
dispose a trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai replique' 
que probablement Vous avez 6t6 des le commencement en faveur d'un 
compromis bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit acceptable non 
seulement pour l'Autriche, mais egalement pour bous. II m'a dit 
ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commence a mobiliser sur la 
frontiere autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus 
difficile pour l'Autriche la possibility de s'entendre avec nous, 
d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que centre la Serbie et 
ne faisait pas de preparatifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai repondu que, d'apres 
les renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait egalement 
sur notre frontiere et que par consequent nous devions prendre des 
mesures analogues. J'ai ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut- 
etre prises de notre cote n'etaient nullement dirigees contre 
l'Allemagne. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 



A? 52. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Nich, le •«/„ Juillet 1914. 

(TCtegramme). 

Aujourd'hui. le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gonverne- 
ment, a declare a Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la neutrality. 

(Sign6) Strandtman. 



- 39 - 



Ko 53. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des AH'aires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le »/„ Juillet 1914. 

(TtWgramme). 

Al'occasion de Parrivee du President de la Republique Francaise 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare tin court expose 
de la situation politique aetuelle, a. pen pres dans les termes suivants: 
L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieure. s'est emparee du 
pretexte de Passassinat de PArehiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des 
garauties qui pourrontrevetir la forme de Poccupation des communi- 
cations militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne 
soutient PAutriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la seule Russie, 
parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre «localisee» entre PAutriche 
et la Serbie. c'est a dire de la punition de la politique precedente de 
la Serbie et des garanties pour Pavenir. De ceci PAllemagne conclue 
qu'il faut exercer uue action moderatrice a Petersbourg. Ce sophisme 
a ete refute a Paris connne a Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen 
a envaintached'entrainer la France a une action solidaire avec PAlle- 
magne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les memes 
tentatives out ete faites a Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a ete 
repondu que Paction devrait etre exercee a Vienne, car les demandes 
exeessives de PAutriche, son refus de discuter les rares reserves de 
la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre 
generate. La France et PAngleterre ne peuvent exercer une action 
moderatrice sur la Russie laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus 
grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie d'accepter 
ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui PAllemagne 
parait renoncer a Pidee d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline 
vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et a Vienne, mais en meme 
temps PAllemagne comme PAutriche tachent de faire trainer l'affaire. 
L'Allemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune autre 
maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparl(;rs manifeste- 
ment dilatoires a. Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des mesures 
actives, et si ces mesures sont tolerees, ses pretentions augmenteront 
proportionellcment. II est tr^s desirable que la Russie prete tout 

— 40 — 



son appui au projet de mediation que presentera Sir E. Grey. Dans 
Ie cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prfitexte de ogarantie*, pourra, en 
fait, changer le statut territorial de l'Europe orientale. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 

J6 54. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres. le "/ S9 Juillet 1914. 

(TWgramme). 

Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du l5 /*8 Juillet 
a Grey. II a declare aujourd'hui a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que 
les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient echoue. 
et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Peters- 
bourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche a la suite de la 
mobilisation de cette demiere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouver- 
nement Allemand s'est declare en faveur de la mediation, mais qu"il 
rencontre des dit'ficultes quant a la forme. Grey a insiste pour que 
le Gouvernement Allemand indiquat la forme laquelle a l'avis de 
l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur media- 
tion pour Gviter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'ltalie 
et de l'Angleterrc la mediation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le 
cas ou l'Allemagne consentirait a se ranger du cote de la paix. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 

.N? 55. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etra ngeres. 

Paris, le I8 / M Juillet 1914. 

(TiUgramme). 

Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entiere resolution du Gouverne- 
ment Francois d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette resolution est sou- 

- 41 - 6 



tenne par les cercles les plus Gtendus et par les partis y conipris les 
radicaux-socialistes qui viennent de lui presenter ime declaration 
expritnant la eonfiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques dugroupe. 
Des son arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphic d'urgence h Londres que 
vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Petersbourg et Vienne il 
etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus tot 
possible sous telle ou autre forme sa propesition coucernant la me- 
diation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a recuaujourd'hui PAmbas- 
sadeur d'AUeniagne qui lui a renouvelS l'assurance des tendances 
pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Alle- 
niagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adbirer a la proposition 
de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a repondu que les mots confe- 
rence* ou «arbitr.age» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a repliqu6 qu'il 
ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre 
forme de mediation. D'apres l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succes 
des negoeiations entre les Puissances il serait necessaire de savoir 
ce que l'Autriche compterait demander a la Serbie. Viviani a repondu 
que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'eu enquerir aupres 
de 1'Autricho, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pour- 
rait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France desirait 
sineerement la paix. mais qu Vile etait en meiue temps r6solue d'agir en 
pleine harmonie avec ses allies et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, 
avait pu se convaincreque cette resolution rencontrait la plus vive 
approbation du pays. 

(Signed Iswolsky. 



JY» 56. 

Telegramme de son Altesse Koyale le Prince Alexandre 
de Serbie a sa Majeste l'L'mpereur. 

Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a 
bien voulu M'adresserhier, Je M'empresse de Laremercierde toutmon 
coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuade>que la cordialesympathie, 
dont Votre Majesty estanimee envers Mon pays, nous est particulie.- 
rement precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que l'avenir de la 
Serbie est assure^ 6tant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de 

_ 42 - 



Votre Majeste.— Ces moments penibles ne peuvent queraffermir les 
liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie 
slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance eternelle pour l'aide et 
la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves pieusement dans I'ame 
de tous les serbes. 

(Sign6) Alexandre. 



J* 57. 

Le Charge d' Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 

Et range res. 

Nich le ,e / i9 Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegrarame responsif 
de Sa Majeste. l'Empereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres 
l'avoir lu.sesigna et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clement*! 
Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'emotion qui l'avait 
gagne. L'heritier est attendu a Nich dans la.nuit. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 



JV?58. 



Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 
France. 

St. Petersbourg le "•/*. Juillet 1914. 

(T61egramme). 

Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communique la 
resolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne 
cessait pas ses preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence 
ces derniers qu'a. la suite de la mobilisation A laquelle avait deja 
procede l'Autriche et vu l'absence evidente chez cette demiere du 
desir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de 
son conflit avec la Serbie. 

- 43 - 



Puisque nous ne pouvons pas aecider au desir de l'Allemagne, 
il ne nous reste que d'accelerer nos propres armcments et de compter 
avec l'inevitabilite probable de la guerre. — Veuillez en avertir le 
Gouvenienient Francais et lui exprimer en nieine temps notre sincere 
reconnaissance pour la declaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a 
faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entie- 
rement sur l'appui de notre allie> la France. Dans les circonstances 
actuelles cette declaration nous est particulierement precieuse. 
Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, 
Italic. Allemagne. 

(Signe) Sazonovr. 



X? 59. 

Le Charge d'A 11 aires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Nich, le »/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T41egramme). 

Le Prince-Regent a public hier un manifeste signe par tous les 
Ministres a l'occasion de la declaration de la guerre par l'Autriche 
a la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine pax les paroles suivantes: «De- 
fendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouver- 
ture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son non 
le discours du trone, au d6but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la con- 
vocation demontrait l'importance des Svenernents actuels. Suit 
l'expose des faits des derniers jours — l'ultimatum autrichien, la 
reponse serbe, les efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui 
etait compatible avec la dignite le l'Etat pour 6viter la guerre et 
enfin l'agression armee du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie. aux 
cotes de laquelle se tient le Montenegro. En passant a l'examen d» 
Pattitude des Puissances en presence du conflit, le Prince insista. 
tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est anime> la Russie et sur la 
Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majeste l'Empereur 
disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque 
mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imperial?- et de la Russie un «jivio> 

- 44 - 



formidable et febrile secouait la salle des seances. Les marques de 
sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi 
relevees separement et provoquerent des «jivio» d'approbation de 
la part des deputes. Le discours du trone se termine pax la declaration 
d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par 1 'expression du voeu que toutes 
les mesures soient prises pour faci liter la tache du Gouvernement. 

(Signe) Strandtuian 



■N? 60. 



Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ainbassadeurs en 

Alleniagne, en Autriche-Hongrie. en France, en Angleterre. 

et en Italie. 

St. Petersbourg, le n / 30 Juillet 1914. 

(T61<; gramme). 

L'Ambassadetir d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a de- 
mand? si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que 
1'Autriehe pourrait donner — de ne pas porter atteinte a l'intesrite 
du Royaume de Serbie — et indiquer a quelles conditions nous 
pourrions encore consentir a suspendre nos arniements; je lui ai 
dicte, pour etre transmise d'urgence a Berlin, la declaration snivante: 
«Si 1'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assume 
le earactere d'une question europeenne, se declare prete a 
eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits 
souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser ses preparatifs 
militaires». 

Veuillez t61egraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouver : 
nement Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre 
desir de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, 
car nous nc pouvons pas admettre que de seniblables pourparlers ne 
servent qua faire gagner du temps a l'AIlemagne et a I'Autriche 
pour leurs preparatifs militaires. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



- 45 



Jti 81. 

L'Ambassadeur en AUemague au Miuistre lies Affaires 
Etrangcres. 

Berlin, le 1T / 3 o Juillet 1914. 

(Ttlegramme). 

J'apprends que le d£cret de mobilisation de l'armGe et de la 
l'lotte" allemandes vient d'etre proinulgue. 

(Signe) SwerbGew. 



A? 62. 

L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Miuistre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 
(TSlegramme). 

Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour 
me communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a l'heure de la mobili- 
sation de 1'annee ct de la; flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets 
des journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes even- 
tualites, et mis en vente a l'heure de l'apres midi, mais que main- 
tenant ils sont confisquSs. 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 



J* 63. 

L'Ambassadeur en Alleinague au Miuistre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le "/ 3 , Juillet 1914. 

(TSlfgramme). 

Ai re$u Votre tSlegramme du 16 — 29 Juillet et ai transmis le 
texte de Votre proposition au Ministry des Affaires Etrangeres que je 

- 46 - 



viens de voir; il in'a dit qu'il avait recu un telegramme identiquc 
de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tersbourg et m'a declare 
ensuite qu'il tfouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche. 

(Sign6) Swerb£ew. 



X 64,- 

L'Anibassaricur en AiigleteiTC au Minis tie des Afl'aires 
Etrangeies. 

Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. 
(Telegramme). 

Ai communique le contenu de Vos t£legrammes du 16 et 1? Juillet 
a Grey lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse,mais desire 
tontinuer let; pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que 
Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il propose- 
rait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que rAutriche 
ne put proliter de ces atermoiemeuts pour ^eraser la Serbie, la 
situation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'etait apparemment 
modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports avec l'Allemagnen'etaicnt pas 
compromis. Apres la declaration de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a 
St.-P6tersbourg concernant la mubilisation allemande, ces rapports 
avaient change et sa demande avait recu de Votre part la seule reponse 
que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne 6tait rcvenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis de Vos 
conditions, Vous les aviez formulas dans des circonstances tout-a- 
fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insists aupres de Grey 
sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la- situation uouvelle 
cr£6e parlafaute de l'Allemagne a la suite de Taction de l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne. Grey a repoudu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait 
compte de ces arguments. 

(Sign£) Benckendorff. 



- 47 - 



M G5. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etraugeres. 

Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramrae). 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demands k Grey pour quelle 
raison l'Angletcrre prenait des raesures railitaires sur terre et sur 
mer. Grey a rSpondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractere 
agressif . mais que la situation 6tait telle que chaque Puissance devait 
se preparer. 

(Sign6) Benckendorff. 



JVv 66. 

L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangercs. 

Vienne, le 18 /„ Juillet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

Malgre" la mobilisation generate je continue a exchanger des vues 
avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs Tous insistent sur 
l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions aggressives quelconques contre 
laRussieetdevis^esdeconqueteaTSgarddelaSerbie, mais tous insistent 
egalement sur la nteessite" pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'au 
bout Taction commenced et de donner a la Serbie une lepon seYieuse 
qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir. 

(Sign6) ScMbflco. 



— 48 



M 67. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en 

Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre ef 

en Italic. 

St. Petersburg, le '*/,, Juillet 1914. 

(T61egramme) 

Me r6fere k mon telegramme du 'Yio" Juillet. D'ordre de son 
gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du 
Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la for- 
mule que j'ai proposee hier k l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagae. J'ai re- 
pondu que j'aeceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci dessous je vous 
transmets la formule modified en consequence. 

«Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses armees sur le 
territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a 
assume^ le caraetere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet 
que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie 
poinrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser 
porter atteinte k ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,— 
la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante». 

(Sign6) Sazonow. 



M 68. 



L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Alfaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 18 / 31 Juliet 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que uos 
pourparlers, qui 6taient deja difficiles a la suite de la mobilisation 
contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves 
mesures militaires que nous prenonscontrel' Allemagne; des nouvelles y 
relatives sont, d'apres lui,re'cues ici de tous les cotes et devront prOvo- 
quer ine>itableinent des mesures analogues de la part de 1'Allemagne. 

— 49 — 1 



A cela j'ai re.pondu que, d'apres des renseignements 8urs dont je 
disposals et qui ctaient confirmed par tous nos conipatriotcs arrivant 
a Berlin, la prise contra nous desmesuressusdite6se poursuivait e.gale- 
nient en Allemagne avecgrande activite. Malgrd cela, Ie Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les offi- 
ciers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 



A» 69. 



Lo Ministre <lcs Affaires Etrangeres a PAinbassadeur en 
Angleterre. 

S.-Petersbourg, le l8 / 31 Juillet 1914. 
(TWgramme). 

J'ai prie l'Ambassadeur d'Angletcrre de transmettre a Grey 
l'expression de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical et 
ferme dont il a use pendant les pourparlers avecrAllemagiieetl'Autri- 
che, grace a quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation 
actuelle n'est pas encore perdu. 

Je l'ai aussi prie. de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pcnsais que 
ce n'etait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques 
chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant al'Autriehe la necessity 
d'un compromis. 

Communique a l'Ambassadeur en France. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



Ni 70. 

Telegraininc secret aux Representants de Sa Majeste 
l'Einpereur a l'ltrangcr. 

Le 19 Juillct/1 Aout 1914. 

(Telegramme). 

A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a declare, d'ordre de 
son (louverncment, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est k dire a- midi, 
Saniedi, nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seuleinent 

— 50 - 



a 1'cgard de I'Allemagnc, mais aussi a regard de I'Autriche, le Gauverne- 
ment Allemand serait force dc donner l'ordre dc mobilisation. A ma 
question si c'6tait la' guerre, l'Ainbassadeur a repondu par la 
negative, mais en ajoutant que nous etions fort pres d'elle. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



IN? 71. 

L'Ainbassadeur cu Angleterrc au Miuistrc des AtTaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 

(Tflegramme). 

Grey m'a dit qu'il a telegraphic a Berlin qu'a son avis la der- 
niere formule acceptee par le Gouvernement Russe eonstitue la base 
de negotiations qui presente le plus de chances pour une solution 
pacifique du conflict. D a exprinie eti raeme temps l'espoir qifaucune 
grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilites avant l'examen de 
cette formule. 

(Signe) Bcnckendorff. 



K»72. 

L'Aiubassadcur cu Augletcrre au Miuistrc des Affaires 
Etraugeres. 

Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 

(Tel£gramrue). 

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne a pos6 aux Gouvernements 
Francais et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutrality 
de la Belgique. 

La France a repondu dans I'affinuative, tandis que le Gouverne- 
ment Allemand a declare ne pouvoir repdndre a cette question categori- 
quement. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 



51 — 



m 73. 

L'Aiubassadeur en Fiance au Ministre ties Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 

(Telfgramme). 

L'Ambassadciir d'Autrichc a visits hier Viviani et lui a dexlar6 
que 1'Autricho non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter attcinte 
a l'int^grite. territorialc de la Serbie, mais etait prete a. discuter 
iivec les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avee la Serbie. Le 
GouvernementFrancaisesttrespreoeuppe paries preparatifs militaires 
extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontiere franchise, car il est 
convaincu que sons le voile du «Kriegszustand>> se produit une veri- 
table mobilisation. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 



m 74. 

L'Amnassadeur en Fiance au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangferes. 

Paris, la 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 

(T616gramme). 

A la reception ir-i du t61£gramme de 1'Ambassadeur de France 
a St.-P£tersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faitc 
I'Anibassadeur Alleniand cuncernant la resolution do 1'Allemagne 
de decreter aujourd'hui la mobilisation generale, le President dc 
la Republique a signe le d£cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on 
precede a l'affichage des listes d'appel des reservistes. L'Amhassadeur 
d'Allcmagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune 
nouvellc communication, en alleguant l'impossibilite de de.chiffrer les 
telegrammes qu'il a reeus. Viviani l'a informe de la signature du 
decret dc mobilisation en r6ponse a la mobilisation allemande et 
lui a fait part de son eionnement de ce que 1'Allemagne eut pris une 
telle mesure a un moment ou se poursuivait encore un exchange de 
vucs amical cntre la Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute 

- 52 - 



que la mobilisation ne prSjugeait pas nexessairement la guerre et 
que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester a Paris comme 
l'Ambassadeur de Russie est reste" a Vienne et celui d'Autriche a 
St.-P6tersbourg. 

(SignS) Iswolsky. 

K? 75. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etran seres. 

Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 
(T£16gramme). 

Jetiensdu President que pendant les dernieres journeys I'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Autriche a assur6 avec force le President du Conseil des 
Ministres et bii meme, que l'Autriche nous aurait declare" 
etre prete a respecter non seulement I'jnt6grit6 territoriale de la 
Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions inten- 
tionnellement fait le silence sur cette declaration." J'ai oppose" un 
dementi catSgorique a cela.. 

(Sign6) Iswolsky. 



A'? 70. 

Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a S. -Peters- 
burg le 19 Juillet 1914 a 7 h. 10 du soir. 

Le Gouvernemont Imperial s'est efforee" des les debuts de 
lacrise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un 
dfcir qui lui en avait £t6 exprimS par Sa Majesty l'Empereur 
de. Russie, Sa Majcste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avee 
l'Angleterre s'fetait appliqu6 a accomplir un role m6diatuur 
aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petcrsbourg, lorsque 
la Russie, sans en attcndre le resultat, procSda a la mobili- 
sation de la totality de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la 
suite -de cette mesure menacante motiv^e par aucun presage 
militaire de la part de l'Allemagne l'Empire Allemand c'est 
trouv6 vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouverne- 

- 53 - 



ment Imperial out manque de parer a ce peril, il aurait compro- 
mis la security et Pexistencc meme de rAllemagne. Par conse- 
quent le Gouverneraent Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies 
en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes inilitaires. La Russie 
ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre 
a 1 ) cette demand? et ayant manifesto par ce refus (cette atti- 
tude 1 ) que son action etait dirigSe contre l'Allemagne, j'ai 
Thonneur, d'ordre de mon Gouverneraent, de faire savoir a 
Votre Excellence ce qui suit: 

Sa Majeste l'Empereur Mon Augtistc Souverain au nom de 
1' Empire, relevant le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la 
Russie. 

St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. 

(Signe) F. Pourtales. 



jY« 77. 

Communique du Ministre des Affaires Etranceres concer- 
iiiint les eveuemeuts des deruiers jours. 

Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. 

Un exposfi defigurant les eveneraents des derniers jours 
ayant parti dans la presse etrangerc, le Ministcre des Affaires 
Etrangcres croit de son devoir de publier l'aperiju suivant des 
pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvise. 

Le 10/23 Juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a 
Belgrade presenta an Ministre President Serbe une note ou 
le Gouvernement Serbe etait accuse d'avoir favorise le mouve- 
ment panserbe qui avait abouti a l'assassinat de l'heritier 
du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence l'Autriche-Hongrie 

') Les mots places entre pannthSses se trouvent dans l'original. II faut 
siippijser que deux variantes avaient et6 preparers d'avance et que par crreur 
clJes ont ete insertes tmtes les deux daus la note. 

— 54 — 



demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamncr 
sous unc forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi 
de prendre, sous le controle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie 
de mesures tendant a la decouverte du coniplot, a la punition 
des sujets serbes y ayant participe et a la- prevention dans 
l'avcnir dc tout attentat sur le sol du Roayume. Un delai de 
48 heures fut fix6 au Gouvernement Serbe pour la reponse a 
la susdite note. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- 
Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la 
note 17 heures apres sa remise a Belgrade, ayant pris connais- 
sance des demandes y contenuos, dut s'apereevoir que quelques 
uncs parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond, tandisque 
d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompatible avec 
la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la 
diminution de la (lignite de la Scrbie contenue dans ces deman- 
des, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa 
preponderance dans lcs Balcans demontree par ces meraes exi- 
gences, le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la 
plus amicale a 1'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de 
soumettre a un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la 
note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne 
crut possible de consentir k une discussion de la note. L'action 
moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ne fut non plus 
couronn£e de sueces. 

Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut mon- 
trde prete a donner satisfaction a l'Autriche dans une mesure 
qui depassa les provisions non seulement de la Russie, mais 
aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a 
Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette 
villc. 

Reeonnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees 
par l'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui 
serait impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a 
employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut 
acceptable pour l'Autriche et menageat son amour-propre de grande 
puissance. En meme temps la Russie etablit fermement qu'elle 
admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une 



— !).') — 



mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution do la dignit6 do la Serbie 
coinme Etat indepondant. Malliourousement tons les efforts d6ploy6s 
par If Gouvernoinent Imperial dans cette direction rosterent sans 
effot. Le Gouvornement Austro-Hongrois, apres s'etre derob6 atoutft 
intervention coneiliatrice des Puissances dans son uouflitavccla Serbie, 
proeeda a la mobilisation, dSelara oificielleinont la guerre k la Serbio, 
et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombarded. Le manifesto qui a accoin- 
pagne la declaration do guorre accuse ouvortemont la Serbio d'avoir 
prepare et execute le crime do Seraiewo. Uno paroille accusation d'un 
crime do droit cotnmun laneee centre tout tin peuple et tout un 6 tat 
attira a. la Serbie par son inanite cvidonte les larges sympathies des 
oercles do la societe europeenne. 

A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernempiit Austro- 
Hougrois. malgre la declaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait roster 
indifterente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvornement Imperial jugea 
necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circumscriptions inilitiires 
de Kiow,d'Odessa,do Moseou ot do Kazan. One telle d6cision s'impo- 
sait parcoque dopuis la date do la remise de la note austro-hon- 
groiso au Gouvornement Serbo et les premieres demarches de la Russie 
cinq jours s'etaient ecoules, ot cependant le Cabinet d>' Vienne n'avait 
fait aucun pas pour aller au devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au 
contraire, la mobilisation de la inoitie" de Parmee austro-hongroiso 
avait ele decretee. 

Le Gouvornement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures 
prises par la Russie; il lui fut en memo temps explique" qu'olles 
n'etaient que la consequence des armements autrichiens ot nullement 
dirigees contre rAllemagne. En memo temps, le Gouvornement 
Imperial deelara quo la Russie etait prete a continuer les pourparlers 
en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de nego- 
ciations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne.soit, en suivant la pro- 
position de la Grande Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des 
quatre GrandesPuissanrr.s non interesseesdtrectement, voire, l'Angle- 
terre, la Franco, 1'Allemagno et l'ltalie. 

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie eclioua egalomont. L'Au- 
triche-Hongri'' deelina un eehauge do vues ultericur avee nous, et le 
Cabinet do Vienne se doroba a la participation a la Conference dos 
Puissances projete>. 

- r,c - 



Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de 
la paix Repondant k la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, a 
quelles conditions nous consentirions encore asuspendrenosaxmements, 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions 
seraient la reconnaissance par I'Aurriche-Hongrie que la question 
Austro-Serhe avaitrevetu le caraetere d'une question europeenne, et la 
declaration de cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas 
insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains 
de la Serbie. 

La proposition de la Russie flit jugee par l'Alleniagne inaccep- 
table pour 1 Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement on recuta St.-Peters- 
bourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation generate 
par rAutriche-Hongrie. 

En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoirre Serbc 
et Belgrade fut bombardee de rechef. 

L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir 
les mesures de precaution militaires. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a cesujet, 
il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses arme- 
meuts pour se premunir contre toutes eventualites. 

Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en dV 
continpit pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de 
cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution 
du conflit qui comporte/ait l'observation des conditions posees par 
nous. 

Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvemement Alle- 
mancl,le 18 /3iJuillet,adressaauGouvernement Russe la demanded avoir 
a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juillet/1 Aout, 
en menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation 
generale. 

Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne 
transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, an nom de son Gouver- 
nement, la declaration de guerre. 



- 57 



JV° 78. 

Le Miuistre des Affaires Etraugeres aux Kepresentaiits de 
S. M. l'Empereur a l'etraiiger. 

St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. 

(TMegramine). 

II est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce des a present 
de rejeter sur nous la responsabilite" de la rupture. Notre mobilisation 
a ete provoquee par l'enornie responsabilite que nous aurions assumee, 
si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment 
ou l'Autriche, se bornanta des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, 
bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale. 

Sa Majesty l'Empereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de l'Empereur 
d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que 
dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriehe. Apres une telle garantie et 
apres toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Alle- 
inagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que 
nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec 
la diguite et l'independance de la Serbie. Une. autre issue, tout en 
etant eompletement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait 
certainemont efaranle l'equilibre Europeen, enassurant l'h^geraonie de 
l'Allemagne. Ce caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infi- 
niment plus important que le pretexte qui l'a cree. Par sa decision de 
nous declarer la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les nego- 
ciations entre les Puissances, rAUemagne a assume une lourde 
responsabilite. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



M79. 



Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a 

St.-Petersbourg au Miuistre des Affaires Etraiigeres le 

24 Jiiillet a 6 h, du soir. 

D'ordre de son Gouvernem^nt le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit: 

- 58 — 



«Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflict entre 
la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie ct en presence du fait 
qu'en suite de ce conflict la Russie d'apres une communication du 
Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostility contre l'Allemagne 
et que celle-ci se trouve par consequent en Stat de guerre avec la 
dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considere egaleraent en £tat 
de guerre avec la Russie a partir du present moment. 



(Sign6) Szapary. 



St.-Petersbourg. 
6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914. 



59 — 



PAGES D'HISTOIRE - 1914 

2* Serie 

Les Pourparlers 

Diplomatiques 

16/29 JOIN — 3/16 AOUT 



IV 

LE LIVRE BLEU SERBE 



NEGOCIATIONS AYANT PRECEDE LA GUERRE 



L1BRAIR1E MlLlTAIRE BERGER-LEVRAULT 
PARIS NANCY 

5-7, RUE DES BEAOX ARTS t8, RUE PES CLACIS 



2H Prix : 60 cen/iines 



Les Pourparlers 



• t m • 



Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe 



11 a ete tire de ce volume cinqnante-cinq exem- 
plaires numerotes a lapresse, dont : 

5 sur papier clu Japon (N os I a 5) ; 
5o sur papier de Hollancle (N oi 6 a 55). 



Diplomatiques 



Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe 



N° 1 

M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, 
a M. N. Paclritch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.) Vienne, le 16/29 juin 191-1. 

Les journaux de Vienne affirment que l'ins- 
truction judiciaire, ouverte centre les auteurs de 
l'attentat, a etabli que le crime avait ete prepare a 
Belgrade, que tout un com plot sur une base plus 
large avait etc organise a Belgrade parmi la jeu- 
nesse inspiree par l'idee panserbe, et que les 
journaux de Belgrade alarment le public par 
leurs peintures de la gravite de la situation en 
Bosnie. Ceci, d'apres eux, exerce une influence 



4 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

considerable, vu quecesjournaux sont introduits 
en Bosnie, en cachette, en grand nombre. 



N° 2 



M. Jov. M. Jooanovitch, ministre a Vienne,' 
a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(TYlegramme.) Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. 

La tendance est de plus en plus 6vidente a 
Vienne de donner a l'Europe l'impression que 
l'attentat commis contre l'archiduc - heritier 
d'Autriche-Hongrie est le resultat d'un complot 
prepare en Serbie. On a l'intention de s'en ser- 
vir comrue d'un moyen politique conlre nous. 
AussiVa.ut-il surveiller avec la plus grande atten- 
tion le langage de nos journaux sur l'e>enement 
de Serajevo. 



N° 3 



M. le D' M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a Ber- 
lin, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.) Berlin, le 11/30 juin 191-1. 

Les journaux de Berlin publient, d'apres les 
informations de Vienne et de Budapest, les ar- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 5 

tides oil l'attentat de Serajevo est rattacbe a la 
Serbie : on induit ainsi en erreur l'opinion pu- 
blique alleroande. 



M. le D T M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a 
Berlin, a 31. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil 
et ministre des Affaires etrang'eres. 

(TClegramme.) Berlin, le 17/30 juin 1914. 

L'bostilite de l'opinion publique en Allemagne 
envers nous dure toujours, entretenue jjar des 
nouvelles mensongeres, envoyees de Yienne et de 
Budapest, que presque tous les journaux alle- 
mands, malgre nos dementis, repandcnt avec 
zele par l'interinediaire de certains journaux. et 
agences. 



N" 5 



M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, 
a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 
Couime le comte Bercbtold n'a pu me rece- 
voir, j'ai eu, sur l'attentat de Serajevo, un entre- 



6 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

tien avcc le premier chef de section du niinis- 
lere des Affaires ctrangeres. Au cours de notre 
conversation, je lui ai diten resume ceci : 

<< Le Gouverncment Royal reprouve de la 
maniere la plus cnergique l'attentat de Serajevo 
et de son cote fera, certainement et le plus loya- 
lement, tout pour prouver que sur son territoire 
il nc souffrira aucune agitation ou entreprisc 
passible d'une peine et pouvant nuire a nos 
relations deja si dedicates avec l'Autriche-IIon- 
grie. Jcpense que le Gouvernement de Belgrade 
estpret a mettre en jugement les complices, s'il 
est prouve qu'il y en ait en Serbie, en depit de 
tous les obstacles qu'y a apportes la diplomatic 
austro-hongroise (creation d'une Albanie inde- 
pendante, opposition a une sortie libre du 
Royaume serbe sur l'Adriatique, demande de 
revision du traite de Bucarest, ultimatum du 
mois de septembre, etc.), lc Gouvernement 
serbe a persiste dans son desir de retablir 
sur des bases solides nos relations de voisinage. 
Vous savcz que dans cette voie quelque chose a 
ete fait et obtenu. La Serbie veut iioursuivre cet 
ell'ort, convaincue qu'il peut et doit etre con- 
tinue. L'attentat de Serajevo ne doit pas et ne 
peut pas entraver cette tache. » 

Le baron Macchio a pris note en se chargeant 
de communiquer au comte Berchtold tout ce que 
jc lui ai dit. Lc meme jour, j'ai communique le 
fond de mon enlrctien aux ambassadeurs de 
France et de Russie. 

Veuillez, etc. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 7 

N° 6 
M. M. Georgecitch, charge d'affaires a Cons- 
tantinople, a M. N. Pachitch, president du 
Conseil et ministre des Affaires e'trangeres. 
Constantinople, le 17/30 juin 1914. 
Monsieur le President, 
J'ai eu aujourd'bui, a propos de l'attentat de 
Serajevo, une assez longue conversation avec 
l'ambassadeur d'Autricbe-Hongrie. J'ai exprime 
l'espoir que ce triste evenement, quoi qu'on en 
dise dans certains cercles diplomatiques, ne nui- 
rait pas aux relations entrc la Serbie et l'Au- 
tricbe-Hongrie, considerablement ameliorees dans 
ces derniers temps. 

II ma repondu qu'il ne faut pas meine avoir 
de crainte a ce sujet. II trouve, lui aussi, que les 
rapports entre la Serbie et l'Autricke-Hongrie 
sont devenus bien meilleurs ces derniers temps. 
II a ajoute cpi'il faut continuer dans cette voie. II 
m'a dit que ses derniers entrctiens avec le comte 
Bercbtold l'avaient convaincu que celui-ci etait 
content de l'attitudc du Gouvernement serbe et 
que, pour sa part, il desire sincerement les rela- 
tions amicales avec la Serbie. 
Veuillez, etc. 

N° 7 
M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministre a Londres, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires e"trangeres. 
(Telogramme.) Londres, le 18 juin/l" juillet 191-1. 

Presque tous les journaux anglais annoncent, 



8 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

d'apres Ics sources autriehiennes, que l'attentat 
de Serajevo est l'oeuvre des revolutionnaires 
serbes. 



N° 8 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres, a toules les Legations 
Royales. 

Belgrade, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1M4. 

La presse austro-hongroise accuse de plus en 
plus la Serbie de l'attentat de Serajevo. Le but 
est evident: ruiner le grand credit moral dont la 
Serbie jouit aujourd'hui en Europe et exploiter 
politiquemcnt coutre la Serbie la folic entreprise 
d'un jeune fanatique exalte. Cependant l'attentat 
de Serajevo a rencontre en Serbie la reprobation 
la plus severe dans toutes les classes sociales; 
dans les cercles officiels ct non officiels, tous ont 
immediatement compris que cet evenement 
aurait la repercussion la plus defavorable sur 
nos relations de bon voisinage et sur la vie des 
Serbes d'Autrichc-Hougrie, ce que les derniers 
evenements ont confirme. Au moment ou la Ser- 
bie fait tout pour que les relations avec la Mo- 
narchic voisine deviennent meilleures et de plus 
en plus amicales, il scrait absurde de penser 
qu'elle aurait pu, soit directement soit indirecte- 
ment, inspircr de pareils actes. Tout au contraire, 
il etait dans l'interet vital de la Serbie elle-meme 
que ce crime fut evite. Par malbeur, cela n'etait 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 9 

pas en son pouvoir, les deux auteurs de l'attentat 
etant sujets autrichiens. La Serbie a toujours 
veille, et depuis les derniers evenements elle re- 
doublera de vigilance, sur les elements anar- 
chistes; si elle en decouvre en Serbie, elle pren- 
dra contre eux, avec energie, les inesures les 
plus severes. De-plus, elle fera tout son devoir, 
et par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour cal- 
mer, a l'interieur de ses frontieres, les esprits 
exaltes. Seulement, elle ne peut nullement per- 
mettre que la presse austro-bongroise induise 
en erreur l'opinion publique en Europe et que, 
dans un but purement politique, elle fasse re- 
tomber la lourde responsabilite du crime d'un 
sujet autricbien sur la Serbie et tout le peuple 
serbe, auxquels de pareils actes ne peuvent cau- 
ser que des dommages sans leur apporter aucun 
profit. 

Je vous prie d'agir, en cet esprit, par tous les 
moyens propices, pour mcttre fin le plus tot pos- 
sible a la campagne antiserbe devant l'opinion 
publique europeenne. 



N° 9 



M. Joe. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(TeK-gramme.) Vienne, le IS juin/1" juillet 1014. 

Des de'monstrations ont eu lieu bier soir devant 
la Legation. Je peux dire que la police s'est mon- 



10 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

tr£e energique. L'ordre et la tranquillity ont 616 
inaintenus. Si j'apprenais que le drapeau national 
ait 616 brule, je ferais une d-marche aupres de 
qui de droit et vous informcrais du resultat. Ge 
sont surtout les cerclcs catholiques inferieurs, la 
presse et les cercles militaires qui prfichent la 
haine contre les Serbes etla Serbie. Je vous prie 
de faire le necessaire pour que les demonstrations 
soient evitees chez nous et pour que le ton de la 
presse de Belgrade soit mesure' autant que pos- 
sible. Les dispositions coulre nous restent ici les 
monies. On croit que l'attitude a prendre, vis-a-vis 
de la Serbie et des Serbes, sera decidee apres les 
funerailles de l'Archiduc. 



N° 10 



M . le D T M. R. Vesnitch, ministre a Paris, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires ctrangeres . 

(Telegramme.) Paris, le 19 juin/2 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement frangais nous conseille d'ob- 
server le plus grand sang-froid et le recueille- 
meut aussi bien dans nos cercles officiels que 
dans l'opinion publiquc. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 11 

N° 11 

M. Joe. M. Joeanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangires. 

Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 

Hier, jour du transfert des depouilles mor- 
telles de l'archiduc Francois-Ferdinand et de sa 
femmc, de Sarajevo, j'ai fait hisser et mettre en 
berne, a mon domicile, Ic drapeau national. 

Cet evencment a donne lieu hier soir aux pro- 
testations du concierge, des locataires, du gerant 
et du proprietaire meme de l'immeuble, qui exi- 
gerent qu'on enlevAt le drapeau. Les explications 
n'ayant servi a rien, on a requis le concours de 
la police qui a demande, non officiellement, l'en- 
levement du drapeau pour eviter les desordres. 
Le drapeau a ete maintenu , et ce fait a provoque 
hier soir des demonstrations vehementes devant 
la Legation. La police fut energique et aucune 
atteinte ne fut portee ni au batiment, ni au dra- 
peau. Vers 2 heures du matin, les manifes- 
tants furent repousses de mon domicile. Les jour- 
naux d'aujourd'hui, surtout ceux de la nuance 
clerico-populaire, ont publie des articles sous le 
titre : « Les provocations du ministre de Ser- 
bie » en representant d'une facon infidele toute 
ectte affaii-e. 

Le drapeau est reste hisse sur l'immeuble de 
la Legation jusqu'a la fin de la messe funebre 
celebree, dans l'eglise de la Cour, pour les de- 
funts, puis il a ete retire. 



12 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

lous les habitants tin quartier que j'habite 
sout alles a la police, a l'Hotel de Ville, a la pre- 
sidence du Conseil des miuistres, pour reclamer 
l'enlevcment de notre drapeau. 

Les manifestauts furent harangues par le doc- 
teur Funder, le directcur principal du journal 
catholique Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner et 
Leopold Mandl, qui sont connus comme les prin- 
cipaux instigateurs de la campagne dirigee ilans 
la presse autrichienne et allemande centre la 
Serbie ct les Serbes. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N» 12 



M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienna, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Vienno, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le President, 

Dans la conversation que j'ai eue a propos de 
l'attentat de Serajevo avec le premier chef de 
section au ministere des Affaires etrangeres, le 
baron Macchio a attaque tres vivement la presse 
de Belgrade. 11 a cite des exemplcs atin de prou- 
ver qu'elle etait elTrene'e et qu'elle faisait die 
lleizercien gegen die Monarchic (des excitations 
contre la Monarchic). Je lui ai dit que la presse 
etait cliez nous completeinent libre et que les 
particuliers et le Gouvcrnement en souffrent sou- 
vent, mais que nous n'avions d'autres moyens 
contre elle que le recours aux tribunaux. J'ai 
ajoute que, dans le cas present, la presse autri- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 13 

chienne et hougroise, que le Gouvernenient com- 
mun tenait entre ses mains, avait commence : 
n'est-ce pas la presse autrithicnne et hongroise 
qui, depuis presque deux ans, administre des 
coups aux Serbes et a la Serbie, en touchant les 
points les plus sensibles? Ces jours-ci, il y avait 
juste un an depuis la malhcureuse guerre avec 
les Bulgares. J'ai ete temoin du manque de res- 
pect avec lequel la presse de Viennc avait traite 
la Serbie et son armee pendant et apres la cam- 
pagne, puis dans beaucoup d'autres questions. 
La presse de Belgrade a ete beaucoup plus 
modere'e. Aujourd'hui aussi, apres cet horrible 
crime, c'est d'ici qu'on envoie dans le monde des 
telegrammes accusant tout le peuple serbe et la 
Serbie comme s'ils avaient ete meles a l'odieux 
attentat de Serajevo. Tous les journaux de la 
Monarchie e"crivent en ce sens. Peut-on rester 
indifferent devant tout cela?Si l'auteur de l'at- 
tentat est de race serbe, tout le peuple serbe et 
le royaume de Serbie n'en sont pas coupables, et 
on ne peut pas les en accuser comme on le fait a 
present 

Le baron Macchio m'a repondu : 

— Personne n'accuse le Royaume, ni le Gou- 
vernement serbe, ni tout le peuple serbe. Nous 
accusons seulement ceux qui entretiennent les 
projets panserbes et qui travaillent a leur reali- 
sation... 

— II m'a paru des le premier moment, lui 
repondis-je, qu'on insistait sur la race de l'auteur 
pour le rattacher a Belgrade et provoquer l'im- 
pression que le crime avait ete prepare en Ser- 
bie. Ceci m'a frappe de suite, car je savais que 
jusqu'a present on appelait les Serbes en Bosnie 



14 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

die Bosniaken (les Bosniaques), et que Ton disait 
bosnische Sprache (la languc bosniaque), die 
Orlhodoxen aim Bosnien (les orthcdoxes de Bos- 
nie); maintenant on dit que l'auteur de l'attentat 
est ein Serbe (un Serbe), mais sans ajouter qu'il 
etait de Bosnie et sujet autricbien... 

— Jo vous repete, reprit le baron Macehio, 
que nous n'accusons ni le Gcuvernemcnt serbe, 
ni le peuple serbe, mais certains agilateurs... 

Je f'ai prie d'agir sur la presse de Viennc, afin 
qu"en ecs heures di'Ticiies oil Ton met a serieuse 
epreuve les relations enire la Serbie et l'Au- 
triehe-Hongrie, clle n'aggrave pas eette crise par 
de telles accusations. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N" 13 

31. le D' M. R. Vesnitch, minis tre a Paris, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et rni- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Pans, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 
J'ai eu, mercredi, a propos de l'attentat de Sera- 
jevo, un assez long entretien avec le nouveau 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres, M. Viviani, que 
cet evenement a rendu passablement inquiet. 
J'ai profite de cette occasion pour lui exposer a 
grands traits les causes qui ont provoque cet 
attentat, a savoir, en jiremier lieu, lintolerable 
systeme de gouvernenient dans les provinces 
annexees, surtout l'attitude des organes officiels 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 15 

et toute la politique du Gouvernement bosniaque 
vis-a-vis de tout ce qui toucbe a la religion ortho- 
doxe. II a compris la situation; cependant il a 
exprime le desir ct l'espoir que le sang-froid et 
la dignite seront gardes chez nous, afin de ne 
j)as donner des motifs pour de nouvelles accusa- 
tions de Viennc. 

Apres la premiere emotion, 1'opinion publique 
francaise s'est ressaisie a tel point que le presi- 
dent du Conseil lui-meme a juge convenable 
d'adoueir au Palais-Bourbon les termes de la 
declaration qu'ii propos de cet evenement, il 
avait faite anterieurement au Senat. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N° 14 



M. leD'' M. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrograd, 
a M^ N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Tetegramme.) Petrograd, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914. 

Le ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a dit que 
les cruautes commises sur les Serbes en Bosnie 
accroitront les sympathies de l'Europe pour nous. 
II croit que le monde ne pretera pas foi aux accu- 
sations lancets de Vienne contre nous. II est 
essentiel que l'opinion publique en Serbie reste 
calme. 



16 PACES D'HISTOIRE 

N» 15 

M. Joe. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires elrangeres. 

(Telegrammc.) Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillct 1911. 

L'emotion dans les cercles militaires et gouvcr- 
nementaux contre la Serbie augmente sans cesse, 
par suite des articles de nos journaux que la Lega- 
tion austro-hongroise a Belgrade exploite avec 
zele. 

N° 16 

M. Joe. Jovanovitch, ministre d Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 

La tendance geuerale des journaux de Vienne 
au sujet de l'attentat est la suivante : 

Des le dimanche i5 juin, dans l'apres-midi, 
les editions speciales des journaux annoncaient 
en gros caracteres que les deux auteurs de l'at- 
tentat etaieut des Serbes, de facon a faire croire 
qu'il s'agissait de Serbes de Serbie. Dans les 
comptes rendus publics plus tard, on remarque 
la tendance constante d'etablir un lien entre cet 
evenemeut et la Serbie, en insistant particuliere- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 17 

merit sur deux circonslanccs qui scmblaient prou- 
ver que les origines de l'attentat devraient etre 
reeherchecs a Belgrade : i° le sejour dc deux au- 
teurs de l'attentat a Belgrade et i" l'origine des 
bombes. Coinine troisieme ct demiere de leurs 
preuves, les journaux d'ici ont commence a pu- 
blier les dires des auteurs de l'attentat a l'ins- 
truction. II est caracteristique que ces « dires » 
n 'ont dte connus que par le Bureau hongrois de 
correspondance et les journaux magyars, surtout 
le journal Az Est. Ces dires se resument a ceci : 
i" qu'il est prouve que les auteurs de l'attentat 
avaient frequents a Belgrade le comitadji Michel 
Ciganovitcb et 2 que l'organisateur et l'instiga- 
teur de l'attentat avait ete le commandant Pri- 
bitchevitch. 

En meme temps, une nouvelle tendance de faire 
retombcr la responsabilite sur l'association « Na- 
rodna Odbrana » (la Defense nationale) com- 
mencait a se faire jour, de sorte que le dernier 
communique du Bureau hongrois de correspon- 
dance aux journaux, vendredi dernier, a ete 
concu dans ces termes : 

« L' instruction poursuivie jusqu'ici a demon- 
tre, d'une facon qui exclut le moindre doute, que 
eet attentat etait le rtSsultat d'un complot. En 
dehors de deux auteurs de l'attentat, on a arrete 
un certain nombre de personnes, pour la plupart 
des jeunes gens; d'apres ce qui est demontre, ils 
avaient ete, comme les auteurs de l'attentat, en- 
gages par la>« Narodna Odbrana » de Belgrade 
pour commettre le ciime et e'etait a Belgrade 
qu'on leur avait remis les bombes et les revol- 
vei*s. » 

Le nieme jour, tard dans la nuit, le meme Bu- 

2 



18 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

reau avait adresse aux journaux la demande sui- 
vante : « Nous prions l'bonorable redaction de 
ne pas publier la ntmvelle au sujet de l'attentat 
de Serajevo, inseree dans notre edition de Ge 
soir. » 

En menie temps, le Bureau de correspondance 
de Viennc a publie le communique suivant : 

« On affirme en lieu competent que l'instruc- 
tion au sujet de l'attentat se poursuit dans le 
plus grand secret. Tous les details publies la- 
dessus doivent etre acceptes sous reserves. » 

Neanmoins, on ne cessait pas de publier a 
Budapest les pretendus comptes rendu* de l'ins- 
truction. Dans le dernier comjjte rendu publie 
par le journal A Nap et reproduit par les jour- 
naux viennois d'hier, la tendance a faire retom- 
ber la responsabilite de l'attentat sur la « Na- 
rodna Odbrana » est encore plus accentuee : on 
pretend que l'accuse Cabrinovilch aurait designe 
le general Jankovitch comme le principal insti- 
gateur. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N° 17 



M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- 
nistre (les Affaires itrangeres. 

Vienne, le 24 jum/7 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le President, 
L'emotion produite par l'attentat de Serajevo 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 19 

subsiste toujours dans les ccrclcs competenls. 
Bien que l'Empereur ait adresse aux presidents 
des Conseils autrichien et hongrois et au ministre 
coramua des Finances, M. Bilinski, une lettre 
qui invite au calrae, on ne pout tout de memo 
pas preciser quelle attitude le Gouvernenicnt 
commun prendra a notrc egard. Pour cux, une 
chose est claire : avcc ou sans preuve que l'at- 
tcntat ait ete inspire a Belgrade, ils doivent re- 
gies une fois pour toutes la question des soi- 
disant agitations panserbes dans les limites de la 
Monarchic des Habsbourg. II n'est pas encore 
decide de quelle facon ils procederont et quels 
moyens ils emploieront pour atteindre leur but; 
on en delibere, surtout dans les hautcs spheres 
catholiqucs et militaires. La decision ne sera 
prise certainement qu'apres qu'on aura appris 
cc que les juges d'inslruction auront trouve a 
Scrajevo. C'est d'apres ce qu'on aura trouve que 
la decision sera prise. 

A cet egard, l'Aulriche-Hongrie aura a ehoisir 
cntre deux solutions : ou considerer le crime de 
Serajevo conime uu raalhcur national, raais au^. i 
comme un acte criminel qui doit etre juge sui- 
vant les preuves etablies, en demandant a la 
Serbie de lui preter aide dans cette tache, afin 
que les coupables ne puissent pas se soustraire a 
la condamnation la plus severe; ou faire dc l'at- 
tentat de Serajevo un complot pauserbe, jougo- 
slave, panslavc, avec toutes les manifestations de 
la haine envers le monde slave, haine jusqu'ici 
dissiuiulee. II y a plusieurs signes qu'on pousse 
les cercles competents vers cette seconde solution, 
et c'est pour cela qu'il faut etre pret pour la de- 
fense. Au cas oil la premiere solution serait 



20 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

adoptee, ce qui serait un signe de grande sagesse r 
il nous faudrait nous y rallier completement. 
Veuillez, etc. 



N° 18 



M. A r . Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires ,etrangeres, a toutes les Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 26 juin/9 juillet 1914. 

Presque tous les jours, le Prinee-heritier recoit 
d'Autriche - Hongrie des lettres de menace de 
mort. Mettez au courant de ce fait dans vos con- 
versations vos collegues et les journalistes. 



N° 19 



M. le D' M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a 
Berlin, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil 
et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.) Berlin, le 1"/16 juillet 1914. 

Le secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ne compre- 
nait pas l'attitude provocante de la presse serbe 
et ses attaques contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie, que 
celle-ci, comme grande puissance, ne peut sup- 
porter. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 21 

N° 20 

M. N. Pachitch , president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le I«/14 juillet 1914. 

i* Le Correspondenz Bureau imperial et royal 
alarnie l'opinion europeenne dans un but spe- 
cial. II ne represente pas l'attitude de la press* 
de Belgrade d'une fa von exacte et vraie. II choi- 
sit a dessein les expressions les plus fortes dans 
les articles des journaux qui publient des res- 
ponses aux injures, aux menaces et aux men- 
songes tendancieux, et les sert au public en Au- 
triche-Hongrie ; 

2° Le Correspondenz Bureau cite surtout les 
extraits des journaux, qui ne sont les organes ni 
des partis, ni des corporations; 

3° L'Autriclie-Hongrie a interdit, depuis l'an- 
nexion bosniaque, l'importation sur son terri- 
toirc des organes de nos partis ainsi que de tous 
les autres journaux paraissant en Serbie, de 
sorte que ceux-ci ne pourraient jias exciter l'opi- 
nion publique en Autriche-Hongrie et en Europe, 
si le Correspondenz Bureau ne faisait pas ressor- 
tir et repandre les nouvelles dont il fait choix 
dans les diflerents journaux en aggravant leur 
contcnu. II y a six jours, VOd/ek, organe du 
parti radical independant, a ete fraj>pe d'inter- 
diction ; maintenant aucun journal serbe ne peut 
passer en Autriche-Hongrie ; 

4° La presse est completement librechez nous; 



22 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

les journaux ne peuvent fitre confisqucs que pour 
le crime de lese-majeste ou bien au cas d'une 
excitation a la revolution. Iln'existe aucune cen- 
sure preventive. 

En cetetat de choses, expliquez a qui de droit, 
rien qu'a titre de renseignement, que nous ne 
possedons aucun moyen constitutionncl ou legal 
de changer la maniere d'ecrire de nos journaux. 
Cependant si Ton compare la maniere d'ecrire des 
journaux serbes avec celle des journaux d'Au- 
triche-IIongrie, on voit clairement que ce sont 
ces derniers quicommencent la polemique et que 
nos journaux nc font que riposter. Insistez de 
meme sur le fait que 1'opinion publique cfoez 
nous est relativement calme et que, de notre 
cote, persoune ne desire provoquer ou blesser 
l'Autriche-Hongrie. De ce que nos journaux pu- 
blient, personne en Europe n'en saurait rien, 
si le Correspondenz Bureau dc Vienne ne le re- 
pandaitdans le seul bat de nuire a la Serbie. 



N° 21 



M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et minis- 
tre des Affaires etrang'eres, a toutes les Lega- 
tions royales. 

(T616gramme.) Belgrade, le 1-/14 juillet 1914. 

Les journaux austro-bongrois ont rcpanduces 
derniers jours le bruit que des demonstrations 
contre la legation d'Autricbe-Hongrie auraient 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 23 

lieu a Belgrade, que certains correspondants des 
journaux austro-hongrois auraientete assassines, 
que les sujets austro-hongrois sont maltraites et 
qu'ils sont pris de panique, que les etudiants 
serbes ont manifesto eontre le ministre d'Autri- 
che-Hongrie lors des funerailles de feu Hariwig, 
ministre de Russie, etc.-.. Toutes ces nouvelles 
sont absolument fausses et inventees. La tran- 
quillite absolue regne a Belgrade; aucune de- 
monstration n'a eu lieu celte annee; personne 
n'a eu l'intention de provoquer des desordres. 
Ce n'est pas seulement le ministre d'Autriche- 
Hongrie et ses fonctionnaires qui se promenent 
librement en ville ; mais encore aucune injure, 
soit par des actes soit par des paroles, n'a ete 
faite a aucun sujet austro-hongrois, comme 
les journaux de Vienne le pretendent, de meme 
qu'aueuu n'a vu sa maison attaquee ni ses 
fenetres brisees ; aucun sujet austro-hongrois 
n'a eu des motifs pour cxprimer la moindre 
plainte. Toutes ces fausses nouvelles ne sont re- 
pandues que dans le but d'emouvoir et d'aigrir 
l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie eontre 
la Serbie. 

Toute la population de Belgrade a pris part 
aux obseques de M. Hartwig, tout le corps diplo- 
matique y assistait, et aucune manifestation eon- 
tre qui que ce soit n'a ete signalee. Toute la cere- 
monie s'est passee dans un ordre exemplaire, de 
sorte que les etrangers en furent surpris. Je vous 
prie de porter ces renseignements a la connais- 
sance du Gouvernement et de la presse. 



24 PAGES d'iiistoire 

N° 22 

M. Joi>. M, Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrang'eres. 

Vienne, le 1°'/14 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 

C'est le Bureau de la presse du ministere des 
Affaires etrangeres qui, cette fois encore, a dirige 
l'opinion publique contre nous. Sauf la Zeit et 
YArbeiter Zeitung, tous les journauxauslro-hon- 
grois ont etc renseignes et diriges par lui pour 
leurs articles sur l'attentat de Serajevo. Vous 
avez vu quels furent ces renseignemenls et le ton 
de leurs articles. 

Je tiens d'une source sQrc que les cercles offi- 
ciels alleraands d'icisont les plus hostiles contre 
nous. Ces cercles ont exerctS une certaino in- 
fluence sur la facon d'ecrire des journaux de 
Vienne, particulierement sur celle de la Nou- 
i'elle Presse Libre. 

Ce journal esttoujours anime d'un esprit anti- 
serbe a outrance. La Nouvelle Presse Libre qui 
a assez de lecteurs et d'amis dans les hauls cer- 
cles financiers et qui, lorsqu'il le faut, ecrit sui- 
A r ant les instructions du Bureau de la presse 
de Vienne, resume 1'afFaire en quelques mots : 
« Nous devons regler nos affaires avec la Serbie 
par la force des armes ; il est evident qu'il n'est 
pas possible d'y arriver par des moyens pacifi- 
ques. Et puisqu'on arrivera a la gueri'eplus tard, 
il vaut mieux en finir tout de suite! » 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 25 

La Bourse est tres mauvaise. Une pareille 
baisse n'a pas eu lieu depuislongtemps. Certains 
papiers ont baisse de 4^ couronncs. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N° 23 



M. Joe. M. Jocanocitch, ministre a Vienne, 
a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Viennei le 2/15 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 

La chose qui doit le plus nous interesser, c'est 
le geste que le Gouvemement austro-hongrois a 
l'intention de faire a propos de l'attentat de Sera- 
jevo. Jusqu'a present, je n'ai pas pu me rensei- 
gner a ce sujet; mes collegues non plus. La devise 
est ici maintenant : « Ne rien communiquer a 
pcrsonne. » 

Une reunion des ministres communs a eu lieu 
la semaine demiere a Vienne. On n'a pas appris 
beaucoup de choses sur les deliberations et les 
resultats de ce conseil. Le communique en fut 
court et peu clair. 11 semble qu'on y a discute 
longuement sur les consequences de l'attentat de 
Serajevo, mais qu'aucune decision n'a ete prise. 
On n'est pa's sur que le chef d'elat-major gene- 
ral et le chef de la marine aient assiste a cette 
seance, comme on l'avait dit. Api'es cette seance, 
le comte Berchtold est alle a Ischl pour en 
rendre compte & 1'Empereur qui y etait reparti 



26 PAGES d'histoire 

apres les funerailles de Francois-Ferdinand, dans 
un etat de sante et d'esprit parfait. Au Parle- 
meut de Hongrie, Tisza a repondu aux interpel- 
lations de l'opposition sur l'evenement de Sera- 
jevo ; vous savez ce qu'il a dit. Son discours 
n'etait pas clair; je pense qu'il n'etait pas elair a 
dessein. D'aucuns y ont vu un ton rassurant 
pour le developpement des choses et pour l'atti- 
tude du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, et d'au- 
cuns, les intentions dissimulees pour — dirai-je — 
une action encore non decidee. On s'est apercu 
qu'il ne £allait point s'aventurer avant de con- 
naitre les re'sultats de l'instruction. Apres cela, 
un certain temps se passa; on parla, on discuta, 
on ecrivit, on inventa, jiuis survinrenlla mort de 
Hartwig et l'alarme du baron Giesl. A ce propos, 
de nouvelles interpellations I'urent adressees au 
comte Tisza au Parlement hongrois; vous avez lu 
sa seconde reponse egalement. Plusicurs per- 
sonnes trouvent ici que ce discours est beaucoup 
plus rassurant que le premier et qu'il est du a la 
lettre de 1'Euipereur. La Bourse est meilleure 
main tenant ; les deux ministres de la Guerre et 
le chef d'etat -major general sont partis en 
conge. Je m'abstiens de toutc appreciation. Ce 
qui frappe dans ce dernier discours, e'est que 
l'hypothese d'une guerre n'est pas exclue, au cas 
ou les reclamations austro-hongroises au sujet 
des consequences de l'attentat de Serajevo n'ob- 
tiendraient pas satisfaction. 

Une chose est d'ores et deja sure : l'Autriche- 
Hongrie fera des demarches diplomatiques a 
Belgrade aussitot que l'instruction aura ete close 
a Serajevo, et l'affaire presentee au tribunal. 

VeuUlez, etc. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 27 

N°- 24 

M. Joi'. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, 
a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et 
ministre des Affaires etrangbres. 

Vienne, le a/15 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur lc President, 

On est d'avis ici que ni l'instruction, ni l'en- 
quete sur l'attentat cdmmis a Serajcvo n'ont 
fourni de preuve suffisante pour qu'on puisse 
accuser la Serbie officielle ; mais on croit que la 
Sei'bie sera accusee d'avoir tolcre sur son terri- 
toire certains elements revolutionnaires. On cri- 
tique et on condamne dans les cercles diploma- 
tiques d'ici les procedes du Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois, surtout l'attitude du Correspon- 
denz Bureau, du Ballplatz et de la presse vien- 
noise depuis l'attentat jusqu'aujourd'hui. Un 
tres grand nombre de pcrsonnes ajiprouvent 
notre attitude, la jugeant correcte et digne d'un 
pays serieux. Elles desapprouvent seulement les 
articles de certains de nos journaux, quoiqu'elles 
reconnaissent toutes que ces articles ont ete pro- 
voques par la presse viennoise. 

Bien qu'il paraisse que le ministere des Affaires 
etrangeres allemand n'approuve pas la politique 
de Vienne contre la Serbie, l'ambassade d'Alle- 
magne a Vienne eneourage cette politique preci- 
sement en ce moment-ci. 

Veuillez, etc. 



28 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE 



No 25 



M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, minislre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre dcs Affaires etrang'eres. 

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1&14. 
Monsieur le President, 

Quelles demarches seront faites? Sous quelle 
forme? Que va demander a la Serbie l'Autricbe- 
Hongrie? Je ne erois pas qu'au Ballplatz meine, 
on puisse repondre aujourd'hui a ces questions 
d'une maniere claire et precise. Je pense que 
cela s'elabore maintenant et que le comte For- 
gacb. y est rcdevenu le facteur principal. 

Dans un de mes rapports precedents, j'ai men- 
tionne que l'Autriche-Hongrie avait a choisir 
entre deux voies : considdrer l'attentat de Sera- 
jevo comme une affaire interieure en nous invi- 
tant a lui preter aide pour decouvrir les cou- 
pables et les punir ; ou bien faire de la tragedie 
de Serajevoun proces contre les Scrbes et la Ser- 
bie et meme contre la Jougo-slavie. A en juger 
i^ar tout ce qui se prepare et ce qui se fait, il me 
semble que l'Aulriche-Hongrie choisira cette 
seconde voie. Elle fera cela, convaincue qu'elle 
obtiendra l'approbation de 1'Europe; pourquoi 
ne pas en profiter pour nous humilieret, jusqu'a 
un certain point, justifier le proces Friedjung et 
celui d'Agram? En outre, elle justifierait devant 
ses peuples et devant 1'Europe les mesures 
severes et reactionnaires qu'elle a l'iniention de 
prendi'e dans le pays, pour reprimer la propa- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 29 

gande panserbe et l'idee jougo-slave. Enfin, ce 
Gouvernement croira faire quelque cliose aussi 
en faveur de son prestige, convaincu que. cela 
le relevera a l'exterieur ainsi qu'a l'interieur de 
la Monarchic 

Je pense que le Gouvernement austro-hon- 
grois redigera un memoire, plutot une accusa- 
tion contre la Serbie. Dans cet acta d'accusation, 
on exposera tout ce qui a ete recueilli contre 
nous depuis avril 1909 jusqu'aujourd'hui, et je 
crois que cet acte sera assez long. Cet acte d'ac- 
cusation, il le transmettra aux cabinets des 
Puissances europe"ennes, en ajoutant que les faits 
exposes lui conferent le droit de faire a Bel- 
grade des demarches diplomatiques et de deman- 
der que la Serbie remplisse a l'ayenir toutes les 
obligations d'un voisin loyal. En meme temps, 
le Gouvernement de Vienne nous remettra, a 
nous aussi, une note oil sera consigne tout ce que 
la Monarchic dualiste desire que nous execu- 
tions sans discussion. 

Veuillez, etc... 



N° 26 



M. le D r M. Jovanovilch, charge" d'affaires a 
Berlin; a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil 
et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.) Berlin, le 3/16 juillet 1914. 

Le secretaire d'Etat m'a declare qu'il a acquis 



30 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

la conviction, d'apres les rapports du ministrc 
d'AUemagne a Belgrade, de l'existenec d'une 
propagande panserbe, que le Gouvcrnemcnt 
devrait energiquement reprimer, dans l'interet 
de scs bonnes relations avee rAutriche-Hongrie. 



N' 1 27 



M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministrc a Londres, a 
M. N. Pachilch, president, du Conseil et mi- 
nistrc des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramma.) Londres, le -1/17 juillet 1911. 

L'ambassade d'Autricbe fait les plus grands 
efforts pour exciter la pi^esse anglaise contre 
nous et la gagn.M' a l'idee que la Monarchic doit 
donncr unc bonne logon a la Scrbie. L'ambas- 
sade remet aux redactions les coupurcs de nos 
journaux comme preuves de la facon dont notre 
presse est redigee. La situation pcut s'aggraver 
au cours des semaincs a veuir. II ne faut pas se 
tier aux declarations pacifiques, bien calculees, 
des cercles austro-hongrois, car on prepare une 
pression sur la Serbic, qui peut se transformer 
en unc attaque a main armee. II est a croire que 
rAutriche-Hongrie changera d'attitude et cher- 
chera a humilier la Serbic, ties qu'elle aura fait 
unc demarche a Belgrade. 



LES POURPARLERS DR>LOMATIQUES 31 

N° 28 

M. Ljdub. Michailovitcli, ministre a Rome, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Tclegramme.) Rome, le 4/17 juillet 1914. 

J'ai des informations siires que le marquis de 
San Giuliano a declare a 1'ambassadeur d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie, qu'une demarche quelconque de 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, dirigee contre Ja Serbie et 
ne'lui temoignant pas les egards dus par une 
nation a une nation, rencontrerait la reproba- 
tion de l'opinion publique en Italie, et que le 
Gouvernement italien tient a ce que l'entiere 
independance de la Serbie soit maintenue. 



N° 29 



M. le D T M. Spalalkooitch, ministre a Petro- 
grad, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil 
et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 5/18 juillet 1914. 

J'ai eu un entretien avec l'adjoint du ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres au sujet de l'attitude 
provocante du Correspondenz Bureau de Vienne 
et de la presse austro-hongroise. M. Sazonoff 
m'a dit, il y a quelques jours, qu'il etait etonne 



32 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

que lc Gouveriiement austro-hongrois n'eiit pris 
aucune mesure pour raetlre fin a celte agitation 
sterile dc la presse de Vienne qui abcutit a 
n'emouvoir personne et qui ne nuit qu'a l'Au- 
triche-Honffrie. 



N° 30 



M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre 
eles Affaires etrang'eres a toules les Legations 

royales. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 6/10 juillet 1914. 

Des l'attentat tie Serajevo, la presse austro- 
hongroise a commence a rejeter Q ur la Serbie la 
responsabilitc de cc crime horrible qui, a son 
avis, etait le resultat de l'idee panserbe. Elle a 
ensuite affirme que cette idee avait ete soutcnuc 
ct propagee par les differentcs associations comme 
« Narodna Odbrana », « Kolo Srpskih Sestara » 
(cercle des Soeurs serbes), etc., que le Gouver- 
ncment serbe avait tolere'es. 

Cependant, des l'arrivee de la nouvelle dc l'at- 
teutat, la Cour et le Gouvernement serbes ont 
exprime non seulement leurs condoleances, mais 
leur vive reprobation et leur borreur contre un 
tel crime. Toutes les rejouissances qui devaient 
avoir lieu ce jour-la a Belgrade furent sus- 
pendues. 

Neanmoins la presse de la Monarchic voisine 
n'a cess6 de rendre la Serbie responsable de l'eve- 
nement de Serajevo. De plus elle a commence a 



LES POURPARLERS DU>LOMATIQUES 33 

ce.propos a lancer differentes nouvelles tendan- 
cieuses et fausses qui ont provoque la presse de 
Belgrade a y repondre, a se defendre et quelque- 
fois a atlaquer aussi, indignee de la voir denatu- 
rer ainsi les evenements. Voyant que c'est avec 
intention que la presse austro-hongroise attirait 
la presse de Belgrade dans cette discussion deli- 
cate et desagreable, le Gouvernemcnt serbe s'est 
empresse de conseiller a la presse de Belgrade et 
meme de lui recommander de garder le sang- 
froid et dc se borner a dementir et a refuter les 
fausses et tendancieuses nouvelles. Cette de- 
marche du Gouvernement serbe est restee sans 
resultat aupres de certains journaux de moiudre 
importance, surtout parce qu'on nc cessait de 
lancer de nouvelles inventions dont la tendance 
etait d'exploiter l'attentat au point de vue poli- 
tique, non sculeinent contre la Serbie, mais aussi 
contre les Serbes d'Auti'iche-Hongrie. Le Gou- 
vernement serbe n'a pas ete a meme de mettre 
fin a cette polemique entre les presses serbe et 
austro-bongroise; la loi et meme les clauses de la 
Constitution garantissent en Serbie l'cnticre 
liberie de la presse et interdisent tdute mesure 
preventive et meme la confiscation des journaux. 
Cette polemique a ete cependant aggravee par ce 
fait que les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest 
avaient pris des extraits de cei'tains de nos jour- 
naux, qui n'exercent aucune influence sur l'ox)i- 
nion publique, aggrave encore leur ton et, de- 
formes de cette facon, les avaient repandus dans 
la presse etrangere dans le but evident d'emou- 
voir Topinion publique dans les autres Etats euro- 
peens et de representer la Serbie comme coupable. 
Ceux qui out suivi cette polemique savent que 



34 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

les journaux de Belgrade n'ont fait que se de- 
fendrc et se bonier a repousser des atlaqucs, a 
refuter des mensongss tendancieux. Les Gouver- 
nements etrangers, occupes par d'aulres affaires, 
n'ont pas eu le loisir de bien voir le but poursuivi 
par la presse austro-bongroise qui est d'emou- 
voir l'opinion jmblique dans la Monarcbie et a 
l'etrangcr. Des le commencement, le Gouverne- 
raent serbe s'est declai-e pret a traduire devant 
les tribunaux tout sujet serbe dont il aurait etc 
prouve" qu'il eut pris part a l'attcntat de Serajevo. 
En outre, il a declare qu'il avait prepare un pro- 
jet de loi pour rendre plus efllcaces les mesures 
deja prises contre tout abus d'explosifs. Ce projet 
de loi etait deja soumis au Conseil d'Etat, mais 
il n'a pas pu etre prdsente a la Skoupcbtina, 
celle-ci ayant et^ dissoutc. Eniin, le Gouverne- 
ment serbe a declare qu'il etait pret a l'avenir 
comme par le passe a remplir tous les devoirs de 
voisinage, auicquels l'oblige sa position d'litat 
europeen. 

Depuis que l'attentat a ete commis, le Gouver- 
nenient austro-bongrois ne s'est jamais adi-esse 
au Gouvernemenl serbe pour un concours quel- 
conque au sujet de l'attentat. II n'a "reclame pour 
aucun des complices. ni rouTerture d'une instruc- 
tion ni la mise en jugeraent. Une seule fois, il a 
demande des reuseignements sur le domicile 
actuel de quelques eleves expulses de l'Ecolc 
normale primaire de Fakrac, qui avaient passe 
en Serbie pour continuer leurs etudes. Tous les 
reuseignements qui ont pu etre recueillis a ce 
sujet lui ont et^ transmis. 

Cependant la campagne contre la Serbie conti- 
nuait dans la presse austro-hongroise, et on exci- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 35 

tait contre la Serbie l'opinion publique en Au- 
triche-Hongi'ie et en Europe. On a pousse" si loin 
dans cette voie que des chefs eniinents de jtartis 
poliliques en Autriche-Hongrie ont commence a 
interpeller au Parlement au sujct de 1'attentat, et 
que le President du Conseil hongrois leur a re- 
pondu. Des discussions engagees a ce sujet, il 
apparait que l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'intention de 
faire certaines demarches, mais on ne voit pas 
dans quel sens. On ne dit pas si les mesures 
prises, surtout les mesures militaires, depen- 
dront de la reponse et de l'esprit de conciliation 
du Gouvernement sei*be. De loin, on fait entre- 
voir la possibility d'un conflit, an cas ou le Gou- 
vernement serbe ne pourrait pas donner une 
reponse categorique et salisfaisanle. 

Lors de la mort subitc du ministre russe 
Hartwig a Belgrade, au domicile du ministre 
dAutriche, la polemique de presse a ete encore 
ranimec; mais ce triste evenement n'a provoque 
aucun desordre, lors des funerailles. Cependantla 
legation dAutriche-Hongrie, par suite de fausses 
nouvelles recues parelle, s'etait e"mue a tel point, 
que les sujets austro-hongrois avaient commence 
a se cacher dans des hotels de Semlin et de Bel- 
grade, et certains a la Legation meme. Le jour 
de l'anniversaire du Roi, qui s'est passe dans un 
ordre parfait, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, 
par l'intcrmediaire du vice-consul Podgradski, 
ma informe, vers 5 heures de l'apres-midi, que 
des agressions contre la legation d'Autriche- 
Hongrie et contre les sujets austro-hongrois a 
Belgrade etaient projetees pour cette nuit meme. 
II m'a prie de prendre les mesures ne'eessaires 
pour la protection des sujets austro-hongrois et 



36 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

de la Legation, en ajoutant qu'il rendrait la 
Serbie responsable de tout ce qui arriverait. Je 
lui ai repondu que le Gouverneruent responsable 
du Royaume de Serbie n'avait aucun renseigne- 
ment sur n'importe quels preparaiifs de cette 
nature, mais que j'en ini'ormerais tout de meme, 
sans retard, le ministrc de lTnterieur et lui de- 
manderais en meme temps de prendre toutes les 
mesures nece-saires. Le lendemain a demontre 
que la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie avait ete 
trompee parde fauxi-enseignements, etantdonne 
qu'aucune agression n'a ete tentee, aucun prepa- 
ratif d'attaque n'ayant ete fait. Neanmoins, la 
presse austro-bongroise a explode cette affaire 
encore dans le but deprouver que l'opinion serbc 
est exeitee et prete a tout. Elle est alle'e meme 
plus loin et a essaye d'affirmei'd qu'en effet quel- 
que cbose devait se passer, car M. Pacbitch, lui- 
meme, avait dit qu'il en avait entendu parler ». 
Tout cela demontre d'une facon evidente l'inten- 
tion d'exeiter l'opinion publique centre la Serbie 
dans cbaque occasion et a pro]^os de tout evene- 
ment. 

Si Ion prend en consideration tout ce qui a etc 
dit au Parle men t bongrois au sujet de la tragedie 
•le Sarajevo, on aura des raisons de s'inquieter 
ct de croire qu'on prepare contre nous une de- 
marcbe qui pourrait avoir des consequences de- 
sagreables pour les relations entre la Serbie et 
l'Autricbe-Hongrie. Cette inquietude est d'autant 
plus justifiee qu'il semble. d'api-es tout, que l'ins- 
truction ouverte ne se bornerait pas aux seuls 
coupabies et aux complices eventuels de l'at- 
tentat, mais qu'elle engloberait aussi la Serbie et 
l'idee panslave. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S §7 

Par son attitude et ses procedcs, le Gouverae- 
ment serbe a donne des preuves irrefutables 
qu'il travaille a l'apaisement des esprits, dans 
l'interet de la.paix et du maintien des bons rap- 
ports avec tous ses voisins. II a donne surtout 
des preuves de son desir de regler et d'ameliorer 
ses relations avec la Monarchic austro-hongroise 
qui, dans ces derniers temps, s'etaicnt refroidies, 
a cause de la guerre balkanique et des questions 
qui en ont de'coule. Dans ce but, le Gouverne- 
ment serbe a procede au reglement des chemin s 
de fer orientaux, de nouveaux chemins de fer 
et du transit des produits auslro-hongrois pour 
Constantinople, Solia, Salonique et Athenes. 

Le Gouvcrnement serbe considere que ses in- 
terets vitaux lui imposent que la paix et la tran- 
quillite dans les Balkans soient consobdees au 
mieux et pour la dure'e la plus longue possible. 
Et c'est parce qu'il desire cela qu'il craint main- 
tenant que la surexcilation de l'opinionpublique 
en Autricbe-Hongric ne fournissc au Gouverne- 
ment austro hongrois des motii's pour faire une 
demarche qui tendrait a humilier la dignite de 
l'Etat serbe et pour faire presenter des reclama- 
tions qui ne pourraient pas etre acceptees. 

C'est pour cela que j'ai l'honneur de vous 
prier de faire, aupres du Gouvernement aupres 
duquel vous etes accredite, tout ce qui est neces- 
saire pour qu'il prenne note de notre desir sin- 
cere de maintenir des relations amicales avec 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, et de'reprimer sur notre ter- 
ritoire toute tentative pouvant porter atteinte a 
la tranquillite et a la securite de la Monarchie 
voisine. De meme, nous accueillerons les recla- 
mations de lAutriche-Honaric au cas oil elle 



38 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

deniandcrait que certains complices se trouvant 
en Scrbie — s'il y en a, bien entendu — soient 
traduits devant nos tribunaux inde'pendants, 
pour etre juges. 

Mais nous ne pourrons jamais accepter des 
reclamations qui iraient contre la dignite de la 
Scrbie et que ne saurait accepter aucun Etat 
qui respectc son independance et qui veut la 
conserver. 

Dans le desir de voir les bons rapports de voi- 
sinage avec la Monarcbie dualiste se consolidev 
et se maintenir, nous prions les Gouvcrnements 
amis de prendre note de notre declaration et 
d'agir dans un esprit paciiique lorsque l'occasion 
se pre'scntcra ou lorsque le besoin 1'exigera. 



N° 31 



M. Joe. M. Joi'anovitch, minis tre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, minislre 
des Affaires etrangeres. 

Vienne, le 7/20 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 
II est Ires difficile, presque impossible d'ap- 
prendre ici quelque chose de positif sur les veri- 
tables intentions de rAutriche-Hongrie. Le mot 
d'ordre pour tout ce qui se fait est d'en gardcr le 
secret absolu. A en iuger par ce que nos jour- 
naux ecrivent, on est optimi-te a Belgrade en ce 
qui concerne nos rapports avec rAutriche-Hon- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 39 

grie. Cepcndant, on ne peut pas etre optimiste. 
II n'est pas flouteux que 1'Autriche-Hongrie pre- 
pare quelquc chose de serieux. Ce qu'on devrait 
craindre le plus, et ce qui est tres a croire, e'est 
qu'elle prepare une guerre contre la Serbie.'La 
conviction generale ici est que ne rien faire cette 
fois-ci encore contre la Serbie equivaudrait pour 
l'Autriche-Hongrie a un veritable suicide. En 
outre, l'idee que la Serbie, apres deux guerres, 
est completement epuisee et qu'une guerre en- 
treprise contre elle serait en fait une simple 
expedition Icrminee par une prompte occupation, 
a pris des racines encore plus profondes. On 
croit aussi qu'une telle guerre serait tcrrainee 
avant que l'Europe ait pu intervenir. 

Les preparatifs militaires qu'on est en train 
de faire, surlout sur la frontiere serbe, prouvent 
que les intentions de l'Autriche sont serieuses. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N° 32 

M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Au- 
Iriche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. Lata Patchoa, 
president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres par interim. 

Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai l'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence 
la Jiote ci-jointe que j'ai recue de mon Gouverne- 



40 PACES D'HISTOIRE 

meat et qui est adressee au Gouvernement du 
Royaume de Serbie. 
Yeuillez, etc. 

Remis personnellement a 6 heures de l'aprcs-midi. 

« Le 3 1 mars 1909, Ie ministre de Serbie a 
Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au 
Gouvernement imperial et royal, la declaration 
suivanle : 

« La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte 
dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bos- 
nie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par 
consequent a telle decision que les Puissances 
prcndront par rapport a l'arlicle 25 du traite de 
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes 
Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a 
abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'oppo- 
sition qu'elle a observec a regard de l'anncxion 
dermis l'automue dernier et elle s'engage, en 
outre, a cbanger le cours de sa politique actuelle 
envers 1'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais 
avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisi- 
nage. » 

Or, l'bistoire des dernieres annees et notam- 
ment les cvenements douloureux du 28 juin ont 
demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mouveinent 
subversif dont lc but est de detacher de la Mo- 
narchic austro-bongroise certaines parties de ses 
territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous 
les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se 
manifester au dela du territoire du royaume par 
des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats 
et par des meurtres. 
Le Gouvernement roval serbe, loin de satis- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 41 

faire aux engagements forrnels contenus dans la 
declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour 
supprimcr ce mouvemcnt : il a tolere l'activite 
criminelle des differences societes et affiliations 
dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene 
de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'atten- 
tats, la participation d'officiers et dc fonction- 
naires dans des agissements subversil's, une pro- 
pagande malsaine dans l'enseignement, tolere 
enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient 
induire la population serbe a la hainc de la 
Monarchie et au mepris dc ses institutions. 

Gettc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement 
royal de Sorbie n'avait pas cesse au moment ou 
les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont de- 
iaontre au monde entier les consequences fu- 
nestcs. 

II resulte des dejwsitions et aveux des auteurs 
de l'attentat du 28 juin que lc meurtre de Sera- 
jevo a etc trarne a Belgrade, que les armes et les 
explosifs dont les mcurtriers se trouvaient etre 
munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et 
fonctionnaires serbes faisant partic de la « Na- 
rodna Odbrana » el enfin que le passage en Bos- 
nie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete orga- 
nise el effectuepar des chefs du service-frontiere 
serbe. 

Les resultats mentionnes de l'instruction ne 
permettent pas au Gouvernement imperial et 
royal de poursuivre plus longtemps lattitude 
dc longanimite expectative qu'il avait obser- 
vee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements 
de Belgrade propages de la sur les territoires 
de la Monarchie. Ces resultats lui imposent au 
contraire le devoir de mettre fin a des menees qui 



42 PAGES d'histoire 

forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tran- 
quillite de la Monarchic 

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouveme- 
ment imperial et royal se voit oblige de denian- 
der au. Gouvernement serbe d'enoncer officielle- 
ment qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee 
contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est- 
a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en 
dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des ter- 
ritoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a 
supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propa- 
gande criminelle et terrorisle. 

Aiin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet 
engagement, le Gouvernement royal de Serbie 
fera publier a la premiere page du Journal Of fi- 
de I en date du i3/a6 juillet l'enonciaiion sui- 
vante : 

c< Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne 
la propagande dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongric, 
e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent 
en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic ans- 
tro-hongroisc des territoires qui en font partie, 
et il deplore sincerement les consequences fu- 
ncsles de ces agissements criminels. 

« Le Gouvernement royal regrettc que ses of- 
ficiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe' a 
la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par 
la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le 
Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellcment en- 
gage par ses declaralions du 3i mars 1909. 

« Le Gouvernement royal, qui desappi'ouve et 
repudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans 
les deslinees des habitants de quelque partie de 
rAniriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son 
devoir d'avertir i'ormellement les officiers, les 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 43 

fonctionnaires et toute la population duroyaume 
que dorenavant il procedera avecla dcrnierc ri- 
gueur contre les personues qui se rendraient 
coupables de pareils agisscraents, qu'il mcttra 
tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » 

Cette enoneiation sera porte'e en meme temps 
a la connaissance de l'armee royale par un ordre 
du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi etserapubli£e dans 
le Bulletin Offlciel de VArthee. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage, en 
outre : 

i° A interdirc toute publication qui excite a la 
haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la 
tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrity 
territoriale; 

2° A dissoudre immediatement la Societe dite 
« Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses 
moyens de propagande et a proceder de la ratoie 
maniere contre les autres societes et afliliations 
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre 
la Monarchic austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement 
royal prcadra les mesures necessaires pour que 
les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer 
leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une 
autre forme; 

3° A eliminer sans delai de l'enseignement pu- 
blic en Serbie, tant du corps enseignant que des 
moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pour- 
rait servir a fomenter la propagande contre TAu- 
triche-Hongrie; 

/J° A eloigner du service militaire et del'adini- 
nistration en general tous les officiers et fonction- 
naires coupables de propagande contre la Mo- 
narchic austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- 
ment imperial et royal se reserve decommuni- 



44 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

quer les noms et les actes au Gouvernement 
royal ; 

5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des 
organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dans 
la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige 
eontre 1'integrite territoriale de le Monarchic ; 

G° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire eontre les 
partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur 
le territoire serbe; des organes delegues par le 
Gouvernement irnjierial ct royal prendront part 
aux reeherches; 

7 A procederd'urgencea l'arrestation du com- 
mandant Yoia Tankositch et du nomme Milan 
Ciganovitek, employe del'Etat serbe, compromis 
par les resultats de l'instruction de Serajevo; 

8° A empecher par des mesures ef'icaces le 
concours des autorites serbes dans le trade illi- 
cite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; 
a licencier et punir severement les fonction- 
naires du service frontiere de Chabatz et de Loz- 
nitza coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du 
crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage 
de la frontiere ; 

9 A donner au Gouvernement imperial et 
royal des explications sur les jjropos injustifia- 
bles de bauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Ser- 
bie qu'a l'etranger qui, rnalgre leur position 
oflicielle, n'ont pas hesite, apres l'attenlat du 
28 juin, a s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une 
maniere bostile envers la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise; 

io° Avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement 
imperial et royal de l'exccution des mesures pre- 
ce"dentes. 

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 45 

reponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard 
jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 5 heures du 
soir. 

Le memoire relatif aux resultats de l'instruc- 
tion ouverte a Serajevo, eii ce qui concerne les 
fonctionnaires mentionn.es sous les n os j et 8, est 
joint a cette note. 



L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribu- 
nal de Serajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et 
consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity 
y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin der- 
nier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations sui- 
vantes : 

i° Le complot, ayant pour but d'assassiner, 
lors de son sejour a Serajevo, 1'archiduc Fran- 
cois-Ferdinand, fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo 
Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, le nomme Milan 
Ciganovitch et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours 
du commandant Voi'a Tankositch ; 

2 Les six bombes etlesquatre pistolets brow- 
nings, au moyen desquels les malfaiteurs ont com- 
mis l'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip, 
Cabrinovitch et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ci- 
ganovitch et le commandant Vo'ia Tankositch ; 

3° Les bombes sont des grenades a main prove- 
nant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe a Kragu- 
jevats; 

4" Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciga- 
novitch enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovitch et 
Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et 
donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a 
Topchidere, des lecons de tir avec pistolets brow- 
nings a Princip et a Gi'abez ; 



•iO PAGES D HISTOIRE 

5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovitch 
et Grabez dc passer la frontiere de Bosnie-Herze- 
govine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur 
contrebande d'armes, un systeme de transport 
secret fut organise par Ciganovitch. 

D'apres cette organisation, l'introduction en 
Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs 
armes fut operee par les eapitaines-frontieres de 
Chabatz (Rado Popovitch) et eelui de Loznitza, 
ainsi que par le douanier Radivoj Grbiteh de 
Loznitza avec le concours de divers particuliers. 



K 8 33 

31. le D' L. Patchou, president du Conseil et ini- 
nistre des Affaires ctrang'eres par interim, a 
toutes les Legations royales. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. 

A propos de l'attentat de Serajevo, le ministre 
d'Autriehe-Hongrie m'a remis aujourd'hui a six 
heures de Papres-midi une note contcnant les 
reclamations du Gouvernement auslro-bongrois 
et a demande une reponse du Gouvernement 
serbo dans un delai de deux jours, e'est-a-dire 
avant samedi a 6 heures de l'apres-midi. II m'a 
informe" verbalemcnt qu'il qujilerait Belgrade 
avec son personnel au cas oil il n'aurait pas recu 
une reponse satisi'aisante dans le delai fixe. 

Le Gouvernement serbe n'a encore pris aucune 
decision, tons les uiinislres n'etant pas presents 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 47 

a Belgrade; mais, des niaintenant, je puis dire 
que ces reclamations sont telles qu'aucun Gou- 
vernement serbe ne pourrait les accepter en 
entier. 



N°34 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires etrang'eres, a M. N. Spalaikovitch, 
ministre a Peirograd. 

(Telegramme.) "Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1914. 

J'ai inforrae le charge d'affaires russe que je 
remettrai la reponse a l'ultimatum austro-hon- 
grois demain saniedi avant 6 beures de l'apres- 
midi. Je lui ai dit que le Gouvernement serbe 
demaudera aux Etats amis de protege r l'indepen- 
dance de la Serbie. Au cas ou la guerre serait 
inevitable, ajoutai-je, la Serbie la fera. 



N» 36 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires etrang'eres. a M. M. Bochkovitch, 
ministre a Londres. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 11/84 juillet 1914. 

J'ai informe aujourd'bui le charge d'alTaires 
anglais que les reclamations de l'Autriche'Hon- 



48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

grie etaient telles que Ie Gouverncinent d'aucun 
pays independant ne pourrait les accepter en 
entier. Je lui ai e.xprime l'espoir que le Gouver- 
nement anglais pourrait agir aupres du Gouver- 
nement austro-hongrois pour que ce dernier 
altenue ses reclamations. Je ne lui ai pas cache 
que j'etais inquiet, a cause des evenements qui 
pourraient survenir. 



N» 33 



M. le D' N. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrograd, 
a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres . 

(Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. 

En sortant du cabinctde M. Sazonow, a qui j'ai 
fait connaitrc le texlcde l'ultimatum austro-hon- 
grois, j'ai rencontre 1'ambassadcur d'Allernagne. 
II avait Fair d'etre de tres bonne humeur. Dans 
la conversation que j'ai engagee avec le conite 
de Pourtales au sujet de la demarche austro-hon- 
groise, je l'ai prie de m'indiquer la maniere dont 
on j>ourrait sortir de la situation cree'e par l'ulti- 
matum austro-hongrois. L'ambassadeur m'a re- 
pond u que cela ne dependrait que de la Serbie, 
puisqu'il s'agit d'une question qui doit etre reglee 
entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie seules et dont per- 
sonne autre ne pourrait semeler. J'ai rcpondu au 
conite de Pourtales qu'il se trompait et qu'il se 
convaincrait bientot qu'il s'agissaitnon pas d'une 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQTJES 49 

question entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, mais d'une 
question europeenne. 



N°37 



S. A. It. le prince heritier Alexandre 
a S. M. VEmpereur de Riissie. 

(Teldgramme.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1911. 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis 
hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note eon- 
cernant l'attentat de Serajevo. Gonsciente de ses 
devoirs internationaux, la Serbie, des les pre- 
miers jours qui suivirent l'horrible crime, a 
declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait prete 
a ouvrir une enquete sur son territoire si la com- 
plicity de certains de ses sujets etait prouvee au 
cours du proces instruitpar les autorites austro- 
bongi'oises. 

Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la 
note austro-hongroise sont inutilcmcnt humi- 
liantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa 
dignite d'Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- 
mande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration 
du Gouvernement dans VOfficiel et un ordre du 
Souveraina l'armeeou nous reprimerions l'esprit 
hostile contre l'Autriche, en nous faisant a nous- 
mfimes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle 
envers nos mene'es pei'fides. On nous impose en- 
suite l'admission de fonctionnaires austro-hon- 
grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a 

4 



50 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

l'instruction et pour surveiller l'cxecution des 
autres conditions indiquees dans la note. Nous 
avons recu un delai de quarante-huit heures 
pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la legation 
d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. 

Nous sommes prets a accepter les conditions 
austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la 
situation d'un Etat inde'pendant, ainsi que celles 
dont l'acceptation nous sera conseille'e par Votre 
Majeste; toutes lcs personnes dont la participa- 
tion a l'attentat sera demonti-ee seront severe- 
ment punies par nous. Certaines, parnii ces de- 
mandes, ne pourraicnt etre executees sans dcs 
cbangements de notre legislation, ce qui exige 
du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. 
Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration du 
delai par l'armee austro-hongroise qui se con- 
centre sur notre frontiere. II nous est imjiossible 
de nous defend re et nous supplions Votre Ma- 
jeste de nous donner son aide le plus tot pos- 
sible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Ma- 
jeste, qui s'est manifestee tant de ibis a notre 
egard, nous fait esperer icrmement que, cctte ibis 
encore, notre appel sera entendu par son gene- 
reux coaur slave. 

Eu ces moments difficiles, j'interprete les sen- 
timents du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Ma- 
jeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du 
Royaume de Sei'bie. 

Alexandre. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 51 



N» 38 

M. N. Packitch, president da Conseil el ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. 

J'ai communique aujourd'hui aux represen- 
tants des Jitats amis les grands traits de la re- 
ponse du Gouvernemcnt royal. Je leur ai dit que 
la reponse sera tout a fait conciliante et que le 
Gouvernement serbe acceptera toutes les recla- 
mations austro bongroises dans la mesure ou il 
sera possible de le faire. Le Gouvernement serbe 
espere que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, 
sauf dans le cas ou il desirerait a tout prix la 
guerre, ne pourra qu'accepter la satisfaction com- 
plete que lui donne la reponse serbe. 



N» 39 



Reponse du Gouvernement royal serbe a la 
note de V Autriche-Hongrie. 

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a recu la com- 
munication du Gouvernement imperial et royal 
du io/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa re- 
ponse eloignera tout malentendu qui menace de 



52 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE 

compromettre les bons rapports de voisinagc 
entre la Monarchic austro-kongroise et le 
Royauine de Serbie. 

Le Gouvernenicnt royal a conscience que les 
protestations qui ont apparu tant a la tribune de 
la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les declara- 
tions et les actes des representants responsables 
de l'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la 
declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 
18/ 3i mars 1909, ne se sontplus renouvelees vis- 
a-vis de la grande Monarchic voisine en aucune 
occasion ct que, depuis ce temps, aulant de la 
part des GouverMemcnts royaux qui se son! -:c- 
ee'de que de la part de ieurs organes, aucune ten- 
tative n'a etc faite dans le but de changer l'etat 
de choses politique ct juridique cree en Bosnic- 
Herzegovine. 

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce 
rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a 
fait aucune representation, sauf eu ce qui con- 
cerne un livre scolaire, au sujet de laqueiie repre- 
sentation le Gouvernement imperial et royal a 
recu une explication entierement satisfaisante. 

La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne 
des preuves de sa politique pacifique et mederee 
pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et e'est 
grace a la Serbie ct aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits 
dans l'interet exclusif de lapaix euroj)eenne, que 
cette paix a etc preservee, 

Le Gouvernement royal nepeut pas etre rendu 
responsable des manifestations d'un caractere 
prive tellcs que les articles des journaux et les 
agissements des societes, manifestations qui se 
produi9ent dans presque tous les pays comme 
une chose ordinaire et qui echappent en regie 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 53 

generate au controlc officiel — d'autant moias 
que le Gouvernement royal, lors dc la solution 
do toute une seric do questions qui so sent pre- 
sentees entrc la Serbie et l'Autriehe-Hongrie, a 
montre une grande prevenance ct a reussi, de 
celte facon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au 
profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 

G'est pourquoi le Gouvernement royal a ete 
peniblemcnt surpris par lcs affirmations d'apres 
lesquelles des sujets du Royaume de Serbie au- 
raient participe a la preparation dc l'attentat 
commis a Serajevo. II s'attendait a etre inviie a 
collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui so rap- 
porte a ce crime ct il etait pret, pour prouver 
par des acles son entiere correction, a agir contre 
toutes les personnes a 1'e'gard desquelles des 
communications lui'seraient faites. 

Se reudaut done au desir du Gouvernement 
imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est dis- 
pose a remeltre aux tribunaux sans e'gard a sa 
situation et a son rang, tout sujet serbc. pour la 
complicity duquel, dans le crime de Serajevo, 
des prcuves lui seraient fourmes. 

II s'engage specialement a fairc publicr a !a 
premiere page du Journal Officiel en date du 
i3/aG juillet I'enonciation suivante : 

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne 
toute propagande qui serait dirigce contre l'Au- 
triche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'cnsemble des ten- 
dances qui aspircnt en dernier lieu a detacher 
de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires 
qui en font partio et il deplore siuccrement les 
consequences fuaestes dc ces agissements crimi- 
nels. 

« Le Gouvernement royal regrelle que cer- 



54 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

tains ofticiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient par- 
ticipe, d'apres la communication du Gouverne^ 
ment imperial et royal, a la propagande sus- 
mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de 
bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvcrnement royal 
s'etait solennellement engage par la declaration 
du 1 8/3 1 mars 1909. 

« Le Gouvcrnement, qui desapprouve et repu- 
die toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans 
les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de 
l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu'il 
est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les offl- 
ciers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du 
Royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la 
derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se 
rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, 
qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a pre'venir et a re- 
primer. » 

Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance 
de l'armee royale jjar un ordre du jour, au nom 
de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince 
heritier Alexandre, et sera publiee dans le pro- 
chain Bulletin officiel de VArmee. 

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage, en outre : 

i° A introduire dans la premiere convocation 
reguliere de la Skoupchtina une disj^osition dans 
la loi sur la presse par laquelle sera punie de la 
maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine 
et au mepris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, 
ainsi que contre toute publication dont la ten- 
dance generale sera dirigee contre l'integrite 
territoriale de l'Aiitriche-Hongrie. 

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitu- 
tion, qui est pi-ochaine, de faire introduire dans 
l'article 22 de la Constitution, un amendement 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 55 

de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus 
puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement, 
aux termes categoriques de l'article 22 de la 
Constitution, est impossible ; 

2 Le Gouverncmcnt ne possedc aucune 
preuve ct la note du Gouvcrnement imperial et 
royal ne lui en l'ournit non plus aucune, que la 
soci"ite « Narodna Odbrana » ct les autres societes 
similaircs aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque 
acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de 
leurs membres. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement 
royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement 
imperial et royal et dissoudra la societe « Na- 
rodna Odbrana » et toute autre societe qui agirait 
contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ; 

3" Le Gouvernement royal scrbe s'engage a 
elimir.er sans delai de 1'instruction publique en 
Serine tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fo- 
mcuter la propagande contre l'Autricbe-Hon- 
grie, quand le Gouvernement imperial et royal 
lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette 
propagande ; 

4° Le Gouvernement royal acccpte, du moins, 
d'eloigner du service militaire ceux dont l'en- 
quete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont cou- 
pables d'actes diriges contre l'integrite du terri- 
toire de la Monarcbie austrodiongroise ; il attend 
que le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui com- 
munique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de 
ces ofliciers et fonctiounaires aux fins de la pro- 
cedure qui doit s'ensuivre ; 

5° Le Gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il 
ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la 
portee de la demande du Gouvernement impe- 
rial et royal tendant a ce que la Serbie s'engage 



56 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des 
organes du Gouverneraent imperial et royal. 

Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collabora- 
tion qui repondrait aux principcs du droit inter^ 
national et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi 
qu'aux bons rapports de voisinagc ; 

6° Le Gouvernement royal, cela va de syi, 
considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une cnquete 
centre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement, 
auraient ete meles au complot du 16/28 jufft et 
qui se ti-ouveraient surle territoire du Royaime. 
Quant a la participation a cette enquete des 
agents des autorites austro-bongroises qu se- 
raient delegues a cet effel par le Gouvernement 
imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal ne 
peut pas l'accepter, car cc serait line violation 
de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure 
criminelle. Gependant, dans des cas coijcrets, 
des communications sur les resultats de Ins- 
truction en question pourraient etre donnees aux 
organes austro-bongrois ; 

j" Le Gouvernement royal a fait f)roceder des 
le soir me me de la remise de la note a l'srresta- 
tion du commandant Voia Tankositch. Quant a 
Milan Ciganovitcb, qui est sujet de la Monarcbie 
austro-bongroise et qui, jusqu'au 15/28 juin, 
etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction 
des cbemins de i'er, il n'a pas pu encore etre 
joint. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est 
prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, 
faire connaltre le plus tot possible les presomp- 
tions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves even- 
tuelles de culpabilite qui ont et^ rccueillies jus- 
qu'a ce jour par l'enquete de Serajevo, aux tins 
d'enquetes ulterieures; 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 57 

8° Le Gouvcrnement serbe renfoi'cera et eten- 
dra les raesures prises pour empecker le trafic 
illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron- 
tiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite 
une enquete et punira severcment les fonetion- 
naires des frontieres sur la ligne Ckabatz-Loz- 
nitza qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse 
passer les auteurs du crime de Serajevo ; 

9° Le Gouvernement royal donnera voloniiers 
des explications sur les propos que ses fonclion- 
naires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont tenu 
apres l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, 
d'apres l'affirmation du Gouvernement imperial 
et royal, ont ete hostiles a la Monarchic, des 
que le Gouvernement imperial et, royal lui aura 
communique les passages en question de ces 
propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les pro- 
pos employes ont en eiTet ete tenus par lesdits 
fonctionnaires, propos au sujet desquels le Gou- 
vernement royal lui-meme aura soin de re- 
cueillir des prcuves et convictions ; 

io° Le Gouvernement royal informera le Gou- 
vernement imperial et royal de l'execution des 
mesures comprises dans les points precedents en 
tant que cela n'a pas etc deja fait par la pre- 
cedente note. A issitdt que cbaque mesure aura 
ete ordonnee et executee, dans le cas oil le Gou- 
vernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satis- 
fait de ce.tte reponse, le Gouvernement royal 
sorbe, considerant qu'il est de l'interet commuu 
de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette ques- 
tion, est pret, comme toujours, a accepter une 
entente pacifique, en remettant cette question 
soit a la decision du tribunal international de La 
Haye, soit aux grandes puissances qui out pris 



58 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

part a I'elaboration de la declaration que 1c 
Gouvernement serbe a f'aite le i8/3i mars 1909. 



N" 40 



M. le baron Gies! de Gicslingen, ministre d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. N. Pachiteh, 
president da Conscil et ministre des Affaires 
ctrangcres. 

Belgrade;, le 12/15 juillet 1914, 6 heures 
de l'apres-midi. 

Monsieur le President, 

Etant donne que le delai fixe par la note que 
j'ai remise sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement a 
Son Excellence M. Patchou avant-hier, jeuili, a 
six lieures de l'aprc -midi, a expire, et que je n'ai 
pas recu une repon *e satisl'aisante, j'ai l'honneur 
d'informer Yotre Excellence que je quitte Bel- 
grade ce soir avec le personnel de la legatioD 
imperiale et royalc. 

La protection de la legation imperiale et 
royale avec tout ce qui s'y rattache, avec ses 
annexes et ses archives, ainsi que la protection 
des sujets et interets autrichiens et hongrois en 
Serbic sont confiees a la legation im2>erialc d'Al- 
lemagne. 

Le.-; chanceliers Ferdinand Jovanovitch et Mi- 
lan Mekoviteh, qui resteront a Belgrade, sont 
rattaclies a la legation imperiale d'Allemagne. 

Enfin, je constate que, des le moment oil 
Yotre Excellence aura recu cette lcttre, la rup- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 59 

ture des relations diplomatiques entre la Serine 
et l'Autriche-Hongrie revetira le caractere d un 
fait accompli. 



Veuillez, etc. 



N°41 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations 
royales. 

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. 

C'est aujourd'hui a 5 h. et 3/4 cle l'apres-midi 
que j'ai remis la reponse a la note austro-hon- 
groise. Vous en recevrez ce soir le texte integral. 
Vous y verrez que nous soinmes alles jusqu'aux 
limites extremes oil nous pouvions aller. Lors- 
qu'il a recu la note, le ministre d'Autriche- 
Hongrie a declare qu'il devait la comparer avec 
les instructions et qu'il donnerait immediate- 
ment sa reponse. Des mon retour au ministere, 
le ministre d'Autriclie-Hongrie ma informe par 
lettre qu'il n'etait pas satisfait de notre reponse 
et qu'il quittera Belgrade ce soir meme avec 
tout le personnel de' la legation. II remet au 
ministre d'Allemagne la protection de la legation 
avec tout le mobilier et les archives, ainsi que la 
protection des sujets et des interets austro-hon- 
orois en Serbie. Enfin, il declare que, par le fait 
de la remise de sa lettre, les relations diploma- 
tiques entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie sont 
completement rompues. 

Le Gouvernement royal a convoque la Skoup- 
chtina pour le 14/27 juillet a Nich, oil partent 



60 PACES D'HISTOIRE 

des ce soir tous les ministeres avec leur person 
ncl. Au nom du Roi, le Prince beritier a signe" 
l'ordre de mobilisation de l'armee ; demain ou 
apres-demain, paraitra une proclamation par la- 
quelle les citoyens qui ne sor.l pas militaircs 
seront invites a rester tranquillement chez eux, 
et les militaircs a rejoindre leurs drapeaux et a 
defendre la Serbie selon leurs forces, au cas ou 
elle serait attaque>. 



N° 4J 



M. le comte Leopold Berchlold, minish'e des 
Affaires etranghres d'Autrichc-Hongrie, a 
M. Joe. M. Jovanovitch, ministre de Serbie a 
Viennc, 

Vienne, Is 12/^r. juillct 1014. 

Etant donne que la note que l'envoye extraor- 
dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire imperial et 
royal a remise au Gouvcrnement royal le io/u3 
de ce mois, est restee sans reponse favorable, 
j'ai ete contraint d'envoycr l'ordre au baron 
Giesl de quitter la capitalc serbe ct de rcmcttre 
la protection des sujeis de Sa Majeste Imperiale 
et Royalc apostolique au ministre d'Allemagne. 

Ayant le regret de voir par la se terminer les 
rapports (jue j'ai eu l'honneur d'entretenir avec 
vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je n'ai pu manquer 
ile mettre a votre disposition les passeports 
ci-joinls pour votre retour en Serbie et pour le 
retour du personnel de la legation royale. 

Veuillez, etc. 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 6i 



N° 43 

Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereur de Rnssie a 
Son Allesse Royale le Prince heritier de Ser- 
bie, Alexandre. 

(Tiilegi-amme.) Peti-ograd, le 14/27 juillet 191 1. 

Votre Altesse Royale, en s'adressant a Moi 
dans ua moment particulierement difficile, ne 
s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui 
m'animent a Son egard et sur Ma sympatliio 
cordiale pour le peuple serbe. 

Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree sur la 
situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'ap- 
plique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes 
difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse 
et le Gouvernement royal ne veuillent faciliter 
cette tiche en ne ncgligeant rien. pour arriver a 
une solution qui permette de prevenir les lior- 
reui's d'une nouvelle guerre, tout en sauvegar- 
dant la dignile de la Serbie. 

Taut qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une 
effusion de sang, tous mes efforts doivent tendre 
vers ce but. Si, malgre notre plus sincere desir, 
Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre 
assuree qu'en aucun cas, la Russie ne se desinte% 
ressera du sort de la Serbie. 

Nicolas. 



62 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 



N° 44 



Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier de Serbie 
Alexandre a Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereur 

de Russie. 

(T616gramme.) Nich, le 17/30 juillet 1914. 

Profondement touclie par le telegrammc que 
Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresser hier, je 
m'empresse de La remercicr de tout Mon cceur. 
Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadee que la 
cordiale sympathie dont Votre Majeste est ani- 
mee envcrs Mon pays nous est particulicrement 
precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que 
l'avtnir de la Serbie est assure, etant devenu 
l'objet de la haute sollieitude de Votre Majeste. 

Ces moments peniblcs ne peuvent que rafler- 
mir les liens d'attachement profond qui unissent 
la Serbie a la sai'nte Russie slave et les senti 
ments de reconnaissance eteruelle pour l'aide et 
la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves 
preeieusement dans l'ame de tous les Serbes. 

Alexandre. 



N° 45 

M. le comte Leopold Berchtold, ministre des 
Affaires etrangeres d'Aatriche-Hongrie, a 
M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres de Serbie. 

(Telegramme.) Vienne, le 15/28 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement royal serbe n'ayant pas 
idonne une reponse favorable a la note que le 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 63 

ministre d'Autriehe-Hongrie lui a remise le 
■23/10 juillet 1914. le Gouvernement imperial ct 
royal se voit oblige de pourvoir lui-meme a la 
protection de ses droits et interets ct de recou- 
l'ir, dans ce but, a la force des armes. L'Au- 
triche-Hongrie se considere done, des ce mo- 
ment, en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. 



N» 46 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires e'trangcres, a toutes les Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.) Nich, le 15/28 juillet 1914. 

Le Gouvernement de l'Autriche - Hongrie a 
declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un 
telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement 
serbe. 



N» 47 



M. le D r Spala'ikovitch, ministre a Petrograd., 
a M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre russe des Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Petrograd, le 15/28 juillet 1914. 

Excellence, 
J'ai l'honneur de porter a votre connaissance 
que je viens de recevoir de M. N. Pachitcb, pre- 
sident du Conseil, ce telegramme urgent envoye 



64 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

dc Nich aujourd'hui a 2 h. 10 dans l'apr&s-niidi. 
« Lc Gouvcrncraent dc l'Autrichc-Hongric a 
declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un 
telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement 
serbe. 9 « Pachitcii. » 

En portant a votre connaissance l'acto qu'uno 
grande Puissance a eu le triste courage de com- 
mettre vis-a-vis d'un petit pays slave qui vient 
a peine de sortir d'une longue serie de luttes 
aussi heroi'ques qu'epuisantes, je prends la liberie, 
en une circonstance si grave pour mon pays, d'ex- 
primer l'cspoir que cct acte, qui brise la paix de 
l'Europe et revolte sa conscience, sera rdprouve 
par tout lc monde civilise et severement puni 
par la Russie, protectrice de la Serbie. 

Jo pric "Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter 
devant le trone de Sa Majeste cette priere de tout 
le peuple serbe et de vouloir bien agreer l'assu- 
rance dc mon devoueinent et de mon respect. 

Veuillez, etc. 



N° 48 



M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre des Affaires etran- 
geres russc, a M. le D T Spalaikovitch, ministre 
de Serbie a Petrograrf. 

Petrograd, le 17/30 juillet 1911. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 
J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 
15/28 juillet, n° 527, par laquelle vous avez bien 
voulu me communiquer le telegramme de Son 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 65 

Excellence M. N. Pachitcli au sujct de la decla- 
ration do guerre de l'Autriche- Hongrie a la 
Serbie. En regrettant sineerement ce triste ev6- 
nemeiit, je m einpresse de vous informer, Mon- 
sieur le Mini.vtre, que je ne manquerai pas de 
soumettre a Sa Majeste l'Empereur la demande 
du peuple serbe, dont vous etes l'interprete. 
Veuillez, etc. 



N* 49 



M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil el ntinistre 
des AJJ aires elrangeres, a M. le D' Jovanovitch, 
charge d'affaires a Berlin. 

(Telegram me.) Nich, le 22 juillet/4 aoul 1914. 

Je vous prie d'informer le Gouvernement impe- 
rial que vous avez recu l'ordre de quitter l'Alle- 
magne avec le personnel de la legation et du 
consulat. Je vous prie de partir saus retard. 



N« 50 



, Le Minisl'ere des Affaires elrangeres serbe 
a la Legation d'Allemagne a Nich. 

Nich, le 24 juillet/6 aoiit 1914. 

Le Ministere royal des Affaires etrangercs a 
l'honneur d'informer la Legation imperiale d'Al- 

5 



66 PAGES d'histoire 

lemagne que, vu l'etat de guerre existant entre 
la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, alliee de l'Alle- 
magne, ainsi que l'etat de guerre existant entre 
la Russie et l'Allemagne, alliee de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie, le Gouvernement royal serbe, se soli- 
darisant avec la Russie et ses allies, considere 
com me terminee la mission en Serbie de Son 
Excellence le baron Griesinger, envoye extraor- 
dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire dAllemagne. 
II prie Son Excellence de quitter, avec le person- 
nel de la legation, le tcrritoire dc la Serbie et 
lui remet ci-joint les passeports necessaires. 



M. le D' Jocanocitch, charge d'affaires a Berlin, 
A M. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 24 juillet/6 aout 1914. 

Lors de la visite que j'ai faite au sous-secre- 
taire d Etat, M. Zimmermann, pour lui notifier la 
rupture des rapports diplomatiques, il m'a, entre 
autres choses, declare que l'Allemagne avait tou- 
jours ete animee de sentiments amicaux envers 
la Serbie et qu'elle regrettait que les relations 
entre la Serbie et l'Allemagne, a cause des com- 
binaisons politiques, dussent etre rompues. II 
tient la Russie, qui a sans cesse excite la Serbie, 
pour seule responsable des eveneraents qui sont 
survenus et qui auront de lourdes consequences 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 67 

pour tous les peuples. Si la Russie n'avait pas, 
au dernier moment, alors qu'il paraissait deja 
possible d eviter un conflit arrue, mobilise toute 
sa Cone militaire, on n'en serait pas arrive a la 
guerre, car l'Allemagne avait use de toute son 
influence sur l'Autriche-Hongrie pour qu'elle 
s'enlendit avec la Russie. Peut-etre l'Autriche- 
Hongrie se serait-elle contentee d'occuper Bel- 
grade, et alors des negociations se seraient enga- 
gers dans le but de regler les raj>ports austro- 
serbes. 



N" 52 



M. Jo(>. M; Joi>anovitch, ministre a Vienne, a 
M. N. Pac flitch, president du Conseil et mi- 
nistre des Affaires etrangeres. 

Nicli, le 3/16 aout 1914. 

Monsieur le President, 

Depuis le i7/3o juin, la legation de Serbie a 
Yienne a ete assiegee par la police et la gendar- 
merie, et son personnel soumis sans cesse a la sur- 
veillance des fonctionnaires de la Surete. Nos 
mouvcments et nos communications avec le 
monde exterieur furent rendus, comme vous 
pouvez le penser, considerablement plus diffi- 
cilcs; lattitude de la rue avait quelque chose de 
menacant envers la legation et son personnel. 

Des le commencement du moisdejuillet, me'me 
les communications telegraphiques avec vous de- 
vinrent plus dilnciles et les evenements se sont 



68 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE 

develojipes si vite que je n'ai pas pu vous com- 
muniquer certains details relatifsa ce qui a pre- 
cede notre conflit arme avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. 
C'est pourquoi je le f'ais maintenant. 

Jusqu'a la fin du mois de juin, il parut que 
toute 1'aH'aire de Serajevo se developpait normale- 
ment. Mais au commencement du mois de juillet 
un revirement s'opera. II n'y avait pas de signes 
patents de ce revirement : c'etaient plutdt des in- 
dices et des symptomes imprecis qui trahissaient 
certaines intentions dissimulees. Tout d'abord, les 
journaux de Vienne et de Budapest, sur les ins- 
tructions du Bureau de la presse du ministere 
des Ail'aires etrangeres, suspendirent la publica- 
tion des informations sur 1c cours de Instruc- 
tion au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo. Cette 
meme presse commenca a representer toute l'af- 
faire comme une question qui devait etre reglee 
entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, eventuelle- 
ment par la force des armes 

D'ailleurs, les grands journaux de Vienne rece- 
vaient des communications pareilles provenant 
de l'ambassade d'Allemagne; exception doit etre 
faite pour le semi-otficiel Fremdenb/att qui etait, 
en general, plus modere, comme aussi pour la 
Zeii et YArbeiler Zeitung. 

A cette nouvelle attitude de la presse, vint 
s'ajouter un etat d'insecurite de la Bourse tel 
qu'on n'en avait pas connu de pared durant tout le 
cours des derniers evenements dans les Balkans. 
Dans les conversations privees des hauts cercles 
financiers, on denoncait le « compte a regler avec 
la Serbie », comme la seule issue de la crise gene- 
rale, financiere et economique, oil l'Autriche- 
Hongrie etait entree depuis l'annexion de la Bos- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE9 69 

nie-Herzegovine. Puis, par uoe circulaire secrete, 
on ordonna le retra'it graduei de la monnaie d'or 
et en meme temps la hausse graduelle de son 
cours. On ne tarissait pas u'explications sur ['in- 
terruption du conge du ministre de la Guerre 
Krobatin et du chef d'eiat-niajor Hcetzendorf, sur 
leur retour et leur sejour a Vienne. Le chei 
d'etat-major general etait tantot dans le Sud, 
tantot dans l'Est, tantot dans le Nord de la Mo- 
narchic, oil il se rencontrait avec le chef d'etat- 
major allcmand, comte de Moltke, en Boheme, a 
Karlsbad, je crois. 

Tous les reservistes, qui avaient ete convoques 
pour les. manoeuvres de juin en Bosnie-Heivego- 
vine, furent maintenus sous les drapeaux. Les 
soldats des cadres en Autriche et en Hongrie 
obtenaient -en nombre beaucoup plus conside- 
rable que d'ordinaire de courtes permissions 
dans le but de terminer les travaux des champs 
et autres, el les reservistes charges des services 
administrates dans I'armec etaient convoques de 
plus en plus. Ajoutcz les interpellations au Par- 
lement hongrois et les reponses ambigues du 
president du Conseil, le comte Tisza, un homme 
d'Etat qui, jusque-la, avait ete tres clair dans ses 
declarations politiques. 

L'attitude du Ballplatz fut la plus earacteris- 
tique. Les receptions hebdomadaires cliez le 
comte Berclitold furent suspendues. Tout d'un 
coup, les conversations au sujet de l'evenement 
de Serajevo avec les representants des Ktats etran- 
gers cesserent, ou, lorsqu'on en parlait, c'etait 
toujours com me par ordre et pour dissiper la 
crainte ou le doute que l'Autriche-Hongrie pre- 
parat une action serieuse contre la Serbie. On y 



70 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

avouait que certaines demarches seraient faites 
a Belgrade des que les resultats de l'instruction 
ouverte au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo en 
auraient suffisamment prouve les attaches avec 
Belgrade. Mais, eu meme temps, on disait que 
ces demarches ne seraient pas telles qu on dut 
s'en inquieter beaucoup. L'ambassadeur de Rus- 
sie qui, en l'absence du eomte Berchtold, avait 
plusieurs ibis cause a ce sujet avec le comte For- 
gaeh, n'a jamais pu saisir les veritables inten- 
tions de l'Autriche-Hongrie. M. Schebeko m'a dit 
que le comte Szapary, ambassadeur d'Autriche- 
Hougrie a Petrograd, qui, pour des raisons de 
familie, se trouvait en Autriche-Hongrie, lui 
avait dit que les demarches qui seraient faites a 
Belgrade auraient le caractere conciliant. Le 
"comtCj d'apres les dires de M. Schebeko a 
M. Sazonow, a donne 1'assurance que la note que 
1' Autriche-Hongrie avait l'intention d'adresser a 
la Serbie serait telle que les Russes n'en seraient 
pas meeontents. M. Dumaine, ambassadeur de 
France, qui, sur 1'ordre de son Gouvernement, 
avait attire l'attention du Gouvernement de 
Vienne sur les complications qui pourraient sur- 
gir au cas oil les reclamations eventuelles qu'on 
avait l'intcntion d'adresser a la Serbie ne seraient 
pas modcrees, recut du baron Macchio, premier 
chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran- 
geres, la reponse que le Gt^vernement austro- 
hougrois appreciait les demarches amicales et 
conciliantes de la France et que les conditions de 
la note a la Serbie seraient de nature a etr 
acceptees par celle-ci sans grande hesitation. Je 
fis remarquer aux ambassadeurs des puissances 
de la Triple-Entente que de telles assurances pou- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 71 

vaient cacher les vraies intentions du Gouverne- 
raeut austro-hongrois afin de mettre les puis- 
sances devant certains iaits accomplis que l'Eu- 
rope serai t obligee d'accepter pour eviter une 
guerre generate. 

Cependant, les precedes du Ballplatz eurent 
un certain succes, car tous mes collegues, que 
j'eus l'occasion de voir ces jours-la, croyaient a 
peine que 1'Autriche-Hongrie voulut entrcprendre 
une action serieuse qui put provoque-r des com- 
plications europeennes. Plusieurs membres du 
corps diplomatique e'taient si confiants que, ces 
jours-la, ils faisaient des preparatifs pour leur 
depart en long conge ou dans les villes d'eaux. 

Malgre tout, on savait qu'on preparait au mi- 
nistere une note qui contiendrait les griefs et les 
reclamations de rAutriche-Hongrie contre la 
Serbie. Ce travail fut confie au eomte Forgach, 
ancien ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie. 
On croyait generalement que, parmi les repr6- 
sentants etrangers, seul l'ambassadeur d'Alle- 
magne, M. Tschirsky, avait ete tenu au courant 
de ce travail, et j'ai eu des raisons de croire qu'il 
a memo collabore a la redaction de la note. Aussi 
les represeutants des Etats qui nous etaient favo- 
rables etaient-ils d'accord avec moi pour penser 
que, redigee par ces deux auteurs, la note con- 
tiendrait des conditions tres dures pour la Ser- 
bie, mais non pas telles qu'elle ne put les accep- 
ter. Lorsque le texte de la note fut public, ils en 
furent tous surpris, pour ne pas dire constern^s. 

Autant on a fait mystere avec soin du contenu 
de la note, autant on a cache la date oil elle ser.ait 
presentee. Le jour de la remise de rultimatum a 
Belgrade, rambassadeur de France eut, a ce 



72 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

sujet, une longue conversation avec le premier- 
chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran- 
geres, le comte Berektold s'etant trouve de nou- 
veau a Ischl. Or, le baron Macchio n'avait pas 
dit a M. Dumaine que ce jour-la, dans I'apres- 
midi, la note serait remise a Belgrade et que le 
lendemain elle serait publiee par les journaux. 

Lorsque le 11/24 juillet, au matin, les journaux 
viennois publierent le contenu de la note quele 
baron Giesl avait remise au Gouvernement serbe, 
ane inquietude s'empara de nos amis et des amis 
de la paix europeenne. C'est alors seulement 
qu'on comprit que de grands evenements euro- 
peens pourraient survenir, bien qu'on ne criit 
pas que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois eut 
i'intention de les provoquer. Ce sentiment fut 
fortifie par les violents articles de tous les jour- 
naux de Vienne, excepte le Zeit et YArbeiter 
Zeitung, ainsi que par les demonstrations de la 
rue qui prouvaient d'une facon evidente que la 
guerre bien entendu une guerre eontre la Ser- 
bie, — serait la solution la plus desirable. 

Apres deux, trois conversations que j'ai eues 
ce jour-la, je me suis rendu compte qu'un conflit 
arme entre la Serbie et la Monarchic etait inevi- 
table, nifime au cas oil la Serbie accepterait tou- 
tes les conditions austro-hongroises, de la pre- 
miere a la derniere. L'attitude de la rue erivers 
notre legation etait deja telle que je m'attendais 
meine a des voies de fait eontre le personnel de 
la legation. 

L'ambassadeur de France aussi bien que celui 
d'Anglcterre, et le charge d'affaires de Russie 
considercrcnt que la demarche du Gouverne- 
ment austro-hongrois etait, non pas une simple 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 73 

note, mais un ultimatum. lis furent indignes de 
la forme aussi bien que du fond et du delai 
fixe par la note, et ils la jugerent, eux aussi, 
inacceptable. Dans les conversations que j'ai 
eues avec eux au sujet de cette note, je leur 
expliquai qu'en particulier les passages relatifs 
a l'ordre du jour du Roi a l'armee, a la destitu- 
tion des fonctionnaires et officiers, et surtout a 
la participation des fonctionnaires austro-hon- 
grois a la « repression du mouvement existant 
en Serbie contre l'integrite de la Monarchic », ne 
pourraient absolument pas 6tre acceptes, etant 
contraires a la dignite et a la souverainete natio- 
nales. Ce n'est qu'une guerre victorieuse, dis-je, 
qui pourrait amener l'acceptation de conditions 
aussi humiliantes pour un pays independant. A 
leur question : s'il ne valait pas mieux les accep- 
ter pour le moment et eviter la guerre, j'ai 
repondu que la note austro-hongroise, qui en fait 
e'tait une declaration de guerre a la Serbie, etait 
redigee de i'acon que, m£me au cas ou la Serbie 
l'aurait acceptee sansaucune reserve, l'Autriche- 
Hongrie y aurait trouve a tout instant des motifs 
pour faire entrer ses troupes en Serbie. C'est 
dans la conviction que le conflit resterait limits 
a nous deux qu'elle avait redige une telle 
note. 

M. Dumaine, Sir Maurice de Bunsen et le prince 
Koudachelf, charge d'all'aires russe, furent sur- 
pris de cette note inattendue, autant qu inquiets 
des complications qu'elle menacait d'amener. 
Avant la remise de la note austro-hongroise, 
M. Schebeko, ambassadeur de Russie, avait dit 
k plusieurs reprises a ses collegues que la Russie 
ne pourrait pas rester indifl'erente a une demarche 



74 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

de l'Autriche-Hongrie qui tendrait a humilier la 
Serbie. Cette opinion, il l'avait ouverternent ex- 
primee au Ballplatz. D'oii, I'inquietude chez les 
ambassadeurs qui envisageaient la possibility 
d'une guerre entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hon- 
grie. 

Le lendemain du jour oil la note fut remise a 
Belgrade, le prince Koudachefl" alia en parler au 
comte Berchtold. A sa de'claration que la note, 
telle quelle, etait inacceptable et que la Russie ne 
pouvait pas regarder avec indifference une humi- 
liation de la Serbie, le comte Berchtold repondit 
que l'Autriche-Hongrie s'etait trouvee forcee de 
faire une telle d-marche en Serbie, son existence 
meme etant mise en question, que l'Autriche- 
Hongrie ne pourrait pas renoncer a ses demarches 
ni changer les conditions de la note, et qu'elle esti- 
mait que ce dillerend ne regardait que la Serbie 
et l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire qu'aucune autre 
puissance n'avait de raisons de s'en meler. 

Cette reponse du comte Berchtold ne laissait 
pas de doutes sur 1'intention de l'Autriche-Hon- 
grie d'infliger une correction a main arraee a Ja 
Serbie, sans jugemenl de l'Europe l'y autorisant. 
Des conversations que j'ai eues alors avec les 
ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-En- 
tente, — qui, durant ces jours penibles, lurent a 
tous egards accueillants et bienveillants envers 
moi et envers le personnel de la legation, — il 
ressortait clairement que, du moment ou elle 
s'etait decidee a adresser cette note qui signifiait 
sans aucun doute la guerre, l'Autriche-Hongrie 
avait re<?u des assurances et meme acquis la con- 
viction que le conflit serbo-austro-hongrois serait 
localise. De m6me, il 6tait clair que l'Autriche- 



LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 75 

Hongrie avait ete confirmee dans cette convic- 
tion particuliercment et peut-etre uniquement 
par M. Tschirsky, ambassadeur d'AUemagne a 
Vienne. M Tschirsky etait seul a penser et a dire 
ouvertement que la Russie se tiendrait tranquille 
pendant que l'Autriche-Hongrie infligerait la pu- 
nition (Straf expedition) a la Serbie. II assurait 
que le ministre des Allaires etrangeres de Rus- 
sie viendrait facilement a bout des panslavistes, 
comrae' l'annee prece^dente, et que la Russie 
n'avait aujourd'hui aucun interet a soulever tant 
de questions epineuses qui la touchent de plus 
pres en Europe et en Asie. Selon lui, il etait 
necessaire qu'une lecon fut donnee a la Serbie. 
La Russie n'avait aucun droit d'intervenir. Quant 
a l'Allemagne, il declarait qu'elle avait pleine 
conscience de ce qu'elle faisait, enappuyantl'Au- 
triche-Hongrie dans sa demarche. 

Ce langage de M. Tschirsky a fait penser a 
beaucoupde personnes que c'est l'Allemagne qui 
a voulu provoquer la guerre europeenne, car, 
bien auparavant, on a dit et meme ecrit a Vienne 
qu'il fallait faire la guerre a la Russie avant 
qu'elle fut prete au point de vue militaire, 
c'est-a-dire avant le printemps de 1917 : « Plus 
on remet l'all'aire, moindres seront les chances 
des puissances de la Triple-Alliance. » (depen- 
dant, de Berlin, de sources diplomatiqnes, les 
plus authentiques nouvelles me parvenaient que 
la Wilhelmstrasse n'approuvait pas Taction de 
l'Autriche-Hongrie dans cette question et que 
M. Tschirsky avait outrepasse ses instructions. 

A son retour de Petrograd, M. Schcbeko, am- 
bassadeur de llussie, multiplia ses ellbrtsaupres 
du Ballplatz, afin d'obtenir prolongation du ceurt 



76 PAGES D'HISTOIRB 

delai fixe" au Gouvernement serbe pour sa re- 
ponse h\a. note austro-hongroise, et de trouver le 
moyen d'arriver a uq echange d'idees sur l'en- 
semble du diilerend entre Vienne et Petro- 
grad; ruais ces efforts resterent sans succos jus- 
qu'au i3/a6 juillet, jour de notre entrevue. Par 
la conversation que j'eus alors avec lui, je com- 
prisqu'a Petrograd la note austro-lion^roise 6tait 
consideree, dans le fond et dans la forme, comme 
une provocation adressee a la Russie, non pas a 
la Serbie, et que la Russie ne soulfrirait pas 
l'humiliation de la Serbie, dut-elle s'exposer a 
une guerre. 

Le jour de mon depart de Vienne, M. Sche"- 
beko me dit que, en depit de toutes les grandes 
dil'ficulles, il y avait des chances pour qu'on 
trouvat a Petrograd, entre le- Gouvernement 
russe et le comte Szapary, une solution quel- 
;onque qui empScherait l'ouverture du conflit. 
D'autre part, des que Ton apprit a Vienne que 
le conflil austro-serbe pouvait provoquei* une 
guerre entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, ou 
commenca a s'en inquieter. 



ANNEXE 



Declarations 
de M. Giolitti a la Chambre italienne [i) 

5 decembre 1914. 

« ... Comme je tiens pour necessaire que la 
loyaute' de 1 Italie dans l'observation des pactes 
interuationaux soit au-dessus de toute discus- 
sion, je me sens oblige de rappeler un precedent 
qui demonlre que l'interpretation donnee par 
notre Gouvernement a nos traites, au debut du 
conflit, etait exacte et qu'elleaele admise comme 
vraie par les Puissances alliees elles-memes. 

« Au cours dela guerre balkanique, precis6- 
ment le 9 aodt 1913, etant absent de Rome, j'ai 
recu de mon collegue, l'hon. Di San Giuliano, le 
telegramme suivant : 

« L'Autricbe nous a communique, ainsi qu'a 
« l'Ailemagne, son intention d'agir contre la 



(1)11 semble qu'ilyait egalement eu une demarche syme- 
trique de l'Auliiche aupres de la Roumanie fn mai 1913. 
M. Take lon-s"0 a rormellement declare qu'il en avail trace 
dans un t< leyramme adresse par le comte Berchtci!d au 
prince de h'ui sienherg et communique par lui au chef du 
Uouvernenient roumaiu. Les dementis officieux auxquels 
cette revelat on adunne lieu de la part de l'Autriche ne nous 
permetteQl pa^ de lui douner place daus ce recueil sous 
forme d'un texte olficiel. 



~8 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 

« Serbie et elle definit cette action une action 
« defensive, esperant appliquer a la Triple-Al- 
« liance le casus foederis, que je crois inappli- 
« cable. Je eherchea concerter avec lAllemagne 
« des ell'oi'ts en vue d'empecber cette action 
« autrichienne; mais il pourrait etre necessaire 
« de dire clairement que nous ne considerons 
« pas cette action eventuelle comme defensive et 
« que, par consequent, nous ne croyons pas que 
« le casus foederis existe. Je te prie de me tele- 
« grapliier a Rome si tu approuves. » 

« — J ai repondu ainsi : 

« Si l'Aulriche agit contre la Serbie, il est 
« evident que le casus Joederis n'existe pas. 
« C'est une action qu'elle entreprend pour son 
« propre compte; car il n'est pas question de de- 
« fense, puisque personnene songe a 1'attaquer. 
« II est necessaire que cela soit declare a l'Au- 
« triche dc la facon la plus formelle et il est a 
« souhaiter que Taction de 1'Allemagne dissuade 
« 1'Autiiclie de cette perilleuse aventure. » 

< C'est ce qui i'ut fait; et l'interpretation don- 
« nee par nous eut le consentement de nos allies 
« avec lesquels nos rapports d'amitie ne furent 
« pas le moins du monde troubles. La de'clara- 
« tion de neutralite faite au debut du present 
« conflit est done conforme a l'esprit et a la 
« lettre des traites. J'ai voulu rappcler ce fait 
« parce que je juge utile qu il apparaisse aux 
« yeux de toute l'Europe que l'ltalie a ete com- 
« pletement loyale. » 



NAKCY-PARI3. — 1TWPRIMEIUE BERSER-IEVBAUI.T 



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